

Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue

Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue

Edited by

Alessandro Stavru
Christopher Moore



BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover Illustration: SOCRATES – Herm of Socrates, 470–399 B.C.E. National Museum of Archaeology, Naples, Italy. Album / Art Resource, NY.

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at <http://catalog.loc.gov>
LC record available at <http://lcn.loc.gov/2017040048>

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISBN 978-90-04-32191-5 (hardback)

ISBN 978-90-04-34122-7 (e-book)

Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense and Hotei Publishing.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

Abbreviations IX

Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue: An Overview from the First-Generation
Socratics to Neoplatonism 1

Christopher Moore and Alessandro Stavru

PART 1

Around Socrates

A Sage on the Stage: Socrates and Athenian Old Comedy 31

Jacques A. Bromberg

Aristophanes' Iconic Socrates 64

Andrea Capra

Protagorean Socrates, Socratic Protagoras: A Narrative Strategy from
Aristophanes to Plato 84

Michele Corradi

Isocrates as a Reader of Socratic Dialogues 105

David J. Murphy

The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue: Plato, Xenophon, and the Others 125

James M. Redfield

PART 2

The Immediate Socratic Circle

On the Dialectical Character of Antisthenes' Speeches *Ajax* and
Odysseus 141

Vladislav Suvák

Socratism and Eleaticism in Euclides of Megara 161

Aldo Brancacci

Aristippus on Freedom, Autonomy, and the Pleasurable Life 179*Kristian Urstad***Shock, Erotics, Plagiarism, and Fraud: Aspects of Aeschines of Sphettus' Philosophy** 202*Claudia Mársico***Phaedo of Elis: The Biography, Zopyrus, and His Intellectual Profile** 221*Danilo Di Lanzo***PART 3*****Plato*****Plato and the Socratics** 237*Luc Brisson***Philosopher Socrates? Philosophy at the Time of Socrates and the Reformed *Philosophia* of Plato** 268*Livio Rossetti***A Literary Challenge: How to Represent Socrates' *Daimonion*** 299*Stefano Jedrkiewicz***The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies** 319*Petter Sandstad***Crying for Help: Socrates as Silenus in the *Euthydemus*** 336*Michael Erler***Socrates and Natural Philosophy: The Testimony of Plato's *Phaedo*** 348*Jörn Müller****Bios Praktikos* and *Bios Theôrêtikos* in Plato's *Gorgias*** 369*Ivan Jordović***The Socratic *Dubia*** 386*Harold Tarrant***Notes on *Lovers*** 412*Sandra Peterson*

PART 4***Xenophon***

How to Defend the Defense of Socrates? From the *Apology* to *Memorabilia*

Book 1 435

Pierre Pontier

Nature, Culture and the Rule of the Good in Xenophon's Socratic Theory of Friendship: *Memorabilia* Book 2 459

Gabriel Danzig

From Generals to Gluttony: *Memorabilia* Book 3 481

David Johnson

Xenophon's Socratic Education in *Memorabilia* Book 4 500

Christopher Moore

Fundamental Parallels between Socrates' and Ischomachus' Positions in the *Oeconomicus* 521

Louis-André Dorion

***Aphroditê* and *Philophrosunê*: Xenophon's *Symposium* between Athenian and Spartan Paradigms** 544

Maria Consiglia Alvino

Xenophon's *Hiero*: Hiding Socrates to Reform Tyranny 564

Federico Zuolo

Xenophon's Philosophical Approach to Writing: Socratic Elements in the Non-Socratic Works 577

Noreen Humble

PART 5***Later Reception***

Aristotle on Socrates 601

Nicholas Smith

Aristoxenus on Socrates 623

Alessandro Stavru

Socratic Protreptic and Epicurus: Healing through Philosophy 665*Jan Erik Heßler***From Competitor to Hero: The Stoics on Socrates 682***Robert Bees***Cicero and the Socratic Dialogue: Between Frankness and Friendship (*Off.*****I, 132–137) 707***François Renaud***Socrates and Alcibiades as “Satiric Heroes”: The Socrates of Persius 727***Diego De Brasi***Plutarch’s Reception of Socrates 744***Geert Roskam***“A Man of Outstanding Perfection”: Apuleius’ Admiration for****Socrates 760***Friedemann Drews***Socrates in Maximus of Tyre 772***Michael B. Trapp***Socrates in the Ancient Biographical Tradition: From the Anonymous *PHib.*****182 to Diogenes Laertius 787***Tiziano Dorandi***An Embodiment of Intellectual Freedom? Socrates in Libanius 799***Heinz-Günther Nesselrath***Political Philosopher or Savior of Souls? Socrates in Themistius and Julian****the Emperor 816***Maria Carmen De Vita***Proclus on Socratic Ignorance, Knowledge, and Irony 836***Danielle A. Layne***Index of Passages 855****Index of Ancient Names 912****Index of Modern Names 921**

Abbreviations

- DK Diels, H. and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th ed., Berlin 1966.
- DL Dorandi, T., *Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers*, Cambridge 2013.
- LSJ Liddell, H.G. and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed., rev. H. Stuart Jones, 1925–1940.
- PCG Kassel, R. and C. Austin, *Poetae comici graeci, I–VIII*, Berlin 1983–2001.
- SSR Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- SVF von Arnim, H., *Stoicorum veterum Fragmenta*, Leipzig, 1903–1905–1924.
- TGF Nauck, A. *Tragicorum graecorum fragmenta, suppl. B. Snell*, Hildesheim 1964.

Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue: An Overview from the First-Generation Socratics to Neoplatonism

Christopher Moore
Pennsylvania State University

Alessandro Stavru
Università Bocconi Milano

1 Scope and Organization of This Collection

The last decade has featured a spawning of studies on Socrates and the Socratic literature that is unprecedented in both quantity and methodological variety. Nearly a dozen edited collections have appeared (among them three *Companions to Socrates*),¹ along with a great many editions, translations, monographs, and scholarly articles.² Basic issues of Socratic scholarship that in the second half of the twentieth century had been bracketed or even rejected as uninteresting or fruitless—such as those of the “historical Socrates,” the “Socratic question,” or the “Socratic schools”—have returned as urgent research directions in this recent upsurge in Socratic studies.

The hypotheses advanced to resolve these issues still need to be verified, and some of them remain highly problematic. It is difficult, in the first place, to establish the extent and the reliability of “Socratic literature” as such,³ and, consequently, to determine whether and to what degree such literature can yield a “Socratic personality” or a “Socratic philosophy.”

One major feature of the “Socratic question” concerns the reliability of the extant sources’ apparent claims about the man named Socrates of Alopecce. Granted, these are all and without question literary portraits of Socrates, that is, fictional representations of his personality and teaching. But it is also a fact

1 See Karasmanēs 2004; Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar 2006; Trapp 2007a and 2007b; Rossetti and Stavru 2008 and 2010; Morrison 2011a; de Luise and Stavru 2013; Bussanich and Smith 2013; Zilioli 2015; Danzig, Johnson, and Morrison (forthcoming).

2 For detailed surveys on the major trends of recent scholarship on Socrates and the Socratics see Stavru and Rossetti 2010; Stavru 2013; and Wolfsdorf (forthcoming).

3 Trapp 2007c; Dorion 2011; Wolfsdorf (forthcoming).

that these representations (i) contain a number of realistic—while perhaps not altogether historical—features that exceeds by far those we can find in other fictional genres of antiquity,⁴ and (ii) exerted, both through their fictional and their realistic features, a great influence on ancient philosophy and history.⁵ These considerations limit or even undermine whatever hopes one might have to make univocal claims about the “fictionality” or the “historical reliability” of Socratic literature.

Many attempts have been made to solve the Socratic question by identifying and then studying those sources assumed to yield the “historical” or at least a “reliable” or a “realistic” Socrates. Scholars have often restricted their inquiry, accordingly, to specific texts, or to some range of texts, by a “quadriga” of authors, namely Aristophanes, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle.⁶ Such a selection led to important scholarly work, but it often failed to account for the literary and philosophical complexity to which these texts refer, and upon which they largely depend.

In fact most scholars opted for a focus on Plato alone.⁷ This yielded a wide range of studies that while meant to deal with “Socrates” actually investigated problems particular to the Platonic corpus.⁸ But a similar treatment was applied to the other major Socratic authors. Calls to re-examine their presentations of Socrates led mostly to studies restricted to the works or the portions

4 What we argue here is not that Socratic literature should be considered historical, but that its historical elements (references to events, persons, etc.) are a clear hint to the fact that this literature *claims* to be realistic. It is a matter of fact that Socratic literature was considered historical throughout antiquity. This makes Socratic literature radically different from other fictional literature of Antiquity such as poetry or myth, where the claim to realism is much weaker if not altogether absent.

5 See Morrison 2011b, xviii.

6 The “quadriga” approach is championed by Guthrie 1971, 7, but is still observable among present-day studies. A useful account of the major interpretations of Socrates relying on a selection between these four authors, or on combinations of them, is in Trapp 2007c, xix.

7 Mostly in the wake of Gregory Vlastos’ distinction between a “Socratic” Socrates_S and a “Platonic” Socrates_M.

8 This way of dealing with Plato’s Socrates can be observed in many of the essays contained in the three recent Companions to Socrates (Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar 2006; Morrison 2011a; Bussanich and Smith 2013). Here, the common practice of labeling as “Socratic” what is actually “Platonic” often goes hand in hand with the claim that the historical Socrates is to be found in the Platonic dialogues and not in Socratic literature—i.e., within the broader context in which Plato’s dialogues were written and to which they constantly refer.

of texts these authors explicitly devoted to Socrates—and only in rare cases to explorations of their literary and authorial context. For example, Socratic scholars dealing with Aristophanes mostly limited their study to the *Clouds* and some passages of *Frogs* and *Birds*; or those dealing with Xenophon to his Socratic works; or those working on Aristotle to the passages in which the name “Socrates” occurs.⁹ Little attention has been paid to the presence of Socratic themes in other works or passages of these authors, or to the conceptual and intertextual links between the Socratic passages of these authors and other testimonies of the Socratic literature.

This collection aims to set out on a new path. It presents a comprehensive picture of Socrates and the Socratic dialogue in ancient Greek and Roman literature, from the comedies of Eupolis and Aristophanes, written during Socrates’ middle age, to the treatises of Proclus, more than eight hundred years later. Each chapter addresses an author or group of authors whose work reveals something significant either about the thinking associated with Socrates and his nearest associates, especially the authors of “Socratic dialogues,” or the power and texture of the Socratic icon as formed in these dialogues and passed down, reinterpreted, and redeployed in the thought, biography, oratory, and literature of the ensuing generations.

Special attention is paid to the Socratic literature of the first generation. Almost two thirds of the contributions directly explore texts written by authors who either knew Socrates directly (from the Comics to Xenophon) or may have relied on oral reports about him (Aristotle and Aristoxenus). Even the last third of contributions (from Epicurus to Proclus) contributes to reconstructing and understanding the dialogues of the first-generation Socratics, as it deals with the reception and interpretation both of well-known and of fragmentary Socratic literature.

That Socrates has left neither writings¹⁰ nor formal institutions comparable to the schools founded after his death (the *Clouds*’ “Thinkery” notwithstanding

9 For detailed surveys of these scholarly approaches see the literature cited in n. 2 above.

10 The issue of Socrates’ *agraphia* is far from clear. In Plato, Socrates disavows writing (*Phdr.* 274b–275c), but composes a hymn to Apollo and verse retellings of Aesop’s fables shortly before dying (*Phd.* 60d–61b). The Hellenistic scholar Dionysodorus denies that he did (DL 2.42), but Diogenes Laertius himself, *Ath.* 14.628f, and *Them. Or.* 2.27b–c seem to confirm it. According to a tradition going back to the second-generation Socratic Menedemus of Eretria (c. 345–260 BCE), Socrates wrote dialogues that after his death were passed on to Aeschines from Xanthippe (DL 2.60, also noted by *Ath.* 13.611d–e, who draws on the Epicurean philosopher Idomeneus of Lampsacus [c. 325–270 BCE]).

ing) shows the necessity of studying his thought through this second-hand, interlocutory, reflective Socratism. In other words, the way Socrates lived his life—in public, in constant conversation, in pursuit of the promising youth of his city, in a shared philosophy of mutual examination—means that to study Socrates requires studying his effect and influence on those around him and those, in turn, around them.

We may note a basic dichotomy among the first-generation literature on Socrates. On the one hand we have the *logoi Sôkratikoî*, written by companions and pupils of Socrates; on the other, works by Comics or Sophists, whose main feature is their polemic against both Socrates and his circle. This collection includes both. The extant and fragmentary texts by Socrates' associates constitute its main focus, as we will see, but not its only focus. Nor could it be, as the Comics and the Sophists provide an indispensable background for understanding how Socrates and the dialogues reporting about him were perceived "from outside." Comic literature of the fifth century gives important information for reconstructing the origins of the Socratic dialogue, especially the political and philosophical motivations prompting the Socratics to represent their master through a new literary form (chapters 1–3). Sophistic literature of the fifth and fourth century provides a lively insight into the way Socrates' teaching was perceived before and after his death, as well as into the polemics between the Socratics and attentive readers of the *logoi Sôkratikoî*, such as Polycrates and Isocrates (chapters 3–4).

Most of the chapters (5–40), while "monographic" and concentrating on a single author or corpus of texts, deal with a wide range of extant and fragmentary Socratic dialogues. This applies to the section on the major companions of Socrates (Antisthenes, Euclides, Aristippus, Aeschines, and Phaedo) as well as to those on Plato, Xenophon, and later reception. Throughout these sections we get a vivid picture not only of Socrates and his teaching but also of the intra-Socratic polemics that characterize each of these authors' work.

We can summarize and say that this collection tackles Socrates as he has been depicted in the *logoi Sôkratikoî*; in the literature that deals polemically with Socrates and these dialogues; and in the later reception that relies in turn on these dialogues and polemics. But these swathes of literature could prove too capacious taken without some principle of further selection. Our main criterion of choice was that of intertextuality: we decided to include only contributions about authors and texts that refer directly, and not merely hypothetically, to topics treated in the Socratic dialogues, or, from the other direction, about authors and texts to which the Socratic dialogues explicitly refer. This meant excluding from the collection figures who may have in fact played a pivotal role for Socrates' education and teaching, such as Archelaus,

Anaxagoras, or Euripides (cf. DL 2.18–19). Their importance for the Socratic dialogue can be only indirectly inferred, textual evidence for their influence on Socrates' thought being very poor.¹¹

2 The Chapters of This Collection

Across forty chapters, the collection brings into one place, for the first time, and by an international range of scholars, the remarkable sweep of sources, perspectives, and arguments worth considering by the present-day student of Socrates and the dialogues that rose around him, and of their philosophical legacy. We hold that understanding Socrates means, in an essential and pronounced way, understanding his significance to those who watched and talked to him, heard about him, and learned from him through the written testimony of the Socratic dialogues. The collection focuses therefore on the Socratic dialogues, their context, and their reception in later centuries. We have arranged the collection into two halves: the period and authors around Socrates, and later reception. In the first half, we address Athenian comedy, members and competitors of the Socratic circle, Plato, and Xenophon. In the second half, chapters tackle the Peripatetics, Hellenistic schools, Roman Imperial writers, Middle Platonists, Neoplatonists, and other authors important for understanding the reception of Socratic dialogues.

A *Around Socrates*

The collection begins with a section on texts dealing with the literary and rhetorical context of Socrates' lifetime. Three chapters are devoted to Old Comedy and the peculiarly intense and ramifying force that Aristophanes—our earliest comprehensive witness to Socrates—had in influencing what everyone since Plato has thought about Socrates. Everyone remembers that in Plato's *Apology* (19c), Socrates blames Aristophanes, especially his *Clouds*, for fomenting prejudice and hatred against himself. But as Jacques Bromberg ("A Sage on Stage: Socrates and Athenian Old Comedy") reminds us, an entire sub-genre of comic drama arose in the 430s–420s, lampooning Socrates and parodying intellectuals of every variety. This broader vantage allows us to reassess Aristophanes' motivations in depicting Socrates as he did. On this reassessment, the

11 Difficulties in determining the extent of the influence of single Presocratics on Socrates surface in the recent collection by Laks and Sætta-Cottone 2013, which features contributions on Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, Archelaus, and Diogenes of Apollonia.

anti-Socratism supposedly manifest in the *Clouds*' conclusion fits less a picture of a malicious playwright than a jokester who inserts every stock comic routine (including arson and shouting) into his putatively "novel" creation. Bromberg also advises us to remember our Athenian history. The *Apology*'s interpretation of the *Clouds*' public effect comes no less than a quarter-century after the play's performance, decades during which popular attitudes toward intellectuals underwent enormous change and during which the memory of the plays by Eupolis, Cratinus, and Plato Comicus that also mocked Socrates and other intellectuals faded, leaving the depiction of an air-walking and logic-chopping Socrates both menacing and in splendid isolation. Plato's selective memory of a time in his infancy ended up affecting both ancient and modern understanding of Socrates' position in democracy and artistic Athens, Bromberg argues. It has also, he adds, determined the narrative arc of the biographies of many other ancient intellectuals.

Bromberg reads Aristophanes as a representative of Old Comedy; by doing so he can picture Socrates against the background of the thinkers and innovators of the late-fifth century parodied in the yearly comic festivals. This becomes a story of Plato's being late to a democratic-dramatic feast that may have been more playful than it later seemed. Andrea Capra ("Aristophanes' Iconic Socrates") shows the other side of the story: Aristophanes' effectiveness at determining the visual aspect, and the "iconic" status, of Socrates. As we see from Plato's *Symposium*, *Apology*, *Theaetetus*, and *Phaedo*, the *Clouds*' picture of a "skywalking, sun-scrutinizing Socrates-Silenus" did not go away; it defined the look, and thereby the character, of the Socrates of ensuing *logoi Sôkratikoi*. Socrates' first entrance in the *Clouds* reflects a story about Silenus that was familiar to the Athenians. When uttering his first words, Aristophanes' Socrates likely presents himself in the guise of Silenus, as a scholion to Pindar and a passage from Aristotle's *Eudemus* seem to suggest. Capra shows that this very image of Socrates is recalled by Plato both in the *Apology* and in the famous prayer to the sun in the *Symposium*, where the Silenic features of Socrates are explicit. This brings Capra to conclude that the mask of the comic actor of the *Clouds* was Silenic in character, as Eugène Dupréel had previously suggested.

The third chapter begins with yet another aspect of the *Clouds*' picture of Socrates: the image of one of his most illustrious educator-colleagues, Protagoras. Aristophanes gives to Socrates not only the interests in natural science characteristic of men like Diagoras of Melos but also the argumentative, grammatical, and even epistemological theses properly attributed to Protagoras, whose fame helped the playwright consolidate in one man the major intellectual trends of his day. It is well known that Protagoras then appears in key roles in Plato's *Protagoras* and *Theaetetus*. Michele Corradi ("Protagorean Socrates,

Socratic Protagoras: a Narrative Strategy from Aristophanes to Plato”) argues, however, that Plato does not simply distinguish Socrates from Protagoras. Like Aristophanes, he brings them into ambiguous relations of similarity and parallel. Of course the one’s moral realism, and the other’s moral relativism, push their favored epistemic theses far apart. But Protagoras’ overriding concern for *paideia*, for the cultivation of his students’ wellbeing, is Socrates’ concern too, and Plato can demonstrate this, in part, by revealing this Protagorean side to his misunderstood hero.

Contemporary with the Socratics, equally committed to education and *philosophia*, but outside their circle, is Isocrates. Not so far outside the circle, to be sure: Isocrates respected Socrates, studied the written dialogues of his companions, presented himself in contrast to them, and thereby competed with them for students. Yet he rarely specifies exactly to whom his arguments apply. David Murphy (“Isocrates as a Reader of Socratic Dialogues”) reconstructs Isocrates’ charges against the Socratics. All major first-generation Socratics expounded ideas that display points of contact with Isocrates’ works. In *Against the Sophists* Isocrates’ criticism toward the “disputers” fits various Socratics, but most of all Antisthenes—as author of *Truth*, *Archelaus*, or *On Kingship*, and *Protrepticus*—who was the most prominent of them in the 390s. Once Plato achieved prominence after the foundation of the Academy, Isocrates turns attention to him. In *Helen* he comes close to citing the *Protagoras*; *Busiris* contains a parody of Sparta-inspired passages of the *Republic*; *Nicocles* defends the pursuit of *pleonexia* against Plato’s *Gorgias*; and in *Antidosis* Isocrates counters the accusation Plato launched at him at the end of the *Phaedrus*. Even after Plato’s death, Isocrates continues this assault: the *Panathenaicus* dismisses a kind of education Plato defends in *Crito*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Laws*; *Antidosis* rejects the criticism of forensic activity Plato had formulated in the *Theaetetus*. It is notable that Isocrates’ work does not feature references to complex dialogues such as *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, *Statesman*, or *Philebus*.

This section ends with a chapter that reflects this collection’s title. James Redfield (“The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue: Plato, Xenophon, and the Others”) defines the “Socratic” dialogue, in its strictest sense, as a genre of more or less realistic historical fiction written by those who knew Socrates in 399 and were brought together by the trauma of his execution. Redfield claims that colloquial literature had already begun in the fifth century, in comedy, whence it migrated into tragedy. In the second half of the century, Socrates developed a characteristic manner of “conversing” (διαλέγεσθαι) with individuals, for the purpose either of questioning or instruction. After Socrates’ death in 399, his companions, partly in compensation for the loss of their master, reproduced

and fixed in writing these conversations, hoping to preserve their memory. In a burst of creativity, influenced by and in competition with one another, they created the genre of the Socratic dialogue. Through it each Socratic came to embody his own authorial goals, and while Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues reached perfection in their own way, we know that their less-well-preserved peers wrote dialogues that were famous, too, for their elegance and creativity throughout Antiquity.



This leads us to the next section, which is devoted to the immediate Socratic circle (excluding Plato and Xenophon for the moment). These chapters provide a thorough overview and fresh reappraisal of the methodological, scholastic, intellectual, historical, and philosophical evidence related to these authors' lost writings. Each focuses on various issues debated in their fragmentary works, showing how Socrates' companions dealt with problems and themes derived from his conversations, life, and teaching.

The first chapter is on Antisthenes of Athens, the oldest and undoubtedly the most prominent of Socrates' pupils at his death in 399.¹² Vladislav Suvák ("On the Dialectical Character of Antisthenes' Speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus*") addresses the author's best-preserved works, a pair of apparently epideictic speeches. Suvák undermines the appearance that the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* are merely rhetorical works and that they therefore lack the dialectical character of other important Socratic writings. In fact, these paired speeches exemplify an argumentative pattern consistent both with Antisthenes' "theses" featured in his fragments and with Socratic investigation into virtue. They should count as part of the Socratic literature, Suvák argues, not relegated, as most scholars maintain, to the sophistic tradition.

Another major Socratic, probably a few years older than Plato, is Euclides of Megara. Aldo Brancacci ("Socratism and Eleaticism in Euclides of Megara") deals with the Socratic and Eleatic features that characterize the extant discussions of him—mostly reported by doxographical tradition. The one surviving fragment of Euclides, thought to derive from his *Eroticus*, dwells on his conception of a "double demon": a "positive" one that urges action in a specific way (as later in Xenophon's *daimonion*); and a "negative" one that inhibits action in a specific way (as in Plato's *daimonion*). A peculiar feature of Euclides' dou-

12 The largest study of Antisthenes to date came out while we wrote this Introduction: Prince 2014 (actually published early 2016).

ble demon is that it belongs not only to Socrates (as in Xenophon and Plato) but also to every human being. This prompts Brancacci to suggest that Socrates may have adhered to a traditional demonology, from which Xenophon and Plato would later detach themselves by introducing a more abstract notion, that of the *daimonion*. The “double demon” is a problematic notion, however, since it is at odds with the fundamental principle of Euclides’ ethics, that of the non-existence of evil. In fact, the path along which Euclides developed Socrates’ intellectual heritage was meant to ensure an ontological foundation of his ethics by introducing a conception of a good he recovered from the Eleatic tradition: the good is always one, equal, and identical to itself; and the good is not an abstract theoretical truth but an objective reality, while evil simply does not exist.

Aristippus of Cyrene, whose age might have been about the same as Euclides’, has long been thought one of Socrates’ rogue students. But this is surely unfair, as Kristian Urstad (“Aristippus on Freedom, Autonomy, and the Pleasurable Life”) argues. Far from foregoing principle and self-control, Aristippus in fact prizes autonomy and self-sufficiency. This enables him to indulge in pleasures without being enslaved by them: in Aristippus’ eudaimonistic outlook, freedom is a condition of the soul that allows its possessor to engage in all sorts of pleasures without being worsted by them in any way. Urstad points out that this enables Aristippus to convert the Socratic principle of self-control (*sôphrosunê*, *enkrateia*) with respect to the desire for pleasure into the art of moving correctly within pleasure. Thus his idea of freedom should be understood as a truly Socratic detachment from contingencies, as a pull towards self-sufficiency that is characteristic of Socrates’ eudaimonism as represented in the works of Xenophon and Plato in particular.

Another Socratic who might have been as old as Euclides and Aristippus, and who was a close friend of the latter, is Aeschines of Sphettus. Unlike Antisthenes, Euclides, or Aristippus, Aeschines did not found a school. He is, however, as Claudia Mársico (“Shock, Erotics, Plagiarism, and Fraud: Aspects of Aeschines of Sphettus’ Philosophy”) claims, essential for understanding what the Socratic circle debated. Mársico’s chapter focuses on one topic of debate: how Socrates could educate both those he loved and those he did not. Aeschines’ extant writings, and in particular his two fragmentary dialogues on *erôs*, display an innovative method of education: a “mental shock” that provokes the improvement of both their characters and their readers. In the *Alcibiades*, this mental shock takes the form of Socrates’ violent back-and-forth tugging of Alcibiades’ emotions. Similarly, in the *Aspasia*, Aspasia induces Xenophon’s wife to blush by means of a series of prodding question. In both cases, the protagonist “shocks” or disrupts the interlocutor’s assump-

tions of knowledge, leaving him or her calm and newly concerned for self-improvement. Aeschines' shock method was not confined, however, just to his writings. His biographical fragments show that he was a highly controversial personality, whose provocations enraged his many enemies. This makes him effectively a *Doppelgänger* of Alcibiades, who also drew the enmity of his fellow citizens.

One of the youngest companions of Socrates was Phaedo of Elis. Danilo Di Lanzo ("Phaedo of Elis: the Biography, *Zopyrus*, and His Intellectual Profile") traces his intellectual and biographical profile, giving special attention to his dialogues *Zopyrus* and *Simon*. In antiquity, these were famous for their "great elegance," and although we have only the scarcest fragments of them, what remains conveys illuminating glimpses of Phaedo's thought. The *Zopyrus* deals with Socrates' outward appearance. Zopyrus, a Persian physiognomist, diagnoses Socrates as wicked, stupid, and a sexual maniac (a pederast or a womanizer, depending on the testimonies). Socrates' companions break into laughter (or become enraged), but this is promptly stopped by Socrates, who admits to these faults and that he has overcome (or erased) them only thanks to reason (or philosophy). Di Lanzo shows how this story and another fragment hint at a broader background. He reconstructs the whole dialogue as about the value of exercise and training against the supposedly indomitable force of passion. A similar theme can be found in the *Simon*, where in a fragment another associate of Socrates, the cobbler Simon, declares his dedication to wisdom and reproaches Aristippus' proneness to luxury, reminding him that temperance can be achieved only through sobriety of hunger and thirst. As Di Lanzo points out, this fragment is important for visualizing the relationship between Simon and the Cynics, who saw in him the most authentic follower of Socrates. The Simon depicted by Phaedo represents therefore an intermediate position between Antisthenes' rigorist Cynicism and Aristippus' hedonistic stance.



Needless to say, the section about Plato could have been much longer. However, we deliberately decided to keep a balance with the other sections, since scholarly investigations into Plato, while hardly complete in terms of Socrates' influence on his life, are easy to find. By this we mean papers and monographs about Plato's depiction of Socrates; his travels from and life in Athens as a response to Socrates' trial and execution; his pedagogical goals and the positive or negative influence on them by Socrates' strictly conversational approach; and the dialectical, epistemic, and metaphysical positions Plato propounds or depicts and their relationship with those of his predecessors and

contemporaries. Even a bibliographic sketch of the topics we omit would overweigh this Overview; we trust the reader may appeal to the references and scholarly apparatus mentioned throughout the chapters on the Platonic dialogues.

The first chapter of this section provides a thorough study of Plato's relations with his peers. Luc Brisson ("Plato and the Socratics") combines an analysis of the intertextual relationships between Plato's and others' *logoi Sôkratikoî* with a discussion of later anecdotes telling of Plato's competition with Socrates' other pupils. Plato's explicit and implicit references to his peers (partly collected in *SSR I H*) have rarely been studied in their complexity.¹³ On the other hand, the anecdotal evidence—or, as the case may be, latter-day guess-work, score-settling, or free-wheeling attribution of unmoored *chreia*—provides a subtle if unstable picture of Socrates' associates. Brisson tackles both aspects, thus providing a robust picture of the intellectual, doctrinal, and personal relations among the first-generation Socratics. He starts with the supposed rivalry between Plato and Xenophon, and goes on to outline Plato's relations with the members of the Socratic circle. These include the politicians—Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides—and the associates who did not found schools of their own, including Chaerephon, Cherecrates, Crito, Critobulus, Apollodorus, Aeantodorus, Aristodemus, Aeschines, Phaedo (whose foundation of the Elian school Brisson doubts), Simon, Cebes, Simmias, Phaedrus, Glaucon, and Diodorus. He finishes by dealing with the purported enmities between Plato and the schools that claimed to rely on Socrates: the Cynics in the wake of Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope; the Cyrenaics with Aristippus; and the Megarians with Euclides.

One particular focus of cross-Socratic comparison is in the origins or popularization of the term *philosophos* and cognates, a word-group that Plato and Xenophon used frequently. It would be valuable to know more precisely the way *philosophos* and its cognates contributed to the self-constitution of the Socratics. Livio Rossetti ("Philosopher Socrates? Philosophy at the Time of Socrates and the reformed *philosophia* of Plato") assesses the available evidence. We have good reason to suppose that this word-group existed already in fifth-century Athens—as we see from Herodotus and Thucydides—albeit infrequently. After Socrates' death the number of occurrences increases significantly. Rossetti reviews references from the late 390s, including in Aristophanes, Alcidamas, and Lysias. Among the Socratics, evidence is scanty—and perhaps not at all reliable—in Antisthenes, Aristippus, Aeschines, and Phaedo.

13 A significant exception being Nails 2002.

Hundreds of references, by contrast, are to be found in Isocrates, Xenophon, and Plato. Rossetti argues that Plato seems to have taken over an idea of philosophy common outside the Socratic circle that meant little more than an intellectual exercise performed among two or more interlocutors, and then reintroduced it among the Socratics as a technical term. In his work, *philosophia* became a reason for living for those who practiced it (“philosophy” as an excellence), and a qualifier for those who taught it (the “philosophers”), the institutions within which it was performed (the “philosophical” schools), and the books in which it was fixed for future generations (“philosophy” books).

A difficult topic in Socratic studies is Socrates’ purported commitment to or visitation by a divine “sign.” The meaning of its intrusion into the eminently rational life of Socrates baffled even his contemporaries. The first writers of Socratic literature—among them Euclides, Plato, Xenophon, and the Academic author of the *Theages*—came to little consensus about its nature, function, or interpretation. Indeed, there is so much disagreement, Stefano Jedrkiewicz (“A Literary Challenge: How to Represent Socrates’ *Daimonion*”) argues, that these authors may not have been trying to make factual claims about Socrates’ life and references to his *daimonion* at all. In any event, its portrayal and narrative explanation seems to have become almost an intrinsic part of Socratic literature itself: Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Apuleius all came to write essays on the *daimonion*. Plato’s portrait has some remarkable features, and a remarkable purpose, when we see it against these other portraits.

As much as the *daimonion* signifies Socrates in Plato and the other Socratics, so too does the analogy from experts. This is the analogy from the fact, for example, that a ship-captain ought not to be selected by lot to the conclusion that a statesman ought not to be selected by lot. The frequency with which Plato, Xenophon, and even Aeschines put this in operation suggests that Socrates in fact used them; Aristotle seems to corroborate this evidence. But these “expert-analogies,” as Petter Sandstad (“The Logical Structure of Socrates’ Expert-Analogies”) calls them, are often taken to be fallacious; and if one of Socrates’ characteristic argument tropes is fallacious, then he becomes riskily akin to sophists and eristic arguers. Thus a defense of Socrates seems to require more careful logical analysis of this common argumentative figure. Sandstad diagnoses the familiar negative evaluations of the expert-analogy in Plato and other Socratics, and proposes a novel, plausible, and textually-supported one, where Socrates argues validly from species to genus to species. Sandstad’s conclusion is that Socrates was, for his time, a good logician who made use of a valid logical form in his arguments.

The next five chapters study a select number of Platonic dialogues. The authors address both the “Socratic” context for Plato’s writing dialogues and

the “Socratic” context revealed by the dialogues. Unique in the Socratic literature is the “autobiography” section in Plato’s *Phaedo* (95e–102a), where Socrates describes his early curiosity about, and then dissatisfaction with, materialistic causal explanation. Yet it is precisely from a curiosity about natural philosophy that both Plato and Xenophon take efforts elsewhere to distance Socrates. After all, his abuse in the *Clouds*, and his tragic downfall in his trial of 399, are both related to Athenian discomfort with the *phusiologia* typified by Anaxagoras and natural philosophy. Thus the “autobiography” section has a very uncertain status. Perhaps Plato treats what Socrates says in it as true but from so much earlier in his life as no longer to be a liability; or perhaps he treats it as false, either as narratively-valuable fiction or a presentation of his own coming of age. Jörn Müller (“Socrates and Natural Philosophy: the Testimony of Plato’s *Phaedo*”) deals extensively with the “first” and “second” sailings described in the passage, and highlights the links with generally acknowledged and distinctive features of Socratic philosophy. Müller argues that the way Socrates tells the autobiography is true, or is to be taken as true, including his investigative self-reliance, recognition of his epistemic limits, ethical intellectualism and teleological world-view (especially as seen in Xenophon), and optimistic theology. Plato’s aim is apologetic: he wants to keep Socrates apart from Anaxagoras, who had also been accused for impiety. Thus Plato counterbalances the accusation of impiety levelled at Socrates in his trial.

In his dialogues Plato takes over structures, motifs, and language from such traditional genres as tragedy, comedy, and satyr play. Michael Erler (“Crying for Help: Socrates as Silenus in the *Euthydemus*”) deals with the comic motifs of the *Euthydemus*: the unmasking of false avowals of knowledge; Socrates’ comic features; and, most importantly, Socrates’ “cry for help” as a reaction to *aporia*. In drama, the “cry for help” motif occurs to explain the entrance on stage of a person or a group to protect or rescue someone in need (the chorus, as in the *parodos* of Aristophanic comedies or in satyr plays such as Aeschylus’ *Diktyulkoi* or Sophocles’ *Ichneutai*). Plato integrates this motif in the *Euthydemus*: here Socrates calls to the eristic practitioners Euthydemus and Dionysodorus for help, hoping to get support in his investigation, but he is eventually disappointed. In fact, the motif of crying for help addressed to the eristic Sileni turns out to be a cry for help that Socrates addresses to himself. The comic flavor of the *Euthydemus* points therefore to a serious issue: that of unmasking Euthydemus’ and Dionysodorus’ claim that they are in command of a knowledge which in fact they do not have.

Plato’s *Gorgias* is also profoundly influenced by contemporary literature. Ivan Jordović (“*Bios Praktikos* and *Bios Theôrêtikos* in Plato’s *Gorgias*”) tackles the last part of this dialogue, which contrasts the notions of a “practi-

cal" life (*bios praktikos*), personified by Callicles, with the "theoretical" life (*bios theôrêtikos*), which Socrates represents. As Jordović points out, this section of the *Gorgias* has intertextual connections with the contrast in Aristophanes' *Clouds* between the Better and the Worse Arguments, as well as with Euripides' and Thucydides' juxtapositions of "quietism" and "meddlesomeness" (*apragmosunê* and *polupragmosunê*). This dichotomy can even be observed in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, in the first conversation between Socrates and Aristippus about the choice between three ways of life: of ruling, of being ruled, and of quietism. These connections reveal Plato's intimate knowledge of contemporary authors, and also that he aimed his dichotomy of *bios praktikos*–*bios theôrêtikos* at transforming philosophy into a powerful politics. Among his goals, perhaps the most important one was to delegitimize the court verdict of 399: as the jury was composed of members of the demos who led a *bios praktikos*, it was by definition incompetent to judge Socrates fairly, who by contrast led a *bios theôrêtikos*.

In the Platonic (*Ant*)*erastai*, or "(*Rival*) *Lovers*," whose authenticity has been doubted since Antiquity, Socrates examines a young man's optimistic view of *philosophia*. This conversation occurs at a grammar school, in view of two boys who, at the dialogue's opening, Socrates describes as eagerly drawing circles and imitating inclinations with their hands. He guesses they were debating about Anaxagoras or Oenipides. One of their admirers harrumphs that, at any rate, they babble about the things in the heavens and drivel on, philosophizing. It is at this point that this admirer's rival defends philosophy. He does not treat astronomical or mathematical investigation as definitional of philosophy; he suggests instead that philosophy is *polumathia*, then that it is having a measured amount of learning, then that it is appearing wise in all important skills. Even this last definition he cannot sustain. Sandra Peterson ("Notes on *Lovers*") provides a commentary for this infrequently examined dialogue, in the process rejecting the strongest arguments against Plato's authorship; situating the back-and-forth conversation in a context of dialectical games; clarifying Socrates' attitudes about philosophy; and speculating about the person of the harrumphing admirer. Whether the *Rival Lovers* is Platonic or otherwise Academic, it deploys many of the tropes of Socratic dialogue and presents Socrates in conversation about that most significant discipline, philosophy, more explicitly than anywhere else in the Socratic literature.

The last chapter of this section addresses the origins of the dialogues whose authenticity has been doubted. Often Plato's dialogues have been thought, even if unconsciously, to have been written at once; and even if not at once, then eventually once and for all. Conversely, dialogues thought only doubtfully Plato's—written perhaps by a student or colleague in the Academy, or someone

at least closely familiar with Plato's Socratic dialogues—are usually treated as independent of Plato. Harold Tarrant ("The Socratic *Dubia*") turns to statistical linguistic analysis of brief spans of the *dubia* and overturns these assumptions. The central passages of certain suspected dialogues—Socrates' radical history of Hipparchus' Athenian innovations in the *Hipparchus*, for example, or Socrates' radical history of the education of the Spartan and Persian royalty in the *Alcibiades*—look much more Platonic than the dialectical exchanges at the margins. Tarrant hypothesizes that the picturesque kernels of these dialogues were Plato's, never finished by the master but preserved and then fleshed out by members of the Academy. The consequences for our understanding of Socrates is that certain of these dialogues may reveal a picture of him developed over many years.



The counterpoint to Plato in Socratic studies has always been Xenophon. In recent years the literature on Xenophon's Socratic and non-Socratic works has grown in substance, rigor, and availability. This section of the volume therefore required an updated and thorough approach to Xenophon, with a chapter devoted to each of the *Memorabilia*'s four books and to each of his other Socratic works. Since recent scholarship on Xenophon has shown that peculiar aspects of Socrates' personality and teaching can be found in almost every one of his works, a chapter deals with a dialogue in which the character Socrates is absent, the *Hiero*, and another with the Socratic features of Xenophon's non-Socratic works in general.

Socrates' defense strategy at his trial has been debated since the time of Plato and Xenophon. According to both authors, Socrates provoked the jury in many respects. Pierre Pontier ("How to Defend the Defense of Socrates? From the *Apology* to *Memorabilia* Book 1") focuses on the apologetic strategies displayed in Xenophon's *Apology* and in the "defense pamphlet" (the *Schutzschrift*) included at the beginning of *Memorabilia*. As Pontier shows, Xenophon characterizes Socrates' defense speech as eulogetic: instead of defending himself, he legitimates his deeds, attributing them to the appearance of a divine entity, the *daimonion*, at all decisive moments of his life. Taking Socrates' "boastfulness" (*megalêgoria*) as a simple provocation would be wrong, however, according to Pontier, since Socrates' choice to die was prompted by a variety of circumstances, not least of which was the *daimonion* itself. The political background of this choice is outlined in *Memorabilia* 1, where Socrates is contrasted with the oligarchs Critias and Antiphon. The latter had a fate similar to Socrates', also condemned to death in a political trial after having defended himself in

a memorable fashion. Xenophon was aware of the symmetrical trajectories of the defenses of Socrates and Antiphon: he deliberately brought them together, thus demonstrating that they should not be confused, since Antiphon's "best" defense would eventually be outclassed by Socrates' "most free and most just" defense.

Apology also characterizes Book 2 of the *Memorabilia*. Here Xenophon responds to the non-formal charges against Socrates, especially that he encouraged his companions to disparage useless family members and to engage in shameful activities. Gabriel Danzig ("Nature, Culture and the Rule of the Good in Xenophon's Socratic Theory of Friendship: *Memorabilia* Book 2") argues that Socrates' emphasis on utility in social relations led him to act in ways that, while they could be seen as problematic, in fact had a positive effect, promoting mutually beneficial alliances among friends and family members. In particular, Socrates persuaded his virtuous companions to form a network of friends that would enable them to profit personally and also to dominate the city in a virtuous oligarchy. Thus, Xenophon's Socrates rejected cultural norms in favor of a natural conception of human association that emphasizes mutual cooperation and benefit. In contradiction to the widely held opinion that Xenophon whitewashed the image of Socrates, this portrait shows how offensive the opinions and behavior he promoted were to his neighbors. Xenophon uses the necessity of a defense to offer his own broad vision of Socrates, which means that in *Memorabilia* 2 he offers many more lessons than the narrowly apologetic ones.

In *Memorabilia* 3, Xenophon presents us with disparate material: seven chapters on leadership, two rather puzzling philosophical chapters, and a pot-pourri of conversations in which Socrates helps artists, advises a hetaera, and dishes out advice on physical fitness and gourmet dining. David M. Johnson ("From Generals to Gluttony: *Memorabilia* Book 3") shows that all these issues are in keeping with the most general goal of the *Memorabilia*, to show how Socrates helped all who spoke with him. Such a variety of topics and interlocutors demonstrates Socrates' all-around usefulness in a way a more unified piece of writing could not. In fact, *Memorabilia* 3 shows its greatest kinship with wisdom literature, especially in its use of brief exchanges in the form of *chreia*. With pithy bits of advice offered by a wise man aimed at broad utility rather than depth, ancient readers accustomed to this genre would have found this section of the *Memorabilia* less problematic than we moderns do—especially if we approach the book looking for the sort of organic, dramatic whole we find in Plato's Socratic dialogues, or in Xenophon's own *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus*. Xenophon's way of presenting Socrates is to show him approached by an interlocutor with a specific problem or question: he responds to the issue at hand, giving his interlocutors the advice they can use.

In Book 4 of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon sets out the system of education that accounts for Socrates' usefulness in his companions' search for happiness. One chapter shows how Socrates persuaded different kinds of youth to take up that education; another deals with one of these propaedeutic methods in detail; chapters 3 through 7 treat of the five stages of the education; and the final chapter of the book (and of the whole *Memorabilia*) explains Socrates' behavior at trial. The fact that this final chapter summarizes the previous seven chapters of the book, but not the three earlier books, suggests that Xenophon composed *Memorabilia* 4 for independent publication, or at least with a unified vision. Christopher Moore ("Xenophon's Socratic Education in *Memorabilia* Book 4") argues for this hypothesis, and claims that Xenophon's main concern here was to illustrate the precise way Socrates proved useful to his fellow citizens. Socrates taught a graduated curriculum, starting with *sôphrosunê* (which Moore shows to be distinct from *enkrateia*), then justice, *enkrateia* ("self-control"), conversation, and only in the last stage *autakeia* ("self-sufficiency"). Only in this last stage do we come upon the usual subjects of education, some of which Socrates could himself teach; for some of which he recommended an expert; and yet others of which (geometry, astronomy, cosmology, arithmetic, health, and forecasting) he thought his friends could learn for themselves.

A peculiar trait of Xenophon's Socrates is the breadth of his knowledge and variety of skills. His competence at estate managing on display in the *Oeconomicus* has caused particular puzzlement to scholars. They have generally assumed that the main character of the dialogue, Ischomachus, serves as Xenophon's alter ego, thereby supplanting Socrates. An important exception to this view was that of Leo Strauss, who saw in Ischomachus the representative of a way of life both opposed to Socrates' way of life and disavowed by him. Louis-André Dorion ("Fundamental Parallels Between Socrates' and Ischomachus' Positions in the *Oeconomicus*") distances himself from both threads of interpretation, and identifies sixty-two points of convergence between Socrates and Ischomachus. Dorion claims that these parallels point to a more or less complete agreement between Socrates and Ischomachus on a wide range of issues. Xenophon himself identifies with both of these characters, making it possible to speak of an Ischomachus-Xenophon with Socratic features. The *Oeconomicus* should therefore be understood as an attempt to valorize the kind of life led by this joint character, one that reflects both Xenophon's own experience in estate managing and the Socratic teaching.

A completely different Socrates occurs in Xenophon's *Symposium*, a dialogue that has connections to both the *spoudaiogeloion* genre of sympotic literature and the political sympotic elegy. Maria Consiglia Alvino ("*Aphroditê*

and *Philophrosunê*: Xenophon's *Symposium* between Athenian and Spartan Paradigms") highlights the political and educational aspects of Xenophon's *Symposium*, and dwells on the pedagogical value of music and dance. Alvino attends especially to the discussion of Socrates' *kalokagathia* and *sôphrosunê*, two notions that convey Xenophon's own philosophical and ethical ideas. This political aspect of the *Symposium* is confirmed by the sources Xenophon makes use of. He draws ideological inspiration from Critias' sympotic elegy, the *Spartan Constitution*. Another source Xenophon seems to refer to is Plato's *Laws*, and especially the section devoted to the sympotic laws. (Xenophon could have known this work in the form of public lectures, which would be a reason for dating the composition of the *Symposium* to the 360s.) As a result, Xenophon's *Symposium* mixes Spartan and Athenian ethical paradigms and the literary mimesis of sympotic genres, thus revitalizing a pedagogical institution that had been banned from Athens. The main purpose of the *Symposium* seems therefore to be political, not literary. Xenophon aims at reorganizing Athenian democracy through educational reform. Socrates' philosophical teaching aims at a general improvement and emancipation of the civic body.

A dialogue in which Socrates' name is not even mentioned is Xenophon's *Hiero*. Yet the dialogue deals with typically Socratic issues such as happiness, the good life, and political rule. As Federico Zuolo ("Xenophon's *Hiero*: Hiding Socrates to Reform Tyranny") points out, Xenophon uses the character of the poet Simonides to convey Socratic thoughts. Simonides functions as the emblematic wise man, who turns the tyrant Hiero from the commonsensical opinion that his life is preferable to all other types of life. Yet Xenophon "hides" Socrates behind Simonides, preempting the cognitive dissonance that would arise from representing Socrates in a non-Socratic situation. After all, the wise man in the *Hiero* is in intimacy with a tyrant and gives the tyrant remarkably realist—even immoralist—advice; and this is contrary to the moralistic image of Socrates represented throughout the *Memorabilia* and other dialogues. The *Hiero* offers a model for counseling tyrants meant to challenge the Platonic and Academic model.

Xenophon's experiments with a variety of literary forms (history, (auto)biography, technical treatise, Socratic dialogue) has led to a tendency to isolate his Socratic works (*Memorabilia*, *Apology*, *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus*) from the rest of his oeuvre, and to deal with these corpora as if they were written by two separate people. Recent scholarship has shown, however, the value of treating Xenophon's corpus as a whole, particularly when examining important concepts in Xenophon's thought, such as grace, disorder, and freedom.¹⁴ Noreen

14 See Hobden and Tuplin 2012.

Humble (“Xenophon’s Philosophical Approach to Writing: Socratic Elements in the Non-Socratic Works”) examines Xenophon’s non-Socratic works from six different angles. The first three concern methodology: the rhetoric of philosophical inquiry, the use of dialectic, and the adaptation of the medium to the intended audience. The remaining three treat pedagogical themes and principles at the core of the writings of both Plato and Xenophon: leadership and education, self-examination, and the usefulness of philosophy. The principles and methodology are general in nature, and therefore not confined to Xenophon’s depictions of Socrates. Humble shows how Xenophon in his non-Socratic works tried to put into practice lessons he learned from Socrates. In many of his characters one can observe the same spirit of wonder and inquiry that pervades his Socratic works, the same concern with political life and leadership, and the same concern with leading a good life. The ensuing picture of a “Socratic” Xenophon is much closer to that recognized by Renaissance humanists than to that sketched out by more recent scholars.

B *Later Reception*

The chapters of the second part of the book, devoted to the later receptions of the Socratic dialogue, take up a range of significant authors who did not themselves write Socratic dialogues but were instead readers, beneficiaries, critics, or chroniclers of them, from Aristotle and Aristoxenus to Epicurus, the Stoics, Cicero, Persius, Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre, Diogenes Laertius, Libanius, Themistius, Julian, and Proclus. This sequence of studies does not have the pretense of completeness,¹⁵ but it aims to address the varied uses to which certain authors put their readings of Socratic dialogues, and the evidence, interpretative framework, and overall evaluation each relied on. The study of these authors is particularly important, as most of them very likely relied on first-generation Socratic literature since lost to time. In fact, it is partly thanks to them that we now have some of the precious few “fragments” of the lost Socratic dialogues.

In what Plutarch calls one of Aristotle’s “Platonic” writings, perhaps the lost dialogue called *On Philosophy*, Aristotle writes that the Delphic inscription “Know Yourself” set the tune for Socrates’ perplexity and search into it. He thereby puts self-knowledge at the beating heart of the Socratic project, and presumably puts Socrates squarely into the lineage of philosophers. But two

15 Important receptions of Socratic dialogues that this collection features only indirectly include those found in Demetrius of Phalerum, Valerius Maximus, Seneca, Phaedrus, Dio Chrysostomus, Aulus Gellius, Lucian of Samosata, the Socratic Letters, Aelian, Athenaeus, and the early Christian writers until Augustine.

important questions remain concerning Aristotle's remarks about Socrates. One is about the extent of Aristotle's appreciation for or distancing himself from the Socratic project. Another is about the sources of Aristotle's knowledge about Socrates. It is to the latter question that Nicholas Smith ("Aristotle on Socrates") gives a definitive answer. In his analysis of all Aristotelian references to Socrates, Smith shows that Aristotle relies on sources beyond Plato and Xenophon. Equally interesting, textual evidence suggests that Aristotle draws on a specific passage of Plato's *Protagoras* (352c1–2) when recounting the Socratic denial of *akrasia* in *Nicomachean Ethics* (1145b21–27). Smith shows that Aristotle's account of Socrates is based on a "developmentalist" reading of Plato, since he attributes the Socratic speeches from the "early dialogues" to the historical Socrates but those from the "later dialogues" to Plato.

Traditional scholarship has often found Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* an untrustworthy testimony to the life of Socrates, given its apparent inconsistencies with Plato and Xenophon. Recent reassessments, however, note that Aristoxenus' account provides a balanced picture of Socrates, which is not at odds with earlier Socratic literature. Alessandro Stavru ("Aristoxenus on Socrates") follows this more positive hypothesis. He reviews all fragments available in the extant editions of Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates*, and provides new texts not included in these collections. Stavru shows that Aristoxenus' characterization of Socrates as an irascible, sex-driven man who eradicates his licentiousness through education is widely confirmed: not only by Aristotle and other Peripatetics, but implicitly also by Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Phaedo, and other Socratics. Both the account based on Aristoxenus' father Spintharus, who knew Socrates personally, and the report about Socrates' youthful association with Archelaus, the historical reliability of which has been shown by recent studies, give us good reasons to claim that Aristoxenus had solid grounds for depicting Socrates the way he did.



We often think of Epicurus as forcefully independent of Socrates. But in some ways his pedagogical mode seems indebted to Socrates. Jan Heßler ("Socratic Protreptic and Epicurus: Healing through Philosophy") argues that Epicurus uses the elements of Socratic protreptic known from the dialogues of Plato. Arguing this requires drawing out the features of protreptic writing found in the classical period, especially in the *Euthydemus* (though also the pseudo-Platonic *Clitophon*, the "Euthydemus" passage of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (4.2), and Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Aspasia*), and best articulated, as it turns out, by Philo of Larissa and Clement of Alexandria. These authors allow us to see

that Epicurus employs the Socratic *logos protreptikos*, which was to exhort and promise a cure from passions. Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* features many aspects of this healing protreptic, but with a significant difference: while the protreptic of the Socratics is mostly aporetic, aimed only at liberating the interlocutor from his false beliefs, Epicurus provides concrete instructions for specific situations by giving advice in the form of fixed doctrines.

It is commonly held that Zeno of Citium founded the Stoa in the wake of Socrates, and that the early Stoics took themselves to be Socratics. Robert Bees ("From Competitor to Hero: the Stoics on Socrates") challenges this view, claiming that, to the contrary, the early Stoics conceived their philosophy as an explicit alternative to Socrates and the Socratics, whom they considered as their competitors. Only in the so-called Middle and Imperial Stoa did the criticisms of Socrates fade away and Socrates became an *exemplum*. Bees dwells extensively on texts that seem to draw a succession line from Socrates to Antisthenes and Cynicism up to Crates and Zeno, and shows how this line was very likely a forgery invented by later Stoics hoping to be called "Socratics" (as in Diogenes Laertius), if it is not an altogether modern reconstruction (since it does not feature in Philodemus' *De Stoicis*). Other characteristics of early Stoicism seem to confirm that Zeno's doctrine can be seen only as an alternative to the Socratic approach. For example, there are no grounds for claiming that Zeno connected the Stoic sage, who has secure knowledge and knows everything, to Socrates. Nor is there evidence that the central tenet of Stoicism, *oikeiôsis*, goes back to Socrates. Bees argues that *oikeiôsis* is an act in which nature induces man to behave according to the objects he deems "his own" (his own nature, descendants, and fellow human beings), while Socrates' care of the self is a concern for the "true self" of the individual man, the soul. The fragments relating to Zeno's immediate followers Cleanthes and Chrysippus confirm this polemical trend toward Socrates. The first Stoic to appreciate Socrates was Antipater of Tarsus, a scholarch of the Middle Stoa. His pupil Panaetius of Rhodes also dealt with the life of Socrates, and defended him against the accusation of having been rich and bigamous. Posidonius of Apamea went even further in his admiration of Socrates. He explicitly criticized Zeno's rational monism and posited an irrational part of the soul, as Plato did. In Imperial Stoicism, Socrates became a model for ethics: his way of life substantiated fundamental Stoic tenets, as the one that death is "unimportant"; for Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, Socrates was a philosophical hero, the embodiment of Stoic doctrine.

An author who was profoundly influenced by Stoicism is Cicero. Much of what he writes is of core importance for reconstructing first-generation Socratic literature, as it often draws on Socratic dialogues (e.g., of *Phaedo*) that are no longer extant. At the end of his life, Cicero sketched a theory of conversation, which he expounded in the first book of *De officiis*. Despite its relative brevity, the passage offers an account of the practical ethics of the Stoic Panaetius. As François Renaud (“Cicero and the Socratic Dialogue: Between Frankness and Friendship [Off. 1.132–137]”) points out, there are good reasons to believe that Cicero’s theory of conversation points at the Socratic dialogues, which he considered the supreme instances of philosophical conversations. This seems to follow from a comparison of *De Officiis* with Plato’s *Gorgias*, from which one decisive agreement surfaces: for both Cicero and Plato, freedom of speech is a call at once for truth and friendship. The role that reproof and correction play in Cicero’s conversation hints, directly or indirectly, at the Socratic refutation as correction and at its analogy to medical treatment. Cicero’s position on this crucial issue is, however, in tension with the kindness or civility demanded by the *humanitas* as well as with the “golden-mean” ethics, the prime issue of *De officiis*.

A Stoic representation of Socrates in early Imperial Rome is featured in Persius’ *Fourth Satire*, which is a satiric adaptation of the Platonic *Alcibiades*. The *Fourth Satire* focuses, on the one hand, on the differences between Persius’ depiction of Socrates and the “traditional” representation offered by Plato and Xenophon, and on the other hand, on the way the Socratic mode of life, as adopted and modified within Stoicism, shaped Persius’ poetics. Diego De Brasi (“Socrates and Alcibiades as ‘Satiric Heroes’: The Socrates of Persius”) argues that Persius’ depiction of Socrates is rooted in his own satirical poetics, but is also a genuine example of Socratic exhortation to philosophy. Persius, like Socrates, emphatically urges his interlocutors (that is, his readers) to live “philosophically,” that is, always to acknowledge their own shortcomings. In Persius’ *Satires*, Socrates is the greatest example of a life spent practicing and urging others to practice philosophy. But Socrates’ constant arousing and reproaching his fellow human beings is also an image of Persius’ own poetics, which consists in the uncovering and chastisement of human faults and sick morals.



The next three chapters deal with the reception of Socrates in Middle Platonism. It has been argued that Plutarch was particularly well informed about Socrates, as he had access to sources that have since been lost. Sometimes he provides relevant information for which he is the only testimony, which makes

him a useful complement to the first-generation Socratic literature and helps lay bare the ideological bias of Plato's and Xenophon's interpretations. Geert Roskam ("Plutarch's Reception of Socrates") shows how this is so. In addition to Plato and Xenophon, he mentions, as sources on Socrates, Aristotle's *On Nobility*, Aristoxenus, Hieronymus, Demetrius of Phalerum, Panaetius, the Megarian School, and Terpsion. Relying on these sources, Plutarch was familiar with the most important aspects of Socrates' life. He mentions most of the biographical details that are known to us, especially Socrates' association with Alcibiades and his divine sign. Plutarch also had a good knowledge of Socrates' philosophy, and in particular of topics such as the *elenchus*, ignorance, and maieutics, Socrates' attitude towards the sophists, and his refusal to be considered a teacher.

Another Middle Platonist who profoundly admired Socrates was Apuleius. His Socrates is the epitome of the perfect philosopher, who combines philosophical insight with religious worship. Friedemann Drews ("A Man of Outstanding Perfection': Apuleius' Admiration for Socrates") deals with the portraits of Socrates depicted by Apuleius in Books 1 and 10 of the *Metamorphoses*, as well as in *De Deo Socratis* and *Florida*. Each differs significantly from the others. In *Metamorphoses*, Socrates cannot control his bodily needs and passions, which has led scholars to claim that he is an anti-Socrates, since the historical Socrates was renowned for his physical endurance and temperance. Drews interprets this antithetical character as a *figura deformata* which in the course of the narration is restored to his true form. This happens at the end of the *Metamorphoses*, when the bizarre character of Book 1 is re-transformed into the true Socrates. So the reader is meant to recognize that the deformed Socrates is not the "real" one. His re-metamorphosis does not come as a surprise, but follows the development of the *Metamorphoses* from the world of witchcraft and deception towards one of true religion and philosophy. Apuleius' admiration of Socrates' divine wisdom is even more evident in *De Deo Socratis*, where Apollo testifies to his wisdom, and Socrates is able to communicate with his "god"—his *daemon* and guardian angel.

The Socrates of Maximus of Tyre's *Dialexeis* is more conventional than Apuleius'. Maximus' Socrates is one of the great philosophers of the past, all of whom deserve equal respect, according to Maximus, but who has the distinctive honor of supplying the jumping-off point for no fewer than eight of his surviving forty-one orations. These include *Dialexis* 3, in which the subject is Socrates' refusal to defend himself (or defend himself properly) when on trial for his life; *Dialexeis* 8–9, where the subject is the nature and function of *daimones*; *Dialexeis* 18–21, where the subject is Socratic (or Platonic) *erôs*; and *Dialexis* 12, which is devoted to the question of the morality of revenge. In each

of these eight orations, the case of Socrates is used as a particularly vivid means of communicating a general philosophical truth, about values, conduct, soul, or cosmos, rather than an object of analysis in its own right. Socrates' presence in the *Dialexeis* is not just deep but pervasive; Michael Trapp ("Socrates in Maximus of Tyre") observes that Socrates fails totally to feature in only sixteen of the forty-one orations (a number of appearances that is exceeded only by Homer). Maximus finds no difficulty in combining information from different Socratic authors and treating them as all on the same footing: details from Xenophon's *Symposium* fit comfortably into the composite picture of Socrates the lover, just as material from the *Oeconomicus* helps paint the picture of his constant efforts to find suitable advisers for himself and his friends (itself a Xenophontic rather than a Platonic emphasis). Similarly, material from Aeschines' *Alcibiades* combines with elements from the Platonic *Symposium*, *Alcibiades*, and *Protagoras* to depict relations with the most charismatic and dangerous of the pupils, just as Aeschines' *Aspasia* meets Plato's *Menexenus* in references to Aspasia as a Socratically endorsed instructress.



Remarkably, the only extant *Life* of Socrates is that found in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Diogenes places Socrates fifth in the Ionian succession of philosophers, following Anaxagoras' student Archelaus.¹⁶ This is the Archelaus who, while called a "physicist," also studied law, value, and justice, thereby introducing Socrates to "ethics," who went on to augment the topic enough to be called the "inventor" of it. The remainder of Diogenes' second book covers Socrates' immediate successors and their students. Indeed, Diogenes arranges a majority of the books with Socrates as pivot: Book 3 on Plato, Book 4 on Academics, Book 5 on Plato's student Aristotle and his followers, and Book 6 on Antisthenes and his Cynic legacy. Tiziano Dorandi ("Socrates in the Ancient Biographical Tradition: From the Anonymous *PHib*. 182 to Diogenes Laertius") studies the structure, meaning, and value of this Socratic *Life*. He specifically draws out Diogenes' reliance on sources that may not originate in Plato, Xenophon, or Aristotle; the Hellenistic traditions of biography from which Diogenes' mixed form derives; and the

16 Diogenes' account of Anaxagoras is itself important for Socratic studies, given the parallels with Socrates, for example Anaxagoras' introduction of *nous* (2.6, 8); his reluctance to concern himself with politics (2.7); his introduction of philosophy to Athens (2.7); his education of Euripides (2.10); his ethical reading of Homer (2.11); and his trial on a charge of impiety (2.12–14).

important Cynic influences on the interpretations of Socrates. Dorandi also puts Diogenes' *Life of Socrates* in relation with a little-known third-century BCE papyrus from el-Hibeh (*PHib.* 182).



Another lively portrait of Socrates is that delivered by Libanius, a supporter of a return to pagan Hellenism. His *Apologia Socratis*, from 362 CE, exceeds in length all other extant *Apologiai*, and takes a novel form, purporting to be the speech of a beneficiary of Socrates'. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath ("An Embodiment of Intellectual Freedom? Socrates in Libanius"), after showing the stereotyped use of Socrates in Libanius' letters, and dealing with the authenticity of some Socrates-featuring declamations, reads this long *Apologia* in its cultural context. The speaker ignores the charge of Socrates' impiety—perhaps to avoid giving the Christians arguments useful in defense of their introduction of new divinities—instead focusing on the charge of corrupting the youth. As it turns out, though, when Libanius defends Socrates' right to criticize the poets, he seems now to *defend* the Christians.



Socrates' legend flourished in the rhetorical tradition of Late Antiquity, particularly in Themistius and Julian the Emperor. These two intellectuals of the fourth century CE are in many ways exact opposites: Julian was an idealist and a philosopher by vocation, remembered mainly for his ambitious plan of pagan restoration despite the Empire's large-scale conversion to Christianity (whence his epithet "Apostate"); Themistius, Julian's erstwhile teacher, was a skilled politician successful as *princeps*' advisor during the reign of several Christian emperors, his open profession of paganism notwithstanding. For Julian, Socrates is the savior of souls who directs all men towards the true knowledge of themselves and the true faith in their (pagan) gods; Themistius sees Socrates instead as a symbol of the *politikos philosophos*, a man who speaks in public with people of all ranks, in a simple and direct way. Maria Carmen De Vita ("Political Philosopher or Savior of Souls? Socrates in Themistius and Julian the Emperor") shows that, despite their differences, these portraits are complementary. Both attest, in their *imitatio/aemulatio* of figures and myths of Classical Antiquity, to the rhetoric capacities of "new Hellenes," and both employ the figure of Socrates, with his typical attitudes, as an appropriate testimonial for their own ideological program. Each of them highlights different aspects of Socrates and attests to the vitality the icon of Socrates had in Late

Antiquity: Themistius focuses on the philosopher's eloquence and his active life in the *polis*; Julian draws on the invitation to care for one's soul and the necessity of having faith in the gods.

The Neoplatonists are thought to have turned their back on Socrates, given both their overriding commitment to Plato and their apparent uninterest in Socrates' avowals of ignorance. Danielle A. Layne ("Proclus on Socratic Ignorance, Knowledge, and Irony") shows that this presumption is wrong. Neoplatonists, despite being concerned mainly with Plato's Socrates, advanced complex arguments on various "Socratic" subjects, including his confessions of ignorance and their seeming contradiction with his avowals of knowledge. Proclus insists that Socrates' avowals of ignorance need not be qualified by an appeal to Socratic irony, since Socrates' "grade" of ignorance would not taint the philosopher's corresponding form of knowledge with "indeterminacy, mixture with ignorance, or uncertainty." Proclus appealed to various activities of intellection as well as grades of not-knowing or ignorance, letting Socrates avow both *a kind of* knowledge and *a kind of* ignorance without contradiction. This entails that when Proclus' Socrates speaks of his ignorance and his corresponding knowledge, he is referring primarily to different modes of intellection (opining/judgment versus understanding) and their appropriate objects (sense versus intellectual). Proclus' Socrates rightly claims both knowledge *and* ignorance insofar as his ignorance refers to sense phenomena and not to eternal reasoning principles. This ignorance is therefore justified since no one can know the sensible, and the recognition of this ignorance is a kind of wisdom itself, which evidences one's own awareness of the various kinds of intellectual activities and their respective objects.

References

- Ahbel-Rappe, S. and R. Kamtekar. *A companion to Socrates*. Malden 2006.
- Bussanich, J. and N.D. Smith. *The Bloomsbury companion to Socrates*. London 2013.
- Danzig, G., D.M. Johnson, and D.R. Morrison. *Plato and Xenophon: comparative studies*. Leiden (forthcoming).
- De Luise, F. and A. Stavru, A. *Socratica III: Studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The rise and fall of the Socratic problem', in: Morrison 2011, 1–23.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *Socrates*. Cambridge 1971.
- Hobden, F. and C. Tuplin C. *Xenophon: Ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Leiden 2012.
- Karasmanēs, V. *Socrates: 2400 years since his death (399 B.C. – 2001 A.D.)*. Athens 2004.

- Laks, A. and R. Sætta-Cottone. *Comédie et philosophie. Socrate et les 'présocratiques' dans les Nuées d'Aristophane*. Paris 2013.
- Morrison, D.R. *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011. (= 2011a)
- Morrison, D.R. 'Editor's Preface', in: Morrison 2011, xiii–xv. (= 2011b)
- Nails, D. *The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics*. Cambridge 2002.
- Prince, S.H. *Antisthenes of Athens: texts, translations, and commentary*. Michigan 2014.
- Rossetti, L. *Le dialogue socratique*. Paris 2011.
- Rossetti, L. and A. Stavru. *Socratica 2005: Studi sulla letteratura socratica antica*. Bari 2008.
- Rossetti, L. and A. Stavru. *Socratica 2008: studies in ancient Socratic literature*. Bari 2010.
- Stavru, A. 'The present state of Socratic studies: An Overview', in: de Luise and Stavru 2013, 11–26.
- Stavru, A. and L. Rossetti. 'Introduction', in: Rossetti and Stavru 2010, 11–55.
- Trapp, M. *Socrates: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment*. Burlington 2007a.
- Trapp, M. *Socrates in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Burlington 2007b.
- Trapp, M. 'Introduction: questions of Socrates', in: M. Trapp 2007a, xv–xxviii (= 2007c).
- Wolfsdorf, D.C. 'The historical Socrates', in: D.C. Wolfsdorf, *Cambridge companion to ancient ethics*. Cambridge (forthcoming).
- Zilioli, U. *From the Socratics to the Socratic schools: classical ethics, metaphysics and epistemology*. New York 2015.

PART 1

Around Socrates



A Sage on the Stage: Socrates and Athenian Old Comedy

Jacques A. Bromberg*
University of Pittsburgh

1 Introduction

The memories of Socrates that have survived from antiquity paint a complicated picture of his relationship with the comic theater. The belated (and likely apocryphal) account in Aelian (*VH* 2.13) is a case in point, reporting *both* that Socrates never attended the theater, except for when Euripides produced a new play, *and* that he stood up in the audience during Aristophanes' *Clouds* so that the audience might compare his face with the mask worn by the "Socrates" character. Plato's Socrates famously questions the role of poets in the state (e.g. *Resp.* 338e–339a, 395e–396a, 606c; *Leg.* 816d–817d, 935d–936b), and Aristophanes' Socrates despises the silliness of comic poets (*Nub.* 296). Yet Plato's and Xenophon's memories of Socrates are filled with irony, humor, and of course laughter.¹ The critique in *Laws* (816d–817d), for instance, is mitigated by the proposition that "one cannot learn what is serious (τὰ σπουδαῖα) without the ridiculous (ἄνευ γελοίων)" (816d–e), and Xenophon opens the *Symposium* by remarking that it is worth remembering "not only the serious deeds (τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα) of good and noble men, but even their playful doings (καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς)" (1.1).² In the *Philebus* 47b–50b, a passage that Mader and de Vries take as a Platonic theory of comedy, Socrates's definition of humor closely

* I am grateful to the volume's editors, as well as to friendly audiences at Dartmouth College and the University of Pittsburgh, for many trenchant comments and observations that helped me to clarify and refine this argument.

- 1 For Socratic irony, see Gooch 1987; Vlastos 1987 and 1991; Vasiliou 1999 and 2002; Edmunds 1987 and 2004; Wolfsdorf 2007 and 2008. For Plato's debts to mime and comedy, see MacDonald 1931; Clay 1979 and 1994; Segoloni 1994; Wolfsdorf 1998, 126 esp. n. 2; and Erler (in this volume). For humor in the dialogues generally, see Petrie 1911; Greene 1920; Cooper 1922, ch. 10; Saxonhouse 1978; Mader 1977; de Vries 1985; Brock 1990; Arieti 1991, ch. 7; Usher 2002; Charalabopoulos 2012, 69–70. For the comedic appearance of Socrates see Karavites 1973–1974; Zanker 1995; Konstan 2011.
- 2 On the ancient genre of "serio-comic" (*spoudaiogeloion*) see Segoloni 2013 with bibliography, and Alvino (in this volume).

resembles his practice of exposing pretension through dialectic: at the urging of Protarchus, Socrates explains the comic absurdity of men who think they are richer (48e1–2), more handsome (48e4), more virtuous (48e9–10), and more wise (49a1–2) than they really are. Socrates' divine duty, as described especially in the *Apology* (e.g., 21c3–8, 30e2–5, 37e–38a), to expose his contemporary's pretensions, closely resembles the work of comedians, whose aim (as we are told by the chorus of initiates in Aristophanes *Frogs*) is “to speak much that is funny (πολλὰ μὲν γέλοιά) and much that is serious (πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαία)” (389–393). Like the texts of Athenian Old Comedy, Plato's dialogues are places where τὰ γέλοια and τὰ σπουδαία—laughing matters and serious matters—meet and overlap, and Diogenes Laertius even recalls Socrates recommending that “one ought to give oneself willingly to the comedians, for if they should call out any of our faults, they will set us straight” (2.36.4–6).

If Socrates held that it could benefit an individual to be the object of comedy, then the Old Comic writers certainly put his theory to the test. The most famous example is of course Aristophanes' *Clouds* (423 BCE), but in the decade before the *Clouds*, comedies lampooning educators, intellectuals, and students appear to have constituted a veritable subgenre of the Old Comic stage. Jokes about Socrates, his associates, and his rivals abound in the texts and fragments of Old Comedy.³ Ancient sources link Aristophanes and Eupolis specifically in attacking Socrates.⁴ In *Phaedo*, Socrates refers to “a certain comic poet” (κωμωδοποιός, 70c1) as the source of the insulting word ἀδολεσχεῖν (“to chatter”) used against

3 Among Socrates' friends, Chaerephon, Alcibiades, and Euripides all appear to have been popular comic targets. For Chaerephon, see *Nub.* 104, 144–156, 501–503, 830–831, 1465–1467, *Vesp.* 1408–1413, *Av.* 1280–1296, 1554–1564, fr. 295 and 552, and discussions by Dover 1968, xcv–xcvii; Tarrant 1991, 160–162; Moore 2013, 287–289. For Alcibiades, see *Ar. Banqueters* fr. 205.6, *Nub.* 1381–1382, *Vesp.* 44–48, *Eup. Baptai* test. ii–vi *PCG*, Lib. fr. 50.2.20–22, and discussions by Vickers 1989; O'Reagan 1992, 112 and 155; Storey 2003, 56–59, 94–111, 194–196 esp. n. 29, 354–355, and *passim*. For Euripides, see *Ran.* 1491–1499 and fr. 392 (= DL 2.18), *Callias* fr. 15 (= DL 2.18), *Telecleides* (fr. 39–40), and discussions by Nightingale 1995, 63–64; Olson 2007, 227–228. Plato too offers comedic descriptions of Chaerephon (*Chrm.* 153b2, *Ap.* 21a3), Apollodorus (*Symp.* 173d9–10; *Xen. Apol.* 28.1–2), Cebes (*Phd.* 63a1, 77a8–9), Aristodemus (*Symp.* 173b2), Hippothales (*Lys.* 204b5–205a8), Thrasymachus (*Resp.* 336b5–6), Prodicus (*Prt.* 315d4–5), Protagoras (*Prot.* 315b8–d1), Lysias (*Phdr.* 235a3–6), the drunken tutors of Lysis and Menexenus (*Lys.* 223a2–7); the surly porter in *Protagoras* (*Prot.* 314c7–d5), and of course Aristophanes (*Symp.* 185c3–6); see esp. Greene 1920.

4 For Eupolis and his dates, see Bowie 1988; Halliwell 1989; Heath 1990; Storey 1990; Parker 1991; Sidwell 1993; Storey 2003, 52–66; Rusten 2006. For a general discussion of Eupolis and Socrates, see Storey 2003, 194–197 and 321–327.

him,⁵ and in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* Socrates alludes to his reputation as "a man who seems to chatter and measure the air" (ἀνὴρ ὃς ἀδολεσχεῖν τε δοκῶ καὶ ἀερομετρεῖν, 11.3.3). Olympiodorus's commentary on *Phaedo* cites a passage from Eupolis, in which this word does appear: "I also hate Socrates, the chattering beggar (τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην), who has thought of everything—except where he might get something to eat" (fr. 386); and fr. 388, attributed to Eupolis by the *Etymologicum Magnum* (18.10) contains the imperative, "but teach him to chatter, you sophist!" (ἀλλ' ἀδολεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδασσον, ὦ σοφιστά).⁶ As Storey points out, the *scholia* to *Clouds* 96 makes by far the boldest claim: "Eupolis, even if he only mentioned Socrates a few times, still attacked him more than Aristophanes in the whole of *Clouds*."⁷ This assertion finds support in Lucian's *Fishermen*, which describes the fondness of ancient audiences for comic mockery: "they enjoy jeers and abuse, and especially when the most respectable things are torn to bits, just as they used to love it whenever Aristophanes and Eupolis brought Socrates here upon the stage to ridicule him, writing all kinds of comedies about him" (25).⁸ If he can be believed,⁹ Lucian is unambiguous that Aristophanes and Eupolis brought Socrates out "upon the stage" (ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνήν), and did not limit themselves simply to making jokes at his expense. Not only that, but Lucian implies the existence of multiple comedies, "of all sorts" (ἁλλοκότους), about him.

Furthermore, plays by Aristophanes' rivals, Cratinus and Eupolis, demonstrate a number of shared attitudes towards contemporary thinkers and educators, in both professional and social contexts, and they anticipate Aristophanes' *Clouds* in important ways. These lost comedies illustrate some popular attitudes towards intellectuals (including Socrates) in the closing decades of the fifth century BCE, and illuminate our picture of the "Sophists," a category that is expanded beyond teachers in rhetoric (as Guthrie imagined) to include experts in a broad array of skills and disciplines, from music to augury to physics.¹⁰ This chapter argues that the treatment of thinkers and educators in Old Comedy reveals important facts about public intellectual life in Athens of the late-fifth century, an appreciation of which enriches elements of the Socratic tradition.

5 Cf. *Resp.* 488e3–489a2.

6 Storey 1985 and 2003, 322 n. 27. Patzer 1994, 74–75 speculates that Socrates is the "sophist" of fr. 388; see discussion below.

7 Storey 2003, 322.

8 Cf. Lucian, *Twice Accused* 33.24–26, calls Aristophanes and Eupolis "formidable men when it comes to ridiculing what is respected and mocking what is proper." See Storey 2003, 321.

9 Storey 2003, 327, justifiably urges caution.

10 Guthrie 1971a, 40, with important responses by Edmunds 2006; Tell 2011, 21–37.

Although the story of Socrates' final days has become a founding myth of philosophy, its emphasis on the role of comedy (and especially of *Clouds*) has rarely received critical attention. Plato's account of the trial and execution of Socrates is so tightly intertwined with his reading of *Clouds* that readers seem to forget the quarter-century that had elapsed between the performance of *Clouds* in 423 BCE and Socrates' trial in 399. The play was staged at a moment in the Archidamian War (431–421 BCE) when the Athenians felt confident and optimistic, believed that they had a strategic advantage, and embraced an aggressive strategy; but two decades later, Athens had suffered repeated public sacrileges, a disastrous campaign in Sicily, a pair of oligarchic coups, and a humiliating defeat by the Spartans that had cost the Athenians their empire, their defenses, and their democracy. In the life of Athens, 423 and 399 BCE were an age apart.¹¹

A deeper understanding of the original literary and intellectual context of *Clouds* therefore promises to pay double, both clarifying our picture of intellectual life in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, and offering insight into Plato's philosophical project a generation later. In order to contextualize the Socrates of *Clouds* within a comedic tradition satirizing intellectuals and educators, I propose examining the surviving fragments of "intellectual comedies" and their place in the intellectual history of the late-fifth century. Scholars have hinted at the existence of this hypothetical subgenre before, though none to date has undertaken to investigate it to any degree. But the evidence for (at least) seven comedies by five comedians satirizing intellectuals in similar ways within a decade of one another seems sufficient to argue for a subgenre of Old Comedy, akin to "demagogue comedies" and "mythological burlesques."¹² In this chapter, therefore, I argue first for the existence of a recognizable and even perhaps popular subgenre of Old Comedy (of which Aristophanes' *Clouds* is only one example) focused on intellectuals and educators, and I describe second the influence of these "intellectual comedies" on the early Socratic tradition. As we might expect of a comic poet, Aristophanes does not appear to have embraced his place within this tradition, maintaining instead that (despite losing the dramatic contest of 423 BCE) *Clouds* was his "wisest" (σοφωτάτη) and "most original" (καινοτάτη) comedy. Yet the existence of strikingly similar, ear-

11 This gap is not diminished by observing that *Clouds* was rewritten after its original production, since the likeliest dates for the revision (420–416 BCE; see Dover 1968, lxxx–xcviii) are nonetheless years before the religious, military, and political disasters of 415–403 BCE. Kopff 1990 has suggested a later date for *Clouds II*, which would complicate this picture, but Storey 1993 remains unconvinced.

12 Storey 2003, 321, draws this useful comparison.

lier comedies about thinkers and educators (including Socrates) problematizes his claim to originality, and complicates the primacy and influence that Plato seems to give *Clouds* in the *Apology*. In order to get the most out of our reappraisal of *Clouds*, therefore, we must also reassess Plato's influential argument about the play's role in fomenting the prejudice that led to the condemnation and death of Socrates in 399 BCE.

2 The "Intellectual Comedy"

The earliest "intellectual comedy" that we know of was Cratinus' *All-Seers* (Παν-όπται), a play that featured the presocratic and early medical writer Hippon.¹³ Very little is known about this play for certain, including its date, though a performance in the middle or late 430s seems most plausible.¹⁴ *All-Seers* certainly preceded *Clouds* (though it is impossible to know by how much), and most readers accept the view that it dealt with the intellectual trends of the middle- and late-fifth century. But the (very few) surviving fragments and *testimonia* of *All-Seers* support this consensus, and several features of Cratinus' apparent treatment of Hippon are especially noteworthy. First, Cratinus' focus on the details of Hippon's theories: fr. 167a (from the *scholia* to Aristophanes *Clouds*) credits Hippon with the comparison of the heavens to an oven cover (πνιγεύς): "Cratinus says these things earlier in his play *All-Seers*, making fun of the philosopher (τοῦ φιλοσόφου) Hippon" (ad 95 = Hippon 26 A 2 DK). Aristophanes exploited, both in *Clouds* (96) and in *Birds* (1001), Hippon's comparison of the sky to an "oven-cover" (πνιγεύς), and the joke is in keeping with what we know of Hippon's teaching, which appears (following Thales) to have focused on the creative agency of moisture (τὸ ὑγρόν). The only extant fragment of Hippon that Diels and Kranz judged genuine comes from the Homeric *scholia* (ad 20.195) and identifies the sea as the source of all things that lie above it; and Aristotle (*Metaph.* A, 984a3–5 = 38 A 7, 10 DK) includes Hippon among the

13 On *Panoptai* see Grey 1896, 11–13; Pieters 1946, 163–164; Rosen 1988, 61–62; Carey 2000, 426–427; Storey 2011, 1.341–345. Rusten 2011, 197, calls *All-Seers* "perhaps the first play to mock philosophers [*sic*] in the manner of Aristophanes' *Clouds*," though presumably Cratinus would not have called them this.

14 On the date of *All-Seers*, see Geissler 1969, 23; Rosen 1988, 62. Grey 1896, 11, suggests that Aristophanes could not have made his claims to sophistication and novelty in *Clouds* (521) and *Wasps* (1044) if *All-Seers* had been a recent production, but this comment seems to ignore the rivalrous nature of Old Comedy. See Halliwell 1989; Heath 1990; Parker 1991; Sidwell 1993; Harvey and Wilkins 2000; Ruffel 2002; Biles 2011.

monists who saw water as the “first cause” (ἀρχηγός), though he hesitates to discuss him alongside Thales, “because of the meager nature of his intellect.” It is impossible to know to what degree Aristotle’s judgment reflects Hippon’s reputation in his own day, but if Hippon did teach that the universal *archêgos* was moisture or water, then two otherwise opaque fragments from *All-Seers* make sense: both fr. 158, “and he gulps down [ἀναρροφεῖ] everything,” and fr. 159, “men seated idly about *gulp down* [ἀναρροφούσιν] these things straight away,” employ the same rare verb ἀναρροφέω (“gulp down”) in a way that could be highly comical in the context of a philosophy endorsing water as *archêgos*. If these jokes are at all typical of *All-Seers*, then the specific—and esoteric—nature of Cratinus’ ridicule is a noteworthy antecedent of *Clouds*.

Two other fragments of *All-Seers* seem especially derisive of the character and habits of Hippon and his students, as well as of the investigating, intellectual spirit of the age. In fr. 161, someone is described as having “two heads and countless eyes,” a perplexing image, reminiscent of the mythical Argos, whose epithet πανόπτης (“all-seeing”) appears to have given Cratinus’ play its title;¹⁵ and in fr. 162 a group is described as “absentminded, ever-forgetful, [but] having good memories” (ἀλλοτριογνώμοις ἐπιλήσμοσι μνημονικοῖσιν). This comedic paradox also recalls again Argos who, despite his hundred wakeful eyes, turns out to be a poor watchman, and it suggests that despite their apparent learning, Hippon and his students were depicted by Cratinus as witless. The epithet μνημονικός (“having a good memory”) reappears in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*—the first thing Socrates asks Strepsiades in fact is, “do you have a good memory?” (εἰ μνημονικός εἶ, 483)—and attests to the importance of the memory arts in Greek education.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the adjective ἐπιλήσμων (“forgetful”) also reappears in *Clouds* to describe Strepsiades: first when he admits to being “extremely forgetful” (ἐπιλήσμων πᾶν, 485) of his own debts, and again when Socrates complains that “I’ve never seen such a boorish man anywhere, so inept, foolish, and *forgetful* (ἐπιλήσμονα)” (628–629). Later in the play, Strepsiades admits to Pheidippides that, “whatever I would learn, I would immediately forget (ἐπελανθανόμην) because of my old age” (854–855). We cannot ascertain what role Hippon himself may have played in the comedy, however, as his name does not appear in any of the extant fragments. But if directed at Hippon or at a group of his students (perhaps the chorus after whom the play is named, as Bergk and Grey proposed),¹⁷ the lines reflect an opinion of presocratic speculation as idle

15 For Argos Panoptês see, e.g., Aesch. *Supp.* 304.

16 E.g. Pl. *Hp. mi.* 368d–e, *Phdr.* 274c–275b, and *Dissoi Logoi* 9.

17 Bergk 1838, 181; Grey 1896, 12–13.

and impractical. Cratinus' Hippon appears, like Aristophanes' Socrates, to have been comically esoteric and his students inept.

More can be surmised regarding Aristophanes' *Banqueters* (Δαιταλείς). This was Aristophanes' first play, produced either by Callistratus or Philonides in 427 BCE.¹⁸ Like *Clouds*, *Banqueters* addressed contemporary education (rather than intellectual speculation), and seems to have contained a comic *agôn* between representatives of the traditional manner of education and the new sophistic style. The plot, as far as we can tell, centers on an Athenian landowner with two sons, "Chaste Boy" (ὁ σώφρων) and "Bugged Boy" (ὁ καταπύγων). "Chaste Boy" has been educated in the traditional system of music and gymnastics, while his brother "Bugged Boy" has opted instead to learn the new techniques taught by the *rhêtors* (professional speakers and demagogues), which he imagines will bring him political success. Fr. 225 may belong to a comic prologue, spoken by the boys' father, lamenting the degeneracy of his second son in a manner that anticipates Strepsiades' prologue in *Clouds*: "He didn't learn these things when I sent him to school, but rather drinking, then bad singing, Syracusan food, Sybaritic feasting, 'Chian wine from Spartan bowls,' getting continuously drunk, living pleasantly" (tr. Rusten 2011, ch. 7).

A classic comic standoff is all but assured between the good son and the bad son, mocking, as Papageorgiou has proposed, Prodicus' famous allegory of Virtue and Vice, and apparently resembling the argument between "Better Argument" and "Worse Argument" in *Clouds*.¹⁹ Fr. 206 may preserve part of this exchange: one character, perhaps "Bugged Boy," asks, "you call this sophistry?" (σοὶ γὰρ σοφίσματ' ἔστιν;), and another, perhaps "Chaste Boy" or their father, responds, "I acquired [this] but you snuck away from the schoolteacher" (ἀγώ'κτησάμην. | σὺ δ' εὐθύς ἀπεδίδρασκεις ἐκ διδασκάλου).²⁰ In fr. 205, "Bugged Boy" reviles his father with insults about his age, while the old man points out mockingly the sources of each of his taunts:

[SON] But you are only a coffin (εἰ σορέλλη), and spices, and wreaths.

[FATHER] See, "coffin" (σορέλλη)? You got that from Lysistratus.

[SON] And surely, perhaps, you will be tripped up (καταπλιγῆσει) by time.

[FATHER] This "tripped-up" (τὸ καταπλιγῆσει) you got from the *rhêtors*.

[SON] These words will come back to haunt you someday.

18 On *Daitales* see Dover 1968, ad 528; Cassio 1978; Segoloni 1994; MacDowell 1995, 27–29; Papageorgiou 2004; Rusten 2011, 301–307.

19 Papageorgiou 2004.

20 Segoloni 1994, 111–193, has proposed Socrates as the unnamed "teacher" of fr. 206.

[FATHER] Ah, *that* you got from Alcibiades (παρ' Ἀλκιβιάδου)!

[SON] Why do you insinuate against and speak poorly of men who cultivate beauty-and-goodness (ἀνδρας καλοκαγαθεῖν ἀσκοῦντας)?

[FATHER] Goodness, O Thrasymachus, who of the lawyers says this garbage (τίς τοῦτο τῶν ξυνηγόρων τηρεῖται)?

Lysistratus we know from elsewhere in Aristophanes as a notorious indigent (*Eq.* 1264–1269) and scoundrel (*Vesp.* 787–792).²¹ In *Acharnians*, he is called “the disgrace of Cholargos, dyed all over in evil, shivering and starving (ρίγῶν τε καὶ πεινῶν ἀεὶ) more than thirty days of each month” (*Ach.* 855–859). Aristophanes’ mockery in these passages resembles the characterization of Socrates’ disciples in *Clouds*: at 413–416, for instance, the Chorus promises Strepsiades that “you will be so blessed among the Athenians and the Greeks if you are mindful and deep thinking and if there is endurance in your soul, and you are not wearied by standing or walking, nor too grieved by shivering nor eager for breakfast (μῆτε ῥίγῶν ἄχθῃ λίαν μῆτ’ ἀριστᾶν ἐπιθυμεῖς).” And not long afterwards, Strepsiades declares, “I now commit my body entirely to these men to do as they will, to be beaten, to suffer hunger and thirst, to shiver (πεινῆν διψῆν | αὐχμεῖν ῥίγῶν) and go unwashed, to be flayed into a wine-skin, if only I might escape my debts!” (439–443). It is also interesting to observe that Alcibiades was an Aristophanic κωμωδούμενος as early as 427 BCE, when he would have been still in his early twenties, and long before he seems first to have come to political prominence after the Peace of Nicias in 421 BCE.²² The scene of filial abuse in *Banqueters* calls to mind the closing scene of *Clouds* (1405–1446), when Pheidippides, who has succumbed to his father’s wishes to enter Socrates’ school, argues that it is right to beat one’s parents.

Third in our survey of intellectual comedies, and less overtly critical of intellectuals than either of these plays, is Eupolis’ *Nanny Goats* (Ἀἴγες). On the basis of subject matter and the mention in the play of Hipponicus (who was dead by 421 BCE) as a κωμωδούμενος, Storey has proposed for *Nanny Goats* a date of Dionysia—424 BCE, perhaps Eupolis’ first victory there.²³ Even from the few surviving fragments, we can make out that the play contained some very suggestive resemblances to *Clouds*. From rustic references in several fragments (e.g. fr. 1, 3, 12, 13, 15, 19, 21, and 22), it appears that one character in the play

21 In the *scholia* to *Wasps* he is called “a pauper and a jester” (*ad* 1308: πένης καὶ σκωπτόλης).

22 Alcibiades appears as a young man in the Platonic *Alcibiades* (dramatic date c. 431 BCE), but he is absent from Xenophon’s *Symposium* (dramatic date of 422 BCE), where Antisthenes appears instead in the role of Socrates’ would-be lover (see esp. *Symp.* 8.4–6).

23 Storey 2003, 67.

was a farmer like Strepsiades (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 43–47, 71–72), who has come to the city looking for lessons. Fr. 11, “I will pay whatever fee is necessary” (ἐγὼ τελεῶ τὸν μισθὸν ὅντιν’ ἂν χρῆ), includes the phrase τελεῖν μισθόν, which reappears in Plato’s *Protagoras* describing fees paid to a sophist (311d1–2).²⁴ From another group of fragments, we can surmise that this fee was offered to a teacher of grammar and music, and a rather pretentious one at that, who grumbles at one point that the farmer has “lived without learning even a little bit of music” (fr. 4). In frs. 17–18, the teacher (“Prodamus” by name) attempts to teach our farmer a dance in honor of Athena, and “when the farmer did the dance awkwardly (σκληρῶς), the teacher commanded him to do it gracefully (μαλακῶς)” (fr. 18 = POxy 2738 col. ii). Storey has suggested that the name of “Prodamus” in Eupolis’ *Nanny Goats* conceals a thinly veiled reference to Prodicus and Damon, whom Isocrates, Plutarch, and others identify as Pericles’ music teacher.²⁵ The farmer’s comical inability to learn Athena’s dance resembles not only Strepsiades’ comical failures in Socrates’ lessons in *Clouds* (e.g., 617–804), but also the scenes in Xenophon’s *Symposium* (2.16–17) and Plato’s *Euthydemus* (272c2–5), where the idea Socrates taking lessons in dancing and music inspires similar laughter.²⁶ Given the chorus of goats and the farmer protagonist, the source of comedy seems most likely to have been two-fold: the increasingly popular contrast (which would become more popular still in New Comedy of the fourth century) between city and country, and the ridiculous portrayal of a boorish middle-aged protagonist being given lessons suited to much younger boys. A farmer has moved from the country into the city walls, bringing his goats with him: fr. 15, “crammed with goat dung,” suggests the cramped living arrangement of the city, and frs. 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 31, and 34, which feature exotic

24 The same phrase (τελεῖν μισθόν) reappears at Ar. *Ran.* 173 of the two drachmas demanded by a “Corpse” (Νέκρος) for carrying Dionysus’ luggage, and μισθόν is also used of a sophist’s fee at Xen. *Symp.* 4.60. It is difficult to imagine that such a common phrase (cf. Hom. *Il.* 21.457, Pl. *Lys.* 280b) could invoke something as specific as a transaction with a sophist. Yet the comedic commonplace of the emaciated intellectual (Chaerephon is called “half-dead” [ἡμιθνής] at *Clouds* 504; see Guthrie 1971b, 45 esp. n. 1; Moore 2013, 288 esp. n. 29) invites us to wonder whether Aristophanes’ “Corpse” character in *Frogs* could be another passing jab at intellectual culture, and the Corpse’s rejoinder (“end of discussion” [μὴ διαλέγου], 176) only sweetens the joke.

25 Storey 2003, 72–74, and 2011, 1.68. For Damon, see 37 DK, Isoc. *Antid.* 235, Plut. *Per.* 4.1–4 (who cites Plato *Comicus* fr. 207), Pl. *Resp.* 3.400b–c, and discussions by Raubitschek 1955; Giangulio 2005.

26 For Socrates’ opinion of lifelong learning, see *Sph.* 251b, *Resp.* 409b, and perhaps *La.* 189a–d, and discussions in Tarrant 1996; Michelini 2000, 519–520; Trivigno 2009, 34 and n. 33. Cf. Theophr. *Char.* 27 on the figure of the “late-learner.”

foods and wine, suggest a *symposium*, in preparation for which the protagonist perhaps applies to a local schoolmaster for some hilarious lessons in etiquette.

Another notorious musician appeared in Ameipsias' *Connus*, named for the citharode and educator, whom our sources (*Euthd.* 272c, 295d; *Menex.* 235e) identify as Socrates' music teacher. The play took second prize in 423 BCE, just beating Aristophanes' *Clouds*.²⁷ Athenaeus (5.218c) comments that Protagoras was not among Ameipsias' chorus of "thinkers" (φροντισταί), indicating that *Connus* had an individuated chorus, whose members had names belonging to individual sophists.²⁸ This supposition is strengthened by fr. 9, which indicates that Socrates appeared in the play: "Socrates, best of a few men, but most foolish of many, have you also come to us (ἦκεῖς | καὶ σὺ πρὸς ἡμᾶς)? You're quite a hardy one. Where on earth did you get that cloak? ... This wretched thing is an insult to shoemakers everywhere ... and yet despite being hungry, he's never dared to freeload." The direct address (σὺ), the statement that "you," Socrates, "have come to us" (ἦκεῖς καὶ σὺ πρὸς ἡμᾶς), and the deictic pronoun "here" (τοῦτι), all indicate beyond doubt that he appeared on stage either as a character in the play or as a member of the individuated chorus of "thinkers." Ameipsias' φροντισταί appear to have been a diverse group, not limited to natural philosophers and professional educators. Besides Socrates and the title-character, Connus, they may have included a priest (fr. 7 deals with sacrifices) and an augur (fr. 10 mentions oracles). The play thus appears to have lampooned a wide range of experts, including musicians, religious leaders, and educators

If Socrates featured in a play by Eupolis, then *Flatterers* (Κόλακες) and *Autolycus* (Αὐτόλυκος) appear to be the likeliest candidates. *Flatterers* won first prize at the Dionysia of 421 BCE, beating Aristophanes' *Peace*, and took as its subject the young heir Callias, son of Hipponicus, who presides in both Plato's *Protagoras* and Xenophon's *Symposium*. Scholars have often suggested that Plato's portrait of the sophist in his *Protagoras* was influenced by Eupolis' caricature in *Flatterers*, and the many comedic elements of that dialogue support this hypothesis.²⁹ Frr. 157–158 describe Protagoras in the house in ways that antic-

27 On *Connus*, see Ar. *Nub. Hypothesis* v (in Dover 1968, 5), Poll. 10.171, DL 2.27–28 and discussions by Sommerstein 1983; Carey 2000, 420–423; Rusten 2011, 356–357; Storey 2011, 1.68–73. The comedian Phrynichus also wrote a play entitled *Connus*, on which see Ar. *Eq.* 534 and Cratinus fr. 317.

28 Such an individuated chorus appears later in, e.g., Aristophanes' *Birds*. For Plato's and Aristophanes' use of the word φροντιστής, see especially Edmunds 2006, 416–418.

29 See especially Capra 2001, ch. 1–3, and 2005, and discussions in Kerferd 1981, 39; Nightingale 1995, 186–187; Tylawski 2002, 44–47; Notomi 2003, 14–18 and n. 10; Storey 2003, 184–185; Arieti and Barrus 2011, 8–13; Charalabopoulos 2012, 70 and n. 105.

ipate Plato's porter scene in *Protagoras* (314c7–d5), and resemble the Aristophanic Socrates: “inside is Protagoras of Teos, a plague who pontificates (ὅς ἀλαζονεύεται) on celestial matters, while eating everything on earth” (fr. 157). Aristophanes' Socrates in *Clouds* is, like Eupolis' Protagoras, a “charlatan” (ἀλαζών, 102), a man of much pretension but little substance, and later in the play, ἀλαζών appears among the many unsavory titles to which Strepsiades aspires: “I shall seem to men to be ... supple, dissembling, slippery, pretentious ...” (444–449: τοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις εἶναι δόξω ... μάσθλης, εἴρων, γλοιός, ἀλαζών ...). The first appearance of ἀλαζών is among the unassigned comic fragments of Cratinus, where it is appropriately paired with the word “braggart” (fr. 380: ἀλαζών καὶ κομπός). Aristotle defines the ἀλαζών as “making pretense to virtues he does not possess or possesses less than he claims,” and contrasts him with the εἴρων, who seems “to deny or make light of those that he does possess” (*Eth. Nic.* 1127a20–23). This conforms to its uses in Aristophanes, as Dover noted.³⁰ By the time of Eupolis and Aristophanes, both ἀλαζών and the verb ἀλαζονεύομαι appear popular comedic terms for intellectual impostors, used and perhaps established by Cratinus.

The chief object of *Flatterers* appears to have been the extravagance of Callias, who has just inherited his father's estate. According to Plato's Socrates in the *Apology* (20a3–4), Callias “has paid more money to sophists than all others combined” (ὅς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι), and Eupolis casts him as host of a grand *symposium* (fr. 160, 165, 170), even offering his possessions as collateral: “now put down the flocks and fields and cattle” (fr. 163); “put down a racehorse in training” (fr. 164); “for the dinner put down a hundred drachmas ... for the wine put down another mina” (fr. 165). The chorus of this play are professional flatterers and free-loaders, who have come to exploit Callias' extravagance, and they describe themselves as ready to praise whatever a wealthy man says in order to get a meal:

if I should encounter some fellow [in the agora], foolish, but rich, immediately I am all over him. Whatever the wealthy man should happen to say, I praise exceedingly and am struck with amazement, appearing to rejoice in his words. Then we head off to dinner, each of us in another direction to [eat up] another's bread ...

Eup fr. 172.9–12

30 Dover 1968, *ad* 102; Wolfsdorf 2007 and 2008. Cf. Ar. *Ach.* 109 and 135. In Plato, see *Chrm.* 173c and *Phlb.* 65c; and Theophr. *Char.* 23.

Meanwhile, fr. 162 (“as they talk they are stealing gold from the house, the silver is being plundered!”) and fr. 169 (“the sink is gone!”) show that possessions of all sorts are vanishing from the house during the party. Here perhaps belong Eupolis’ unassigned fr. 365, “Socrates, taking his turn, while singing a song by Stesichorus—stole a decanter,” and fr. 386 (mentioned above), “I also hate Socrates, the chattering beggar, who has thought of everything—except where he might get something to eat.” Both Patzer and Storey understand fr. 365 as a running joke on the poverty of Socrates, who has to steal to survive, as in *Clouds* 177–179: “He sprinkled fine ashes on the table, and bent a little spit, and then took it as a pair of compasses and—filched a cloak from the Palaestra.”³¹ Moreover, frs. 365 and 386 contain familiar themes of the chattering, impoverished, and impractical intellectual, and would fit appropriately in the mouths of a chorus of professional flatterers.³²

The year after *Flatterers*, Eupolis revisited the character of Callias in *Autolycus* from 421/40 BCE.³³ This time, the comedy focused on the education of the young Autolycus (the son of Lykon, one of Socrates’ prosecutors two decades later), who had won the *pankration* at the Panathenaic Games of 422 BCE, and who reappears later as Callias’ guest of honor in Xenophon’s *Symposium*—a text which seems to have drawn heavily on Eupolis’ play. A passage from Apsines’ *Rhetoric* (3 = Eup. test. iii) may reveal elements of plot: “after being arrested as an illegal alien, Eupolis is sold as a slave at public auction. Lykon purchases him and entrusts his son [to him].” From this *testimonium*, Storey conjectures that *Autolycus* opened with Eupolis himself (or an actor playing him) explaining his status as Lykon’s slave and Autolycus’ tutor, and that the *agôn* featured contest between ‘Eupolis’ and another for the right to teach Autolycus. Appealing to an anecdote in Aelian (*VH* 10.41) in which a “fellow slave” (ὁμόδουλος) named “Ephialtes” attempts to steal one of Eupolis’ plays, Kaibel proposed that *Autolycus* featured a contest between Eupolis and Ephialtes (both slaves of Lykon), and Storey builds on his proposition by identifying Eupolis’ opponent in the *agôn*, “Ephialtes,” as a veiled reference to Aristophanes.³⁴

If Storey’s reconstruction is accurate, then *Autolycus* offered an inventive twist on the “intellectual” comedy, with rival comedians in the roles of rival educators. The plot is comical in ways familiar from Eupolis’ other plays. Fr. 48,

31 Patzer 1994, 69; Storey 2003, 322–323.

32 Storey 2003, 324.

33 For *Autolycus* see Patzer 1994, 74–75, Storey 2003, 81–94, 326–327, and 2011, 2.68–79. For the revision of the play, see *PCG* Eupolis test. ii; Geissler 1969, 42–43; Storey 1990, esp. 28–29.

34 Kaibel 1889, 40–42; Storey 2003, 86–89.

most likely from the prologue, “and they live here in three little huts, each having his own household,” and fr. 55, “you must pay the harbor tax before entering,” suggest a comedic exchange with a door-keeper as in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* (395–406), *Thesmophoriazusae* (39–70), and Plato’s *Protagoras* (314c7–d5), as well as perhaps in *Flatterers* (see fr. 157, above, describing Protagoras as “inside” [ἐνδον]). Fr. 60 preserves part of the *agôn*, with one character accusing another, “you have wasted your impious life (ἄσεβων βίον), you wretch, on your rather strange ideas (ἐπὶ καινοτέραις ιδέαις),” and another replies, “How so, you who have licked clean the rims of so many dishes?” The word “strange, new” (καινός) is of course a commonplace in Comedy to describe “original” work (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 547, *Vesp.* 1044), and in a fragment of the comedian Antisthenes, where he complains how comedians “must always invent new names (ὀνόματα καινά), backstories, circumstances, beginnings, and endings” (fr. 191.17–20). Storey therefore sees in this exchange a heated contest between two rival comedians. But the combination of “strange ideas” and “impiety” (ἄσεβων) suggests less a rival comedian than a sophist, who has come to argue with the “Eupolis” character for the right to tutor Autolycus: καινός reappears in *Frogs* 890, pertaining to Euripides’ “strange” gods, as well as among the charges against Socrates, whose alleged impiety consisted not of worshipping “new gods” but “other strange gods” (ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά, Pl. *Ap.* 26b4; cf. Xen. *Ap.* 12 and *Mem.* 1.1.1–2). The phrase “licked clean the rims of dishes” further recalls the parasitic sophists of Ameipsias’ *Connos* (e.g. fr. 9 about Socrates) and *Flatterers*, especially if fr. 365 and 386 (also about Socrates) belong to that play.³⁵ Meanwhile, *Autolycus* fr. 59 from the *scholia* to *Clouds* 252, “he is making a display of smoke and shadows,” evokes the evanescence and inutility characteristic in comedic representations of presocratic or sophistic doctrine, and strengthens the argument not only that a sophistic character appeared in *Autolycus*, but that he may have competed in the *agôn* against the “Eupolis” character. Callias is of course closely associated with sophists (Pl. *Ap.* 20a3–4), as Eupolis had characterized him in *Flatterers*, and Xenophon’s Socrates in *Symposium* (4.62–63) lists Prodicus, Hippias, the painter Zeuxippus, and a certain Aeschylus of Phlius among those he patronized. Fr. 50a of *Autolycus*, “because I have wasted my inheritance on you,” is therefore surely, as Storey argues, a line by of Callias, who (as in *Flatterers* fr. 160, 163–165, 170) is again pilloried for his wasteful spending habits.³⁶ But Storey’s proposition that the

35 It would be worth considering, however, whether these two unassigned Eupolidean fragments might in fact belong to *Autolycus*.

36 Storey 2011, 2.73 n. 1.

line is directed at Autolycus is unconvincing: Autolycus makes a much poorer target than a sophist, on whom Callias is notorious (especially in Comedy) for “wasting” money. If my reading of fr. 50a, 59, and 60 is correct, then the previously unassigned 388, “but teach him to chatter, you sophist!” (ἀλλ’ ἀδολεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδασον, ὦ σοφιστά) fits the educational context of *Autolycus*. Patzer has proposed this, identifying Socrates as the “Sophist” invoked, and Storey calls the suggestion “attractive”: “just as *Kolakes* has provided material and inspiration for Plato’s *Protagoras*, *Autolykos* will have given Xenophon material for his symposium, including the presence of Socrates.”³⁷ If the attribution is correct, then fr. 388 (being a variation of the iambic tetrameter catalectic verse used in choral entrances, exits, and in comic *agônes*) might confirm that a “sophist” took part in the comic *agôn*. As comical as two comedians vying for the right to tutor Autolycus would surely have been, a comedian competing with a sophist for that right would have been equally (if not more) comical, given Callias’ association with sophistic types and the comedic characterization of sophists and intellectuals as pretentious hacks. Make Eupolis’ “sophist” in this play Socrates, and we may well be on our way to understanding Lucian’s comment (*Fishermen* 25) that Eupolis and Aristophanes wrote “all kinds” of comedies about him.

As in other Eupolidean comedies (*Nanny Goats* and *Flatterers*), a symposium may have provided the context for the comedy in *Autolycus*, and the extant fragments exhibit a number of potentially significant intertexts with Xenophon’s *Symposium*, which the author frequently characterizes as a comedic text.³⁸ Fr. 48 on the three doors on stage and fr. 55 invoking a “harbor-tax” may lie behind the arrivals at Callias’ door of the jester Philip at 1.11 and the Syracusan entertainer at 2.1. Xenophon’s Philip in particular resembles a comedian (or at least, a comedic character) in several respects. He is described in terms often used to describe comedian and comic characters, a “buffoon” (γελωτοποιός, 1.11), who takes pride “in his buffoonery” (ἐπὶ τῷ γελωτοποιεῖν, 3.11), and Xenophon uses the same words as Plato uses to describe the “buffoonery” (γελωτοποιῶν, *Resp.* 606c) that citizens enjoy “in comic performance” (ἐν μιμήσει κωμωδικῇ), but are ashamed to display themselves. Two bawdy fragments of Eupolis’ play, “legs and thighs straight to the ceiling” (σκέλη δὲ καὶ κωλῆνες εὐθὺ τοῦρόρου, fr. 54), and “you lifted up your leg, you loathsome man” (ἀνεκάς τ’ ἐπαίρω καὶ βδελυρὸς σὺ τὸ σκέλος, fr. 57), anticipate and may have inspired

37 Patzer 1994, 74–75; Storey 2003 324.

38 See, e.g., Xen. *Symp.* 4.28 (ἀναμῖξ ἔσχωψαν), 4.45 (ἀνεγέλασαν ἅπαντες).

Phillip's burlesque dancing at *Symp.* 2.21–22;³⁹ and at 2.14, Philip ridicules for cowardice the demagogue Peisander, who was a popular Old Comic *kômôidoumenos* beginning around 426 BCE, and was also ridiculed for cowardice by Aristophanes (*Babylonians* fr. 84, Av. 1553) and Eupolis (*Astrateuoi* fr. 35). Xenophon's "Syracusan" is also compared (by Antisthenes) to "someone who abuses" (λοιδορουμένω, 6.9), using a term often employed by comic characters to describe their abuse of one another (cf. Ar. *Ach.* 37, *Eq.* 90 and 1400, *Nub.* 1140, *Ran.* 857, *Eccl.* 248, *Plut.* 456); and at times, he and Philip exhibit a tense rivalry (see, e.g., 4.55, 6.8–9), which may also have drawn inspiration Eupolis' comic *agôn* in *Autolycus*. Finally, fr. 58 on a "perfumed woman from Rhodes" seems strangely to anticipate Callias' extravagant offer in *Symposium* to share some perfume with the group, "so that we may feast on sweet smell as well" (2.3).

Alongside the influence of *Flatterers* on Plato's *Protagoras* (see above, and n. 29), the many apparent reminiscences of *Autolycus* in Xenophon's *Symposium* challenge the monopoly of influence that *Clouds* has held over the Socratic tradition since antiquity. We will return to the originality of *Clouds* in the following section, but before moving on to our final example of "intellectual comedy," Plato Comicus' *Sophists*, it is worth emphasizing an especially unique and remarkable feature shared by *Clouds* and *Autolycus*: both plays were revised by their authors after their original performances, and as far as we can tell, no other Eupolidean play received this treatment. The two versions of *Autolycus* seem to have existed side by side long enough for at least five ancient commentators to refer to "*Autolycus B*" (Σ *Clouds* 109), "the other *Autolycus*" (Σ Ar. *Thesm.* 941; Σ Pl. *Ap.* 28e; Pollux 7.202), or to "*Autolycuses*" (Σ Hom. *Il.* 13.353). As with the revision of *Clouds*, we are told that Eupolis' edits to *Autolycus* were not extensive: Galen in his *Commentary on Hippocrates' Regimen* (1.4 = Eupolis, *Autolycus* test. ii) offers *Autolycus* as his example (παράδειγμα) of something "revised again" (ἐπιδιασκευάσθαι), which he defines as "having the same plot and most of the same words." It is unknown why Eupolis chose to revise this play. Storey imagines a few scenarios (a poor finish or a cancelled performance in 420 BCE?), and even raises the possibility that Eupolis' revision may have inspired Aristophanes to revise *Clouds* (though the reverse is, so far as I can tell, equally plausible).⁴⁰ Certainly, Galen's description of Eupolis' revision is very like the first *hypothesis* of *Clouds*, but until more evidence comes to light,

39 Eupolis' verb "lift up" (ἐπαίρω) in fr. 57 is most likely being used of "lifting up a leg" to fart, as in Hdt. 2.162.14.

40 Storey 2003, 83.

Eupolis' motives will remain mysterious. Nevertheless, when it comes to evaluating the literary influence of *Clouds* (on Plato especially) and *Autolycus* (on Xenophon apparently), we must continue to reflect on the status of these two texts as revisions.

A similar picture of the thinker/educator seems to emerge from Plato Comicus' *Sophists* (Σοφισταί).⁴¹ The comedy is impossible to date for certain, as the prominent Athenians whose names appear in the fragments alternated in notoriety between 422–403 BCE. But the popularity of “intellectual” comedies in the late 420s BCE argues in favor of a comparatively early date (more on this question shortly). One naturally assumes from the title that the chorus consisted of a group of sophists, in a similar way perhaps to Cratinus' *All-Seers*, Ameipsias' *Connus*, and Eupolis' *Flatterers*. This assumption about the composition of the chorus is supported by the fragments, which do suggest some sophistic ideas: fr. 149 records that “the comedian Plato in *Sophists* included the *aulos*-player Bacchylides the Opuntian under the name ‘sophist;’” and the remark suggests the possibility of another individuated chorus of thinkers (as in *Connus*). Moreover, Plato's inclusion of a pipe-player among his “sophists” indicates again a broad use of the term to indicate “experts,” as in the passages from Cratinus and Ameipsias discussed above, and conforms to the expansive definition of the τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην in Plato's *Protagoras* (316d3–e4), which includes poetry, prophecy, gymnastics, and music. Very few fragments from *Sophists* survive, but fr. 145—“the mind of humankind is a thing of foresight” (προμηθία γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ νοῦς)—seems especially aimed at intellectual activity. Carey suggests that the fragment reflects “the positive and evolutionary view of human society which we find in fifth-century thinkers, in contrast to the pessimistic and nostalgic view of change which marks traditional Greek thought from Homer onwards.”⁴² But the line seems more likely to be ironic, employing the same style of mockery as the title of Cratinus' *All-Seers*, with its sarcastic reference to the “all-seeing” nature of the mythological Argos. As we have seen repeatedly, intellectuals and their students in Old Comedy are neither *all-seeing* nor *provident*: they are, on the contrary, “forgetful” (Cratinus fr. 162, Ar. *Nub.* 485, 628–629, 854–855) and “gullible” (Cratinus fr. 158–159), “pretentious” (Cratinus fr. 380, Eup. fr. 157, Ar. *Nub.* 102, 449), “beggars” (Eup. fr. 386, Ameipsias fr. 9), “braggarts” (Cratinus fr. 380), “supple, dissembling, slippery, pretentious” (Ar. *Nub.* 449), “thieves” (Eup. fr. 365, Ar. *Nub.* 177–179), and

41 Plato Comicus' datable plays range from c. 422–391 BCE: Carey 2000, 425–426; Pirrotta 2009, 39–41; Storey 2011, 3.158–163.

42 Carey 2000, 425–426.

sloppy dancers (Eup. fr. 18). To *Sophists* perhaps belongs also the previously unassigned fr. 207, cited by Plutarch in his biography of Pericles as an attack by Plato on the musician Damon: “but first tell me, please,” one character asks another, “for you are allegedly that Chiron who reared Pericles” (πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μοι λέξον, ἀντιβोलῶ· σὺ γὰρ | ὥς φασι [ᾧ] Χείρων ἐξέθρεψας Περικλέα). The imperative (λέξον) and the second-person pronoun (σύ) indicate that Damon appeared on stage in Plato’s comedy, and the pseudo-honorific “Chiron” (a reference to the learned, mythological Centaur who raised Achilles) resembles such sarcastic appellations as “Goodness, O Thrasymachus, who of the lawyers says this garbage” in Aristophanes’ *Banqueters* (fr. 205), “the man’s a Thales” in *Birds* (1009), and “well done, O Palamedes, you most clever creature!” in *Frogs* (1451).⁴³

From this brief survey of fragments, some conclusions may be drawn that shed light on Socrates and his era. If Storey’s dating of 424 BCE for Eupolis’ *Nanny Goats* is right, it marks the beginning of a period towards the end of the decade-long Archidamian War (431–421 BCE) during which the popularity of intellectual comedies appears to have peaked in Athens: the following year, 423 BCE, saw two comedies at the Dionysia featuring Socrates as a character (Ameipsias’ *Connus*, and Aristophanes’ *Clouds*), and in 421 and 420 BCE, Eupolis twice pilloried the profligate Callias (also a character in Plato and Xenophon) in *Flatterers* and *Autolycus* for wasting his money on sophists and parasites. Given this grouping, one is tempted to propose a comparatively early date for Plato’s *Sophists*, whose potential dates run nearly the entire last quarter of the fifth century. The majority of these comedies appear to have focused on the contemporary thinker as a social animal, interacting primarily in contexts outside the school, and especially in *symposia*. Such appears to be the case in Eupolis’ *Nanny Goats*, *Flatterers*, and *Autolycus*, and in Ameipsias’ *Connus*, all from the late-420s BCE, as well as in Plato Comicus’ *Sophists* (which may be contemporary), though Eupolis’ *Nanny Goats* (like *Clouds*) features scenes with Prodamus for which a schoolroom setting seems more plausible (esp. frs. 4, 11, 17, 18). These comedies all employed a broad definition of “sophist,” including

43 Storey 1988 has complicated Aristophanes’ seemingly straightforward vocative, “O Thrasymachus,” by suggesting that this Thrasymachus is not the sophist from *Republic* 1, but rather the given name of “Buggered Boy.” In light of these examples, which he acknowledges, Storey’s argument that such a use is “without good parallel in extant Aristophanes” seems mistaken—to say nothing of the underlying assumptions, first, that absence of evidence is evidence of absence, and second, that Aristophanes could not be making a new sort of joke. I appeal here to the *lectio hilarior*, which states that in a Comedy, the funnier reading is the likelier.

Socrates and Protagoras alongside musicians, grammarians, choreographers, augurs, poets, and priests, and their humor appears to have derived from the character and the habits of these intellectuals and educators as well as from the foibles and ineptitude of their students.

3 The Originality of *Clouds*

These “intellectual comedies” from the 430s and 420s BCE no doubt established the audiences’ and the judges’ expectations, and it is among them that *Clouds* ought to be read and studied. To be sure, this is not how Aristophanes wanted his play to be remembered. He had presented *Clouds* at the City Dionysia in 424/3 BCE, and had finished disappointingly in third place, behind Cratinus’ *Pytine* and Ameipsias’ *Connus*. At the Lenaia the following winter, Aristophanes criticized the previous year’s judges in the *parabasis* of *Wasps*: “though you were lucky to find such a defender [sc. myself], such a cleanser of this country, you betrayed him last year when he planted his most original (καινοτάταις) ideas, and you made them barren by not thinking clearly” (1043–1045). He subsequently revised the text of *Clouds*, and within a few years (between 420–416 BCE) he had produced a new text, which now included the claim that *Clouds* was “the most sophisticated” of his comedies (ταύτην σοφώτατ’ ἔχειν τῶν ἐμῶν κωμῳδιῶν, 523).⁴⁴ The revised *Clouds* is, of course, the version that we possess, and most likely the one that Plato (who was too young to have seen the original production in person) and his successors knew as well.⁴⁵ The new *parabasis* went on to describe the revised play as a fresh and original comedy that rejects traditional sorts of jokes: dangling phalluses (537–539), jokes about bald men and obscene dances (540), grumpy old men beating others with sticks (541–542), torches and cries of pain (543). Aristophanes then characterized himself as a boldly original poet: “I don’t look to deceive you with the same jokes over and over again, but I skillfully devise ideas that are always fresh, never the same as one another, and all clever” (οὐδ’ ὑμᾶς ζητῶ ῥαπατᾶν δις καὶ τρίς ταῦτ’ εἰσάγων, | ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ καινὰς ιδέας εἰσφέρων σοφίζομαι, | οὐδὲν ἄλλῃ-λαισιν ὁμοίᾳς καὶ πάσας δεξιᾶς, 546–548). What are we to make of these bold claims?

44 On the dating of Aristophanes’ revision of *Clouds* see esp. Dover 1968, lxxx–xcviii; Kopff 1990; Storey 1993.

45 For the argument that the original *Clouds* circulated in antiquity alongside the revised version, see Dover 1968, lxxxv–xc.

Generations of readers have taken Aristophanes at his word, embracing his indignation in the *parabasis* as sincere. But when *Clouds* is considered alongside the other intellectual comedies of the period, it becomes clear that Aristophanes' claims to originality are hyperbolic.⁴⁶ Not only was Aristophanes indebted to Cratinus, and perhaps to Eupolis as well, for their intellectual comedies of the 430s and 420s BCE, but he had also already embarked four years earlier on an apparently similar critique of sophistic education in *Banqueters*, a play to which he appeals directly in the revised *parabasis* of *Clouds* (528–529).⁴⁷ These facts do not lessen the importance of *Clouds* in the intellectual history of the late-fifth century BCE, nor do they mean that *Clouds* was merely derivative and therefore uninteresting. On the contrary, the status of *Clouds* as the sole extant example of this thriving subgenre of Old Comedy only increases its value. The writing of comedies satirizing intellectuals was well established by the 420s BCE, and we know that Socrates himself was *specifically* singled out for ridicule by several comedians besides Aristophanes, especially by Ameipsias and Eupolis. Carey has suggested, following Reckford, that Aristophanes' *Clouds* showed a greater interest in the contents of sophistic doctrine than any of his comic predecessors.⁴⁸ But their hypothesis does not hold up: we know, if we can believe the *scholia*, that Aristophanes' esoteric joke about the *πινγεύς* (*Nub.* 96–97) was borrowed from Cratinus' *All-Seers*; and fr. 158–159 of this lost play (which is perhaps as much as a decade older than *Clouds*) may also have exploited the comedic potential of Hippon's theories about water and moisture.

Moreover, like Ameipsias' *φροντισταί* in *Connus* and the chorus of Plato's *Sophists*, Aristophanes' *Clouds* invoked a broad definition of σοφιστής: his Socrates is interested not only in celestial phenomena and physics, but in meter, diction, and rhythm (638–651), argument (98–99, 657), grammar (658–692), and dialectic (740–742); and he too is associated with a variety of experts and pretenders to expertise:

For, by Zeus, you do not know how many sophists (σοφιστάς) they [sc. the Clouds] nourish, Thurian prophets, medical practitioners, lazy dandies

46 Even without comparing the plays of his contemporaries and rivals, Aristophanes' claims in the *parabasis* mislead on their own terms; for readings of its inconsistencies see Hubbard 1991, 88–112; O'Reagan 1992, 67–79.

47 It is quite possible, of course, that Aristophanes' indignation in these passages is not meant to be taken seriously, but rather is simply part of Old Comedy's "system of ritualized insults" as described in, e.g., Heath 1990, 152.

48 Carey 2000, 430–431; Reckford 1987, 396.

with onyx rings, song-twisters of Dithyrambic choruses, astrological quacks; they nourish lazy men who do nothing, because [these men] celebrate them with songs (ὅτι τὰύτας μουσσοποιοῦσιν).

AR. *Nub.* 331–334

Discussing σοφιστάς in line 331, Dover suggests the passage “may be the earliest example of the sense ‘teacher of undesirable or superfluous accomplishments,’” but Cratinus had used the word to denote poets in *Followers of Archilochus* (Ἀρχίλοχοι) from at least a decade earlier: “what a hive of sophists you have disturbed” (οἶον σοφιστῶν σμήνος ἀνεδιφήσατε, fr. 2).⁴⁹ Diogenes Laertius, who quotes this passage, explains that “poets too may be sophists (καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ σοφισταί), as Cratinus in *Followers of Archilochus* calls Homer and Hesiod, using the term as a compliment” (2.13). It is difficult to see the compliment in Cratinus fr. 2 that Diogenes observes, since “hive of sophists” seems unmistakably negative, as Dover himself admits.⁵⁰ But since there is nothing about *Clouds* 331–334 to indicate that σοφιστής is meant to denote “teachers,” Dover’s argument about 331 trips over itself: already a decade (at least) before *Clouds*, Cratinus appears to have used σοφιστής mockingly to describe poets, an opinion that is preserved in Socrates’ notion in *Clouds* that the Clouds nourish all of these useless eggheads, “because they celebrate them with songs” (ὅτι τὰύτας μουσσοποιοῦσιν, 334). The point is especially noteworthy as it permits us to see Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, alongside Ameipsias’ *Connus*, contributing to popular opinions about public intellectuals as combative (hence, perhaps, Cratinus’ “hive” metaphor) and insubstantial. Ameipsias, Aristophanes, and Plato Comicus thus inherited (from Cratinus, as far as our surviving texts can tell) a broad comedic definition of σοφιστής that included religious, medical, musical, and proto-scientific experts, as well as poets, who in the fifth century BCE remained the foremost intellectual and moral authorities in Greek culture.⁵¹

49 Dover 1968, ad 331. For Cratinus’ *Followers of Archilochus*, see Bakola 2010, 71; Storey 2011, 1.268–275. Its possible dating ranges widely from the early 440s to the late 430s BCE.

50 Dover 1968, ad 297. Other appearances of the metaphor applied to people reaffirm the negative denotation of “hive”: Ar. *Vesp.* 425, Pl. *Resp.* 552c, *Plt.* 293d.

51 See the important discussion of the term in Edmunds 2006. This also supports the conclusion in Tell 2011, 26, that “the word σοφιστής was in use in reference to a wide category of *sophoi* both during and after Plato’s lifetime.” Socrates seems keen to address the comparatively high moral and intellectual authority of (esp. epic) poets in Pl. *Ion*, Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.10, and in Xenophon’s characterization of Niceratus in *Symposium* (esp. 3.5–6, 4.6–8, 4.45, 8.31); see also the epigram attributed to the Delphic Oracle by Σ *Nub.* 144c: σοφὸς

Why should the originality (or not) of *Clouds* matter? Because Plato in the *Apology* appears to single out Aristophanes' caricature of Socrates in *Clouds* as especially responsible for the popular prejudice against him, and this testimony (confirmed apparently by Aristophanes' claims to originality) has contributed to the influence of *Clouds* on the biographical tradition about Socrates and other figures from the late-fifth century BCE. But if *Clouds* belongs to a broader Old Comic tradition about intellectuals and educators, then we must reassess not only Plato's justification for singling it out from among the comedies that mocked Socrates and his contemporaries, but also the claims of intellectual historians (both ancient and modern) who have (mis?)taken Plato's claims about *Clouds* as evidence for the mistreatment of "philosophers" in Athens during the first decade of the Peloponnesian War.

4 Plato's Reading of *Clouds*—And Its Consequences

In approaching the *Apology*, scholars continue to stress Plato's emphasis on the negative impact of *Clouds* in particular,⁵² but the first mention of comedians in *Apology* does not specify any author or play at all: at 18c6–d1, Socrates complains about his oldest accusers only that "the most unreasonable thing of all is that it is not even possible to know or to speak their names, unless any of them happens to be a comic poet" (ὁ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμωδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν). This could obviously refer to Eupolis or Ameipsias as much as Aristophanes, though scholars and commentators have most often assumed that Aristophanes is its chief target.⁵³ Likewise, in *Phaedo* (70c10–12), Socrates implies that some comedian has described him as "chattering" (ἀδολεσχέω) and, in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, he complains of having a reputation as "a man who seems to chatter and measure the air" (ἀνὴρ ὃς ἀδολεσχεῖν τε δοκῶ καὶ ἀερομετερεῖν, *Oec.*

Σοφοκλῆς, σοφώτερος δ' Εὐριπίδης, | ἀνδρῶν δὲ πάντων Σωκράτης σοφώτερος; cf. DL 2.37, Pl. *Ap.* 21a).

52 For arguments in favor of the primacy of *Clouds*, see e.g. Guthrie 1971b, 374; Vander Waerdt 1994; and Capra (in this volume).

53 Riddell 1877, Burnett 1924, and Miller and Platter 2010 mention plays by Eupolis and Ameipsias, though Riddell remarks that Aristophanes is "doubtless chiefly meant." Likewise, Miller and Platter think that "Aristophanes is the primary referent," and that the description of the charges at 18b7 is an echo of *Clouds*. Helm 1999 and Rose 1989 refer only to Aristophanes. Cf. Hubbard 1991, 106 n. 55; Bouvier 2000.

11.3.3).⁵⁴ Aristophanes does use the word in *Clouds* to describe the inhabitants of the *phrontistêrion* (1484–1485), but only Eupolis (fr. 386) uses it specifically of Socrates, so it is impossible to ascertain to whom Socrates refers in *Phaedo* and *Oeconomicus*. In fact, Plato specifies Aristophanes in only one of the few passages in which Socrates complains about his treatment in Old Comedy: “for you have seen these things yourselves in the comedy by Aristophanes, a certain ‘Socrates’ being carried about there, talking about walking on air and much other nonsense about which I don’t know the slightest thing” (ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω, *Ap.* 19c2–5).

These words invoke a comedy about Socrates that by the time of the trial was already two-and-a-half decades old, and scholars have seen this as evidence for the enduring power and influence of comic performance, arguing that Aristophanes’ representation of Socrates was unforgettable even after two decades.⁵⁵ The influence of the *Clouds* on the Socratic tradition is further enshrined by the number of Socratic texts that quote from or otherwise refer to it. Both Xenophon and Plato, in their respective *Symposia*, quote memorable lines from the play. The Syracusan in Xenophon’s *Symposium* asks Socrates, “Are you the one they call ‘the thinker’ (*ho phrontistês*)” (*Symp.* 6.6: Ἄρα σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ φροντιστὴς ἐπικαλούμενος;), echoing perhaps deliberately the word used of Socrates and his disciples throughout *Clouds* (e.g. 266, 414, 456, 1039).⁵⁶ A moment later, he challenges Socrates to measure the distance between them in “flea feet” (Xen. *Symp.* 6.8.1–2: ἀλλ’ εἰπέ μοι πόσους ψύλλα πόδας ἐμοῦ ἀπέχει), an unmistakable reference to *Clouds* 143–152, when a student explains to Strepsiades the school’s method for measuring the length of flea-jumps (cf. *Nub.* 830–832). Meanwhile, in Plato’s *Symposium*, Alcibiades comments on Socrates’ composure following the Athenian defeat at Delium in 424 BCE: “to me he seemed, as you put it, Aristophanes, to carry himself there just as he does here, ‘swaggering and casting his eyes sideways’” (ἔμοιγ’ ἐδόκει, ὦ Ἀριστόφανες, τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκεῖ διαπορεύεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνθάδε, βρενθυόμενος καὶ τῷ φθαλμῷ παραβάλλων, *Symp.* 221b1–4). Scholars have observed further echoes from *Clouds* in *Euthydemus*, *Laches*, *Menexenus*, *Protagoras*, *Phaedrus*,

54 Xenophon’s verb ἀερομετερεῖν (lit. “to measure the air”) is a *hapax legomenon*. One expects ἀεροβατεῖν as in *Nub.* 225, 1503, and Pl. *Ap.* 19c. Is Xenophon thinking of another Socratic episode, or simply confusing two Aristophanic scenes?

55 See, for instance, Capra (in this volume).

56 Edmunds 2006, 416.

and elsewhere, supporting the notion that Plato felt a need to engage with Aristophanes' play in particular.⁵⁷ Yet the case of Xenophon is less clear. We must be careful not to assume, simply because Xenophon quotes a line from *Clouds* in a text starring Socrates, that *Clouds* was first and foremost in his mind. On the contrary, Xenophon's first reference to a comedy in *Symposium* (when Socrates remarks at 2.24 how "wine refreshes [ὁ οἶνος ἄρδων]" the soul) is not to *Clouds* but to *Knights* (τὸν νοῦν ἴν' ἄρδω, 96, 114), and as we have seen, Eupolis' *Autolycus* appears to have been a far more influential text for Xenophon.

Regardless, Plato's allegation in *Apology* that Old Comedy could destabilize the reputation of private individuals in Athens is also plausible enough; it seems, in fact, assured by the tradition that comedians were on occasion legally barred during the 440s, 430s, and 420s BCE from mocking individuals by name.⁵⁸ So blaming comedians for laying the foundation of prejudice upon which Socrates' prosecutors would build their case is not totally unjustified. But it is quite another thing to argue that the comedians who had caricatured Socrates and his contemporaries on stage a quarter-century earlier had viewed them as genuine threats to the state, or had meant them any harm.⁵⁹ This is nevertheless precisely what intellectual historians (beginning in antiquity) have taken for granted: that Aristophanes' aim in *Clouds* was to raise the audiences' awareness of sophistry and its dangers in order to put an end to it. Diogenes Laertius, for one, appears to embrace fully Plato's apparent (though as we have seen not unequivocal) characterization of Aristophanes as one of Socrates' oldest personal enemies, recording that Anytus first roused "Aristophanes and the comic poets" (2.38) against Socrates.⁶⁰ The *scholia* to Plato's *Apology* (ad 18b)

57 For *Euthydemus*, see Michelini 2000; Tarrant 1991, 165; for *Laches*, see Tessitore 1994, 123; for *Menexenus*, see Trivigno 2009, 34 and n. 33; for *Protagoras*, see Capra 2001; for *Phaedrus*, see Moore 2015.

58 Σ Nub. 31. For the 440s, see Σ Ves. 67. For the 430s, see the decree, passed in 440/39 BCE, forbidding the mockery of any person by name (Σ Ar. Ach. 67). For the 420s, the law passed by Cleon, after Aristophanes' attack in *Knights* of 424 BCE (Σ Aelius Aristides 117.18). That comedians continued nevertheless to defy these laws seems equally assured both from the fact that these laws had to be passed again and again, decade after decade (and were therefore never successfully enforced), as well as from the contents of the extant comedies and fragments.

59 As Dover 1968, lvi, acknowledges, the same audience that had awarded Aristophanes first prize for his denouncement of Cleon in *Knights* in 424 BCE proceeded nevertheless to reelect Cleon as general the year after.

60 See the brief, but bitter, scene between Socrates and Anytus at Pl. *Meno* 89e–95a.

elaborates: “this Anytus was the son of Anthemion, an Athenian citizen, and lover of Alcibiades, a rich man from his tannery; he was made fun of for this by Socrates (ῥέθεν καὶ σκωπτόμενος ὑπὸ Σωκράτους), and for this reason he persuaded Meletus with a bribe (μισθῶ) to bring Socrates to court on the charge of impiety.” The mockery of Anytus by Socrates for his tanning business recalls the fun made by Aristophanes of Cleon (esp. in *Knights* of 424 BCE; but cf. *Ach.* 377–382 and *Vesp.* 1284–1291), also a successful tanner.⁶¹ But Diogenes’ description of Anytus rousing Aristophanes and the comic poets against Socrates, over two decades before initiating the legal process that ended his life, is surely anachronistic, and based on two questionable assumptions: first, that Aristophanes was the first and foremost comedian to attack Socrates, and second, that his portrait of Socrates in the *Clouds* was malicious in its intent and effect. The fragments of intellectual comedies from the 420s BCE (some also featuring Socrates) show the first of these assumptions to be false: Aristophanes was neither the first to ridicule Socrates on stage nor (if Lucian’s testimony about Eupolis is to be believed) was he necessarily the harshest. But no less problematic is the notion that Aristophanes aimed his comedy deliberately and maliciously at a man whom he felt posed a genuine threat to the state. Two pieces of evidence call this assumption into question. First, the evidence of Plato’s *Symposium*, where not only do Aristophanes and Socrates associate on apparently amiable terms, but at 221b1–4 Alcibiades quotes explicitly and unapologetically from *Clouds* (362–363) in his encomiastic praise of Socrates.⁶² While this does not prove, of course, that Socrates (to say nothing of Plato) and Aristophanes were on good terms, it is significant to find a comedian included by name among a group who “all share in common a mad passion and frenzy for philosophy (τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶ βακχείας)” (*Symp.* 218a7–b4). Second, if Aristophanes had intended to warn his audience of the dangers of associating with Socrates, then his play had little effect—and perhaps the opposite effect. Dover argues that Socrates’ behavior at Potidaea and Delium, as described in *Symposium* (219e–220e) and *Laches* (181b), had made him the

61 The similarities between Socratic mockery and the comic phenomenon of ὀνομαστί κωμῶδειν (publically ridiculing well-known individuals by name) is an especially valuable point of contact between the Socratic tradition and the texts of Greek Old Comedy, and would merit further study. For ὀνομαστί κωμῶδειν and the resulting lawsuits, see Ar. *Ach.* 502–503. Evidence includes [Xenophon] *Constitution of the Athenians* 2.18, as well as the *scholia* on Aristophanes *Clouds* (ad 31), *Acharnians* (ad 67, 1150), *Birds* (ad 1279), and *Frogs* (ad 153 and 404); discussions in Halliwell 1984; Sommerstein 1986 and 1996; Rosen 1988, esp. 59–82; Atkinson 1992; Rusten 2011, 89–91.

62 Heath 1987, 9–12.

subject of conversations, and that his “appearance, manner, and way of life” must have been well known in Athens by the time of *Clouds* (and of Ameipsias’ *Connus*).⁶³ But it seems more likely that these two plays helped thrust Socrates fully, and perhaps unexpectedly, out of anonymity. The dramatic dates of Plato’s dialogues, only three of which (*Parmenides*, *Protagoras*, and *Charmides*) may confidently be dated before 424/3 BCE, support this claim. In *Charmides*, for instance, which is dated to the end of the military action at Potidaea in 429 BCE, Socrates seems surprised to learn that the young Charmides even knows his name (156a). On the other hand, the bulk of Socrates’ conversations seem to date from post-423 BCE, suggesting that Plato wished to represent this period as Socrates’ most active.⁶⁴ His growing notoriety in the second half of the 420s BCE may have been due in part to his fortitude and heroism at Potidaea and later at Delium (424 BCE), to which Laches and Alcibiades were witnesses;⁶⁵ but his appearance in *two* plays in a single Dionysia, in front of as many as 17,000 spectators, surely helped to make “Socrates” a household name, and by the time of *Birds* (414 BCE) Socrates was well known enough for Aristophanes to coin the verb “socratize” (σωκρατέω, 1282; and cf. 1553–1564). If Aristophanes had wished to discourage his countrymen from associating with Socrates, he appears only to have made them more eager to do so; if his wish was to motivate legal action against Socrates and his ilk, then the charges were slow in coming.

Nevertheless, scholars have largely continued to take the Platonic Socrates and Diogenes Laertius at their word, and these ancient *testimonia* have spawned an influential narrative about the trial and death of Socrates that invokes his treatment by Aristophanes in *Clouds* as evidence of his growing unpopularity, already in the 420s BCE. According to this common narrative, Aristophanes’ aim in *Clouds* was to show the Athenians “how the teaching of one of their fellow citizens threatened the welfare of the state.”⁶⁶ This remark by Grey is now over a century old, but the sentiment is echoed influentially in Dover’s introduction to the play:

We can at any rate infer from the mere fact of his writing the play that he did not regard the pursuit of philosophy as a necessary ingredient of a civilized society, and his portrayal of the effect of Socrates’ teaching on

63 Dover 1968, l–lii.

64 The developmental chronology proposed by Zuckert 2009, 8–19, supports this hypothesis.

65 See the descriptions of his behavior in *Symposium* (219e–220e) and *Laches* (181b); Edmunds 2004, 196. Cf. Patzer 1994, 60–67; Nightingale 1995, 15–17 and n. 8.

66 Grey 1896, 15; cf. Couat 1889, 279.

the character of Pheidippides is an invitation to violence, or repressive legislation, against such teachers.

DOVER 1968, lvi

The great Marxist ancient historian de Ste. Croix, citing Dover's commentary, evidently also took Plato's account in the *Apology* for granted, claiming that Aristophanes' "caricature of Socrates in *Clouds* undoubtedly contributed to the hostility with which he was regarded by many Athenians at the time of his trial."⁶⁷ These historians and commentators saw Aristophanes alone behind Socrates' complaints (in *Apology* and *Phaedo*) about his treatment in Comedy—thanks in large part, no doubt, to Plato's reference to *Clouds* at *Apology* 19c—and despite the fact that several other comedies from the period featured Socrates in their plays.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, Plato's story of the trial and death of Socrates—invoking as it seems to do the pernicious influence of "Aristophanes" on the litigious and fickle Athenian demos—lurks in the background to the biographies of many ancient intellectuals, which commonly hold comedians responsible for the ill-treatment of thinkers and educators in Athens. Take the case of Cratinus' *All-Seers*: fr. 167b (from the *scholia* to Clement of Alexandria) reports that "Cratinus remembered Hippon as being impious [ὡς ἄσεβοῦς γενομένου]" (*ad* 24.2 = Hippon 26 A 2 DK); and both Athenaeus (13.610b) and Simplicius (*Phys* 23.22 = Hippon 38.A4) also refer to Hippon as "godless" (ὁ ἄθεος). Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* mentions him among a group who claimed that nothing exists beyond our senses: "as for instance Hippon, who was first charged as an atheist [πρότερον ὁ ἄθεος ἐπικληθεὶς], since this man declared that nothing exists beyond the objects of our perception" (462.29–31 = Hippon 26 A 9 DK). While it is possible that Cratinus characterized Hippon as comically rejecting Athenian religious orthodoxy, much like Aristophanes' Socrates would later do in *Clouds* (e.g. 247–248, 367–424), there is no evidence apart from Alexander's comment that Hippon was "brought to trial as an atheist" (ὁ ἄθεος ἐπικληθεὶς), and none of the fragments of *All-Seers* supports his claim. We therefore have reason to accept the hypothesis that Hippon's impiety is the invention of a later age, and beside the point of Cratinus' comedy.

67 De Ste. Croix 1972, 235 and cf. 371.

68 This belief has continued to influence treatments of Aristophanic politics for over fifty years. For Aristophanes as representative of a general Athenian animosity toward "philosophers," see Filonik 2013, 57; for Socrates as a threat to democracy, see Vlastos 1983; Wood and Wood 1986; Mhire 2014.

A series of similar episodes surround the friends of Pericles, including the presocratic Anaxagoras, the Milesian Aspasia, and the musician Damon. The story of Anaxagoras' trial for impiety (ἀσεβεία; see DL 2.12–14) is impossible to dismiss entirely, but bears many signs of being a comedic invention.⁶⁹ The first to mention the trial is Diodorus Siculus in the first century BCE, who puts it in the context of a series of political attacks against Pericles. As Diodorus explains (12.39.3.1–5), Pericles recognized that only a great war would distract the Athenians from their petty and envious lawsuits, and brought about the war with Sparta as a diversion from the suits against him. He then cites as evidence for this claim several comic passages that question Pericles' motivation of the Megarian Decree (12.40.6 = Ar. *Pax* 603–606, 609–611, *Ach.* 530–531, and Eup. *Demes* fr. 102). Meanwhile, in Plutarch's biography of Pericles, his Milesian consort Aspasia appears not only as the object of a fictitious prosecution inspired by comedy, but according to Plutarch (*Per.* 32) she was actually brought to trial by a comedian, Hermippus, who had attacked Pericles directly in at least one comedy (Hermippus fr. 47 *PCG* = Plutarch *Per.* 36.6). Alongside these associates of Pericles fits also the musician and educator Damon, and whom Storey identifies behind Eupolis' pseudonymous "Prodamus" in *Nanny Goats*. Plutarch (again, in the *Life of Pericles*) reports that Damon was "an utter sophist, who under the name of music concealed from the masses his utmost cleverness" (ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἔοικεν ἄκρος ὦν σοφιστὴς καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν δεινότητα, *Per.* 4.2). Accordingly, he was unmasked as "scheming" (μεγαλοπράγμων) and a "lover of tyranny" (φιλοτύραννος), and ultimately ostracized. But once again, the extant fragments of *Nanny Goats* reveal nothing dangerous about Prodamus or his lessons; nor is there any reason to suggest either impiety or apostasy on the part of the educator, who is characterized as a useful—if pretentious—member of Athenian high society. When specifying that Damon's ostracism "provided a source of amusement for the comedians" (παρέσχε τοῖς κωμικοῖς διατρίβην), Plutarch does not mention Eupolis, but cites Plato Comicus as the source of the line. I have suggested that perhaps Plato Comicus' fr. 207 (= Plut. *Per.* 4.1) belongs to his *Sophists*, but again none of the few surviving fragments of this lost comedy appear to have treated intellectuals as a particularly menacing phenomenon. Even Aristophanes may not be unequivocally accused of ill-will towards Socrates: when Strepsiades appears late in *Clouds* with torches to burn down the *Phrontistêrion*, why should we imagine that Aristophanes is (for the first time in the play) offering Strepsiades' behavior as a model for his audience to follow, and

69 Dover 1968, xxxviii; Mansfeld 1979; Woodbury 1981; Filonik 2013, 27–33.

not simply making a stock joke of Old Comedy? After all, both the torches and the subsequent cries of pain appear among the stock comic elements that Aristophanes lists in the revised *parabasis* (*Nub.* 543), suggesting that he is (as throughout the *parabasis*) most concerned with making some good jokes, and not necessarily a political point. In fact, outside of the claims by Plato's Socrates about comedians in the *Apology*, there is no reason to believe that the *Clouds*, or any other intellectual comedy for that matter, was particularly malicious or had any measurable political or legal consequence. It is possible that, if we had the complete comedies of Cratinus, Eupolis, and Plato, their anti-intellectual biases would be revealed; but the fact remains that none of the extant fragments suggests that old comic poets sought to bring about legal action against the thinkers they satirized. As Plato's *Protagoras* puts it, "I have never suffered anything bad on account of claiming to be a sophist" (μηδὲν δεινὸν πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστὴς εἶναι, 317b–c).⁷⁰

Of course, some thinkers and intellectuals besides Socrates may actually have suffered legal action against them in Athens: the reward promised for the death or capture of the "atheist" Diagoras of Melos is one example, though it rests again upon two passages of Aristophanes (*Nub.* 830, *Av.* 1072–1075) and their respective *scholia*, and another from the pseudo-Lysianic speech *Against Andocides* (6.17).⁷¹ But most appear, like Hippon, Damon, and Aspasia to be subjects of fictitious trials, modeled on the trial of Socrates by later biographers drawing uncritically from comedy as a historical source. These biographers composed their own accounts of Athenian anti-intellectualism by building upon Socrates's comments about comedy in the *Apology*, and by reading Aristophanes' *Clouds* as unique and malicious in its attack. Their reading of *Clouds* ignored both the tradition of intellectual comedies to which *Clouds* belonged, and the profound changes in the intellectual atmosphere of Athens in the quarter-century between the production of these comedies in the 430s and 420s BCE and the trial and execution of Socrates in 399 BCE. Aristophanes wrote *Clouds* at a moment when intellectual comedies were at the height of their popularity, and when sophistic education was new enough and perceived as goofy enough to be funny. Hippon, Protagoras, and Damon had come under its lens, and perhaps even Gorgias too, if the anecdote of the sparrow defecating upon him (82 A 23 DK = Arist. *Rh.* 3, 1403b14) originates in comedy, as some have

70 For the (again fictitious) trial of Protagoras and the burning of his books by the Athenians, see DL 9.51, Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.63, Plut. *Nic.* 23.4, Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9.56, and discussion by Filonik 2013, 36–39.

71 See Janko 1997, 87–94; Filonik 2013, 46–51.

proposed.⁷² A decade later the climate for intellectuals in Athens had changed, yet the revised *Clouds* remained, boldly proclaiming its originality to all who cared to believe, and enshrining itself perhaps unintentionally in the minds of ancient and modern readers alike as the play that killed Socrates. It is a great irony therefore that the significance of *Clouds* in the intellectual history of the late-fifth century BCE rests not in breaking with the tradition, as Aristophanes would have had it, but rather in representing it so well.

References

- Arieti, J.A. *Interpreting Plato: the dramas as dialogue*. Savage, MD 1991.
- Arieti, J.A. and R.M. Barrus. *Plato's Protagoras: translation, commentary, and appendices*. Lanham, MD 2011.
- Atkinson, J.E. 'Curbing the comedians: Cleon vs. Aristophanes and Syracosios' decree', *CQ* 42 (1992), 56–64.
- Bakola, E. *Cratinus and the art of comedy*. Oxford 2010.
- Bergk, T. *Commentationum de reliquiis comoediae Atticae antiquae libri duo*. Leipzig 1838.
- Biles, Z.P. *Aristophanes and the poetics of competition*. Cambridge 2011.
- Bouvier, D. 'Platon et les poètes comiques: peut-on rire de la mort de Socrate?', in: M.L. Desclos, *Le rire des Grecs: anthropologie du rire en Grèce ancienne*. Grenoble 2000, 425–440.
- Bowie, E.L. 'Who is Dicaeopolis?' *JHS* 108 (1988), 183–185.
- Brock, R. 'Plato and comedy', in: E.M. Craik, *Owls to Athens: essays on classical subjects presented to Sir Kenneth Dover*. Oxford 1990, 39–49.
- Burnet, J. *Plato: Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito*. Oxford 1924.
- Capra, A. *Ἀγὼν λόγων: il Protagora di Platone tra eristica e commedia*. Milan 2001.
- Capra, A. 'Protagoras' Achilles: Homeric allusion as a satirical weapon (Pl. *Prt.* 340a)', *CPh* 100 (2005), 274–277.
- Carey, C. 'Old comedy and the sophists', in: D. Harvey and J. Wilkins, *The rivals of Aristophanes: studies in Athenian old comedy*. London 2000, 419–436.
- Cassio, A.C. *Aristofane: Banchettanti (Δαιταλῆς). I frammenti*. Pisa 1978.
- Charalabopoulos, N.G. *Platonic drama and its ancient reception*. Cambridge 2012.
- Clay, D. 'The tragic and comic poet of the *Symposium*', *Arion* 2 (1979), 238–261.
- Clay, D. 'The origins of the Socratic dialogue', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 23–47.
- Cooper, L. *An Aristotelian theory of comedy*. New York, 1922.

72 Rosenmeyer 1955, 225.

- Couat, A. *Aristophane et l'ancienne comédie Attique*. Paris, 1889.
- Dover, K.J. *Aristophanes: Clouds*. Oxford 1968.
- Edmunds, L. 'Il Socrate aristofaneo e l'ironia practica', *QUCC* 26 (1987), 7–21.
- Edmunds, L. 'The practical irony of the historical Socrates', *Phoenix* 58 (2004), 193–207.
- Edmunds, L. 'What was Socrates called?' *CQ* 56 (2006), 414–425.
- Filonik, J. 'Athenian impiety trials: a reappraisal', *Dike* 14 (2013), 11–96.
- Geissler, P. *Chronologie der altattischen Komödie*. Munich 1969.
- Giangiulio, M. 'Pericle e gli intellettuali: Damone e Anassagora in Plut. *Per.* 4–8 tra costruzione biografica e tradizione', in: L. Breglia and M. Lupi, *Da Elea a Samo: filosofi e politici di fronte all'impero ateniese*. Naples 2005, 151–182.
- Gooch, P.W. 'Socratic irony and Aristotle's *eiron*: some puzzles', *Phoenix* 41 (1987), 95–104.
- Greene, W.C. 'The spirit of comedy in Plato', *HSPH* 31 (1920), 63–123.
- Grey, W.R. *The treatment of philosophy and philosophers by the Greek comic poets*. Diss. Johns Hopkins 1896.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *The sophists*. Cambridge 1971a.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *Socrates*. Cambridge 1971b.
- Halliwell, S. 'Ancient interpretations of ὀνομαστικῶς μὲν in Aristophanes', *CQ* 34 (1984), 82–88.
- Halliwell, F.S. 'Authorial collaboration in the Athenian comic theatre', *GRBS* 30 (1989), 515–528.
- Heath, M. *Political comedy in Aristophanes*. Göttingen 1987.
- Heath, M. 'Aristophanes and his rivals', *G&R* 37 (1990), 143–158.
- Helm, J.J. *Plato: Apology*. Mundelein, IL 1997.
- Hubbard, T.K. 'Parabolic self-criticism and the two versions of Aristophanes' *Clouds*', *CLAnt* 5 (1986), 182–197.
- Hubbard, T.K. *The mask of comedy: Aristophanes and the intertextual parabasis*. Ithaca 1991.
- Janko, R. 'The physicist as hierophant: Aristophanes, Socrates and the authorship of the Derveni papyrus', *ZPE* 118 (1997), 61–94.
- Kaibel, G. 'Zur attischen Komödie', *Hermes* 24 (1889), 35–66.
- Karavites, P. 'Socrates in the *Clouds*', *CB* 50 (1973–1974), 65–69.
- Kerferd, G.B. *The sophistic movement*. Cambridge 1981.
- Konstan, D. 'Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', in: D.R. Morrison, *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011, 75–90.
- Kopff, E.C. 'The date of Aristophanes, *Nubes* II', *AJP* 111 (1990), 318–329.
- Laks, A. and R. Saetta Cottone. *Comédie et philosophie. Socrate et les 'présocratiques' dans les Nuées d'Aristophane*. Paris 2013.
- MacDonald, J. *Character-portraiture in Epicharmus, Sophron, and Plato*. Sewanee, TN 1931.

- MacDowell, D.M. *Aristophanes and Athens*. Oxford 1995.
- Mader, M. *Das Problem des Lachens und der Komödie bei Platon*. Stuttgart 1977.
- Mansfeld, J. 'The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian period and the date of his trial', *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979), 39–69.
- Mhire, J.J. 'Rethinking the quarrel anew: politics and boasting in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', in: J.J. Mhire and B.-P. Frost, *The political theory of Aristophanes: explorations in poetic wisdom*. Albany 2014, 47–66.
- Michellini, A.N. 'Socrates plays the buffoon: cautionary protreptic in *Euthydemus*', *AJPh* 121 (2000), 509–535.
- Miller, P.A. and C. Platter. *Plato's Apology of Socrates: a commentary*. Norman, OK 2010.
- Moore, C. 'Socrates and self-knowledge in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', *CQ* 65 (2015), 534–551.
- Nightingale, A.W. *Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy*. Cambridge 1995.
- Notomi, N. 'A protagonist of the sophistic movement? Protagoras in historiography', in: J.M. van Ophuijsen, M. van Raalte, and P. Stork, *Protagoras of Abdera: the man, his measure*. Leiden 2003, 11–36.
- Olson, S.D. *Broken laughter: select fragments of Greek comedy*. Oxford 2007.
- O'Reagan, D. *Rhetoric comedy and the violence of language in Aristophanes' Clouds*. Oxford 1992.
- Papageorgiou, N. 'Prodicus and the agon of the logoi in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', *QUCC* 78 (2004) 61–69.
- Parker, L.P.E. 'Eupolis or Dicaeopolis?' *JHS* 111 (1991), 203–208.
- Patzer, A. 'Sokrates in den fragmenten der Attisches Komödie', in: A. Bierle, P. von Möllendorf and S. Vogt, *Orchestra, Drama, Mythos, Bühne*. Stuttgart 1994, 50–81.
- Petrie, R. 'Aristophanes and Socrates', *Mind* 20.80 (1911), 507–520.
- Pieters, J.T.M. *Kratinus. Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der vroeg-attische comedie. Suivi d'un abrégé en français*. Leiden 1946.
- Pirrotta, S. *Plato Comicus, Die fragmentarischen Komödien: ein Kommentar*. Berlin 2009.
- Raubitschek, A.E. 'Damon', *C&M* 16 (1955), 78–83.
- Reckford, K.J. *Aristophanes' old-and-new comedy: six essays in perspective*. Chapel Hill, NC 1987.
- Riddell, J. *The Apology of Plato*. Oxford 1877.
- Rose, G.P. *Plato's Apology*. Bryn Mawr 1989.
- Rosen, R.M. *Old comedy and the iambographic tradition. American Classical Studies*, XIX. Atlanta 1988.
- Rosenmeyer, T.G. 'Gorgias, Aeschylus, and *apate*', *AJPh* 76 (1955), 225–260.
- Ruffel, I. 'A total write-off: Aristophanes, Cratinus, and the rhetoric of comic competition', *CQ* 52 (2002), 138–163.
- Rusten, J. 'The four "new Lenaeon victors" of 428–5 BCE (and the date of the first Lenaeon comedy)', *ZPE* 156 (2006), 22–26.

- Rusten, J. *The birth of comedy*. Baltimore 2011.
- Saxonhouse, A. 'Comedy in Callipolis: animal imagery in the *Republic*', *American Political Science Review* 72 (1978), 888–901.
- Segoloni, L.M. *Socrate a banchetto: il Simposio di Platone e i Banchettanti di Aristofane*. Roma 1994.
- Sidwell, K. 'Authorial competition? Aristophanes' *Knights* and Eupolis', *GRBS* 34 (1993), 365–389.
- Sommerstein, A.H. 'Konnos' figleaf?' *CQ* 33 (1983), 488–489.
- Sommerstein, A.H. 'The decree of Syrakosios', *CQ* 36 (1986), 101–107.
- Sommerstein, A.H. 'How to avoid being a *Komodoumenos*', *CQ* 46 (1996), 327–356.
- Ste. Croix, G.E.M. de. *The origins of the Peloponnesian War*. London 1972.
- Storey, I.C. 'Eupolis 352K', *Phoenix* 39 (1985), 154–157.
- Storey, I.C. 'Thrasymachos at Athens: Aristophanes fr. 205 (*Daitales*)', *Phoenix* 42 (1988), 212–218.
- Storey, I.C. 'Dating and re-dating Eupolis', *Phoenix* 44 (1990), 1–30.
- Storey, I.C. 'The dates of Aristophanes' *Clouds* 11 and Eupolis' *Baptai*: a reply to E.C. Kopff', *AJPh* 114 (1993), 71–84.
- Storey, I.C. *Eupolis: poet of Old Comedy*. Oxford 2003.
- Storey, I.C. *Fragments of Old Comedy*. Cambridge, MA 2011.
- Tarrant, D. 'Plato as dramatist', *JHS* 75 (1955), 82–89.
- Tarrant, H. 'Plato, prejudice, and the mature-age student in antiquity', *Apeiron* 29 (1996), 105–120.
- Tell, H. *Plato's counterfeit sophists*. Cambridge, MA 2011.
- Tessitore, A. 'Courage and comedy in Plato's *Laches*', *Journal of Politics* 56 (1994), 115–133.
- Trivigno, F.V. 'The rhetoric of parody in Plato's *Menexenus*', *Ph&Rh* 42 (2009), 29–58.
- Tylawski, E.I. *Saturio's inheritance: the Greek ancestry of the Roman comic parasite*. New York 2002.
- Usher, M.D. 'Satyr play in Plato's *Symposium*', *AJPh* 123 (2002), 205–228.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. 'Socrates in the *Clouds*', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 48–86.
- Vickers, M. 'Alcibiades on stage: Aristophanes' *Birds*', *Historia* 38 (1989), 267–299.
- Vasiliou, I. 'Conditional irony in the Socratic dialogues', *CQ* 49 (1999), 456–472.
- Vlastos, G. 'The historical Socrates and Athenian democracy', *Political Theory* 11 (1983), 495–516.
- Vlastos, G. 'Socratic irony', *CQ* 37 (1987), 79–96.
- Vlastos, G. *Socrates: ironist and moral philosopher*. Ithaca 1991.
- Vlastos, G. 'Socrates' reverse irony', *CQ* 52 (2002), 220–230.
- Vries, G.J. de. 'Laughter in Plato's writings', *Mnemosyne* 38 (1985), 378–381.

- Whitehorne, J. 'Aristophanes' representations of "intellectuals"', *Hermes* 130 (2002), 28–35.
- Wolfsdorf, D.C. 'The historical reader of Plato's *Protagoras*', *CQ* 48 (1998), 126–133.
- Wolfsdorf, D.C. 'The irony of Socrates', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65 (2007), 175–187.
- Wolfsdorf, D.C. 'ΕΙΡΩΝΕΙΑ in Aristophanes and Plato', *CQ* 58 (2008), 666–672.
- Wood, E.M. and N. Wood. 'Socrates and democracy: A reply to Gregory Vlastos', *Political Theory* 14 (1986), 55–82.
- Woodbury, L. 'Anaxagoras and Athens', *Phoenix* 35 (1981), 295–315.
- Zanker, P. *The mask of Socrates: the image of the intellectual in antiquity*, tr. A. Shapiro. Berkeley 1995.
- Zuckert, C.H. *Plato's philosophers: the coherence of the dialogues*. Chicago 2009.

Aristophanes' Iconic Socrates

Andrea Capra

Durham University

λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτοὺς δι' ὧν σκώπτουσιν ἐπαινοῦντες αὐτόν

DL 2.27, on comic playwrights who abuse Socrates



In this chapter I shall try to sketch what is in my view Aristophanes' main contribution to the history of Socratism.¹ Aristophanes, I shall argue, provided Socrates with a (literally) “iconic” status that proved a major influence for Socratic writers and for Plato in particular, to the extent that it would be hard to imagine Plato's Socrates in the absence of Aristophanes'. In many ways, Socrates' aspect, behavior, and even views as they appear in Socratic literature were ultimately shaped by Aristophanes' *visual* characterization.

1 Comic Avatars

Let me begin by listing a few data in chronological order:

427 BCE. Aristophanes' first play, the now lost *Banqueteers*, compared the traditional with the new, corrupt education. Socrates may have been a character of the play, as a champion of the latter.² The comedy was second in the agon of the City Dionysia.

423 BCE. Aristophanes produced the *Clouds* at the City Dionysia. Socrates is the main individual target of the comedy: he is in fact the second great figure

1 Stavru 2013 provides a useful and updated *status questionis* on Socratic studies. My own references to secondary literature will necessarily be very selective, and I will not discuss the presentation of Socrates by other comic playwrights (see Patzer 1994 for a detailed examination of the relevant sources).

2 Segoloni 1994, 111–193, has come up with very strong arguments to the effect that Socrates should be identified with the dubious *didaskalos* of the *Banqueteers*.

thoroughly attacked by Aristophanes, whose *Acharnians* and *Knights* had singled out Cleon as the city's enemy. *Clouds* came in third and lost the contest to Amipsias' *Connus*, which also lampooned Socrates, and to the *Flask of Wine* by Cratinus, who was the winner.

423–?³ BCE. Aristophanes kept working on the *Clouds*. Apparently, the play's agon and exodus underwent significant revisions,⁴ and the parabasis was entirely rewritten: Aristophanes complains about the incompetence of the audience, who were unable to appreciate the quality of the 423 production.⁵ Except for very few fragments (fr. 392–401 *PCG*), only this revised and retrospective version has survived.

414 BCE. Aristophanes' *Birds* obtains the second prize at the City Dionysia. Toward the end of the play, the Herald sings the praises of the new regime, which he favorably compares with old Athens: back then, people used to go dirty and mean and "Socratize" (1282). Right before the final scene, moreover, the chorus mentions a sinister lake where Socrates acts as a necromancer in the company of his disciple "Chaerephon the Bat" (1553–1564).⁶

405 BCE. At the City Dionysia, Aristophanes presents the *Frogs*, which won the extraordinary distinction of a repeat performance.⁷ The play features a cutting remark about Socrates (1314–1315), whom the chorus identifies as an accomplice of Euripides in the murdering of traditional *mousikê*. As far as we know, this is the poet's last word on Socrates, who drinks the hemlock in 399.

Though it is seldom noticed, Aristophanes' references to Socrates stretch over a quarter of a century, starting from the poet's debut and virtually extending—thanks to the re-performance of the *Frogs* and possibly of the *Clouds*—until

3 Internal evidence may point to c. 414 as the date of the final revision, as Kopff 1999 argues on the basis of *Nub.* 335 and 830.

4 Sommerstein (2009, 183) aptly describes our text of the *Clouds* as a "transitional draft, intermediate between the performed script of 423 BCE and the never completed script that Aristophanes at one time hoped would be performed in, perhaps, 418."

5 The extent to which Aristophanes revised the play is a vexed question. For a recent and well-informed discussion, see Biles 2011, 167–210.

6 On *Av.* 1555 and its possible influence on *Phdr.* 261a7, see Moore 2013.

7 This was probably due to political rather than "artistic" reasons: see Sommerstein 1993. Contrary to common opinion, the *Frogs* did not come first. For a recent discussion of the evidence, cf. Canfora 2014, 402–410.

the philosopher's death and even beyond.⁸ This is important and should affect our understanding of Aristophanes' Socrates. Scholars rightly point out that satire, in order to work, must have a basis in reality,⁹ but it is equally true that Aristophanes' characters come into existence through repetition, until they begin to live a life of their own: Cleonymus may have abandoned his shield in real life, but it is Aristophanes' repeated mention of the event over the years—he attacks him in seven out of nine of his extant fifth-century plays—that made him notorious and synonymous with cowardice. In other words, we should be more sensitive to the fact that comic characters, play after play, tend to build upon themselves, until they become “living *topoi*.”¹⁰ Thus, even the passing remark we find in such a successful comedy as *Frogs* could have the power to revive what was by then a well-established satirical cliché,¹¹ and by the fact that the relevant mask surely remained available for some time and was possibly reused or adapted.¹²

The effects of Aristophanes' repeated mentioning of Socrates over the years could be all the more powerful as the *Clouds*, an early play that the poet presents as the “sister” of the *Banqueteers*, had singled him out as its main target character.¹³ Aelian's story that Socrates stood in the theatre during the performance of the *Clouds* as if to invite comparison between his real self and his comic avatar is intriguing, not least because it alerts us to the danger that the comic image could replace the real one over the years.¹⁴ This is all the

8 *Nub.* 523 seems to imply further performances of the play. On re-performance see Marshall 2012.

9 See, e.g., Bowie 1998, 54, and Konstan 2011, 76.

10 “*Topoi* viventi,” as Treu 1999, 73, nicely puts it. Platter 2014 shows how this applies to Socrates' reputation.

11 This is not the place to discuss the image of Socrates in playwrights other than Aristophanes; Edmunds 2007 argues that the identification between Socrates and the sophists is specific to Aristophanes.

12 Cf. Marshall 1999, 197. On Aristophanes' much-discussed portrait-masks see now Catenacci 2013 and Totaro 2015, who steer clear of over-scepticism. My argument is not affected by this problem, but I agree with them that portrait-masks existed and were recognized as such by the audience. There is also the possibility that statuettes representing Aristophanes' Socrates circulated as a souvenir of sorts. Such statuettes did exist, and although they usually represented stock characters, the archaeologist Mingazzini 1970, 357–358, has argued that one statuette, from the Hellenistic age, does in fact reproduce the aspect of an actor playing Socrates in a later re-performance of the *Clouds*.

13 Cf. *Nub.* 534–536. On the implications of the metaphor, see Imperio 2013.

14 *VH* 2.13.68–70. On this and other more or less fanciful anecdotes concerning Socrates' reaction to comic attacks, see Bouvier 2000, 428–432.

more possible in a world in which there were no visual or acoustic recordings, and individualized portraiture was the exception rather than the rule.¹⁵ Jobless Socrates may well have been always out in the streets, engaged in endless talk with as many bystanders as he could lure into discussion, and yet his comic avatar had a huge advantage, in that he was simultaneously visible or audible to huge audiences. Even today, the image of public figures, however powerful and skillful in controlling and manipulating the media, can be significantly distorted by satirists: one should try to imagine what could possibly happen in classical Athens, where the theater was no doubt one of the most powerful ways to become popular—or, indeed, notorious.

2 The Reaction of the Socratic Circle

In the light of Socrates' involuntary career on the stage, it is not surprising that his companions should be keen on trying to counter the vivid impression left in the Athenians' minds by his comic avatar. The case of the *Clouds* is especially fortunate, as we have an entire play devoted to Socrates, so that we are in a relatively good position to assess its impact on Socratic literature. Even discounting the direct reply found in Plato's *Apology*, to which I shall return, the data are impressive. Long ago, Guthrie made the following point:

Xenophon and Plato make several references to the treatment of Socrates by the comic poets, though not all are certainly to Aristophanes. In the *Oeconomicus* (11.3) he says he is "supposed to be a poor man" and in the *Symposium* (6.6) Xenophon makes a direct reference to the *Clouds* when the impresario rudely asks Socrates not only whether he is "the one they call *phrontistês*" but also whether he can tell him how many feet away a flea is, "for this is the sort of geometry they say you do" (cf. *Clouds* 145f.). At *Phaedo* 70b–c Socrates says drily that if, as a man condemned to death, he discusses the possibility of immortality, "not even a comic poet could say that I am a chatterer about things that don't concern me," and the remark in the *Republic* (488e) that in the "democratic" ship the skilled steersman will be called a "sky-gazer, a chatterer, and useless" is a fairly obvious reference to the Socrates of comedy. In Plato's *Symposium* (221b)

15 Catenacci 2014 discusses a few Athenian exceptions prior to the Peloponnesian war (remarkably, democracy seems to have discouraged the development of individual portraiture).

Alcibiades quotes the actual words from the *Clouds* about his “swaggering and rolling his eyes.”¹⁶

GUTHRIE 1969, 374

Even more interestingly, Plato’s references are integral to the alleged biography of his hero. Vander Waerdt has argued that “the two Platonic texts that might be adduced with greatest plausibility as evidence for Socrates’ own philosophical development both are centrally concerned to respond to Aristophanes’ portrayal.”¹⁷ In other words, the *Clouds* seems to play a crucial role for Xenophon’s and especially for Plato’s construction of their Socrateses. Like other scholars, however, Vander Waerdt described this phenomenon in purely negative terms, and yet this is not the only way to look at Aristophanes’ influence for the definition of the fourth-century Socrates. As I shall argue, Aristophanes’ comic icon of Socrates had also a *positive* influence, which provided a point for deep imaginative and moral reflection by Plato and others.

Socrates’ physical aspect and mannerisms should not be underestimated: unlike its modern counterpart, Greek philosophy is foremost a *bios*, an all-encompassing way of life.¹⁸ The intrinsic inseparability of doctrines, behavior, and aspect takes center stage in Plato’s *Symposium*. The ostensible subject of the dialogue is *erôs*. This is the one area in which Socrates, thanks to the extraordinary teaching of the mysterious Diotima of Mantinea, gives up his usual disclaimer of knowledge by presenting himself as an expert in things erotic.¹⁹ The dialogue also hosts what is by far the fullest and most celebrated portrait of Socrates: Alcibiades’ comparison of Socrates with Marsyas, the satyrs, and especially what Alcibiades refers to as wooden Silenic statuettes, whose ugly and ridiculous aspect conceals—until one opens them up—sublime beauty

16 The list is far from complete. An entire dialogue, the *Protagoras*, is built as a reversal of the *Clouds*, with an impressive number of allusions to both verbal and performative facts. See Capra 2001, chs. 1–3.

17 Vander Waerdt 1994, 5. Vander Waerdt refers of course to the *Phaedo*’s intellectual autobiography (96a–100b) and to Socrates’ remark in the *Apology*, when he points out explicitly that his philosophical inquiry has nothing to do with Aristophanes’ caricature (18b–19d).

18 Hadot 1995 provides a classic discussion of the topic, although his main focus is Hellenistic philosophy. Rossetti 2011 and Sassi 2015 tackle Socrates’ *bios* and behaviors extensively.

19 At 177d, Socrates famously states that love is the only field in which he can claim some kind of knowledge (177d and *passim*). That love is something divine and potentially fruitful for pedagogy is also clear from the *Alcibiades* by Aeschines (*SSR* VI A 53): cf. Ioppolo 1999. Other Platonic passages relevant to the problem of Socrates’ knowledge of things erotic include *Chrm.* 155d, *Lysis* 206a, *Thg.* 128b.

and virtue.²⁰ Remarkably, the comparison is later emphatically reiterated to include not only the exterior ugliness of Socrates' aspect, but also the exterior of his *logoi*, which sound ridiculous at first, but, once opened, reveal sublime qualities (221d–e).

Scholars have taken the image of Socrates-Silenus as Plato's own invention, designed to challenge traditional notions of *kalokagathia* and to provide an implicit description of his own *Sôkratikoî logoi*, namely, the Platonic dialogue (e.g., Gaiser 1984, 55–76). Accordingly, Plato's hero oscillates between the arduous peaks of his reasoning and the low profile of his examples—to the bafflement of his interlocutors, he keeps talking about “pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers” (*Symp.* 221e, tr. Jowett). On the iconographic side, a similar infraction of the *kalokagathia* code has been recognized in the so-called “Type A,” a family of Roman copies related to a portrait that Plato and his associates placed in the precinct of the Academy.²¹ With its markedly Silenic features, combined with a number of more “civilized” traits, this privately sponsored portrait was intended as a defiant challenge, and is arguably a milestone in Greek art history, in that it broke with the well-established tradition of idealized portraits.²² As such, it stands in sharp contrast with Lysippus' later and—as Paul Zanker puts it—“revised” portrait of Socrates.²³ This work (Type B) resulted from a public commission and—with its more dignified features designed to provide a tamer version of the earlier portrait—reflected an attempt on the part of the Athenians at reintegrating the unjustly convicted master into Athens' civic ideology and parameters.²⁴

20 215a–216d. Although some scholars have tried to undermine its credibility (e.g. Nightingale 1995, 120, and Narcy 2008), Alcibiades' description of Socrates is usually considered to be endorsed by Plato (see, e.g., Brisson 1998, 51–54; Zanker 1995, 32–39), though its relationship to Socrates' speech is debated (see Destrée 2012 for a discussion of the main options and Tulli and Erler 2016 for a wide range of approaches).

21 This is confirmed by a more accurate reading of *PHerc.* 1021. See Speyer 2001.

22 Cf. Zanker 1995, 32–39. Socrates' face was also taken as a challenge to physiognomic theories, as is clear from Phaedo's story of his conversation with Zopyrus (cf. e.g. Sassi 2015, ch. 2; and Toole 1974–75, on Phaedo's influence on Plato's silenic portrait of Socrates).

23 Zanker 1995, 57–62.

24 For a rich and updated discussion of both “Type A” and “Type B,” see Charalabopoulos 2012, 159–178, with comprehensive bibliography (including works that differ more or less markedly from Zanker's interpretations). Cf. also Capra 2016.

3 Enter Silenus

Although I share the idea that Plato and his companions wanted to provoke their fellow citizens, I think that a close examination of Socrates' entrance in the *Clouds* should prompt second thoughts as to the way scholars reconstruct the "invention" of Socratic iconography. Socrates' apparition *ex machina* on board a fantastic flying device, which usually scholars refer to as a "basket," must have been memorable,²⁵ and Plato often recalls the scene both explicitly and implicitly. In the *Apology*, Socrates mentions his invisible detractors, who "took possession" of the Athenians' mind "with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause."²⁶ This description, which foreshadows the perverse influence of poetry on young children's mind as described in the *Republic*, would be enough to conjure up the *Clouds*, but Socrates leaves no room for doubt.²⁷ Not only does he claim that his enemies are impossible to identify by name, "unless in the chance of a comic poet" (18d), but a few lines later he lays his cards on the table:

That is the nature of the accusation, and that is what you saw (ἐώρατε) yourselves in the comedy of Aristophanes, who has introduced one Socrates swinging about (περιφερόμενον) saying that he's skywalking (ἀεροβατεῖν), and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little.

PL. *Ap.* 19c1–5 (tr. JOWETT, modified)

25 Rather than as a basket, the device should be more correctly described as a rack (Revermann 2006, 188).

26 18b–c, tr. Jowett. Stephen Halliwell 2008, 254–255, points out that in "the relevant passages of the *Apology*—passages whose one-sided interpretation has become one of the stalest received opinions in classical scholarship—a *distinction* is indicated between the comedian Aristophanes (and by extension other comic poets too who wrote plays about Socrates) and those who over the years have maligned Socrates with real 'malice and denigration' (φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ, 18d)." Even more radically, it has been argued that, in the context of the *Apology*, "Aristophane ... est l'un des témoins principaux de la défense à côté d'Apollon; celui-ci pour montrer que Socrate est un homme pieux, celui-là pour montrer que les impies sont les accusateurs qui font la comédie dans le tribunal" (Santoro 2013, 205).

27 Cf. *Resp.* 2.377a–b. Bouvier 2000, rightly emphasizes this important if seldom noticed parallel.

What we have here is an unequivocal reference to Socrates' first entrance in the *Clouds*, which Plato achieves by reproducing Aristophanes' extravagant words (ἀεροβατεῖν) and by conjuring up Socrates' "swinging" apparition *ex machina* (περιφερόμενον). Remarkably, the emphasis is on the *visual* impact of the scene (έωρᾶτε) as well as on the "deal of nonsense" uttered by Aristophanes' Socrates. Here is the relevant passage from the *Clouds*:

STREPSIADES: Socrates! Here, you, call out to him for me, good and loud.

DISCIPLE: No, you call him yourself; I'm busy.

STREPSIADES: Socrates! my sweet little Socrates!

SOCRATES: *O ephemeral* creature, why call on me (τί με καλεῖς, ὦ 'φήμερε)?

STREPSIADES: First of all, I pray, tell me what you are doing up there?

SOCRATES: I am sky-walking (ἀεροβατῶ) and scrutinizing (περιφρονῶ) the sun.

219–225, my italics

As the relevant (and largely overlooked) *scholion* suggests, Socrates' first words amount to a Pindaric quote:

When introducing the dialogue between Silenus and Olympus, Pindar had the former utter the following words: "*O ephemeral*, miserable creature (ὦ ἄλ᾽ αὖς ἐφήμερε), you speak silly things."

Σ ad *Nub.* 223(d) = fr. 157 SNELL

At first sight, the suggestion of the *scholion* may look far-fetched.²⁸ Yet Silenus' disparaging reply was made recognizable by the pompous and wholly exceptional apostrophe "O ephemeral."²⁹ This vocative form is unparalleled in ancient Greek literature and must have sounded very peculiar: as such it works as a powerful catchword,³⁰ either because Pindar's poem would be well-known

28 Willi 2003, 107–108, shares the scepticism of Dover 1968, 125–126, *ad* 223, as regards the possibility of a Pindaric allusion. He detects instead an Empedoclean echo in Socrates' words (cf. 31 B 3.4 DK).

29 Aristophanes' rare quotations from Pindar amount to easily recognizable lines (cf. Mastro-marco 1994, 153–155). Pindaric style and echoes may carry a connotation of ludicrous conceit (cf. Loscalzo 2005).

30 A TLG survey gives only another instance of (ἐ)φήμερε. This is found in a poem by Michael Choniates (*Carmina* 5.1) as late as the twelfth century CE (a time of revival for ancient

or because it would reflect a familiar story about Silenus.³¹ A neglected piece of evidence, preserved by Aristotle, provides decisive confirmation:

And Silenus was finally forced to talk: “*Ephemeral* seed (ἐφήμερον σπέρμα) of painful destiny, why do you force me to speak?”

ARIST. *Eudemus* fr. 44.27–29 ROSE

The conclusion to be drawn here is that Aristophanes’ Socrates, when he utters his first words, *presents himself in the guise of Silenus*. The allusion to Silenus’ revelation was probably as striking as it was easy to recognize, and the joke could be appreciated even more fully if the actor playing Socrates bore a clear resemblance with Silenus. This is why I am inclined to conclude that the mask of the actor must have been Silenic in character.³² However that may be, what we moderns regard as the most iconic trait of Plato’s Socrates is in fact a reinterpretation of his Aristophanic avatar.³³

On introducing the *eikon* of Socrates-Silenus, Alcibiades utters the following words:

comedy). Remarkably, the *Suda* has a specific voice for Aristophanes’ ὦ φήμερε (s.v., under omega). The explanation coincides with that of the *scholion*. Socrates’ one apparition on the flying machine in the Platonic corpus has him address his audience with ὠνθρώποι: “O human beings” (*Clit.* 407a–b).

31 Easterling 2013, 194, aptly notes that the story “was certainly current before Aristotle’s time.”

32 Aelian *VH* 2.13.68–70 comments on the likeness of Socrates’ mask in the *Clouds*. His is no more than a fair guess, but—regardless of what Socrates’ real face looked like—the mask-makers had only to adapt or simply appropriate familiar satyr masks and faces, which clearly resemble “type A” (cf. Lapatin 2006, 111, and Marshall 1999, 194; note also that satyrs occasionally exhibit Socratic features: in the *Ichneutai*, Sophocles has them deal with the “Socratic” virtue of *sôphrosunê*). Especially relevant is a mid-fifth century statue of Papposilenus with child Dionysus and a tragic mask, found in the vicinity of the theatre of Dionysus and possibly related to Sophocles’ *Dionysiscus* (National Museum of Athens 257, now on display in the New Acropolis Museum). Papposilenus, who wears a theatrical fleece-like coat but has no mask, bears an exceptional resemblance to Socrates’ portraits. For a full and illuminating discussion see Charalabopoulos 2012, 159–178. Charalabopoulos suggests that “the Sokrates of the Academy could have been modelled on the Papposilenos of the Theatre of Dionysos” (176). This is very attractive; I would only add that Socrates’ mask in the *Clouds* provides the missing link (cf. Capra 2016).

33 Dupréel 1922, 324, suggested that “l’aspect caricatural que conserve Socrate dans la littérature et dans l’art doit sans doute plus au grossièrement conventionnel de la scène qu’au modèle vivant.”

I'll try and praise Socrates through images (δ' εἰκόνων). And maybe he'll think I want to elicit laughter, but the purpose of the *eikôn* is not laughter but truth.

PL. *Symp.* 215a4–6

The reference to potentially *ridiculous* images points to comedy, and the idea is confirmed a bit further, when Alcibiades directly addresses Aristophanes:

There was another occasion on which his behavior was very remarkable ... He and Laches were retreating, for the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be discouraged, and promised to remain with them; *and there, Aristophanes, you might see him, as you describe, just as he is in the streets of Athens, "swaggering in the streets and casting his eyes sideways,"* calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance.

PL. *Symp.* 220e7–221b6 (tr. JOWETT, modified, my emphasis)

Alcibiades' words, in fact, feature a verbatim quotation from the *parodos* of the *Clouds*, which addresses Socrates:

And you, priest of the subtlest balderdash, tell us what you desire; for we would not give ear to any other present-day celestial expert except for Prodicus, in his case because of his skill and intelligence, in yours, *because you swagger in the streets and cast your eyes sideways,* go barefoot and endure much suffering, and give yourself airs on our account.

AR. *Nub.* 359–363 (tr. SOMMERSTEIN, my emphasis)

In their original context, the strange words describing Socrates' gait are of course comic and abusive, and—once again—stand out for their *visual* quality, in that they are likely to reflect the actor's look or behavior.³⁴ Thus, the principle enunciated at the beginning of Alcibiades' speech is promptly applied to a specific example. The very same image, whose original purpose was certainly

34 Remarkably, the chorus' words single out Socrates for his *aspect*, whereas Prodicus is mentioned because of his wisdom. This leaves little doubt that Socrates' exuberant countenance was indeed an important feature of the *Clouds*. Socrates' look should not be confounded with the pale and anodyne appearance of his disciples who, unlike Socrates, cannot tolerate the open air (cf. *Nub.* 185–200).

to elicit laughter, is put to the service of (Plato's) truth and turned into a model of military prowess.

The principle whereby Plato appropriates and "opens up" comic images is a productive and multi-faceted one, and it extends well beyond the pair formed by *Clouds* and *Symposium*: the *Banqueteers*, the *Birds*, and the *Frogs* may have had a similar impact on Socratic literature.³⁵ It is important to note that both the physical aspect and the behavior of Socrates are involved in the process, as the images of Silenus and that of swaggering Socrates make clear. It remains to see how Aristophanic comedy prefigures other aspects of Socrates' character as we know it from his companions, and especially from Plato.

4 Staring at the Sun

According to a successful if somewhat simplistic formula, Aristophanes' Socrates is a scapegoat (e.g., Guthrie 1969, 376) who stands for the sophists in general.³⁶ The question arises, then, why Aristophanes chose Socrates, of all people, as the main target of his lampooning. Socrates was probably a well-known figure, and he was enough of an eccentric to raise all sorts of suspicions, which resulted in the popular idea that he was a "sophist." It was more than enough to make him a convenient target in the eyes of the audience at large, but this is not the whole story. Building on the suggestion of a few scholars, David Konstan puts forward an elegant explanation:

For one thing, Socrates seems to have been odd-looking, always a good qualification for being the butt of humor (Karavites 1973–1974), though it must be acknowledged that, as Dover points out (1968: xxxii), there is no mention of his appearance in *Clouds* (whether this was conveyed by a grotesque mask is a moot question). Besides this, Socrates was a native

35 A full catalogue would require a book-length monograph. In Capra 2007 I have collected a number of examples from the *Symposium* and other dialogues: Plato consistently appropriates and reverses comic images. The principle sheds light on the disconcerting similarities between Aristophanes' *Assemblywomen* and Plato's *Republic* 5.

36 This reading has become almost universally accepted after Kenneth Dover's masterful edition of the *Clouds* (Dover 1968, xl). Bowie 1995 is a remarkable exception, which can work as a salutary warning against oversimplification. Bowie also offers a concise survey of scholarly interpretations that, unlike Dover's, emphasize the historicity of Aristophanes' Socrates (cf. n. 3). On the astonishing variety of philosophical influences in the *Clouds* see now Laks and Cottone 2013, an excellent collection of papers.

Athenian, whereas the great majority of natural philosophers and rhetoricians were foreign; it is better to attack a figure who is local and known to many than to pick on a visitor like Gorgias or Protagoras, who might be good for a laugh but hardly would sustain an Athenian audience's interest for an entire play ... Finally, and perhaps most important, Socrates was a character and even a bit of a public nuisance—that is, he was not simply an elite scientist or dialectician who hobnobbed with the rich, but a busybody, as the Athenians would perceive it, who went round confronting people in the streets and squares, arguing with them and exposing their exaggerated opinion of their own intelligence.

KONSTAN 2011, 87

Although I would not subscribe to Dover's downright skepticism, I find this very convincing, and I would only add that Socrates, if we take Plato's insistence on his disavowal of knowledge at face value, had yet another advantage going for him: he presented himself, so to say, as a *tabula rasa*, on which a playwright, while making his character recognizable through visual and behavioral mannerisms, could easily inscribe any conceivable doctrine.³⁷

One may suspect that part of Aristophanes' game was precisely to ascribe as many doctrines as possible to someone who famously professed none. Similarly, Aristophanes confines his villain to the ludicrous space of the *phrontisterion*, something that was flatly belied by the fact that jobless Socrates could be seen spending his day in the streets of Athens—which is why he was recognizable to Aristophanes' audience, as Konstan remarks (cf. *Nub.* 102–104). Such a reversal would be in keeping with the irony that surrounds the play's parabasis, in which Aristophanes comes up with the astonishing claim that the *Clouds* stands out for its unprecedented chastity: allegedly, the play “has not sewn on a piece of hanging leather, thick and reddened at the end, to cause laughter among the children,” shows “no old man, who, while uttering his lines, batters his questioner with a stick,” and does not “rush upon the scene carrying a torch and screaming, *Iou Iou!*” (538–543). The second part of the comedy famously belies these boasts, in that it features hanging phalluses, torches, a violent old man and even the interjection “*Iou Iou!*” which is found both at the beginning and, repeatedly, at the end of the play.³⁸ Such blatant contradictions, it would

37 Including, at least in embryo, Socrates' own. See, e.g., Vancamp 1992 (on Socrates' maieutic art) and Broackes 2009 (on separate soul and Forms). Socrates' willingness to parrot back to his interlocutors *their* views may be also relevant, as he could *appear* to have many views while in fact having none.

38 *Nub.* 1, 1170, 1320, 1493. Hubbard 1991, 90–106, infers that the parabasis must refer to the

seem, are integral to the play's humor, and certainly do not make things easy for anyone searching for historical facts, let alone historical doctrines. However, they certainly do not detract from the productivity of Aristophanes' *visual* images.

As we (and, more literally, the Athenian audience) have *seen*, Aristophanes' Socrates contemplates the sun aboard his flying basket as he utters his opening cue. How was this realized on stage? Aristophanes surely resorted to the *machina*, which implicitly equates Socrates with a tragic god. As for the sun, Martin Revermann, on discussing the open-air conditions of the Greek theatre, has made the following point:

Particularly striking are those instances where the theatrical integration of the sun would seem to be mandated by the situational logic of a scene. One such instance is Socrates' airwalk (*Clouds* 225): ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον ("I airwalk and think around the sun"). During his airborne inspection Socrates must be looking at the real sun which thus becomes an integral part of the *mise en scène*, if only because ignoring the real sun is bound to strike the audience as confusing and nonsensical, not least given the southern orientation of the Theatre of Dionysus ... There is scope for more subtle theatricality lurking here, because Socrates' περιφρονεῖν can be humorously translated into visual action by letting the crane move "about," around the visible sun as the fixed point of reference. Plato's peculiar wording in the *Apology* may, as Moellendorff [2005, 127 n. 46] observes, point to exactly such movements.

REVERMANN 2006, 111–112

We can thus imagine the actor rotating, in the effort of scrutinizing the blinding Greek sun. In the *Apology*, the movement is rendered through the common verb περιφέρωμαι, literally "to be brought around." To describe the action, however, Aristophanes resorts to two memorable words, namely ἀεροβατῶ and περιφρονῶ. The first is perhaps a hilarious invention, which I have translated with the verb "to skywalk." By contrast, the second verb is found in Thucydides (1.25.4) and elsewhere, but Aristophanes gives it what is likely to be an extraordinary meaning, which is peculiar to the *Clouds* and is found nowhere else in pre-Christian literature. The verb, which elsewhere means "to despise," refers here to Socrates' scrutinizing the sun from different angles, that is by swinging

original version of the *Clouds*. Olson 1994, however, has convincingly countered Hubbard's arguments.

around on board his flying device: this is of course suggested by the prefix *περι-*, but it is only the visual context that allows one to bring home Aristophanes' point.³⁹

As John Tzetzes acutely noted (ad 225a), the two meanings of the verb coexist in Socrates' cue. The ambiguity adds to Socrates' impiety, which consists precisely, among other things, in his pretension to displace the gods (remember that he enters as a *deus ex machina*) and to delve into mother nature's mysteries. This is made clear in the very close of the comedy, when Strepsides sets fire to the *phrontisterion*:

SOCRATES: Here, you on the roof, what do you think you're doing?
 STREPSIADES: "I'm sky-walking (*ἀεροβατῶ*) and scrutinizing (*περιφρονῶ*) the sun."
 SOCRATES: Help! wretched me! I'm going to choke!
 CHAEREPHON: But what about me, poor thing, I'll be burnt to death!⁴⁰
 STREPSIADES: Well, what was your idea in wantonly flouting the gods and inspecting the seat of the Moon? Chase them, hit them, pelt them, for a hundred causes, but most of all remembering how they wronged the gods!
 CHORUS-LEADER: Lead the way out; for we have done enough singing and dancing for today.

AR. *Nub.* 1502–1510/1 (tr. SOMMERSTEIN, modified)

Strepsides' appropriation of Socrates' bizarre words, besides making them memorable for future quotation, is a nice example of a recurrent feature of Aristophanic comedies, which Thierry once called "*la structure tournante*" and reminds one of the notion of *contrappasso* in Dante's *Comedy*: in a number of subtle and hilarious ways, which rest on both verbal and visual codes, the tables are turned, and the villain gets punished (see Thierry 1986, 345–346).

39 Further evidence can be found in a later scene, in which Socrates acts as a supercilious teacher and Strepsides as a thick student. Strepsides, whose very name means something like "rotator," is asked to "rotate himself" and "scrutinize things," in a long and hilarious passage (700–742). The lack of pre-Aristophanic instances of the verb may lead to the hasty conclusion that the meaning "compass in thought, speculate about" must be primary (cf. LSJ s.v.).

40 Sommerstein tentatively gives these words to Chaerephon (the manuscripts are silent). See Sommerstein 1998, 232, ad 1497.

5 The (Im)pious Skywalker and the Sunrise

As we have seen, the icon of skywalking, sun-scrutinizing Socrates-Silenus duplicates itself within the play according to the principle of *la structure tournante*. Its later offspring, however, is even richer. In the *Apology* Socrates confronts his skywalking avatar directly, and in the *Phaedo* he launches in what he refers to as a second apology, which is rounded up by one more explicit reference to the comic stage.⁴¹ Further on, when it comes to dissociating himself from the likes of Anaxagoras (the very same confusion which is denounced and ultimately associated with Aristophanes' influence in the *Apology*), Socrates recalls the time when he decided to give up directly *staring at the sun*, lest he turned blind (99d–e). This resulted in his decision to look for truth in *logoi*, Socrates' celebrated "second sailing," one of the founding texts of Socratism, and one that is arguably influenced by Aristophanes' comic avatar.

Another striking example is found in a passage from the *Theaetetus*, in which the malicious orator "gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up a slave" (175c–d, tr. Jowett). This passage belongs to the famous comparison between the life of philosophy and the life of politics, another founding text. Socrates' words have been rightly taken to contain yet another echo of the *Clouds*,⁴² as Plato conjures up Aristophanes' skywalking Socrates by hanging the dizzy orator in the air, thus appropriating the comedy's *structure tournante* at his expense.

The examples I have been discussing revolve around Socrates' aspect and behavior as well as his interests and views as recreated by Plato, and it is probably not a coincidence that they include a number of foundational texts. The list could certainly be longer: for example, it would be interesting to attempt a fresh reading of the *Republic* in this "solar" perspective, especially as regards the image of the sun and the trouble involved in its direct contemplation. However, it is time to conclude, and I would like to do so by returning one last time

41 Cf. 63b (beginning of the "apology") and 70b (reference to Aristophanes at the end of the "apology"). Rashed 2009 insightfully explores the crucial role played by the *Clouds* in the *Phaedo*.

42 See Ambrosino 1985 (esp. on *Tht.* 175d ~ *Nub.* 231–234). Cf. Nevola 1989 (on *Tht.* 161e ~ *Nub.* 135–139).

to Socrates-Silenus and to the special relationship between the *iconic* Socrates of the *Clouds* and his *ironic* counterpart in Plato's *Symposium*.

A number of further parallels could be adduced in favor of this very special relationship, but I shall focus on just one passage. I am referring to Socrates' strange behavior at Potidaea, when he was serving as a soldier. Right before quoting Aristophanes' line, Alcibiades recounts how Socrates stood "thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumor ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and speculating (φροντίζων) about something ever since the break of day" (*Symp.* 220c). Given the context of the speech, which opens and closes with the ultimately Aristophanic image of Silenus, the description of Socrates standing in full sun and "speculating" (note the verb φροντίζω, pointing to the *phrontisterion*) cannot but recall, once again, the *Clouds*, but Plato significantly alters the ending of the story:

At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun.

PL. *Symp.* 220c8–d5 (tr. JOWETT)

Of course, this may well be a true story that Plato, through the character of Alcibiades, is reporting faithfully, just as the historical Socrates, to a certain extent, was likely to resemble Silenus (e.g., Leão 1995), although the memory of his "real" face would have been lost within one generation.⁴³ However, I doubt that Plato would ever have written these lines—as well as the description of Socrates-Silenus—were it not for the Aristophanic verbal and visual subtext. Aristophanes' iconic and impious avatar, who goes so far as to "scrutinize" and "despise" the sun, turns smoothly into his Platonic namesake, the ironic and pious Socrates, who even *prays* to the Sun.

A whole set of strategies can be deployed to cope with Aristophanes' Socrates, from Xenophon's gloomy rebuttals⁴⁴ and Lysippus' tamed statue to the cunning appropriation of Plato who, with the fashioning of his dialogues and

43 Giuliani 1997, 34, makes the interesting point that "die Silensikonographie als Hilfskonstruktion verwendet wurde, um ein Phantombild des Sokrates herzustellen."

44 Carrière 1998, 245, aptly notes that "la référence à la Comédie Ancienne est, pour Xénophon, fondamentalement dévalorisante." However, the beauty contest between Socrates and Critobulus (*Xen. Symp.* 5.5–7) can be viewed as a comic transfiguration of teleology.

of the Academy's revolutionary portrait, turned Aristophanes' "icons" into positive images and paradigms of the philosophical life. Either way, Aristophanes' Silenic character lies at the foundation of *Sôkratikoí logoi* and can be seen as a turning point in the history of Greek portraiture. Not too bad for a comedy whose production resulted in an epic failure. Whatever we make of his fantastic claims about the "chaste" superiority of the *Clouds*, Aristophanes, after all, definitely had, and scored, an important point.⁴⁵

References

- Ambrosino, D. 'Aristoph. *Nub.* 218–239', *MCr* 19–20 (1985), 65–69.
- Biles, Z.P. *Aristophanes and the poetics of competition*. Cambridge 2011.
- Bouvier, D. 'Platon et les poètes comiques: peut-on rire de la mort de Socrate?', in: M.L. Desclos, *Le rire des Grecs: anthropologie du rire en Grèce ancienne*, Grenoble 2000, 425–440.
- Bowie, E.L. 'Le portrait de Socrate dans les *Nuées* d'Aristophane', in: Trédé and Hoffmann 1998, 43–66.
- Brisson, L. *Platon: Le Banquet*. Paris 1998.
- Broackes, J. 'Αὐτός καὶ αὐτόν in the *Clouds*: was Socrates himself a defender of separable soul and separate Forms?', *CQ* 59 (2009), 46–59.
- Canfora, L. *La crisi dell'utopia: Aristofane contro Platone*. Roma 2014.
- Capra, A. *Ἀγὼν λόγων: il Protagora di Platone tra eristica e commedia*. Milan 2001.
- Capra, A. 'Stratagemmi comici da Aristofane a Platone 1: il satiro ironico (*Simposio, Nuvole* e altro)', *Stratagemmi* 2 (2007), 7–48.
- Capra, A. 'Transcoding the Silenus. Aristophanes, Plato and the Invention of Socratic Iconography', in: Tulli and Erler 2016, 437–442.
- Carrière, J.C. 'Socratism, platonisme et comédie dans le *Banquet* de Xénophon', in: Trédé and Hoffmann 1998, 243–271.
- Caserta, C. 'Vista, parole e inganno nelle *Nuvole* di Aristofane', *Stratagemmi* 29 (2014), 11–44.
- Catenacci, C. 'Le maschere 'ritratto' nella commedia antica', *Dioniso* 3 (2013), 37–59.
- Catenacci, C. 'Protostoria del ritratto ad Atene tra VI e V sec. a.C.: tiranni e poeti', in: P. Angeli Bernardini, *La città greca: gli spazi condivisi. Convegno del centro internazionale di studi sulla grecità antica, Urbino 26–27 settembre 2012*, Roma 2014, 55–73.
- Charalabopoulos, N. *Platonic drama and its ancient reception*. Cambridge 2012.

45 Warm thanks to M. Giovannelli and M. Sassi for their perceptive reading of drafts of this paper.

- Destrée, P. 'The speech of Alcibiades (212c4–222b7)', in: C. Horn, *Platon: Symposium*, Berlin 2012, 191–205.
- Dover, K.J. *Aristophanes: Clouds*. Oxford 1968.
- Dupréel, E. *La légende socratique et les sources de Platon*. Brussels 1922.
- Easterling, P.E. 'Sophocles and the wisdom of Silenus: a reading of *Oedipus at Colonus* 1211–1248', in: D. Cairns, *Tragedy and archaic Greek thought*, Swansea 2013, 193–204.
- Edmunds, L. 'Socrates and the sophists in old comedy: a single type?', *Dioniso* 6 (2007), 180–187.
- Gaiser, K. *Platone come scrittore filosofico. Saggi sull'ermeneutica dei dialoghi platonici*. Napoli 1984.
- Giuliani, L. 'Das älteste Sokrates-Bildnis: ein physiognomisches Porträt wider die Physiognomiker', in: W. Schlink, *Bildnisse: Die europäische Tradition der Portraïtkunst*, Freiburg 1997, 11–55.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *A history of Greek philosophy*, III: *The fifth-century enlightenment*. Cambridge 1969.
- Hadot, P. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* Paris 1995.
- Halliwell, S. *Greek laughter: a study of cultural psychology from Homer to early Christianity*. Cambridge 2008.
- Hubbard, T.K. *The mask of comedy: Aristophanes and the intertextual parabasis*. London 1991.
- Imperio, O. 'Il conflitto generazionale nei *Banchettanti* di Aristofane', in: D. Susanetti and N. Distilo, *Letteratura e conflitti generazionali: dall'antichità a oggi*, Roma 2013, 75–95.
- Ioppolo, A.M. 'Socrate e la conoscenza delle cose d'amore', *Elenchos* 20 (1999), 53–74.
- Karavites, P. 'Socrates in the *Clouds*', *CB* 50 (1974), 65–69.
- Konstan, D. 'Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', in: D.R. Morrison, *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*, Cambridge 2011, 75–90.
- Kopff, E.C. 'The date of Aristophanes, *Nubes* II', *AJPh* 111 (1990), 318–329.
- Laks, A. and R. Sassetta Cottone. *Comédie et philosophie: Socrate et les 'présocratiques' dans les Nuées d'Aristophane*. Paris 2013.
- Lapatin K. 'Picturing Socrates', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*, Malden, MA 2006, 110–155.
- Leão, D. 'Retrato físico de Sócrates nas Nuvens e em Platão — breve apontamento', *Humanitas* (Coimbra) 47 (1995), 327–339.
- Loscalzo, D. 'Vestire il poeta (Aristoph. *Av.* 904–959)', in: S. Grandolini, *Lirica e teatro in Grecia: il testo e la sua ricezione: atti del 11 incontro di studi*, Napoli 2005, 221–234.
- Luise, F. de and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*, Sankt Augustin 2013.
- Marshall, H.R. 'Some fifth-century masking conventions', *G&R* 46 (1999), 188–202.

- Marshall, H.R. 'Clouds, Eupolis and reperformance', in: C.W. Marshall and G. Kovacs, *No laughing matter: studies in Athenian comedy*, London 2012, 55–68.
- Mastromarco, G. *Introduzione ad Aristofane*. Bari 1994.
- Mingazzini, P. 'Su due oggetti in terracotta raffiguranti Socrate', *PP* 25 (1970), 351–358.
- Moellendorff, P. von. *Grundlagen einer Ästhetik der alten Komödie: Untersuchungen zu Aristophanes und Michail Bachtin*. Tübingen 1995.
- Moore, C. 'Socrates *Psychagôgos* (*Birds* 1555, *Phaedrus* 261a7)', in: de Luise and Stavru 2013, 41–44.
- Narcy, M. 'Socrate nel discorso di Alcibiade (Platone, *Simposio* 215a–222b)', in: L. Rossetti and A. Stavru, *Socratica 2005: Studi sulla letteratura socratica antica presentati alle Giornate di studio di Senigallia*, Bari 2008, 287–304.
- Nevola, M.L. 'Aristoph. *Nub.* 135–139 (*ap. Plat. Theaet.* 161e)', *MCR* 23–24 (1989), 227–231.
- Nightingale, A.W. *Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy*. Cambridge 1995.
- Olson, S.D. 'Clouds 537–44 and the original version of the play' *Philologus* 138 (1994), 32–37.
- Patzer, A. 'Sokrates in der Attischen Komödie', in: A. Bierl and P. von Möllendorff, *Orchestra: Drama, Mythos, Bühne*, Stuttgart 1994, 50–81.
- Platter, C. 'Plato's Aristophanes', in: S.D. Olson, *Ancient comedy and reception: essays in honor of Jeffrey Henderson*, Berlin 2014, 132–165.
- Rashed, M. 'Aristophanes and the Socrates of the *Phaedo*', *OSAPh* 36 (2009), 107–136.
- Revermann, M. *Comic business: theatricality, dramatic technique, and performance contexts of Aristophanic comedy*. Oxford 2006.
- Rossetti, L. *Le dialogue Socratique*. Paris 2011.
- Santoro, F. 'La citation des *Nuées* dans l'*Apologie de Socrate* de Platon', in: Laks and Sætta Cottone 2013, 193–206.
- Sassi, M.M. *Indagine su Socrate. Persona filosofo cittadino*. Torino 2015.
- Segoloni, L.M. *Socrate a banchetto: il Simposio di Platone e i Banchettanti di Aristofane*. Roma 1994.
- Sommerstein, A.H. 'Cleophon and the restaging of the *Frogs*', in: A.H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. Henderson, B. Zommermann, *Tragedy, comedy and the polis: papers from the Greek drama conference, Nottingham, 18–20 July*, Bari 1993, 461–476.
- Sommerstein, A.H. *Aristophanes: Clouds*. Warminster 1998.
- Sommerstein, A.H. *Talking about laughter and other studies in Greek comedy*. Oxford 2009.
- Speyer, A. 'The earliest bust of Socrates? New observations to Philochoros in *PHerc.* 1021 Col. 2', *BCPE* 31 (2001), 81–95.
- Stavru, A. 'The present state of Socratic studies: an overview', in: de Luise and Stavru 2013, 11–26.
- Thiercy, P. *Aristophane: fiction et dramaturgie*. Paris 1986.

- Toole, H. 'Εἰς ποίου Σωκρατικὸν πρέπει να ἀποδοθῇ ἡ δυσμορφία τοῦ Σωκράτους, *Athena* 75 (1974–75), 303–317.
- Totaro, P. 'Maschere e potere nella commedia greca antica', *C&C* 10 (2015), 373–387.
- Trédé, M. and P. Hoffmann. *Le rire des anciens*, Paris 1998.
- Treu, M. *Undici cori comici: aggressività, derisione e tecniche drammatiche in Aristofane*. Genova 1999.
- Vancamp, B. 'L' historicité de la maïeutique socratique: réflexions critiques', *AC* 61 (1992), 111–118.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. 'Socrates in the *Clouds*', in: P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*, Ithaca 1994, 48–86.
- Willi, A. *The languages of Aristophanes: aspects of linguistic variation in classical Attic Greek*. Oxford 2003.
- Zanker, P. *The mask of Socrates: the image of the intellectual in antiquity* tr. A. Shapiro. Berkeley 1995.

Protagorean Socrates, Socratic Protagoras: A Narrative Strategy from Aristophanes to Plato

Michele Corradi

Aix-Marseille Univ, IHP, Aix-en-Provence, France

1 Introduction

In the *Sophist*, in the long quest for the definition of sophist—where Plato makes some of his most complex statements on being¹—the Eleatic Stranger proposes an image of a nobler form of the sophistic art. He depicts it as the art of purifying someone, through dialectic, of his false opinions and his presumptions of knowing. Critics have correctly read this image as a very problematic presentation of Socrates' *elenchus*.² The Eleatic Stranger himself observes that there is a certain similarity between sophists and philosophers: as the wolf resembles the dog, the fiercest resembles the tamest. He also sets the *elenchus* within the sophistic art, as one of its noblest (γενναία) forms, very similar to philosophy (229e1–231b8). Certainly, since the early dialogues, one of Plato's main goals was to clarify the relation between Socrates and the sophists. Such a goal was probably related to the apologetic intent of rehabilitating Socrates' figure, whose memory was still at the center of disputes many years after his death, as proven both by the evidence concerning Polycrates' 393 accusation (κατηγορία) and by the reaction of Socrates' students.³ According to Plato, the popular contempt surrounding Socrates' tragic death may be mostly ascribed to a confusion of the Socratic *paideia* with that of other contemporary figures considered responsible for the profound crisis of Athens at the end of the fifth century.⁴ In particular, Plato holds that this confusion is due largely to Socrates' portrait in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Nevertheless, as the *Sophist* shows, Plato comes to a surprising conclusion: the experience of Socrates, as historical figure, has to be seen within the context of the *sophistikê*.⁵ Yet this is not a real

1 See at least Prior 1985, 127–167; Fronterotta 2007, 65–134; Solana 2013.

2 Cf. Centrone 2008, xvii–xxi.

3 Cf. Bandini and Dorion 2000, 79–81 n. 77.

4 On this specifically Platonic strategy to defend Socrates, see Notomi 2010; on Plato's hostility towards the sophists see Kerferd 1981, 4–5, who correctly refers to *Gorgias* (462b3–465e1) and *Sophist* (221d1–236d4, 264c4–268d5) as “set-piece treatments.”

5 Cf. Taylor 2006.

surprise, if we focus on the relation, established by Plato, between Socrates and the most important sophist, Protagoras.

Among Socrates' antagonists in Plato's dialogues, Protagoras is one of the most important indeed. In the eponymous dialogue, Protagoras' speech occupies almost nine Stephanus pages, singularly long in the Platonic dialogues (320c8–328d2 = 80 C 1 DK). The whole first part of the *Theaetetus* (151d7–187a6) is dedicated to the discussion of the man-measure doctrine (80 B 1 DK). We find explicit references to Protagoras in yet other works, including *Cratylus* (385e4–386e5 = 80 A 13 DK; 391b9–c9 = 80 A 24 DK), *Euthydemus* (286b8–c4 = 80 A 19 DK), *Hippias Major* (282d3–e6 = 80 A 9 DK), *Meno* (91d2–92a2 = 80 A 8 DK), *Phaedrus* (267b10–c7 = 80 A 26 DK), *Republic* (10.600c3–e2), and *Sophist* (232b1–233a7 = 80 B 8 DK).⁶ In his pages, Plato underlines the striking differences between Protagoras and Socrates, as many scholars have often noticed. Think alone of the opposition between Protagoras' long speeches (μακρολογία) and Socrates' dialectic in the *Protagoras*,⁷ or of Socrates' inability to accept the relativity of values consequent to the man-measure principle in the *Theaetetus*,⁸ or of compensation for the sophist's doctrines (μαθήματα) (*Cratylus*, *Hippias Major*, *Meno*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*).⁹ Despite these oppositions, Plato makes use of refined narrative strategies that aim at revealing unexpected points of convergence between the two figures.¹⁰ I refer principally to the overturning of Socrates' and Protagoras' positions at the end of the *Protagoras*, followed by the sophist's praise-prophecy speech about Socrates (361a3–e6), and to the curious image of the *Theaetetus*, where, as a ventriloquist, Socrates gives voice to a Protagoras redivivus, back from Hades to defend his own positions (166a2–168c2 = 80 A 21a DK). Through these strategies, Plato seems to make allusion to the possible overlapping of the two figures, discerning the Socratic aspects in Protagoras and the Protagorean aspects in Socrates. In this chapter, I shall concentrate mostly on these narrative strategies, on the converging role of

6 Cf. Nails 2002, 256–257.

7 The most careful analysis of this opposition in the dialogue is that by Giannantoni 2005, 48–74.

8 Cf. Sedley 2004, 62–65.

9 Cf. Tell 2011, 39–59; Schrieffl 2013, 102–141. The polemic against the sophists' earning money from teaching is not limited to Plato. For example, Xenophon's Socrates considers taking fees for teaching to be an infringement of one's freedom (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.6, 1.6.5). For a useful survey of ancient sources on the problem, see Blank 1985.

10 On the similarities between Socrates and Protagoras in Plato's dialogues, see the recent study concerning the Platonic presentation of sophists by Corey 2015, at 39–66, 165–200.

Socrates and Protagoras and its meaning in Plato's perspective. The aim of this analysis will be in particular to shed some light on the construction of Socrates' character in Plato's dialogues.

We must admit, however, that the assimilation of Socrates and Protagoras is not entirely an invention by Plato. Unfortunately, we are not able to date the source of the curious tradition reported by Diogenes Laertius, according to whom Protagoras was the first to use the Socratic method of discussion (οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε, 9.53). Undoubtedly, in the *Clouds*, the dramatist Aristophanes, whom Plato studied and admired very much indeed,¹¹ already represented Socrates by stressing his affinities with Protagoras. Before approaching Plato, then, I shall focus on Aristophanes and on his Protagorean Socrates.

2 The Protagorean Socrates of the *Clouds*

As it is well known, the interpretation of Socrates' character in the *Clouds*, which is, in many aspects, very different from Plato's or Xenophon's Socrates, occupies a very important place in Socratic studies.¹² It has often been stressed by scholars that in the character of the Socrates of the *Clouds* it is possible to detect the comic intellectual's mask. Such a mask actually combines the two principal trends of the culture of Aristophanes' day, namely, the cosmological reflection of thinkers like Anaxagoras or Diogenes of Apollonia, and the rhetoric and linguistic teachings of the sophists.¹³ Among this latter group, Protagoras played a major and most representative role.

Let us observe the elements of the *Clouds*' Socratic character and their relation with the sophist. In Socrates' school, the "thinkery" (φροντιστήριον), teach-

11 For example, about the γελοῖον, Tulli 2010 underlines the relationship between the *Philebus* (47d5–50e2) and Aristophanes' comedies. For the similarity between the *Republic's* image of the "Ship of State" (6.488a2–489a2) and the *Knights* (185–193, 728–972, 1218–1226), cf. Hunter 2012, 73–76. A laudatory epigram about Aristophanes is attributed to Plato (*Epigr.* 14 Page): *the Graces, seeking for themselves a shrine that would not fall, found the soul of Aristophanes* (αἱ Χάριτες, τέμενός τι λαβεῖν τόπερ οὔχι πεσέεται / ζητοῦσαι, ψυχὴν εἶδρον Ἀριστοφάνους). For the biographical tradition concerning Plato's admiration for the comic poet, see Swift Riginos 1976, 176–177.

12 For an excellent review of the recent contributions on Socrates and the "Socratic problem," see Stavru and Rossetti 2010, 11–55. Cf. Dorion 2011. On Socrates on the stage of the Athenian Old Comedy see Bromberg (in this volume).

13 Cf. Imperio 1998, 99–114, and, recently, Konstan 2011, 75–90. On the characterization of Socrates in the *Clouds*, see Capra (in this volume).

ers taught students, in exchange for money (ἀργύριον ἣν τις διδῶ), how to win just and unjust trials (νικᾶν καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀδίκαια, 94–99). They used two kind of arguments, the stronger and the weaker (εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς φασὶν ἄμφω τῷ λόγῳ, τὸν κρείττον, ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττον, 112–113 = 80 C 2 DK). The weaker argument allows one to prevail even over just causes. For this reason, Strepsiades, the comedy's protagonist, wants to send his son, Pheidippides, to Socrates' school. With luck, Pheidippides will learn how to rid his family of the debts he incurred (1–120). Introduced to the scene by Socrates, two teachers, in the play personified λόγοι ("arguments" or "speeches"), debate about which would offer the best *paideia* (889–1104). Although most of the *scholia*, *hypotheses*, and *dramatis personae* call the two arguments Δίκαιος ("Just") and Ἀδίκος ("Unjust"), evidence from the script itself suggests that the two λόγοι were named Κρείττων ("Stronger") and Ἡττων ("Weaker").¹⁴ This prompts us to reconnect Socrates' doctrine to the famous promise (ἐπαγγελμα) that Aristotle attributes to Protagoras in the *Rhetoric* (2.24, 1402a24–28 = 80 A 21 DK): to make the weaker argument stronger (τὸ τὸν ἥττω ... λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν).¹⁵ In the *scholia recentiora* to the *Clouds* (112b), a late exegetic tradition underlines how Aristophanes here attributes to Socrates a Protagorean doctrine. The analysis of the challenge between the two speeches actually shows the reference to a particular dialectic technique, which was used to reverse and to win over the opponent's arguments. This technique seems to be more likely a Protagorean tool (80 A 1 DK, 80 A 4 DK) and, as Jacqueline de Romilly has observed (1992, 75–81), is often illustrated in texts of Aristophanes' day.

Another example of the link between Socrates and Protagoras is the grammar lesson that Socrates gives to Strepsiades (659–691 = 80 C 4 DK).¹⁶ This lesson, conceived by Socrates as preliminary for learning the ἄδικος λόγος, provides the occasion to develop a discussion about the grammatical genders and, in particular, about their relation to biological gender. Socrates claims the necessity of introducing, beside the masculine term for cock, ἀλέκτωρ, a new female term, ἀλεκτρυάϊνα, to distinguish the male gender from the feminine. Following a criterion of morphological symmetry, he also proposes changing the feminine form of the second declension ἡ κάρδοπος, "kneading basin," into ἡ καρδόπη. Finally, he claims that the ending in -α of the vocative of the proper name Ἀμύ-

14 Cf. Guidorizzi in Guidorizzi and Del Corno 1996, 294.

15 On this important Protagorean doctrine, see Corradi 2013.

16 For a more detailed analysis of the scene and its relationship with Protagoras' linguistic doctrines, see Corradi 2012, 148–159. Cf. also Rademaker 2013, 88–94. According to Napolitano 2012, 202–203, Aristophanes mocks Protagoras' ὀρθόπεια also at 392–394 with the etymological pun on βροντή ("thunder") and πορδή ("fart").

νίας, which is a masculine name of the first declension and, thus, is common to many feminine names, reveals the intrinsic feminine nature of the name and of its possessor as well. These observations on language and the nature of terms are in sympathy with Protagoras' research on the ὁρθόεπεια (80 A 26 DK). In this regard, it is important to observe Socrates' insistence about the adverb ὁρθῶς (659, 679). According to Aristotle (*Rh.* 3.5, 1407b6–8 = 80 A 27 DK; *SE* 14.173b17–22 = 80 A 28 DK), Protagoras studied the problem of a name's gender and criticized Homer for considering masculine the substantives πῆληξ and μῆνις. Protagoras' criticism is original, as it goes against the factual reality of Greek; still, it is not totally clear whether he assumed a criterion of morphological symmetry or correspondence between grammar genre and gender. Indeed, the both perspectives are present in Socrates' lesson to Strepsiades.

Less clear, but still plausible, are the allusions to the famous Protagorean man-measure principle (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, 80 B 1 DK) underlined by Koch and, more recently, by Schiappa and Gavray.¹⁷ The theme of the measure is already present in the *Clouds*' prologue, when Socrates' student (μαθητής) illustrates for Strepsiades the scientific results obtained by his master. The first reference to measure is about the flea's jump (διεμέτρησε, 148; ἀνεμέτρει, 152); the second is about the cartographic representation of the Earth's surface (γεωμετρία, 202; γῆν ἀναμετρεῖσθαι, 203). The preliminary linguistics lesson that Socrates gives to Strepsiades also starts off with the theme of "measure" or "meter" (μέτρον): although Socrates refers to poetic meter, Strepsiades assumes that he means the unit of measure for flour, provoking Socrates' disappointment at the absurdity of the old man's statements on the μέτρα: "oh man, you're just talking nonsense" (οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦνθρωπε, 644). The vocative ὦνθρωπε ("oh man"), used in the context of reflection on the μέτρα, might recall the famous opening words of Protagoras' *Truth* (Ἀλήθεια): πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ("Of all things man is measure").¹⁸ On the other hand, I do not believe that Socrates alludes to the agnosticism at the *incipit* of Protagoras' *On gods* (Περὶ θεῶν, 80 B 4 DK). Socrates' "impious" doctrines relate much more to the atheism professed by Diagoras of Melos, referred to explicitly at 860, and to Anaxagoras' and Diogenes' cosmological doctrines.¹⁹

17 Koch ³1876, 69; Schiappa ²2003, 110–113; Gavray 2007, 134–135.

18 On Protagoras' man-measure principle, see Corradi 2012, 112–132. On the Protagorean notion of μέτρον, cf. van Berkel 2013.

19 Cf. Gavray 2007, 134–135. On Diagoras' atheism, see Winiarczyk 2016, 61–115.

Thus, I believe that Aristophanes conspicuously used Protagoras' doctrines for creating Socrates' character, the prototype of the intellectual's comic mask. This operation is made possible by some analogies between the two intellectuals, analogies that were also present in Athenian public opinion. Nonetheless, this assimilative process also responds to an exigency of Aristophanes' comic theatre, namely that of summarizing in a unique and clearly recognizable character all the cultural and fashionable trends of Athens during the 420s.

3 The Protagorean Socrates of Plato

In the wake of Aristophanes, this process of synthesis of Socrates' and Protagoras' figures finds an important echo in Plato's pages, despite the philosopher's usual tendency to distinguish Socrates from the sophists. In this respect, one might find almost surprising the *Apology of Socrates's* silence about Protagoras. Perhaps this silence is not unimportant.²⁰ Analysing the genesis of the Athenians' contempt toward him, Socrates actually mentions the accusations formulated against him by Aristophanes in the *Clouds*. These accusations concern research into natural phenomena (celestial and subterranean), making stronger the weaker argument (τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν), and teaching (19b4–c2). For the purpose of this chapter, it is particularly important to stress the reference to “strengthening the weaker argument.” As I already underlined, the sources usually attribute this doctrine to Protagoras. In the *Apology*, Socrates does not reply to this last accusation directly. Perhaps an indirect reply is provided by his long speech on the Delphic Oracle and his successive examinations of Athens' reputedly wise men. In these pages, Socrates illustrates the very nature of his πρᾶγμα, his philosophical occupation (20c4–22e6). Curiously, he does not here refer explicitly to Protagoras, though he does not hesitate to mention Gorgias (19e3), Prodicus (19e3), Hippias (19e4) and Evenus (20b8, 20b9) concerning teaching (19e1–20c3). Later, in his exchange with Meletus, he mentions Anaxagoras (20d6, 20d8), to whom the meteorological doctrines falsely attached to Socrates should be attributed (26d1–e3). According to Socrates, “to make the weaker argument stronger” is nothing more than a commonplace or generic accusation frequently formulated against those who philosophize (τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρῶχειρα, 23d2–9).

Commentators correctly consider the *Protagoras* to be the dialogue where Plato emphasizes as much as possible Socrates' differences with the sophists

²⁰ For a more complete discussion of this problem, see Corradi 2013.

and thus with Protagoras.²¹ Nevertheless, the dialogue is not as unambiguous as it may seem at the first reading: elements that seem to separate the two figures are mixed up together with others and create unexpected convergences.

We have a first example in the introduction. During the discussion between Socrates and Hippocrates, which reveals the danger arising from the adoption of the sophists' *paideia*, Socrates admits that, if one can determine that they are valid, one could accept Protagoras' *mathēmata* (313c4–314b4). The sophists are presented by Socrates as merchants and pedlars of *mathēmata* that they sell by covering with praises (ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἃ πωλοῦσιν), without knowing and caring for their content or for their influence on the soul of the buyer. Their client is ignorant as well, unless he is a physician of the soul (an ἰατρικός), able to distinguish between good and bad doctrines (ἐπιστήμων τοῦτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρόν); such a client is the only one who can safely buy Protagoras' *mathēmata* (ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν).²²

In this dialogue Socrates shows his close knowledge of the sophists' and Protagoras' dialectical instruments.²³ Although he claims his distaste for *makrologia* (328d8–329b5, 334c7–d5, 335b3–c2, 335d6–336b3), he makes very long speeches himself (e.g. 319a8–320c1, 342a6–347a5, 354e3–356c3, 357b5–358a4).²⁴ Moreover, although he considers the exegetical discussion of poetry to be very like a drinking-party of vulgar fellows (347b7–348a9), Socrates gives an elaborated interpretation of Simonides' poem, solving the supposed *aporia* propounded by Protagoras (338e6–347a5).²⁵ And although Socrates claims that his discussion aims purely at searching for the truth and not at prevailing over his interlocutor (360e6–8), he often develops arguments that are not always correct from a logical point of view, giving Protagoras the occasion to diagnose their weak points (331a6–333b6, 349e1–351e3).²⁶

The dialogue's conclusion (360e6–362a4) offers the best example of Plato's tendency to bring together, and not only to separate, Socrates and Protagoras. There Socrates states that if the conclusion of the speeches (ἐξοδος τῶν λόγων)

21 Cf., e.g., Manuwald 1999, 69–75.

22 On this interesting passage, see Corradi 2016, 348–352.

23 Cf. Capra 2001, 99–121.

24 Cf. Giannantoni 2005, 51. For a reconstruction of the features of Socrates' rhetoric, see Rossetti 2001.

25 Cf. Giuliano 1991; see also Denyer 2008, 147–167.

26 On the oft-discussed problem of Socrates' fallacious arguments in the *Protagoras*, there is a good *status quaestionis* in Ildefonse 2012; see also Capra 2001, 180–204; Trabattoni 2016, 241–263.

pronounced during the dialogue could speak, it would make fun of him and Protagoras and claim that they are both strange men (ἄτοποι): at the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates claimed that virtue cannot be taught, while, at the end, he reduces all the virtues, justice, temperance and courage, to knowledge (πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία);²⁷ since they are all knowledge, virtues can be taught. On the other hand Protagoras, who at the beginning of the dialogue claimed that virtue can be taught, and denied that virtue is a knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), now draws the opposite conclusion (τοῦναντίον).

Thus, the positions of the two intellectuals are clearly reversed. In this context, the usage of the adjective *atopos* for defining the two intellectuals is meaningful. Actually, it is the same ἀτοπία (“singularity”) that often characterises Plato’s Socrates²⁸ that now brings him together with Protagoras: as in a very refined mirrors game, the sophist’s image is now projected on the philosopher’s, and vice versa.

Socrates does not treat the reversal, however, as a reason to end the conversation. He would like, he says, to continue investigating the nature of virtue and the way it can be taught. Making allusion to the myth narrated by Protagoras at the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates wishes not to be diverted by Epimetheus in his research. The philosopher rather prefers to be inspired by Prometheus: like him, he is provident about his life (προμηθεύμενος).²⁹ It is in this spirit that Socrates wants to continue discussing these matters with Protagoras.

The sophist replies by acknowledging Socrates as a noble opponent. The sophist also tells him not to consider him a bad (κακός) man and not to be envious (φθονερός): he has already claimed to many people (πρὸς πολλούς) his estimation for Socrates (πολὺ μάλιστα ἄγαμαι σέ). He also predicts that he might become one of the wisest men ever (οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιτο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ).³⁰ Thus, Protagoras elaborates a prophecy—Socrates shall

27 It is important to notice the allusion to the man-measure principle in the sequence πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. For a survey of all possible allusions to Protagoras’ Ἀλήθεια in the dialogue, see Serrano Cantarín and Díaz de Cerio Díez 2005, 1–11. The historical reliability of Protagoras’ portrait in the dialogue is underlined by Brancacci 2012, 63–65.

28 Cf. Ildefonse 1997, 220 n. 361.

29 It is important to consider the etymological game on προμηθεύομαι and the Titan’s name, Προμηθεύς. See now Bertagna 2012, 91–100.

30 As Denyer 2008, 204, points out, the expression τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιτο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ “is more than simply ‘you might get a reputation for wisdom.’ It amounts almost to ‘you might come to be ranked with the Seven Sages.’”

become one of the wisest men alive, just like him—as it is previously mentioned in the dialogue (e.g., 316c5–317c5). This prophecy could be interpreted as a sort of investiture of Socrates.³¹

After Socrates' speech, Protagoras claims that he would rather postpone the debate to another occasion. Socrates agrees with the sophist and, alluding to the central phase of the dialogue (334c7–336b3), claims that it is time to go and that he stayed so long only to please Callias. The final section of the dialogue thus offers us a meaningful exchange between the two interlocutors.

Most critics consider this final scene very ironic: Plato's only aim is to underline Socrates' triumph over Protagoras.³² In my opinion, however, irony is not sufficient here to understand the sense of the dialogue's conclusion. The result of the long debate is the reversal of the initial positions and, according to Socrates, leaves room for another research path, namely, an in-depth analysis of the concept of *aretê*, which he wishes to develop together with Protagoras. At the end of the dialogue, Protagoras resembles what Plato calls the true philosopher: with no envy (*φθόνος*),³³ the sophist predicts Socrates' brilliant future and designates him his own successor in the circle of the wisest men. What emerges from this picture is, beyond all the contrasts and divergences, a space common to both intellectuals. This space concerns the crucial role that Socrates and Protagoras attribute to *aretê* in human life and the confidence that both show in the possibility of transmitting it through a good *paideia*. In order to give evidence of this converging perspective, Plato seems, somehow, to readapt Aristophanes' idea of a Protagorean Socrates. An important element of contact between Aristophanes' comedy and Plato's dialogue is indeed the final personification of the conclusion of the speeches (*ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων*), which closely recalls the challenge between the Stronger and the Weaker *logoi* of the *Clouds*.³⁴

31 The *post-eventum* prophecy is typical of Plato's narrative strategies, as at the end of the *Phaedrus* (279a3–b3) or the beginning of the *Theaetetus* (142c3–d3). Cf. Tulli 1990 and 2011. According to Corradi 2014, in the first part of *Protagoras* (314e3–316a5), Plato sets the stage for the final prophecy through a series of allusions to *Odyssey's* *véxνια*.

32 Cf. Manuwald 1999, 442–444. According to Frede 1992, xvii–xx, the change of position is not only the result of a dialectical strategy; Protagoras holds on to the insight that *aretê* is matter of wisdom but compromises his position for political cautiousness. Despite the differences in the way of approaching the problem of *aretê* and its teachability, Gagarin 1968, 163, thinks that Socrates and Protagoras arrive at similar conclusions. Long 2013, 39, suggests that “the *Protagoras* thus ends without a formal conclusion but with a thoroughly Socratic conclusion in clear view.”

33 Casertano 2004, 766, correctly refers to Pl. *Ep.* 7.344b5–6: dialogue without envy (*ἄνευ φθόνων*) is a necessary condition for reaching the truth.

34 Cf. Manuwald 1999, 445.

In the *Clouds*, by assimilating the figures of Socrates and Protagoras, Aristophanes built the image of Socrates as the paradigm of the modern intellectuals' corrupted *paideia*, represented, in his piece, by the Weaker argument. In the *Protagoras*, Plato gives to Aristophanes' suggestion a new meaning: it is only through the comparison with Protagoras that Socrates acquires a new awareness of his role as a teacher. As we have seen, at the beginning of the dialogue (319a8–320c1) Socrates denied that virtue is teachable and only after his discussion with Protagoras can he realise that *aretê* is a *mathêma* and, as Protagoras predicts, that he is the man who can teach others this *mathêma*, becoming the paradigm of a new good *paideia*.³⁵

As I already emphasized, the comparison between Socrates and Protagoras is not confined to the *Protagoras*. The mature Plato of the *Theaetetus* presents Protagoras again, this time to analyze the core of the sophist's thought, the man-measure doctrine. After a long and elaborate analysis of this principle, again Socrates prevails over the sophist and confutes his position. Nonetheless, in the *Theaetetus* as well, Plato uses a narrative technique that reveals unexpected similarities between Protagoras and Socrates. Although the sophist is not present, dead many years before the scene of the dialogue in 399, Socrates himself literally gives him voice and defends his positions. Let us analyze the strategy displayed in the dialogue.

4 The Socratic Protagoras of the *Theaetetus*

As it is well-known, in the first part of the dialogue Socrates analyzes Theaetetus' definition of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as perception (αἴσθησις). According to Socrates, this definition recalls Protagoras' man-measure principle. Socrates proposes that they reinterpret Protagorean relativism in light of the Heraclitean doctrine of perpetual flux, which, he imagines, the sophist would have secretly professed.³⁶ Having established the connection between the three theses—Theaetetus' definition, the man-measure principle, and the Heraclitean doctrine—through an epistemological theory that reduces truth to the result of a constantly evolving subject-object interaction, Socrates checks the value of this body of doctrines through a series of arguments that, as he himself admits,

35 For the figure of Socrates as educator in Plato's dialogues, a useful survey is in Scott 2000. On paradoxical features of his *paideia*, see Kohan 2010. For the relationship between Socrates' teaching and his disavowal of knowledge, see McPartland 2013.

36 For the relationship of *Theaetetus*' "secret doctrine" with Protagoras, see Lee 2005, 77–117. See also the recent study by Brancacci 2011.

are much closer to eristic than to philosophical research (164c8–d2, 165d1–e4). Following the useful schema proposed by Ferrari,³⁷ we may say that Socrates develops his refutation of Protagorean doctrines in three main parts. Firstly, if every phenomenon is perceived as true by someone and *aisthêsis* is the truth's sole criterion, Protagoras should have claimed that a pig, a dog-faced baboon, or any other creature provided with perception is the measure of all things (161c2–d2). Secondly, if every man is the best judge of his own sensations and opinions, it would be impossible to understand why Protagoras is considered wise (σοφός) and a teacher (διδάσκαλος), and worthy of financial compensation (161d2–e3). Finally, if *epistêmê* and *aisthêsis* are identical, one could not explain phenomena like the perception or the incomprehension of an unknown language, viewing with one eye but not the other, and memory (163b1–164c6).

After these arguments, Socrates takes it on himself to imagine Protagoras' reply, given the sophist's lack of successors (ἐπίτροποι) able to defend him (164e2–7). Socrates' strategy is particularly meaningful, as Plato again fuses Socrates' and Protagoras' figures. Socrates actually wears the sophist's mask and pronounces himself the words that Protagoras might have spoken to reply to his arguments.

"Protagoras' speech" is articulated in two parts: both are constituted by a curious mix of Socratic and Protagorean elements. The first part of "Protagoras' speech" answers to the absurd consequences that Socrates deduces from Protagoras' man-measure principle, namely that human beings, animals, and gods are equally wise. Recalling Theaetetus' inexperience, Socrates thinks that his young interlocutor has too quickly accepted his criticisms against Protagoras, criticisms that might be mere "demagoguery" (τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούσεις καὶ πείθῃ, 162d3–4).

Then, Socrates dons the sophist's mask and imagines the words that Protagoras or his representative would have spoken to reply to his arguments (πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, 162d4–163a1). Addressing himself to Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus with the vocative, "My fine people, young and old" (ὦ γενναῖοι παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες),³⁸ Socrates' Protagoras invites them not to pronounce a demagogic speech. The debate's protagonists have mentioned in their speech the gods but the sophist refuses to make any statement concerning their existence. They say things that the masses would accept, for example that it would be strange not to find a man wiser than any farmyard animal whatsoever. In fact, Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus do not provide

37 Ferrari 2011, 56–57; see also Sedley 2004, 54–56.

38 On the use of this vocative form, see Long 2004, 27 n. 1.

a necessary demonstration (ἀπόδειξιν ... καὶ ἀνάγκην) of this, confining themselves to probability (εἰκός). Actually, according to Socrates' Protagoras, were Theodorus to use probability in his research field, geometry, he would not be a good geometer.³⁹ For this reason, Socrates and Theodorus have to reconsider every argument, in order to understand whether they are founded solely on persuasion and likeness (σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους) or not.

The speech of Socrates' Protagoras is particularly interesting. Plato builds it entirely from the sophist's own doctrines, as the allusion to the famous *incipit* of the *Περὶ θεῶν* shows (80 B 4 DK).⁴⁰ The reference to the necessary rigor of geometry might also be put in relation to the criticism that, according to Aristotle (*Metaph.* B.2, 997b32–998a4 = 80 B 7 DK), Protagoras had himself developed—perhaps in the *Περὶ μαθημάτων*.⁴¹ Be this as it may, certain details closely recall other Platonic dialogues. First of all, the accusation of making long speeches (δημηγορεῖν) is the same that Socrates formulates against Protagoras in the eponymous dialogue (336b1–3): he claims that, giving long speeches, Protagoras avoids the rigor of Socratic dialectic. According to Socrates, there is a real opposition between conversation and oratory, the latter conceived for the masses (χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ' ὥμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμενους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν).⁴² Secondly, Protagoras seems to exhort Socrates and his interlocutors to make use of arguments that are not built on persuasion and likeness; when discussing such important matters, he invites them to inspire themselves to the rigor that is proper to mathematical sciences. It is indeed striking that Protagoras, a sophist, addresses his criticism towards arguments built on the πιθανόν and εἰκός, which are typical of the sophists' repertoire.⁴³ Moreover, the reference to “necessity” (ἀνάγκη) is often used in Socratic dialectic, as at *Theaetetus* 160a9, 170e7, 179b1, and 188a9.⁴⁴

39 On Theodorus' mathematical research and its relationship with Protagoras' teaching, see Corradi 2012, 211–216.

40 On Protagoras' *Περὶ θεῶν*, see Bonazzi 2010, 135–138.

41 Cf. Corradi 2012, 177–229.

42 Cf. Balansard 2012, 124–129.

43 It is not necessary to attribute to Socrates only, and not to Socrates' Protagoras, the last three lines of the speech (162e8–163a1). Cf. Narcy ²1995, 332–333 n. 175. As Long 2004, 27 n. 11, points out, at 178e3–6 Plato underlines the pride that Protagoras took in the powers of πιθανόν.

44 Cf. Giannopoulou 2013, 69. Many scholars assume Socrates' irony in constructing Protagoras' speech; see, e.g., Lee 1973, 226–229. For the use of the term πιθανολογία, a *hapax* in Plato, see Corradi 2016a.

The second time Socrates gives his voice to the sophist is the famous “Apology” of Protagoras (166a2–168c2 = 80 A 21a DK). This passage is probably the richest and most articulated presentation of the man-measure doctrine.⁴⁵ The core of the argument developed by Protagoras is that all sensations and opinions are true for the subject who perceives them. Nevertheless, this does not imply a lack of any value distinction: there are, actually, *sophoi* able to replace bad (πονηραί) sensations, *hexeis*, and opinions with good and useful (χρησται) sensations, *hexeis*, and opinions. The doctor and the farmer, for example, change out ill sensations in patients and plants for healthy ones; the politician (ῥήτωρ) claims that what seems just to the cities is what is beneficial; the sophist, through his *paideia*, operates great changes in his students and deserves, for this, great compensations (166d4–167d4 = 80 A 21a DK).

For our purposes, the sections of the “Apology” before and after the exposition of Protagoras’ own doctrines are the most interesting (166a2–c9; 167d5–168c2). In these passages Socrates’ Protagoras teaches Socrates the correct method of discussion in order to reach a valuable philosophical result and a veritable “protreptic” effect on the interlocutor. We will see that, as in the *Protagoras* it is only after confronting Protagoras that Socrates acquires a new awareness of his role as a teacher, in the *Theaetetus* it is only after wearing the sophist’s mask that he achieves a correct philosophical and pedagogical methodology.

In the first section of the “Apology” (166a2–c9), Protagoras accuses Socrates of having intentionally scared Theaetetus with his questions, thereby making fun of him.⁴⁶ Thus, it is necessary to proceed in a different way, and to accept only the answers that the sophist himself would have given to Socrates’ questions.⁴⁷ This is the sole way to refuse the sophist’s doctrines. Concerning Socrates’ argument about memory and perception, Protagoras would have had no problems in admitting the absolute heterogeneity of memory and sensible

45 The references to writing (συγγράμματα, γέγραφα) in the *incipit* of the “Apology” (166c9, 166d1) leads us to assume that Plato uses genuinely Protagorean material. See Corradi 2013, 77–79. Balansard 2012, speaks instead of “Socratic recreation of the Protagorean doctrine.” However, Demont 2013, 134–136, shows the coherence of the “Apology” with Plato’s presentation of Protagoras’ doctrines in the homonymous dialogue. Cf. Denyer 2013. On Plato’s hermeneutical strategy in the “Apology,” see also Gavray 2013, 42–45.

46 The “Apology” dismisses all the objections against Protagoras’ doctrine that Socrates presented in 160e6–165e4. See the useful outline in Chappell 2004, 102. See now Ambuel 2015, 67–73.

47 Cf. Cambiano 2007, 116.

experience.⁴⁸ It is possible, he could admit, to know and not to know something at the same time and that, in the wake of the flux doctrine, one cannot speak of a person as the same over time. So, Protagoras invites Socrates to avoid verbal traps and to discuss his doctrines in a more honest way. Making allusion to an argument previously developed by Socrates, he pushes him to focus on the essence of the man-measure principle and not to involve in his reason pigs and dog-faced baboons. Indeed, in so doing, Socrates pushes other people to the same misbehavior toward the sophist's writings (συγγράμματα).

Thus, the Protagoras played by Socrates asks Socrates to be honest with his doctrines by reporting the truth; moreover, the sophist here invokes a kind of discussion where one should avoid making verbal traps, *ὀνομάτων ... θηρεύσεις* (166c1–2). The image of the “verbal traps” reminds one of Plato's references to hunting.⁴⁹ In the *Euthydemus*, for example, Socrates refers to Euthydemus' will to prevail over his adversary by means of linguistic tricks, describing him as someone ready to hunt his adversary by surrounding him with his words (*με θηρεύσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας*, 295d1–2).⁵⁰ In the *Theaetetus* it is Protagoras' turn to describe Socrates in the role of the hunter.

The necessity of developing a dialectical method directed toward research and not resolving itself in a verbal contrast is made even more explicit in the final section of Socrates' long Protagorean speech (167d5–168c2). Once having established the general perspective of the man-measure doctrine, Protagoras asks Socrates whether he is able to oppose another speech to his own (*λόγος, ἀμφισβήτει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών*) or if he prefers to develop the discussion by asking questions (*δι' ἐρωτήσεων*): this method must be used especially by the most reasonable people. Again, the sophist recommends to Socrates that he asks his questions correctly, because whoever claims to be concerned about *aretê* ought not misbehave by setting verbal traps for his interlocutors. According to Protagoras, one is misbehaving when the method and the mode of the discussion are not specified, given that there are discussions of many and different kinds, including agonistic (*ἀγωνιζόμενος*) and dialectical ones (*διαλεγόμενος*). In the first case, the interlocutors discuss only playfully (*παίζῃ*), trying to prevail over each other as much as they can. In the second, instead, the speakers confront each other seriously (*σπουδάζῃ*), trying to establish the truth, mutually correcting and adjusting their positions, seeking to remove any errors they

48 See the correct interpretation of this passage by Giannopoulou 2009, 70–74.

49 Cf. Classen 1960, 56.

50 Cf. already Campbell 21883, 83. For the relation of the “Apology” of Protagoras to the *Euthydemus*, see Narcy 21995, 93–95.

have made. If Socrates follows these “rules,” his interlocutors will accuse themselves of their own mistakes; hating themselves, they will end up embracing philosophy. Contrarily, by “misbehaving,” Socrates will push his adversaries into hating philosophy. That is why Socrates must follow Protagoras, developing his research without polemic and in a non-hostile way, and investigating Protagoras’ doctrines in the true way. According to the sophist, it is in the same spirit that Socrates has to analyze Theaetetus’ hypothesis, that *epistêmê* and *aisthêsis* are identical, without playing with the words, as most people usually do.⁵¹

Thus, Socrates’ Protagoras is the defender of a correct method of discussion. The sophist distinguishes between the agonistic discussion, wherein every means is allowed to prevail on the adversary, and a discussion that aims at finding the truth. The failure to make or observe this distinction can generate confusion and produce bad results, as in the case of those abandoning philosophy due to their confusion.

The presence of many elements that Plato usually ascribes to Socrates’ dialectic in his dialogues is here indisputable.⁵² The opposition between the method of the long and continuous speech and the dialectical method, which is typical of the majority of the Platonic dialogues, is drawn by Socrates at the beginning of the *Sophist* (217c1–d3) in relation to the method that the Stranger of Elea wishes to use in the discussion. The Eleatic Stranger prefers the dialectic method whenever his interlocutor is mild-tempered (ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως). In other cases, it is preferable to proceed “by himself” (καθ’ αὐτόν).⁵³ Already in the *Protagoras* (328e5–329b5), Socrates contrasts Protagoras’ talking to politic oratory. The latter is inert like a book, unable to answer or to pose any questions (οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι) or to reply to any simple question about its content. Just like a bronze pot when someone hits it, it can only make a long sound, never providing answers. But while Protagoras gives long and beautiful speeches (μακροὺς λόγους καὶ καλοὺς), when he is asked questions he can make short answers (κατὰ βραχύ), and when it is his turn to ask the questions he is ready to wait for his interlocutor’s answer, a virtue that Socrates acknowledges to be rare.⁵⁴

51 For a useful analysis of the passage, see Giannopoulou 2009, 84–87; cf. Gavray 2017, 267–283.

52 See, e.g., McCabe 2000, 36–40; Blondell 2002, 254–255. An extensive survey of the contemporary debate on Socrates’ philosophical methodology is offered by Wolfsdorf 2013. On Xenophon’s presentation of Socrates’ dialectic, see Gourinat 2008. See also Redfield (in this volume).

53 Cf. Centrone 2008, 9 n. 9.

54 Cf. Giannantoni 2005, 58–60. For an analysis of the passage in the context of Plato’s criticism of writing, see Trabattini 1994, 22–24, with useful bibliography. Plato approaches

As to the distinction between a correct dialectical method and an agonistic one, there are many parallels in Plato's dialogues. The opposition between the serious (σπουδή) and the playful (παιδιά) made by Socrates' Protagoras in the "Apology" recalls the *Phaedrus*' famous passage distinguishing oral teaching and writing (274b6–277a5).⁵⁵ If the synonymic distinction between ἀμφισβητεῖν ("to argue") and ἐρίζειν ("to wrangle") developed by Prodicus in the *Protagoras* (337a6–b3) goes in the same direction as the methodological distinction made by Socrates' Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*,⁵⁶ the most meaningful and evident parallel passage is from the *Meno* (75c8–d7). Here, Socrates contrasts to his dialectic nothing other than agonistic speech, aiming only at confuting the adversaries. Socrates also insists that friends should use only the dialectical method, searching for the true and basing themselves on what the interlocutor admits to know.⁵⁷

Of the bad consequences arising from the use of a wrong method of discussion, it is useful to mention a parallel passage from the *Phaedo* (89d1–90c7). Here Socrates cautions against the risk of *misologia*, the hatred of *logoi*, that he relates to those accustomed to constructing arguments to defend or to demolish something without any concern for the truth (οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες). Just as in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates claims that the use of the wrong method of discussion generates hatred for the *logos* and, consequently, the abandonment of philosophy.⁵⁸

5 Conclusion

The above-mentioned texts show that Socrates' Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* is a spokesman for a philosophical methodology that is close to many issues typical of the Socratic dialectic propounded by Plato. The sophist somehow assumes a critical role towards the arguments developed by Socrates in the dia-

the subject of the dialectical method's superiority in the *Gorgias* as well, when Socrates (462a1–5), just like in the *Protagoras* (335b3–c2), claims that he will abandon the discussion if his interlocutor keeps indulging in long speeches without accepting the dialectical method of posing and answering to his questions (ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτῶμενος, ... ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου). Cf. Long 2004, 31.

55 Cf. Erler 2007, 416–418; Capra 2014, 177–178.

56 Cf. Taormina 2004.

57 For the major textual and exegetical problems of the passage, see Canto-Sperber 21993, 230–231 n. 53. See also Scott 2006, 35–37; Ferrari 2016, 162–164 nn. 56–59.

58 Cf. Friedländer 1969 [1975³], 164 and 491 n. 33; Casertano 2015, 340–342.

logue, underlying their mistakes and developing himself a new perspective to improve the discussion. Just as at the end of the *Protagoras*, in the *Theaetetus* we see a real turning of the roles: here it is Socrates who uses sophistic arguments, and Protagoras' task is to bring him back to the dialectic method, to philosophy.⁵⁹ Finally, in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates prevails on Protagoras; nevertheless, in this dialogue Socrates' "victory" is built on the comparison of roles and their exchange with Protagoras, who furnishes Socrates with the instruments to construct a more correct *elenchus* and to pass from the initial eristic *paidia* to philosophical research (*σπουδή*). Even in the *Protagoras* Socrates overcomes his initial skepticism about the possibility of teaching *aretê* (319a8–320c1) only after confronting Protagoras. Perhaps this is the authentic sense to give to the sophist's prophecy according to which Socrates is Protagoras' successor (361d7–e5).⁶⁰

The analyzed passages shed some light on the whole operation displayed by Plato in the two dialogues. It is correct to claim that Plato was indeed conscious of the differences between Socrates and Protagoras. Such differences consisted, mostly, in the opposition between Socrates' confidence in an objective system of reality and Protagoras' relativistic perspective.⁶¹ Nevertheless, Plato could not ignore the affinities between the two intellectuals in methodological orientation. Perhaps that is the correct sense to give to Diogenes Laertius' statement that Protagoras was the first to use the Socratic method of discussion (9.53).⁶² In my opinion, however, what Plato wants to underline by making use of these refined narrative techniques is, mostly, the context of *paideia*.⁶³ By assimilating the figures of Socrates and Protagoras, Aristophanes built the image of Socrates as the paradigm of the modern intellectuals' corrupted *paideia*, represented, in his piece, by the Weaker argument. Plato somehow recycles Aristophanes' suggestion to give it a new meaning: it is only through the comparison with Protagoras that Socrates acquires a new awareness of his role of teacher. What we have then, at the end of this analysis, is the figure of Socrates as a teacher and, perhaps, as a nobler kind of sophist, champion of a new *paideia* which, owing to a new system of values, can overcome the limits of his great predecessor, Protagoras.

59 Cf. Palumbo 2002, 190–192.

60 Cf. Gagarin 1969, 160–164; Corradi 2014, 42–48.

61 Cf. Woodruff 2011, 91–110.

62 Berti 1978, 353–358, and Robinson 1990 stress the similarity of Protagoras' method of discussion and that of Socrates. See also Capra 2001, 147–153.

63 According to Corey 2015, 198, Plato's Socrates "incorporates' Protagoras into his own pedagogy."

References

- Ambuel, D. *Turtles all the way down: on Plato's Theaetetus, a commentary and translation*. Sankt Augustin 2015.
- Balansard, A. *Enquête sur la doxographie platonicienne dans la première partie du Théétète*. Sankt Augustin 2012.
- Bandini, M. and L.-A. Dorion. *Xénophon: Mémoires*, 1. Paris 2000.
- Berkel, T.A. van. 'Made to measure: Protagoras' metron', in: van Ophuijsen, van Raalte and Stork 2013, 37–67.
- Bertagna, M.I. 'Sulla costruzione del racconto nel *Protagora* di Platone', *AntPhilos* 6 (2012), 91–100.
- Berti, E. 'Greek dialectic and free speech', *JHI* 39 (1978), 347–370.
- Blank, D.L. 'Socratics versus sophists on payment for teaching', *ClAnt* 4 (1985), 1–49.
- Blondell, R. *The play of character in Plato's dialogues*. Cambridge 2002.
- Bonazzi, M. *I sofisti*. Roma 2010.
- Bussanich, J. and N.D. Smith. *The Bloomsbury companion to Socrates*. London 2013.
- Brancacci, A. 'La "dottrina riservata" di Protagora (Plat. *Theaet.* 152c7–e1)', *Méthexis* 24 (2011), 87–108.
- Brancacci, A. 'La pensée politique de Protagoras', *RPhA* 30 (2012), 59–85.
- Cambiano, G. 'Come confutare un libro? Dal *Fedro* al *Teeteto* di Platone', *AntPhilos* 1 (2007), 99–122.
- Campbell, L. *The Theaetetus of Plato with a revised text and English notes*. Oxford 1883.
- Canto-Sperber, M. *Platon, Ménon: traduction inédite, introduction et notes*. Paris 1993.
- Capra, A. *Ἀγὼν λόγων: il Protagora di Platone tra eristica e commedia*. Milano 2001.
- Capra, A. *Plato's four muses: the Phaedrus and the poetics of philosophy*. Washington 2014.
- Casertano, G. *Il Protagora di Platone: struttura e problematiche*. Napoli 2004.
- Casertano, G. 'La struttura del dialogo (o di quando la filosofia si fa teatro)', in: Casertano 2004, 729–766.
- Casertano, G. *Fedone, o dell'anima: dramma etico in tre atti: traduzione, commento e note*. Napoli 2015.
- Centrone, B. *Platone: Sofista*. Torino 2008.
- Chappell, T.D.J. *Reading Plato's Theaetetus*. Sankt Augustin 2004.
- Classen, C.J. *Untersuchungen zu Platons Jagdbildern*. Berlin 1960.
- Corey, D.D. *The sophists in Plato's dialogues*. Albany 2015.
- Corradi, M. *Protagora fra filologia e filosofia: le testimonianze di Aristotele*. Pisa-Roma 2012.
- Corradi, M. 'Τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν: Aristotle, Plato, and the ἐπάγγελμα of Protagoras', in: van Ophuijsen, van Raalte and Stork 2013, 69–86.
- Corradi, M. 'Platone al termine del *Protagora*: la profezia di una παιδεία possibile', in:

- M. Vallozza, *Etica e politica: tre lezioni su Platone*. Atti del Convivium Viterbiense 2013 (Viterbo, 17 maggio 2013). Viterbo 2014, 33–52.
- Corradi, M. 'Doing business with Protagoras (*Prot.* 313e): Plato and the construction of a character', in: G. Cornelli, *Plato's styles and characters: between literature and philosophy*. Berlin 2016, 335–356.
- Corradi, M. 'Πιθανολογία e πιθανολογεῖν tra Platone, Aristotele ed Epicuro: un dialogo metodologico a distanza', in: M. Tulli, *Ricerche di filologia classica*, VII: *testo e forme del testo. Ricerche di filologia filosofica*. Pisa-Roma 2016a, 217–256.
- Denyer, N. *Plato: Protagoras*. Cambridge 2008.
- Denyer, N. 'The political skill of Protagoras', in: V. Harte and M. Lane, *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy*. Cambridge 2013, 155–167.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The rise and fall of the Socratic problem', in: Morrison 2011, 1–23.
- Erler, M. 'Platon', in: H. Flashar, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: die Philosophie der Antike*, II, 2. Basel 2007.
- Ferrari, F. *Platone. Teeteto*. Milano 2011.
- Ferrari, F. *Platone. Menone*. Milano 2016.
- Frede, M. 'Introduction', in: S. Lombardo, K. Bell and M. Frede, *Plato: Protagoras*. Cambridge 1992, vii–xxxiii.
- Friedländer, P. *Plato*, III tr. H. Meyerhoff. Princeton 1969.
- Fronterotta, F. *Platone. Sofista*. Milano 2007.
- Gagarin, M. 'The purpose of Plato's *Protagoras*', *TAPhA* 100 (1969), 133–164.
- Gavray, M.-A. 'Apologie et comédie chez Platon: essai de reconstitution croisée (*Nuées*, *Apologie de Socrate* et *Théétète*)', *RPhilos* 132 (2007), 131–156.
- Gavray, M.-A. 'Comment ne pas interpréter un fragment philosophique: le dialogue avec Protagoras dans le *Théétète*', in: D. El Murr, *La mesure du savoir: études sur le Théétète*. Paris 2013, 25–47.
- Gavray, M.-A. *Platon, héritier de Protagoras. Dialogue sur les fondements de la démocratie*. Paris 2017.
- Giannantonio, G. *Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone*. Napoli 2005.
- Giannopoulou, Z. 'Objectivizing Protagorean relativism: the Socratic underpinnings of Protagoras' apology in Plato's *Theaetetus*', *AncPhil* 29 (2009), 67–88.
- Giannopoulou, Z. *Plato's Theaetetus as a second Apology*. Oxford 2013.
- Giuliano, F.M. 'Esegesi letteraria in Platone: la discussione sul carne simonideo nel *Protagora*', *SCO* 41 (1991), 105–190.
- Gourinat, J.-B. 'La dialectique de Socrate selon les *Mémorables* de Xénophon', in: M. Narcy and A. Tordesillas, *Xénophon et Socrate. Actes du colloque d'Aix-en-Provence (6–9 novembre 2003)*. Paris 2008, 129–159.
- Guidorizzi, G. and del Corno D. *Aristofane: le Nuvole*. Milano 1996.
- Hunter, R.L. *Plato and the traditions of ancient literature: the silent stream*. Cambridge 2012.

- Ildefonse, F. *Platon, Protagoras*: traduction inédite, introduction et notes. Paris 1997.
- Ildefonse, F. 'Platon: *Protagoras*', in: R. Goulet, *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*: v a. Paris 2012, 759–771.
- Imperio, O. 'La figura dell'intellettuale nella commedia greca', in: A.M. Belardinelli, O. Imperio, G. Mastromarco, M. Pellegrino and P. Totaro, *Tessere: frammenti della commedia greca: studi e commenti*. Bari 1998, 43–130.
- Kerferd, G.B. *The sophistic movement*. Cambridge 1981.
- Koch, T. *Ausgewählte Komödien des Aristophanes*, 1: *die Wolken*. Berlin 1876.
- Kohan, W.O. 'Sócrates: La paradoja de enseñar y aprender', in: Rossetti and Stavru 2010, 159–184.
- Konstan, D. 'Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', in: Morrison 2011, 75–90.
- Lee, E.N. "'Hoist with his own petard": ironic and comic elements in Plato's critique of Protagoras (*Tht.* 161–171)', in: E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos and R.M. Rorty, *Exegesis and argument: studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*. Assen 1973.
- Lee, M.-K. *Epistemology after Protagoras: responses to relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus*. Oxford 2005.
- Long, A.G. 'Refutation and relativism in *Theaetetus* 161–171', *Phronesis* 49 (2004), 24–40.
- Long, A.G. *Conversation and self-sufficiency in Plato*. Oxford 2013.
- Manuwald, B. *Platon, Protagoras: Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Göttingen 1999.
- McCabe, M.M. *Plato and his predecessors: the dramatisation of reason*. Cambridge 2000.
- McPartland, K. 'Socratic ignorance and types of knowledge', in: Bussanich and Smith 2013, 94–135.
- Morrison, D.R. *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011.
- Nails, D. *The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics*. Cambridge 2002.
- Napolitano, M. *I Kolakes di Eupoli*: introduzione, traduzione, commento. Mainz 2012.
- Narcy, M. *Platon, Théétète*: traduction inédite, introduction et notes. Paris 1995.
- Notomi, N. 'Socrates versus sophists: Plato's invention', in: Rossetti and Stavru 2010, 71–88.
- Ophuijsen, J.M. van, M. van Raalte and P. Stork. *Protagoras of Abdera: the man, his measure*. Leiden 2013.
- Palumbo, L. 'Verità sofistica e verità filosofica nel *Teeteto* di Platone', in: G. Casertano, *Il Teeteto di Platone: struttura e problematiche*. Napoli 2002, 188–200.
- Prior, W.J. *Unity and development in Plato's metaphysics*. London 1985.
- Rademaker, A. 'The most correct account: Protagoras on language', in: van Ophuijsen, van Raalte and Stork 2013, 87–111.
- Robinson, T.M. 'Socrates and others as *epigonoi* of Protagoras', in: K.J. Boudouris, *The philosophy of Socrates*, 11: *elenchus, ethics and truth*. Athens 1990, 93–98.
- Romilly, J. de. *The great sophists in Periclean Athens* tr. J. Lloyd. Oxford 1992.

- Rossetti, L. 'La rhétorique de Socrate', in: G. Romeyer Dherbey and J.-B. Gourinat, *Socrate et les socratiques*. Paris 2001, 161–185.
- Rossetti, L. and A. Stavru. *Socratica 2008: studies in ancient Socratic literature*. Bari 2010.
- Schiappa, E. *Protagoras and logos: a study in Greek philosophy and rhetoric*. Columbia, SC 2003.
- Schrieffl, A. *Platons Kritik an Geld und Reichtum*. Berlin 2013.
- Scott, D. *Plato's Meno*. Cambridge 2006.
- Scott, G.A. *Plato's Socrates as educator*. Albany 2000.
- Sedley, D. *The midwife of Platonism: text and subtext in Plato's Theaetetus*. Oxford 2004.
- Serrano Cantarín, R. and M. Díaz de Cerio Díez, *Platón, Protágoras: edición crítica, traducción, introducción y notas*. Madrid 2005.
- Solana, J., 'Socrates and 'noble' sophistry (*Sophist* 226b–231c)', in: B. Bossi and T.M. Robinson, *Plato's Sophist revisited*. Berlin 2013, 71–85.
- Stavru, A. and L. Rossetti. 'Introduction', in: Rossetti and Stavru 2010, 11–55.
- Swift Riginos, A. *Platonica: the anecdotes concerning the life and writings of Plato*. Leiden 1976.
- Taormina, D.P. 'Il logos di Prodicò (337A1–C4)', in: Casertano 2004, 375–389.
- Taylor, C.C.W. 'Socrates the sophist', in: L. Judson and V. Karasmanēs, *Remembering Socrates: philosophical essays*. Oxford 2006, 157–168.
- Tell, H. *Plato's Counterfeit Sophists*. Cambridge, MA 2011.
- Trabattoni, F. *Scrivere nell'anima: verità, dialettica e persuasione in Platone*. Firenze 1994.
- Trabattoni, F. *Essays on Plato's epistemology*. Leuven 2016.
- Tulli, M. 'Sul rapporto di Platone con Isocrate: profezia e lode di un lungo impegno letterario', *Athenaeum* 78 (1990), 403–422.
- Tulli, M. 'Weak ignorance: the γελοῖον from the scenes of Aristophanes to the dialogue of Plato', in: J. Dillon and L. Brisson, *Plato's Philebus: Selected Papers from the Eighth Symposium Platonicum*. Sankt Augustin 2010, 237–242.
- Tulli, M. 'Platone, il proemio del *Teeteto* e la poetica del dialogo', in: M. Tulli, *Ricerche di filologia classica, VI: l'autore pensoso. Un seminario per Graziano Arrighetti sulla coscienza letteraria dei Greci*. Pisa-Roma 2011, 121–133.
- Winiarczyk, M. *Diagoras of Melos: a contribution to the history of ancient Atheism*. Berlin 2016.
- Wolfsdorf, D.C. 'Socratic philosophizing', in: Bussanich and Smith 2013, 34–67.
- Woodruff, P. 'Socrates and the new learning', in: Morrison 2011, 91–110.

Isocrates as a Reader of Socratic Dialogues

David J. Murphy
New York

1 Background: Isocrates and the “Disputers”

Isocrates sought to train his students not only to master influential and persuasive speech but also to acquire good judgment (δόξα) and values for success in private and public life. Although his outlook in some ways resembled that of Protagoras or other so-called sophists, Isocrates considered himself a philosopher. Announcing his program as “philosophy,” Isocrates had entered “the marketplace of ideas” in fourth-century Athens and was competing with other public intellectuals for students.¹ Because his “philosophy” and his differences with Socratics are often discussed, I focus instead on what Isocrates shows us about how Socratic dialogues were understood during the time of their production.²

Isocrates identifies his rivals only by vague plurals, but verbal parallels help trace his literary confrontations. Of Socratic writers, we can detect with confidence only Antisthenes and Plato behind Isocrates’ allusions, although other Socratics may also be meant (cf. § 4 below). Isocrates’ interaction with dialogues shows that: 1. unlike many modern critics, he treats them as assertoric works, which express views of the author; 2. although he does not adopt Socratic methods, he takes dialogical elements into his own writing; 3. certain of Plato’s dialogues circulated more widely than is sometimes acknowledged.

As he tells us (*Antidosis* 193), Isocrates introduced his pedagogical “undertaking” (πραγματεῖαν) in *Against the Sophists* (c. 392–390 BCE). Although he does not define “sophist” in that earlier work, it is clear that he means a professional teacher of public discourse (*C. Soph.* 14–15, cf. 19).³ Among these teachers, Isocrates most criticizes those who “involve themselves in disputations” (1, 20). Some of his criticisms echo criticisms made of sophistical figures by comic poets: they are boasters/impostors (1, 19), peddle useless and harmful

1 Collins 2015, 18. For Isocrates’ place within this intellectual/educational scene, see Collins’ Part 2; Wareh 2012; Pinto 2015.

2 On Isocrates’ “philosophy,” cf. *Panegyricus* 47–49, *Antidosis* 183–188, 270–282, *Panathenaicus* 30–32; Schiappa and Timmerman 2010, 43–66; Levet 2015. On *doxa* in Isocrates, cf. also Poulakos 2001.

3 Cf. Tell 2011, 32–36, 48–51.

teachings (8, 20), and engage in “idle talk and hairsplitting” (ἄδολεσχίαν καὶ μικρολογίαν, 8) and “trifling arguments” (λογίδια, 20).⁴ Not paralleled in extant comedy but in Plato is Isocrates’ mockery of sophistical figures about their fees: their teaching’s low value is laid bare by their proportionately low fees (three or four minae, 3–4), and its moral impotence by their requirement that students deposit fees with third parties (5).⁵

Isocrates goes on to attribute to the “disputers” nine specific claims. These teachers claim to:

- a. Seek truth, presumably about ethics (1)
- b. Teach virtue and how to live (3–6, 20)
- c. Have knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) about how to live, superior to opinion (3, 8)
- d. Lead their students to become virtuous or “noble and good” (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, 5–6)
- e. Provide happiness (εὐδαιμονία) as the outcome (3–4, 7), making students “all but immortal” (4)
- f. Promote care (ἐπιμέλεια) of the soul/self (8)
- g. Disparage gold and silver while desiring profit (4)
- h. Detect (cf. τηροῦντας, “watching out for”) verbal contradictions (7), hairsplitting
- i. Know the future (2, 7).

By around 390, the above claims marked Socratics, not just any rivals.⁶ In contrast to what he presents as his pragmatic philosophy, Isocrates wants to

4 Boasting/imposture: Ar. *Nub.* 102, 449, Eup. *Kolakes* fr. 157 PCG; uselessness: Antiphanes *Cleophanes* fr. 120 PCG; trifling arguments and idle talk: Ar. *Nub.* 1480, 1485, *Ran.* 1491–1492, *Tagenistae* fr. 506 PCG, Eup. *Adespota* fr. 388 PCG, Alexis *Asotodidaskalos* fr. 25 PCG. It is legitimate to consider Socrates of the *Clouds* as a sophistic figure. With Prodicus, he is grouped with “sophists about upper realms” (μετεωροσοφιστῶν, 360–361). His patron Clouds nourish sophists (331), he makes people into sophists (111, 1309), and the play ascribes to him things ascribed to sophists (cf. Papageorgiou 2004; Notomi 2013, 15–16). On ridicule of sophists, cf. Carey 2000 and Edmunds 2006. On portrayal of Socrates (and sophists) in comedy, see Bromberg and Capra (both in this volume).

5 For sophists’ mistrust of their students over fees, cf. Pl. *Grg.* 519c5–7; for proportionately low fees, cf. *Ap.* 20b9, *Cra.* 384c1. Plutarch reports Isocrates’ fee as ten minae (1000 drachmas), *Dem.* 5, cf. [Plut.] *X. Orat.* 837d–838e.

6 Although no Socratic is known to have boasted foreknowledge, it figures in dialectical moves in Plato (*Prt.* 354a–c, 356a–357b, *La.* 195e–196a, *Chrm.* 173e–174a). It is likely that Isocrates takes foreknowledge to be entailed by c.–d.: virtue combined with knowledge ensures a happy life only if it includes knowledge of outcomes.

box up theirs as a species of eristic, and in some respects, Socratic methods could be seen as overlapping eristic.⁷ Ἀδολεσχία καὶ μικρολογία in fact resurface only at *Antidosis* 262, where Isocrates describes teaching that clearly belongs to Plato's Academy. Since the Socratics' literary vehicle was dialogues, Isocrates' conception of their enterprise will have come in large part from those works.

2 Antisthenes

Although individual criticisms of “disputers” in *Against the Sophists* fit various Socratics (cf. below, § 4), combined they must speak against Antisthenes alone, the most prominent Socratic in Athens in the 390s.⁸ Antisthenes maintained the following (cf. *SSR* V A): virtue is teachable; it can be learned; it cannot be lost; it is the supreme good (August. *De civ. D.* 8.3, 18.41 = *SSR* I H 13). If virtue is teachable, it is a kind of knowledge. Antisthenes insinuated that one can gain virtue-knowledge from him (DL 6.8 = *SSR* V A 172). Criticism for seeking money while claiming to despise it fits portrayals of Antisthenes (Xen. *Symp.* 4.34–44, cf. DL 6.2, 4, 6–9, 13). It does not fit Plato, who, as far as we know, did not charge fees.⁹ Isocrates had reason to resent Antisthenes, who had belittled his speechwriting in two works (cf. DL 6.15 = *SSR* V A 41.7–8). At this time when “sophist” and “philosopher” were not fixed categories, it was natural for Isocrates to aim at Antisthenes as one of the “sophists” of the speech's title, given the latter's rhetorical works and style and the traces of sophistic influence in his writing.¹⁰

Because it is largely from Antisthenes' dialogues that later authors quote, one infers that they were his most read compositions. We know that Antisthenes wrote at least eleven dialogues; at least some were “Socratic” (DL 2.64 = *SSR* I H 17). It is highly probable, then, that dialogues figure among Isocrates's sources when he criticizes views that match those of Antisthenes.

Against the Sophists opens against those who “undertake to tell lies right at the beginning of their ἐπαγγελμάτων” (1), that is, program pieces that advertised the writer's teachings. By twice linking “truth” to rivals' *epangelmata* (ἀληθῆ λέγειν ... τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν, 1), Isocrates evokes the title of Antisthenes' *Truth*.¹¹ His charge, that “they pretend to seek the truth, but undertake to tell lies” (1,

7 Cf. Nancy 2007.

8 On Antisthenes' status, cf. Patzer 1970, 243–244; Eucken 1983, 26–27.

9 Cf. Swift Riginos 1976, 118 n. 104.

10 On Antisthenes' affinities with sophists, cf. Prince 2006, 78–80.

11 Cf. Brancacci 2005, 25–26, 35–36, 87–91.

“truth” claim), plays on Antisthenes’ doctrine that one cannot speak falsely. This conclusion is bolstered by the *Helen* (4), where Isocrates repeats the accusation of lying against rivals who deny the possibility of falsehood—again, Antisthenes (cf. n. 17 below). As a rhetorically polished dialogue (DL 6.1 = SSR V A 11) and *epangelma* of a rival school, *Truth* will have caught Isocrates’ attention. We can deduce from its placement with logico-linguistic works in the Antisthenic *corpus* (DL 6.16 = SSR V A 41.31–35) that *Truth* too dealt with logic and language. Isocrates’ derision of disputers’ truth-seeking (1, “hairsplitting”) and his denial that ἐπιστήμη guarantees happiness (3, “knowledge” and “happiness” claims) fit what he would have found in *Truth*.

Fragments that portray Gorgias and Socrates and the topics “Great King” and “double *paideia*”—two levels of virtue and happiness—have been persuasively assigned to Antisthenes’ *Archelaus*, or *On Kingship*.¹² These fragments contain three claims attacked in *Against the Sophists*: the “teach virtue” claim, namely “how [the Great King] stands in respect to virtue and education” (fr. 3 B Brancacci), and the “truth” and “knowledge” claims, namely “in knowledge and in right wisdom and in the truth; in this, that one knows what is, what is not in his power, what to strive to make happen, to what to take pains to prevent from happening” (fr. 4 B). The latter passage also could have suggested the “know the future” claim. The “truth” claim is also implied by βασιλεὺς ἀληθῶς (fr. 5) and by fragment 2, where Socrates insists that the only true description of a specialist is the one unique and proper to him. These reflect Antisthenes’ doctrine of οἰκεῖος λόγος (cf. n. 17 below). Isocrates may have viewed such precision as “hairsplitting.” Moreover, other fragments of the *Archelaus* present the “happiness” claim—that is, happiness is the outcome of virtue-knowledge (fr. 3 B, 4 C, 5). Because we do not know the date of *Archelaus*, however, we only note these points of contact with *Against the Sophists*.

Likewise, we only note other Antisthenic dialogues that are likely to have presented themes that crop up in *Against the Sophists*. At least one discourse of the *Protrepticus* was a Socratic dialogue; rare words cited from it bespeak a sympotic setting (cf. SSR V A 63–65), and Socrates’ presence is suggested by Athenaeus’ quotation from it (784d = SSR V A 64). Its characters may have discussed such themes as the “become virtuous/καλὸς κ’ἀγαθός” claim and the “knowledge” and “happiness” claims, which loom large in protreptic discourses, or exhortations to philosophy.¹³ “Double *paideia*” appears in *Prometheus*

12 Brancacci 1992.

13 On those protreptic themes cf. Michelini 2000 and Collins 2015. They are prominent in Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 13.14–28 (= SSR V A 208). Antisthenes’ *Protrepticus* (see now Brancacci

words in *Greater Heracles*: “you will be no complete man until you learn those things which are more exalted than humans” (Them. Περὶ ἀρετῆς p. 43 Mach 12–13 = SSR V A 96.6–7).¹⁴ One of the *Cyrus* dialogues implied the “knowledge” claim: “Cyrus the King, asked what subject is most necessary to learn, said, ‘to unlearn the bad’” (Arsenius, *Violetum* 502.13–14 = SSR V A 87).

Of the disputers’ claims, then, most are explicit in Antisthenes’ dialogues. “Care of self/soul” is a corollary of the others. *Archelaus* fragment 4 B could have suggested “know the future.” If Dio did use Antisthenes’ *Protrepticus*, we can posit the latter work as his source for the “disparage gold and silver” claim at *Oratio* 13.20, and the “care of self/soul” claim at 13.28. Since more than one Antisthenic dialogue articulated these themes, we can only conclude that Isocrates is responding to at least one dialogue. It follows that some or all of these views were voiced by characters. From their mouths, Isocrates has extracted authorial positions.

We cannot account for this “extraction” by supposing that the “rhetorical cast” of Antisthenes’ dialogues (DL 6.1) led Isocrates to treat them as treatises and to miss their mimetic form. Antisthenes’ dialogues had question-answer, characters, and space-time settings. Julian noted their mythical or faux-historical elements (*Or.* 7, 209a, 215c, 216d–217b = SSR V A 44). Isocrates in fact was aware of dialogues as a kind of writing, even if the Hellenistic conception of the dialogue genre had not yet crystallized.¹⁵ We best account for his extractions by tracing them to the assumption, standard in his time, that an author’s thought can be conveyed by characters’ utterances. Of disputers’ claims, he will have derived “teach virtue” and “know the future” by inference, and “hairsplitting” by observation. Characters presumably articulated the others. He attributes all to the author.

Writing when dialogues were appearing in profusion, Isocrates mines them for authorial thought couched in characters’ words, and he tacitly assumes that his readers will do the same. Isocrates applies this assumption to epic as well. From the gods’ deliberations in the *Iliad* (16. 431–458, 644–655, 22.167–185) he infers and attributes to Homer the teaching that humans cannot know

2013, 33–34). On the other hand, [Pl.?] *Clitophon*. and other sources have been proposed (cf. Moles 2005, 117–119). Similar treatment of Palamedes by Dio (*Or.* 13.21) and Plato (*Resp.* 7.522d1–8) strengthens the hypothesis that Dio draws on the *Clitophon* plus other sources.

14 The best translation from the Syriac is Luz 1996, 90–91.

15 He distinguishes dialogues *de re*, though not *de dicto* (*Antid.* 45, *Panath.* 1); cf. Wilcox 1943b, 429–430. On ancient definition of dialogues as a genre, cf. Jazdzewska 2014 and Dubel 2015; on Isocrates’ conception, cf. Murphy 2013, 315–321.

the future (*C. Soph.* 2). Modern critics generally assume a gulf between author and character, such that in characters' utterances we hesitate to read authors' views.¹⁶ Isocrates betrays no sense of such a gulf.

The other work in which Isocrates' opponents hold positions like Antisthenes' is the *Helen* (c. 380s–370 BCE). Isocrates attacks those who expatiate on a strange and counter-intuitive subject (1). Of these, “some” (οἱ μὲν) deny “that it is possible to (a) speak falsehoods or (b) contradict or (c) assert two contradictory propositions about the same things.” Critics detect Antisthenes as the vague “some,” for Aristotle reports (a)–(b) and (c), a proposition that entails (c), as his views.¹⁷ One of Isocrates' sources was probably *Truth*, where Antisthenes will have expounded his οἰκεῖος λόγος doctrine. We can conclude from the *Helen* that Isocrates knew Antisthenes' work, acknowledged its style, and condemned its content.

3 Plato

Once Plato achieved prominence, Isocrates turns attention to him and the Academy. He comes closest to citing Plato at *Helen* 1. Mentioned after οἱ μὲν among those who “have grown old” in maintaining their strange and paradoxical theses are οἱ δέ, “some others.” These hold “that (d) courage and wisdom and justice are the same thing (ταὐτόν), and that (e) we have none of them by nature, but (f) [that] there is one knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) concerned with them all” (*Helen* 1). (d)–(f) parallel three conclusions reached in Plato's *Protagoras*: strong “unity of virtue,” by which justice, temperance, piety, wisdom, and courage (329c–e, 349b1–3) amount to one and the same thing, knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, 361b1–2); “virtue is knowledge” (329–334, 349–361); “virtue is not by nature.” “Virtue is not by nature” follows from “virtue is knowledge” when Protagoras admits that ignorance makes people cowardly (360d–e). In Plato's dialogues, ταὐτόν specifies the identity of the virtues only in the *Protagoras* (329d1, 331b4, 333b6, 350d5), for in other dialogues, it is agreed that parts of virtue may be distinguishable and, thus, not ταὐτόν (*La.* 194d–e, 199c–e, *Grg.* 504c1–3, 506e–507c, *Meno* 78d–79c, 88c–89a). (e), though, *could* be derived from the

16 On this problematic see, e.g., Press 2000 and Marmodoro and Hill 2013.

17 Cf. *Metaph.* Δ.27, 1024b32–34, and for (b), also *Top.* 1.11, 104b21, and DL 3.35 (= SSR V A 148, 152, 153). Aristotle reports (a)–(b) as consequences of (c), viz. Antisthenes' doctrine of οἰκεῖος λόγος: “nothing should be spoken of except by the formula proper to it, in one-to-one correspondence (τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ἐν ἐφ' ἑνός).” On οἰκεῖος λόγος, cf. Brancacci 2005, 195–223, and Suvák (in this volume).

argument for “virtue is not by nature” in the *Meno* (89a6–b9, 98d1–5). For (d)–(f), then, Isocrates lifts ταῦτόν directly from the *Protagoras* and distills the rest from that discussion’s outcome, if not also from the *Meno*.

When Isocrates says that his rivals “claim to teach” (*Helen* 7), it is understandable that he should include Plato, for Socrates admits (*Prt.* 361b–c) that virtue is teachable. The Academy attracted adherents and competed with Isocrates’ own school. In *Helen* 1, then, Isocrates interprets positions argued by the character Socrates and criticizes them as the author’s.

Isocrates goes on to lump οἱ μὲν and οἱ δέ with earlier sophists and to call all their works συγγράμματα (2, 11).¹⁸ He locates these rivals within the tradition of sophistical educator—like himself, creators of *logoi* that are marked by style and propositional content and are fair game for criticism along those axes. He has two motives in particular for reacting to the *Protagoras*. First, Socrates argues as though virtue is *epistêmê*, a position opposed to Isocrates’ *doxa*-based philosophy. Second, Protagoras is refuted after having expounded (323c–328a) an outlook that overlaps Isocrates’ own on many fronts, including insistence that excellence depends on a triad of natural endowment, teaching, and effort/practice (cf. *Prt.* 327c–d with *C. soph.* 14–18, *Ad Nic.* 12, *Antid.* 184–187, 192, 276–278, *Panath.* 198).¹⁹

In the *Busiris* (15–27), institutions that Isocrates credits to Egypt match those of the Sparta-inspired state of Plato’s *Republic*. After writing that the philosophers “who undertake to speak about such things and are most renowned prefer the constitution in Egypt,” Isocrates adds that the Spartans imitate Egyptian customs (17). The link to Sparta helps us see that Isocrates is parodying the *Republic*.²⁰ Part of his fun with his “not serious” subject (9) may be to attach ideas from Plato to the mythical evildoer, Busiris, and see how many allusions people catch. This presumes a *Republic* (or earlier version of it) known outside Academic coteries.²¹

In the *Nicocles* (c. 372–365 BCE), Isocrates puts into the king’s mouth two arguments against critics of *logoi* and philosophy. First, against those who say that the devotees of “philosophy” are motivated not by virtue but by πλεονε-

18 σύγγραμμα covers prose works in general and includes dialogues; cf. Szlezák 1985, 376–385.

19 On the overlap cf. Roochnik 1996, 214–215, 223–226, 283–288, although I believe Plato’s *Protagoras* does claim a *technê*; cf. *Prt.* 316d–317a, 318e–319a. On the triad, a notion Isocrates shares with Plato and others, cf. Shorey 1909; Nestle 1911, 20–23; Poulakos 1997, 86–97; Marzluf 2004.

20 Cf. Livingstone 2001, 45–56.

21 Thesleff 2009 updates his own hypothesis of a proto-*Republic* consisting of Books 2 through the first part of 5.

ξία (“pursuit of advantage”), Isocrates replies that it is not always vicious to seek *pleonexiai* (“advantages”); one can gain advantage *with* virtue (μετ’ ἀρετῆς πλεονεκτῆσαι, 2).²² Second, if someone misuses the power of persuasion, the user is to blame, not the power, and *logos* in fact grounds our being human (the so-called “hymn to *logos*,” 5–9). Although Isocrates had always criticized the misuse of oratory and had once upbraided “teachers of πλεονεξία” (*C. Soph.* 20), the vehement language (“those who dare to speak ill ... deserve hatred,” *Nic.* 9) and the position of these arguments early in the speech give it away that he now takes the criticisms to be levied against himself. They had been made in the *Gorgias*. Socrates there describes rhetoric as “not an undertaking based on expertise, but one of a soul good at guessing and brave (ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας) and naturally clever at addressing people” (*Grg.* 463a6–8). These words parody *Against the Sophists* 17: “the work of a soul manly and of good judgment (ψυχῆς ἀνδρικής καὶ δοξαστικῆς)” and “the student ought to have ... a suitable nature.”²³ Isocrates must have caught another parody of himself in the figure of the speechwriter of *Euthydemus* 304d–305e, who inhabits the frontier between philosophy and politics. The similarities between that figure and Callicles, whom Socrates silences in the *Gorgias*, require Isocrates to defend his own stance.²⁴ In particular, after Callicles had brushed away the criticism that *pleonexia* is unjust (*Grg.* 483c3), Socrates had made mockery of him on that very point (490c–491a, cf. 508a7).

Isocrates brings out the nuances of his own views in *Nicocles* 1–9. His defense of pursuing *pleonexia* (1–4) improves upon the defense of rhetoric made by Plato’s *Gorgias* (*Grg.* 456c–457c; in particular, “beat” and “kill,” τύπτουσι ... ἀποκτείνοντας, *Nic.* 4, echo τύπτειν ... ἀποκτείνοναι in *Grg.* 456d4–5), while the “hymn to *logos*” rebuts Socrates’ devaluation of persuasion.²⁵

At *Nicocles* 46–47, Isocrates comes close to Plato on reason’s power to convert natural tendencies into stable virtues. Isocrates has Nicocles say that those who are “orderly” (κοσμίους) and “moderate/self-controlled” (σωφρονοῦντας) by nature and not “by intelligent resolve” (γνώμη) “may be persuaded to change” (μεταπεισθεῖν), but “with reasoning” (μετὰ λογισμοῦ) they remain steadfast for life, because they have discerned that virtue is the greatest of goods. It was Plato

22 On connotations of *pleonexia* in Isocrates, cf. Bouchet 2007.

23 Cf. Shorey 1909, 195–196; Eucken 1983, 36–39. The latter answers Dodds’ skepticism (1959, 225).

24 On Isocrates as the speechwriter, cf. Michelini 2000, 528–530; Palpacelli 2009; Brancacci 2011, 17–22; Collins 2015, ch. 4, an “Isocratean critic.” On that figure and Callicles, cf. Sudhaus 1889, 56–57.

25 On *Nicocles* as a reply to *Gorgias*, see Barney 2010, 109–115.

who most explicitly connected “order” (κόσμος) with *sôphrosunê*.²⁶ Plato paints a picture as well of those whose service to the state is “undone by persuasion” (μεταπεισθέντας, *Resp.* 3.413b5); prospective guardians need the right education to solidify their disposition as civic virtue (*Resp.* 3.416b–d). These are the only instances of μεταπειθω in aorist passive in either author. Moreover, in the *Meno*, reasoning/calculation (λογισμός) about the cause is what binds down true opinions (98a2–3). Only here does Isocrates use λογισμός for reasoning that confirms virtue. I conclude that he draws on Plato for this argument that nature needs education to stabilize character.

The *Nicocles* reveals how deliberately Isocrates expresses his thought through utterances of characters in fictive contexts.²⁷ Isocrates’ strategy supports the conclusion that he extracts other writers’ views from utterances of *their* characters. The *Nicocles* is an oration spoken by king to subjects. Nicocles says, “the other discourse, how it is fitting to exercise sole power, you heard from Isocrates” (11). That other discourse was the *To Nicocles*, which was, however, not written for declamation to subjects; it is Isocrates’ open letter to his former pupil. Nicocles continues, “I shall try to go through the upcoming discourse ... not as though I shall outdo the former one.” Here the *Nicocles* marks itself too as fictional by presenting the former, fictional recitation as actualized. Years later in *Antidosis* 253–257, the Isocrates character claims and quotes *as his own* (“and I already said these very things previously,” 253) the very “hymn to logos” that had been put in the mouth of the Nicocles character. In the prologue to *Antidosis*, Isocrates in his authorial voice announces that he will go on to defend his actual ideas and career in the form of a “pretend” (προσποιουμένην, 13; cf. “assume/suppose,” ὑποθέλμην, 8) courtroom speech. Since the Isocrates character in the rest of *Antidosis* (14–323) articulates the author’s thought, we infer that the “hymn to logos,” both in the economy of the *Nicocles* and in that of *Antidosis*, forms part of the fiction *and* expresses views of the author. Isocrates in the *Antidosis* is treating his own *Nicocles* as we saw him treat the *Iliad* and dialogues of the Socratics.

In the *Antidosis*, Isocrates broadens his controversy with Plato. By this time, Plato had insinuated that Isocrates was no true philosopher (*Phdr.* 278e–279a).²⁸ Isocrates counters by appropriating themes and structure from the

26 *Chrm.* 159b3, *Grg.* 504d1–3, 508a2, *Plt.* 306e–307e, 308e–310d; cf. Witte 1970, 64–65.

27 On fictive elements in Isocrates, see Usener 2003 and Nicolai 2004, 111–118, 136–146.

28 The classic argument that *Phdr.* 279a disparages Isocrates was made by de Vries 1953; on the passage’s irony, see now McAdon 2004; Yunis 2011, 243–246; Brancacci 2011, 29–38. Tulli’s contrary case misses important details (1990, 409). *Phdr.* 267a7–b1 is a blatant parody of *Paneg.* 8.

Apology.²⁹ When he evaluates an educational program that matches the Academy's, he complains that "certain experts in disputation speak abuse about public, useful discourses ... to make their own more honored" (258). The public discourses include his own (cf. *περί ἡμῶν*, 259 *bis*). Although Aristotle may also be meant (cf. below, n. 31), Isocrates' word choice spotlights Plato: "we, being involved with political discourses, which those people say are contentious" (*φιλαπεχθήμονας*, 260). That adjective appears nowhere in Aristotle, but Plato's Socrates applies it to gatecrashers into philosophy who discourse only about human matters (*Resp.* 6.500b4–5, cf. 495c3–4).³⁰ Preparing to argue that his, not the Academy's, is the true philosophy, Isocrates employs two assumptions about a dialogue: that the author can express a view about a contemporary in it, and that Plato's dialogues are *logoi* that compete with his own. The first assumption operates already at the beginning of the *Antidosis*, where Isocrates pushes back at "some of the sophists who slander my occupation and say it is about forensic speechwriting" (2–3; cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 304d6).³¹ When Isocrates insists that credit in public speaking is won by "philosophy and reasoning," not "by nature and chance" (292), he rejects the basis of Socrates' faint praise in the *Phaedrus*, that his success is from nature (279a4, a9).

Some eight years after Plato's death, Isocrates still contests statements from his dialogues. In the *Panathenaicus* he writes, "all men of sense would choose and want" to inflict injury on others rather than suffer it, and to rule others unjustly rather than escape that charge and be ruled unjustly, although "a certain few of those claiming to be wise, if asked, would deny this" (117–118). Earlier in the work, Isocrates complained about criticisms from "sophists" (5) and dismissed a kind of education that, again, matches that of the Academy (26–29).³² Isocrates' defense of unjust victory over just suffering puts him directly at odds with the *Crito*, *Republic*, and *Gorgias* (esp. 468e–469c, and cf. Isocrates' *ἐλοιντο καὶ βουληθεῖεν* with *βουλοίμην* ... *ἐλοίμην*, *Grg.* 469c1–2).³³ The words "claiming to be wise" show that "if asked" (*Panath.* 118) does not refer to Socrates, for Isocrates always respected him, as the *Busiris* and *Antidosis*

29 Of many discussions of *Antidosis* and Plato, cf. Ries 1959, 150–163; Masaracchia 1995, 30–38; Alexiou 2007. On appropriation from *Apology*, cf. Nightingale 1995, 28–43; Ober 2004.

30 Against doubts that this reference is to Plato, cf. Wilcox 1943a, 126–127; Masaracchia 1995, 34.

31 Aristotle too disparaged Isocrates in lectures (Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 18, Quint. *Inst.* 3.4.11) and in his dialogue *Gryllus* (cf. Berti 1997, 84–99; Blank 2007, 11–16).

32 Aristotle is probably also in view. His *Protrepticus* had attacked Isocrates and perhaps made him a character. Cf. Hutchinson and Johnson 2014 and 2010; Collins 2015, 244–264.

33 Cf. Roth 2003, 151–152.

show. Rather, Isocrates imagines someone posing questions to the *author*. When Isocrates corrects those who single out as a distinct type of constitution one based on property qualifications (131), the taxonomy in *Republic* 8 (550c11–12, cf. 553a2) is the only one he can be criticizing.³⁴

Isocrates also alludes to Plato without saying that he is responding to anyone. He parallels things said by characters in Plato (cf. e.g. *De Pace* 31 with *Resp.* 3.392b) or clashes with them (cf. e.g. *Antid.* 180–185 with *Grg.* 463–465, *Ad N.* 48–49 with *Resp.* 10.597b–599b) or seems merely to borrow (cf., e.g., “concord among thieves” theme at *Panath.* 226 with *Resp.* 1.351c8–10, or *Epistle to Alexander* 5 with *Phdr.* 279a5–7). These allusions do not reveal Isocrates’ assumptions about dialogues as a kind of writing. They do provide insights into the effects of dialogues.

First, they illustrate Isocrates’ acquaintance with Plato’s work. At *Antidosis* 30, Isocrates divides teachers of young men into “those knocking about the law courts” (περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καλινδουμένων) and “those involved with philosophy” (περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατριψάντων). His wording picks up the opposition Socrates had made in the *Theaetetus* between “those who spend (διατριψάντες) a lot of time in philosophical pursuits” and “those youths who hang around (κυλινδούμενοι) in law courts and such places” (172c4–5, 8–9). Isocrates appears to take the criticism in *Theaetetus* 172–177, especially the assumption of forensic involvement, as directed against himself and his school, and he rejects it. There is reason to think that when he eulogizes Athens in *Areopagiticus* 74–75 (357 or 355/4 BCE), he subtly corrects *Timaeus* 24c–25d, and when in *Panegyricus* 53 he praises Athens’ support of the underdog, he reacts to *Menexenus* 244e.³⁵ It is possible that when Isocrates values political discourse like his own as higher than law-writing (*Antid.* 80–83), he intends his criticism to encompass arm-chair productions like Plato’s *Laws*.

The tie to the *Laws* is more explicit at *Panathenaicus* 114–118. Justifying the changes that occurred in Athens when its leaders relied on navies recruited from the lower orders rather than on land forces, Isocrates insists that “no one could justly censure those who made this choice” (115), and he launches the “unjust victory is better” argument. Although others had deplored the consequences of Athens’ naval build-up, it was Plato in *Laws* 4.706–707 who highlighted the decline of virtue among citizens of a state that abandons land for sea warfare—the very phenomenon that Isocrates now justifies. Eucken

34 Cf. Eucken 1982, 54.

35 Cf. Eucken 1983, 163–165, 210–212. Thesleff 1999, 107, however thinks that “the *Timaeus-Critias* complex remained a draft not intended for publication in its present shape.”

noted that “the good order of the polity” (ὁ τε κόσμος ὁ τῆς πολιτείας, 116), the only occurrence of this phrase in Isocrates, echoes a phrase that Plato uses several times in the *Laws*. It is reasonable to think that Isocrates is responding to it.³⁶

When he branded as “ineffectual ... the laws and constitutions written by the sophists” (*Phil.* 12), one cannot but think that *Laws* and *Republic* stood foremost in his mind. This sneer was noticed in the Academy, for Speusippus remarks to Philip II that “Isocrates ... has not held off from Plato in the speech sent to you” (*Letter to Philip II*, 2).

Although we cannot be sure of the dates of many Platonic dialogues, it is likely that Isocrates knew these Platonic works on or before:

Isocratean work	Date of Isocratean work	Refers to Platonic work
<i>Helen</i>	380s–370s	<i>Protagoras</i> ; <i>Meno</i> ?
<i>Busiris</i>	380s–370s	(proto?-) <i>Republic</i>
<i>Panegyricus</i>	c. 380	<i>Menexenus</i>
<i>Nicocles</i>	c. 370	<i>Gorgias</i> , <i>Euthydemus</i> , <i>Meno</i> ? <i>Republic</i> ?
<i>Areopagiticus</i>	357	<i>Timaeus</i>
<i>Antidosis</i>	354–353	<i>Apology</i> , <i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>Philip</i>	346	<i>Laws</i> ?
<i>Epistle to Alexander</i>	342–341	<i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>Panathenaicus</i>	342–339	<i>Laws</i>

One notices the absence of dialogues heavy on analysis of concepts, like *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*. From the *Theaetetus* we find echoes only of the middle, more rhetorical portion. On the other hand, our results support the theory that Plato’s narrated dialogues (e.g. *Protagoras*, *Republic*, *Euthydemus*) were among the first disseminated outside Academic circles.³⁷

A second conclusion we can draw from Isocrates’ strategy of allusion and appropriation is that his audience could spot his own and his rivals’ footprints. He recognizes that his careful readers catch subtleties that elude superficial ones (cf. *Phil.* 23–24, *Panath.* 136, 246). They who had read Isocrates many times

36 Eucken 1982, 67–68; Roth 2003, 149–152.

37 Cf. Thesleff 1982, 53–64; Tarrant 1996.

(*Antid.* 55, *Panath.* 268) must have also known Plato's (and Antisthenes') works well enough to catch allusions. When Isocrates disseminated the *Philip* "to you and the other [readers]" (1), he will have been confident that they would catch his criticisms of Plato. Isocrates expects in turn that his Academic rivals will read him (*Panath.* 25), and they did; Speusippus (*Letter to Philip II*, 1) refers to details in Isocrates' *Philip* and says that it was discussed in the Academy. For his part, Isocrates invited associates to comment on his writing (*Phil.* 17, 23, *Areop.* 56, *Panath.* 200, 232–235), and, as one infers from the *Helen* and *Busiris*, he had students compare texts on a question. The schools' curricula presume that students did their own reading.³⁸ Copies of speeches obtained by Isocrates' students (cf. *Panath.* 233, 262) certainly circulated and spawned further copies. Beyond Athens were other cultivated readers, as in Sparta (*Panath.* 251). Isocrates' allusions indicate that outside Academic circles, Plato's dialogues found readers who prized writing rich in interaction, speeches, ethics, and politics.³⁹ If we may extrapolate from Isocrates' hermeneutics, we can infer that these readers too found views of authors in characters' utterances.

4 Other Socratic Writers

Alongside Antisthenes and Plato, other first-generation Socratics also expounded ideas that display points of contact with Isocrates' works. Of those from whom more than titles survive, Aristippus of Cyrene is credited by Sotion and Panaetius (DL 2.85 = SSR IV A 144.30–44) with twelve prose compositions. Other unnamed authorities identified five of these as dialogues (DL 2.84 = SSR IV A 144.1–11), but that identification remains uncertain.⁴⁰ We have no evidence, in any case, that Aristippus wrote Socratic dialogues: 1. no ancient authority says that he did; 2. from Panaetius it appears that he did not;⁴¹ 3. ps.-Demetrius distinguishes between the "Aristippean form of *logos*," or continuous argument, and the "Socratic form," or question and answer that leads the

38 Cf. Johnson 1959, 29–32.

39 More dialogues "eventually reached a larger public" than Thesleff's list (1993, 40–41) of *Gorgias*, *Symposium* and *Phaedo* allows.

40 Cf. Clay 1994, 30–31.

41 "Panaetius however thinks that of all the Socratic dialogues, those of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes and Aeschines are true/real [ἀληθεῖς], but he wavers over those of Phaedo and Euclides and does away with [ἀναίρεῖ] all the others" (DL 2.64). It does not matter for our purposes whether ἀληθεῖς here implies "presenting a faithful picture of Socrates' life/thought" or "written by the given author."

interlocutor to puzzlement (*Eloc.* 296–297). Although Aristippus seems to have shared Socrates' esteem for virtue and for the knowledge that leads to it, we lack grounds to include Aristippus with confidence in the present study.⁴² We do have fragments of Socratic dialogues of Aeschines of Sphettus, entire productions of Xenophon, and evidence about Euclides of Megara. Unfortunately, despite some parallels, the evidence that Isocrates reacted to their dialogues is not strong.⁴³

Aeschines displays a number of characteristics of Isocrates' disputatious educators. First, his dialogues urge virtue and knowledge in language similar to that which Isocrates imputes to the "disputers" in *Against the Sophists*.⁴⁴ Second, despite the unreliability of some sources, Aeschines seems to have taken students.⁴⁵ The story that upon returning to Athens from Syracuse he did not dare "to practice as a sophist" (σοφιστεῦειν, DL 2.62 = SSR VI A 13.5–7) does not exclude teaching activity in the 390s, when Isocrates wrote *Against the Sophists*.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, Aeschines' fragments do not display logico-linguistic analysis that Isocrates would dismiss as hairsplitting, or counter-intuitive theses like those in the *Helen* (cf. § 3 above). To be sure, Aeschines' *Alcibiades* apparently argued "virtue is not by nature" (*POxy* 1608 col. 1 fr. 1 = SSR VI A 48).⁴⁷ Nowhere, however, does Aeschines betray concern with "unity of virtue," with the several virtues' connection to a special kind of knowledge, or with the nature of virtue.⁴⁸ We cannot detect an attitude toward him on Isocrates' part or draw conclusions about his dialogues from Isocrates' works.

"Possible but not confirmed" must also be our verdict on an Isocratean reaction to Euclides. Euclides was considered an eristic in later tradition ([Galen.]

42 On Socratic elements in Aristippus, cf. Zilioli 2012, ch. 2.

43 Our remains of Phaedo of Elis are too meager to connect them to Isocrates' writings.

44 "Virtuous/καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός": Aristid. *Or.* 46 p. 293 Dindorf (= SSR VI A 50.21, 48–51), Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.53 (= SSR VI A 70), Stob. 2.8.26 (= SSR VI A 95); "Knowledge": Aristid. *Or.* 46, p. 294 Dindorf (= SSR VI A 50.39, 45), Max. Tyr. 38.4 (= SSR VI A 62), Prisc. *Inst.* 18.189 (= SSR VI A 88); "Care of self/soul": Aristid. *Or.* 46, p. 294 Dindorf (= SSR VI A 50.41–43), Stob. 2. 31.23 (= SSR VI A 77), cf. Dittmar 1912, 180–181. Although Lysias mocked him over the "happiness" claim (Ath. 612 A = SSR VI A 16.19–21), εὐδαιμονία does not appear in Aeschines' best attested fragments; against Dittmar, Krauss and Giannantoni do not assign *Soc. Ep.* 6, which mentions it (fr. 35.48 Dittmar), to the *Callias*.

45 DL 2.20 = SSR I D 1, DL 2.63, 5.35 = SSR VI A 13, Ath. 507C = SSR VI A 21.

46 This return was probably in 380; cf. Humbert 1967, 218–220.

47 "Virtue is not by nature" is affirmed in Pl. *Alc. I* and Xen. *Mem.* 4.2, which may rely on Aeschines' *Alcibiades*. Cf. Dittmar 1912, 107–110, 155–157; Berry 1950.

48 Cf. Döring 1984, 27–29.

Hist. philos. 7 = SSR II A 27; DL 2.107 = SSR II A 34), and he had followers (cf. DL 2.108 = SSR II A 23; DL 2.112–113 = SSR II A 24). We do not have evidence, however, that he was teaching in Athens in the earlier fourth century.

Because Euclides is credited with a form of the “unity of virtue” thesis, however, one may think he is meant among οἱ δέ of the *Helen*, who made the virtues τὸ αὐτό (cf. above, §3). Euclides “declared that the good is one [but] called by many names, at one time wisdom (φρόνησιν), at another, god, and at other times, mind and so on” (DL 2.106 = SSR II A 30, and cf. SSR II O 15). Virtue, too, the Megarians said, is one but called by many names (DL 7.161 = SSR II A 32). Menedemus, whom chroniclers put in the Megarian tradition (DL 2.126 = SSR III F 1), “does away with the number and differences of the virtues, on the basis that it is one and uses many names; for the same thing (τὸ αὐτό) is called moderation and courage and justice, just as with ‘mortal’ and ‘human’” (Plut. *De virt. mor.* 440 E = SSR III F 17). We do not know, however, whether Megarians articulated “virtue is not by nature.” Stilpo is said to have asked rhetorically whether exile can deprive one of “courage or justice or any other virtue” (Stob. 3.40.8 = SSR II O 31)—a question not consistent with the “unity of virtue” thesis. Megarians, then, come in behind Plato among candidates for οἱ δέ.⁴⁹

Although Xenophon may have previously written about Socrates’ trial, his Socratic dialogues emerged in the 360s and later.⁵⁰ Isocrates’ allusions to *The Choice of Heracles* in *To Demonicus* (c. 373) therefore are more likely to be to Prodicus’ display piece than to Xenophon’s retelling (*Mem.* 2.1.21–34).⁵¹ Isocrates’ image of the politician as slave of the demos (*Areop.* 26, 355 BCE) may be influenced by Xenophon (cf. *Mem.* 2.1.8–9). On the whole, though, influence seems to have flowed to Xenophon from Isocrates.⁵²

49 Giannantoni 1990, 4.57–60, traces connections between Euclides’ thought and Socratic precedents. Euclides’ unity of virtue thesis, however, seems to have differed in some ways from what is presented in Plato’s *Protagoras*; see Brancacci (in this volume).

50 Huss 1999, 402–403; Dorion 2000, ccxlviii–ccxlix.

51 The *Memorabilia* were available when Isocrates alluded to the *Choice* again in 346 (*Phil.* 109–113). On connections among these works, cf. Murphy 2013, 327–329. In favor of the authenticity of *Ad Dem.*, Sandys 1868, xxxi–xl remains persuasive; the case against is summarized by Menchelli 2015, 11–13.

52 On *logos*, cf. *Mem.* 3.3.11 to *Nic.* 5–9; on luxury vs. restraint, cf. *Cyr.* 8.8.15–18 to *Ad Nic.* 32; on beauty’s effects, cf. *Symp.* 4.15 to *Helen* 57; on sophists, cf. *Cyn.* 13.1–9 to *C. Soph.* Isocrates also provided Xenophon models of moral exhortation (cf. Gray 1985; Pontier 2016).

5 Conclusion

Isocrates' disputes with Socratics are in-house among educators, for he and his rivals all defend "philosophy" against detractors. Isocrates does not appropriate distinctively Socratic forms of argument like induction from examples. He stays with forms familiar to orators (e.g., *a fortiori* arguments, *C. soph.* 2, *Arch.* 26–27) and prefers *endoxa* to "What is X?" inquiries (e.g. *Arch.* 37). It is not clear whether Isocrates got his "philosoph-" terms from Socratics. In his "hymn to *logos*," though, he makes the Platonic field of expertise a subsidiary of his own. There he puts dialectical reasoning, even with oneself—Plato's enterprise (*Tht.* 189e, *Soph.* 263e–264a)—under the sway of *logos*, which he stakes out as *his* area of expertise ("whoever best hold discussions [διαλεχθῶσιν] with themselves," *Nic.* 8).

On other points, too, Isocrates occupies his own space. He parallels Aeschines on care or training (ἄσκησις, cf. *Stob.* 2 31.23 = *SSR* VI A 77) of the soul, and Antisthenes (*DL* 6.2 = *SSR* V A 85) and Xenophon (e.g. *Cyr.* 1.5.7, 1.5.9) on the value of labor (πόνος) for virtue.⁵³ Unlike Antisthenes, on the other hand, he can approve of reducing πόνος (*Evag.* 45), and rather than accept bad reputation (ἄδοξία) as an opportunity to exercise virtue, he thinks it always to be avoided (*Ad Dem.* 43, *Plat.* 39, *Ep. ad Phil.* 4). Overall, Isocrates bundles precepts rather than seeks to guide human life by the light of one or two leading principles. Like Socrates, he can speak of virtue as the greatest of goods (*Nic.* 47) or as good for itself and its consequences (*Nic.* 30). Unlike Plato and Aristotle, his fruits of virtue are conventional: wealth, honor, power, and pleasure (cf. *Paneg.* 49, *Ad Dem.* 45–46, *Antid.* 217, 285).

As his career proceeds, Isocrates displays appreciation of the dialogue form. Inserting direct discourse into later works (*On the Peace* 57, *Antid.* 133–137, 142–149, *Phil.* 17–23), he closes his last with a literal dialogue, *Panathenaicus* 199–265.⁵⁴ There he and former students voice opposing assessments of Spartan values. When the pro-Spartan student, out-argued by Isocrates, departs wiser, "knowing himself" (*Panath.* 230), we see a nod to the Socratic tradition. In form, though, this passage more resembles Aristotle's dialogues—and, from what we can see, Antisthenes'—than Plato's, for ideas clash via speeches, not via elenctic examination or back-and-forth investigation. Its dénouement,

53 Cf. ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια, *Isoc. Evag.* 41, 42, 60, *Antid.* 181, 210, 245, 250, 304, *Ad Nic.* 12, *Ad Dem.* 6, *Areop.* 43; ἄσκησις, *Ad Dem.* 21, 40, *Nic.* 44, *Bus.* 22, *Antid.* 209–210, 304; πόνος, *Ad Dem.* 12, *Evag.* 78, *Areop.* 43, *Antid.* 184, 209, 291, *Panath.* 3, 260, *Ep.* 8.5.

54 On dialogical elements in Isocrates, cf. Alexiou 2001.

where Isocrates reports that he silently left his companions to their misapprehensions, is like none other we possess until we reach Cicero's late dialogues. Writing for readers rather than declaiming on a single occasion to a large audience, Isocrates can create extended dialogue free from the risks of obscurity or incongruous artifice that restrict dialogical sections even in Demosthenes, who of extant Attic orators is the one most adept at deploying them.⁵⁵

It is reasonable to suppose that Isocrates includes Socratic writers when he speaks of "those who are accustomed to praise" Socrates (*Bus.* 6). If so, he shows that he is aware of how the Socratic dialogue was employed to memorialize Socrates. And as I proposed, Isocrates' extraction of authors' views from characters' utterances suggests that he saw dialogues as assertoric *logoi*, like his own compositions. His assumptions about mimetic writing bring into relief by contrast the historical relativity of our own, opening a window on a different hermeneutic among readers of the dialogue when it was young.⁵⁶

References

- Alexiou, E. 'Die Kommunikation mit dem Publikum: Dialogszenen bei Isokrates', *WJA* 25 (2001), 85–98.
- Alexiou, E. 'Rhetorik, Philosophie und Politik: Isokrates und die *homologoumene arete*', *Rhetorica* 25 (2007), 1–14.
- Barney, R. 'Gorgias' defense: Plato and his opponents on rhetoric and the good', *SJPh* 48 (2010), 95–121.
- Berry, E.G. 'The Oxyrhynchus fragments of Aeschines of Sphettus', *TAPhA* 81 (1950), 1–8.
- Berti, E. *La filosofia del 'primo' Aristotele*. Milano 1997.
- Blank, D. 'Aristotle's academic course on rhetoric and the end of Philodemus, *On Rhetoric* VIII', *BCPE* 37 (2007), 5–47.
- Bouchet, C. 'La *πλεονεξία* chez Isocrate', *REA* 109 (2007), 475–489.
- Bouchet, C. and P. Giovannelli-Jouanna. *Isocrate: entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques*. Lyon 2015.
- Brancacci, A. 'Struttura compositiva e fonti della terza orazione *Sulla regalità* di Dione Crisostomo: Dione e l'*Archelao* di Antistene', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 11.36.5 (1992), 3308–3334.
- Brancacci, A. *Antisthène: Le discours propre*. Paris 2005.

55 On dialogical elements in Demosthenes, cf. Gotteland 2015.

56 Parts of this paper are revisions of Murphy 2013. The author thanks *Classical World* and its editor, Matthew S. Santirocco, for permission to use material from that paper here. All translations are my own.

- Brancacci, A. 'L'elogio di Isocrate nel *Fedro*, la chiusa dell'*Eutidemo*, e la polemica isocrateo-antistenico-platonica', in: G. Casertano, *Il Fedro di Platone: struttura e problematiche*. Napoli 2011, 7–38.
- Brancacci, A. 'Introduzione al pensiero politico di Antistene', in: F. de Luise and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 29–40.
- Carey, C. 'Old comedy and the sophists', in: D. Harvey and J. Wilkins, *The rivals of Aristophanes: studies in Athenian old comedy*. London 2000, 419–436.
- Clay, D. 'The origins of the Socratic dialogue', in: P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic Movement*. Ithaca 1994, 23–47.
- Collins, J. *Exhortations to philosophy: the protreptics of Plato, Isocrates and Aristotle*. New York 2015.
- Dittmar, H. *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker*. Berlin 1912.
- Dodds, E.R. *Plato: Gorgias*. Oxford 1959.
- Döring, K. 'Der Sokrates des Aischines von Sphettos und die Frage nach dem historischen Sokrates', *Hermes* 112 (1984), 16–30.
- Dorion, L.-A. *Xénophon: Mémorables*. Paris 2001.
- Dubel, S. 'Avant-propos: théories et pratiques du dialogue dans l'Antiquité', in: Dubel and Gotteland 2015, 11–23.
- Dubel, S. and S. Gotteland. *Formes et genres du dialogue antique*. Bordeaux 2015.
- Edmunds, L. 'What was Socrates called?' *CQ* 56 (2006), 414–425.
- Eucken, C. 'Leitende Gedanken im isokratischen Panathenaios', *MH* 39 (1982), 43–70.
- Eucken, C. *Isokrates: seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen*. Berlin 1983.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Gotteland, S. 'Du discours au dialogue: Démosthène et ses interlocuteurs fictifs', in: Dubel and Gotteland 2015, 87–106.
- Gray, V.J. 'Xenophon's *Cynegeticus*', *Hermes* 113 (1985), 156–172.
- Humbert, J. *Socrate et les petis socratiques*. Paris 1967.
- Huss, B. 'The dancing Socrates and the laughing Xenophon, or the other *Symposium*', *AJPh* 120 (1999), 381–409.
- Hutchinson, D.S. and M. Johnson. *Aristotle: Protrepticus or exhortation to philosophy*. <http://www.protrepticus.info/Reconstruction2014ix1.pdf>, 2014.
- Hutchinson, D.S. and M. Johnson. 'The *Antidosis* of Isocrates and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*', <http://www.protrepticus.info/antidosisprotrepticus.pdf>, 2010.
- Jazdzewska, K. 'From "dialogos" to dialogue: the use of the term from Plato to the second century CE', *GRBS* 54 (2014), 17–36.
- Johnson, R. 'Isocrates' Methods of Teaching', *AJPh* 80 (1959), 25–36.

- Levet, J.-P. 'D'une rhétorique pédagogique à une "certaine philosophie": les enseignements d'Isocrate et la sagesse', in: Bouchet and Giovannelli-Jouanna 2015, 309–318.
- Livingstone, N. *A commentary on Isocrates' Busiris*. Leiden 2001.
- Luz, M. 'Antisthenes' Prometheus myth', in: J. Glucker and A. Laks, *Jacob Bernays: un philologue juif*. Villeneuve d'Ascq 1996, 89–103.
- Marmodoro, A. and J. Hill. *The author's voice in classical and late antiquity*. Oxford 2013.
- Marzluf, P. 'Aptitude or experience? Isocratic ambivalence and the ethics of composition', *RhetR* 23 (2004), 293–310.
- Masaracchia, A. *Isocrate: retorica e politica*. Roma 1995.
- McAdon, B. 'Plato's denunciation of rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*', *RhetR* 23 (2004), 21–39.
- Menchelli, M. *Alla scuola di Isocrate, nella scuola di Platone: corpus Isocrateo e corpus Platonico tra scritti autentici e pseudepigrafici*. Parma 2015.
- Michelini, A.N. 'Socrates plays the buffoon: cautionary protreptic in *Euthydemus*', *AJPh* 121 (2000), 509–535.
- Moles, J. 'The thirteenth oration of Dio Chrysostom: complexity and simplicity, rhetoric and moralism, literature and life', *JHS* 125 (2005), 112–138.
- Murphy, D.J. 'Isocrates and the dialogue', *CW* 106 (2013), 311–353.
- Narcy, M. 'Che cosa è un dialogo socratico?', in: G. Mazzara, M. Narcy, and L. Rossetti, *Il Socrate dei dialoghi*. Bari 2007, 21–32.
- Nestle, W. 'Spuren der Sophistik bei Isokrates', *Philologus* 24 (1911), 1–51.
- Nicolai, R. *Studi su Isocrate: la comunicazione letteraria nel IV sec. a.C. e i nuovi generi della prosa*. Roma 2004.
- Nightingale, A.W. *Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy*. Cambridge 1995.
- Notomi, N. 'A protagonist of the sophistic movement? Protagoras in historiography', in: J.M. van Ophuijsen, M. van Raalte, and P. Stork, *Protagoras of Abdera: the man, his measure*. Leiden 2013, 11–36.
- Ober, J. 'I, Socrates ... The performative audacity of Isocrates' *Antidosis*', in: T. Poulakos and D. Depew, *Isocrates and Civic Education*. Austin 2004, 21–43.
- Palpacelli, L. *L'Eutidemo di Platone: una commedia ordinariamente seria*. Milano 2009.
- Papageorgiou, N. 'Prodicus and the agon of the logoi in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', *QUCC* 78 (2004) 61–69.
- Patzner, A. *Antisthenes der Sokratiker: das literarische Werk und die Philosophie*. Diss. Heidelberg 1970.
- Pinto, M. 'L'école d'Isocrate: un bilan', in: Bouchet and Giovannelli-Jouanna 2015, 319–329.
- Pontier, P. 'Isocrate et Xénophon, de l'éloge de Gryllos à l'éloge du roi: échos, concordances et discordances', *Ktéma* 41 (2016), 43–58.
- Poulakos, T. *Speaking for the polis*. Columbia, SC 1997.
- Poulakos, T. 'Isocrates' use of *doxa*', *Ph&Rh* 34 (2001), 61–78.

- Press, G.A. *Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity*. Lanham, MD 2000.
- Prince, S.H. 'Socrates, Antisthenes and the Cynics', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*. Malden 2006, 75–92.
- Ries, K. *Isokrates und Platon im Ringen um die Philosophia*. Diss. Munich 1959.
- Roochnik, D. *Of art and wisdom: Plato's understanding of techne*. University Park 1996.
- Roth, P. *Der Panathenaios des Isokrates*. Munich 2003.
- Sandys, J. *Isocrates: ad Demonium et Panegyricus*. London 1868.
- Schiappa, E. and D. Timmerman. *Classical Greek rhetorical theory and the disciplining of discourse*. Cambridge 2010.
- Shorey, P. 'Φύσις, Μελέτη, Ἐπιστήμη', *TAPhA* 40 (1909), 185–201.
- Sudhaus, S. 'Zur Zeitbestimmung des Euthydems, des Gorgias, und der Republik', *RhM* 44 (1889), 52–64.
- Swift Riginos, A. *Platonica: the anecdotes concerning the life and writings of Plato*. Leiden 1976.
- Szlezák, T. *Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie: Interpretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen*. Berlin 1985.
- Tarrant, H. 'Orality and Plato's narrative dialogues', in: I. Worthington, *Voice into text: orality and literacy in ancient Greece*. Leiden 1996, 129–147.
- Tell, H. *Plato's counterfeit Sophists*. Cambridge, MA 2011.
- Thesleff, H. *Studies in Platonic chronology*. Helsinki 1982.
- Thesleff, H. 'Looking for clues: an interpretation of some literary aspects of Plato's "two-level model"', in: G. Press, *Plato's dialogues: new studies and interpretations*. Lanham 1993, 17–45.
- Thesleff, H. *Studies in Plato's two-level model*, Helsinki 1999.
- Thesleff, H. 'The early version of Plato's *Republic*', in: H. Thesleff, *Platonic Patterns*, Las Vegas 2009, 519–539.
- Tulli, M. 'Sul rapporto di Platone con Isocrate: profezia e lode di un lungo impegno letterario', *Athenaeum* 78 (1990), 403–422.
- Usener, S. 'Isokrates und sein Adressatenkreis: Strategien schriftlicher Kommunikation', in: W. Orth, *Isokrates: Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers*, Trier 2003, 18–33.
- Vries, G.J. de. 'Isocrates' reaction to the *Phaedrus*', *Mnemosyne* 6 (1953), 39–45.
- Wareh, T. *The theory and practice of life: Isocrates and the philosophers*. Cambridge, MA 2012.
- Wilcox, S. 'Criticisms of Isocrates and his φιλοσοφία', *TAPhA* 74 (1943), 113–133 (= 1943a).
- Wilcox, S. 'Isocrates' "Genera" of Prose', *AJPh* 64 (1943), 427–431 (= 1943b).
- Witte, B. *Die Wissenschaft vom Guten und Bösen: Interpretationen zu Platons Charmides*. Berlin 1970.
- Yunis, H. *Plato: Phaedrus*. Cambridge 2011.
- Zilioli, U. *The Cyrenaics*. Durham 2012.

The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue: Plato, Xenophon, and the Others

James M. Redfield
University of Chicago

The present essay aims to place Plato and Xenophon within a phase of literary history. The fourth century BCE saw the origins in Greek of colloquial prose and something like what we would call fiction; within this arose a sub-genre, the dialogue, and within this sub-genre a special variety, the Socratic dialogue. Plato and Xenophon, of course, were among the several authors of these last: I shall have something to say about the whole group who wrote them, about Plato's relation to it, and also about Xenophon's, and also about their relations to each other.

Colloquial literature began already in the fifth century, in comedy, whence it migrated into tragedy,¹ causing Cratinus to coin the verb *euripidaristophanizein*, “to do like Euripides and Aristophanes” (fr. 307 K.). Comedy had originated in Syracuse, with Epicharmus. Prose dialogue a century later also originated in Syracuse, with Sophron and his son Xenarchus. Aristotle in an oft-quoted sentence of the *Poetics* remarks: “We are not able to provide a common name for the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic dialogues” (*Poet.* 1447b9–10). We, however, do have a generic name for them: we call them “dialogues.” They are characteristically written in more-or-less colloquial language, in prose or sometimes in verse, intended for personal reading rather than performance, and portraying characters who, even if mythological, appear something like ordinary people, and who even if historical, are rather freely treated. Sophron thus inaugurated a genre which has had a long history, including in Greek such authors as Theocritus, Plutarch, and Lucian, and which was readily adapted into other languages, including the Latin of Cicero, the Italian of Galileo, the French of Diderot, and the English of David Hume. Contents range widely from serious argument and scientific doctrine to lighthearted amusement.

¹ Thus in Ar. *Ran.* 949–952, 959, Euripides boasts of eliminating poetic diction and heroic themes in favor of the ordinary: “the woman talked and the slave just as much, the master, the maiden and the hag (ἀλλ’ ἔλεγεν ἡ γυνή τέ μοι χῶ δοῦλος οὐδὲν ἤττον τοῦ δεσπότητος χή παρθένος χή γραῦς ἄν)”; “mine was democratic drama (δημοκρατικὸν γὰρ αὐτ’ ἔδρων)”; “I brought in ordinary matters, things we use, familiar things (οἰκεῖα πράγματα εἰσάγων, οἷς χρῶμεθ’, οἷς ξύνεσμεν).”

The dialogue thus secured its place in the history of European prose. It originated in the fourth century as an aspect of the development of a reading public. Up to the mid-fifth century literary works were written for performance—in symposia, in law courts and assemblies, at festivals, in the theater; publication might follow. By the fourth century a book trade was developing and writers were writing directly for publication; public speeches might be addressed to imaginary occasions, as in the major works of Isocrates, or be published in forms in which they were not or could not have been delivered—as in Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* or *On the Crown*. We may take as the manifesto of this change Thucydides' often quoted assertion that his book is not an *agonisma*, something to win a prize in a contest, but rather a *ktema es aiei*, a possession for all time—or, in a more free but perhaps for accurate translation, a book to take home and keep.

In the fourth century, in other words, there developed a strand of private literary culture, not intended for public space. Dialogues suited this shift; people could read them in privacy, and they imitate private conversations (private or even secret; the longest surviving fragment of Sophron [2A Hordern] represents two women conducting a magical rite). This mode was attractive to philosophers partly because philosophy was typically a matter of private (or even, in the case of the Pythagoreans, secret) conversations, as Plato's Callicles says of the philosopher: "avoiding the public spaces of the city ... and slinking into hiding he spends the rest of his life whispering in a corner with three or four adolescents" (Pl. *Grg.* 485d–e).²

My topic here, however, is the variety of dialogue we—and the Greeks—call Socratic. Obviously these dialogues involve Socrates; in what follows I shall further restrict the term to dialogues by people who knew Socrates. Already in the fourth century these were a group with special claims to understand "the Socratic." Aristotle wrote dialogues, but they were not Socratic. Perhaps he felt, being of a later generation, unqualified to portray Socrates. In any case the dialogues written by people who knew Socrates are the relevant context for Plato and Xenophon, and these are the only Socratic dialogues with which we moderns have to any degree concerned ourselves.³ The Socratic dialogue, as

2 Hordern 2004, 8, remarks that the mimes of Sophron and Herodas mainly take place indoors; Plato's dialogues seem often to be placed in an enclosed or secluded open-air space—a prison cell, a gymnasium, a courtyard, the porch of the King Archon.

3 Obviously later writers could and did write Socratic dialogues. The *Halcyon* is a Socratic dialogue (of uncertain date and authorship) but no one reads it. Lucian wrote some dialogic discourse for Socrates, but that is a joke. Vegetti 2004 recently published some, not however intending it to be an addition to the canon.

we understand it, has an element of memoir. Therefore the Socratic dialogue, in this restricted sense, was a fugitive genre; it did not survive the generation that remembered Socrates.

In the compass of this essay, furthermore, I shall restrict the term “Socratic” to include, among those who knew, admired, and were influenced by Socrates, only those who were in Athens in 399 and therefore together experienced the trauma of his trial and execution. These men, as I imagine them, continued to be in touch with each other in the early fourth century and in a burst of creativity, influenced by and in competition with one another, created the genre of Socratic dialogue—partly, perhaps, in compensation for the loss of Socrates. This picture is not original with me; I draw it from the work of Livio Rossetti. It is to a degree an imaginary account but it is not implausible and is consistent with the scrappy evidence we have. In other words, it results from a legitimate act of the historical imagination.⁴

By this (admittedly contentious) definition of the term, Critias and Alcibiades were not Socratics, nor, paradoxically, were Chaerephon or Theages; they died before Socrates. Neither was Xenophon in this sense a Socratic; he was in Persia during the trial and returned to Athens, if at all, much later. In Rossetti’s estimate, the genre of Socratic dialogue developed in the first decades of the fourth century, whereas Xenophon’s writings, so far as they can be reasonably dated, belong to the last years of Xenophon’s life—he died in 353.⁵ It seems reasonable to give Xenophon’s Socratic works a similar date.⁶ If so, it is reasonable to conclude that, along with his memories of Socrates and his own free invention, he was substantially influenced by the by-that-time-substantial Socratic literature. He was not a creator of the genre, but rather a respondent to it and a re-maker of it.

The canonical list of friends of Socrates who survived his execution is the list in Plato’s *Phaedo* of those present at the death of Socrates: fourteen names, plus three who ought to have been there but were not.⁷ Of these only nine seem

4 Rossetti is difficult to cite; his extensive bibliography consists of articles, most of which incorporate by reference one or more of his other articles. Here I mention as representative Rossetti 2001 and 2007. For a socio-political analysis of the relation of this genre to its audience, starting from Rossetti’s work, see Vegetti 2006.

5 Higgins 1977, 131, with notes giving bibliography arguing for the dating of various works (not including the Socratic works). Higgins further suggests that Xenophon returned to Athens at the end of his life, and that this reconnection stimulated his Socratic writings. This is plausible, but it does rest a conjecture on a conjecture.

6 See Kahn 1996, 30, with a bibliographical note.

7 The *Phaedo* list is not complete. Neither Glaucon nor Adeimantus is included. Adeimantus

to have made any kind of career in teaching and/or writing—and this number includes Crito, the reality of whose dialogues has been doubted by most scholars since Zeller. Evidently to be a friend of Socrates was not a sufficient cause for the production of Socratic dialogues. Panaetius recognizes, along with Xenophon, only Plato, Antisthenes, and Aeschines, and somewhat doubtfully, Phaedo and Euclides (*SSR* I H 17). Clearly other names could be added. Aristippus wrote dialogues, but these may not have been Socratic; some of them were in Doric (he spent some time at the court of the Syracusan tyrants) and these could not have been Socratic. Aristippus also wrote treatises, as did Antisthenes. Probably others on the canonical list—for instance Apollodorus and Hermogenes—were “silent partners,” non-publishing if participating members of the group that jointly generated the Socratic genre.

The primary source for the Socratic dialogue obviously was Socrates’ own discourse. He clearly had a distinctive life-style and way of speaking. The comic poets represent him as a talkative ascetic, and as *semnos*, a pejorative term when applied to mortals, something like “holier than thou.”⁸ Aristoxenus related that his father Spintharos, who had actually known Socrates, testified that “he had not encountered many more persuasive than this, such was his voice and articulation and the character he displayed, and in everything he said his manner of saying it was distinctive. This applied when he was not angry; when he was flooded with this emotion he was quite out of control and might say or do anything” (*SSR* I B 44).⁹

Socrates evidently had great moral authority and provided an example (except when angry, perhaps) of a life devoted to ethical discourse and practice. It seems clear, however, that he was not teaching what we might call “a philosophy”—that is to say, a body of doctrines about, or approaches to, fundamental questions, supported by reasonably persuasive arguments. The main evidence for this negation is the diversity of the Socratics, who ranged from Aristippus, who boldly advertised his life of self-indulgence, to Antisthenes, who was later held to be the precursor of the Cynics, and who dressed in rags.

is mentioned as present at the trial (*Ap.* 33e); to “Glaucón of Athens” are attributed nine dialogues in one book (Diogenes Laertius 2.124). Phaedrus may not have returned from exile.

8 *σεμνός*: Callias fr. 12 (= *SSR* I A 2) and *Ar. Ran.* 1496 (= *SSR* I A 7); also *Nub.* 363; for the pejorative sense of the term see *Eur. Hipp.* 88–108.

9 Οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκώς εἶη, τοιαύτην εἶναι τήν τε φωνήν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις τήν τοῦ εἶδους ιδιότητα. γίνεσθαι δὲ που τοῦτο, ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζοιτο, ὅτε δὲ φλεχθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τούτου, δεινὴν εἶναι τήν ἀσχημοσύνην. οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀποσχέσθαι οὔτε πράγματος: Aristoxenus fr. 54a Wehrli = *SSR* I B 44.

These two, on fact, seem to have had nothing in common except their connection to Socrates and their dislike of Plato.¹⁰

Socrates, on the evidence of both Plato and Xenophon—and to some extent, Aristophanes—had a characteristic manner of teaching, called “conversing” (διαλέγεσθαι).¹¹ Socrates, with or without an audience, would pick out an individual for questioning or instruction. No doubt this is why his followers found Socrates’ own views opaque: his discourse was generated in relation to specific persons on particular occasions. It would thus have seemed proper and even necessary to dramatize Socratic discourse in terms of the interplay of specific characters, set in a particular occasion. We find this not only in Plato and Xenophon but also in Aeschines of Sphettos, one of whose dialogues (for example) began: “It was actually during the procession of the Greater Panathenaia; we were sitting in the stoa of Zeus Elutherios, I and Hagnon father of Theramenes and Euripides the poet ...” (SSR VI A 76). Probably this sort of dramatic specificity was a generic feature of the Socratic dialogues.

That the genre did in some respects represent aspects of the historical Socrates should not lead us to suppose that its authors achieved or intended historical accuracy. The contrary has been thoroughly argued by Charles Kahn, especially for Aeschines and Xenophon, concluding that “Plato’s dialogues are relatively free of anachronism; that is simply a consequence of their dramatic realism ... One of Plato’s greatest literary achievements: the creation of the ‘realistic’ historical dialogue, a work of imagination designed to give the impression of a record of actual events, like a good historical novel” (Kahn 1996, 35). Indeed we may think of the Socratic dialogue as a genre of historical fiction, whereby the Socratics, in their competitive diversity, aimed each to appropriate the memory of Socrates by assuming his persona in their work, so that each created a different “true” Socrates.

Pseudo-Demetrius, who had the texts before him, speaks of difference:

Generally just as with the same wax one makes a dog, another an ox, another a horse, so on the same topic one makes his point as an accusation, saying: “People leave money to their children, but they do not leave with it the knowledge for using the inheritance.” This kind of sentence

10 Evidence for Aristippus’ hostility to Plato is anecdotal—cf. SSR IV A 15–18. Antisthenes evidently wrote a dialogue against Plato, who appears in it under the (insulting) pseudonym of Sathon. Someone (presumably standing in for Antisthenes) in this says: “I see horse, but not horseness; I see a human being but not humanness” (SSR V A 147–149).

11 In Plato we find this developed into a technical term, *dialektikê*, as the “coping stone of the sciences” (Resp. 533c); as a technical term this was further developed by Aristotle.

is called “Aristippean.” Another will bring forth the same point suggestively (*hupothetikos*) as Xenophon mostly does, saying, for example: “One should not only leave money to his own children, but also the knowledge for using it.” Then there is the type particularly called “Socratic,” which evidently Aeschines and Plato most aimed at; this would rearrange the previously mentioned topic into a question, in something like the following way: “My child, how much money did your father leave you? Wasn’t it a lot and more than you can count?” “It was a lot, Socrates.” “So he also left you the knowledge for using it?” So not only has he thrown the child into a quandary (*aporia*) before he knows it, but also he’s reminded him that he is not knowledgeable, and also he has turned him toward education. And he did all this naturally and delicately, with none of the so-called “Scythian manners.”

DEMETR. *Eloc.* 296

The *aporia* offered here as an example has a sub-text: how do you feel about your father and his care for you? This is an adolescent kind of issue, not the kind of thing that occurs much in Plato. There is one close analogy: the opening of Socrates’ first examination of Lysis (*Lysis* 207d–e): Do your parents love you and want you to be happy? Can one be happy if he can’t do what he wants? So your parents let you do whatever you want?

While Socrates’ ability to teach the young is at issue in the *Laches* and the *Charmides*, the *Lysis* is the only dialogue in which we see him actually doing it.¹² Socrates’ most notable younger pupil was Alcibiades, but in Plato it is expressly stated that he did not approach Alcibiades until his other lovers had left him (*Alc.* 103a–b)—roughly at the age at which he appears in the *Protagoras* (309b), “when the beard first is growing.” Alcibiades in Aeschines’ dialogue *Alcibiades* may have been considerably younger, since the relation between parent and child did figure in that dialogue (*SSR VI A* 48). Perhaps Demetrius’ example is from there.

Dialogues entitled *Alcibiades* are also attributed to Antisthenes, Euclides, and Phaedo. Antisthenes told the story (*SSR V A* 200), also told by Alcibiades in his speech in Plato’s *Symposium* (220e), of how Socrates yielded the prize of valor to Alcibiades. The figure of Alcibiades was thus generic. Other names familiar from Plato turn up in the fourth-century Socratics, who thus competed not only in their representation of Socrates but also in respect to other figures, with a shared sense of what other figures were worth representing.

12 Xenophon takes it for granted that Socrates instructed the young; cf. *Xen. Ap.* 20–21. The prime case in Xenophon is Euthydemus (*Mem.* 4.2–3, 5).

The Socratic dialogues are only one aspect of the literary reputation that came to Socrates after his death. Relevant here, I would suggest, is the second edition of Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Aristophanes produced this play in 423 and it was his one outstanding failure. He wrote about this somewhat bitterly in his next play, the *Wasps* (1043–1050) and set himself to revise it, with an eye to a second production; this, however, never happened. Eventually a revised version was published; the most notable novelties in this version were a new parabasis (defending the original play), a new agon (the contest between Right and Wrong) and a new ending (the burning of Socrates' house). This revision is however incomplete—the old parabasis was retained along with the new, and there are many other indications of imperfect revision, as Dover (1968, xcvi) points out, so that this version is, he concludes, “unperformable” and “intended for reading.” It has the look of something found in his papers and published posthumously, like Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Aulis*, but this would place the publication at the earliest in 375 (the date of Aristophanes' death is uncertain) and if, as I strongly suspect, Plato's use of the play in the *Apology* relies on the revised version, this seems rather late. The truth is, however, that we do not have publication dates for most of these documents; if we had them we could write a narrative history, but as it is we are reduced to more-or-less plausible speculation.

A number of these early publications cluster around Socrates' trial. Polycrates, personating Anytus, wrote a speech prosecuting Socrates. For this we have a kind of a date: Favorinus pointed out that the speech mentioned the restoration of the walls of Athens by Conon, and was therefore written after 390 (DL 2.39). Isocrates criticizes Polycrates in his *Busiris*, generally taken to be an early work; George Mathieu (1956, 190) therefore dates the speech of Polycrates somewhere between 390 and 385. The particular criticism Isocrates makes is that Polycrates charged Socrates with being the teacher of Alcibiades; if this were true, says Isocrates, it would not be to Socrates' discredit, since Alcibiades was a great man. However, says Isocrates (*Bus.* 5), no one has ever noticed Alcibiades being educated by Socrates. If this statement is not an ironic bare-faced falsification, it must mean that Isocrates had not yet seen the numerous Socratic dialogues connecting the two. This in turn suggests that those dialogues were not published before 390, and confirms an early date for Polycrates, as well as a later date for those dialogues.

Lysias then wrote a response to Polycrates.¹³ Lysias had certainly known Socrates but he was no Socratic. His only other known connection with them

13 The story was told and retold in later times: that Lysias wrote a speech for Socrates to use

(other than his presence in Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Republic*) was his prosecution of Aeschines for breach of contract, a speech in which he made various more or less scurrilous charges against Aeschines (*SSR* VI A 16). That Lysias wrote on behalf of Socrates suggests that Socrates' execution was a shocking event not only for the Socratics but for the Athenian intelligentsia in general. In any case Lysias' defense of Socrates was not a defense of philosophy but an ad hominem attack on Anytus' motives.¹⁴ Plato's *Apology of Socrates*, of unknown date, was, as we shall see, something very different.

One thing seems clear about the trial of Socrates from Xenophon's evidence: Socrates made no effective defense. Everyone who has written about the trial, says Xenophon, speaks of Socrates' *megalegoria*, a word that means "threatening arrogance" (cf. Eur. *Heraclea*. 356).¹⁵ Xenophon (*Ap.* 1–9) supplies an explanation: Socrates told Hermogenes that at his advanced age he had no need to live, and execution would be a relatively painless and dignified way to die. (Possibly this is from a lost Socratic dialogue.) Few readers have accepted this rationalization: suicide by law court. The testimony of Aristoxenus' father suggests a simpler explanation: that Socrates relied on his usually reliable persuasive powers, but in the unfamiliar courtroom setting, forced to be silent as three different people said bad things about him, he simply lost it and ranted at the jury.

In any case, Socrates' failure to make an effective defense left a gap that was filled post mortem by others than Lysias.¹⁶ Theodectes of Phaselis, a late-fourth-century rhetorician and tragic poet, evidently wrote a defense of Socrates (*Ar. Rh.* 1399a = *SSR* I B 5). Demetrius of Phaleron, a companion of Aristotle and patron of Theophrastus, wrote an *Apology of Socrates* (frs. 91–93 Wehrli, not in *SSR*); centuries later Libanius wrote a massive version (*SSR* I E 1). Socrates' trial, in other words, continued (and continues) to be a matter of concern.¹⁷ We shall come to Plato and Xenophon's defenses in the context of a comparison of these two authors.

at his trial, but Socrates rejected it, saying it was a fine speech but not for him (*SSR* I C 133, 134, 135, 254). The scholiast to Aelius Aristides, who evidently had Lysias' text before him, refers to it as titled: *Against Polycrates, On Behalf of Socrates* (*SSR* I C 137).

14 See Rossetti 1975, to my mind a completely persuasive reconstruction of Lysias' speech.

15 Xenophon also says that Socrates made the judges convict him "by boasting about himself in court" (διὰ τό μεγαλύνειν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, *Ap.* 32).

16 Danzig 2003 (incorporated in Danzig 2010) suggests a powerful motive for the writing of defenses of Socrates by his friends: his conviction and execution reflected on them as in part their failure to preserve Socrates.

17 As recently as 1989 I.F. Stone's *The Trial of Socrates* became a national best-seller.

Some preliminary remarks: Xenophon draws on Plato's work (a set of relevant passages is conveniently collected by Kahn 1996, 393–401) but the reverse is not the case. Plato's work, in other words, was part of the Socratic literature that shaped Xenophon's work; we may presume that Xenophon drew on other Socratic writers as well, although we lack the documentation. Xenophon does not acknowledge his debt to Plato; he makes only one off-hand mention of him (*Mem.* 3.6.1). Plato mentions Xenophon not at all. This may be an indication of antipathy between them. However it should be noticed that Plato does not include in the conversations he reports his other two chief Athenian literary competitors, Antisthenes and Aristippus (except in the *Phaedo* list); Xenophon foregrounds them both.¹⁸ Given these inclusions the absence of Plato from the Xenophontic conversations is the more notable. Plato honors Euclides of Megara and Phaedo of Elis, the former as the vehicle of the *Theaetetus*, the latter as the narrator of the dialogue named after him; Xenophon mentions neither. The antipathy, if any, would seem to have been on Xenophon's side.

This play of absence and presence is symptomatic of a fundamental difference between the Socratic representations of Plato and Xenophon. Plato represents Socrates as philosophically isolated. We do not see him debating philosophical matters with others who share his point of view, understand his terms, accept the fundamental value of his enterprise—Chaerephon, for instance, shows up in several dialogues, but not as an interlocutor. Plato's Socrates does not cross-examine Phaedo or Euclides or the young Isocrates (mentioned ambiguously at *Phdr.* 278e–279b) nor does he dispute with Democritus, mentioned nowhere in Plato. We may read the *Republic* as the philosophical education of Adeimantus and (especially) Glaucon, but these two ambitious young men do not bring a philosophical education in with them. Phaedrus' love of discourse is aesthetic rather than ethical or metaphysical. The great exception, of course, is the *Phaedo*; this exception probably reflects the exceptional importance in Plato's thought of the myth of an ethically significant afterlife, highlighted in the *Seventh Letter* (335). In the *Phaedo* Simmias and Cebes, two Pythagoreans, representatives of a respected and respectful alternative philosophical tradition, can dispute with Socrates on something like equal terms. Otherwise Socrates converses with more-or-less worldly persons; in these conversations he alone stands for an aspiration to something beyond the wisdom current in this world.

Xenophon's Socrates, by contrast, is a thoroughly worldly figure. He is just as dominant in conversation as Plato's, and in that sense just as wise, but the

18 Neither writer mentions Aeschines, except that Plato includes him also in the *Phaedo* list.

content is solid, middle-of-the-road good sense. In terms of the fourth-century contestation concerning the meaning of *philosophia* Xenophon is closer to Isocrates than to Plato. Xenophon has not Plato's need to distinguish Socrates so sharply from those around him or to make of him an isolated figure.¹⁹

Xenophon's worldly approach to Socrates is represented in his response to Socrates' conviction. In the *Memorabilia*, in the context of a general account of Socrates' virtues and some reflections on education, Xenophon (evidently working from Polycrates) reviews the charges against Socrates and marshals counter-evidence; this must be something like Lysias' speech (and may be partially derived from it): the speech Socrates should have given. In his *Apology* Xenophon purports to quote some passages from the speech Socrates did give, which (as noted above) he explains after characterizing them as boastful and provocative. Xenophon thus posthumously acquits Socrates: he should have been acquitted and he would have been acquitted if he had cared to be.

Plato adopts a completely opposite tactic: accepting the fact that Socrates was convicted, Plato wrote him a speech in which he actually wins by losing. Plato's *Apology* hardly mentions the charges and does not at all engage the evidence or the arguments of the opposition. Instead he begins with the assertion that his real prosecutor is Aristophanes' *Clouds* which told the Athenians that "there is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a speculator about things above us and a seeker of what is beneath the ground, a maker of the worse into the better reason."²⁰ Because the *Clouds* was an old play, Plato can claim that this accusation was immemorial; few of his readers will have remembered that the play, when produced, was an abject failure. In any case the claim that the jury is hopelessly prejudiced by the *Clouds* enables the speaker to ignore the charges actually before the court.

Plato's second critical choice was to provide Socrates with a divine mission, taken to be implied by the Delphic oracle that said there was none wiser than Socrates. Whether or not this oracle was ever given—which is doubtful²¹—the mission is not in the oracle but in Socrates' interpretation of it. After all, nowhere does the oracle tell Socrates to go looking for wise men, much less,

19 Xenophon does distinguish Socrates from "the many" in respect to two issues: the omniscience of god (*Mem.* 1.19) and the meaning of madness (*Mem.* 3.9).

20 ἔστι τις Σωκράτης σόφος ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀνεζητηκῶς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν (*Ap.* 18b). Although the issue may have been raised in the first *Clouds*, the mention of "worse and better reason" suggests to me that Plato is working from the revised agon.

21 Nowhere else in Plato's work does Socrates refer to this oracle or claim a divine mission.

when he does not find them, to show them that they are not wise. Once this becomes his mission Socrates can make the claim familiar from those who rely on a higher power: here I stand and can do no other. In that case any evidence the accusers can bring is simply irrelevant and Socrates has no need to answer it.

The third choice Plato made is to make Socrates' response to the charges consist of his cross examination of Meletus. He does not have much difficulty in making Meletus look foolish—something Socrates was particularly good at—and since Meletus was the primary accuser, if Meletus cannot make sense of his own charges they virtually disappear. Nevertheless Socrates more or less accuses himself by his defense: he here displays his dialectical art as consisting of some poor logic and weak analogies. However he provokes Meletus into accusing him of not believing in gods at all—something that was not illegal in Athens and not before the court.

The fourth choice Plato made is to give Socrates a final speech after the vote on the sentence—something I doubt was ever allowed in an Athenian court. Here he contradicts something he had said in his first speech: that he was a kind of stinging fly who kept the Athenians awake, and if they swat him they will spend the rest of their lives asleep. Now he says:

I can tell you, you who put me to death, that you will suffer after my death a penalty much more severe, by Zeus, than that with which you kill me. You do this now thinking you will be spared undergoing cross-examination of your lives, but it will turn out quite the opposite, I'm telling you. There will be more people to cross-examine you, people I held back, although you didn't know it. And they will be more severe inasmuch as they are younger, and they will make you even more miserable.

PL. *Ap.* 39c–d

This is Plato speaking for the Socratics or at least the Academics: we're here, and we're not going to go away. Where Xenophon's defense looks backward, toward the correction of an error, Plato's defense looks forward to the difference Socrates will make, not least by the manner of his death. Plato's *Apology* indeed continues to serve as the manifesto of humanistic philosophy.

The *Apology* is Plato's only Socratic work in which he himself appears: he is mentioned by Socrates as one of his friends present at the trial. This seems to be an assertion of the historical accuracy of a speech which (as I read it) is wholly fictional. The apparently casual mention of the author as an eye witness confirms the reality of the fiction. That, of course, is an irony, and as such is consistent with Plato's whole approach.

Plato never appears in the dialogues proper, either as an interlocutor or in the audience. (At the beginning of the *Phaedo* he even notes his own absence.) Several dialogues are simply put before us, even when (as for example in the *Crito*) no one else is there; Plato as author grants himself a god's-eye knowledge of the event. Some others are narrated by Socrates to a shadowy internal audience (a device also used by Aeschines) and a number are framed by a more-or-less tangled account of their transmission (the *Symposium* is the most extreme case). The transmission, however, never ends with Plato; he gives no account of how he knows these things, he just knows them. This implicit claim endows Plato's work with an absolute authority: whether we have before us a Socrates Plato remembered or his own personal fantasy of Socrates or Plato's fictional re-creation of Socrates, Plato's Socrates is the "real" Socrates—and most readers since have so taken him.

Xenophon, by contrast, is constantly present in his Socratic dialogues; he is the narrator and we are the audience. He begins his *Symposium* with a claim to have himself attended the party; he begins the *Oeconomicus*: ἤκουσα δὲ ποτε αὐτοῦ ("I once heard him"), and this claim applies to everything that follows. The verb ἤκουσα ("I heard") occurs four times in the *Memorabilia* (plus μοι ... ἀκοῦντι, 1.6.14). More often the dialogue is introduced by a simple ποτε ("once"), which may imply the narrator's presence. In one place (*Mem.* 1.3) Xenophon himself converses with Socrates. Thus Xenophon retrospectively places himself as a central figure in the Socratic circle; he becomes, as it were, Boswell to Socrates' Dr. Johnson (except, of course, that Boswell was really close to Johnson, whereas Xenophon has retrospectively created the relationship).²² Since he is consistently present as an admiring reporter, Xenophon, like Boswell, associates himself with his source; he implicitly certifies that Socrates' remarks are worth reporting and true or at least in that sense worthwhile.

Plato, on the other hand, by distancing himself from the scenes he represents also tends to distance himself from the ideological content of the representation. Socrates is shown conversing with certain persons on certain occasions; that occasion in its particularity is put before us as worth our attention. Furthermore, Plato's Socrates (unlike Xenophon's) is consistently ironic; he often takes positions that are for the sake of the argument or in any case are worthwhile in relation to that interlocutor at that moment. Since these are not even Socrates'

22 That this representation was to a degree successful with at least one of the fourth-century Socratics is shown by Xenophon's presence as a character in one of Aeschines' dialogues (*SSR VI A 70*).

views in any stable sense, they certainly are not Plato's views; Plato's work is ironic all the way through. Since Plato never speaks to us we do not have Plato's views, except perhaps in the letters attributed to him; as with any writer of fiction we have Plato's ethos. We know what he thought worth dramatizing, and what was problematic about it. Plato's Socrates, I am asserting, is neither Plato's mouthpiece nor an independent thinker whose philosophy Plato is reporting. Plato's Socrates is rather an idealized figure who is the protagonist in a continuing drama representing in fictional terms the relation between the philosopher and the world.

All this is only to say that the Socratic dialogue as a genre was put to different uses by different authors—certainly by Plato and Xenophon. Plato perfected the genre in a certain manner, but his work was not definitive for others. Xenophon, the only classical author we have who wrote in a great variety of modes, clearly brought to his work the kind of originality he brought to the *Anabasis* and the *Cyropaedia*. In terms of literary history we may suspect an influence of another classical author who wrote in a variety of genres: Ion of Chios. The *Memorabilia* may take something from Ion's *Epidemiai*, in which the author recounted conversations of famous men he had known.

No doubt if we had the works of other Socratics we would encounter further variants—and we already have enough variants to suggest further differences. This is not in conflict with what I might call “the Rossetti proposal” concerning the sociological relations that conditioned the creation of the genre. It means only that those who invented the Socratic dialogue were exceptionally creative people—and, as I have tried to suggest in relation to Plato and Xenophon, that they employed their creativity in defending (indirectly) their own diverse projects and concerns.

References

- Danzig, G. 'Apologizing for Socrates: Plato and Xenophon on Socrates' behavior in court' *TAPhA* 133 (2003), 281–321.
- Danzig, G. *Apologizing for Socrates: how Plato and Xenophon created our Socrates*. Lanham, MD 2010.
- Dorandi, T. 2013. *Diogenes Laertius: lives of eminent philosophers*. Cambridge 1980.
- Dover, K.J. *Aristophanes: Clouds*. Oxford 1968.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990. (= SSR)
- Higgins, W.E. *Xenophon the Athenian: the problem of the individual and the society of the polis*. Albany 1977.
- Hordern, J.H. *Sophron's Mimes: text, translation and commentary*. Oxford 2004.

- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Mathieu, G. and E. Bremond, E. *Isocrates: Discours*. Paris 1956.
- Rossetti, L. 'Alla ricerca dei logoi Sokratikoi perduti (11): l'apologia Sokratous di Lisia' *Rivista di Studi Classici* 23 (1975), 87–99.
- Rossetti, L. 'Le dialogue socratique *in statu nascendi*', *PhilosAnt* 1 (2001) 11–35.
- Rossetti, L. 'I Socratici della prima generazione', in: Rossetti and Stavru 2008, 39–75.
- Rossetti, L. and A. Stavru. *Socratica 2005: Studi sulla letteratura socratica antica presentati alle Giornate di studio di Senigallia*, Bari 2008.
- Stone, I.F. *The trial of Socrates*. New York 1989.
- Vegetti, M. *Repubblica libro XI, Lettera XIV: Socrate incontra Marx, lo straniero di treviri*. Naples 2004.
- Vegetti, M. 'Socratici', in: Rossetti and Stavru 2008, 85–87.

PART 2

The Immediate Socratic Circle



On the Dialectical Character of Antisthenes' Speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus*

Vladislav Suvák
Prešovská Univerzita v Prešove

1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is neither a detailed analysis nor a systematic interpretation of Antisthenes' speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus*¹ but rather a study of their integration into the broader context of Socratic literature and the narrower context of Antisthenes' testimonia. I would like to ask a simple question: Is it possible to read Antisthenes' speeches as texts belonging to what we call the Socratic literature? If it is possible to interpret the *speeches* in terms of the Socratic dialectical reasoning that we find in Plato or Xenophon, then *Ajax* and *Odysseus* could represent an alternative form of the Socratic search for a good life—an alternative to the genre of Socratic *dialogues* as a whole.

The two most extensive texts surviving under Antisthenes' name are *Ajax* (SSR V A 53) and *Odysseus* (SSR V A 54).² These speeches present a fictional rhetorical confrontation between well-known Homeric heroes. As the mythical background implies, the ostensible theme of the speeches is the contest for the arms of Achilles. But readers can find at a deeper level another subject. Ajax and Odysseus show two moral characters engaged in the debate over the meaning of virtue. The older line of scholarly interpretation took the speeches as exem-

1 The speeches have survived in the codices under the titles Αἶας ἢ περὶ Αἶαντος λόγος and Ὀδυσσεύς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσεύως. It is clear that the first title is connected with Ajax's *apologia* of his own person. We could therefore retitile the second the Ὀδυσσεύως λόγος, because Odysseus too defends himself.

2 The authenticity of the speeches has been much discussed in the past. Mullach 1867, 2.269–270, described them as late imitations of Gorgias' speeches. Radermacher 1892, 569–576, considered the speeches to be late prose transcription of an unknown tragedy of Ajax. Other classical philologists (Dahmen 1897; von Arnim 1898; Joël 1901; Altwegg 1907; Lehnert 1909; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1912; Gomperz 1922) have entered into the discussion to express slight or profound objections against the authenticity of the speeches. Contemporary historians, however, and almost without exception, consider the speeches to be genuine (e.g., Höistad 1948; Decleva Caizzi 1966; Patzer 1970; Rankin 1986; Giannantoni 1990; Brancacci 1990; LévyStone 2005). For more details see Prince 2014, 198–199.

plary rhetorical exercises and placed them into a relationship with epideictic speeches of the type exemplified by Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*. Friedrich Blass was probably first to notice that these speeches have, besides a rhetorical form, also a dialectical character.³ Historians turned their minds to a closer study of their content and became gradually convinced that Antisthenes depicted, through an ethical-rhetorical prism, his own understanding of human character.⁴ Contemporary scholars, except for some minor exemptions,⁵ agree that the speeches pose ethical questions. Many of these scholars are actually convinced that Antisthenes created them not under the influence of sophistical rhetoric, but as a Socratic.⁶ This means that we could or actually should read them in the context of Socratic thought. But if we try to do so, we will face a cardinal question: What relationship between rhetoric and dialectics should we ascribe to *Ajax* and *Odysseus*?

This question is not arbitrary. Under the influence of a tradition that relies mainly on the portraits of Socrates in early Plato's dialogues to interpret Socratic thought, we tend to set rhetoric in explicit opposition with dialectics. From this perspective, rhetoric creates speeches without the internal possibility of dialogue and without the opportunity to think about and know what is actually and not just apparently good and right. Rhetoric helps us when we aim to convince someone, even to convince ourselves, but it does not foster a relationship with truth.⁷ In this Platonic sense, we understand rhetoric as something opposed to dialectics and true philosophizing. According to this line of thought, the rhetorical features of Antisthenes' speeches entail their undialectical and thus unphilosophical character.

These speeches will show themselves in new light, however, if we realize that dialectical investigations, with which most modern interpretations of Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues are concerned, cannot be separated from their rhetorical framework. I will first analyze some passages from Xenophon and Plato that imply various forms of the relation between rhetoric and dialectics. Then I will turn to Antisthenes' speeches, and try to read them by the help of extant theses attributed to Antisthenes.

3 See Blass 1892, 310–315.

4 See Höistad 1948, 94–102; Patzer 1970, 213.

5 See Luttazzo 1996, 275–357.

6 Contra, e.g., Patzer 1970, 246–255; especially the conclusion on 255: “the Presocratic Antisthenes never existed.”

7 See e.g. Pl. *Phdr.* 259e4–260a4.

2 Socrates on Rhetoric in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*

In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, we do not come across an explicit opposition between rhetoric and dialectics. In Book 3 Socrates claims that the most noble principles in life, which correspond to laws of our community, we acquire by the help of speech, and it is precisely through speech (διὰ λόγου) that we gain every piece of knowledge: "those best at teaching use speech the most; and those who have the most understanding of the most serious things converse most nobly."⁸ There is no conflict between a good teacher, a virtuous thinker, and rhetorical skill; a wise man is, as a rule, both a virtuous teacher and a virtuous orator. This does not mean, however, that Socrates educates his disciples to become orators in the sense of giving them a rhetorical political education. Xenophon defends Socrates against accusations of having a bad influence upon youth, saying that Socrates "did not rush his companions to become skilled in speaking and in taking action and in contriving. Socrates thought that moderation should come to be in them before these things. For he held that those who had these abilities without being moderate (σωφρονεῖν) are more unjust and more able to do mischief" (*Mem.* 4.3.1). What must precede rhetorical skill is moderation (σωφρονεῖν). At the same time, we see that Xenophon does not contrast the man capable of dialectical dispute (διαλέγονται; cf. *Mem.* 3.3.12) with the orator (ρήτορ; cf. *Mem.* 4.6.15). In *Memorabilia* 4, Xenophon describes Socrates as the most convincing orator: "whenever he went through something in argument (λόγος) by himself, he proceeded via what was most agreed upon, holding this to be safety in argument. Therefore, of those I know, he, when he spoke, produced by far the most agreement in his listeners. And he said that Homer, too, applied to Odysseus the attribute of being a reliable orator (τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ρήτορα εἶναι) on the grounds that he was competent to lead his arguments through the opinions of human beings" (4.6.15).

This passage is significant because Xenophon uses a vocabulary very similar to that in Antisthenes' interpretation of Odysseus' problematic epithet πολύτροπος. Let me quote the part of the fragment that cites Antisthenes' interpretation of Odysseus' *polutropia* (*SSR* V A 187): according to Porphyry, "Antisthenes solves the difficulty by saying: What then? Is Odysseus bad because he is called πολύτροπος? Is it not because he is wise (σοφός) that Homer has given him that name? Τρόπος sometimes designates character, sometimes the use of speech. For on the one hand a man is εὖτροπος ('of good ways') when his character is

8 Xen. *Mem.* 3.3.11–12: οἱ ἄριστα διδάσκοντες μάλιστα λόγῳ χρώνται καὶ οἱ τὰ σπουδαιότατα μάλιστα ἐπιστάμενοι κάλλιστα διαλέγονται. I follow Amy L. Bonnette's (1994) translation of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.

turned toward the good, and on the other, *τρόποι* of speech are inventions of various kinds.”⁹ Antisthenes’ concept of a polytropic man is strikingly similar to the attitude that Xenophon ascribes to Socrates. For Antisthenes, rhetoric and philosophy do not form two different fields; he is Socratic in his approach to rhetoric.¹⁰ Giannantoni notices parallels between Antisthenes’ interpretation of Odysseus’ attribute *πολύτροπος* and Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (4.6.15) and connections between Antisthenes’ interpretation of *polutropia* and the discussion about Odysseus’ attribute *πολύτροπος* in Plato’s *Hippias Minor* (*Hp. mi.* 364c–365c, 369b–371e).¹¹ Giannantoni rejects the traditional opinion of German scholars that Antisthenes’ Homeric interpretations are based on the sophistic concept of rhetoric. These interpretations represent instead a distinctive appropriation and development of Socrates’ examinations, and in this sense fit into the framework of “investigation of names” (*ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων*, *SSR V A 160*). Based on the passages mentioned above (*Mem.* 4.6.15) it seems that Xenophon’s works do not place dialectics into an opposition to rhetoric as Plato’s early dialogues do.

3 Socrates in Plato’s *Protagoras* about Rhetoric

Plato opposes sophistic rhetoric to Socratic dialectics in various ways: clever speaker *vs.* man who speaks the truth, probability *vs.* truth, persuasive speech *vs.* true speech, long monologic declamation *vs.* short discourse.¹² In Plato’s *Protagoras*, Socrates formulates one of the main critiques of rhetoric. It will be significant for our investigation that this critique has an interesting connection to Antisthenes. Let us first recall the scene of *Protagoras* 334c–338c.

In reaction to Protagoras’ long talk (*μακρὸς λόγος*, *Prt.* 334c9), Socrates demands that the renowned orator Protagoras shorten his answers, to answer only as briefly as needed (334d7–9). He must make use of his art of succinct-

9 I quote from Silvia Montiglio’s translation (2011, 22). See Giannantoni 1990, 4.345–346, who links Antisthenes’ interpretation of Odysseus’ *polutropia* with the investigation of names (*ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων*; cf. *SSR V A 160*). See the detailed commentary of the fragment *SSR V A 187* in connection with *ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις* in Brancacci 1990, 45–60.

10 See Patzer 1970, 186.

11 See Giannantoni 1990, 4.345–346.

12 Cf. e.g., *Pl. Ap.* 17a–c, in which Socrates emphasizes from the start that, since he believes that what he says is just, his speech will be simple, unprepared, and composed of casual words. Socrates assures everybody that he will tell the bare truth, in contrast to his accusers, who can speak convincingly but have yet to speak a single true word.

ness (βραχυλογία, 334d7–335a3) to meet this demand; otherwise they will not have a dialectical conversation (διαλέξεσθαι, 335a2). Protagoras objects that if he accepted Socrates' demand—to carry on as his opponent prescribes him to do—he would never win a rhetorical contest (335a4). Protagoras acknowledges that victory is the goal of his performance, just as it is for athletes striving in competition.¹³ Socrates, however, cares for something else: investigation, understanding, and the self-knowledge that helps a person make a better decision. Despite Socrates' not explicitly saying so, Plato's reader senses that Socrates assumes a fundamental difference between Protagorean λέγειν and Socratic διαλέγειν.¹⁴ Socrates claims that he cannot follow Protagoras' long speeches, and proposes replacing the extensive discourse with a concise one. He would be ready to leave if Protagoras carried on with long speeches, but Callicles stops him. Socrates' demand is simple: Protagoras must respond to Socrates' questions briefly (336a6–7). Only in this manner will he dispute with him. Socrates' admirer Alcibiades also supports his demand, asserting that Socrates has not mastered the art of long talk in which Protagoras reigns but can carry on a dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι) because he has mastered the art of giving and receiving *logos* (336c1). If Protagoras thinks he is able to win over Socrates in the art of brief speech, he can join him in a dialogue. The only condition is not to slip into a long speech (μακρὸς λόγος), that is, not to use a trick to avoid justified exposition (διδόναι λόγον). It is necessary for each of them to make plain his opinion (336d5).

Other participants in the dispute hope that Socrates and Protagoras continue their conversation. Obviously again, it is not by chance that many renowned sophists are present among them. Prodicus asks Socrates and Protagoras to agree upon the mode of discourse as friends who come along with each other and not as opponents and enemies who squabble (337b1–b3). Hippias proposes that neither Socrates nor Protagoras should insist upon their demands—Protagoras should not stretch out all the cable, letting himself go with the breeze and escaping into a sea of words; Socrates should give freer rein to his speeches, showing them elegantly shaped in their true colors (338a). They should choose an overseer who watches out that each of them will observe a moderate measure of words.

Hippias' proposal is acclaimed by others. This is the breaking point of the whole passage. It is here that we see that the present sophists understand

13 As the sophist Hippias mentions, he will participate in rhetorical competition during the Olympic Games. Hence he uses the same word as athletes do: ἀγωνίζεσθαι (cf. Pl. *Hip. mi.* 364a).

14 Cf. *Prt.* 334d2, 335a2, 335b2, 335d3, etc. See Burnyeat 2013; Moore 2016.

the λόγος quite differently than Socrates does. All of them approve the “middle course” (μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμείν, 338a6–7) between long (rhetoric) and short speech (dialectics). But the attentive reader of Plato’s dialogue “knows” that Hippias’ proposal is a misunderstanding of Socrates’ demand for concise speech. There is no middle course. Socrates rejects Hippias’ proposal, observing that it is not possible to appoint an umpire for their dialogue. A worse man would not be able to oversee the better, an equal would do the same as they do, and they would not find a better, that is, wiser, man than Protagoras. Instead, Socrates proposes that Protagoras serve as examiner first while Socrates answers, and that they subsequently switch roles. Everybody who participates in a conversation would be a judge then, because anyone would easily find out if someone responds improperly.

Based on the above-mentioned passage we could conclude that Platonic διαλέγεσθαι means adhering to a “brief speech” (βραχυλογία). Brief speeches are the opposite of “long talks” (μακροὶ λόγοι), all prepared speeches, “created” as some piece of work (ἔργον) by means of a skill, namely the rhetorical skill (τέχνη ῥητορική). Brief speeches, by contrast, constitute the investigative exchange, which as a living speech must be in the form of questions and answers. Rhetoric will not lead us to an unexpected truth; its speeches aim to persuade the listeners about something which is expected by the speaker from the beginning. The truth about things which Socrates seeks in a dialogue, however, is not expected but becomes evident only after a process of dialectical inquiry.

4 Antisthenes on βραχυλογία, λόγος μακρός, and οἰκείος λόγος

The conclusion we reached above has a form of a particular thesis: investigative dialogue based on brief speeches is the opposite of the long talks of rhetoricians. We shall not take this thesis for being absolute. However, in a certain sense this thesis can serve us because the major part of the surviving fragments of Antisthenes likewise take the form of theses. If we want to understand them, we must read each with the help of the parallel texts that form the broader framework of Socratic literature.

Let us begin with one of Antisthenes’ unfamiliar fragments, *SSR V A 104* (= *Gnom. Vat.* 743 n. 12 [= *Gnom. Vindob.* 99]). Antisthenes, we are told, “says that excellence (*aretê*) does not use many words, but badness [uses] infinitely many (ἔφη τὴν ἀρετὴν βραχύλογον εἶναι τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἀπέραντον).”¹⁵ If we were to take

15 Giannantoni 1990, 4.389, associates this formulation with another “definition” of ἀρετή:

this statement to reflect Socrates' perspective in Plato's *Protagoras*, we might take it as a claim that the investigation of *aretê* requires brief speech (βραχυλογία). Antisthenes might not have meant succinctness in the conventional sense only, because βραχυλογία is essential for any investigative discourse (διαλέγεσθαι). This is confirmed by the second part of the statement, according to which erroneous acting (κακία) must be connected with the opposite of βραχυλόγος, the μακρὸς λόγος of rhetoric.

But we do not need to take this statement to reflect the perspective of the *Protagoras*, and in fact we have reasons not to. For we might find that the “endless talk” (ἄπεραντος λόγος) enables to understand not only Antisthenes' view of Socratic dialectics, but also his critique of Plato's Socrates method of inquiry.¹⁶ The statement could be asserting that the prolonged attempts to answer “What is it?” (τί ἐστι) questions we find in the Platonic dialogues in fact fail to lead us to excellence just because they are not βραχυλογίαι. There is no excellence in endless (theoretical) disputes, for these lead to the recognition that the “What is it?” question remains unanswered. Indeed, many dialogues of the early Plato end with a recognition of this lack of an answer: “I know that I do not know ‘what (excellence) is.’”¹⁷ Therefore, Antisthenes' statement that excellence is a short speech (τὴν ἀρετὴν βραχύλογον εἶναι) could be understood as a refusal of Plato's recommendations to seek essentialist definitions of excellence, against which Antisthenes puts his οἰκεῖος λόγος—maybe in some specific form of brief speech, βραχυλογία, which at the end of every inquiry arrives at the root of the “name” (ὄνομα) of what is investigated (see *SSR* V A 160).

Evidence in favor of this interpretation comes from other Antisthenic fragments surviving in the Aristotelian tradition. In *Metaphysics* H 3 Aristotle refers to the problem which occupied the minds of Antisthenes' followers (1043b4–32 [= *SSR* V A 150]): “one cannot define what a thing is, since a definition is a

that virtue is in deeds (*SSR* V A 134). Neuhausen (2010, 158–160) notes in his commentary on the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades II* that Antisthenes apparently initiated the identification of ἀρετή with βραχυλογία. The Spartan concept of prayer may serve as an inspiration for this identification. It is significant that the Spartans concentrate on the essential use of a prayer formula (βραχυλογία) that they recognize as an expression of φρόνησις. This idea also applies to ordinary language usage, in which they restrict themselves to what is “necessary to be said” (ἀ δεῖ λέγειν) (cf. *Alc. II*. 148b–c; *Pl. Prt.* 342e, 343b5; *Leg.* 1.641e4–7).

16 Cf. Diogenes the Cynic on Plato (*SSR* V B 55): ὡς ἀπεραντολόγον; cf. also Stob. 3.36.21 (= *SSR* V B 55).

17 See *Pl. La.* 199e11 and 200e5; *Chrm.* 175b2–4; *Euthphr.* 15c1–12; *Lysis* 223b7–8.

long formula (λόγος μακρός). However one can explain what it is like (ποῖον); for instance, one cannot say what silver is, but one can say that it is like tin" (tr. Bostock 1994). We do not know to whom exactly Aristotle refers when he mentions the "followers of Antisthenes" (οἱ Ἀντισθενεῖοι), but it seems that he has in mind those who objected to Platonic-Aristotelian definition by genus and species, specifically those Socratics who denied the possibility of defining τί ἐστίν. Aristotle makes an unflattering comment about them (calling the followers of Antisthenes ἀπαίδευτοι ["uneducated"], *Metaph.* H.3, 1043b24), but does not deny that the problem of defining is of some concern to Antisthenes.¹⁸

One more supplementary remark should be made here. "The things" (τὰ πράγματα) disputed in Socratic dialogues are not just random things, and by no means the things-in-themselves, but those which concern our life, or the way of life we should pursue.¹⁹ From this point of view, Aristotle's example in the case of silver is surprising, in fact even misleading. Between "silver" and "excellence of character" lies a cardinal difference. If I have acquaintance with some peculiar field of knowledge, in the art of metalwork, for example, then I am able to accept the identifications of "things" that belong to this field; otherwise, I could not agree or argue with others about how, say, a certain alloy is produced. We would not, however, as easily find two people who would agree upon the definition of "justice" or "courage." This is not because they would be ignorant in the field concerned, but because the art of living (τέχνη τοῦ βίου) is a knowledge of a different sort than mathematics or metalwork. In fact, it is in contrasting approaches to the Socratic "knowledge of ignorance" that we should search for the point of departure for the two distinct routes that our two Socratics followed. While Antisthenes understood *dialegesthai* rather as an examination of one's character and a way to inner refinement, what Plato made of it was a route to ultimate knowledge that should become a criterion for the transformation of man and community in the spirit of the maxim that *to know the good is to act in accordance with this knowledge*.

Aristotle's other reference to Antisthenes (*Metaph.* Δ 29, 1024b26–34 [= *SSR* V A 152]) says that he "naively considered that nothing can legitimately be described except by its own proper formula (οἰκεῖος λόγος), one to one (ἐν ἑφ' ἑνός); an opinion from which it resulted that there is no such thing as contra-

18 On this Aristotelian passage, see further Döring 1985, 232, with Simplic. *In Aristot. categ.* 208,28–32 [= *SSR* V A 149], *Ath.* 5.220d–e (= *SSR* V A 147), *DL* 3. 35 (= *SSR* V A 148).

19 The expression τὰ πράγματα could be translated as "practical matters." See the equivalents proposed in Bonnette's translation of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (1994, 169): "practical matters," "business," "affairs."

diction (μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν), nor even practically as falsity (ψεύδεσθαι).²⁰ For now, let us not occupy ourselves with the logical-metaphysical argumentation against the concept of λόγος as οἰκεῖος λόγος formulated by Aristotle mainly to affirm his own doctrine of definition (ὅρος). We will also bypass the question whether Antisthenes' argumentation was aimed primarily against Plato's teaching.²¹ Instead, we will direct our attention towards another aspect of Aristotle's testimony in the *Metaphysics*. If the theses οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν and οὐκ ἔστιν ψεύδεσθαι²² constituted a part of the teaching about οἰκεῖος λόγος—as the quoted passage of *Metaphysics* Δ 29 assures us—we should not refer to them in connection with the teaching of sophists, even if most of the commentators encourage us to do so.²³ The theses concerning the impossibility of ἀντιλέγειν and ψεύδεσθαι do not express what Protagoras' thesis that *everything is true* (πάντα ἀληθῆ) does, because for Antisthenes only the οἰκεῖος λόγος is true. Furthermore, it seems that Antisthenes pursued in his argumentation something other than a defense of relativism or skepticism, because he did not reject “contradiction” in its ordinary sense. As he says in fragment *SSR* V A 174, you should not stop a man arguing against you by arguing against him, but you should teach him, as “nobody cures a madman by going mad himself” (οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενός τις ἰᾶται).²⁴ Antisthenes' comparison between an individual who contradicts and the one who rushes headlong into nowhere shows that he proceeded from the Socratic assumption about the badness of alleged knowledge.²⁵ The symptom of madness could be, for example, the flattery against which we must protect ourselves when using Socratic *dialogesthai*. This is confirmed also by Epictetus' testimony that the “beginning of all education is the investigation of names” (Epict. *Diss.* I 17,10–12 [= *SSR* V A 160]).²⁶

20 Translated by Christopher Kirwan 1998.

21 See Rankin 1974, 316–320.

22 Some other sources also refer to them: Cf. Arist. *Top.* 104b19–21 (= *SSR* V A 153); DL 9.53 (= *SSR* V A 154) and Procl. *In Plat. Cratyl.* 37 (= *SSR* V A 155).

23 Antisthenes' “logical theses” are connected with the theses of sophists by the majority of the commentators—from Zeller to Guthrie. Navia (2000, 53–64) has recently explored these relations.

24 Cf. Rankin 1986, 122.

25 See Röck 1903, 67–68.

26 Giannantoni 1963, 228–237, explicates the theses οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν and οὐκ ἔστιν ψεύδεσθαι with the help of διαλέγεσθαι, that is the Socratic conception of ἀλήθεια understood as an *agreement* (ὁμολογία). Cf. also Brancacci 1990, ch. 4, about the dialectical method in Antisthenes.

To put it simply, Antisthenes looks to be in agreement with Plato that the investigation of *aretê* requires “brief speech” (βραχυλογία). On the other hand his statement that “excellence does not use many words” could be understood as a rejection of Plato’s effortful search for essentialist definitions of *aretê*. Antisthenes sets against Plato’s notion of dialectics his own concept of οἰκεῖος λόγος—maybe in some specific form of βραχυλογία. Antisthenes’ thesis about the impossibility that two λόγοι should contradict each other shows that his attitude is not sophistic but rather Socratic, in line with Socrates’ conception of the ill character of alleged knowledge which is in reality ignorance (ἀμαθία).

5 Antisthenes’ Speeches in the Context of Socratic Literature

If we applied this perspective to Antisthenes’ speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, we could claim that Odysseus speaks to Ajax as to a human being who lives in the world of alleged knowledge. He reproaches him for an ignorance that prevents him from attaining excellence (τὰ καλά; *SSR* V A 54, §13), and describes ignorance as the greatest evil for those who suffer from it (*SSR* V A 54, §13).²⁷ An example of a human being controlled by an ill-fated ignorance is for Antisthenes precisely Ajax, the tragic hero of Oedipus’ type, whose alleged knowledge will lead him to madness and ultimately to suicide. Odysseus makes several allusions to Ajax’s tragic end, for example when he reminds Ajax of his naïveté and childishness,²⁸ or when he compares him to an angry wild boar (*SSR* V A 54, §6). Odysseus distinguishes the ignorant man from the good man (ἀγαθόν), who cannot suffer any harm from anyone—neither from a companion, nor an enemy, nor even from himself (*SSR* V A 54, §6).²⁹

Ignorance (ἀμαθία), understood as a diseased condition of soul, belongs among the key themes of Socratic thought. There is no doubt that Antisthenes’ Odysseus speaks of ignorance in a Socratic manner when criticizing Ajax for being subjected to common opinion about what is good.³⁰ Ajax’s ignorance,

27 See Pl. *Chrm.* 173d: temperance (σωφροσύνη) would not allow ignorance (ἀνεπιστημοσύνη) to interfere with our actions.

28 Cf. *SSR* V A 54, §6: ἡλίθιος ἦσθα.

29 In Odysseus’ words we can hear an echo of some theses well known from Plato’s dialogues, e.g., that a good man is not supposed to suffer harm from anyone and for a good man there is no evil death or alive (that is, nothing that happens to a good man harms him; Pl. *Ap.* 41c–d). See LévyStone 2005, 208–212.

30 See *SSR* V A 54, §5: “I don’t blame you for your ignorance—like everyone else you suffer this condition involuntarily”; *SSR* V A 54, §3: “You don’t know anything if you call the

despite being unintentional, is according to Odysseus the real cause of erroneous judgment and acting (SSR V A 54, § 4).³¹

A well-known fragment of Antisthenes quoted by Epictetus (*Diss.* I 17,10–12 [= SSR V A 160]) could be interpreted as an affirmation of the fact that Antisthenes used his Socratic sequence in defining excellence akin to the way Plato does in his dialogues or Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*.³² Antisthenes' dialectical investigation starts by clarifying the name (ὄνομα) of each excellence and is aimed at making practical decisions leading to good actions. Epictetus, or more precisely Antisthenes, uses the expression παιδείσις to emphasize that dialectical investigation ends up with a systematic process of education.³³ The attempts of modern interpreters to discover intersections between Antisthenes' ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις and Prodicus' investigation of synonyms are not convincing; nor are the supposed allusions to Antisthenes in Plato's *Cratylus*.³⁴ The idea that education should begin with a systematic investigation of names acquires specific meaning only when we read it in Socratic manner, namely as an examination of statements (ἐξετάζειν τὰ λεγόμενα).³⁵

The echo of Antisthenes' ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις (SSR V A 160) can be heard in Odysseus' reaction to Ajax's accusation that he is a temple robber (ιερόσυλος),³⁶ or in Odysseus' response to Ajax's accusation that he treats a crime as if it were a noble act (καλόν). Ajax casts doubt on Odysseus' courage by referring to the episode where under the cloak of night³⁷ he stole a temple statue of goddess

man who rescued the statue of the goddess a temple-robber"; SSR V A 54, § 4: "you are too ignorant to understand how you benefited."

- 31 See Pl. *Ap.* 25d–26a, 37a on the difference between intentional and unintentional acting, which is reformulated by Plato in other dialogues in the form of the paradoxical thesis *no one errs intentionally*. For more detailed description of the Socratic origin of the Platonic thesis that *ignorance is the ultimate cause of erroneous acting*, see Kahn 1996, 92, who compares it with Antisthenes' *Odysseus*.
- 32 See, e.g., the conclusion of Socrates' dialogue with Euthydemus (*Mem.* 4.2) which ends in a typical *aporia* (see Pl. *Meno* 79e–80b), where Euthydemus can no longer respond.
- 33 See ps.-Pl. *Def.* 416a27–28.
- 34 See Pl. *Cra.* 429d, 432d–e, 433d; Dümmler 1881, 1–9; Festugière 1932; Navia 2000, 23–24.
- 35 A good example of such an examination could be the passage from Plato's *Laches* 197e–198b. For further details see Giannantoni 1990, 4.384–385; Giannantoni 1963, 228–237.
- 36 See Mazzara 2010, 257–268. According to Mazzara, Antisthenes proceeds in a manner similar to Gorgias' in *Encomium of Helen* 7, when he investigates what a "barbarian" (βάρβαρος) is.
- 37 Ajax uses the opposition λάθρα–φανερῶς (*secretly–openly*; SSR V A 53, § 5) to discredit Odysseus' courage. Odysseus is a coward because he acts in secret (e.g., when he dresses himself in beggar's clothes). Odysseus will respond to Ajax's accusations (SSR V A 54, § 10).

and even displayed it to the Achaeans, as if he had done a fine deed (καλόν).³⁸ Ajax proceeds from the conviction that temple robbery is a crime that can gain an appearance of a refined action (καλόν) only in speech (λόγος) but never in deed (ἔργον). Odysseus in Ajax's view obscures the true nature of his actions with the help of speech (rhetoric). Let us recall that Ajax both begins and ends his speech by referring to the contrast of words and deeds (λόγοι–ἔργα). It can actually be said that the whole of Ajax's speech is built upon the antithesis of λόγου–ἔργου. At the very moment he appeals to umpires to make a just decision, he says that "many long speeches (μακροὶ λόγοι) are given because people cannot do anything" (SSR V A 53, § 8). As we see, Ajax repudiates rhetoric as such and puts plain heroic deeds in the spirit of traditional morals of warrior against its long speeches.³⁹

Odysseus defends himself against Ajax's accusation by reminding him of the sufferings and dangers he had to face as he set out after Athena's statue (SSR V A 54, § 3). No one can describe his raid as an act of cowardice. At first sight it seems that Odysseus defends himself in a manner usual for a court speech. But we also notice that his primary objective is not a refutation of Ajax's accusations, as it would be in judicial rhetoric. Odysseus goes beyond refutation as he recalls the circumstances that led him on a secret journey behind the walls of Troy. He had to bring the statue of Athena; it was necessary for the ultimate victory of Achaeans. It was not a case of sacrilege, then, but a fulfilment of prophecy. Ajax has shown once more his ignorance (ἀμαθία) when he claims that sacrilege was committed by the one who rescued the lost statue, Odysseus, and not by the one who stole it treacherously, Alexander. Odysseus gives his view of what has happened and with his speech he gives meaning to things that happened. Only after making clear the circumstances that led him to his deed does he return to Ajax's critique of speech and rhetoric. Odysseus allegedly boasted in front of others that he had done some noble and fine deed (καλόν), but in fact he acted viciously. Odysseus responds to Ajax with a further explication:

Ajax appeals also to jurors to judge in public, and not in secret—jurors also have to realize they will be punished justly for bearing out a false verdict (SSR V A 53, § 8).

38 I follow the translation of Gagarin (Gagarin and Woodruff 1995).

39 Joël (1901, 2.1.146) connects Antisthenes' speech with the supposed polemic between Laches and Nicias in Plato's *Laches*, which in his opinion argumentatively parallels that between Ajax and Odysseus. Joël supposes that Laches is in dispute with Nicias over φρόνησις and ἰσχύς, λόγος and ἔργον, ἀνδρεία understood as καρτερία (Laches) and σοφία (Nicias). Contra Joël cf. Giannantoni 1990, 4.260.

So, while everyone is praying for the capture of Troy, you call me a temple-robber for trying to discover how to accomplish this? Well, if it's a good thing (καλόν) to capture Troy, surely it's a good thing to discover the key to doing so. Everyone else is grateful, but you criticize me, since you are too ignorant to understand how you benefited. I blame you not for your ignorance—like everyone else you suffer this condition involuntarily—but because you cannot be persuaded that these very acts for which you reproach me are your salvation.

SSR V A 54, § 4–5

Odysseus puts things right in elucidating who is a temple robber (ιερόσυλος) and what is a good thing (καλόν). The process of explication could be interpreted as a representation of an inquiry into names (ὀνόματα), or, more precisely, investigation of the common words *ιερόσυλος* and *καλόν*.⁴⁰ Odysseus is not running the risk that he will fail to prove he is right, but aims to explain and instruct Ajax rather than to refute him (see SSR V A 174). In Odysseus' speech we sense the powerful pedagogical tone we find in other Socratics.⁴¹ Its aim is not only an agreement with the subject, but also a transformation of the self and those who participate in the discussion.

Ajax's speech is shorter and simpler than Odysseus'. Ajax doubts the value of defences realized in speech. The only criterion for justice should be deeds:

What sort of justice would there be when the jurors know nothing, and have their information from speeches, although the events took place in reality (τὸ δὲ πράγμα ἐγίγνετο ἔργῳ)?

SSR V A 53, § 1

Ajax is anxious about the fact that the jurors did not witness the event they are going to judge.⁴² By what speech can he persuade them that he acted in the right way? He calls into question the jurors' and the courts' competence. In making an absurd demand of the jurors, to judge deeds only, and not to take

40 See Pl. *Resp.* 6.495c–d. The passage in which Plato's Socrates points to the abuse of philosophy ("full of noble words and sayings" [καλῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων μεστήν]), is put in connection by some of the commentators with Plato's critique of Antisthenes and the Cynics (Adam 2009, 2.28). It is much more probable that Plato wanted to criticize the sophists of Euthydemus' kind (see *Euthyd.* 271c–272b).

41 Similar is the role of Socrates in pseudo-Plato's *Alcibiades* or Aspasia in Aeschines' *Aspasia*. See also Mársico (in this volume).

42 See SSR V A 53, § 4. See also Pl. *Th.* 201b–c.

the speech in account, he formulates his demands like a warrior who knows that one cannot reach victory on the battlefield exclusively by speech:

I ask you, therefore, you judges and jurors who know nothing, to examine deeds (ἔργα) rather than words (λόγοι) when you decide about ἀρετή. War is decided by deeds, not words, and it is impossible to answer the enemy with a speech:⁴³ you must fight in silence and either win or be enslaved.

SSR V A 53, § 7

Ajax implicitly fears his position as an orator to be worse than the experienced Odysseus':

If I were contending against a man like myself, it wouldn't matter if I were defeated; but no two men could be more different than he and I.

SSR V A 53, § 5

The fundamental distinction between Ajax and Odysseus lies in their approach to speech itself (λόγος). Odysseus distinguishes between rhetoric and dialectics: between empty talk and false accusations, on the one hand, and the investigation of how things happened, on the other. Ajax places speech in opposition to action. For Odysseus, speech is something that could and should be equal to deeds: we should avoid bad words as we avoid mischief. Here lies the uniqueness of his character: Odysseus is a man who can put his words and deeds in harmony, thus being the archetype of the Socratic sage.⁴⁴

As to their genre, *Ajax* and *Odysseus* belong to the genre of epideictic speeches. But they are *apologiai* at the same time—even if presented in front of a fictional court. None of the heroes calls the other by name. Both heroes appear in front of the jurors to depict their deeds in the best possible light. However, there is a difference: Ajax addresses his speech to jurors only, Odysseus to the jurors and Ajax. From the beginning of the speech, Odysseus proceeds in his defence in the same way that Ajax does, using the pronoun "I" (ἐγώ). A reminder of his heroic deeds emphasizes the distinction between him and the other Achaeans, that is between "I" (ἐγώ) and "you" (ὁμεις).⁴⁵ But as he moves to

43 Οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς τοὺς πολέμιους ("it is impossible to argue against the enemy"). Some commentators (cf. Patzer following Mullach) point to a parallel with Antisthenes' proof of the impossibility of contradiction (see SSR V A 152, 153). This interpretation is rejected by Declava Caizzi 1966, 90–91, and Giannantoni 1990, 4.263.

44 See LévyStone 2005, 212.

45 See SSR V A 54, § 1: "I have done the army more good than all of you."

the explication of the events that happened, which are at the core of his argument, he addresses Ajax repeatedly. Although Odysseus, like Ajax, is hostile to the jurors, he does not use the most common tool of judiciary rhetoric, that is, recalling the competence or benevolence of the jurors. Odysseus' apologetic speech strategy shifts its attention from the defence of one's person to the cause of the whole plea, from the question of the proper owner of Achilles' armor to an inquiry into the excellence of character (see *SSR* V A 54, § 6, 11, 13), which follows what Ajax had pointed out before (*SSR* V A 53, § 4).⁴⁶

Ajax and *Odysseus* are by their genre epideictic speeches, but they also represent an archetype of judicial and political speeches. Ajax and Odysseus are involved in a contest (ἀγών). From this point of view it seems that their objective is not to reach a better communication or understanding, as would be normal in dialogue, but victory. Proceeding from this assumption, Antisthenes' declamations should be judged as other epideictic performances of contemporary orators are. We could compare them—as Kathryn Morgan does—on the basis of successfulness.⁴⁷ Were we to do so, Ajax's speech would emerge as unsuccessful rhetoric (as an ineffective use of λόγος); Odysseus' speech would be an example of successful rhetoric (as an effective use of λόγος). If we asked what Antisthenes' speeches refer to, we would likely reach something akin to Morgan's conclusion. Ajax's failure tells us what we should do if we aim to be more successful, namely, to listen to our teachers of rhetoric more carefully and improve our oratory skills.

We could object to such an interpretation that nowhere does Antisthenes mention the winner of the speech contest. The text does not tell us which of the speeches prevailed. We can assume that either this was of no importance to him, or he relied on the fact that the result of the contest was widely known.⁴⁸ We should consider the possibility that Antisthenes could have made Ajax a winner, if he meant to emphasize some of the motifs of Ajax's speech, for example the "excellence which does not require many words."⁴⁹ Much more proba-

46 Odysseus' confident performance in front of the tribunal is similar to Socrates' defence. Neither try to win over the judges, and both performances make an arrogant impression. See Montiglio 2011, 25–26.

47 See Morgan 2000, 119.

48 The Athenian audience could have been familiar with it because of the adaptation of an episode ὅπλων κρίσις (the contest over the arms of Achilles) from the *Little Iliad* or from contemporary tragedies.

49 See *SSR* V A 134: "excellence is a matter of actions, and does not require many words and much learning." Rankin (1974, 151–173) thinks that Ajax and Odysseus present two distinct aspects of the Antisthenian hero: None of them has a fear of hard labor (πόνος);

ble, however, is the assumption that for Antisthenes the winner of the contest was not important. The absence of an evaluative stance should be connected to the specific character of the speeches. Because together they form a coherent whole, the question of success becomes less relevant to their proper understanding than other questions, for example concerning the correct meaning of ἀρετή. *Ajax* and *Odysseus* are not autonomous *apologiai*, but an interconnected pair of speeches. Such a pair cannot be called “dialogue” in the Socratic sense of βραχυλογία, but neither are they merely a series of “long speeches” (μακροὶ λόγοι) with no relationship to each other. Odysseus responds to many of Ajax’s accusations (even using “brief speech”!) not only to defend himself, but also to instruct Ajax and help him become more knowledgeable (as knowledge depends on us, but requires the help of a friend). Odysseus reminds us of Socrates, who by his speech instigated self-knowledge in his interlocutors. Odysseus’ speech features traits that recall dialectical investigation: Odysseus shows that merely alleged knowledge forces us to produce errors in judgment and causes us to act in ways that make us unhappy. In other words, without self-knowledge we are unable to live our lives correctly and happily.⁵⁰ Odysseus is clearly concerned to help Ajax understand his own imprudence and thus avoid further erroneous action, action that could lead to his self-destruction.⁵¹ He is not involved in a selfish effort to defend his person. His speech is therefore not only apologetic, but contains a yet more important dimension that relates to Socratic education: to help the other person know himself. Here lies the dialectical character of Antisthenes’ speeches.

If we now turn back to the opening question, whether the opposition of rhetoric and dialectics constitutes one of the key themes of Socratic literature, we can say that in Antisthenes’ speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus* this opposition does not occur. Antisthenes—and under his influence also Xenophon and, later, other Greek writers influenced by non-Platonic portraits of Socrates (for example, Dio Chrysostom)—did not understand rhetoric and poetics as something explicitly opposed to Socratic dialectics. Both forms of knowledge are constitutive of human life. Each of them is helpful to life in a distinct

Ajax resembles the impulsive and narrow minded Heracles; Odysseus, on the other hand, resembles the reasoning Heracles; Ajax represents a man who was not rewarded for his pains, πόνοι, nor for the effort to reach virtue (ἀρετή); all the attributes characteristic of Ajax indicate his tragic end (one similar to Heracles’).

50 Cf. the progress of the conversation and its conclusion in the Platonic *Alcibiades* or *Charmides*.

51 See *SSR* V A 54, §5: “but to judge from what is likely (εἰκός), I think your bad temper will result in some harm to yourself.”

manner.⁵² Each of them depends exclusively on us, if we are able to make a proper use of them.

6 Conclusion

The traditional line of interpretation placed Antisthenes' speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus* into a relationship with epideictic literature (Gorgias, Isocrates). Most contemporary scholars agree that the speeches also pose ethical questions, and that Antisthenes created them as a Socratic. But if we try to read them in the context of Socratic literature (Xenophon, Plato, Aeschines), we should ask about the relation that rhetoric and dialectics have in Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus*.

Aristotle's references (*SSR* V A 150, *SSR* V A 152) indicate that Antisthenes' thesis of the impossibility of ἀντιλέγειν may be part of his teaching about οἰκεῖος λόγος. The comparison of a contradicting individual to one who rushes headlong into nowhere (*SSR* V A 174) implies that Antisthenes proceeds from the assumption of the Socratic teaching about the badness of merely apparent knowledge (cf. *SSR* V A 160]). If we apply this perspective to Antisthenes' speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, we can claim that Odysseus speaks to Ajax as someone who lives in the realm of apparent knowledge. According to Odysseus, Ajax's ignorance (ἀμαθία) is the real cause of his erroneous judgment and acting (*SSR* V A 54, § 4). We can read this attitude as peculiar to the Socratic questioning of a good life.

We can see that the whole of Ajax's speech is built upon the antithesis of λόγος–ἔργον. Ajax expresses a strong disbelief concerning any defence realized in speech. The only criterion for justice should be deeds (*SSR* V A 53, § 1). Ajax rejects rhetoric as such and puts plain heroic deeds in the spirit of the traditional morals of warrior against its long speeches. Odysseus defends himself against Ajax's accusation by reminding him of sufferings and dangers he had to face (*SSR* V A 54, § 3). It may at first sight seem that he defends himself in a manner usual for a court speech. But at the same time we can notice that Odysseus goes beyond the scope of refutation. In his speech we sense the powerful pedagogical tone we can find in other Socratics. Its aim is a transformation of the self and those who participate in the discussion. This is one of the main purpose of Socratic dialectics.

52 Cf. *SSR* V A 187. Antisthenes' commentary on the epithet πολύτροπος shows that Odysseus is σοφός in both the rhetorical and the ethical sense.

The fundamental distinction between Ajax and Odysseus may be seen in how they approach speech itself (λόγος). For Odysseus, speech is something that should be equal to deeds. An important characteristic of Odysseus is that he is a man who can put his words and deeds in harmony. In this way he is an archetype of the Socratic sage. Odysseus does not understand rhetoric as something in explicit opposition to Socratic dialectics. Both forms of knowledge are constitutive for human life because they can help us seek out the meaning of virtue. Each of them is helpful to life in a distinct manner (cf. *SSRV* A 173). From this point of view, Antisthenes' Odysseus is not only a rhetorical figure of the epideictic speech, but also a mythical proto-image of the Socratic sage. His way of searching for a good life provides an important and attractive alternative to Plato's use of Socratic dialectics.⁵³

References

- Adam, J. *The Republic of Plato*, 11. Cambridge 2009.
- Allen, R.E. *Socrates and legal obligation*. Minneapolis 1980.
- Altwegg, W. 'Zum Aias and Odysseus des Antisthenes', *Juvenes dum sumus* (1907), 52–61.
- Arieti, J.A. and R.M. Barrus. *Plato's Protagoras: translation, commentary, and appendices*. Lanham, MD 2011.
- Arnim, H. von. *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa: mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik und Philosophie in ihrem Kampf*, Berlin 1898.
- Blass F. *Die attische Beredsamkeit*. Leipzig 1892.
- Bonnette A.L. *Xenophon: Memorabilia*. Ithaca 1994.
- Bostock D. *Aristotle: Metaphysics Z and H*. Oxford 1994.
- Brancacci, A. *Oikeios logos: la filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene*. Naples 1990.
- Brancacci, A. 'Dialettica e retorica in Antistene', *Elenchos* 2 (1996), 359–406.
- Burnet, J. *Platonis Opera*, 1–v. Oxford 1907.
- Burnyeat, M.F. 'Dramatic aspects of Plato's *Protagoras*', *CQ* 63 (2013), 419–422.
- Caizzi, F.D. *Antisthenis fragmenta*. Milan 1966.

53 This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No. APVV-0164-12. The first version of the study was published in Slovak language in *Filosofický časopis* 61 (2013) 33–50. I would like to thank Igor Deraj for his help with the English translation of the first version of the text. I am also thankful to Livia Flachbartová for her suggestions that helped improve the text. Finally, I am highly grateful to Alessandro Stavru, Christopher Moore, and William Desmond for their detailed and valuable comments on the manuscript.

- Dahmen, J. *Quaestiones Xenophontaeae et Antistheneae*. Diss. Berlin 1897.
- Döring, K. 'Antisthenes: Sophist oder Sokratiker?', *SicGymn* 38 (1985), 229–242.
- Dümmmler, F. *De Antisthenis logica*. Buecheler 1881.
- Festugière, A.J. 'Antisthenica', *RSPH* 26 (1932), 345–375.
- Gagarin M. and P. Woodruff. *Early Greek political thought from Homer to the Sophists*. New York 1995.
- Giannantoni, G. *Dialogo e dialettica nei dialoghi giovanili di Platone*. Roma 1963.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Gomperz, T. *Griechische Denker*, II: Sokrates und die Sokratiker: Plato und die Alte Akademie. Berlin 1922.
- Höistad, R. *Cynic hero and cynic king: studies in the cynic conception of man*. Lund 1948.
- Joël, K. *Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates*. Berlin 1901.
- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Kirwan C. *Aristotle: Metaphysics Γ, Δ, and Ε*. Oxford 1998.
- Lehnert, G. 'Bericht über die rhetorische Literatur bis 1906', in: W. Kroll, *Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Leipzig 1909, 226–340.
- Lévystone, D. 'La figure d'Ulysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate *polutropos*', *Phronesis* 50 (2005), 181–214.
- Luttazzo, M.T. 'Dialettica o retorica? La polytropia di Odisseo da Antistene a Porfirio', *Elenchos* 2 (1996), 275–357.
- Mazzara, G. 'Aspetti gorgiani e pitagorici nel socratico Antistene', in: S. Giombini and F. Marcacci, *Il quinto secolo: studi di filosofia antica in onore di Livio Rossetti*. Perugia 2010, 257–268.
- Montiglio, S. *From villain to hero: Odysseus in ancient thought*. Ann Arbor 2011.
- Moore, C. 'Spartan philosophy and sage wisdom in Plato's *Protagoras*', *Epoché* 20 (2016), 281–305.
- Morgan, K.A. *Myth and philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Plato*. Cambridge 2000.
- Mullach, F.W.A. *Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum*, I–III. Paris 1867.
- Navia, L.E. *Antisthenes of Athens: setting the world aright*. Westport 2000.
- Neuhausen, H. *Der Zweite Alkibiades: Untersuchungen zu einem pseudoplatonischen Dialog*. Berlin 2010.
- Patzer, A. *Antisthenes der Sokratiker: das literarische Werk und die Philosophie*. Diss. Heidelberg 1970.
- Prince, S.H. *Antisthenes of Athens: texts, translations, and commentary*. Michigan 2014.
- Radermacher, L. 'Der Aias und Odysseus des Antisthenes', *RhM* 47 (1892), 569–576.
- Rankin, H.D. 'Irony and logic: the ἀντιλέγειν paradox and Antisthenes' purpose', *AC* 43 (1974), 316–320.
- Rankin, H.D. *Antisthenes sokratikos*. Amsterdam 1986.

Röck, H. *Der unverfälschte Sokrates: der Atheist und 'Sophist' und das Wesen aller Philosophie und Religion gemeinverständlich dargestellt.* Innsbruck 1903.

Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, U. von. *Die griechische Literatur des Altertums.* Stuttgart 1912.

Socratism and Eleaticism in Euclides of Megara

Aldo Brancacci*

Università di Tor Vergata

1 Foreword

The sources for Euclides of Megara are scarce, and it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct his philosophy fully. The aim of this paper is to reassess the main evidence about Euclides and answer a pair of questions. These are indeed the two fundamental questions posed by his thought: the nature of Euclides' Socratism, and the problem of his adherence to Eleaticism. Although these issues are largely independent, they are still to some extent linked. In fact, a survey of the sources related to the Socratism of Euclides is not of secondary importance for considering whether he was somehow also connected to the Eleatic tradition.

The difficulty of this survey is related to the imbalance between the complexity of these issues and the scarcity of the extant documentary framework. In this chapter I will first determine the most reliable data emerging from the ancient texts and then reconstruct the overall character of Euclides' thought. I will relate these data to a broader theoretical and historical-philosophical context. I will thereby refrain from giving drastic or prejudicial answers to either question, in contrast to what has occasionally been done before. Although I will neither cite nor discuss in detail the wide bibliography on Euclides and the Megarian school, I will deal with the contributions that have most influenced the study of those two issues.

2 Euclides as a Disciple of Socrates

It is certain that Euclides was a direct disciple of Socrates,¹ just as it is certain that the entire ancient tradition referred to him as the founder of the Megarian school.² Yet modern historiography has passed through a stage of hypercriti-

* I thank Daniele Iozzia and Francesco Verde for reading and discussing an earlier version of this paper.

1 Cf. DL 2.47 (= SSR I H 5); *Suda* s.v. Εὐκλείδης; *Suda* s.v. Σωκράτης (= SSR II A 1). Cf. also Dio Chrys. Or. VIII 1 (= SSR I H 2).

2 On the foundation of the school of Megara by Euclides, see Anon. *Comm. In Plat. Theaet.*

cism in dealing with the Megarian school. Some scholars have come to deny its unity and continuity, if not its existence, stretching the data deriving from ancient sources. For this chapter, however, this problem is not directly relevant, as for the earliest phase of the school nobody doubts that philosophical activity related to Euclides took place in Megara, and that this activity was characterized by doctrinal unity.

It is worth noting that an inquiry into the sources and modern scholarly literature is the first step towards addressing correctly the question of the Socratic schools. The philosophical traditions generated by Socrates' teaching did not yield institutions like the philosophical schools of Plato and Aristotle, or later of Stoicism and Epicureanism. Less unified, and not necessarily provided with an institutional structure or a regular teaching location, the Socratic schools can be located halfway between the teaching model of the Sophists—although compared to this, not only do they appear much more structured but also much longer lasting—and that of the later Hellenistic philosophical schools—to which they will later be contemporary and much closer from a doctrinal viewpoint.³ It is not difficult to see how this reflects Socrates' independent style, and the fact that neither dogma nor orthodoxy could be traced back to him. This is also the reason that, as Cicero observed,⁴ many different philosophical orientations derived from the teaching of Socrates. It is undeniable that Euclides was the initiator of the school called Megarian. It is also certain that he initiated a philosophical circle in Megara, where he was born and seems to have always lived on a stable basis.⁵ It is likely that from the inception of the school he had a number of companions and followers, including Terpsion whom Plato mentions in the *Phaedo* alongside Euclides; apparently both had come from Megara to attend the execution of Socrates in prison.⁶ Plato's passage is of utmost value, since the death of Socrates and the identity of the disciples who attended to it were precise and familiar historical facts Plato was obliged to report in an accurate way; this is why

(PBerol. 9782) coll. 3.50–4.3 Bastianini-Sedley (= SSR II A 26): "Euclides was among the distinguished disciples of Socrates and started the so-called Megarean school, which later became rather Sophistic." Cf. also Strabo 9.1.8 (= SSR II A 29): "Once in Megara there were also the so-called Megarian philosophers, successors of the Megarian Euclides, who was disciple of Socrates." Cf. ps-Galen *Hist. philos.* 7 (*Dox. Gr.* p. 604.7–16) (= SSR II A 27).

3 On the juridical status of the philosophical schools in Greece, see Maffi 2008.

4 Cf. Cic. *De or.* 3.16.61–17.62 (= SSR I H 4).

5 Cf. DL 2.106 (= SSR II A 1).

6 Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 59c2–3 (= SSR I H 1). On Euclides' disciples, cf. DL 2.108 (= SSR II A 23); DL 2.112–113 (= SSR II A 24); DL 6.89 (= SSR II A 25).

he also mentions Antisthenes, a philosopher with whom his relations were certainly not good; in fact, this is the only occurrence of Antisthenes in Plato's corpus.⁷

Relying on the authoritative testimony of the Platonist Hermodorus, who wrote a biography of Plato, Diogenes Laertius states that, after the death of Socrates, Plato went to Megara along with others of Socrates' companions.⁸ There is no reason to doubt this information, which confirms that in the city of Megara there could be found an autonomous and well-defined Socratic nucleus related to Euclides. The third major testimony is provided by Aristotle, who, in a famous passage of *Metaphysics*, attributes to the Megarians a metaphysical doctrine that clearly characterizes their philosophical position.⁹ The chronology suggests that Aristotle is referring here not so much to Euclides as to his successors, but the testimony is important because it proves once again that there was a philosophical movement in Megara. In fact, the theoretical position of this school was so well defined that Aristotle could refer, as a shorthand, to the Μεγαρίκοι. Last but not least, leaving aside all the evidence relating to the later stages of the school,¹⁰ a maxim attributed to Diogenes of Sinope refers to the σχολή of Euclides.¹¹

Euclides' special affection for and loyalty to Socrates is attested in the famous episode that the philosopher Taurus, master of Aulus Gellius, told when encouraging young people to study philosophy. In the *Attic Nights*, Aulus Gellius, dwelling on the authority of his master, argues that Euclides challenged the decree that forbade on pain of death Megarian citizens from going to Athens. He travelled more than twenty miles every night to listen to the teachings of Socrates.¹² The fact that Taurus was a Platonist seems to confirm that the ancient tradition was convinced of the good relations between Euclides and Plato. Another famous anecdote—reported with slight variations by many ancient sources—focuses on Euclides' great kindness and benevolence.¹³ This

7 Cf. *Phd.* 59b8 (= SSR I H 1).

8 Cf. DL 3.6 (*Hermodorus* F 2 Isnardi Parente² = SSR II A 6). On Hermodorus, see Zeller 1859; Natorp 1912, 861; Isnardi Parente 1974, 999–1002.

9 Arist. *Metaph.* θ 3, 1046b29–1047b9 (= SSR II A 15).

10 For the *vexata quaestio* of the Dialectic school and the Megarian school (as well as the debated issue of Diodorus Chronus' connection with Megara), see Verde 2013, 210–213.

11 DL 6.24 (= SSR II A 28 = SSR V B 487).

12 Cf. Gell. *NA* 7.10.1–4 (= SSR II A 2).

13 Cf., e.g., Plut. *de frat. am.* 18, 489d: “Euclides, the Socratic, is famous in the schools because, when he heard an inconsiderate and brutal speech from his brother who said, ‘May I be damned if I don’t get even with you,’ he replied, ‘And so will I, if I don’t persuade you to

anecdote was probably meant to emphasize Euclides' similarity to Socrates, to whom the most ancient Socratic tradition attributed the same features.¹⁴

We also know that Euclides, like all other major Socratics, composed Socratic dialogues. The specific source for this information is Panaetius, who made them the subject of his critical and philological research. Diogenes Laertius has preserved the list of six dialogues: *Lampria*, *Aeschines*, *Phoenix*, *Crito*, *Alcibiades*, and *Eroticus*.¹⁵ No fragment definitely referable to any one of them is extant, but the titles of these dialogues are a secure confirmation that Euclides belonged to the Socratic circle.¹⁶ While from the title *Lampria* nothing can be inferred, the dialogue *Phoenix* refers most likely to the famous Phoenix, teacher of Achilles, who will become later a subject dear to Cynical tradition.¹⁷ It is likely that in this dialogue Euclides echoed the interest in Homer that had been cultivated by the Sophists and Socrates, and that was also shared by other Socratics, including Antisthenes.¹⁸ It is very likely that the title *Aeschines* refers to Aeschines of Sphettus, and that from this dialogue Diogenes Laertius drew the information he reports about the relationship between Socrates and Aeschines. It is therefore possible—although there is no evidence for this—that Euclides's *Aeschines* featured a description of Socrates' confinement in jail alternative to that reported in Plato's *Crito*.¹⁹ All the major Socratics dealt with Alcibiades: Antisthenes, Euclides, Aeschines, perhaps Phaedo, and of course Plato.²⁰ Euclides' *Crito* is also related to the Socratic circle; we have no information about its content, but it is likely that, like the *Alcibiades*, it concerned political²¹ or ethical themes. The *Eroticus* might have dealt with topics analogous to those featured in Antisthenes and Plato, or in other first-

stop your anger and love me as you used to do.'" Cf. also Stob. *Flor.* 4.27.15; Plutarch. *de ira cohib.* 14.462c.

- 14 Cf. the whole dialogue on friendship between Socrates and Critobulus in Xenophon *Mem.* 2.6.
- 15 Cf. DL 2.108 (= SSR II A 10), who says there are six dialogues and gives their titles; *Suda* s.v. Εὐκλείδης includes the same titles but after the last one says καὶ ἄλλα τινά.
- 16 See the considerations in Giannantoni 1990, 4.36–38.
- 17 Cf. Gerhard 1909.
- 18 On this element of Antisthenes' philosophy, see Brancacci 1990, 45–69 (= Brancacci 2005, 42–63).
- 19 Rossetti 1972 maintains that Euclides' *Aeschines* was the source for all writings reporting details of Socrates' captivity not attributable to Plato's *Crito*.
- 20 The authenticity of *Alcibiades* is notoriously debated: for the *status quaestionis* see Aronadio 2008, 33–41.
- 21 On this claim, cf. Wolf 1954, 92, 94; see also Giannantoni 1990, 4.37, and Dittmar 1912, 163–177; Chroust 1957, 175–181; Ehlers 1966, 10–25.

generation Socratics. In fact, for all major first-generation Socratics, the erotic theme was central in the *bios* and philosophy of Socrates. The writings of Antisthenes and Euclides are among the first examples of this genre, certainly the first ones popping up within the Socratic group.

3 Euclides' Socratism

Euclides' Socratism is confirmed by the scarce remains of apophthegmatic literature as well as by the doxographical tradition, which is also scarce but much more interesting and important. One of the extant maxims goes: "The philosopher Euclides, asked what the gods were and to whom they were propitious, replied: 'I do not know that, but I know that they hate the meddlers.'" ²² Here we can see an echo of Socrates' disavowal of knowledge, which is applied to the world of the gods. Other maxims show a more generic sententious content, or are in line with the wisdom tradition.

The only surviving fragment of Euclides, which I have examined in detail elsewhere, ²³ has been thought (on insufficient evidence) to derive from the *Eroticus*. The fragment fits Socrates' narrative and conversational style perfectly. It features a character, certainly Socrates, talking about two demons, *Thanatos* and *Hypnos*: ²⁴ "Sleep is a young-looking and childish demon; it is easy to persuade him, and it is easy to escape him. This one instead [sc. death] is hoary and old, dwells especially among the elderly, is difficult to persuade and to avoid. Once this demon has appeared, it is hard to escape him: he pays no attention at all [nor he can hear], because he is deaf; nor can you try to clarify anything to him, because he is blind." ²⁵ Alongside this fragment we should recall the testimony of Censorinus: "Euclides the Socratic says that a double genius was indiscriminately assigned to us, as you can learn from Lucilius, in the sixteenth book of the *Satires* [= fr. 518 Marx]." ²⁶ As to the relationship between the two texts, there are only two possibilities: either the dou-

²² *Gnom. Vat.* 743 n. 277 (= *SSR* II A 17).

²³ Cf. Brancacci 2005b, 143–154.

²⁴ Gigon 1947, 286, thinks that this fragment concerns an allegory similar to Prodicus' tale of the crossroads. In my opinion, the speech of Euclides' Socrates was related to the subject of a painting, as in Antisthenes' Socrates in *SSR* V A 95 (*Gnom. Vat.* 743 n. 11).

²⁵ See Stob. *Flor.* 3.6.63.

²⁶ Censor. *De die natali* 3.3 (= *SSR* II A 11): *Euclideses autem Socraticus duplicem omnibus omnino nobis genium dicit adpositum, quam rem apud Lucilium in libro satyrarum* [fr. 518 Marx] *licet cognoscere*.

ble demon mentioned by Censorinus is to be identified with the two demons *Hypnos* and *Thanatos*, which would make the testimony fairly trivial; or the double demon is not to be identified with those two figures, which would, by contrast, make the argument in Censorinus' account of much greater significance.²⁷

The second hypothesis, namely that the "double demon" should not be identified with *Hypnos* and *Thanatos*, is supported by the fact that the fragment transmitted by Stobaeus does not say that both *Hypnos* and *Thanatos* belong to the same person; on the contrary, the hoary and old demon dwells especially (μάλιστα) among older people. Moreover, in Censorinus' testimony the term *adpositum* denotes that the double demon inherently belongs to men. This is to be distinguished from the expressions "once it appeared" (ἅπαξ παρῆ) and "dwelling mainly" (μάλιστα ἐμπεφυκώς) that we find in Stobaeus. Censorinus' report is also at odds with Stobaeus' claim that on one hand "it is hard to avoid" and "difficult to escape" Death, and on the other "easy to flee" Sleep. Censorinus' account applies therefore to anyone, as the two demons definitely belong to every individual ever since.

The inconsistencies between the testimonies of Aulus Gellius and Censorinus could perhaps be solved,²⁸ but if we remain loyal to the texts, it is more likely that Censorinus' double demon is not to be identified with Sleep and Death. It might instead synthesize the two main activities Plato and Xenophon attributed to Socrates' *daimonion*, that is, urging him to act in a specific way (Xenophon) or to prevent him from acting in a specific way (Plato).²⁹ Alternatively, the two demons might have been distinct, for example a good and a bad demon, or they might have personified some faculties not otherwise identified: if for example they personified *phronêsis* and *aphrosunê*, we would have to infer that Euclides' ethical thought was based on a radical antithesis unknown to the other first-generation Socratics. For Plato's Socrates, evil and ignorance are not opposed to good and knowledge. In fact, since Plato's Socrates disclaims any knowledge (unlike Xenophon's Socrates), for him neither knowledge and ignorance, nor indeed evil and ignorance, could be reified into distinct and opposing psychic entities. Moreover, such a reifying of *phronêsis* and *aphrosunê* into two demons would be at odds with the fundamental principle of

27 Zeller (1922⁵, 260 n. 2) argued that the two demons should be identified with wisdom and foolishness, while Boyancé (1935, 189–202) thought that they were identical to the good and the bad demons of the Pythagorean tradition.

28 See on this point Brancacci 2005b, 150.

29 According to what I suggested in Brancacci 2005b, 152–153.

Euclides' ethics, the non-existence of evil. Certain only is that as Euclides' double demon—and a true and proper demonology—applied to all men equally, it must also apply to Socrates himself.

This is a very important point that should be highlighted. Euclides' demonology might also bear a Pythagorean influence,³⁰ which would differentiate his Socrates from the Platonic one. For Plato, the demon is essentially a "sign" (σημεῖον) or a divine "voice" (φωνή) without any further specifications, not the demon bearing personal qualities that it is for Euclides. This consideration could be taken further, prompting us to reformulate the whole question. Could it be that Plato idealized and spiritualized the theme of the *daimonion*, while the historical Socrates had a more traditional conception, to which the demonology of Euclides would be more faithful? In the present state of our knowledge of the Socratics this question has to remain unanswered. It is nevertheless useful to ask it. A variation of it could run as follows: did Socrates have a conception of the demon sufficiently fluid to be touched by irony, so that it could develop both in Euclides' literal and demonological sense and in Plato's theoretical and abstract sense? In my opinion, this question can be answered affirmatively.

The pivotal testimony for Euclides' ethical thinking features in a well known passage of Diogenes Laertius: "He [sc. Euclides] argued that the good is one, though called by different names: now wisdom, now god, now intellect, and many more. He rejected everything that is contrary to the good, saying it had no reality."³¹ According to this testimony, Euclides hypostatized the concept of good. This is the first and fundamental feature of his moral thought, to which the denial of the reality (μὴ εἶναι) of what is contrary to the good corresponds. Because the good is determined as "one" (ἓν), Euclides' thesis is summed up in the two formulas of the "good-being" and the "good-one." This ontological foundation of ethics involves the concept not only of the good, but also of what is contrary to the good. The latter concept comes up because the moral values are included in the ontological domain, which is ruled by the antithesis between being and not-being. This very important theoretical feature is a characteristic of Euclides' thought.

There is no doubt that Diogenes Laertius' account has a specifically Socratic feature, especially with regard to the thesis of the unity of the good. It refers to

30 For a possible parallelism with Xenocrates' demonology, see his frs. 133–148 Isnardi Parente².

31 DL 2.106 (= SSR II A 30): οὗτος ἐν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεόν, καὶ ἄλλοτε νοῦν καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δ' ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνήρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων. [= [Hesych. Miles.] *de vir. illustr.* 27; Arsen. p. 253.27–254.2].

the reduction of all the particular virtues to the one virtue that is the science of good and evil, as Socrates discusses it in the *Protagoras*. It is also based on the Socratic theme of the attractiveness of the good as the supremely desirable reality, one that cannot be compared, once known as good, to any other object of the will. Hence Socrates' notorious principle that "no one errs willingly" (οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἑξαμαρτάνει). For Socrates, whatever is desired is desired because it appears to be good, indeed as the greatest good; but only those who know the greatest good as it is, not just as it appears, can strive for it. It seems that Euclides goes a step further than Socrates in that he equates the good with being—that is, with the only being, understood as a positive ontological principle—and to have equated evil, or in general anything contrary to the good, with not-being. In Plato such a clear and rigorous thesis is not attributed to Socrates, and even if some formulations of the unity of virtue occurring in the *Protagoras* are comparable to the first part of Euclides' thesis (that is, the objectivity of the good-one),³² Plato does not formulate a formal equation in the way Euclides does; and this is all the more important as the other main tenet of Euclides (that is, the non-being of evil) is completely unknown to Socrates. The partial and merely generic resemblance of Euclides' theses with those of Plato can suggest, if anything, that in Socrates' lifetime or immediately after, discussions about the unity of virtue were present *in nuce*, and that these were later developed, receiving an explicit and rigorous ontological formulation with Euclides' theory of the good-one.

In fact, Socrates did not believe, unlike the Sophists, that "names" are given "conventionally." He did certainly not delve into the discussion of the Sophists' antithesis between what is by convention (νόμῳ) and what is by nature (φύσει), while it is significant that Antisthenes dealt with it in order to provide a more solid foundation to his Socratic positions.³³ Socrates did not discuss this antithesis because he cared less to establish the objectivity of the "name" than to urge every human being to give a thorough study to names and moral concepts. Such study is accomplished through an interpersonal διαλέγεσθαι, or within the interiority of one's own conscience, as follows from the *beltistos logos* discussed in the *Crito* (46b). At any rate, it seems that Socrates' whole philosophy required that the meaning of "names" indicating moral values was not purely conventional or relativistic, but such as to lead people to respect the values they convey.

32 Cf. Pl. *Prt.* 329c, as highlighted in Giannantoni 1990, IV, 57.

33 Cf. Phld. *De pietate* 7^a, 3–8 (p. 72 Gomperz = SSR V A 179) and Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.13.32 (= SSR V A 180). On these texts, see Brancacci 1985–1986, 218–230.

If we keep to Plato, but also, though from different theoretical perspectives, to what emerges from Antisthenes and Xenophon, Socrates achieved this outcome by a rational examination of moral concepts either via the Socratic-Platonic ἐξετάζειν, or via Antisthenes' ἐπίσχεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων. This inquiry involved merging logical and ethical stances, so that (logical) meaning and (ethical) value came to be identical. The path by which Euclides developed Socrates' intellectual heritage was, instead, to ensure the ontological foundation of moral concepts. In particular, the conceptions of the good-one and of the good-being guaranteed the absoluteness of the good and ensured that the good was not an abstract theoretical truth but an objective reality. Therefore the good as such was a real, and a really possible, object of the will. Euclides' denial of the existence of evil and of what is contrary to good substantiated those conceptions as well as the related idea of the attractiveness of good, but also Socrates' fundamental principle that οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἑξαμαρτάνει. Finally, the assumption of the polysemy of names as a common linguistic feature of mankind was necessary for any use of Socrates' διαλέγεσθαι, and guaranteed the possibility of dialectics (which was especially important for Euclides, and of course for the Megarians).³⁴

To be sure, such an ontological development of Socrates' intellectual heritage implies quite a shift of emphasis in some fundamental themes of Socrates' philosophy. As we have no explicit testimony about this shift, I will limit myself to one explanatory example. The principle οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἑξαμαρτάνει asserts that no one chooses evil of his own free will, since any object of volition, in order to be actually desired, must appear good to those who strive for it even if *in fact* it is not good. In this important note lies *in nuce* the reason for Euclides' ontological foundation of Socratism. If the thought of Socrates implied a distinction—which could even be of merely implicit or secondary importance—between what appears and what is, between what merely seems and what is true and objective, then this could open the path to Euclides' ontological foundation of ethics, which can be seen as an objectivist development of the master's thought. By reducing everything contrary to good to not-being, Euclides certainly transformed Socrates' thought: if according to Socrates nobody errs voluntarily, then evil cannot exist *as evil*, and is therefore devoid of reality. This way, Euclides reduced the principle οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἑξαμαρτάνει to a mere *consequence* of his ontological thesis.

34 About dialectics, cf. DL 2.107 (= SSR II A 34), and the commentary by Döring 1972; see also Muller 1985, 106–107.

4 Euclides's Eleaticism

Did Euclides accomplish this ontological foundation of Socratic ethics by taking up Eleaticism? All ancient tradition reports that Euclides adhered to or was close to Eleaticism. This claim has long been accepted without objections by modern historiography.³⁵ For the this tradition we refer to the evidence of Diogenes Laertius, who, at the very beginning of the biography of Euclides, says that Euclides “also devoted himself to the study of Parmenides.”³⁶ Cicero, in turn, in the *Lucullus*, after pointing out that the Megarian school derived from the Eleatics, finds its *princeps* in Xenophanes, who was then followed by Parmenides and Zeno. Cicero then reports that “later there was Euclides of Megara, a disciple of Socrates, from whom they were called Megarians. They said that this is only good, what is always one, equal and identical to itself; they took many theories from Plato too.”³⁷ Cicero's passage is echoed by Lactantius who, in the *Divinae Institutiones*, writes: “Rightly, therefore, Euclides, illustrious philosopher, who was the founder of the Megarian school, disagreeing with other philosophers, said that the supreme good is what is equal and always identical to itself.”³⁸ Finally I recall the testimony about the Peripatetic Aristocles in Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica*, which while it does not refer directly to Euclides, does refer to the Megarians in general, and more specifically to Stilpo: “But there were others who formulated an opposite doctrine. They thought that sensations and representations should be rejected and only reason should be believed. Such doctrines were professed in ancient times by Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melissus and later by Stilpo and the Megarians. Therefore they believed that being is one and the other (as opposed to being) is not, and that absolutely nothing is either generated or perishes or moves.”³⁹

The overall value of this evidence was first challenged by Kurt von Fritz. His position, although very controversial, has been quite influential, and thus I will

35 For the main phases of this historiography, cf. Giannantoni 1990, 4.53–55.

36 DL 2.106 (= SSR II A 30): οὗτος [sc. Euclides] καὶ τὰ Παρμενίδεια μετεχειρίζατο.

37 Cic. Acad. Pr. 2.42.129 (= SSR II A 31): *post Euclideses Socratis discipulus Megareus, a quo idem illi Megarici dicti, qui id bonum solum esse esse dicebant, quod esset unum et simile et idem semper; hi quoque multa a Platone.*

38 Lactant. Div. Inst. 3.12.9 (= SSR II A 31): *merito ergo philosophorum non obscurus Euclideses qui fuit Megaricorum conditor disciplinae, dissentiens a ceteris id esse dixit summum bonum, quod simile sit et idem semper.*

39 Aristocl. ap. Euseb. Praep. evang. XIV 17, 1 p. 756 b–c (= SSR II O 26 = Aristocles F 7 Chiesara = 2 Mullach, T XII + F 5 Heiland).

discuss it.⁴⁰ On the grounds that Aristocles merges the Megarian school with the Eleatic tradition and subordinates the first to the latter, von Fritz formulates the two methodological criteria that guide him in his reconstruction of the Megarian philosophy: 1) testimonies are reliable only when they relate to individual facts; 2) when instead they establish historical connections that do not clarify what is already known about a specific doctrine, they have no more value than any modern interpretation. As to the first criterion, von Fritz is convinced that Euclides belonged to the Socratic circle (as attested by Plato's *Phaedo*); as to the second criterion, the connection of the Megarian school with the Eleatic tradition is just an hypothesis, comparable with any modern hypothesis. It is pretty clear that even if one accepts this conclusion—which in my opinion should be accepted—one cannot deduce from it that individual doctrinal statements on Euclides attested by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, or others are unreliable. To be rigorous, and following von Fritz's principle strictly, one should refuse the hypothetical thesis that the Megarian school is the continuation of the Eleatic school. But nothing more than this, since nothing else follows from the starting premise. Von Fritz's methodological canon, which considers as reliable only what is confirmed by a source in relation to a "fact," and as questionable or even false what is a historiographical "interpretation" or "reconstruction,"⁴¹ is evidently positivistic. It is easy to criticize it both *de jure*, from an historiographical perspective, and *de facto*, anytime one deals with an author or a problem of ancient philosophy. For example, though many chronological, geographical, or historical data in Diogenes Laertius, in the *Suda*, or elsewhere are derived from reliable sources, modern critics have refuted them for various reasons, such as errors in the chronological count, confusion between different events, the desire to force chronology in order to establish relationships or correspondences between certain philosophers, errors of the manuscript tradition, textual lacunae, and more. This applies also to the second kind of information—even if one admits that in historical-philosophical research the information deriving from the sources can be distinguished into such drastically opposed categories. In fact, even were we to accept von Fritz's questionable criterion of rigidly opposing (almost *à la* Nietzsche) "facts" to "interpretations," under no circumstance could such a distinction be the starting point of historical research. It is rather its final aim, since the historian always deals with "documents" that are related either to "facts" or to "interpretations." Such

40 Cf. von Fritz 1931, 707–724.

41 It should also be observed that, if one puts the question this way (which should be avoided), Cicero's and Diogenes Laertius' testimonies would also be "facts," since they have been preserved and can be still read.

documents must prove reliable and valuable through historical-philological, philosophical, linguistic, and scholarly analyses, and through all the instruments provided by philosophical research and *Altertumswissenschaft*. Historiographical interpretations or reconstructions by ancient authors, as well as their statements about simple “facts,” can then be ranked in a variety of ways: as trustworthy, acceptable, only partly reliable; or on the other hand as tendentious, frankly dubious, or false. Such ranking relies on careful examination of their grounds, on the value of the sources, and on a large number of other factors.

Von Fritz knew this very well, although in this case he opted for a simplistic and excessively rigid interpretive framework. Above all, it is not correct to think that the opinions of the ancients have the same value as the assumptions of the modern scholars. The ancients had access to a much wider number of sources than us, in this instance the literature of the *logoi Sôkratikoî*, now lost except for a few fragments. This is true, in particular, in the case of Cicero, who often cites the *Socraticorum libri*.⁴² He reads Antisthenes and quotes Aeschines,⁴³ having access to a biographical, doxographical, and literary background of information that is now lost, or of which only rare vestiges are extant.

I now return to the testimonies specifically related to Euclides. Aristocles' testimony, crucial for Kurt von Fritz because it refers cumulatively to the Megarians, is less significant than others, and I will therefore leave it aside. It is noteworthy, however, that the first of the two tenets Aristocles refers to the Megarians (“being is one and what is other [than being] is not”) coincides with the proposition that all sources attribute to Euclides. This is a hint that it was considered to be the founding stone of the school's doctrine. The second proposition (“nothing is generated, nor perishes, nor moves”)⁴⁴ fits perfectly with the first, but it could *also* be attributed to Euclides, if only in hypothetical terms, since no other source reports it; for this reason, and for the sake of caution, we will leave it aside. More important is the testimony of Cicero, which relates specifically to Euclides, and confirms the core of the testimony of Diogenes Laertius from which we started. Cicero adds that the good is not only one but also “equal and identical to itself.” This clearly parallels Parmenides'

42 Cf. Cic. *Acad.* 1.16 (*ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libri maximeque Platonis intellegi potest*); *Div.* 1.122 (*in libris Socraticorum*); *Off.* 1.104 (*sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libris*).

43 On Antisthenes, cf. Cic. *Att.* 2.38.5; on this, see Brancacci 2003, 259–278. On Aeschines, cf. *Inv rhet.* 1.31.51–53 (= *SSR VI A 70*).

44 Probably from here come Diodorus Cronus' *aporiai* on movement; on this see Verde 2013, 214–230.

being, as among the *σήματα* of τὸ ἓν are the one, the equal, and the identical.⁴⁵ In the second testimony Diogenes Laertius explicitly reports that Euclides studied Parmenides. It is significant that this information occurs right at the outset of the *bios* devoted to Euclides. This shows that in ancient biographies Euclides' connection with the Eleatic tradition was a well-known, undoubted fact. Also important is the information provided by Lactantius. He relates to the *summum bonum* the Eleatic predicates of equality and self-identity. Lactantius depends on Cicero's testimony, although he provides a simplified version of it (not mentioning the ἓν). He also reaffirms the ethical character of this ontological doctrine. Euclides used this Eleatic terminology to characterize the perfection and absoluteness of the moral good, whose origin lies in the Socratic topic of the attractiveness of good. Antisthenes confirms this view by using an entirely different terminology, drawn from military practice (since to him life is a fight, μάχη). He states that φρόνησις (which we have seen to be one of the many names of the good for Euclides) is "a very solid wall, which cannot fall nor be betrayed," just as ἀρετή is "a weapon which cannot be taken away."⁴⁶ Euclides, whose basic tenet is that the good is an objective reality and therefore a safe goal to strive for, highlights the unity, identity, and equality to itself of the good—ultimately, its absoluteness and indefectibility.

In his judgment on the literature of the λόγοι Σωκρατικοί, Panaetius assumed that the only ἀληθεῖς ones were the dialogues of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines. He doubted those of Euclides and Phaedo and rejected the rest.⁴⁷ The exact interpretation of the meaning of the adjective ἀληθεῖς has been long discussed: some scholars believe that it means "authentic," others "true, or truthful," or "trustworthy."⁴⁸ Panaetius' judgment was strongly influenced by his own convictions and philosophical views. It is known that for this reason he considered almost all the writings of Aristo the Stoic inauthentic, assigning them to Aristo the Peripatetic. He even rejected the *Phaedo* on the grounds that in this dialogue Plato claims the immortality of the soul, while Panaetius thinks it is mortal.⁴⁹ Since Panaetius' philological considerations were strongly deter-

45 Cf. Parmenides 28 B 8 DK, vv. 6 (ἓν), 22 (ὁμοῖον), 29 (ταῦτόν).

46 Diocl. *ap.* DL 6.12 (= SSR V A 134).

47 Cf. DL 2.64 (= T 145 Alesse = fr. 126 van Straaten).

48 The first scholars claiming the authenticity of the ἀληθεῖς were Brandis 1844, II, 1 n. 1, and Grote 1888, 112. This interpretation, entailing the factuality of these dialogues, from which follows the possibility of using them for gaining knowledge of Socrates, goes back to von Arnim 1898, 31, then followed by Gigon 1952, 321, and others. For extensive bibliography see Alesse 1997, 280–285.

49 Cf. Asclep. *In Met. Aristot.* 991b3 p. 90 Hayduck (= T 146 Alesse = fr. 126 van Straaten).

mined by his philosophical considerations,⁵⁰ it is fair to assume that his suspicion about Euclides' dialogues was influenced by the philosophy he attributed to Socrates. There was probably some difference between the Socrates of the major Socratics (Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes) and the one described by Euclides, but not enough to induce Panaetius to condemn the latter's dialogues. Could the difference depend instead on the Eleaticism of Euclides' Socrates? Or on his ontologization of Socratic ethics? The answer to these questions can only be hypothetical, but I would plead for an affirmative one.

It is Gabriele Giannantoni's great merit to have emphasized the Socratic character of Euclides, although he did not think that his thought could be a recovery of Eleaticism. Giannantoni reprised some of Kurt von Fritz's considerations I have already discussed and criticized. He noticed that Euclides' concept of the unity of the good refers to the Socratic topic of the one ἀρετή, that is, of the science of the good and the evil.⁵¹ Euclides' fundamental tenet of the unity of the good is not identical, however, to the Socratic thesis of the unity of virtue, even if it is connected to it. It is clearly something more, and more precise. Indeed, from a certain perspective, Euclides' tenet is actually quite different from Socrates'. This follows both from the fact that the formula of the *Protagoras* deals with goods, ἀγαθά, in the plural, while Euclides speaks of the one good (ἓν) in the singular; and from the fact that to define the domain of moral science Socrates talks not only about goods but also about evils, κακά, in the plural,⁵² while Euclides formally denies the existence of things contrary to the good. Socrates assumes and recognizes the existence of evil things, which he reduces to ignorance of the good, or rather of what is the real good; of such an evil Euclides denies even the existence. Thirdly, Euclides does not just say that the good is one. He goes further and attributes to the good an ontological value, as is most clearly shown in his claim that all that is contrary to the good is not-being, τὰ δ' ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνήρκει μὴ εἶναι φάσκων. As von Fritz noticed, Euclides' fundamental tenet rests on the antithesis between ἀγαθόν (which is ὄν) and μὴ ὄν.⁵³ Finally, Euclides' other theses attested by doxography show unambiguously a recovery of Parmenidean concepts of the good. There is no reason to doubt them, and even the scholars claiming the exclusive Socratism of Euclides have not provided objective reasons to deny their reliability. It is true, however, that Euclides has provided an interpretation of Socrates' intellectual heritage that is original and unique, since he provides it

50 On Panaetius' Plato, see Dorandi 2014, 16–20.

51 Cf. Giannantoni 1990, 4.57–59.

52 Pl. *Prt.* 356d5.

53 Cf. von Fritz 1931, 709.

with an objectivist ground that is guaranteed by the recovery of Eleatic ontology. In Antisthenes a similar intellectual process can be observed, but here such objectivation aims at founding the moral concepts while probably also opposing polemically the relativism, the conventionalism, and the subjectivism of the Sophists.⁵⁴

I therefore agree with the more balanced position of Döring, who, while agreeing with von Fritz that Euclides' thought is clearly related to that of Socrates', does not deny that it also features Eleatic elements. Indeed, Döring is convinced that Euclides developed and integrated these elements in his Socratic ethics.⁵⁵

5 Conclusion

There is nothing strange, nor even historically or philosophically surprising, about this reconstruction. As Gabriele Giannantoni has admirably shown for Plato,⁵⁶ all the philosophers and the philosophical traditions influenced by Socrates' teaching tended to develop, to radicalize, and to intellectualize their master's theses.⁵⁷ Euclides' recovery of Eleaticism is by no means an isolated case within Socratic tradition, and there is nothing "unlikely" in it.⁵⁸ As a general fact, it should be noted that in Classical Greece ontology is either of Eleatic origin (thus taking on an objectivist and realistic perspective) or derived from Heraclitus (taking on a relativistic and subjectivist perspective). Within the Socratic tradition, the persistent influence of Eleaticism obviously surfaces in Plato (as is well known), but also in Antisthenes (as is certainly less well known). Antisthenes, in fact, explicitly assumed the equation $\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu = \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu \tau\iota = \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu \tau\acute{o} \delta\upsilon$ which is clearly derived from Eleaticism. Moreover, his theory of *oikeios logos* was based on the lack of distinction between essential predication and accidental predication, which is a typical outcome of Eleaticism and will therefore be criticized later by Aristotle.⁵⁹ It should be added that Xenophon's

54 Cf. Brancacci 1990, 89–97 (= Brancacci 2005, 80–87).

55 Cf. Döring 1972, 87.

56 Cf. Giannantoni 2005.

57 On Antisthenes, see Brancacci 1990.

58 See von Fritz 1931, 708, who, however, does not justify his drastic stance.

59 On the first issue, cf. Procl. *In Plat. Cratyl.* 37 (= SSR V A 155), and Brancacci 1990, 196–197, 212–213, 256–257 (cf. Brancacci 2005, 171, 184, 218–219); on the second one, cf. Arist. *Metaph.* Δ 29, 1024b26–34 (= SSR V A 152), and Brancacci 1990, 246–248 (= Brancacci 2005, 210–212).

Socrates devotes himself to the study of the ancient sages, whom he addresses without any prejudice, with the sole aim of finding in them something good to keep. In this capacity, he is presented as a teacher and “director of studies” within the circle of friends and followers gathered around him.⁶⁰ If Socrates was so open to the study of the ancient σοφοί, would it be really unlikely that Euclides, his pupil, was too? Indeed, on the basis of this important testimony it is reasonable to assume that Euclides could already have found in Socrates hints for a recovery of Eleaticism—a recovery that some scholars have already noticed.⁶¹ Finally, and most importantly, there is no contradiction between being a Socratic and being a philosopher open to other traditions.⁶² The obvious reason for this is that Socrates never turned his thought into a dogmatically established philosophy, but also that on his death and before, when he was still alive, a Socratic orthodoxy did not exist, as the wide variety of his disciples’ philosophical orientations reveals. Nor did such an orthodoxy exist later, since the different Socratic traditions always retained their diverse and irreducible theoretical features. Last but not least, the Socratics were connected not only to Socrates but to other philosophers as well. For example, we know from the ancient tradition that Antisthenes was Gorgias’ auditor and that Aeschines of Sphettus’ work was also influenced by Gorgias.⁶³

All of this must be taken into account when reconstructing Socratic philosophies. Their character derives, on the one hand, from the specific way their authors retained and interpreted Socrates’ intellectual heritage, and, on the other hand, from the individual philosophical orientations that they grafted onto the Socratic legacy, which they developed by taking up other traditions of thought. This applies even to Plato, despite his thought being very different from that of the other Socratics. There is, however, at least one parallel: that between Euclides’ ontologization of Socratic ethics and the evolution of Plato’s ontology from the Socratic *eidê*—that is, the good, the just, the pious, and all other moral values—to his postulation of universal and independent ideas. As

60 Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.14.

61 Cf. von Fritz 1931, 708 (who refers to Stenzel 1926, 994, 998, 1002, 1011, and Hönlwald 1917, 195 etc.); Döring 1972, 87; Oehler 1962, 49.

62 The same applies to the Atomists, who legitimize their principles by reprising, while also deeply altering, Parmenides’ dichotomy: cf. 67 A 6 and A 7 DK, on which see Calogero 1963, 370–375.

63 On Antisthenes, cf. DL 6.1; *Suda* s.v. Ἀντισθένης (= SSR V A 11). On Aeschines of Sphettus, cf. DL 2.63 (= SSR VI A 13). Xenophon also reports that Antisthenes associated with Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos with Socrates’ benign approval: cf. Xen. *Symp.* 4.62–63 (= SSR V A 13).

the philosophy of Socrates was never a closed system, it is neither strange nor inconsistent with Euclides' profession of Socratism that he aimed to provide solid ground to Socratic ethics through the ontological foundation of a good he recovered from the Eleatic tradition.

References

- Alesse, F. *Panezio di Rodi: Testimonianze*. Napoli 1997.
- Arnim, H. von. *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa: mit einer Einleitung: Sophistik, Rhetorik und Philosophie in ihrem Kampf*, Berlin 1898.
- Aronadio, F. *Platone: dialoghi spuri*, Torino 2008.
- Boyanćé, P. 'Les deux demons personnels dans l'antiquité grecque et latine', *RPh* 9 (1935), 196–210.
- Boys-Stones, G.R. and C. Rowe. *The circle of Socrates: readings in the first-generation Socratics*. Indianapolis 2013.
- Brancacci, A. 'La théologie d' Antisthène', *Philosophia* 15–16 (1986), 218–230.
- Brancacci, A. *Oikeios logos: la filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene*. Naples 1990.
- Brancacci, A. 'Zwei verlorene Schriften des Antisthenes', *RhM* 146 (2003), 259–278.
- Brancacci, A. 'The double daimon in Euclides the Socratic', *Apeiron* 38 (2005), 143–154.
- Brandis, C.A. *Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie*. Berlin 1844.
- Chroust, A.-H. *Socrates: man and myth: the two Socratic apologies of Xenophon*. London 1957.
- Dittmar, H. *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker*. Berlin 1912.
- Dorandi, T. 'Ancient ἐκδόσεις: further lexical observations on some Galen's texts', *Lexicon Philosophicum* 2 (2014), 1–23.
- Döring, K. *Die Megariker: Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien*. Amsterdam 1972.
- Ehlers, B. *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des Sokratischen Eros: der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines*. München 1966.
- Fritz, K. von. 'Megariker', in: *RE Supplementband V*, 1931, coll. 707–724.
- Gerhard, G.A. *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen*. Berlin 1909.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Giannantoni, G. *Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella filosofia di Platone*. Napoli 2005.
- Gigon, O. *Sokrates: seine Bildung in Dichtung und Geschichte*. Basel 1994.
- Gigon, O. 'Review: Aristoteles, die Lehrschriften by Paul Gohlke', *Gnomon* 24 (1952), 316–324.

- Grote, G. *Plato and the other companions of Socrates*. London 1888.
- Hönigswald, R. *Die Philosophie des Altertums: problemgeschichtliche und systematische Untersuchungen*, München 1917.
- Maffi, A., *Lo statuto giuridico delle scuole filosofiche greche*, in: H. Hugonnard-Roche, *L'enseignement supérieur dans les mondes antiques et médiévaux: aspects institutionnels, juridiques et pédagogiques. Colloque international de l'Institut des Traditions Textuelles*. Paris 2008, 113–125.
- Müller, R. *Les Mégariques: fragments et témoignages*. Paris 1985.
- Natorp, P. 'Hermodoros (n. 5)', in: *RE* VIII/1 (1912), col. 861.
- Oehler, K. *Die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles: ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bewusstseinsproblems in der Antike*. München 1962.
- Rossetti, L. 'Tracce di un logos Sokratikòs alternativo al Critone e al Fedone platonici', *A&R* 20 (1972), 34–43.
- Stenzel, J. 'Logik', in: *RE* XIII/1 (1926), coll. 991–1011.
- Verde, F. *Elachista: La dottrina dei minimi nell'Epicureismo*. Leuven 2013.
- Wolf, E. *Griechische Rechtsdenken*, III. Frankfurt 1954.
- Zeller, E. *De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonico*. Marburg 1859.
- Zeller, E. *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung: Sokrates und die Sokratiker; Plato und die Alte Akademie*. Leipzig 1922.
- Zeller, E. and R. Mondolfo, R. *La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico*, Parte II, III/1, Firenze 1974.

Aristippus on Freedom, Autonomy, and the Pleasurable Life

Kristian Urstad
Douglas College

The traditional characterization we have handed down to us of Aristippus of Cyrene is of someone who lacks or simply repudiates any notion of self-control and, hence, of someone susceptible to unrestrained excess and self-enslavement.¹ I hope to show here that such a characterization deserves significant reassessment.

I approach the issue by examining it in light of Aristippus' Socratic background. Not much has been said about this Socratic background. In the little that has been said, Aristippus has not fared well. The typical depiction of Aristippus is that of a somewhat superficial fellow-pupil of Socrates gone wildly astray.² He is often viewed, among the number of Socratics, as the most independent from Socrates, independent to a degree bordering on unfaithfulness.³ Such radical independence is exaggerated. The Socratic lifestyle, among other things, is one in which an individual is maximally self-sufficient and in control of his life. I will try to argue here that Aristippus, against the traditional characterization, is actually deeply concerned with such Socratic features as self-control, autonomy, self-sufficiency, and insusceptibility to contingencies, even though, interestingly, he is also someone who pursues pleasures largely undeterred. In this sense at least, Aristippus' outlook ought not to be seen as extraneous to the Socratic spirit. Let me begin by saying something about Aristippus himself and his affiliation with Socrates.

1 For some earlier sources see, Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.1, 2.1.31, Ath. 12.544a, Cic. *Fin.* 2.18.40, Luc. *Vit. auct.* 12; for some later commentary, see Watson 1895, 41–47, Guthrie 1971, 143, Rankin 1983, 200, Annas 1993, 228, and Kahn 1996, 18.

2 Giovanni Reale 1986, 39, says that the doctrine of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics is “in essence a Socraticism which destroys the true Socrates ... a kind of lunatic Socraticism ...”; see also Kahn 1996, 17–18.

3 Reale 1986, 271.

1 Aristippus and the Socratic Connection

Though we do not have definite information about his birth or death, the general consensus is that Aristippus was roughly the same age as Plato, or perhaps a little older.⁴ He was a native of the wealthy and apparently extremely lush and beautiful⁵ Cyrene (whence the name of his so-called followers, the Cyrenaics), a city founded by Greek colonists from Thera on the northern coast of Africa (now Eastern Libya),⁶ to which he supposedly returned towards the end of his life and where he founded a school. It is reported that he initially came to Athens as a young man, already partly educated it seems,⁷ because he was attracted by what he had heard recounted of Socrates by Ischomachus, whom he had met at the Olympic games.

Aristippus, when he met Ischomachus at Olympia, asked him by what manner of conversation Socrates succeeded in so affecting the young men. And when Aristippus had gleaned a few odd seeds and samples of Socrates' talk, he was so moved that he suffered a physical collapse and became quite pale and thin. Finally he sailed for Athens and slaked his burning thirst with draughts from the fountain-head, and engaged in a study of the man and his words and his philosophy, of which the end and aim was to come to recognize one's own vices and so rid oneself of them.⁸

PLUT. *De curios.* 2.516c

It is clear from this passage in Plutarch and others in Diogenes Laertius (2.76, 78, 80, 85) that what he was primarily attracted to in Socrates was his wisdom as it pertained to practical ethics or achieving the good life. This is not to suggest that Aristippus completely eschewed theoretical studies (mathematics, natural sciences, etc.), or that he did not live a life on the basis of specifiable philosophical views.⁹ It is only to say that he, not unlike Socrates it

4 I believe Plato was born in 427 BCE. Some historians put Aristippus' date of birth at 427 BCE, others eight years earlier. The date is based on assumptions about how old he must have been when he met or developed relations with other notable figures in his life. For more discussion on Aristippus' age, see Grote 1865, 549 n. s; Guthrie 1975, 491; Zeller 1963, 112.

5 Fuller 1931, 115–117.

6 DL 2.65.

7 Rankin 1983, 200.

8 See also DL 2.65, where a similar story is given by Aeschines. Aeschines is reported to have been on friendly terms with Aristippus (DL 2.60).

9 Thus I am in disagreement with Mann 1996, 110, who in speaking about Aristippus and

seems,¹⁰ would probably have denounced carrying such studies beyond the point at which they cease to serve practical ends or aid in the realization of the good life.¹¹ These last points need to be elaborated upon for the reason that there are interpretations which claim that Aristippus was actually nothing more than a mere voluptuary of minor intellectual and philosophical vigor with little claim to possessing anything like a doctrine.¹²

Let us first consider briefly the case of Aristippus' written works and then of their philosophical substantiality. Diogenes Laertius alleges a list of written works by Aristippus, including a history of Libya in three books, one work containing twenty-five dialogues, and six books of essays (2.83–84). Moreover, Diogenes cites Sotion and Panaetius as reporting a list of treatises that belong to Aristippus (2.85). Also, Aristotle, a younger contemporary of Aristippus, seems, judging from the little but valuable testimony given in his *Metaphysics* (B.2, 996a21–34, perhaps also M.3, 1078a31–33), to have been acquainted with the position of Aristippus, something that might further imply Aristippus' arguments were committed to writing.¹³

the philosophical life claims that "if we think that philosophy is a matter of arriving at philosophical views by means of arguments or reasons, as is the case with, say, Aristotle or Epicurus ... we would be disinclined to see Aristippus as a philosopher ...," and "the depicted life is supposed to be not just the one that Aristippus, as a matter of fact, happened to live; it is rather supposed to be the life he lived on the basis of, or as a result of, his philosophical views. It is because the life, somehow, reflects the philosophy that it is a philosophical life ... [and given this,] it is difficult to see how the life of Aristippus could even count, or even be thought to count, as a philosophical life" (97–98). Mann, however, does go on to say that "the life of Aristippus, if it can be counted as a representation of the philosophical life at all, should be assimilated to Lives like those of Diogenes and Pyrrho. It is a depiction of the self-sufficient life ..." (110–111). While Mann is right to stress the importance of the self-sufficient life for Aristippus, I think he is wrong to say that Aristippus adopts such a life without arguments or reasons. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere for a much more philosophically substantial view of Aristippus (Urstad 2008, 2009).

10 See Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11–13, 15, and 4.7.3; Pl. *Phdr.* 230a; Arist. *Part. an.* 1, 642a28; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.10–11.

11 E.g. Arist. *Metaph.* B 2, 996a21–34; "After him (Socrates) Aristippus the Cyrenaic and Ariston of Ceos were forced to affirm that philosophy ought to argue only ethical issues ..." (Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 15.62.7); on a similar claim with respect to the Cyrenaics, see Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.2 and DL 2.92.

12 See DL 2.84 for the claim by Sosicrates that Aristippus wrote nothing at all. On lack of philosophical doctrines, see Annas 1993, 229; Kahn 1996, 18; Mann 1996.

13 B 2: "This is why in mathematics nothing is proved by means of this kind of cause, nor is there any demonstration of this kind—'because it is better, or worse'; indeed no one

Furthermore, as both Grote (1865, 549) and Tsouna (1994, 381–382) point out, Aristippus earned the reputation as a successful lecturer who charged a significant fee (DL 2.62, SSR IV A 1, 3, 7, 23), a reputation presumably grounded in his intellectual and literary activity. After all, Aristippus was notable enough to be invited to Syracuse by the tyrant Dionysius when Plato was there around 361, an invitation we might presume came to pass because of just this sort of activity. Furthermore, Theopompus is reputed to have claimed that Plato's treatises were not his own, but were borrowed from the dialogues of Aristippus.¹⁴ This claim is probably not true, but it is interesting because it would seem a strange one to have been made if Aristippus had written *nothing* down and—assuming that he had written something down—if his dialogues were not held in high estimation. Moreover, according to Diogenes (DL 4.5), Speusippus wrote an *Against Aristippus of Cyrene*, which was probably a shot against the ideas of Aristippus. If this is true, it might suggest that there had existed certain writings or doctrines on the part of Aristippus (cf. Grote, 1865, 550). Finally, there is a fragment to be found in the work of Philodemus where Epicurus asks to be sent Aristippus' essays, which were concerned with some of Plato's dialogues (SSR IV A 147).

Regarding the content of Aristippus' teachings, we can gather that they were not empty of philosophical substance. Of the list from Sotion and Panaetius we get some of the following titles, some of which clearly betray philosophical and ethical interests: *Introduction to Philosophy*, *On Education*, *On Virtue*, and *To Socrates*.¹⁵

Perhaps a final sign of philosophical substantiality on the part of Aristippus is his connection with Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo*. Recalling the names of the most faithful friends of Socrates who were present the day on which the

even mentions anything of the kind. And so for this reason some of the Sophists, e.g., Aristippus, ridiculed mathematics; for in the arts, even in handcrafts, e.g., in carpentry and cobbling, the reason always given is 'because it is better, or worse,' but the mathematical sciences take no account of goods and evils." M 3: There is no explicit mention of Aristippus in the following passage but Rankin 1983, among others, takes one of the referents here to be him: "Now since the good and the beautiful (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν) are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error."

14 Ath. 11.508d. There is also some evidence that Epicurus plagiarized Aristippus' teachings (DL 10.4).

15 DL 2.83–85. For more on Aristippus' alleged interest in ethical, and broadly intellectual, questions, see Tsouna 1994, 383–384. See also DL 2.68, 69, 70, 71, 79, 80, for indications of Aristippus' love for philosophy and education.

philosopher drank the hemlock, Plato felt the need to expressly say that Aristippus was not there since he was at Aegina.¹⁶ This might suggest that Aristippus was a true intellectual follower of Socrates, someone with a special adherence to him on a philosophical level. After all, Plato is reported to have been on bad terms with Aristippus and to have abused him.¹⁷ The fact that Plato nevertheless makes sure to account for the absentee makes all the more convincing that there existed an important connection or relationship between Socrates and Aristippus.¹⁸ We might find it hard to envision Socrates being in a relationship with anyone without there being some sort of intellectual bond between them.

This connection in the *Phaedo* brings us to a further important point that bears on the issue of philosophical substantiality on the part of Aristippus. Aristippus was not only a friend and admirer of Socrates but also his student.¹⁹ Diogenes Laertius reports that Aristippus was a pupil (μαθητής) of Socrates (2.74) and that he went to him for wisdom (σοφία) and education (παιδεία) (2.78, 80). It would be reasonable to assume from this that it was not simply specifiable attitudes or convictions or a set of character traits exhibited in a style of life that Aristippus received from his teacher (for instance, a sense of confidence and autonomy), but also certain philosophical views or reflections. Though of course this is not to suggest that Aristippus endorsed them all. As we shall see, it is my contention that some of Aristippus' views are best explicated as alternatives to those views he perceived in Socrates' teachings and with which he disagreed. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that listening to Socrates and being exposed to the questions he asked and his intellectual vitality in general would not have bore in an admirer and receptive individual like Aristippus a worthy degree of philosophical fruit, both in the form of a style of life and in the form of philosophical views, views backed by reasons and arguments.²⁰

16 Pl. *Phd.* 59b. At least nine of the companions who assembled together in Socrates' prison on the day of his execution are credited with literary and philosophical activity in the form of Socratic dialogues. Although most scholars are persuaded that Aristippus did not write any dialogues, there is some indication of Aristippus as a writer of *Sókratikoí logoi*, e.g. *SSR* IV A 222 (see also Clay 1994, 28).

17 For example, DL 3.36 and 2.65; see also the suggested enmity at Arist. *Rh.* 2, 1398b31–32, and in Ath. 8.343c–d and 11.507b. See Brisson (in this volume), esp. section 4.

18 Plato, after all, does not mention Xenophon's absence from the death-scene, and there was apparently also quite a bit of bad-blood between these two (see, e.g., Ath. 11.504e–f, and Brisson in this volume).

19 Note ἐταῖρος in Echecrates' question at *Phaedo* 58c, and Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.18.31, and τοὺς συνόντας at Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.

20 Several of Socrates' close friends or associates became well-known for Socratic intellec-

It is important to remember that both Plato (*Phd.* 59b) and Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1, 3.8) were actually present in the Socratic circle.²¹ This is important because it implies (in Plato's case) and reports (in Xenophon's case²²) Socrates' and Aristippus' presence with one another. Furthermore, given that they were similar in age and their close association in Athens, Plato's dialogues were almost certainly available to Aristippus.²³ Thus not only was Aristippus intimate with Socrates himself, but he had exposure to the views of "Socrates" in Plato's dialogues (and presumably to other Socratic writings in the same period).²⁴ The very few commentaries on the ethical views of Aristippus have hardly attempted to account for his Socratic background and affiliation. In staying sensitive to this background, I will show that Aristippus holds views close to recognizably Socratic positions, and that he should therefore be seen as a genuine Socratic in his own right.

tual thought. Here, the likes of Antisthenes, Xenophon, Euclides of Megara, Aeschines of Sphettus, and Phaedo of Elis come to mind. Yet not all of them did; Chaerephon, Aristodemus and Apollodorus are examples, to name only a few. That being said, the aforementioned testimony does seem to emphasize a particularly strong philosophical yearning on Aristippus' part and suggests a significant intellectual connection between the two men.

- 21 Xenophon reportedly left Athens two years before Socrates' death, at that time around thirty years of age (Grote 1865, 564). It is generally agreed that Xenophon had, prior to this, established some sort of acquaintance or intimacy with Socrates at Athens, one which could have been almost as long as Plato's (see Guthrie 1971, 13).
- 22 Grote 1865, 533, among others, takes the discussions Xenophon puts forth between Socrates and Aristippus in the *Memorabilia* to be based on *actual* hearing.
- 23 Moreover, there are particular details mentioned by Plato in some of his dialogues which might indicate reference to certain hedonistic doctrines and views on pleasure that were in the air at the time, and that may very well have been initiated by Aristippus. Thus that Plato may sometimes be making reference to the views of Aristippus should not be dismissed prematurely (in support of the view that Plato is indeed making such references, see Merlan 1960, 33–35; Guthrie 1975, 498).
- 24 Though no fragments from this work survive, Antisthenes is reported to have written a book entitled *On Pleasure*. Moreover, several ancient commentators attribute sayings to Antisthenes referring to the topic of pleasure. Some of these sayings seem to suggest that he held a conception of pleasure closely connected to self-sufficiency, pleasure that does not undermine the cultivation of reason (see SSR V A 126, 127). Aristippus may very well have read Antisthenes' works or have conversed with him about his views on pleasure.

2 Freedom and Pleasure

Let us now begin with the discussion between Socrates and Aristippus in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 2. At the start, Xenophon says that Socrates was aware that one of his "companions"—no doubt meaning Aristippus²⁵—was rather licentious or unrestrained (ἀκολαστοτέρως) in matters requiring the practice of self-control (ἐγκράτεια, 2.1.1). Aristippus, now having been named, goes on to claim that his path to living most pleasantly (ῥῆδιστα βιοτεύειν, 2.1.9) and to happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is through freedom (δι' ἐλευθερίας) (2. 1. 11).

What does Aristippus mean here by freedom? No doubt he means a certain indifference to political involvement; he later will claim that he is not confined by any political community but is instead everywhere a stranger (ξένος, 2.1.13).²⁶ But this is not all he means. Their discussion is framed in a hedonistic context: the issue at stake is the amount of pleasure accruable by the adoption of certain lifestyles. For instance, Aristippus' claim about freedom as a path to happiness comes as a reply to Socrates' question "whether rulers or the ruled live more pleasantly" (2.1.10). Freedom, according to Aristippus, also has to do with the pursuit of the pleasures of the moment. We can gather this from what Socrates infers about him: he is intemperate in regards to eating, drinking, and sex (2.1.1), he has a weakness for high living (2.1.15), and he is indolent in regards to restraining himself from present enjoyment (2.1.20). Aristippus pretty much confirms this a few passages later when he presents the reasons for *not* wanting to be a ruler: rulers sacrifice a large part of their desires and abstain from many good things (2.1.8–9).²⁷ We might draw from this that, for Aristippus, happiness consists in the largely undeterred pursuit and satisfaction of present-moment desires.

25 Though in regards to this "companion" O'Connor 1994, 159, notes, "We need not assume that the associate whose licentiousness Socrates noticed was Aristippus himself, for there are other examples in the *Memorabilia* of Socrates conversing with one person for the benefit of someone in the audience." In this particular case, however, I find this hard to believe. Firstly, Xenophon has Socrates address his speech directly to Aristippus. Secondly, Xenophon was no friend of Aristippus (DL 2.65; on their radical difference of character, see Grote 1865, 538), and it simply makes sense to see the pleasure-loving Aristippus as the target of Socrates' exhortation of the virtuous life.

26 For more on Aristippus and this political aspect see Jaeger 1943, 52–53; Tsouna 1994, 385–386; O'Connor 1994, 159–163.

27 Moreover, Vice, who Socrates presumably takes to represent the views of Aristippus (we remember it is *his* rendition of Prodicus' fable, 2.1.21), makes this sort of total acquiescence towards pleasures quite clear (see 2.1.23–25).

Socrates then says that Aristippus' so-called freedom is not really freedom at all, but only a recipe for various forms of slavery (2.1.12–18). Though the forms of slavery spoken of up to this point are mostly of the external and physical variety, Socrates does, through the mouth of Virtue in his rendition of Prodicus' fable, go on to warn Aristippus that licentious people are also susceptible to a type of *inner* slavery. For example, he says that they eventually succumb to "souls without sense" (ψυχᾷς ἀνόητοι) and general mental distress and hardship (2.1.31). He alludes briefly to a capable soul, one which is orderly and efficacious in setting up the proper life and one which will always remain autonomous throughout its exposure to various experiences (2.1.19). Socrates' central point in his discussion with Aristippus is that the relentless pursuit of certain pleasures may actually, through their "formidable enemy force" (to borrow Foucault's description), make them one's master, and that therefore abstaining from, or at least pulling back on, one's desires is necessary for avoiding this slavery.

Socrates' warnings appear not to shake Aristippus' confidence. He is resolute in his declaration that he is absolutely "no candidate for slavery" (οὐδὲ εἰς τὴν δουλείαν αὐτὸν ἐμαυτὸν τάττω, 2.1.11); in fact, so insistent is he about this that he repeats the same thing again. Clearly he thinks that he has an entirely viable way. He explains,

but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I endeavour to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery but through freedom, which is the most certain road to happiness.

XEN. *Mem.* 2.1.11

So Aristippus steadfastly believes that one can actually pursue one's present-moment desires, presumably including many of those of the luxurious variety, without succumbing to slavery, and that this is achieved through the application of a kind of freedom. What is interesting, then, is that Aristippus explicitly shares Socrates' resolution to avoid slavery, but does *not* judge, as Xenophon's Socrates does, that to be free entails leading the fully temperate or restrained life. He thinks one can maintain autonomy without abstaining from one's desires. Aristippus might be said to be challenging the conception of freedom connected to restraint and abstinence.

We can get a better sense of how Socrates and Aristippus each conceive of their approach to pleasures and their shared commitment to avoiding slavery by taking a closer look at their respective notions of *enkrateia* and *eleutheria*. In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates sees the relationship between the agent and pleasure as one which involves the agent's *struggle for domination* over his

desires and pleasures. The terminology here²⁸ and in Plato²⁹ might be said to draw allusions to a sort of battle for power between two opposing energies. On the one side, it suggests a perception of pleasures, particularly those of sex, with their own power of ascendancy and dominion, threatening rule over the agent, with the possibility of reducing him to slavery. On the other, the agent, the one practicing *enkrateia*—exemplified by Socrates, and the virtue he exhorts Aristippus to adopt—appears as someone who sets himself firmly *against* these pleasures, adopting a kind of adversarial and combative stance towards them. Foucault, in his *History of Sexuality*, recognizes similar allusions; he says the ethics of *enkrateia* involves the “perception of the *hêdonai* and *epithumiai* as a formidable enemy force, and the correlative constitution of oneself as a vigilant adversary who confronts them, struggles against them, and tries to subdue them” (1985, 66).

Considered etymologically, such a description of *enkrateia* as a kind of active form of domination over pleasures involving some resistance and struggle makes good sense. The word *enkrateia* itself does not crop up before Plato and Xenophon, but the corresponding adjective does. It derives from *enkratês*, which was used of anyone having physical or authoritative power over something else usually yielding resistance.³⁰ It is in Plato³¹ and Xenophon that we see its expansion into a noun and applied for the first time to the ethical domain of the individual, and specifically to the individual's attempt at control with regards to desires and pleasures.

28 For example, Socrates' talk of the intemperate man being carried away (*φερόμενοι*) by the desire for women (2.1.4) attests not only to Socrates' perception of the forceful nature of certain desires, but also to the fact that his man of *enkrateia* is someone who must struggle in order to maintain control over them.

29 In Plato's *Gorgias*, Socrates also exhorts *enkrateia*, which he couples with *sôphrosunê*, but this time to Callicles (491e). Throughout their discussion, Plato employs all sorts of expressions having to do with the handling of pleasures that attest to the perception of these pleasures as potent, antagonistic forces (e.g., 491d, 491e, 505b7, 513d). See also Plato's discussion of *sôphrosunê* in *Republic* (e.g., 3.389d–e, 430e) where *sôphrosunê* is conceived much as in the *Gorgias* but with more scope (see North 1966, 169). Concerning Plato's dismissal of *enkrateia* in his other dialogues see below.

30 See Jaeger 1943, 2:53–54; Long 1993, 143.

31 Actually, Plato never uses the term in his so-called early dialogues. Its omission in the *Charmides* is of particular interest since it is a dialogue devoted to the definition of *sôphrosunê*. North 1966, 152 explains the absence by stating that this dialogue is dominated by Socrates' conception of virtue as knowledge. Dorion 2007, 121–122 makes sense of its absence by arguing that Plato dismisses it as a theoretical impossibility (see *Chrm.* 168b–c); Dorion takes this to be confirmed by the passage at *Republic* 4.430e12–431a1 where *enkrateia* is described as a kind of superiority over oneself.

Now a further manifestation of *enkrateia*, one which looks to be a natural concomitant of the perception of pleasure's so-called "formidable enemy force," takes the form of a kind of frugality or total distance from appetites. Socrates' subsequent examples to Aristippus suggest something like this. That is, he who practices *enkrateia* is able to stay away or hold off from desires for food, thirst, sleep, comfort, etc. (*Mem.* 2.1.2–3). Xenophon perhaps gives greater confirmation to this elsewhere when he reports, as mentioned earlier, that Socrates was "the most *enkratês* of all men over sex and bodily appetite ... and so trained for needing moderate amounts that he was easily satisfied when he had only little" (1.2.1).³²

Thus we might see Socrates' exhorted virtue as a form of self-control *over* the desire for pleasure, that is, as a kind of control meted out *on* desires and from a place *external* to them—perhaps not unlike that of a position of self-protection in warfare. In fact, exactly this sort of warfare imagery concerning desires is precisely what we find in both Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (1.23) and Plato's *Republic* (8.560b–c). In the former, the man of *enkrateia* must guard his estate from armed tyrants (representing gluttonous desires) attempting to take it over. In the latter, the picture Socrates paints is that of a citadel or acropolis-soul trying to protect itself from a throng of desires below.³³ There is clearly then a heavy *externalization* of desire or pleasure (primarily of the bodily sort) built into the notion of *enkrateia*. These sorts of desires are perceived as forces attempting to act on the agent from the outside. The action of the man practicing *enkrateia* is therefore largely preventative; the attempt at control comes in at a point *before* the acceptance of these desires, in fact impeding the satisfaction of these desires.

Let us now return to the discussion in the *Memorabilia*. Having listened patiently to Socrates' seven or so instances of the would-be-ruler practicing *enkrateia*, for example, cases of restraining from desires for food, drink, sleep, sex, etc. (2.1.1–6), Aristippus makes his position clear: he does not want to follow this sort of stance towards his desires. As mentioned, he is resolute in the fact

32 For Xenophon, *enkrateia* is the foundation of all virtue and the first thing one ought to establish in one's soul (*Mem.* 1.5.4); Socrates is made to encourage his companions to cultivate *enkrateia* above all things (4.5.1). Xenophon also brings together knowledge or wisdom with *enkrateia* (3.9.5), but in a way which gives the latter preeminence or more foundational a role. Self-control seems to be a necessary condition and prerequisite of the knowledge of good and bad in life (1.5.5). See also Moore's chapter in this volume.

33 Plato does not speak specifically of *enkrateia* here but rather of moderation (*sôphrosunê*) and the like. However, as mentioned previously, Plato does couple moderation with *enkrateia* earlier on in the *Republic* (4.430e).

that he does not intend to abstain and sacrifice his pleasures (2.1.8–9). Clearly then, Aristippus' policy here is not one of restraint or accepted moderation. When desires surface, Aristippus shows little reserve or hesitation; he simply acquiesces to them.

That said, however, Aristippus' relation to pleasure is significantly more complex than that of some simple foolhardy voluptuary. Despite surrendering to his desires, Aristippus considers himself absolutely *no* candidate for subjugation or slavery (2.1.11). This is due to, as he goes on to say, the possession and exercise of *eleutheria* (2.1.11). Aristippus then looks to retain part of the essential feature of self-mastery, or non-subjugation, from Socrates' keynote virtue and shifts it from something exercised outside of one's desires to something exercised within them. He transforms what we might view as the Socratic principle of self-control over the desire for pleasure into control within the pleasure; or, put somewhat more broadly, he converts what Socrates might view as the life of moderation and even restraint into the art of moving correctly within the life of pleasure.

Of course, Aristippus does not call this art of moving correctly within the life of pleasure, or take it to involve, the virtue of *enkrateia*. After all, this is the very thing Socrates tries to persuade Aristippus that he needs to cultivate (2.1.1), and which involves the sort of sacrificing-of-desires policy which Aristippus explicitly sidesteps. Aristippus, instead, calls the particular virtue or good he is trying to offer up as a candidate against Socrates' *enkrateia* "freedom." Nevertheless, the point to notice here is that Aristippus is clearly interested in a kind of autonomy or self-mastery, and, to that extent, he is not far from the virtue Socrates exhorts him to acquire.³⁴

34 See Long 2006, 9 n. 8, and Caizzi 2006, 132. We might also notice that Aristippus claims that the freedom he speaks about is the most certain road to happiness (*μάλιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἄγει*, 2.1.11). This signals to us an awareness on Aristippus' part of a conception of happiness concerned with meeting Socrates' worries about self-sufficiency. That it is the "most certain" path suggests that so long as this freedom is being exercised, disappointment or frustration is not likely to occur (or no more likely than by exercising any other virtue) and that therefore one's happiness will be kept invulnerable. So Aristippus might be said to be agreeing with Socrates' identification of self-sufficiency with the lack of frustration and the complete fulfilment of desires, but disagreeing that it must necessarily follow from this that the most reasonable thing to do is to lower one's desires so as to guarantee their satisfaction. That is, contra Socrates, who might be interpreted as believing that in order to secure the conditions for happiness one must reduce one's desires in the appropriate way, Aristippus here seems to be suggesting that *happiness is made most secure* through the exercise of a kind of freedom that actually allows for the largely unrestrained pursuit of one's desires.

There is little in the *Memorabilia* discussion that indicates to us how exactly Aristippus understands the nature of his freedom. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of this we have to look outside the testimony of Xenophon. However, before doing so, a rather illuminating clue to this discussion remains to be considered.

3 Overcoming the Rule of Pleasure

In the passage already alluded to at *Memorabilia* 2.1.11, Aristippus says that his way of freedom leads neither through *rule* nor slavery. It is this *denial* of ruling (οὐτε δι' ἀρχῆς) as an accompaniment of freedom that is interesting. It is precisely through ruling, perhaps as kings, tyrants or potentates, that most Greeks conceived of freedom. The tyrant was thought most *eleutheros*, for “*eleutheria* is manifested in ruling over others and in not submitting to the rule of others oneself” (Adkins 1972, 68, 112). In other words, freedom is typically understood as the power and control over *others and the external environment*. Even Xenophon's Socrates, throughout much of his discussion with Aristippus, upholds a similar conception. He warns Aristippus that if one wants to be free one must initiate a life of active rule since it is obvious that “the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves” (2.1.12–13).³⁵

Thus when Aristippus categorically denies any association between ruling and freedom we may have good reason to think that something quite different is being implied about the latter notion. That Aristippus does not understand the exercise of freedom in terms of commanding or oppressing, or in any outwardly physical way, suggests perhaps that he is referring to something more along the lines of a kind of *internal* freedom.³⁶

35 Socrates continues by saying that is the strong (οἱ κρείττονες), the brave and able (οἱ ἀνδρείοι καὶ δυνατοί), those with citizenship, those with friends, and those with weapons who will be far less likely than Aristippus to succumb to slavery (2.1.13–14). Socrates even appears to think that ruling is *necessary* for the achievement of happiness; for instance, when Aristippus exclaims, “But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to *identify* with happiness?” (2.1.17, italics added), Socrates gives absolutely no indication that this is not what he is saying.

36 Tsouna (1994, 378; 2002, 471) also characterizes freedom according to Aristippus as a kind of internal good or condition of the soul. She speaks specifically about “internal freedom,” “psychological independence,” and the conditions necessary for avoiding “harm of the soul.”

The testimony outside Xenophon seems not only to support such a direction in interpretation but also to fill it out. Much of the secondary evidence on Aristippus in this regard points very distinctly to a concern for a kind of inner emancipation or independence of mind, predominantly in the handling of pleasures. What we get, in effect, is a picture of someone who breaks with the tradition in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE preoccupied with the kinds of pleasures one ought to stay away from, or from the distance one ought to keep between oneself and certain pleasures, by emphasizing a focus on the internal employment or management of pleasures, *whatever kind they may be*. Consider a few examples:

The one to master pleasure is *not* he who *abstains* but he who *employs* it *without being carried away by it*, just as being a master of a ship or of a horse is not abstaining from using them, but directing them where one wishes.

STOB. *Ecl.* 3.17.17 = SSR IV A 98 (italics added)

Aristippus, while clothed in purple and anointed with perfumes, was not less temperate than Diogenes;³⁷ for just as if somebody had equipped his body with the ability to be untouched by fire, he would be of good cheer even if he entrusted his person to Etna, no too anybody who has *equipped himself well for pleasure will neither, when engulfed in it, get hot nor burn nor melt*.³⁸

MAXIM. TYR. 1.9 = SSR IV A 58 (italics added)

By paralleling the effects of pleasure with the effects of something as powerful and destructive as fire, the latter quotation attests to the strongly cautionary

37 Diogenes the Cynic emphasizes the more physical aspect of temperance or self-control (though he does uphold a two-dimensional askesis, the other of which is a spiritual one). He sees it consisting largely of the heavy training and good condition of the body to prevail over anything; moreover, he appears to have forced himself, through habitual exercise, to learn to despise pleasure (DL 6.70–71). Diogenes' lifestyle was predominantly ascetic. On the contrary, in Aristippus, there is little that points to a concern for this constant physical training and exertion as a means of being "equipped" for pleasure. Rather, not only does autonomy, in Aristippus' case, appear to come almost solely via the mind but it is also, by many accounts, marked by a kind of effortlessness (DL 2.66).

38 This claim of maximal flexibility and autonomy, moreover, looks to be extended to almost *all* situations: "He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances" (DL 2.66).

and admonitory perception of pleasure. We might see this as further serving to accentuate Aristippus' tremendous quality of self-mastery; like someone walking straight into a burning fire and not suffering from the flames and heat, Aristippus appears to indulge in pleasures without being subjugated or harmed in any way by their effects.³⁹

In an elucidation on Aristippus' self-mastery, Guthrie mentions J.L. Austin's comment about taking two portions of a favorite sweet when there remains only enough for one per guest:

I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing to temptation ... But do I lose control of myself? ... Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse.

GUTHRIE 1969, 495 n. 1

Indulgence, in other words, need not bring with it any kind of frenzy, madness or loss of control in the agent. This is something Aristippus seems to have clearly understood and it is perhaps best brought out in his reported relationship with Lais: "I possess Lais, she does not possess me." That is, he enjoys Lais without suffering the madness and lack of control that, for instance, Soc-

39 To bring this out more we might consider examining Aristippus in regards to sexual relationships or relationships of passion. It is precisely these sorts of pleasures that, for many (as is vivid in the ancient literature), exert their power; they are often thought to be accompanied by a kind of madness or loss of control (see, for instance, Pl. *Resp.* 1.329c, 3.403a; *Leg.* 6.783a; in Epicurus, see DL 10.118; in Lucretius, see *DRN* 4.1073–1140 and 4.1141–1150). The testimony on Aristippus is filled with references to these sorts of relations with women (and perhaps men). For example, in the *Memorabilia*, Socrates starts off his discussion with Aristippus by accusing him of being rather licentious in regards to, among other things, sex (2.1.1). This is also hinted at in Socrates' rendition of Prodicus' fable: Vice promises Heracles that if he takes her path he shall meet with the most joyful pleasures of love, while Virtue retorts that Vice's traveller fills himself with all things before he even desires them and deploys any kind of trick he can, even using men as women, to gain sexual pleasures (2.1.30). Furthermore, just in Diogenes Laertius alone, there are six separate references to Aristippus' frequent encounters with different ladies and courtesans (2.69, 74, 76, 81; in 84 note the name of one of his dialogues: *To those who blame him for his love of old wine and of women*) and above all the much quoted reference to the famously beautiful hetaira Lais (2.75). It is somewhat startling that there is so much testimony to these sorts of indulgences and absolutely *no* indication alongside this that Aristippus ever suffers any subjugation or loss of control or, for that matter, even feels slightly intimidated by the effects of any such experiences.

rates presumes will afflict Critobulus after kissing Alcibiades' handsome son (Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.9–11).

This is perhaps further highlighted by looking at the contrast in the trepidation reflected in Aristippus' contemporary Antisthenes in regards to sexual attraction. Though probably exaggerated, Antisthenes is reported to have said that he would rather be mad than feel pleasure (DL 6.3); as a precaution to getting too stirred up and therefore subjugated he allegedly associated only with women who were ugly (DL 6.3). Aristippus by contrast freely consorted with the most beautiful and seductive hetaerae.⁴⁰

We should begin then to get a picture of someone who might adequately meet Socrates' warning about the disruptive effects of certain desires and pleasures. That is, we should gather from all this that there is an independence of mind and a kind of coolness in Aristippus' approach to his excesses that seem to undermine the common perception—implied by Socrates in his rendition of Prodicus' Fable—of madness, disruption of the soul, or loss of control as the necessary outcomes of licentiousness.⁴¹ In other words, it is apparent in the testimony that Aristippus made precisely this sort of internal self-mastery (*eleutheria*), concerned with the disruptive desires that Xenophon's and Plato's Socrates scorns, a *central* concern. It is just this active control or manipulation over his experiences without, in turn, allowing them any influence over him that marks him with the kind of autonomous freedom that allows for the continued exploration and enjoyment of *all* desires and pleasures—the kind of freedom, moreover, that might give him good reason to think his happiness to be invulnerable.

4 Some Common Objections

I will now present and then respond to some of the common criticisms of Aristippus and his outlook as I have presented them here. For the purpose of convenience, I will call the first one the *Hollow Autonomy Objection*, the second the *Negative Freedom Objection*, and the third the *Hollow Pleasure Objection*.

40 Grote 1865, 546, says that “the society of these fascinating Hetaerae was dangerous, and exhaustive to the purses of those who sought it ...” That Aristippus was not only successfully able to participate in this manner of life, but to appear to have done so quite smoothly, would seem further testament to his composure.

41 Diogenes reports Aristippus as having said with respect to himself, “Obviously, nothing hinders a man from living extravagantly *and well*” (DL 2.69, italics added).

4.1 *The Hollow Autonomy Objection*

For starters, it has been said of Aristippus that his *adapting himself* “to place, time and person, and of playing his part appropriately under whatever circumstances” (DL 2.66), does not amount to any kind of substantial autonomy whatsoever. Annas, for instance, in her *Morality of Happiness*, says that although Aristippus appears to stress his freedom and autonomy, “the project of pursuing the present pleasure in fact leads to the need for a maximally flexible lifestyle, one which requires adjusting to circumstances to *such an extent as to make the claim of autonomy look rather hollow*” (Annas 1993, 229, italics added). She refers to the stories at the court of Dionysius I where Aristippus is depicted as having amused the tyrant in all sorts of allegedly self-degrading ways. Her thought is that, in his quest to fit in everywhere and enjoy the maximum amount of pleasure, Aristippus spreads himself thin to the point that no independent or sovereign agent may remain at all.

This seems to me to be an unfair objection. There is little if anything in this testimony that shows that Aristippus does not maintain some level of autonomy throughout his experiences or that he does not keep some amount of control or “distance” throughout the various situations we find him in. In fact, most of the repartee about him suggests that the reason he feels so confident in every situation is not because he can behave, if need be, in the way others expect him to behave, but because he is able to turn those situations, where he does behave as others expect him to, *to his hedonic benefit*.

Far from a mere court-jester who compromises his independence and who can hardly be said to be getting what he wants, the picture we get of Aristippus is more that of a self-directing or self-governing virtuoso. Even when he is adjusting to the circumstances around him, he is not being thwarted from doing and getting what he wants, pleasant experiences.⁴²

Thus, against Annas, it would, I think, be quite unwarranted to judge Aristippus as someone sacrificing himself or giving up his agency to the circumstances around him in his pursuit of pleasure. Horace’s praise of Aristippus is perhaps an apt reminder to objections like Annas’ and a reinforcing summary of what has just been said.

I slip back stealthily into the rules of Aristippus, and would bend the world to myself, not myself to the world.

HOR. *Epist.* 1.1, ll. 10–19

42 For more on this see Mann 1996, § III.

The anecdotes that contrast Aristippus with Diogenes the Cynic only reinforce this view. Consider a few:

Diogenes, as he was washing the dirt from his vegetables, saw him [Aristippus] and said, "If you had learned to make these your diet, you would not have paid court to kings." Aristippus replied, "If you knew how to associate with men, you would not be washing vegetables."

DL 2.68

Horace continues:

"If he who censures me knew how to live with princes, he would sniff at greens." Of these two sages tell me whose word and deeds you approve; or, since you are the younger, hear why the view of Aristippus is the better. For this is the way, as the story goes, that he dodged the snapping cynic: "I play the buffoon for my own profit, you for the people's. My conduct is better and nobler by far. I do service that I may have a horse to ride and be fed by a prince: you sue for paltry doles; but you become inferior to the giver, though you pose as needing no man." To Aristippus every form of life was fitting, every condition and circumstance; he aimed at higher things, but as a rule was content with what he had. On the other hand, take the man whom endurance clothes with his double rags: I shall marvel if a changed mode of life befit him. The one will not wait for a purple mantle; he will put on anything and walk through the most crowded streets, and in no inelegant fashion will play either part. The other will shun a cloak woven at Miletus as worse than a dog or a snake, and will die of cold if you do not give him back his rags. Give them back and let him live such an uncouth life.

HOR. *Epist.* 1.1, ll. 13–32

The suggestion here is that only in these special circumstances, that is, when he is living minimally, wearing ragged garments and acting contemptuously and shamelessly towards others, can the cynic Diogenes reveal himself to be autonomous. Aristippus, it might be said, "achieves his independence without so heavy a renunciation."⁴³ Diogenes, because of his obsession or dependence on asceticism, is not really free in the same way as Aristippus—that is, he

43 Grote 1875, 547. Durant 1939, 506, in opposing Aristippus from the Cynics, says "Aristippus' motto was, 'I possess, but am not possessed'; Antisthenes' was, 'I do not possess, in order

cannot really function in each environment. That is, while Diogenes has only one fixed manner of proceeding and so would be susceptible to compromising his independence if he were to get involved in affairs involving those of the rich, the powerful, the various socialites, and the luxurious and pleasurable life,⁴⁴ Aristippus shows that he can carry on gracefully even when surrounded by all these things.⁴⁵

4.2 *The Negative Freedom Objection*

Some commentators nevertheless continue to find reason to attribute to Aristippus a more restricted account of freedom than the one I have just now outlined. They find this primarily from a statement Aristippus makes in the *Memorabilia*. There, Aristippus tells Socrates that his plan for avoiding oppressive treatment is to be a foreigner (ξένος) in every land (2.1.13). Due to this, some commentators have thought of Aristippus as a kind of solitary outcast, as someone forging complete alienation from all social and political communities.⁴⁶

David O'Connor, following in this vein, goes on to interpret the foreigner claim as a distorted version of Socrates' self-sufficiency, in which Aristippus is said to be identifying self-sufficiency with complete alienation (1994, 161). The *particular* freedom, and hence happiness, he tries to achieve, O'Connor says, is not *within* the political community but *from* it. What O'Connor seems to be suggesting then is that Aristippus upholds a kind of negative freedom, that is,

not to be possessed'" (1939, 506). Decleva Caizzi 2006, 131, says of Aristippus that "he does not withdraw from his environment yet remains indefinitely detached."

44 This may be a bit simplified. As mentioned previously, Diogenes' asceticism also involves a spiritual component; and he is reported to have said that the practitioner of both forms of training—physical and spiritual—is capable of overcoming anything (see DL 6.70–71).

45 Again there is a strong Socratic connection in all of this. Horace's portrait of Aristippus might remind one of Alcibiades' eulogy of Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*. "His words made me think that my own had finally hit their mark, that he was smitten by my arrows. I didn't give him another chance to say a word. I stood up immediately and placed my mantle over the light cloak which, though it was the middle of winter, was his only clothing. I slipped underneath the cloak and put my arms around this man—this utterly unnatural, this truly extraordinary man—and spent the whole night next to him. Socrates, you can't deny a word of it. But in spite of all my efforts, this hopelessly arrogant, this unbelievably insolent man—he turned me down! He spurned my beauty, of which I was so proud, members of the jury—for this is really what you are; you're here to sit in judgment of Socrates' amazing arrogance and pride. Be sure of it, I swear to you by all the gods and goddesses together, my night with Socrates went no further than if I had spent it with my own father or older brother" (219b–d; see also 220a).

46 See, for instance, August. *De. civ. D.* 18.41 and Tsouna 1994, 386.

the freedom and self-sufficiency that demands the exclusion of, or abstention from, particular modes of life. I think, however, that there is a more apt way of conceiving Aristippus' foreigner claim, one that need not commit him to the kind of negative freedom and so-called distorted self-sufficiency that is attributed to him.

To see this, we must first back up a bit. What Socrates does in the particular passage of the *Memorabilia* before the foreigner claim is challenge Aristippus with a kind of exhaustive and exclusive disjunction: either one is a ruler or one is ruled in a political society. Socrates seems to think that happiness is achievable only through political rule and that misery is produced by the exclusion of such involvement. We get a strong sense that Socrates has been thinking throughout their discussion that ruling over others is indeed a *necessary* condition for happiness when quite late into their dialogue Aristippus exclaims "But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to *identify* with happiness?" (2.1.17, italics added), to which Socrates gives absolutely no indication that this is not what he is saying.

Aristippus opts for neither of Socrates' two alternatives. What he says, in the celebrated passage we have met several times before, is that he has a third option. This way leads neither through ruling nor through slavery but through freedom, which is the most certain road to happiness (2.1.11). It is in the context of this third option that Aristippus makes his foreigner claim. It is from his denial of Socrates' disjunction and his opting for a third option that commentators take Aristippus to mean that it is only through a kind of negative, apolitical freedom that he is able to achieve self-sufficiency and happiness.

Aristippus, however, need not be suggesting anything so extreme. From what we have seen above concerning Aristippus' ability to be free in any environment, we might see in his third option not some definitive call about the relation of freedom and happiness to the life of the foreigner, but the much more narrow and targeted denial of Socrates' *necessity* claim of ruling for happiness. It is Aristippus here—and not, as is conversely thought, Socrates—who might be seeing his interlocutor's account of freedom as a limited one, where one can only be free and happy when one is ruling in a political society. Aristippus might see Socrates' account as restricted since it can only allow one to achieve happiness via the freedom enacted in one particular mode of life, in the life of the ruler. If we view the crux of Aristippus' denial in his third option as one concerned with challenging Socrates' necessity claim only, it leaves it open for Aristippus to be making the larger point that the particular freedom he himself speaks of need not require any particular mode of life in order for happiness to be achieved. On this interpretation, the life of the foreigner

is simply one *among many modes of life* to which Aristippus' freedom can be applied, a kind of plasticity of freedom he might think comes out on top over Socrates' more rigid one.

In any case, that Aristippus upheld, in general, a kind of negative freedom simply runs against the kind of life the testimony depicts for us. As mentioned briefly, Aristippus consorted with the intellectual elite of Athens, with the most renowned hetaerae, even with Dionysius and other princes. The picture is of someone who engaged in civic existence, who prized not only intelligence and education but also the amenities and refinements of city life. The references to self-sufficiency, moreover, suggest that Aristippus adapted perfectly well to all these things (cf. DL 2.66; Hor. *Epist.* 1.17). It is difficult then to see this as representative of a position of freedom and self-sufficiency that demands or necessitates the exclusion of, or abstention from, certain modes of life.

4.3 *The Hollow Pleasure Objection*

A final criticism, again not unrelated to our above analyses, might claim that, due to his commitment to complete self-possession or autonomy, Aristippus, in his hedonic endeavours, is perhaps no longer experiencing pleasures in any full way, at least not in the more enriched and passionate sense typical of, say, relationships of love. Harold Tarrant (1994, 124), for example, says that it was Aristippus' intention "to avoid that feeling of being swept away by pleasure, which is the very aspect of pleasure that many might think most deserved the name 'pleasure.' Such persons might very well accuse Aristippus of rejecting the pleasure in pleasures, and being left with nothing but a pleasant *physical sensation*." Grote (1875, 545) perhaps implies something similar when he says that, "We may doubt whether he ever felt even for *Lais*." Moreover, it is reported by Diogenes (2.74) that Aristippus was not at all bothered by the fact that the courtesans he lived with had been with many men, something of which we might think for many would incite some kind of jealousy or passion.⁴⁷

Aristippus' choice of relations with the legendary *Lais* is interesting in this regard. Hetaerae occupied an elevated position in Athenian culture. The *hê-*

47 In one sense it is surprising to me that someone like Aristippus might be viewed as holding to this myopic or reductive view of pleasure experiences, as something like merely physical sensations. Such charges would appear, at least on the surface, to be much truer of the likes of Antisthenes or Diogenes. The former, for example, looks to view sexual relations as a *purely* bodily need, for whose satisfaction *any* woman will do (Xen. *Symp.* 4.38), and the latter appears to advocate a community of wives, perhaps something approaching a system of loveless unions (DL 6.72). These sorts of attitudes are much more befitting of Tarrant's charges than most of what we find in Aristippus.

doné of which Demosthenes says that the Athenians gain from the hetaerae is to be distinguished from the “daily needs” they get satisfied from typical concubines (*Contra Neaera*, 122). The hetaerae provided “pleasure” by satisfying the intellectual and aesthetic rather than just the physical requirements of their admirers.⁴⁸ So that Aristippus, unlike Antisthenes, did not simply go for “whatever chance put in his way,” but instead chose to enter into relations with one of the most venerable and untouchable hetaerae around, Lais,⁴⁹ perhaps suggests that it was not his regular intention to pursue, and hone in on, some brute sensation of pleasure, at least not in the case of these sorts of relations.

I suspect that part of the reason for Aristippus’ reputation as someone concerned only with reductive, bodily pleasures is due to testimonial conflation between him and the later Cyrenaics. It is largely the Cyrenaics, and not Aristippus, who exalt bodily pleasures and who take it to occupy a central place in their ethics.⁵⁰ To mention only one example, in Diogenes Laertius’ first doxographical section comprising the life of Aristippus, there is no indication that bodily pleasures are viewed as paramount. To be sure, there are references to luxurious living but there are just as many, if not more, references to philosophical, intellectual, and artistic pleasures—the sorts of enjoyments hard to square with Tarrant’s purely physicalist description.

But perhaps this is not an entirely adequate response to the criticisms raised. For I take it that the force of Tarrant’s criticisms is not that Aristippus cannot enjoy a variety of pleasures, but that he cannot, due to the maintaining of his control and invulnerability, do so in any *wholehearted* way. But why, we might ask, should Aristippus agree to this? Aristippus’ point seems to be that it is a *precondition* for feeling pleasure in the more enriched sense that one is *not* “swept away” by it, *not* that one *is*. Tarrant’s criticism, it might be argued, gets it backwards. It is not the abolishment of control or self-possession, but rather the accompaniment and exercise of it that makes the experience of pleasure a wholehearted one—or so Aristippus might be suggesting.

48 For example, Aspasia, probably the most famous hetaera of antiquity, is reported to have had an enormous influence on Pericles regarding instructing him in matters of military action, art, and rhetoric (see Thornton 1997). She was also reportedly close to Socrates and to other members of the Socratic circle. Regarding Socrates, Aspasia may even have served as the model for Diotima of the *Symposium* (see Boys-Stones 2013, 233–234).

49 On the purported splendor of Lais, see Ath. 13.588c–f. Aristippus, not surprisingly, is also alleged to have written two books on her (see DL 2.84–85).

50 For example, DL 2.87; Cic. *Luc.* 139; Lactant. *Div. inst.* 28.3, 34–37. See also Urstad 2009.

5 Final Remark

I have argued here for the important place and role of freedom in Aristippus' outlook. Freedom for him, I suggested, is a unique internal state or condition of the soul, one which allows its possessor to engage in all sorts of pleasures without being worsted by them in any way. It also occupies a dominant position in his eudaimonistic outlook, and serves as a kind of capacity that ensures happiness, if need be, by being able to turn all circumstances into potential sources of enjoyment. In this sense freedom for Aristippus is intimately linked to a deep concern for autonomy and self-sufficiency. In all this there is clearly a strong affiliation with Socratic teaching, as represented in the works of Xenophon and Plato in particular. Whatever the exact details are, there is certainly an internalist bent in Socrates' eudaimonism, in his conception of virtue and happiness, and a detachment from contingencies, and a strong pull towards self-sufficiency. The Socratic lifestyle is one in which an individual is maximally self-sufficient and in control of his life.

Aristippus then, if I am right about him, should be seen as a genuine Socratic and a substantial philosopher in his own right, deviating from his teacher in some philosophically interesting and important respects, but all the while staying aligned in other more fundamental ways.⁵¹

References

- Adkins, A. *Moral values and political behaviour in ancient Greece*. London 1972.
- Annas, J. *The morality of happiness*. Oxford 1993.
- Boys-Stones, G.R. and C. Rowe C. *The circle of Socrates: readings in the first-generation Socratics*. Indianapolis 2013.
- Caizzi, F.D. 'Minor Socratics'; in: M.L. Gill and P. Pellegrin, *A companion to ancient Philosophy*. Oxford 2006, 119–135.
- Clay, D. 'The origins of the Socratic dialogue', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 23–47.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Plato and enkrateia', in: C. Bobonich and P. Destrée, *Akrasia in Greek philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus*. Leiden 2007, 119–138.
- Durant, W. *The life of Greece*. New York 1939.
- Foucault, M. *The history of sexuality, 11: the use of pleasure*, tr. R. Hurley. New York 1985.
- Fuller, B.A.G. *History of Greek philosophy, 11*. New York 1931.

51 I am grateful to Christopher Moore and Alessandro Stavru for providing me with some valuable comments and suggestions regarding the manuscript.

- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Grote, G. *Plato and the other companions of Socrates*, III. London 1885.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *A history of Greek philosophy*, III: *The fifth-century enlightenment*. Cambridge 1969.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *Socrates*. Cambridge 1971.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *A history of Greek philosophy*, IV: *Plato, the man and his dialogues: earlier period*. Cambridge 1975.
- Jaeger, W. *Paideia: the ideals of Greek culture*, II, tr. G. Highet. New York 1943.
- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Long, A.A. 'Hellenistic ethics and philosophical power', in: P. Green, *Hellenistic history and culture*. Berkeley 1993, 138–156.
- Long, A.A. *From Epicurus to Epictetus: studies in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy*. Oxford 2006.
- Mann, W. 'The life of Aristippus', *AGPh* 78 (1996), 97–119.
- Merlan, P. *Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle*. Wiesbaden 1960.
- North, H. *Sophrosyne: self-knowledge and self-restraint in Greek literature*. Ithaca 1966.
- O'Connor, D. 'The erotic self-sufficiency of Socrates: a reading of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 151–180.
- Rankin, H.D. *Sophists, Socratics and Cynics*. Totowa 1983.
- Reale, G. *From the origins to Socrates: a history of ancient philosophy*. New York 1986.
- Tarrant, H. 'The *Hippias Major* and Socratic theories of pleasure', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 107–126.
- Thornton, B. *The myth of ancient Greek sexuality*. Oxford 1997.
- Tsouana, V. 'The Socratic origins of the Cynics and Cyrenaics', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 367–391.
- Tsouana, V. 'Is there an exception to Greek eudaimonism?', in: M. Canto and P. Pellegrin, *Le Style de la Pensée Mélanges J. Brunschwig*. Paris 2002, 464–489.
- Urstad, K. 'Aristippus and freedom in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*', *Praxis* (2008), 41–55.
- Urstad, K. 'Pathos, pleasure and the ethical life in Aristippus', *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* (2009), 1–22.
- Vander Waerdt, P. *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994.
- Watson, J. *Theories of hedonism*. London 1895.
- Zeller, E. *Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy*. London 1963.

Shock, Erotics, Plagiarism, and Fraud: Aspects of Aeschines of Sphettus' Philosophy

Claudia Mársico

Universidad de Buenos Aires

The Socratic philosophers had different destinies. Some of them formed lines of tradition that kept their memory alive, despite the gradual loss of their texts. This was not the case for Aeschines, whose sole student, Xenocrates, it is said, was stolen away by Plato.¹ That he lacked a school legacy, however, did not diminish Aeschines' prominence within the Socratic circle. Despite being a minor among minors, Aeschines is a key figure for understanding that circle. The doxography about him reveals a twofold perspective: behind a few positive observations about him is an unrelentingly harsh critical nucleus. In this chapter I will tackle, in light of this twofold perspective, both the legacy of Socrates in Aeschines' philosophy and its innovation. I argue that Aeschines developed an original method that uses mental shock to provoke his readers into improvement. In what follows I will examine this theme in the dialogues of Aeschines and, more specifically, in his two dialogues on *erôs*, (1) *Alcibiades* and (2) *Aspasia*. This will allow (3) to connect these results with fragments from other dialogues and (4) to review the evidence that associates Aeschines with the so-called disciples who lost their way. My goal is to understand Aeschinean philosophy and the reasons it was rejected by its opponents inside and outside the complex climate of the Socratic group.

1 The Shock Method

Much scholarship studies the so-called Socratic *elenchus*. It often analyses the existential aspects of this method and uses Plato's dialogues for the textual material.² When the Platonic Socrates refutes his interlocutor, he frequently makes him feel ashamed; it is also clear that he deploys the *elenchus* to eradi-

1 Athenaeus, citing Hegesander, said Xenocrates was his only pupil (XI.507c = SSR VI A 1), though Diogenes Laertius mentions another disciple named "Aristotle the Myth" (DL 2.63 = SSR IV A 24).

2 See Vlastos, 1982, 37; Renaud, 2010, 183–198; Inverso 2014, 47–60.

cate false beliefs, and in some contexts to obtain knowledge. As we shall see, the dialogues of Aeschines offer valuable material illustrating an opposing model, where Socrates alters the mind and mood of his fellows. Aeschines stresses the shock caused by arguments, not principally worried about knowledge or strictly theoretical issues. Thus there is a difference of aim among the Socratic models. While the “major” Socratics—Antisthenes, Plato, and Xenophon—have knowledge as their goal, Aeschines disclaims *epistêmê* and prioritizes a kind of spiritual healing that does not rest upon ontological assumptions like Plato’s theory of Forms or Antisthenes’ *orthotês onomatôn*. For Aeschines, the transmission of philosophy means the practice of mental shock carried out by *erôs*. This shock is more than the *aporia* of the Platonic dialogues, since it is not just a moment of the method but, as we will see, its very core.

It is traditional to believe that Socrates acts upon the soul of another by a peculiar kind of erotic mania. Yet this leads to a difficulty in understanding his pedagogical method. His *erôs* would thus seem restricted to those strictly considered his *eromenoi*, his beloveds; but there are many others who receive the benefits of his training. Aeschines is among those—at least no ancient source testifies to his being Socrates’ *eromenos*—although he surely did not think of himself as simply a non-benefiting witness of Socrates’ practices. Hence it is plausible to suppose that Aeschines benefited from Socrates’ *erôs* but did so in a different way than an *eromenos* like Alcibiades.

Therefore, the problem concerns the way Socrates benefited those who were his *eromenoi* and those who were not. Some elements to clarify the relationship between Socrates and his beloved can be inferred from Aeschines’ *Alcibiades*, while the *Aspasia* helps us to understand how *erôs* was useful to other people as well. Let us begin with the shock method as applied to Socrates’ beloved.

Few figures received as much attention from the Socratics as Alcibiades. Euclides, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and Plato wrote works entitled *Alcibiades*,³ and the list of authors and works grows if we take into account explicit mentions or appearances of Alcibiades elsewhere in the Socratic literature. The most famous occur in Plato’s *Symposium* and in the Socratic works of Xenophon. Many emphasize the young nobleman’s charm. However, Alcibiades was also one of the rejected suitors of Socrates. Two testimonies to this fact should be examined together. In the first, the Platonic Socrates says ironically that he does not want an intimate relationship with the younger Alcibiades (*Symp.* 219a).

3 See on Euclides, DL 2.108 (= SSR II A 10); on Antisthenes, DL 6.15–18 (= SSR V A 41), and on Phaedo, *Suda* s.v. Φαίδων (= SSR III A 8).

He accuses Alcibiades of trying to exchange bronze for gold.⁴ In the second, reported by Xenophon, Antisthenes, again the younger man, suffers a similar rejection: after having declared his love, Socrates answers presumptuously—and ironically—that Antisthenes loves not his soul but only his beauty.⁵ In both cases, though for different reasons, Socrates inverts the relationship of the mature lover and the young beloved, presenting himself as the beloved man who judges as unsatisfactory the attitudes of Alcibiades and Antisthenes, two very different suitors.⁶ Aeschines' approach in the *Alcibiades* has the peculiarity that he introduces no distortions or inversions into the traditional relationship between lover and beloved as in the celebrated passage of the Platonic *Symposium* (219b–d). On the contrary, in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* Socrates examines the traditional relationship between erotics and *paideia*, and assumes the role of a lover who shows concern for the welfare of his young beloved and tries to improve him.

The preserved passages of this dialogue display, on the one hand, the interaction of Socrates with a young Alcibiades not yet marked by the events of his adult life and, on the other, Socrates' evaluation of Alcibiades' conduct. Aeschines aims at showing that Socrates was not responsible for Alcibiades' deviations from the norms of proper behavior. This has its parallel in Plato's *Symposium*, where Alcibiades himself claims that Socrates advised him to act differently than he was—showing him that without alleviating his deficiencies he would be acting in politics as an ignorant man—and because of this he felt ashamed, but so strongly was he carried away by the crowd, he could not obey him.⁷ At the same time, however, Aeschines' version presents something different. In Aeschines, Alcibiades is sick, his misfortunes the result not of political life but of an illness from which he had long suffered.⁸ Alcibiades' flaw was present from the very beginning. This means that Socrates is working on doomed land, with discouraging prospects. In his judgment about Alcibiades, Aeschines is a pessimist. Yet he still depicts Socrates' attempt to correct Alcibiades' ravings.

4 On this much-discussed passage, see Schein 1974, 158–167; Anderson 1993, 115–124; Scott 2000, 121–131; Mársico 2011 ad loc.

5 See Xen. *Symp.* 8.4–6 (= SSR V A 14).

6 See Pl. *Symp.*; Dover 1980, 4–5; Brancacci 1993.

7 See Pl. *Symp.* 215e–216c.

8 The testimony of Max. Tyr. *Diss.* 7.7 (= SSR VI A 42) about Alcibiades' sickness and his description of him in 6.6 (= SSR VI A 42), where he says that Alcibiades suffered an old illness, could be easily compared with the extant fragments of Aeschines' *Alcibiades*.

At the same time, the reference to an old flaw affecting Alcibiades' conduct works as a reference to the old accusations against Socrates, which were the reasons underlying the trial, as Plato states in *Apology* 18a–d. The allusion to the trial allows us to compare Alcibiades with Socrates. In both cases, past events affect the present. From the perspective of the Socratics, while Socrates is a victim of persistent misunderstandings and nefarious motives, Alcibiades was condemned by accurate judges. In Aeschines' view, philosophy itself banished Alcibiades and its verdict is final; his virtue is unrecoverable. Given this situation, Alcibiades seems hopeless. However, the text of Aeschines suggests that even such a seemingly unimprovable character can be modified. The case of Alcibiades shows therefore in the best possible way the power of *erôs*.⁹

In the most-preserved passage of Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, Socrates alludes to Themistocles. The exposition is highly erotic. Socrates detects Alcibiades' arrogance, which implies that he thinks he is better than Themistocles. So he induces in Alcibiades envy for Themistocles and his political achievements, and then a feeling of doubt about Alcibiades' power to match them—a feeling that he is worse than Themistocles. In brief, Alcibiades shows pride and arrogance, then Socrates operates on his mind and alters his mood, making deeper and more complex feelings come to the fore.¹⁰ We could say that Socrates produces “narcissistic injuries” that threaten the self-esteem of the youth, reinforce his insecurity, and bring about his envy.¹¹ This procedure stimulates passions and leaves Alcibiades increasingly vulnerable to Socrates' words. Like a psychoanalysis *avant la lettre*, Socrates' intervention causes Alcibiades to lose control of his superficial attitude and bring out his inner emotions. This mechanism removes the mental barriers, so that the initial negative condition, which condemned Alcibiades and at first seemed incurable, can be improved and his soul can be healed.

Socrates makes Alcibiades oscillate between opposite positions. First, he feeds the pride that allowed Alcibiades to criticize Themistocles by drawing attention to a negative aspect of Themistocles' life. He mentions Themistocles's parental conflicts. This prompts Alcibiades' rejection of Themistocles as a model.¹² This *excursus* prepares the ground for a new movement, aimed at showing that the previous criticism of Themistocles had been unfair, and that it would be difficult for Alcibiades to equal Themistocles' achievements.

9 On Alcibiades' attitudes against the gods and the possibility of his changing his character, see Esposito and Rossetti 1984, 27–35.

10 See Ael. Arist. *Orat.* 46.2, 369d (= SSR VI A 51).

11 See Cic. *Tusc.* 3.32.77 (= SSR VI A 47).

12 See POxy 1608 col. 1, fr. 1 (= SSR VI A 48 = fr. 7) and col. 1, fr. 4 (= SSR VI A 48).

Socrates now praises Themistocles, and emphasizes that in fighting the Persians Themistocles faced an uphill battle that he overcame, thanks only to his virtue (*aretê*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*). He did so well that “the Persian king realized that his position was weaker the day he met a man who was more noble than himself.”¹³ However, Themistocles’ knowledge is depicted by Socrates as a series of self-benefiting tricks. Themistocles took advantage of his intermediary position after the battle of Salamis, when he lied to the Persian king, telling him that the decision not to destroy the bridge over the Hellespont was his own rather than that of the assembly. This yielded to him favors that would have helped him once he was later exiled.¹⁴

Does Aeschines consider Themistocles’ conduct commendable? Strictly speaking, his depiction of Themistocles’ *aretê* and *epistêmê* serves to illustrate his ability to operate successfully in a given environment. Without further qualification, the story of Themistocles might seem as an incentive for Alcibiades’ most harmful tendencies, and not as an element to restrain or correct them. Yet this is not the end of Socrates’ intervention, only an intermediate point within a nonlinear sequence of pedagogical steps. Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* was intended to be effective on readers. Indeed, readers knew what happened to Alcibiades, and it is very likely that they were thinking of him while going over Aeschines’ account of Themistocles. Maximus of Tyre explicitly mentions Alcibiades’ friendship with Tissaphernes and his influence on the foreign politics of Sparta, and compares them to the incidents that led Themistocles to rule Magnesia by bequest of the Persian king.¹⁵

Socrates’ account of Themistocles’ *epistêmê* also applies to Alcibiades, so that the reader can examine two instances in which knowledge was not enough to prevent the resentment felt by Athens. At this point, Alcibiades bursts into tears and reverses his initial state. Due to his “emotional dizziness,” he abandons his arrogance and sobs at being unable even to equal Themistocles. In the third stage of the sequence, Socrates shows that Themistocles, even if he is a model for Alcibiades, is far from being perfect. It is therefore not enough to emulate Themistocles. This paves the way for an *erôs*-driven search in which both interlocutors are involved.

In another brief *excursus*, this one on chance and knowledge, Aeschines’ Socrates claims that Themistocles’ *epistêmê* includes a demerit.¹⁶ The last fragments explain more clearly Themistocles’ failure. He succeeded in political

13 See Ael. Arist. *Orat.* 46.2, 292–294d (= SSR VI A 50).

14 On this episode, see Hdt. 8.83.

15 See Max. Tyr. *Diss.* 6.6 (= SSR VI A 42).

16 See Ael. Arist. *Orat.* 46.2, 369d (= SSR VI A 51).

issues, but he was far from being a model of philosophical inquiry. Indeed, when the talk with Alcibiades seems close to an end, Socrates unveils his overall purpose: he shows that *paideia* is subject to erotics, which in turn is powered by a divine power (*theia moira*). He compares himself to the Bacchae, because “whenever they become inspired, they draw milk and honey from sources where others cannot even draw water.”¹⁷ Interestingly, the Aeschinean Socrates does not pretend to have knowledge, claiming instead that his educational power springs from *erôs*. This non-conventional power, we may add, gives hope to Alcibiades’ soul, which, as we saw, appeared to be doomed. Readers acquainted with Alcibiades’ story know that eventually no actual change of behavior came about. This means that Aeschines emphasizes not the result, but a particular stage of the paideutic process, one during which it is possible that Alcibiades, at least for a moment, becomes aware of his state of deprivation and loses his shield of pride.

It is important to note that this process entails a dialectical approach that differs significantly from other methods used among the Socratics. Aeschines’ shock is not just an elenctic instrument to eradicate false beliefs, but a device of psychic transformation. Aelius Aristides says that Aeschines’ Socrates manages to pick the *kairos*, the opportune moment to persuade Alcibiades, but this *kairos* is not a tool of persuasion.¹⁸ Socrates alters Alcibiades’ emotions through violent turns. The young Alcibiades begins swelling with pride and is then shaken by Socrates until he falls into self-contempt and admiration of Themistocles and bursts into tears. A step further, he is raised to an attitude of self-contempt and admiration of Socrates, who replaces the imperfect Themistocles.¹⁹ In this way, through the shock method, the lover improves his beloved. But the shock method is more than this, as it can also improve those who are not involved in an erotic relationship. On this the *Aspasía* has something to say.

2 The Scope of Erotics

Aspasía, Pericles’ partner, is a central character in the classical Greek imaginary. Several Socratics refer to her when dealing with the topic of wise women and their role in erotics. As with the *Alcibiades*, the *Aspasía* deals with *paideia*.

17 See Ael. Arist. *Orat.* 45.2, 23–24d, and also 19–20d (= SSR VI A 53). The same context occurs in Pl. *Ion* 534a. See Wilamowitz 1919, 2.25.

18 See Ael. Arist. *Orat.* 46.2, 369–370d (= SSR VI A 49). The skill of getting along with both sides recalls Antisthenes’ *polutropia*.

19 See Plut. *Alc.* 4, 193c (= SSR VI A 54).

The rich Callias is a concerned father who wants to be told the best teacher for his son Hipponicus.²⁰ Socrates claims that Hipponicus should take Aspasia as a teacher. The context suggests that Callias was surprised by the proposal. The irony of the subsequent part of the story has been noted by Ehlers and shared by Kahn.²¹ As Callias was extremely wealthy and usually spent money on the services of all kinds of sophists, Socrates suggests that these sophists were as useful as the hetaeras whose services he also regularly bought.²² So when Socrates recommends the most renowned of them, he is warning against Callias' habit of paying for what is priceless and converting teaching into prostitution. He means that Callias misunderstands the role of *erôs*.

But Socrates is not just joking. He defends women as teachers and presents three cases in which women performed successfully in traditional male areas. The first example is Rhodogyne of Persia, a warrior woman who abandons her hairstyle to take up arms and protect her political power. Her *erôs* is projected outward, that is, towards power.²³ The second example is Thargelia of Miletus, who is associated with power not directly but through the men she lives with. This case is significantly different from the first, as are the contexts in which Rhodogyne and Thargelia deploy their respective instances of *erôs*: war in the first place, political-diplomatic councils in the second. In this latter case, there is a person who operates on her behalf, Antiochus of Thessaly, who is in love with her. This is much clearer in Plutarch's version of this account, which speaks of the many powerful men, interchangeable for Thargelia's purposes, who are all guided by sensual power.²⁴ We could say that this *erôs* acts on Thargelia's personal benefit. The third example is Aspasia, who also is from Miletus. At first glance, this case seems to replicate Thargelia's, especially in her activity as hetaera and the quasi-technical way by which she imparts teachings to her partners. Indeed, an account goes that after the death of Pericles, Aspasia helped the clumsy Lysicles triumph in politics. This reinforces the idea that she could do the same in other cases. Apparently, Aspasia chose to help Lysicles just to make use of her educational power.²⁵

20 See Max. Tyr. *Diss.* 38.4 (= SSR VI A 62).

21 See Ehlers 1966, 40; Kahn 1994, 96.

22 About Callias and his wasteful character, see the next section.

23 See the anonymous *On Women* 8 (= SSR VI A 63) and Philost. *Images* 2.5 (= SSR VI A 63). On this character, see Levine Gera 1997, 151–158.

24 See Plut. *Per.* 24.3–4, 165b (= SSR VI A 64).

25 See Ehlers 1966, 50. On the chronological problems about Lysicles' death, see Wilamowitz 1900, 551–553.

Cicero reports that in Aeschines' dialogue *Aspasia* uses an inductive process in which Xenophon's wife must answer questions about situations where other people have objects better and more preferable than her own. *Aspasia* goes on to ask her what she would do if another woman had a better husband.²⁶ We find here again a mental shock evident in the wife's blush, one that resembles the cry of Alcibiades.²⁷ Both allusions indicate that the subjects are disrupted and transformed through this experience. This first questioning is followed by another directed to Xenophon, who responds in the same way and resorts to silence instead of saying that he prefers another man's wife. When both spouses are embarrassed and confused, *Aspasia* offers a solution: both should improve themselves and become the best choice for their partner. This recalls the situation we have seen previously in Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, where Alcibiades suffers because he cannot equal Themistocles, and Socrates shows him a better model to follow. Here the spouses are altered because inductive reasoning opens the possibility of preferring others outside of the marriage. *Aspasia* shows them that this possibility is ruled out if they manage to understand "that there is not on earth a better man or woman" than their spouses, that is, each other. In both cases the impression of something that seems unchangeable (Themistocles' supremacy over other politicians in the *Alcibiades*, the superiority of potential partners outside marriage in the *Aspasia*) is resolved, and self-improvement becomes the solution to the restoration of the shocked individuals' calm. Socrates manages to change Alcibiades because he is in love with him, while Xenophon and his wife work as incentives for each other because they are committed to a shared erotic relationship.²⁸ The sources connect the passage with the inductive method,²⁹ which may suggest that such a method was characteristic of Aeschines' approach. However, this passage is an isolated case, making it inadequate for inferring from it that Aeschines regularly adopted induction as a method. Indeed, if we must choose a name for

26 See Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.31.51–53 (= *SSR* VI A 70). The other sources, namely Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.27–29 (= *SSR* VI A 70) and Victorinus *Rhet.* 1.31, 240.20–241.15 (= *SSR* VI A 70), depend on Cicero. Quintilian keeps the questions to Xenophon's wife and claims she made a mistake in preferring someone else's goods, while Victorinus changes the protreptic program into a proposal of reconciliation, which is an oversimplification of the original version.

27 See Döring 1984, 25.

28 Natorp 1892, 489–500, understands *Aspasia* as Socrates' *alter ego*, in his protreptic power on their interlocutors.

29 See above, n. 26.

Aeschines' approach, it would be better to think of a persuasiveness aimed at altering the listener and overcoming his resistance. Induction, in any case, is nothing but a tool useful for this general purpose.³⁰

There is no inconsistency between the induction method and the improvement Aspasia induced in her husbands, which is not limited to rhetorical and political issues but also involves a comprehensive plan for personal improvement, in the way she suggested to Xenophon and his wife. Indeed, the love that bound her to Pericles connects this episode with the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates, especially because Aspasia seems to be a woman "wise in erotic matters," as the Platonic Socrates says in *Symposium* 201d about another woman, Diotima. It has been said that Plato's *Menexenus* could be a critical response to Aeschines' *Aspasia*, where Aspasia's skills were restricted in order to create a "theoretical space" for Diotima, the priestess of Mantinea, whose knowledge of *erôs* was far more developed than Aspasia's.³¹ In fact, this comparison points to the list of women in Aeschines' *Aspasia*, ranked according to the type of *erôs* they represent. Rhodogyne and Thargelia are left behind by Aspasia, who embodies the model proposed by Aeschines. It may have been tempting for Plato to develop this idea and say that Diotima surpasses Aspasia. So, Aeschinean erotics would be defeated by Platonic erotics committed to the superior level of Forms.³²

If we compare this approach with the argument in Plato's *Symposium*, we find that Aeschines stresses the shocking aspects caused by arguments, but he is not primarily worried about knowledge or strictly theoretical issues. By contrast, Plato's Diotima begins with a refutative exchange that shames Socrates, but her main concern is to define *erôs*. Her argument does not rest on the interpersonal relationship between Socrates and herself, nor on that between Socrates and Agathon, but on ontological assumptions that depend on the theory of Forms. These assumptions guarantee the erotic ascent from a beautiful body to beauty itself.

If the speech between Socrates and Diotima in Plato's *Symposium* points to Aeschines' *Aspasia*, Alcibiades' speech in Plato's *Symposium* shows intertextual

30 See Rossetti 1984, 271–283.

31 See Dittmar 1912, 50–59; von Loewenclau 1961, 33; Kahn 1994, 97; Pownall 2004, 60.

32 I believe that the context of the *Symposium* and the references to *auto to kalon* ("beauty itself") at 211d2, e1, e3 are enough to sustain the view that this dialogue deals with the theory of Forms, as do other dialogues of Plato's middle period such as *Phaedo* and *Republic*. See for instance Kahn 1998, 340–345, or, for the view that the *Symposium* is at least a good complement for these dialogues, Gonzalez 2002, 31–84; Sayre 2002, 177.

echoes of Aeschines' *Alcibiades*. In the Platonic dialogue there is also a praise, not of Themistocles but of Socrates, proffered by Alcibiades, who displays from a practical viewpoint what Socrates had explained earlier in his speech by expounding Diotima's theory about *erôs*. Indeed, Plato's Alcibiades is different from Aeschines', tormented as he is not just by the practical consequences of *erôs*, but also by his lack of knowledge about it. From this perspective, Plato's new treatment is intended to point out that erotic relationships are more complex than Aeschines had diagnosed, and that a theoretical background is necessary to explain what went wrong with Alcibiades.

The whole text of Aeschines' *Aspasia* is characterized as an ironic mosaic. Aeschines takes Aspasia's and Lysicles' figures from comedy and that of Thargelia from Hippias. He invents the stories of Rhodogyne and Xenophon's wife, who was not old enough to be married when Aspasia died.³³ This difficulty has been partially solved by Rossetti. He conjectures that this Xenophon was not the son of Gryllus, but an elder Socratic who is also mentioned by other authors.³⁴ The story is therefore about the elder Xenophon, and in this context the younger Xenophon adds his reaction against Aeschines' work in an interesting illustration of complex intragroup relationships.

The *Aspasia* reveals an important point that remained obscure in the *Alcibiades*, where it seems that the master-disciple relationship depends on finding an adequate partner. Aspasia's case reveals that one may find an adequate partner, as we see from her teaching to Pericles and Lysicles, but also that an individual engaged in a rewarding relationship should not be content. On the contrary, he should improve others, as Aspasia does with Xenophon and his wife. Similarly, Socrates can cause improvement to other members of his environment. His erotic capacity and his ability to mutate the world "as the Bacchae" do guarantee his transformative power. It is not restricted to his beloved, but pours on people around him like milk that flows from stones.

3 Scandal, Provocation, and Philosophical Training

Aeschines' shock method can help us to get a clearer understanding of the biographical facts alluded to at the opening of this chapter. Aeschines is a

33 See Kahn 1994, 99.

34 He would be the author of the *Constitution of Athens* attributed to Pseudo-Xenophon or the Old Oligarch. If this hypothesis holds, the dialogue would have been properly attributed to its author and the mistake would have occurred only because the distinction between homonyms faded away. See Rossetti 1975, 361–381; 1997, 141–158.

controversial character dealing with controversial characters. He multiplies conflicts and this attitude may have caused the critical and ironic responses to him.

Let us see some examples. In the *Callias*, the rich man who in the *Aspasia* was seeking a teacher for his son talks with his own father, Hipponicus. Callias is scolded for spending excessively on sophists.³⁵ So Hipponicus reminds him about his grandfather. This ancestor ignored his family duties and left his relative Aristides in poverty, causing bad reputation for him and his descendants.³⁶ Given the recurrence of Aeschines' poverty in many sources, it is not surprising that wealth and its connection with a noble life may have been an important concern for him. In fact, the situation recurs in the *Telauges*. Here Proclus says that Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus and half brother of Callias, was criticized because he despised Telauges, who, according to Diogenes Laertius, was son of Pythagoras and famous for his unkempt appearance.³⁷

From this we should not infer that Aeschines reproached Telauges for this attitude. Demetrius says that it is not clear whether Aeschines praises or mocks Telauges, as his style is not ironic but only "apparently ironic."³⁸ In fact, if Aeschines' irony is merely apparent, it is difficult to say what he really meant, and this is relevant for evaluating the controversial character of his prose. Chroust suggested that Aristoxenus, the peripatetic philosopher with sympathies for Pythagoreanism, based his rejection of Plato and Aeschines on the latter's excesses in the *Telauges*.³⁹ Despite this suggestion, Aeschines' aggressive attitude could be linked with the polemic aspects attributed to him by other sources, and we may even think that the charge of plagiarism responded not only to the fidelity of his style but also to his quarrelsome attitude, which was perhaps inherited from Socrates.⁴⁰ Socratic irony, or "appearance of irony," could be a key aspect to understand the legacy of Socrates in Aeschines' philosophy. Aeschines conceived philosophy as mental shock and used provocation as a way of improvement.

35 The protagonists of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Strepsiades and Pheidippides, might parody the real Callias and Hipponicus: note Strepsiades' wasteful attitude, the sons with horsey names, and the allusions to bad marital relationships. This suggests an interesting link between comedy and Socratic dialogue; see Clay 1994, 23–47.

36 See Plut. *Arist.* 25.4–9, 334b–d (= SSR VI A 75).

37 See DL 8.53. See also Ath. 5.220a (= SSR VI A 84). Kahn 2001, 49, links this attitude with Cynicism and says that he "is dressed as an eccentric hippie."

38 See Demetr. *Eloc.* 291 (= SSR VI A 89).

39 See Chroust 1962, 98–118.

40 See, for instance, Ath. 13.611d–612d (= SSR VI A 16).

The *Critias* and the *Telauges* are linked with Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. The fictional context of this work is the same as that of the *Miltiades*, the dialogue Aeschines brought to Syracuse to make a good impression on the ruling tyrant Dionysius. Aeschines alludes there to characters of the fifth century BCE, including Pericles' general Hagnon and the poet Euripides. Hagnon was the father of Theramenes, the controversial politician sentenced to death in 404 BCE on Critias' initiative. It is said that Socrates tried to stop the execution. Theramenes' conviction was, in some sense, a foreshadowing of Socrates' fate and a sign of the controversial relationships entertained by Socrates.⁴¹ Theramenes was a member of Socrates' group, as was Alcibiades. He had the nickname "buskin," the shoe that fits either foot.⁴² This casts doubts indirectly on Socrates' personality. By the way, Aeschines' dialogue shows Hagnon worried to find the best teachers for his son, thus suggesting that eventually he would not succeed in the task and Theramenes would become a corrupt man. Alcibiades and Theramenes would be friends and at the same time terrible challenges for Socrates and his paideutic power. The young Miltiades is treated, as Telauges in the homonymous dialogue, with an attitude of praise and irony. Miltiades was so peaceful that "he was quieter than the bronze statues."⁴³ If calm can be conceived as anti-eristic, in the Aeschinean way of thinking the stony attitude of this youth seems an indication of his stupidity and his consequent need for a teacher who should shake him from this attitude.

The idea of travel and displacement for the sake of education is a common theme in Socratic literature. Diogenes Laertius claims that Aeschines told how Aristippus came to Athens. Plutarch may have referred to this circumstance when he tells about Aristippus' meeting Ischomachus at the Olympic Games:

Aristippus was so enthusiastic [about what he heard from Ischomachus] that he wasted away, and became quite pale and lean, thirsty and parched, till he sailed to Athens and drew from the fountain-head, and knew the wonderful man himself and his speeches and philosophy, the object of which was that men should recognize their faults and so get rid of them.⁴⁴

PLUT. *Curios.* 2, 516c (= SSR VI A 91)

41 See Diodorus Siculus, 14.5. Cicero (*Tusc.* 1.46) compares Theramenes with Socrates.

42 About Theramenes, see Ar. *Ran.* 531 and Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.31.

43 See Stob. 2.31.23 (= SSR VI A 77).

44 This text is related to DL 2.65 (SSR VI A 91). See FS 1276–1277 and notes ad loc.

It is likely that this story was part of the *Miltiades*. It is an example of the quest for philosophical *erôs*, which is a better option than the quietism of the silent Miltiades. As Alcibiades cries and Xenophon and his wife blush, Aristippus suffers and becomes lean. His shock marks the beginning of philosophy. This view is characteristic of Aeschines' perspective. This passage of the *Miltiades* shows that the challenge of finding a teacher, as is mentioned in the *Alcibiades*, is prompted by a force that can lead men to extreme experiences and decide their fates.

Moreover, the mention of Ischomachus recalls one of the most scandalous and controversial stories of the classical period, one with which many of Aeschines' characters are involved. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* shows Ischomachus educating his wife in household management. His daughter married the wealthy Callias, but his wife and pupil Chrysilla plagued the family with ridicule when she became entangled in a love affair with his son-in-law. She had a son with him, pushing Callias' daughter to a suicide attempt.⁴⁵ It is not surprising that there are ironical readings of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, understanding the choice of Ischomachus as a suggestion that he was not the right teacher, lacking virtue. It is therefore necessary to seek education elsewhere, namely in the Socratic teaching.⁴⁶ Aeschines might have thought of this in his *Aspasia*, where Xenophon and his wife undergo a protreptic process that touches and transforms people, and which is therefore very different from the confidence of Ischomachus who believes he is educating while he is only building his ruin.⁴⁷

From the *erôs*-induced shock, Aeschines' characters enter into a state of conflict. Gross failure awaits those who do not experience *erôs*. Distortions of this thesis may have led to the view of Aeschines as a manipulator who seduced people for personal gain. Aeschines, as a theoretical *Doppelgänger* of Alcibiades, was highly controversial and dragged behind him the anger of many enemies. It is hard to know the truth in the allegations of Lysias, but it seems certain that the program of philosophical shock advocated by Aeschines must have exposed him to polemic struggle, far from conducive to the formation of a school, but full of Socratic inspiration.

45 See Andoc. 1.124–127.

46 See Strauss 1970, Stevens 1994, Danzig 2003, and Kronenberg 2009. See Dorion (in this volume) for a contrasting view.

47 Note that this point does not depend on chronological issues regarding the priority of Xenophon or Aeschines. The important aspect is that they share the same themes.

4 Aeschines as Alcibiades' Doppelgänger

Aeschines is a singular figure in several respects. He is alone, a disciple without disciples. He is said to stay true to the Socratic way of life. He arouses a peculiar fury in his opponents.⁴⁸ At the same time, he looks strikingly similar to the cursed disciples of Socrates, especially Alcibiades.

This comparison seems fanciful if we think of Aeschines as a poor rhetorician without influence.⁴⁹ After all, Alcibiades was famous and powerful. Yet both were a blemish on Socrates, potentially contributing to his execution. Both were dazzled by worldly pleasures. Aeschines pursued Sicilian wealth as a parasite.⁵⁰ Their contrasts unite them as two sides of the same coin. At first glance they are opposites, but they have surprising points of convergence. Seneca noted that Aeschines, the poor disciple of Socrates, gave himself to Socrates to get better, and because of this he triumphed in a field where Alcibiades, the rich disciple, failed miserably.⁵¹ However, doxography, as we will see, seems to cast doubt on this point and suggest that Aeschines is another failure. Not only Alcibiades but also Aeschines are Socratic failures. In this regard, Aeschines was a ghostly double of Alcibiades, because he was beset by the same faults, but on a lower, secondary level.

Athenaeus transmits a passage in which Lysias ridicules Aeschines' misdeeds: Aeschines, who was then over-indebted, hired Lysias' services to save his perfume manufacturing business, a business generally considered worthless, and then refused to pay. Lysias adds that Aeschines swindled traders so often that his neighbors moved out, tired of the visit of creditors that resembled a permanent funeral procession. Lysias also says that traders preferred the hazards at sea to those of doing business with Aeschines because he did not respect private property.⁵²

Aeschines' reputation for vileness may be a result, however, less of his actual activities than of people's interests in Alcibiades. People may have wanted to show that Alcibiades' bad behaviors could not be explained by his social class

48 See the references below.

49 See DL 2.20 (= SSR VI A 7).

50 He carries his *Miltiades* to Sicily to persuade Dionysius of his value. See Philost. *Apoll.* 1.35.1 (= SSR VI A 14); *Suda* s.v. Aeschines (= SSR VI A 25); Luc. *Paras.* 32 (= SSR VI A 24).

51 See Sen. *Ben.* 1.8.1–2 (= SSR VI A 6).

52 See Ath. 13.611d–612d (= SSR VI A 16). Millet 2002, 1–4, analyzes Aeschines' case to understand ancient credit. On perfume and Aristippus, see Ath. 12.544d–e (= SSR IV A 31); Greg. Naz. *Poems* 1.2.10.307 and 319–334 (= SSR IV A 33).

and its power to destroy reflective habits. Their evidence would be the anonymous and politically obscure Aeschines. His delinquency was the plebeian parallel of the scandals of wealthy youths.

The poor Aeschines receives some praise for giving himself over to Socrates. But one story presents a between-the-lines criticism. Aeschines borrowed money from Socrates because he ran out of food. This is striking because Socrates is traditionally treated as extremely austere and almost poor. So, Aeschines borrowed from a poor man.⁵³ This may mean that he was even lower than Socrates in the economic pyramid, but also that he did not ask his richer companions to help him. He did not even ask Aristippus, who had many possessions and was his close friend. This is a strange story, unless we think that Aeschines must have turned to Socrates because everyone else, tired of his betrayal of their trust, refused to lend him money. The implication would be that Aeschines' poverty came from his systematic betrayal of his friends and colleagues.

This critical picture gains strength from another passage about food. In a similar situation, Socrates replies ironically that Aeschines should borrow from himself by reducing the amount of food he eats.⁵⁴ The precise meaning of this joke is obscure. It could carry the sense that a loan to Aeschines was unrecoverable. Or perhaps Aeschines was fat, and he would be better off if he went on a diet. Whatever Aeschines' body shape, the story implies that even Socrates, hardly greedy or selfish, preferred not to lend money to Aeschines.

Such an attack shares the atmosphere with Polycrates' pamphlet, a text written probably when several Socratics were returning to Athens.⁵⁵ Internally, they disagreed about the way to deploy Socrates' figure. Externally, they presented a single face and together coped with reactions from the intellectual environment. Some people were not happy with the return of the group. They seem to have thought not only that Socrates was justly condemned but that the unseemly conduct of his followers confirmed the correctness of this opinion. We must thus pay special attention to the derogatory attitude within and toward the Socratic movement when we analyze the sources. Negative pro-

53 See Cod. Vat. Graec. 96, fol. 62^v (= SSR VI A 5). About Socrates' poverty and its force in tradition, see the *Socratic Epistle* 6, probably to Chaerephon, in Malherbe 1977, 233–239; Mársico 2012, 114–124.

54 See DL 2.62 (= SSR VI A 13).

55 On Polycrates' pamphlet, see Brickhouse and Smith 1990, 71–87; Gribble 1999, 214–259; Janko 2009, 57–59.

files of single Socratics may have been useful in the cultural ambience of that moment, both to the intra-group conflicts and the conflicts with non-Socratic intellectuals.⁵⁶

This way of thinking may have been largely responsible for the negative view of Aeschines. He was thought not only to have scammed strangers of money, but also to have plagiarized from friends' written works. It seems that readers thought Aeschines wrote with excellent prose. The Second Sophistic writer Hermogenes, in his *On the Forms*, compares Aeschines with Xenophon and Plato.⁵⁷ This favorable comparison had its forebear in Cicero, who says that "there is something very humorous and elegant in that continued *irony*, which Socrates employs to so much advantage in the dialogues of Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines."⁵⁸

Yet Aeschines' mastery was often attributed to Socrates' having written his dialogues. The stories say that Socrates' widow Xanthippe gave them to him as a sort of present. This story, which goes back at least to *About the Socratics* of the Epicurean Idomeneus of Lampsacus, does not account for the ploy Aeschines made use of for getting this favor. Still, it is noteworthy that such a scandal-prone disciple would receive the widow's gift.

In fact, the comments of Lysias, who probably best illustrates this negative aspect in doxography, relate the scam against Hermaeum the perfumer with the accusation of plagiarism: Aeschines presents as his own the works of Socrates that he got from Xanthippe, just as he took off Hermaeum's business after seducing his wife, even though she was an old woman and "it would have been less trouble to him to count her teeth than the fingers of her hand, they were so many fewer."⁵⁹ According to these accounts Aeschines is a thief and also a plagiarist without dignity.

The same story of Socrates' authorship of Aeschines' seven perfect dialogues is repeated by Diogenes Laertius, attributing the tale to Menedemus of Eretria, and by Phrynichus.⁶⁰ This shows that this opinion was widespread. Aristippus, who in other testimonies appears as one of Aeschines' closest friends, does not hesitate to distrust the authenticity of his dialogues and it is said that in Megara, where an important meeting took place after the death of Socrates,

56 The external pressure is clear from the broad attack Isocrates displayed at the beginning of *Against the Sophists* (13.1). From that perspective, the members of the Socratic group were venal intellectuals who told lies and deceived their students.

57 See Hermog. *Forms* 2.12.2 ed. L. Spengel, *Rh. G.* 2.419.25–420.7 (= *SSR VI A 20*).

58 See Cic. *Brut.* 85.292 (= *SSR VI A 27*).

59 Ath. 13.611d–612f (= *SSR VI A 16*).

60 See DL 2.60 (= *SSR VI A 22*) and Phrynichus apud Phot. *Bib.* 61 (= *SSR VI A 33*).

the Cyrenaic shot him an immoderate “where did you get that, thief?”⁶¹ Other texts also portray the relationship between them as full of ups and downs, the weak side of Aeschines always being that he steals others’ property.⁶² Now, just as we reviewed the rumors about the dark side of Aeschines, we must note that there are witnesses who praised him as a member of the “chorus of Socrates,”⁶³ or stressed that his conduct was blameless.⁶⁴

The attention Aeschines has received in the doxographical sources is enough to demand more of our attention than he has traditionally received. We cannot know how longstanding were the comparisons between Aeschines and Alcibiades and, if they were contemporaneous, to what extent Aeschines was aware of them, or whether the attention Aeschines paid to Alcibiades inspired the comparison. Anyway, both figures come together as two contrasting examples of “disciple types” used by the anti-Socratic tradition. Both also develop aspects associated with “erotics,” which is clear in the case of Alcibiades, but also present in Aeschines’ writings dealing with the mechanisms of seduction. Indeed, Aeschines is a *Doppelgänger* because he displays his philosophy through the figure of Alcibiades: Alcibiades stood always in the foreground, while Aeschines remained in the shadows and his work got destroyed by the ravages of time. This twist, however, invites us to look at Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* and pay special attention to the issues that marked successes and failures of this pair of doubles. This will allow us interpret Aeschines’ philosophy as an original way of transformation and improvement.

References

- Anderson, D. *The masks of Dionysus*. New York 1993.
 Brancacci, A. ‘Érotique et théorie du plaisir chez Antisthène’, in: M.-O. Goulet-Cazé and R. Goulet, *Le cynisme ancien et ses prolongements*. Paris 1993, 33–55.
 Brickhouse, T. and N.D. Smith. *Socrates on trial*. Oxford 1990.
 Chroust, A.-H. ‘Plato’s detractors in antiquity’, *RMeta* 16 (1962), 98–118.
 Danzig, G. ‘Why Socrates was not a farmer: Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* as a Philosophical Dialogue’, *G&R* 50 (2003), 55–76.

61 See DL 2.62 (= SSR VI A 13).

62 See DL 2.82–83 (= SSR VI A 24) and Plut. *Cohib.* 14.462d (= SSR VI A 24).

63 See Themist. *Orat.* 34.2 (= SSR VI A 38). His presence in the Platonic list in *Ap.* 33e (= SSR VI A 5) confirms this information.

64 See Lib. *Ap. Soc.* 150 (= SSR VI A 38).

- Dittmar, H. *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker*. Berlin 1912.
- Döring, K. 'Der Sokrates des Aischines von Sphettos und die Frage nach dem historischen Sokrates', *Hermes* 112 (1984), 16–30.
- Dover, K.J. *Plato, Symposium*. Cambridge 1980.
- Ehlers, B. *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des Sokratischen Eros: der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines*. München 1966.
- Esposito, A. and L. Rossetti. 'Socrate, Alcibiade, Temistocle e i 'Dodici Dèi'', *ZPE* 54 (1984), 27–35.
- Gonzalez, F. 'Plato's dialectic of forms', in: Welton 2002, 31–84.
- Gribble, D. 'Plato and the Socratics', in: D. Gribble, *Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation*. Oxford 1999, 214–259.
- Inverso, H. 'Disputas por el método: *élenchos* y dialéctica en el Eutidemo de Platón', *Circe* 18 (2014), 47–60.
- Janko, R. 'Socrates the freethinker', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*. New York 2009, 48–62.
- Kahn, C.H. 'Aeschines on Socratic eros', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 87–106.
- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Kahn, C.H. *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans: a brief history*. New York 2001.
- Kronenberg, L. *Allegories of farming from Greece and Rome*. Cambridge 2009.
- Levine Gera, D. *Warrior women: the anonymous Tractatus de mulieribus*. Leiden 1997.
- Loewenclau, I. von. *Der Platonische Menexenos*. Stuttgart 1961.
- Malherbe, A. *The Cynic epistles: a study edition*. Atlanta 1977.
- Mársico, C. *Platón, Banquete*, Buenos Aires 2011.
- Mársico, C. *Sócrates y los Socráticos: cartas*, Buenos Aires 2012.
- Mársico, C. *Filósofos socráticos: testimonios y fragmentos*, 1–11. Buenos Aires 2014. (= FS)
- Merkelbach, R. 'Zum Miltiades des Aischines', *ZPE* 9 (1972), 201.
- Millet, P. *Lending and borrowing in ancient Athens*. Cambridge 2002.
- Natorp, P. 'Aischines' Aspasia', *Philologus* 51 (1892), 489–500.
- Patzner, A. 'Aischínou Miltiádes', *ZPE* 15 (1974), 271–287.
- Pownall, F. *Lessons from the past: the moral use of history in fourth-century prose*. Ann Arbor 2004.
- Renaud, F. 'Humbling as upbringing: the ethical dimension of the elenchus in the *Lysis*', in: G. Scott, *Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's dialogues*, University Park 2010, 183–198.
- Rossetti, L. 'Alla ricerca dei logoi Sokratikoi perduti (III)', *Rivista di Studi Classici* 23 (1975), 361–381.
- Rossetti, L. 'Le inferenze pseudoanalogiche', in: G. Santinello. *Metafore dell'invisibile: ricerche sull'analogia*. Brescia 1984, 271–283.

- Rossetti, L. 'Autore dell'*Athenaion Politeia* fu forse un socratico, omonimo di Senofonte erchieo?', in: M. Gigante and G. Maddoli *L'Athenaion Politeia dello Pseudo-Senofonte*. Napoli 1997, 141–158.
- Rossetti, L. and C. Lausdei. 'Ancora sul *Milziade* di Eschine socratico: P. Oxy. 2890 (Back)', *ZPE* 33 (1979), 47–56.
- Sayre, K. 'Do forms have a role in Plato's *Philebus*?', in: Welton 2002, 169–191.
- Schein, S. 'Alcibiades and the politics of misguided love in Plato's *Symposium*', *Theta Pi* 3 (1974), 158–167.
- Scott, G.A. *Plato's Socrates as educator*. Albany 2000.
- Slings, S. 'Some remarks on Aeschines' *Miltiades*', *ZPE* 16 (1975), 301–308.
- Stevens, J. 'Friendship and profit in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 209–237.
- Strauss, L. *Xenophon's Socratic discourse: an interpretation of the Oeconomicus*. Ithaca 1970.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994.
- Vlastos, G. 'The Socratic Elenchus', *OSAPh* 1 (1983), 27–58.
- Welton, W. *Plato's Forms: varieties of interpretation*, Lanham, MD 2002.
- Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, U. von. 'Lesefrüchte', *Hermes* 35 (1900), 533–566.
- Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, U. von. *Platon: Sein Leben und seine Werke*. Berlin 1919.

Phaedo of Elis: The Biography, *Zopyrus*, and His Intellectual Profile

Danilo Di Lanzo
Università di Tor Vergata

Although ancient philosophy has shown increasing interest in Plato's characters,¹ very little has been written about Phaedo of Elis; what exists serves mainly for commentary on the Platonic dialogue which bears his name, not as a substantive re-imagination of his overall personality.² The reasons for this silence or, at best, only passing attention to Phaedo could perhaps be traced back to the exiguous testimonial remains and the dubiety with which even they have been received.³ For example, Robin himself, pausing over Phaedo's biography, says that "around the personality of Phaedo we have only uncertainties and darkness" (1970, xi) and Humbert asserts that Phaedo "is for us an enigma" (1967, 277). Only in relatively recent times has there been an awakening of studies that have attempted to define his character with precision, to whom a paragraph of the history of ancient philosophy has even been dedicated.⁴

In this article I propose a delineation of Phaedo of Elis' intellectual profile based on a critical analysis of the accounts that deal with him. I will take into consideration the most relevant contributions made by both ancient and recent secondary literature, including his complex and not yet sufficiently clarified biography. Additionally, I will specifically examine his most important work, *Zopyrus*, and, based on the examination of verifiably authentic fragments, I will try to reconstruct the content and highlight the unfortunately few documented philosophical themes that we can attempt to identify.

1 Nails 2002.

2 Wilamowitz's assertion (1879, 189) is emblematic: "Philosophy should be silent about Phaedo." Subsequent studies on the history of philosophy have largely followed Wilamowitz's position. Except in rare occasions, scholars only mention Phaedo's name without dwelling on his personality.

3 Parmentier 1926, 23, justifiably observes that "all the details of the ancients regarding Phaedo seem dubious and demand a lengthy critical examination."

4 I am referring to Reale 1996, 427–430. Among early studies, most worth mention is von Fritz 1935 and 1938. Recent discussions include Rossetti 1973, 1974, 1980, 2015; Sarri 1975, 178–200; Montuori 1976; Giannantoni 1990; Dušanić 1993; Boys-Stones 2004; Kahn 2008, 17–20.

1 Biography

According to ancient sources, Phaedo was born in Elis, in the western Peloponnese, from a noble family (τῶν εὐπατριδῶν, DL 2.105). He was later taken prisoner during a war in which his country was defeated, enslaved,⁵ sold to an Athenian procurer, and forced to prostitute himself.⁶ It was in this capacity that Phaedo came into contact with Socrates, from whom he gained respect and fondness, and was ransomed by one of his disciples.⁷ Once free, he converted to philosophy and became one of Socrates' dearest students. Once Socrates died, Phaedo returned to Elis to found his philosophic school.

Despite this ancient evidence, Monique Dixsaut states that this story seems too attractive to be true (1991, 313). Her doubtfulness, like others', begins with the testimony of Diogenes Laertius. That testimony seems to be a typical example of his improbable biographies, based largely on stereotyped⁸ topics and simple improvisations, perhaps nothing but "a little story at the fringes of the *Phaedo*."⁹ Even if so, however, the story is realistic enough to explain Phaedo's presence in Athens in 399 BCE, when he was imprisoned during the war.¹⁰

The first task the scholarship has taken up is establishing the circumstances in which Phaedo's capture might have happened. Preller already pointed to two possibilities: either during the Peloponnese war in 431 BCE (Thuc. 2.25), when the territory of Elis was plundered, or during the Eliac war of 401–400 BCE, led by Sparta and aided by the Athenians military forces.¹¹ Preller

5 This goes unmentioned at by Gell. NA 2.18.1–5 (= SSR III A 3).

6 DL 2.105; Gell. NA 2.18; Origen. C. Cels. I 64; Lib. declam. I 184.

7 The identity of the disciple who ransomed Phaedo, through the mediation of Socrates, is uncertain: Alcibiades or Crito in DL 2.105; Crito in DL 2.31; Cebes in Gell. NA 2.18.1–5; Alcibiades in Suda s.v. Φαίδων.

8 Fairweather 1974.

9 Robin 1978, x. Boys-Stones 2004, 3, shares the same opinion and admits the possibility that Phaedo's ancient biographies "were themselves embroidered in the light of his role in the Phaedo," or even, he adds, "in the light of his own philosophy."

10 McQueen and Rowe 1989 have shown that Phaedo's capture during the war is historically possible. See also Dušanić 1993.

11 Xen. Hell. 3.2.21–25 and Diod. Sic. 14.17.4–12. Xenophon links the Iliac war to the Dercillida expedition, dating it back to 399–398; Diodorus, by contrast, places it in 401. If one trusted Xenophon's chronology, Elis would have fallen only after the death of Socrates, and so too Phaedo would have been taken prisoner and sold as a slave only after his death; thus they would never have encountered each other. In this case, the *Phaedo* and its setting would

believed that in 399, at the death of Socrates, Phaedo was not yet eighteen years old, the first date being too early for Phaedo's capture (1846, 393–396). Burnet (1911, x) and von Fritz (1938) also reached this conclusion, inferring Phaedo's age from a clue in the Platonic *Phaedo*: his long hair that Socrates lovingly caressed (89b) was peculiar to Athenian youth. This would also explain Xenophon's silence about Phaedo: he left Athens in 401 BCE, before Phaedo's arrival.

This reconstruction, placing Phaedo's birth in 417–416 BCE, was completely rejected by Grote (1867, 503–504), who proposed a very suggestive alternative also accepted by Montuori (1976, 30–34). These scholars assumed that the slave sale of the Eupatridae could have occurred neither at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war nor during the Eliac war. The only example of a similar sale occurred in 415 BCE during the Athenian repression of the Melians (Thuc. 5.116). According to Grote, "if Phaedon had been a Melian youth of good family, he would have been sold at Athens, and might have undergone the adventures narrated by Diogenes" (1867, 504). Thus, if Diogenes' account regarding Phaedo's slavery and prostitution and his following meeting with Socrates is to be believed, we must correct the text, reading Φαίδων Μήλιος instead of Φαίδων Ἡλείος.¹² This would make sense of Alcibiades' role in manumitting Phaedo, since Alcibiades definitely left Athens in 407 BCE. Nevertheless, against Grote's hypothesis is the fact that every other source, such as Aulus Gellius and Strabo, living at least two centuries before Diogenes Laertius, mentions Elis as Phaedo's home country. For this reason, Grote's thesis has been rejected, and Preller's, focused on the hair scene, preferred (Gomperz 1893–1909).

Against Preller's theory, however, some have queried the claim that the length of Phaedo's hair would necessarily correspond to his youth. In fact, the hair that Phaedo wore long on his shoulders may not have signified youth, but

be unhistorical and Plato's dialogue would be a "heartless mystification" (Burnet 1911, xii). For this reason, McQueen and Rowe 1989, adopting Preller's reconstruction, use Diodorus' chronology.

12 Montuori agrees with Grote's reconstruction, summing up his position as follows: "If Phaedo were Socratic, he would not be from Elis; if he were from Elis, he would not be Socratic" (1976, 32). Montuori improves on Grote's hypothesis by finding a way to avoid emending Laertius' text: even were Phaedo born in Melo, his name could have acquired the toponym of the school he founded and not that of his birthplace. Montuori remembers that the same happens in modern times: for example, this is the case of Benedetto Croce, commonly remembered as the "Neapolitan philosopher," even though he was born in the Abruzzi (33 n. 55).

his extravagance¹³ in appearing like a typical Athenian young man¹⁴ despite being a mature one, or his emulation—common among Athenian aristocrats—of the Spartans.¹⁵ For this reason, Robin contended that the word παίζειν in Plato's *Phaedo* (89b) would signify not “lovingly caress” but “tease,” suggesting that Socrates would not “play with” (as it is often translated) Phaedo's hair as with that of one's sweetheart but “tease” him for his Peloponnesian mane, an oddity in Athens.¹⁶ The hypothesis is completely plausible, but it is important to underline that, in the scene of the Platonic dialogue, Socrates does not limit himself to *joking* about Phaedo's hair. He does in fact caress it affectionately, gathering it in his hands and pulling his fingers through it, conscious that Phaedo's death will soon cause him to sacrifice its beauty. The last caress to Phaedo's hair is a very intense and emotional moment,¹⁷ and Socrates allows himself to make a fond and familiar gesture which is not a mocking act of the master towards his follower. Robin (1978, x n. 2) is surely wrong when he speaks about an “equivocal” attitude; therefore, it is improbable that Phaedo is middle-aged; Phaedo, Simmias, and Cebes, to whom Socrates mainly directs his philosophical education, are all young (τῶν νεανίσκων, 89a).

13 Parmentier 1926, 23, found it a “une singularité”; “une étrangeté” for Robin 1978, 89b n. 1; “una rarità” according to Rossetti 1973, 364.

14 Valgimigli 2000, 184 n. 110: “In Athens only young men, until about eighteen years of age, wore their hair long.” Centrone 2000, 216 n. 100, agrees.

15 Montuori 1976, 8–10, sees a distinctive aspect of the pro-Spartan Athenians in the long hair; cf. *Ar. Eq.* 580 and *Nub.* 14.

16 Robin, 1978, 89b n. 1. Even Valgimigli 2000, 184 n. 110, thinks that “Phaedo, young but not very young, from Elis and not from Athens, had long hair which gave him an exotic air about which Socrates loved to banter and joke.”

17 Montuori 1976, 36 n. 71, recalls the pages which Gabriele D'Annunzio dedicated to the famous episode of Socrates' caress. About the scene of Phaedo's hair, even D'Annunzio seems to understand the dramatic and touching atmosphere: “Since he was sitting on the bed and next to him Phaedo was seated on a stool, [Socrates] put his hand on his disciple's head and caressed it, pressing his hair to his neck, as he was already used to joking like this with his fingers in those young untamed locks. He did not yet speak, as his sentiment must have been intense and lined with delight. Through this beautiful and fleeting moment, he communicated, maybe just once, with the earthly life in which he had completed his perfection, carrying out his ideal of virtue; and maybe he felt that nothing was beyond this, that his finished existence was enough in itself, that the extension into eternity was nothing but a semblance—like a halo around a star—produced by the extraordinary splendor of his humanity. The young man from Elis' hair had never had such a sublime virtue. He enjoyed it for the first time, as he was dying; he also knew that that the next day, in death, it would be cut. He then said—and his disciples had never heard such a tone in his voice: ‘Tomorrow, Phaedo, you will have this beautiful mane cut.’ To which Phaedo replied: ‘It seems so, Socrates’” (D'Annunzio 1995, 312–313).

Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the possibility that the other aspects of Phaedo's biography—the imprisonment, the slavery, and the prostitution—were invented, as Humbert (1967, 277–278) suggests, by some peripatetic denigrators,¹⁸ or that they were created ad hoc, in light of Plato's *Phaedo*, who may have added details to the narrator of the dialogue in order to render more vivid the conversion to philosophy and its purifying function (see Gigon 1946).

In the light of these considerations, Preller's reconstruction has been brought into question again. Rossetti observed that, had Phaedo been captured during the Eliac war as Preller thought, the time between his imprisonment and Socrates' death would have been too short for everything his biography asserts to have happened. For this reason, Rossetti assumes that the events causing Phaedo's seizure and slavery were those that occurred in 431 BCE during the Peloponnesian War (1977, 123–126).

In contrast, Montuori follows Grote's thesis and considers the service that Phaedo performed at the brothel. According to Montuori, Phaedo was certainly imprisoned and sold to a brothel keeper, but he did not prostitute himself, Athenian legislation¹⁹ having made doing so a crime; he was just a servant.

18 Cf. Gell. *NA* 2.18, 1–5. Among the authors who started a long series of rumors and gossip regarding Socrates, the Socratics and, in particular, Phaedo, we recall Aristoxenus and Hermippus. The latter, the author of *Περὶ τῶν παιδεία διαπρεψάντων δούλων*, is probably the source of the story about Phaedo's scandalous past (see Giannantoni 1990, 118–119). Such maligning could have been known to Hegesander, in *Ath.* 11.507c, who did allude to Plato's presumed attempt to have return him to prison. Epicurus was also aware of it, in *Cic. Nat. D.* 1.33, 93, and Hieronymus of Rhodes in *DL* 2.105, who in his work *Περὶ ἐποχῆς*, with mockery, called Phaedo δούλον.

19 Montuori 1976, 38–39, cites the text of the *γραφὴ ὑβρεως* (tr. Del Grande 1947, 289), as one can read in Demosthenes and Aeschines. Aeschines' long speech on pederasty during the oration against Timarchus is a necessary digression in order to demonstrate that Timarchus was a *pornos*. A great demonstration, especially from a political point of view: a political ally of Demosthenes, Timarchus accused Aeschines of not following the instructions he received and of having reached an agreement with Philip thanks to the peace of Philocrates (364 BCE) without respecting the interests of the city. According to Aeschines, however, Timarchus did not have the authority to speak in tribunals, given his devotion to prostitution. Montuori 1976, 39, observes that, even if the text of the *γραφὴ*, which can be read in both Demosthenes and Aeschines, is apocryphal and is recorded in different forms, "it is undeniable that both explicitly condemn the violence against slaves and young boys": "Why does the law mention slaves?," Aeschines asks, *c. Tim.* 17, "Not because the legislature is concerned about the fate of the slaves; but because, as its aim is to teach you to respect free men, it has been mandated to refrain from committing violence even against the slave himself." It can be read in Demosthenes, *c. Mid.* 47: "If someone commits violence (ὕβρις) against any person, either a child,

As Giannantoni (1990, 118) observes, these interpretations merely appear to be attempts to rationalize and make historically plausible what is clearly a story. What is certain is that Plato, was not present during Socrates' final hours of life because of illness.²⁰

2 Plato's Use of Phaedo as Narrator of the *Phaedo*

It is extremely difficult to say why Plato used Phaedo as the narrator of this dialogue and names it after him. Any answer is speculative, as the great number of hypotheses put forth shows. For example, in the view of Parmentier (1926, 23), Plato was paying a simple homage to a dead friend. Giannantoni (1990, 119), by contrast, thinks that the choice of Phaedo is motivated precisely by his insignificance for the circle of Socrates: by choosing Phaedo as his narrator, Plato ensures that our view of Socrates at such an important moment will not be clouded by association with Euclides, Antisthenes, or Aristippus.

I think it is relevant to consider that according to Plato Phaedo is young but open to discussion.²¹ The fact that he does not seem to have a philosophical thought of his own might explain why he is represented as a young and inexperienced disciple, still to be initiated into philosophy. Plato could have been interested in giving him a leading role exactly for this reason, that is, because he was far from the intellectual level of Socrates' other disciples.

a woman, a free man or a slave, or commits an illegal act against them, he who is Athenian and has the right, should denounce it to Thesmothetae." See the objection to this interpretation by Dover 1978, 39 n. 22, taken up by Montuori 1982. Concerning Aeschines' oration, Timarchus, and the prostitution law, Cantarella 2006, 73–78, is worth a look.

20 Pl. *Phd.* 59b. About this aspect, Valgimigli and Centrone oppose interpretations: the first states "there is no reason to suppose that Plato was not really sick in those days" (Valgimigli 2000, 176 n. 10); the second, more cautiously, affirms "it is difficult to interpret Plato's announcement of his absence (unless it does reflect historical reality); certainly, it also means that *Phaedo* is not a historically accurate account, but a *logos* composed in the spirit of Socrates" (Valgimigli 2000, 200 n. 12).

21 To the objection made several times by Humbert 1967, 278; Montuori 1976, 33 n. 55; Rossetti 1977, 123–124; Robin 1978, x, according to whom Phaedo's youth would have prevented him from facing such demanding philosophical arguments, such as the belief in the immortality of the soul, and from following a very simple and refined discussion, we can respond, as Dixsaut 1991, 34, does, with the same words that Plato attributes to Nicias in *Laches*: we do not have to think that "old age brings wisdom" (188b).

Some scholars think that the distinctive characteristics of the *Phaedo*—as compared to those of other Platonic dialogues—can be explained by the hypothesis that Plato wanted to evoke the philosophy of Phaedo of Elis itself. This is what Boys-Stones (2004) claims, suggesting that the viewpoint adopted by Plato takes into account the position of the historical Phaedo who, on the one hand, defended the existence of an independent rational soul and, on the other, explained desires as physical epiphenomena on which reason cannot act, but which can ensure that a person chooses to organize his life rationally despite physiological influences to the contrary. Rossetti (1973, 79–80) does not exclude the possibility that Plato, in writing the *Phaedo*, had already read some of Phaedo's *logoi Sôkratikoî*, which might have been the reason for the correspondences between what we can infer from Phaedo's writing and what Plato makes him say in the eponymous dialogue. The heart of Phaedo's interests might very well be in philosophy, seen as a sort of care and purification of the soul: both the way to control one's senses and the gateway to salvation. Concerning this, Humbert (1967, 279–280) stresses that the theme of the omnipotence of philosophy over the soul was particularly dear to Phaedo; Rossetti adds that these issues were not only the heart of Phaedo's Socratic thought but a sort of common denominator for all of Socrates' followers.²² Giannantoni admits that the topics of the ἐγκράτεια (“self-restraint”) and the θεραπεία τῆς ψυχῆς (“therapy of the soul”) were themes common to the whole Socratic circle.²³

This hypothesis is backed by two passages by Julian and Seneca which clearly refer to the therapeutic activity of philosophy and its moral liberation. Both passages seem to be linked to Phaedo's manumission:

You have heard tell of the famous Phaedo of Elis, and you know his story. However, if you do not know it, study it more carefully, but at any rate I will tell you this part. He thought that there is nothing that cannot be cured by philosophy, and that by her all men can be purified from all their modes of life, their habits, desires, in a word from everything of the sort. If indeed she only availed those who are well born and well bred there would be

22 Rossetti 1974, 150 writes: “Thus we are able to point out that the idea of a *therapeia* of souls was actually the core of Phaedo's Socraticism”; “we find definite evidence to assert that the idea of a therapeutic dimension of the *epiméleia tēs psychês* was very widespread among almost all the Socratics (only Euclides seems to remain completely silent on the topic): it was thus a common inheritance from Socrates.”

23 Giannantoni 1990, 127. See Brancacci 2005, 101–104, 146–149. For the concept of ἐγκράτεια, see also Urstad (in this volume).

nothing marvelous about philosophy; but if she can lead up to the light men so greatly depraved, then I consider her marvelous beyond anything.

JULIAN. *Ep.* 82, 445 a = SSR III A 2 (tr. W. CAVE WRIGHT)

Phaedo says: certain tiny animals do not leave any pain when they sting us; so subtle is their power, so deceptive for purposes of harm. The bite is disclosed by a swelling, and even in the swelling there is no visible wound. That will also be your experience when dealing with wise men: you will not discover how or when the benefit comes to you, but you will discover that you have received it.

SEN. *Ep.* 94.41 = SSR III A 12 (tr. R.M. GUMMERE)

3 The Dialogues *Zopyrus* and *Simon*

Zopyrus and *Simon*, the only dialogues (διάλογοι) that Diogenes Laertius' catalogue rates as among the authentic works (γνησίοι) by Phaedo²⁴—and to which the two aforementioned quotations should be attributed (von Fritz 1938), even if there are no convincing reasons to assign them to one or another²⁵—probably treated the same topics of appetite-control and the distrust of the senses. Sufficiently prepared for philosophy and for talk with Socrates, Phaedo was even ready to write his dialogues, still in circulation during the fifth century CE²⁶ and famous for being “very elegant” (*admodum elegantes*).²⁷

Zopyrus, just like *Physiognomicus* by Antisthenes, must have dealt with Socrates' renowned strangeness (ἄτοπία),²⁸ that is, the disconcerting contrast between Socrates' unpleasant physical appearance and the beauty of his soul and his talks.²⁹ Having come from the East into Athens, *Zopyrus*, probably

24 DL 2.105 distinguishes the authentic dialogues (Ζώπυρος, Σίμων) from those whose authenticity was contested (δισταζόμενοι): Νικίας, Μήδιος, Ἀντίμαχος ἢ Πρεσβύτας.

25 For this reason, Rossetti 1977, 128–132, considers the two fragments “incertae sedis.”

26 Cicero (*Nat. D.* 1.93) could have read *Zopyrus*; Seneca, Theon of Smyrna, and Julian could make literal citations from Phaedo; Plutarch and Synesius seem to have had a precise idea of the *Simon* plot.

27 Likewise Gell. *NA* 2.18 defines Phaedo's works as those of a “philosophus illustris”. Robin 1978, XI, gives a derogatory interpretation to the expression, translating *admodum elegantes* with “élégance maniérée”.

28 See Stavru 2011, 99–130.

29 The missing texts in SSR are printed *in extensor* by Rossetti 1980, 184–192.

belonging to the Persian nobility,³⁰ meets Socrates for the first time and on observing his bull neck, declares that he is a stupid (*stupidus*) and obtuse person. Further, because of his bulging eyes, he should be inclined toward women (*mulierosus*).³¹ These remarks cause bewilderment and hilarity among the bystanders, Alcibiades in particular.³² Unexpectedly, Socrates himself intervenes to calm them, declaring that he was born with the aforementioned vices, but that he managed to break free from them thanks to the exercise of reason.³³

It seems probable that, from its initial contrast between external ugliness and seductive internal beauty, the conversation would have moved towards an educative horizon, where reason would be shown capable of dominating the most rebellious personalities and passionate tempers, even those of a feral or wild nature. I think this is the meaning of the fragment that reaches us from Theon of Smyrna, in which somebody, maybe Zopyrus himself, tells Socrates a tale about a lion cub:

It is said, Socrates, that a lion cub grew fond of the younger son of the king [of Persia] ... And it occurs to me that the lion, bred with the child, accompanied him wherever he went [even] when the child became a boy; in fact, the Persians said that the lion was in love with him.

THEON. *progymn.* 3 (= SSR III A 11)

-
- 30 No information is available regarding the figure of Zopyrus and, therefore, it is only possible to make conjectures. Herodotus (3.160) speaks of a famous Persian man called Zopyrus and underlines that his homonymous nephew ran away from Persia to Athens. In Pl. *Alc.* 122b1–2, Socrates speaks of a Zopyrus as the *paidagogos* of Alcibiades. Foerster 1893, vii–xii, finds probable the identification of Zopyrus with the wizard of Syria who, according to Aristotle (DL 2.45), predicted a violent death for Socrates. Wilamowitz 1879, 187–189 and 476–477, thinks that the physiognomist was Phaedo's invention; Kahn 2008, 18 n. 18, agrees.
- 31 *Mulierosus* in Cic. *Fat.* 5.10; *libidinosus* in Σ ad Pers.; ὁμιῶντα παιδεαστοῦ in Cassian. *Conlat.* 13, 5, 3.
- 32 The joke about *mulierosus* probably concerns Socrates' attitude towards homosexuality—a fact Alcibiades knows very well, given his relationship with Socrates.
- 33 With *Zopyrus*, more than with Antisthenes' *Physiognomicus*, ancient physiognomic tradition about Socrates was born, as Giannantoni 1990, 125, claims, following Guthrie 1969, 397–398; Rossetti 1973, 371–372; and Toole 1974–1975, 303–317, who think that in the *Zopyrus* we have the first occurrence of the theme of Socrates' outward appearance, taken up by Plato in the *Symposium* and the *Theaetetus* but absent in his purportedly earlier dialogues. Actually, the only passage with an explicit reference to Socrates' "ugliness" is Pl. *Tht.* 143e. Cf. Stavru 2011, 110.

Rossetti (1977, 146) treats the fragment as an example of the typical confrontation between Greek *paideia*—or more specifically the Socratic variety—and that of the Eastern sages. In my opinion, however, what we have here is an argument which deduces facts about human training from examples in the animal kingdom: the value of exercise and training is recognized even where nature seems to oppose an indomitable force.

Phaedo's second dialogue, *Simon*, contains no fewer interpretative difficulties. Here Phaedo depicts Socrates conversing with a cobbler with whom he regularly met and held long talks. Wilamowitz (1879, 187–193) tried to reconstruct this dialogue assuming that the *Socratic Epistles* 12 and 13 were based on it. *Epistle* 12 was purportedly sent by Simon the Shoemaker to Aristippus; *Epistle* 13 is Aristippus' response to it. In *Epistle* 12 Simon rebukes Aristippus for making fun of his life as a shoemaker:

I hear that you ridicule our wisdom in the presence of Dionysius. I admit that I am a shoemaker and that I do work of that nature, and in like manner I would, if it were necessary, cut straps once more for the purpose of admonishing foolish men who think that they are living according to the teaching of Socrates, when they are living in great luxury. Antisthenes shall will be the chastiser of your foolish jests. For you are writing him letters which make fun of our way of life. But let what I have said to you in jest suffice. At any rate, remember hunger and thirst, for these are worth much to those who pursue self-control.

Soc. Ep. 12 (= SSR III A 16, tr. SELLARS 2001, 269)

Thus, Simon proudly admits to being a cobbler (στυτοτόμος), declares his dedication to wisdom (σοφία), and yells at Aristippus to remember that the only means to temperance (σωφροσύνη) are sobriety, hunger, and thirst—but not luxury. In *Epistle* 13 Aristippus begins his reply to Simon:

I do not ridicule you, but rather Phaedo, when he said that you are more excellent and wiser than Prodicus of Ceos (famous for his σοφία),³⁴ who said that you refuted him with regard to his *Encomium to Heracles*. No, I do admire and praise you, since, though you are but a shoemaker, you are filled with wisdom and used to persuade Socrates and the most handsome and noble youths to sit with you; youths such as Alcibiades, son of Clinias,

34 Ar. *Nub.* 361 and Pl. *Prt.* 315e.

Phaedrus the Myrrhinean, and Euthydemus, son of Glaucon. Also, of the men of public affairs, Epicrates, Sacesphorus, Euryptolemus, and others.

Soc. Ep. 13 (= *SSR* IV A 224, tr. SELLARS 2001, 269)

Aristippus concludes that Simon should give credit to the respect and friendship he himself shows, and should distrust Antisthenes, who walks barefoot, inviting the others doing the same, wearing long and dirty beard and carrying a stick, with nits and long nails, like animals (13.1).

If it is true that the author of the two epistles knew Phaedo's dialogues and was influenced by them, as Wilamowitz claims, the figure of Simon depicted by Phaedo would represent an intermediate position between Antisthenes' rigorist cynicism (see Sellars 2001) and Aristippus' hedonistic stance. It is all too clear the stance for which Simon has a proclivity when he states that he is happy to cut leather straps "for admonishing foolish men who think that they are living according to the teaching of Socrates when they are living in great luxury" (*SSR* III A 16). In fact, according to the Cynics, Simon the Shoemaker was endowed with two qualities which would distinguish the ideal philosopher: self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) and freedom of speech (παρρησία). Moreover, they claim that Simon was the most authentic follower of the Socratic philosophy. Therefore, by taking Simon as a sort of bridge between their philosophy and the Socratic one, and as imbued with the two above-mentioned qualities, the Cynics assume that Socrates himself possessed those qualities and was, in fact, the "first dog" (see Sellars 2001, 262–264).

Of course, there is the chance that the two letters refer to the dialogues written by Simon himself, the ones Diogenes Laertius³⁵ calls "cobblers' tales" (σκυτικοὶ λόγοι). But this hypothesis seems quite improbable. The only thing we know about these works is that they were written by the shoemaker; we do not know whether he featured as a character in them.³⁶ As for the historical existence of Simon the shoemaker, it is difficult if not impossible to give an opinion. Should it be true that Xenophon and Plato's silence does not prove that he was an invention,³⁷ it is also true that the circumstantial evidence for his existence, such as Antisthenes' presumed mention of him in his *Heracles*³⁸

35 DL 2.122 lists thirty-three dialogues collected in one book. Sellars 2003, 207–209, offers a useful overview of the questions around Simon and his "leathern dialogues."

36 Giannantoni 1990, 120. On Antisthenes' ethics see now Brancacci 2015.

37 Hock 1976, 41–53, who supports Hirzel 1895, 102–104 and Hobein 1927; they assume that Simon is an historical character who actually existed.

38 As Dummmler 1882, 37 n. 1, had supposed. On Antisthenes' *Heracles*, see Brancacci 2015, 53–55.

and the discovery in the Athenian *agora* of what may be a cobbler's shop with a cup inscribed "Simonos,"³⁹ does not prevent Simon from being a mere literary creation of Phaedo (Wilamowitz 1879, 187–193; Humbert 1967, 280; Kahn 2008, 18). Phaedo, at any rate, has surely shaped his historical or invented figure for philosophical purposes (Giannantoni 1990, 124).

4 Conclusion

We know nothing about the most specific aspects of Phaedo's philosophy; furthermore, the assignment to Phaedo of a doctrine similar to the Megarians' and characterized by a particular propensity for the dialectics (Humbert 1967, 280), probably dependent on a fragment of Timon (DL 2.107), is not convincing. The attribution of "dialectics" comes from a pun: Phaedo's name resembles the verb φλέδων—"to have a big mouth." More probable is Themistius' claim (*Or.* 34.5) that Phaedo's λόγοι Σωκρατικοί simply concerned ethical matters (*ta êthika*). This Phaedo, interested in moral problems, revived the person who had defined their horizon better than anybody else: Socrates.

References

- Boys-Stones, G.R. 'Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the soul', *Phronesis* 49 (2004), 1–23.
 Brancacci, A. *Antisthène: Le discours propre*, Paris 2005.
 Brancacci, A. 'The Socratic profile of Antisthenes' ethics', in: Zilioli 2015, 43–60.
 Burnet, J. *Plato: Phaedo*. Oxford 1911.
 Cantarella, E. *Secondo natura: la bisessualità nel mondo antico*. Milano 2006.
 D'Annunzio, G. *Prose scelte: le vergini delle Rocce*. Firenze 1995.
 Dixsaut, M. *Platon: Phédon*. Paris 1991.
 Dover, K.J. *Greek Homosexuality*. London 1978.
 Dümmler, F. *Antisthenica*. Halle 1882.
 Dušanić, S. 'Phaedo's enslavement and liberation', *ICS* 19 (1993), 83–97.

39 Thompson 1954, 54–55, reports on the excavation where a sufficient number of nails were found to justify the hypothesis that the building was occupied by a shoemaker. Perhaps it is his name that was found carved in the genitive, ΣΙΜΟΝΟΣ, with the kind of letters dating back to the fourth century, on the broken base of a cup, in the excavation area. In a more complete publication, Thompson 1960, 234–240, is more but not certainly convinced that the cup had been broken in the house.

- Fairweather, J.A. 'Fiction in the biographies of ancient writers', *Ancient Society* 5 (1974), 231–275.
- Foerster, R. *Scriptores physiognomonici Graeci et Latini*. Leipzig 1893.
- Fritz, K. von. 'Phaidon von Elis und der 12 und 13: Sokratikerbrief', *Philologus* 90 (1935), 240–244.
- Fritz, K. von. 'Phaidon' (3), in: *R.E.* 19.2 (1938), 1538–1542.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, 1–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Gigon, O. 'Antike Erzählungen über die Berufung zur Philosophie', *MH* 3 (1946), 1–21.
- Gomperz, T. *Griechische Denker*, 1–III. Leipzig 1909.
- Grande, C. del. *Hybris: colpa e castigo nell'espressione letteraria degli scrittori della Grecia antica: da Omero a Cleante*. Napoli 1947.
- Grote, G. *Plato and the other companions of Socrates*. London 1888.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *A history of Greek philosophy*, III: *The fifth-century enlightenment*. Cambridge 1969.
- Hirzel, R. *Der Dialog: ein literarhistorischer Versuch*. Leipzig 1895.
- Hobein, H. 'Simon' (6), in: *RE* III/1 (1927), coll. 163–173.
- Hock, R.F. 'Simon the shoemaker as an ideal Cynic', *GRBS* 17 (1976), 41–53.
- Humbert, J. *Socrate et les petis socratiques*. Paris 1967.
- Kahn, C.H. *Platone e il dialogo socratico*. Milano 2008.
- McQueen, E.L., and C.J. Rowe. 'Phaedo, Socrates and the chronology of the Spartan war with Elis', *Méthexis* 2 (1989), 1–18.
- Montuori, M. *Socrate: un problema storico*. Napoli 1984.
- Montuori, M. 'Su Fedone di Elide', *AAP* 25 (1976), 27–40.
- Montuori, M. 'Nota su Fedone di Elide e S. Kenneth Dover', *Corolla Londoniensis* 2 (1982), 119–122.
- Nails, D. *The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics*. Cambridge 2002.
- Parmentier, L. 'L'age de Phédon d'Elis', *BAGB* 10 (1926), 22–24.
- Preller, L. 'Phädon's Lebensschicksale und Schriften', *RhM* 4 (1846), 391–399.
- Reale, G. *Storia della filosofia antica*, 1. Milano 1996.
- Robin, L. *Platon: Phédon*. Paris 1970.
- Rossetti, L. 'Socratica in Fedone di Elide', *StudUrb(B)* 47 (1973), 364–381.
- Rossetti, L. 'Therapeia in the Minor Socratics', *Theta Pi* 3 (1974), 145–157.
- Rossetti, L. *Aspetti della letteratura socratica antica*. Chieti 1977.
- Rossetti, L. 'Ricerche sui "Dialoghi Socratici" di Fedone di Elide', *Hermes* 108 (1980), 183–200.
- Rossetti, L. 'Phaedo's *Zopyrus* (and Socrates' Confidences)', in: Zilioli 2015, 82–98.
- Sarri, F. *Socrate e la genesi storica dell'idea occidentale di anima*, II. Roma 1975.
- Sellars, J. 'Socraticorum Maximus: Simon the shoemaker and the problem of Socrates', *Plí* 11 (2001), 253–269.

- Sellars, J. 'Simon the shoemaker and the problem of Socrates', *CPh* 98 (2003), 207–216.
- Stavru, A. *Il potere dell'apparenza: percorso storico-critico nell'estetica antica*. Napoli 2011.
- Thompson, D.B. 'The house of Simon the shoemaker', *Archaeology* 13 (1960), 234–240.
- Thompson, H. 'Excavation in the Athenian agora: 1953', *Hesperia* 23 (1954), 54–55.
- Toole, H. 'A quel Socratique doit-on attribuer la laideur de Socrate?', *Athena* 75 (1975), 303–331.
- Valgimigli, M. *Platone: Fedone*. Roma 2000.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von. 'Phaidon von Elis', *Hermes* 14 (1879), 187–193.
- Zilioli, U. *From the Socratics to the Socratic schools*. London 2015.

PART 3

Plato



Plato and the Socratics

*Luc Brisson**

CNRS

Socrates was an unfamiliar character who gathered around himself a diverse group of individuals fascinated by his personality and his beliefs. After his death, what Plato considered the event marking the birth of what he would call “philosophy,” these individuals adopted quite disparate theoretical positions. Socrates’ primary direct “biographers,” Xenophon and Plato, gave contrasting images of him.¹ After drawing out Plato’s rivalry with Xenophon, I will concentrate on what we can learn from the ancient testimonies concerning Plato’s attitudes toward all the other “Socratics.”² This chapter is motivated by the following goal: to take the explicit or implicit relationships that Plato presents in his work as having with fellow members of the Socratic circle, and to compare them with testimony from both Xenophon and the Hellenistic biographical tradition. The testimony of Xenophon is not on the same intellectual level as Plato’s, and the subsequent biographical tradition invented personal relations between Plato and other Socratics, illustrating often specious doctrinal oppositions by means of anecdotes invented for this purpose or already associated with other persons. Nevertheless, this information, whose ideological content has profoundly influenced modern and contemporary history of philosophy, should be taken into account. By going at it this way, we can better judge Plato’s testimony about the other Socratics.

The most straightforward information about the Socratics comes from Diogenes Laertius, who writes:

Of those who succeeded him and were called Socratics the chief were Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and of ten names on the traditional list the most distinguished are Aeschines, Phaedo, Euclides, Aristippus. I must first speak of Xenophon; Antisthenes will come afterwards among the Cynics; after Xenophon I shall take the Socratics proper, and so pass on

* I thank Christopher Moore for translating this article from French into English and whose many comments allowed me to improve it. I also thank Louis-André Dorion for benefiting me by his knowledge of Socrates and Xenophon. Throughout this paper I have cited only the most recent literature that also itself contains further relevant bibliography.

1 On this issue see now Dorion 2004 and 2013.

2 For the texts, SSR; for commentary, Döring 1998.

to Plato. With Plato the ten schools begin: he was himself the founder of the First Academy. This then is the order which I shall follow.³

DL 2.47

I will follow this order in the main, speaking first about Xenophon, then about the members of the Socratic circle who did not found a proper school, and finally about the three schools that claimed to rely on Socrates: the Cynics in the wake of Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope; the Megarians with Euclides; and the Cyrenaics with Aristippus. At Diogenes Laertius' time, biographers would illustrate the doctrines and character of philosophers with the help of anecdotes, most of which could be used for various people in various circumstances.⁴ Despite their sometimes free-floating use, these anecdotes refer to real debates between Plato and the schools of the Cynics, the Cyrenaics, and the Megarians. In Plato's dialogues we can find shards of these debates, and trace them back to Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Euclides.

1 Xenophon

Plato and Xenophon⁵ seem each to have known Socrates for around ten years, though we cannot make the span of time more precise. Xenophon, who records the words and deeds of Socrates not only to defend him against the accusations brought against him during the trial but also, in so doing, to preserve them for posterity,⁶ depicts a Socrates characterized by three virtues important in his own conception of the complete moral life: self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια), endurance (καρτερία), and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια). Of these three virtues, it is self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) that holds first place, because it is a divine attribute. Divinity, which has need of nothing, has in effect neither to practice self-mastery nor to prove its endurance; therefore, self-sufficiency ought to be taken as assimilation to divinity.⁷

Plato, who is present during the trial of Socrates (*Ap.* 34a3), but who acknowledges his own absence when Socrates drank the hemlock (*Phd.* 59b), gives to Socrates the image of the educator *par excellence*, insisting on his wis-

3 Translations of Diogenes Laertius from R.D. Hick's 1925 Loeb Classical Library edition.

4 For a collection of these anecdotes, see Swift-Riginos 1976.

5 For an overview and bibliography see Döring 1998, 182–200.

6 *Mem.* 1.3.1; 4.1.1.

7 See Xen. *Mem.* 1.6., esp. 1.6.10. The theme of assimilation to god is very important to Plato's Socrates.

dom (σοφία) and opposing with it the accusation brought against him during the trial, that he corrupts the youth. But Socrates reiterates that he has no knowledge. How then to resolve this contradiction, that of an educator who avows ignorance? Plato's answer is for us to consider knowledge no longer as a set of values and practices transmissible by means of payment, but as something concealed in one's soul, albeit forgotten once it enters an earthly body. The work of the master consists therefore in making the soul of his interlocutor remember what it knows by means of dialogue, which takes the form of *elenchus*. The *elenchus* has two faces: first, it makes the interlocutor conscious of his ignorance; and second, in order to free him of the shame provoked by the recognition of his ignorance, it helps him remember the knowledge concealed in his soul.

Thus Socrates, the "midwife" of souls, appears in several of the dialogues as defending two counter-intuitive Platonic assumptions: the independence of soul from the body, and the existence of intelligible realities separated from the sensible things that participate in them as images do in their models. Plato's attribution of these presuppositions to Socrates is not obvious to all, and was not already in Antiquity, as this anecdote illustrates:

This is why Socrates in the presence of many witnesses (πλειόνων παρόντων) described a dream he had and offered a rather amusing conjecture about him [Plato]. "Because I imagined," he said, "that Plato had turned into a crow (χορώνη),⁸ and had hopped up on top of my head, and was pecking at my bald-spot and looking in all directions and cawing. So I suspect, Plato, that you're going to bury me in lies!"⁹

ATH. 11.507c-d

This is why it is important to compare Plato's testimony about Socrates with Xenophon's, especially since the ancient tradition insists on a rivalry between them.

The most complete testimony to the rivalry between Xenophon¹⁰ and Plato is found in Aulus Gellius (c. 130 CE), who dealt with it in a chapter of his *Attic Nights* (Gell. NA 14.3). In the second century CE, there were *Lives* of Xenophon and of Plato written by authors who knew neither Xenophon nor

8 The crow is consecrated to Apollo, as is the swan. The anecdote according to which the swan intervenes in the first meeting of Socrates and Plato is reported by DL 3.5.

9 Translations of Athenaeus from S. Douglas Olson's 2007–2012 Loeb Classical Library edition.

10 See now Dorion 2000–2011, which holds a wealth of information, as well as Dorion 2013.

Plato personally. They had to make conjectures based on facts inferred from their writings (14.3.1), and Aulus Gellius was dependent on these *Lives*. These authors observed that neither Xenophon nor Plato refer to one another in their works (14.3.2), while competing on the question of education; thus these authors imagined that Plato circulated two books of his *Republic*, and, after having read them, Xenophon wrote his *Cyropedia* to mark his opposition to them (14.3.3). In any case, in his *Laws* (3.694c–695c) Plato is very tough on Cyrus' education. He thinks that his education is an education in softness, taught to him by women in the absence of men occupied in fighting a war.¹¹ According to Aulus Gellius (14.3.4), this was Plato's reaction to Xenophon's critiques of his *Republic*. Both interpretations suggest that Aulus Gellius means the second and third books of the *Republic*, which deal with education. Louis-André Dorion and Gabriel Danzig doubt the existence of a debate between Plato and Xenophon on the question of the education given to Cyrus, noting that it was a highly debated theme during that time: Antisthenes, for instance, wrote much about Cyrus.¹² We ought therefore be careful when dealing with the rivalry between Plato and Xenophon, lacking, as we do, direct evidence.

Finally, certain authors observed that Xenophon never has Socrates discuss astronomy, physics, or mathematics, attributing to him the belief that these studies contribute neither to wisdom nor to happiness. In Plato, by contrast, notably in the *Republic*, Socrates speaks about physics, music, and geometry (14.3.5). This proves, they thought, that Plato gives a distorted picture of Socrates.

A century later, Diogenes Laertius (c. 250 CE) seems to follow the same tradition, but provides more information:

And it seems that Xenophon was not on good terms with him. At any rate, they have written similar narratives as if out of rivalry with each other, a *Symposium*, a *Defense of Socrates*, and their moral treatises or *Memorabilia*. Next, the one wrote a *Republic*, the other a *Cyropaedia*. And in the *Laws* Plato declares the story of the education of Cyrus to be a fiction, for that Cyrus did not answer to the description of him. And although both make mention of Socrates, neither of them refers to the other, except that Xenophon mentions Plato in the third book of his *Memorabilia*.

DL 3.34

11 Dorion 2003; Danzig 2002.

12 See DL 6.2, 16, 18, as well as Giannantoni (SSR IV, n. 32); Goulet-Cazé 1986, 32, n. 51 and 46, n. 99; Dorion 2013, 411.

This report again suggests an intense competition between two contemporaneous Athenian authors who seem almost pointedly to ignore one another.

In his *Learned Banqueters* (11.504e–505b), Athenaeus (c. 170 CE) appears inspired by the same source. He also notes that the two authors wrote on similar themes. He adds that in the *Meno*, Plato opposed himself to the depiction of Meno drawn in the *Anabasis* (2.5.28 and 2.6.21–29). Marcellinus, in his *Life of Thucydides* (27), claims that Xenophon blamed Meno out of his envy toward Plato. Moreover, Xenophon tells an anecdote involving Socrates and Plato's brother Glaucon, an impetuous and ambitious young man (*Resp.* 2.357a and 8.548d):

Ariston's son, Glaucon, was attempting to become an orator and striving for headship in the state, though he was less than twenty years old; and none of his friends or relations could check him, though he would get himself dragged from the platform and make himself a laughing-stock. Only Socrates, who took an interest in him for the sake of Plato and Glaucon's son Charmides,¹³ managed to check him.¹⁴

XEN. *Mem.* 3.6.1

This anecdote is apparently directed against Plato, who fails to bring his own brother Glaucon to his senses. We might note that according to Plato it is Alcibiades (*Alc.* 123c)—about the same age as Charmides, the brother of the mother of Plato, and therefore the maternal uncle of both Glaucon and Plato—whom Socrates tries to dissuade from politics; in Xenophon, it is a certain Euthydemus (4.2.1) whom Socrates seeks to dissuade from politics.¹⁵

Let us add to these testimonies passages from (clearly inauthentic) letters. In one letter addressed to Aeschines, Xenophon reproaches Plato for his fondness for Pythagoreans and Egyptians.¹⁶ In another, Xenophon reproaches Plato for having given a distorted image of Socrates.¹⁷ This record seems to have been fabricated by scholars who read the works of these two great authors and noticed that they wrote on the same topics without citing each other. In the absence of totally reliable direct evidence, we can know neither whether Xenophon and Plato knew each well nor whether they were in competition.

13 This is Glaucon III; see Nails 2002.

14 Translations of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* from E.C. Marchant's 1923 Loeb Classical Library edition.

15 On the question of the identity of this Euthydemus, see the long note by Dorion 2011, 65–67.

16 See Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 14.12; Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 2.24.

17 *Soc. Ep.* 15.

2 Those Who Did Not Found a School

I pass now to all those who play a part in the Socratic circle and are cited in one way or another by Plato and Xenophon. Xenophon, after having explained that Critias and Alcibiades turned out badly¹⁸ once they left Socrates (*Mem.* 1.2.12–26), gives this list of those close to him:

But Crito was a true associate of Socrates, as were Chaerephon, Cherecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondes, and others. Of these not one, in his youth or old age, did evil or incurred censure.

XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.48

Let us look at these men and relationships in detail.

2.1 *Those Who Engage in Politics: Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides*

Plato and Xenophon take effort to defuse the accusation leveled at Socrates, that he corrupted the youth, in his trial of 399. We have good reason to believe that this trial was instigated to punish Socrates, despite the amnesty law of 403, for the relationships he had with the political men held responsible for the Athenian disaster: Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides.

In the *Apology*, Plato brings up two waves of accusations: the ancient accusations, corresponding to those brought up by Aristophanes in the *Clouds*, and the present accusations, those of Anytus, Lycon, and Meletus, which accuse Socrates of having corrupted the youth. Even if they could not be proven, these latter accusations, to which Callicles alludes in the *Gorgias*, and which Anytus addresses to Socrates in the *Meno*, had the benefit of plausibility. In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon dedicates thirty-five paragraphs (*Mem.* 1.2.12–47) to acquitting Socrates of the accusation that he was the evil genius behind Critias and Alcibiades.¹⁹ Rightly or wrongly, Socrates was seen as the mastermind of the politicians whose actions undermined not only the power of the democracy but perhaps even the very foundations of the city.

After having met in Sicily with unprecedented disaster, for which Alcibiades was held largely responsible, Athens, put under a severe blockade, was decisively defeated by Sparta in 404. Peace was arranged, and the Long Walls were razed. Only twelve triremes remained. Theramenes wished to resume his plan

¹⁸ I note that Charmides is not mentioned here; we learn later that Socrates encourages him to engage in politics (*Mem.* 3.7.1–3).

¹⁹ See Dorion 2004b, 27–30 (“The asymmetry between Charmides and Critias”).

for a moderate constitution. But he was stopped by a group of extremists, which included Charmides, the maternal uncle of Plato, and who entered Athens with the Spartans. Their leader, Critias, a relative of Plato's, who like Charmides belonged to Socrates' circle, appealed to Lysander, the general who defeated the Athenians. In his presence, Critias had the Assembly vote into power a constitutional commission of thirty. Having installed a garrison of seven hundred Spartans on the Acropolis, Critias' men unleashed their proscriptions. After having attacked only the sycophants or the demagogues whose fate little interested public opinion, these proscriptions grew widespread: potential political opponents were eliminated, old scores were settled, and as there was no money, the fortunes of rich metics were seized.

Many citizens fled. A rupture came between Theramenes and Critias, who won the condemnation to death of his rival. Theramenes had to drink hemlock. But Lysander's influence waned and the exiles, whose numbers grew, regrouped. One of them, Thrasybulus, came with seventy men to seize Phyle, on the southern foothills of Mt. Parnitha. They could not be dislodged, and their numbers increased. When they grew to a thousand, they marched on the Piraeus. The battle began at the top of Munychia. Thrasybulus won this battle in the streets; Critias and Charmides were killed. Guerillas were installed between Piraeus and Athens. The oligarchs saw no more salvation in Sparta which, for various reasons, judged it fit to negotiate with the democrats. At the end of 403, an amnesty was proclaimed, from which were excluded the survivors of the Thirty. After a solemn sacrifice on the Acropolis, Thrasybulus exhorted the city to harmony and democratic institutions were put in place. But Athens was livid: to the innumerable deaths of the last campaigns, which had the highest mortality of the entire war, and to the naval victims of the blockade, were now added the victims of the Thirty, between fifteen- and twenty-five hundred, according to various sources.

In this context, a judge who did not interpret Socrates' behavior positively—as Plato and Xenophon did—could therefore more or less consciously express a radical rejection of all that had passed, especially toward a man who quite imperturbably continued his attack against the values of a city that had suffered so much. A resentment could have been particularly strong in a man like Anytus toward someone taken to be the inspiration of the actions of individuals as questionable as Alcibiades and as dangerous as Charmides and Critias, responsible for the misfortune and death of so many democrats.

All told, Socrates had in his circle men of politics whose actions harmed the city, and the trial brought against him in 399 was the consequence.

2.2 *The Others*

Most of the other members of Socrates' circle were ordinary citizens, attracted to a person with uncommonly original behavior and speech. Many of these people seem to have tried to imitate Socrates, including in dress. It is hard to know whether these were "fanatics," that is to say, "groupies," or rather followers who wanted to imitate their master as an exemplar of virtue, self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια), endurance (καρτερία), and self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια).

Moreover, the question arises whether there were erotic relations linking these young men to Socrates. At the end of the *Symposium* we find Alcibiades' provocative speech:

Well, this is my praise of Socrates, though I haven't spared him my reproach, either; I told you how horribly he treated me—and not only he but also Charmides, Euthydemus, and many others. He has deceived us all: he presents himself as your lover (as ἐραστής), and, before you know it, you're in love with him (as παιδικά) yourself! I warn you, Agathon, don't let him fool you! Remember our torments: don't wait, like the fool in the proverb, to learn your lesson from your misfortune.²⁰

PL. *Symp.* 222a–b

In the dialogue that bears his name, Charmides, who has for his maternal uncle the Critias who was one of the Thirty Tyrants, is described as a young man of dazzling beauty (154a–155e).²¹ In the beginning of the *Charmides*, Socrates, excited by Charmides' beauty, demonstrates his remarkable moderation (σωφροσύνη). Furthermore, Euthydemus—who in this passage is not the sophist who gave his name to another Platonic dialogue but the young aristocrat loved by Critias, and featured in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*—was also a great beauty (*Mem.* 1.2.29, 4.2.1). Alcibiades uses here the vocabulary of *paiderastia*, where a young man would become the beloved of an adult who was his lover and would thus await riches, power, or knowledge. In reversing the roles, since it is the young Alcibiades, Charmides, and Euthydemus, among others, who are the lovers, Socrates seeks to show that he is opposed to the quasi-institution that was *paiderastia*. Such at least was Plato's and Xenophon's point of view.

20 All translations of Plato from John Cooper, ed., *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis, 1997).

21 See also Xen. *Mem.* 3.7 and *Symp.* 3.9.

2.2.1 Chaerephon and Cherecrates

Cherecrates was Chaerephon's younger brother.²² Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.3.1–19) reports a discussion that Socrates had to put an end to a quarrel between them.

A childhood friend of Socrates', Chaerephon features in the *Clouds* (144–164), where he appears as a sort of “assistant” to Socrates. When hinting at Chaerephon's appearance, Aristophanes compares him to a “bat,” itself assimilated in the *Odyssey* (24.6) to a phantom (see *Av.* 1564, *Vesp.* 1408–1413). Chaerephon has an impetuous spirit (as we also see in *Xen. Ap.* 14). At the beginning of the *Charmides*, Plato describes the way he welcomed Socrates on his return from the siege of Potidaea:

When they saw me coming in [to the palaestra of Taureas] unexpectedly, I was immediately hailed at a distance by people coming up from all directions, and Chaerephon, like the wild man (μᾶνικός) he is, sprang up from the midst of a group of people and ran towards me and, seizing me by the hand, exclaimed, “Socrates! how did you come off in the battle?”

PL. *Chrm.* 153b

In the *Gorgias*, Chaerephon speaks rather little. But we might note that Callicles asks him a question: “Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates serious? Is he joking?” (481b). This shows the closeness of his relationship with Socrates.

In the *Apology*, Plato reports what Socrates is supposed to have said, during his trial, about the oracle that would determine his mode of life:

You know Chaerephon. He was my friend from youth, and the friend of most of you, as he shared your exile and your return. You surely know the kind of man he was, how impulsive (σφοδρός) in any course of action. He went to Delphi at one time and ventured to ask the oracle—as I say, gentlemen, do not create a disturbance—he asked if any man was wiser than I, and the Pythian replied that no one was wiser. Chaerephon is dead, but his brother [Cherecrates] will testify to you about this.²³

PL. *Ap.* 21a

This testimony is very rich in information. Already dead by 399, Chaerephon was a democrat who had to flee the regime instituted by Critias and Charmides

²² Brisson 1994: on Chaerephon, 304–305; on Cherecrates, 283; but now, Moore 2013.

²³ In Xenophon (*Ap.* 14), Socrates recalls that the Pythia answered Chaerephon that nobody was more free, more just, or more prudent than him. This suggests that Plato privileged *sophia*.

in particular, which shows that Socrates' circle had diverse political orientations; moreover, Chaerephon seems to have admired Socrates' knowledge so much as to ask the Delphic oracle about it.

2.2.2 Crito and Critobulus

In Plato's *Apology* (33d–e), Socrates says of Crito that he is of the same age and from the same deme as him, and he recalls that they have been friends since childhood. This means that Crito was born around 470, and that he was from the deme Alopece. With a wife of greatest nobility (*Euthyd.* 306e) Crito had two sons whose names Diogenes Laertius claims to know: Clinias²⁴ and Critobulus.²⁵

With Crito and Critobulus there came to the trial a group of citizens that we might consider the faithful: Lysanias of Sphettos, the father of Aeschines; Antiphon of Cephise, the father of Epigenes; Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides and the brother of Theodotus; Paralius, the son of Demodocus and brother of Theages; Adeimantus; and Acontidorus (*Ap.* 33e–34a). We find some familiar figures in this group: Aeschines and his father; the father of Epigenes who is present at the death of Socrates; Paralius, the family son of Demodocus and the brother of Theages, who gives his name to an inauthentic dialogue; Acontidorus the brother of Apollodorus; and Adeimantus the brother of Glaucon and Plato. Nicostratus, the son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus, is unknown.²⁶

Plato and the Socratic tradition present Crito as a rich man (*Apol.* 33e; *Cri.* 44b), willing to give financial help not only to his friends (*DL* 2.20, 31, 105, 121) but also to Archdemus, to protect him against attacks by sycophants (*Mem.* 2.9.1–8). With his son Critobulus, Crito is present at the death of Socrates (*Phd.* 59b–c). He deals with all the practical matters. Crito asks his servants to take home Socrates' wife, Xanthippe, and his children (*Phd.* 60a–b). Plato depicts Crito as the representative of the opinion of the many, as one who does not understand the content of the discussions Socrates characteristically holds.

After having given some biographical information about him, Diogenes Laertius tells us that Crito wrote seventeen dialogues collected in a single volume (ἐν ἐνὶ βιβλίῳ, 2.121). This expression can mean, it seems, that those seventeen dialogues were copied on a single roll of papyrus and that there-

24 Clinias III, for which see Nails 2002, 100–101.

25 Brisson 1994, 522–526 for Crito; and 520–521 for Critobulus.

26 See Nails 2002, 283–284.

fore they were not very long. Then he gives us the titles of these dialogues, which very probably were written by someone else, and then attributed to Crito.

2.2.3 Apollodorus, Aeantodorus, and Aristodemus

Apollodorus, of the deme Phalerus (*Symp.* 172a), narrates the *Symposium*; he is between twenty and thirty.²⁷ Apollodorus tries to imitate Socrates' way of talking and acting (*Symp.* 172c–173b). The judgment of an anonymous interlocutor is not very complimentary:

You'll never change, Apollodorus! Always nagging, even at yourself! I do believe you think everybody—yourself first of all—is totally worthless, except, of course, Socrates. I don't know exactly how you came to be called “the maniac” (μανικός), but you certainly talk like one, always furious with everyone, including yourself—but not Socrates!

PL. *Symp.* 173d

This description corresponds to what Xenophon says about Apollodorus in his *Apology of Socrates* (28). Apollodorus helps, with his brother Aeantodorus, at the trial of Socrates (cf. Pl. *Ap.* 34a). He is ready, with Crito and his son Critobulus, to vouch for the sum of thirty minas, which could have been the fine that his friends advised Socrates to offer as an alternative punishment (*Ap.* 38b). He is also part of the group of those present when Socrates drinks the hemlock (*Phd.* 59d). In this occasion his behavior lacks restraint:

Apollodorus had not ceased from weeping before, and at this moment his noisy tears and anger made everybody present break down.

PL. *Phd.* 117d

This is a good example of a behavior that explains his nickname of “crazy” (μανικός). Note that Chaerephon is also, like Apollodorus and Aristodemus, described as “crazy” (μανικός), which suggests that within the Socratic circle one could find fanatical admirers.

In this context we can understand better the anecdote portraying an Apollodorus violently opposed to a Plato trying to take the lead of Socrates' followers:

27 Brisson 1989, 275–276.

Hegesander of Delphi in his *Commentaries* discusses Plato's nasty (κακο-ηθεία) attitude toward everyone, writing as follows: After Socrates' death, his friends were extremely discouraged. Plato was at one of their parties and took the cup; told them not to worry, since he was capable of leading the school himself (ικανὸς αὐτὸς εἶη ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς); and toasted Apollodorus. Apollodorus responded: "I would rather have taken the cup of poison from Socrates than accept this toast of wine from you."

ATH. 11.507a–b

The arrogance of Plato, absent when Socrates drank the hemlock but now claiming to take the head of the school of Socrates, is denounced by the most fanatic of the partisans of Socrates, Apollodorus. The anecdote is striking, but it has little chance of being authentic, given that the Socratic circle seems not to have comprised so homogenous a group. Anyway, it seems that it is to this tradition that we must attach the accusation we find in Athenaeus of Naucratis: "In general, [Plato] behaved toward Socrates' disciples like a step-mother (μητρειά)" (Ath. 11.507d). On the death of Socrates, Plato wanted to replace him as the mother of the group; but he would have been a "bad mother." Note, incidentally, that the accusation refers not to the father but to the mother; perhaps this alludes to Socrates' *maieusis*.

It should be observed that Apollodorus portrays a certain Aristodemus,²⁸ present at the party given by Agathon, as proximate narrator in the *Symposium*, of whom Plato gives this description:

A fellow called Aristodemus, from Cydatheneum, a real runt of a man—he always went barefoot. He went to the party because, I think, he was obsessed (ἐραστής) with Socrates—one of the worst cases at the time. Naturally, I [sc. Apollodorus] checked part of his story with Socrates, and Socrates agreed with his account.

PL. *Symp.* 173b

Everything suggests that Aristodemus' attachment to Socrates was as strong as Apollodorus'. His imitating Socrates' shoelessness represents the strength of his attachment—an attachment, moreover, represented by his desire to imitate the most incidental of Socratic characteristics.

28 Brisson 1989; 393–394.

2.2.4 Aeschines

Aeschines of Sphettus (c. 430–360) is familiar in the tradition for having been a disciple of Socrates.²⁹ In his writings Plato mentions Aeschines only twice, in the *Apology* where he supports Socrates at the trial (33e2), and in the *Phaedo* where he is present as Socrates drinks the hemlock (59b8).

Aeschines wrote philosophical dialogues, the list of which Diogenes Laertius preserves, and forensic speeches. Note that three dialogues attributed to Aeschines bear the same title as dialogues attributed to Plato: *Axiochus*, *Eryxias*, and *On Virtue* (DL 2.60–61).³⁰ Moreover, Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, considered as inauthentic by Diogenes Laertius, is similar to the first *Alcibiades* attributed to Plato and to the dialogue between Socrates and Euthydemus in Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.2). There is, moreover, much overlap between titles of works among the Socratic circle.

It is perhaps because he wrote forensic speeches (DL 2.62) that some authors claim he inspired Crito in the *Crito*. On this reading, Plato put in the mouth of Crito a speech which was in fact Aeschines':

Idomeneus declared that it was Aeschines, not Crito, who advised Socrates in the prison about making his escape, but that Plato put the words into the mouth of Crito because Aeschines was more attached to Aristippus than to himself.

DL 2.60 (see also 3.36)

In addition to robbing him of his speeches, Plato would have acted badly toward an Aeschines become poor. He apparently refused to help him: "Once Aeschines sank into poverty, Plato let him fall, but Aristippus supported Aeschines" (DL 3.36). It should be noted that it is a Cyrenaic, Aristippus, whose goal is pleasure, who aids the indigent, and not Plato, the intellectualist moralist. Athenaeus (11.507c) was more severe, adding that even if Plato knew that Aeschines was poor, he deprived him of his only disciple, Xenocrates.

One can suppose that it was poverty that drove Aeschines to Dionysus of Syracuse. It seems that Plato was found with Dionysus at the same time as him; what's more, in his *Second Letter* (312a),³¹ Plato complains that Dionysus put him in competition with other philosophers. Two anecdotes related to

²⁹ SSR VI A; Goulet-Cazé 1989, 89–94; Döring 1998, 201–206.

³⁰ Aeschines is also said to have written dialogues "without a head" (ἀκέφαλοι, DL 2.60), like the Platonic *On the Just*, *On Virtue*, and *Demodocus* (DL 3.62).

³¹ An inauthentic letter which had, however, a large influence.

this journey contradict one another. One says that Aeschines went to Dionysus (probably the younger), to whom he offered some of his dialogues in exchange for which he received presents from the tyrant. "Plato felt jealous toward Aeschines, it's said, for this reason: that Dionysus held Aeschines in great esteem."³² The other shows a Plato who asks Dionysus to show more consideration for Aeschines.³³ While the first anecdote is anti-Platonic, Plutarch, who is Platonic, reverses things. One can query the authenticity of these anecdotes, but they illustrate an important (neo-Pythagorean) point: friendship means fixing what one has neglected.

2.2.5 Phaedo and Simon

Phaedo was from Elis, a city in the northwest of the Peloponnese.³⁴ His name was immortalized by Plato, who made him the reporter of the dialogue that recounts Socrates' final hours.

In prison, we find this very group of the faithful (*Phd.* 59b–c): Apollodorus; Crito and Critobulus; Hermogenes³⁵ (see also the *Cratylus*, where he defends a conventionalist view of language), the son of Hipponicus, the richest man then in Athens; Epigenes³⁶ (see *Mem.* 3.12), who was present at Socrates' trial; Ctesippus of Paeania³⁷ (*Lysis* and *Euthydemus*), the cousin of Menexenus, and the lover of Clinias, the half-brother of Hermogenes;³⁸ Menexenus³⁹ (see *Menexenus* and *Lysis*), one of Socrates' youngest interlocutors, perhaps related to Socrates' family; and some other citizens of Athens. There were also foreigners: from Thebes, Simmias with Cebes and Phaedondas; and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion. Aristippus, and Cleombrotus of Ambracia,⁴⁰ about whom we know nothing else, were in Aegina. Plato was sick.

Next, this detail mentioned in the eponymous dialogue shows that in 399 Phaedo must have been, if not an adolescent, at least a young man:

I [Phaedo] happened to be sitting on his right by the couch on a low stool, so that he [Socrates] was sitting well above me. He stroked my head and

32 DL 2.61 (= SSR VI A 13) and Philostr. *V A* 1.35 (= SSR VI A 14, followed by *Suda* = SSR VI A 25).

33 Plut. *De adul. et amic.* 67c–e.

34 SSR III B; Döring 1998, 487–494.

35 See Brisson 2000, 667.

36 See Brisson 2000, 182.

37 See Brisson 1994, 532–533.

38 See Brisson 2000, 667.

39 See Brisson 1994, 433–434.

40 See Flamand 1994 433–436.

pressed the hair on the back of my neck, for he was in the habit of playing with my hair at times.

PL. *Phd.* 89b

That said, Diogenes Laertius reports a strange anecdote that aims at showing the wickedness of Plato:

Phaedo was a native of Elis, of noble family, who on the fall of that city was taken captive and forcibly consigned to a house of ill-fame. But he would close the door and so contrive to join Socrates' circle, and in the end Socrates induced Alcibiades or Crito with their friends to ransom him; from that time onwards he studied philosophy as became a free man.

DL 2.105

This anecdote is very likely not authentic. One can see here the return of a familiar theme, since Plato was also said to have been put into slavery (DL 3.19), and recovered by his friends.⁴¹

One may also note that the punch-line of this anecdote could be the following: "Plato was himself convinced to have denounced Phaedo as not free, with the intention of making him return to servitude" (Ath. 11.507b). An index of this accusation can be found perhaps in Diogenes Laertius: "Hieronymus,⁴² in his work *On the Suspension of Judgment*, attacks him [sc. Phaedo], calling him a slave" (2.105).

Diogenes Laertius gives the titles of Phaedo's works, albeit advancing reservations (2.105). It is noteworthy that among the dialogues attributed to Phaedo is a *Simon*. There was a Simon the shoemaker⁴³ with whom Socrates is supposed to have discussed in his workshop, and who is said to have written thirty-three dialogues (DL 2.122).

Diogenes Laertius ends his biography on Phaedo with the following sentences: "He was succeeded by Plistanus of Elis, and a generation later by Menedemus of Eretria and Asclepiades of Phlius, who came over from Stilpo's school. Till then the school was known as that of Elis, but from Menedemus onward it was called the Eretrian school" (2.105). This information about a

41 For a list of other anecdotes, see Swift-Riginos 1976, 86–92; for their meaning, see Brisson 1992, 3656–3658.

42 On Hieronymus of Rhodes, a peripatetic philosopher of the third century BCE, see Schneider 2000, 701–705.

43 Goulet 1997, 119–125.

school run by Phaedo is as doubtful as the anecdotes about his life and the attribution of his works. We know nothing of this Plistanus, and in the biography on Menedemus (DL 2.126), we learn that the last followed two other disciples of Phaedo: Anchipylus⁴⁴ and Moschus. If we suppose that Phaedo was born around 420, and Menedemus after 345, we have to think that Anchipylus and Moschus were the disciplines of Plistanus and not of Phaedo.⁴⁵ The uncertainty around this information sets pretty great doubt on the existence of a school of Phaedo in Elis. But the debate remains open.

2.2.6 Cebes and Simmias

Cebes and Simmias (in company of a certain Phaedondes) were, at first, disciples of Philolaus when he was at Thebes in Beotia (*Phd.* 59c, 61d). Then Cebes and Simmias established themselves in Athens, where they became followers of Socrates (*Mem.* 1.2.48; 3.11.17). In fact, Xenophon only repeats what we can read in Plato. In the *Crito* (45b–c), Cebes and Simmias are said to have brought the sum necessary for Socrates to escape his imprisonment. Diogenes Laertius cites a list of writings attributed to Cebes (2.125) and to Simmias (2.124). In the *Phaedrus* (242b), Socrates compares Simmias' taste for speeches with that of Phaedrus.

2.2.7 Phaedrus

To this group we ought perhaps add Phaedrus (*Prt.* 315c, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*), who frequents Lysias for his rhetoric lessons, and whom two *Epigrams* (*Greek Anthology* 7.669 and 670, under the name of Aster)⁴⁶ describe as Plato's beloved. Diogenes Laertius (2.29–32) claims to have found in a work of Arisippus of Cyrene amorous epigrams addressed by Plato not only to Phaedrus but also to Dion (*Greek Anthology* 7.99) and to Alexis (*Greek Anthology* 7.100). Alexis is probably the familiar comic dramatist (c. 375–275?) who must be associated with Agathon, the tragic poet and host of the *Symposium* to whom yet another amorous epigram is addressed (*Greek Anthology* 5.78). Dion is the one who invited Plato to visit the Syracusan tyrants (see *Ep.* 7). In the dialogue that bears his name, Phaedrus reads to Socrates a speech written by Lysias on a paradoxical theme: a young man must give his favors to the man who does not love him. As the book attributed to Aristippus of Cyrene, Περὶ παλαιᾶς τρυφῆς, is

44 The name varies across the manuscripts (see Roeper 1854).

45 Ath. 2.44c, citing Hegesander of Delphi, presents Anchimolus and Moschus as practicing oratory (σοφιστεύσαντας) in Elis.

46 Follet 1964, 13–14.

a fake,⁴⁷ it is more than likely that this collection was made several centuries after Plato's death, and was attributed for ideological reasons to Aristippus of Cyrene, who assimilated the good to pleasure.

2.2.8 Glaucon

Among these disciples we ought to count Glaucon, the brother of Plato and Adeimantus, who wrote nine dialogues collected in a single volume (2.124); none of these dialogues remain. According to Diogenes Laertius, thirty-two additional dialogues, though not by him, circulated under his name.

2.2.9 Diodorus

Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.10) presents a conversation with a certain Diodorus whom he describes as a companion (ἑταῖρος) of Socrates, but about whom we know nothing else.

In this disparate list we find followers very attached to the person of Socrates—philosophers, ordinary citizens, and even perhaps craftsmen: Adeimantus, Aeantodorus, Antiphon, Apollodorus, Aristodemus, Charmides, Cephalus, Cherecrates, Chaerephon, Cleombrotus, Critobulus, Crito, Ctesippus, Demodocus, Diodorus, Epigenes, Aeschines, Euthydemus, Glaucon, Hermogenes, Lysanias, Menexenus, Nicostratus, Paralius, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Terpsion, Theages, and Xenophon. The way Plato treats them in *Apology*, *Symposium*, *Charmides*, *Crito*, *Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias* does not correspond with the accusation that he is a “step-mother” of this group of men. These anecdotes are inspired by anti-Platonic authors (Peripatetics, Stoics, and Epicureans) who systematically excoriate Plato.

Plato's position is more polemical when he deals with the three philosophical schools that claimed to follow Socrates,⁴⁸ thus reflecting his strained relations with them.

47 Dorandi 2007.

48 On this subject Brisson 1997, 145–184; Dorion 1996².

3 The Cynics: Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope

3.1 *Antisthenes*

Antisthenes was born around 445 and died after 366.⁴⁹ Apparently he was a disciple of Gorgias before he joined up with Socrates. According to Xenophon, Antisthenes was one of the closest follower of Socrates (*Mem.* 2.5; 3.11.17; *Symp.* 4.44, 8.4–6). Diogenes Laertius makes him the founder of Cynicism and the teacher of Diogenes of Sinope (2.19; 6.2.13–15). Diogenes Laertius thereby posits the succession Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes of Sinope-Crates of Thebes-Zeno, which makes Socrates the common ancestor of both Cynicism and Stoicism. A thorough examination of the passage in Diogenes casts serious doubt on this succession. It is likely that Antisthenes is above all a Socratic, whose relations with Diogenes are not clear.⁵⁰

For Antisthenes, the practice of virtue sufficed for bringing happiness (DL 6.11), a doctrine one finds in Plato's early dialogues. But virtue needs neither speech nor knowledge; it involves the force (ἰσχύς) that is part of self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια).

The philosophical assumption on which Antisthenes—who opposed himself to Plato—relied is the following: only individuals exist. So, the only element common to a group of individuals is the name, and not the Form in which according to Plato they participate.⁵¹ Each individual can be designated only as such. Therefore, only a comparison between individuals is possible. Of this ontological atomism leading to tautology two consequences follow: (i) Contradiction is impossible: two interlocutors can say only the same thing, since if one says something different it is because he is speaking about something else. (ii) Nothing is false, since to speak falsely is to bring up something other than the individual about which one speaks. This is the thesis that Socrates attributes to Dionysodorus: “This is how the argument goes, right? Either one tells the truth when one speaks, or one does not speak?” (*Euthyd.* 286c). Aristotle is even more explicit:

Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded (εὐήθως) when he claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper to it—one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error.

ARIST. *Met.* Δ 29, 1024b32–34, tr. ROSS (see also *Top.* 1.11, 104b20–21)

49 SSR V A; Döring 1998, 267–280; Goulet 1989, 245–253.

50 Sayre 1948.

51 Simplicius summarizes this position: “I see a horse, I do not see horseness” (Simpl. *In Cat.* 208.28–32 Kalbfleisch).

Moreover, among the sixty-five titles that Diogenes Laertius attributes to Antisthenes we find an *On Contradiction* in three books (DL 6.16), to a reading of which Antisthenes invited Plato to listen:

It is said also that Antisthenes, being about to read publicly something that he had composed, invited Plato to be present. And on his inquiring what he was about to read, Antisthenes replied that it was something about the impossibility of contradiction. "How then," said Plato, "can you write on this subject?"

DL 3.35

As Plato pointed out to him, in writing about this paradox, Antisthenes proves that contradiction is possible, and thereby refutes himself.

Faced with this reply, Antisthenes reacts sharply:

[Plato] showing him that the argument refutes itself, thereupon he [Antisthenes] wrote a dialogue against Plato and entitled it *Sathon*. After this they continued to be estranged from one another.

DL 3.35

In Greek, *Sathon* comes from *Sathe*, the male sexual organ, the penis.⁵² The crudeness of the context suggests that we should translate it into English with *Weenie*. This affectionate nickname is given by a nurse to a male infant in a comedy.⁵³ Elsewhere Diogenes Laertius mentions a calmer reaction: "Having been told one day that Plato was speaking badly about him, he replied 'It's how it is for a king, to behave well and to be spoken badly of'" (6.3). This apophthegm, which was attributed to Antisthenes by Epictetus,⁵⁴ was ascribed to Alexander by Plutarch.⁵⁵ This circumstance places a persistent doubt on its correct attribution.

Antisthenes mocked Plato's character, specifically his pride:

And he used to taunt Plato with being conceited. At all events when in a procession he spied a spirited charger he said, turning to Plato, "It seems

52 Diogenes Laertius gives it two titles (6.26): *On Contradiction* and *Sathon*, which we must distinguish. Athenaeus makes two references to this title (2.220d; 11.507a).

53 See the note by Kassel-Austin *PCG* at Telecleides fr. 71.

54 *Diss.* 4.6.20.

55 *Plut. Alex.* 41.2; *Apophthegms of Alexander* 181–182; John Chrysostom 47.23 does not give the attribution.

to me that you would have made just such a proud, showy steed.” This because Plato was constantly praising the horse.⁵⁶ And one day he visited Plato, who was ill, and seeing the basin into which Plato had vomited, remarked, “The bile I see, but not the pride.”⁵⁷

DL 6.7

The critique of pride (τῦφος) and striving for renown (φιλοδοξία) is a Cynic theme, which Diogenes of Sinope also used against Plato (DL 6.26).⁵⁸

By a curious reversal, which can be explained only as an oversight, Stobaeus describes a Plato critiquing the loquacity (μακρολογία) of Antisthenes:

When Antisthenes dragged on in a conversation, Plato said: “He who establishes the length of the speech is not the one who speaks but the one who listens.”

STOB. Flor. 3.36.22

The *Gnomologium Vaticanum* (437) focuses this story on Plato. Once more, we note the instability of an anecdote. Pride and verbosity are the usual critiques brought against Plato by the Cynics. We find them in Diogenes of Sinope.

3.2 *Diogenes of Sinope*

We know fourteen anecdotes about the relations between Diogenes of Sinope⁵⁹ and Plato. Some of them target the ontological foundation of Plato’s thought and specific dialogues. Others concern the person of Plato.

As Antisthenes did, Diogenes of Sinope attacks Plato’s hypothesis of intelligible Forms. Plato’s response is wonderful:

As Plato was conversing about Forms and using the nouns “tablehood” and “cuphood,” he said, “Table and cup I see; but your tablehood and cuphood, Plato, I can nowise see.” “That’s readily accounted for,” said Plato, “for you have the eyes to see the visible table and cup; but not the understanding by which intelligible tablehood and cuphood are discerned.”

DL 6.53

56 See DL 3.39: “Being mounted on horseback, he quickly got down again, declaring that he was afraid he would be infected with horse-pride.” This point is probably a gloss.

57 Pride is associated with bile.

58 On τῦφος as a Cynic trope, Decleva Caizzi 1980.

59 SSR V B; Döring 1998, 280–321. See also Sayre 1938 and 1948; Goulet-Cazé 1994.

Diogenes of Sinope also takes issue with the dialectics that leads to the definition of man as a “featherless biped” (*Plt.* 266e):

Plato had defined Man as an animal, biped and featherless, and was applauded. Diogenes plucked a fowl and brought it into the lecture-room with the words, “Here is Plato’s man.” In consequence of which there was added to the definition, “having broad nails.”

DL 6.40

The distinction between a feathered biped and an unfeathered biped is only a stage in the dialectical process of division leading to the definition of “statesman” as “shepherd of his people.” In the *Statesman*, this definition is abandoned before the telling of the myth. The conclusion of the anecdote is even funnier than the attribution to Plato of such a definition is wacky.

According to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius (6.80), corroborated by that of Philodemus (*PHerc.* 155 and 339), Diogenes of Sinope wrote a *Republic* depicting a city where sages could lead an autarchic life.⁶⁰ We should understand it as a critical response to Plato’s *Republic* and *Laws*:

Diogenes asked Plato if he had written the *Laws*. And he said: D.—Well, you wrote the *Republic*, right? P.—Very much so. D.—But the *Republic*, does it not include laws? P.—It does include them. D.—Why then did you also have to write the *Laws* too?

STOB. *Flor.* 3.13.45

But according to Diogenes of Sinope, it was not possible to run a city without law. On this point, Diogenes Laertius reports a syllogism.

Without a city no benefit can be derived from the civilized way of life;
But the city is the place where the civilized way of life is possible.
Furthermore, there is no advantage in law without a city;
Therefore law is something civilized.

DL 6.72

Such a syllogism drew on a set of syllogisms about law and the city the author of which may have been Cleanthes.⁶¹

60 On this subject, see Husson 2011.

61 For an analysis, see Goulet-Cazé 1982, 214–240.

As with many other Socrates, Diogenes reproaches Plato for his voyage to visit the younger Dionysus:

Plato was discussing various subjects in the presence of Diogenes, who paid little attention to him. The son of Ariston was annoyed and said: "Listen to what I have to say, dog." Diogenes, unruffled, replied: "But I have not returned to the place where I was sold, as dogs do," alluding to Plato's second journey to Sicily.⁶²

AEL. VH 14.33

Diogenes refers to the episode where Plato, after one of his voyages to Sicily, is supposed to have been sold into slavery and then redeemed. Nonetheless, he returns a third time to Syracuse, where he was yet again sold. This allows Diogenes of Sinope to turn back against Plato the contemptuous epithet "dog" he had hurled against him. Antisthenes, it is worth noting, never claimed the name "dog," a point that could distinguish him from Diogenes of Sinope.

For a Cynic who puts self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια)⁶³ before all else, this voyage is a perfect occasion to denounce Plato's parasitism:

Plato saw him washing lettuces, came up to him and quietly said to him, "Had you paid court to Dionysius, you wouldn't now be washing lettuces"; he with equal calmness made answer, "If you had washed lettuces, you wouldn't have paid court to Dionysius."

DL 6.58

In fact, Diogenes of Sinope reproaches Plato for not being satisfied by what nature gives him in Attica and for searching for something better in Syracuse:

Observing Plato one day at a costly banquet taking olives, "How is it," he said, "that you the philosopher who sailed to Sicily for the sake of these dishes, now when they are before you do not enjoy them?" "Nay, by the gods, Diogenes," replied Plato, "there also for the most part I lived upon olives and such like." "Why then," said Diogenes, "did you need to go to Syracuse? Was it that Attica at that time did not grow olives?"

DL 6.25

62 Translation from Nigel Wilson's 1997 Loeb Classical Library edition.

63 Goulet-Cazé 1989, 38–40.

The necessity of living according to nature is a Cynic theme. Diogenes Laertius remarks, "But Favorinus in his *Varia Historia* attributes this intent to Aristippus."⁶⁴

Diogenes also denounces Plato's pride, when Plato returns his criticism:

And one day when Plato had invited to his house friends coming from Dionysius, Diogenes trampled upon his carpets and said, "I trample upon Plato's vainglory." Plato's reply was, "How much pride you expose to view, Diogenes, by seeming not to be proud." Others tell us that what Diogenes said was, "I trample upon the pride of Plato," who retorted, "Yes, Diogenes, with pride of another sort."

DL 6.26

And he denounces Plato's hypocrisy:

Being reproached with begging when Plato did not beg, "Oh yes," says he, "he does, but when he does so—He holds his head down close, that none may hear [Hom. *Od* 1.157, 4.70]."

DL 6.67

Finally, he denounces the gluttony that is in contrast with self-mastery (ἐγκράτεια):

Another time he was eating dried figs when he encountered Plato and offered him a share of them. When Plato took them and ate them, he said, "I said you might share them, not that you might eat them all up."

DL 6.25

In this Cynic context, gluttony is associated with loquacity:

Diogenes once asked him for wine, and after that also for some dried figs; and Plato sent him a whole jar full. Then the other said, "If someone asks you how many two and two are, will you answer, Twenty? So, it seems, you neither give as you are asked nor answer as you are questioned." Thus he scoffed at him as one who talked without end.

DL 6.26

64 This remarks shows once more that an anecdote can be linked to various people.

Plutarch reports Diogenes' critique of Plato's laxness, a fault that impedes the virtue of endurance (καρτερία):

Indeed we may see these very opponents of mine often inciting young men with praise and often chastising them with admonitions; and of these, in the first case pleasure is the consequence, in the second pain (in fact, admonition and rebuke engender repentance and shame, of which the first is a kind of pain, the second a kind of fear); and of these methods they make particular use to improve their charges. As Diogenes also remarked, when Plato was being praised, "What is there so august about one who has spent so much time talking philosophy, yet has never caused anyone pain?"

PLUT. *de mor. virt.* 452c–d (tr. HELMBOLD)

Plato does not lag behind. He in turn denounces Diogenes' pride and vanity (cf. 6.26):

One day he got a thorough drenching where he stood, and, when the bystanders pitied him, Plato said, if they really pitied him, they should move away, alluding to his vanity.

DL 6.41

One day Plato said to Diogenes that he takes his lunch in a public place and invites him to share: "Since your simple manners would be friendly, Diogenes, if they were manners!"

THEON *Prog.* 5

Plato used to say of Diogenes, according to reports, that he was a mad Socrates (μαϊνόμενος Σωκράτης).

AEL. *VH* 14.33

Diogenes of Sinope and Plato accuse each other of failing to practice the virtues that they put forward in their theories. And they do it by illustrating their claims, as was the practice then, with anecdotes that could serve as well in other situations too.

4 The Cyrenaics: Aristippus

Attracted to Athens by the renown of Socrates, Aristippus of Cyrene⁶⁵ was nevertheless absent at Socrates' death. Plato says that both he and Cleombrotus were then in Megara (*Phd.* 59c). Some took this information as slanderous.⁶⁶ Diogenes Laertius echoes this negative judgment (2.65) and adds: "Plato showed hostility toward Aristippus too" (3.36). Aristotle testifies that this hostility was shared. Aristippus reproaches Plato for his interpretation of Socrates' words: "Or again as Aristippus said in reply to Plato when he spoke somewhat too dogmatically, as Aristippus thought: 'Well, anyhow, our friend', meaning Socrates, 'never spoke like that'" (Arist. *Rh.* 2.23, 1398b29–31). In fact, Plato and Aristippus had opposing views on the question of the good: for Plato, it is wisdom; for Aristippus, pleasure. On the question of pleasure Socrates had a very different position (Xen. *Mem.* 1.6, 2.1, 3.11, 4.5; Plato in *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*).

That said, caution is required, for much of the evidence for the doctrine attributed to the Cyrenaics, of which Aristippus was the founder, has been presented in the language of the New Academy and Epicureanism. This is why we must keep to a minimal position. If judgment can only bear on internal affections, this means that epistemology concerns only the sphere of sensation and that ethics pertains only to the pleasure or pain that accompany those sensations. Even adopting this minimal position, it seems that the opening of the *Philebus*, Plato's dialogue to which the subtitle *On pleasure* was given, attacks the doctrine of the Cyrenaics (DL 2.86–87). This enmity could also be explained by their rivalry at the court of Dionysus the younger in Syracuse.⁶⁷

It seems, however, that most of the anecdotes about Plato and Aristippus were invented to illustrate their opposition on the question of pleasure. One part of the stories portrays a Plato who criticizes the pleasure-seeking of Aristippus, who each time finds a clever rejoinder.

The first is about Aristippus' lifestyle:

When he was reproached by Plato for his extravagance, he inquired, "Do you think Dionysius a good man?" and the reply being in the affirmative, "And yet," said he, "he lives more extravagantly than I do. So that there is nothing to hinder a man living extravagantly and well."

DL 2.69 (see also 2.76)

65 SSR IV A; Döring 1998, 246–266; see also Caujolle-Zaslalawski 1989, 370–375.

66 See Demetr. *De eloc.* 38.

67 Plut. *Dion* 19.3.

Aristippus' response is explained by the fact that like him, Plato came to Syracuse to visit Dionysus.

The other critiques are more specific. One is about the pleasures of eating:

But Socrates' student Aristippus was also a glutton; according to Sotion⁶⁸ and Hegesander, Plato once criticized him for his gluttony ... The Delphian writes as follows: When Plato attacked him for buying a large number of fish, Aristippus informed him that he had paid only two obols. When Plato said "I would have bought them myself at that price," Aristippus responded: "So you see, Plato: it's not that I'm a glutton—it's that you're a miser!"

ATH. 8.343d

At the reproach made to him, Aristippus suggests that Plato is not virtuous but stingy.⁶⁹ Then Diogenes Laertius moves on to entertainment:

One day Dionysius over the wine commanded everybody to put on purple and dance. Plato declined, quoting the line: "I could not stoop to put on women's robes" [= Eur. *Bacch.* 836]. Aristippus, however, put on the dress and, as he was about to dance, was ready with the repartee: "Even amid the Bacchic revelry, True modesty will not be put to shame" [= Eur. *Bacch.* 317–318].

DL 2.78

Once again, Aristippus' reply is cunning. Finally, we get to questions of money:

He [Aristippus] received a sum of money from Dionysius at the same time that Plato carried off a book and, when he was twitted with this, his reply was, "Well, I want money, Plato wants books."

DL 2.81

The response is strange, but perhaps the story may be compared to the following:

68 Sotion is a biographer of the third century; he wrote the *Successions*.

69 Similar anecdotes can be found at DL 2.66 and 75.

Whereupon Aristippus of Cyrene, who was present on one of these occasions, said that Dionysius was safely munificent; for he offered little to men like him, who wanted more, but much to Plato, who would take nothing.

PLUT. *Dion* 19.3 (tr. PERRIN)

Contrary to Plato, who refuses to receive important presents, Aristippus seems to remain detached when faced with such gifts:

Hence the remark of Strato, or by some accounts of Plato, “You alone are endowed with the gift to flaunt in robes or go in rags.”

DL 2.67

Diogenes’ report ends with this apophthegm, which reprises the Stoic opposition between the serious (σπουδαῖος) and the worthless (φάυλος) displayed in the following passage:

When Plato had come to see Aristippus, who was ill, and asked him how he was, Aristippus responded that the sage is fine even when he has a fever, while a man does nothing bad even if he does not have a fever.

Gnom. Vat. 30

The anecdote equivocates playfully on καλῶς εἶναι, which means both “fare well” and “behave well.”

Once more, we notice that the anecdotes illustrate the points of doctrine associated with events experienced both by Plato and Aristippus.

5 The Megarians: Euclides

Presented as the founder of the School of Megara, Euclides, who died sometime between 369 and 366, plays an important role in the *Theaetetus* (142a–143c). He is, with Terpsion (who attends Socrates’ death: see *Phd.* 59c), one of the two interlocutors in the prologue. It is he who recounts—because he has written it down—the discussion that Socrates had with Theodorus on the eve of his trial. Theodorus was teaching geometry in Athens, and Theaetetus was his student.

For the Megarians, intellect alone is trustworthy.⁷⁰ Their quest for knowledge is limited to what reason is able to grasp of reality, that is, its identity and

70 See Muller 1985 and 1988; Muller 2000, 272–277.

permanence. They deny that truth may be found in what is sensible, which they separate irrevocably from the world of the Forms that only intellect can apprehend. In fact, according to Aristotle, the Megarians identify potentiality and actuality (*Metaph.* Θ 3, 1047a14–16), and in doing so, they spoil change and becoming (these two terms seem here to be taken in their Aristotelian sense), both of which require a shift from potentiality to actuality. For them being is in fact fixed in identity and permanence. From this metaphysical claim derives an equally clear ethical claim. Euclides argues that the good is one, admitting that this good is expressed by the plurality of goods (DL 2.106), which leads to the unity of virtue thesis (7.161) supported by Socrates.

One can also see Socrates' influence in his interest in dialectic. Moreover, for the Megarians, dialectic becomes eristic, as in the *Euthydemus*, as Socrates himself notes in an anecdote (DL 2.30), which caused Euclides to be mocked by Timon (DL 2.107).

It seems that the critique of the friend of the Forms of the *Sophist* (248a–249c) is in fact targeted at the Megarians. The Eleatic Stranger does not want to “accept the claim that everything is at rest, either from defenders of the one or from friends of the many forms” (249c–d). It seems that to find an equivalent of this doctrine one must look to the Megarians. For Plato, for whom the Eleatic Stranger is the spokesman, there are, as for the friends of the Forms, two separate domains, that of being and that of becoming, which correspond to the intelligible forms and sensible world respectively. Therefore nothing prevents a definition of being as the power to act or to suffer.

Some anecdotes say that Plato took refuge in Megara after the death of Socrates (DL 2.106). Diogenes Laertius (2.108) says that Euclides wrote six dialogues.

6 Conclusion

Socrates was surrounded by an important group of followers who were seduced by him and who took him as an exemplar, going as far as copying his modes of daily life; Plato reduces this seduction from that of the body to that of the soul. Around him were men who played an important and very negative political role, a fact which could explain his indictment in 399.

It is surprising that by his deeds and words Socrates gave birth to such diverse and divergent philosophical currents. This fact prompts some conclusions. Socrates must have been a particularly disconcerting character. Even if one thinks that Plato's testimony is more tendentious than Xenophon's, it remains essential for giving an idea of the atmosphere in which Socrates' circle lived,

and of the soil in which all these different philosophical doctrines took root: the Platonic doctrine of the separation of the intelligible and sensible, and of the body and the soul; the Cynic challenge of this doctrine, which involves a life according to nature; the claim of the Cyrenaics that pleasure defines the good; or the Megarians' dismissal of the senses in favor of intellect as alone trustworthy. Despite their disconcerting character, these doctrines illustrate not only the opposition between different philosophical positions, but also Plato's absolute originality.

In Plato's work, the presence of Socrates is felt not only in the early dialogues, which give the leading role to him and describe him in direct interaction with some of his followers, but also in the dialogues in the periods of Plato's maturity and even old age. Plato never stops taking a position in relation to the Cynics, Megarians, and Cyrenaics. We might even add that several dialogues attributed to Plato, but whose authenticity has been put in doubt, must be set in their Socratic context.⁷¹

Plato is a "Socratic" who interacts with those who were part of Socrates' circle of close human relationship and constant philosophical discussion. Ethically and politically, Plato took to its logical extreme Socrates' definitional requirement (τί ἐστιν); he managed to find a "moral realism" on the hypothesis of separate and intelligible forms. But to achieve this, Plato had to develop a philosophy of nature, which meant renouncing Socrates (*Phd.* 96e–100a).

References

- Angeli, A. 'I frammenti di Idomeneo di Lampsaco', *BCPE* 11 (1981), 41–101.
 Angeli, A. 'Idoménée de Lampsaque', in: Goulet 2000, 860–863.
 Brisson, L. 'Apollodore de Phalère', in: Goulet 1989, 275–276.
 Brisson, L. 'Diogène Laërce, livre III: Structure et contenu', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*. Berlin 1992, 3618–3760.
 Brisson, L. 'Aristodèmos d'Athènes', in: Goulet 1994, 293–294.
 Brisson, L. 'Ctésippe de Péanée', in: Goulet 1994, 532–533.
 Brisson, L. 'Cléombrote d'Ambracie', in: Goulet 1994, 532–533.
 Brisson, L. 'Les Socratiques', in: M. Canto, *Philosophie Grecque*. Paris 1997, 145–184.
 Brisson, L. 'Épigénès de Céphisa', in: Goulet 2000, 182.
 Brisson, L. 'Hermogène d'Athènes', in: Goulet 2000, 667.
 Brisson, L. *Écrits attribués à Platon*. Paris 2014.

71 Brisson 2014.

- Caizzi, F.D. 'Τῦφος: contributo alla storia di un concetto', *Sandalion* 3, (1980), 53–66.
- Caujolle-Zaslowski, F. 'Aristippe de Cyrène', in: Goulet 1989, 370–375.
- Danzig, G. 'La prétendue rivalité entre Platon et Xénophon', *RFHIP* 16 (2002), 351–368.
- Danzig, G. 'Did Plato read Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*?', in: Scolnicov and Brisson 2003, 286–297.
- Dorandi, T. 'Περὶ παλαιᾶς τρυφῆς attributo a Aristippo nella storia della biografia antica', in: M. Erler and S. Schorn, *Die griechische Biographie in hellenistischer Zeit*. Berlin 2007, 157–167.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Les Socratiques', in: J. Brunschwig and G. Lloyd, *Le savoir grec*. Paris 1996, 909–923.
- Dorion, L.-A. *Xénophon: Mémoires*. Paris 2001.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Une allusion à la *Cyropédie* au livre III des *Lois* (694c)', in: Scolnicov and Brisson 2003, 281–285.
- Dorion, L.-A. *Socrate*. Paris 2004. (= 2004a)
- Dorion, L.-A. *Platon: Charmide, Lysis*, Paris 2004. (= 2004b)
- Dorion, L.-A. *L'autre Socrate: études sur les écrits socratiques de Xénophon*. Paris 2013.
- Flamand, J.-M. 'Cléombrote d'Ambracie', in: Goulet 1994, 433–439.
- Flashar, H., Döring, K., Erler, M., Kerferd, G.B., Ueberweg, F. *Die Philosophie der Antike*. Basel 1998.
- Follet, S. 'Deux épigrammes platoniciennes pour Phèdre', *REG* 77 (1964), 13.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 'Un syllogisme stoïcien sur la loi dans la doxographie de Diogène le cynique: à propos de Diogène Laërce VI 72', *RhM* 125 (1982), 214–240.
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. *L'ascèse cynique: un commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI*, Paris 1986.
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 'Aischinès de Sphettos', in: Goulet 1989, 89–94.
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 'Antisthène', in: Goulet 1989, 245–253.
- Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 'Diogène de Sinope', in: Goulet 1994, 812–820.
- Goulet, R. *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, I. Paris 1989.
- Goulet, R. *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, II. Paris 1994.
- Goulet, R. 'Trois cordonniers philosophes', in: M. Joyal, *Studies in Plato and the Platonic tradition: essays presented to John Whittaker*. Aldershot 1997, 119–125.
- Goulet, R. *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, III. Paris 2000.
- Goulet, R. *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, V. Paris 2012.
- Husson, S. *La République de Diogène: une cité en quête de la nature*. Paris 2011.
- Moore, C. 'Chaerephon the Socratic', *Phoenix* 67, (2013), 284–299.
- Muller, R. *Les Mégariques: fragments et témoignages*. Paris 1985.
- Muller, R. *Introduction à la pensée des Mégariques*. Paris 1988.
- Muller, R. 'Euclide de Mégare', in: Goulet 2000, 272–277.
- Muller, R. 'Phédon d'Élis', in: Goulet 2012, 279–285.

- Nails, D. *The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics*. Cambridge 2002.
- Roeper, G. 'Conjecturen zu Diogenes Laertius', *Philologus* 9 (1854), 1–42.
- Sayre, F. *Diogenes of Sinope: a study of the Greek Cynicism*. Baltimore 1938.
- Sayre, F. 'Antisthenes the Socratic', *CJ* 43 (1948), 237–244.
- Schneider, J.-P. 'Hiéronymos de Rhodes', in: Goulet 2000, 701–705.
- Scolnicov, S. and L. Brisson, *Plato's Laws: from theory to practice. Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum*. Sankt Augustin 2003.
- Swift Riginos, A. *Platonica: the anecdotes concerning the life and writings of Plato*. Leiden 1976.

Philosopher Socrates? Philosophy at the Time of Socrates and the Reformed *Philosophia* of Plato

Livio Rossetti

Università degli Studi di Perugia

1 The Problem

Herodotus, Thucydides, Hippocrates, Gorgias, and eventually Socrates, then Aristophanes (in the *Ecclesiazusae*), Alcidas, Isocrates, Aeschines, Phaedo, Plato, Aristippus, Xenophon, and a few others are the intellectuals who, in less than a century, helped to establish what philosophy is. To this list we must add a small number of observers, such as Hippias, Polycrates and Lysias, who had the opportunity to dwell on what they possibly could have characterized as philosophical but did not. Thus we can look at a single notion, “philosophy,” or its marked absence, through the eyes of an extensive group of intellectuals well-placed to speak of pre-Platonic disciplinary trends, all of whom gravitated toward Athens.

This theme of pre- and non-Platonic philosophy has been the subject of little attention so far.¹ Sandra Peterson’s recent book (2011) is an exception; she argues that Socrates would present his interlocutors’ (non-Platonic) views of philosophy rather than his own, and that his interlocutors would present, with some honesty, their views of Socrates. A further exception is Andrea Nightingale’s 1995 study of Plato’s construction of “philosophy” from its pre-Platonic roots. I follow these works in my concern for the *history* of the terms referring to “philosophy.” I will focus here on the establishment of an idea of philosophy before Plato, but without a special concern for Plato’s creative beliefs about “philosophy,” and without assuming that the earliest idea of philosophy makes sense only in light of Plato’s later and reformed idea.

The fifth century saw the rise of what are now called the pre-Socratic “philosophers” and the sophists, but we might find that (i) during the first two thirds of fifth century BCE nobody used *philosophy*- words; (ii) towards the end of the century and the very first decades of the fourth, *philosophia* cognates (*philosophēin*, *hoi philosophountes*, *philosophos* as an adjective²) came into

1 I count myself among those who have treated it inadequately (in Rossetti 2010 and elsewhere).

2 As a noun, *ho philosophos* has a number of occurrences in Plato and Aristotle, but does not

circulation, if only marginally and with no connection with the teachings of the Presocratics; and (iii) within several more decades, these words mobilized increasing intellectual energies, to the point of ensuring a spectacular celebrity for the new form of excellence that people learned to call philosophy. Thanks to this sudden acceleration starting in the 380s, “everyone” came to know—and to know all at once—about the existence and look of philosophy; the first “shelf” of philosophy books grew and the first schools of philosophy were born; and a growing number of young intellectuals desirous to become philosophers flowed into Athens. Add to this an often-overlooked detail, that not much later, Aristotle and Theophrastus, together with several other teachers of philosophy, built a Panhellenic legal literature of surprisingly vast dimensions—in the end occupying more than a hundred books—and then a publishing enterprise so impressive as to dwarf the output of the many other disciplines also cultivated by these “philosophers.”³ This fact speaks of what philosophy became in less than a century: among everything else, a powerful editorial and publication enterprise.

Such definitive indications of the sensational success of the idea (indeed, of a particular idea) of philosophy in the years of Plato’s maturity causes us to wonder about the idea’s period of incubation and the ensuing chain reaction in its popularity. Wondering about this leads to a further set of questions:

- What idea of philosophy circulated in the years before Plato’s maturity?
- Can we get at this idea by contrasting the uses of a still sporadically used term?
- To what extent was the idea cultivated around Socrates?
- How did Socrates contribute to the acceleration that led to the Platonic version of philosophy?
- Can we affirm that in the first bookshelf containing philosophy (if one can speak of the shelf) there were to be found a certain number of Socratic dialogues?

These questions might be reduced to two key concerns. First, what did philosophy look like at first—or put another way, starting from what idea of philosophy did Plato develop his own idea? Second, is this earlier idea—one

show up in Xenophon or Isocrates. *Philosophos* as an adjective had much less success over the centuries.

3 Surveyed in Rossetti 2004. I confess to being unable to explain why this genre of Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’, in which they were by far the most prolific, is regularly omitted by those who know best their writings.

we have perhaps been tempted to characterize as primitive, poor, superficial, simplified—to be identified with Socrates and the work of other Socratics? Lowell Edmunds (1994) had many reasons to ask: what was Socrates called? Perhaps *ho philosophos* too?

For the reasons given above, the field of observation will be expanded beyond the fifth century to those contemporaries of Plato who were not drawn into his sphere of influence (and who, therefore, would not have shared any new conceptions of philosophy he may have advanced, except accidentally), and, with due precautions, to Plato himself. What we will seek to find out is whether these early occurrences of *philosoph-* words have something in common, how we might best characterize this “archaic” idea of philosophy, and how coherent and stable is it.

2 **Philosoph-* before about 440 BCE

When did talk about philosophy begin? And what did it mean then?

(A1) Since Aristotle it has been repeated countless times that philosophy began with **Thales**, it having been thought that in Thales’ writings one could recover some embryonic philosophical idea. But it is quite clear that Thales knew nothing of philosophy, and could not even have taken a step toward philosophy, for the reason that he simply could not have represented to himself this goal. We might helpfully compare his case to that of Leonardo da Vinci. We can call Leonardo a forerunner in the manufacture of flying machines, since he knowingly and repeatedly designed devices aimed to transform, by means of gears, the motion of legs into the motion of a pair of artificial wings, with the aim of putting man in the condition of flying. But the case of Thales is very different and, if he came to work out ideas which, in other times, were judged to be philosophical in character, this cannot be taken for Thales’ intention since the connection with philosophy was established not by him but by others retrospectively and long after his death.

(A2) **Anaximander** has many merits, and his knowledge reflects a relatively coherent approach (hence an embryonic method, and an embryonic epistemology). But this is a knowledge with a compound and not systematic structure, where each conjecture is based on its own set of evidence and reasoning.⁴ Much closer to philosophy was **Anaximenes**, who worked to treat the notion of air as a central and “strategic” idea, meant to explain a virtually unlimited

4 More reasoning than evidence, indeed! I tried to give an account of this in Rossetti 2013.

range of observable phenomena by appeal to condensation and rarefaction. In what we know about Anaximenes, however, there is no trace of what would have been an idea with undeniable philosophical potential—that an explanation is good if (and only if) it is universally applicable.

(A3) In the case of **Pythagoras**, many have tried to validate the converging testimony of Cicero (*Tusc.* 5.3.8–4.10) and Diogenes Laertius (8.8 and 1.12) to conclude that it was he who coined the term *philosophos* and used it to refer to himself. It is a nice story; but it is highly likely that this is just one of the many triumphs attributed to Pythagoras more than half a millennium after the fact, done mainly to win glory when proclaiming oneself a Pythagorean.⁵ Moreover, even had Pythagoras really called himself a philosopher (which possibility, admittedly, we cannot exclude), his use would have been entirely local; during Plato's time, the Pythagoreans did nothing that would justify their being called philosophers. At best, Plato and some of his students attached importance to some (philosophical) teachings inspired by Pythagoras.

(A4) In the case of **Heraclitus**, the authenticity of the only fragment in which reference to *philosophos* appears is still debated (*philosophous andras*, fr. 35 DK). It seems reasonable to agree with Wilamowitz (1880, 215), Marcovich (1967, 26–27), and Fronterotta (2013, 174–175), among others, that the explicit reference to the philosophers is due not to Heraclitus but to Clement of Alexandria, as an expansion of the (genuinely Heraclitean) sentence *chre pollôn historas einai* (“one must be an investigator into many things”). Of course certainty is impossible, and the contrary opinion continues to have several supporters; but it is not so important to reach certainty on this point, since this occurrence would have remained isolated for about half a century. Moreover, even were *philosophous* to be Heraclitus', the expression would serve only to emphasize *historas*, investigators and experts (of many things). If so, it would allude to people who were curious, attentive or, at best, deep—in any event, it would have a meaning similar enough to that found with most of the occurrences soon to be examined.

What is next is to examine something more familiar, namely the occurrences of the term in Gorgias, Herodotus, Thucydides, Hippocrates, and few others, occurrences whose dating really cannot precede the decade 440–430. In those years, what is commonly labeled as “pre-Socratic philosophy” had already deployed a large part of its potential. It is as if the Greeks began to talk frequently about philosophy only once a memorable “philosophical” season drew to a close. For many, this fact is irrelevant since philosophy does not

5 Cf. Burkert 1960 and, more recently, Centrone 2015, 38.

need the name to be itself; but I repeat that the purported philosophy of the pre-Socratics was, at best, an *unintentional* philosophy for which even a roughly identifiable trajectory was lacking. Parmenides' theory of being and not-being, for instance, came to be recognized as eminently philosophical *only* almost a century (if not a whole century) after its formulation. This situation, usually ignored, cannot but make us think.

3 **Philosoph- in the Time of Socrates*

We now proceed to examine the evidence available for the period from 440 to 399 BCE, where 440 is proposed as the *terminus post quem* of Gorgias' *Helen*. For its date of composition there are no reliable indicators, in particular, no significant points of contact with Euripides' Trojan cycle. Nevertheless it is commonly assumed that the *Helen* was antedated by the *Peri tou mê ontos* but not by Gorgias' arrival at Athens in the year 427 and therefore may have been written before Herodotus' Book 1 and Thucydides' Book 2.

(B1) An articulated reference to philosophy surfaces in *Gorgias' Helen* 13. In it Gorgias speaks of the power and danger of persuasion. For evidence he appeals, first of all, to the *logoi* of *meteôrologoi* (writings concerning both meteorological and astronomical phenomena, namely the books called *Peri Phuseôs* by many pre-Socratics), because they offer a succession of ever new theories, often incredible and obscure, though sometimes plausible; secondly, to the *tous anankaious dia logôn agonas*, those competitions through speeches that "have to" take place (in the courts and in the assemblies), and in which a speech well done can both please (*eterpse*) and persuade a large audience; and thirdly, to the *philosophôn logôn amillai* (disputes conducted with "philosophical" speeches).⁶ The latter, we read, are speeches distinguished by the speed of reasoning (*gnomê*) and the consequent ductility (*eumetabolê*) of opinion, the easy changeability of beliefs that that kind of speech has the power to determine or at least encourage. The comparison reveals that the books of the "meteorologists" concern a kind of knowledge that, at least in theory, is very precise and depends on observations of the sky and atmospheric phenomena; that verbal competitions are an essential and thus unavoidable part of civic life; and that "philosophical speeches" lack such immediate social utility. This last group are *logoi* that constitute ends in themselves, attempts to construct argu-

6 Note that the word *philosophôn* here acts as an adjective, not a noun. It is a rather rare use, though met in Heraclitus fr. 35.

ments on a more or less impromptu basis, provocations or adventures of the mind, and even attitudes for a free thinker willing to break taboos. It is worth noticing that, without some sort of characterization like this, the distinction would remain groundless.

What to think of the Gorgianic works known to us in whole or in part—the *Palamedes* and *Peri tou mê ontos*—and of the *Helen* itself? What type of *logoi* are they? They neither teach directly and explicitly about the world, nor present themselves as courtroom speeches (there being no trial of Palamedes or Helen performed). It is likely, therefore, that they are *logoi* of the philosophical type. In that case, the notion of “philosophical speeches” refers not just to the construction of appealing or insidious arguments that lack an immediate connection to reality, but also that are able to excite the audience and *almost* to persuade. Such are, obviously, the *Helen*, *Palamedes*, and *Peri tou mê ontos*. But if we look around, we can readily see the emergence of two types of speech that have precisely these characteristics, and that, moreover, go beyond Gorgias: on the one side, the *antilogiai* and, on the other, the *logos amarturos*. They are two types of writings cultivated by different authors (among them Gorgias) and characterized by the coupling of a playful component with the intentions of causing perplexity and proving the unprovable, respectively.⁷ Not identifying what Gorgias called “philosophical speeches” with these often memorable and virtuosic mental acrobatics is hardly conceivable.⁸

If this is the right description of Gorgias’ works, we find ourselves in the sphere of leisured culture, the comforts of which permit dedicating oneself to the development of speeches and writings designed to embroider bizarre situations. Such is the case of the three writings of Gorgias, nearly all antilogies known to us, and the many ingenious attempts to prove something in the absence of real evidence (the *logoi amarturoi*). Therefore, the passage in Gorgias’ *Helen* shows us an intelligible distinction between what, in his opinion, can or cannot pass for philosophical. What makes the difference seems to be sophisticated cogitation, the ingenious idea, the exhibition of intellectual vitality, the construction of a piece of communication that provokes thought, even if it is not immediately useful and does not advance any secure knowledge.

(B2) In *Herodotus* we find not an adjective but a verb. In 1.30.2 Croesus is said to have said to Solon: *philosopheôn gên pollên theôriês heneken epelêluthas*: “phi-

7 See Rossetti 2012 and 2014.

8 “In Xenophon’s writings, the word we translate ‘philosophy’ most often indicates skill at verbal dueling”: I think this characterization by Sandra Peterson in an unpublished paper on Xenophon is perfectly suited to Gorgias as well.

losophizing, you've traveled to many places in your desire to see-and-learn." The first of these words, rendered here "philosophizing," is in fact untranslatable. I note, however, that between *philosophheôn* and *theôriês heneken* there is considerable overlap: certainly, he is traveling first to see, but then also to understand (and thus to learn), to meet, to establish relationships, to be known and recognized. Therefore, to specify that Solon travels while *philosophheôn* is to recognize the important mental elaboration of his experience. In fact, when someone traveling is not *philosophheôn*, we assume that he is a superficial traveler, one who devotes little energy to the development of mind and as a result benefits little from his efforts. Solon is called a traveler who is anything but shallow. But nothing else is being said. If we interpreted Croesus' lines as "being a lover of wisdom, you went, etc.," we would be constraining ourselves to attributing a meaning to the parts of the word, not to the sense present in the statement taken as a whole.

(B2a) Another detail concerning Solon merits our attention. When, near the end of Xenophon's *Symposium*, Socrates elaborates a "lesson" for Callias, we find, quite unexpectedly, *pôs pote Solôn philosophêsas* (8.39). Socrates tells Callias that he should investigate the knowledge that Themistocles used in order to free Hellas, the knowledge that allowed Pericles to become a powerful city councilor, and the way Solon conducted his reflections (*pôs philosophêsas*) to establish authoritative laws (*nomous kratistous*). This great achievement, actually civically useful, seems to depend on Solon's having practiced *philosophhein*. *Philosophhein* leads, that is to say, to a far-sighted and courageous initiative. By *philosophhein* Xenophon means, therefore, the ability to think and to develop measures that can bring extraordinary benefits to the city. There is therefore a connection with the statement that we find in Herodotus: Solon is a philosophical mind because his mind is exceptionally shrewd.

(B3) The verb form of *philosoph-* also arises in Thucydides. Pericles' speech (2.40.1) emphasizes it: *philokaloumen met' euteleias kai philosophoumen aneu malakias*, "We love beauty with simplicity and we love culture without abandoning ourselves to weakness." Of great significance are the two restrictions, *met' euteleias* and *aneu malakias*. If we try to clarify Pericles' thinking here, we can say that the following idea takes shape: "We Athenians are at war and, as warriors, we are able to invest the greatest energy in military operations, but at the same time we can appreciate the pleasures of life, and we will gladly do so, though without excess. We Athenians willingly cultivate many beautiful things: theater, dance, choirs, the Homeric poems, monumental buildings, statues, paintings, the harp, wine, dancers, loves, the nakedness of the gymnasiums, races, parties, games (e.g., *cottabus*), competitions of every sort, and more. To these multifarious activities, ones that make life worth living, we dedicate our-

selves with greater determination than those living in other cities and we wish our children to devote themselves to them with commitment. We are therefore proud to be, on average, more educated and refined than others, but we know the limit and, as warriors, we are certainly not less determined, less organized, and less threatening than the Spartans". If the verb *philosophein* suggests a softness like that for which Heraclitus scolded his fellow citizens in his fr. 125 DK, the Pericles of Thucydides takes care to preempt such a judgment, not only by introducing the clarification *aneu malakias*, but also by taking care to specify that "we are able to fight hard as well as to cultivate beauty and intellectual excellence." He therefore acknowledges that "we Athenians *philosophoumen* because we give importance to culture and other beautiful things more than the citizens of many other *poleis*," but also stresses: "We are not because of that worthless as warriors, because we know moderation and fortitude." One may deduce that here *philosophein* evokes a mix of culture, pleasure, luxury, and well-being, what in our time is often designated by the noun-phrase "quality of life." There is a significant correlation between the image of Athens outlined here and the anecdotes of Aristippus (found in Diogenes Laertius), who allowed himself many pleasures but at the same time claimed for himself the ability to dominate them and, if necessary, to know how to give them up (on Aristippus see c8 below).

(B4) Another relevant piece of evidence emerges from a compressed passage of *De vetere medicina*. This work, an expression of the **Hippocratic medical school**, has been conjectured to have been written between 430 and 400 BCE. In VM 20 the author begins by recalling that, according to some doctors and sophists, there can be no talented doctor who does not know what man is, and then adds: "I, however, think what is being said by a sophist or a doctor on nature, is less important for the medical art than for the art of painting." So some doctors and some "sophists" (a generic term that stands for *sophoi*, intellectuals) claim that "to know" man and to know how man is made and how his body functions (and thus have a theory or body of relatively organic teachings about this subject) constitutes a precondition for the competent practice of medicine. But, the author of the treatise goes on to say, "their *logos* [sc. theory] tends toward philosophy, just as Empedocles and others who have written [sc. books] on nature [and explained] what man is from the beginning, [focusing on] how in the first phase [man] was formed and from what he was put together" (τείνει δὲ αὐτέοισιν ὁ λόγος ἐς φιλοσοφίην, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη). Passing over the references to Empedocles and (indirectly) to Parmenides—and also the details of the present attempt at translation, a set of points that would take us far in vain—we note that this passage speaks

of speculation about the appearance of man on earth, and the way in which the first men are thought to have been formed. That kind of knowledge, we are told, is not medical art and is not relevant to the practice of medicine, so it is philosophy. Translation: those are speculations of a dubious profession and even of doubtful utility.

By an impressive coincidence, in later times the knowledge of Parmenides and Empedocles was treated as a properly philosophical knowledge; the author's treatise called it philosophical yet not in relation to a form of excellence, one that has not yet even been established, but only to recognize an occupation, even if not downright idle, constituted by attempts at gaining knowledge through an unverifiable speculation devoid of practical relevance.

Synthesis 1. Were we restricting consideration to only these occurrences, it would be difficult to evaluate the points of contact and divergence, especially since every witness, every situation that gives way to a *philosoph-* word, and any declaration invariably brings something of its own, new, original, immeasurable. But this does not create a real obstacle; otherwise one could not compile dictionaries or make translations. Finding commonalities or patterns is simply part of the job of interpretation. Each of these witnesses associates philosophy with the leisure to pursue thoughts, the adventures of the mind, the welfare of those who do not concern themselves with only the most urgent needs but who can gain satisfactions that are purely intellectual, without tangible benefits stemming from any supposed educational value. To confirm or develop this view, we ought therefore consider the additional textual evidence which is available about words in the group *philosoph-* whose use is not yet affected by the "hurricane" of Plato (e.g., Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* of 392).

(B5) A nod, now, to some negative evidence starting with **Aristophanes**. The Socrates of the *Clouds* is a sophist and a versatile intellectual, but is not called a philosopher. Both versions of the *Clouds* were written at the time of Socrates' full maturity as well as at the moment of Athens' maximum deployment of new forms of arrogant opportunism in public life (note the apparent continuity that links the stated objectives of Strepsiades to the attitudes portrayed in *Banqueters*, *Acharnians*, and *Knights*). In the *Clouds* Socrates is an intellectual largely in harmony with the prevailing trend in Athenian society of the time. Nevertheless, the specificity of his character does not fail to emerge, as we see from the vastness of his disciplinary interests, the establishment of a sort of commune with his disciples, even his own sobriety (the "Thinkery" is little characterized by luxury; Strepsiades offers money, but Socrates had not asked for it, does not seek more, and does not even check how much is given

him).⁹ These are details of character that would make it possible to call Socrates *philosophos*—in Gorgias' sense of intellectually curious, bright, and also a bit weird—even if Aristophanes also draws frequent attention to Socrates' unmistakably bizarre (*atopos*) personality, one that hardly fits well with any current model of conduct. The fact that the work does *not* mention philosophy is surprising if we consider the widespread tendency to recognize in it intellectual vitality, the art of speech, and the ability to make the most unexpected ideas appear plausible. This, after all, is what Strepsiades goes to look for with Socrates and expects from him (cf. C1.1, C1.2).

The fact that Aristophanes does not mention philosophy does tell us an important thing: that at least at the time of the play's revision, a special relationship between Socrates and philosophy was not yet known (at least not to the comedian). Further, it must have been perfectly possible, at that time, for Socrates to establish himself apart from philosophy, since philosophy had not yet come to characterize or define him or at least his public image. In fact, if philosophy had constituted an important feature of the personality of Socrates, philosophy would represent a highly innovative and characteristic membership card, and thus worthy of being exploited (or ridiculed) by the playwright. Therefore we have a strong indication that, at the time, philosophy had not yet become particularly important for Socrates, or perhaps even for his contemporaries. This is no more than a clue, an argument from silence, but a non-negligible clue nonetheless.

(B6) Negative evidence stems from a “lost” work by Hippias of Elis too. His *Sunagôgê* (“Harvest”), compiled by the last decades of the fifth century, included a proto-history of Greek philosophy. A sophist younger than Socrates, in this work Hippias traced the history of the earliest pre-Socratic wisdom, without, however, calling it philosophy. As far as we understand, he brought into a single thread a long series of different personalities, including Homer and Hesiod, Orpheus and Musaeus, Thales and Alcmaeon, Heraclitus and Parmenides, Empedocles and Ion, and Melissus and Gorgias.¹⁰ In reporting and connecting these pieces of information, Hippias seems to have focused on the question that we usually associate with the notion of *archê*, the question of

9 As I had occasion to point out in Rossetti 1974, I might add that the logic of the play itself does not demand the simplicity or sobriety of Socrates' character; indeed, that aspect seems somewhat dissonant with the rest of his character. For this reason, we ought to consider that part of Aristophanes' portrayal a reflection of Socrates' actual nature. On the matter see also Konstan 2011; Cerri 2012.

10 Fundamental on the topic remains Patzer 1986. A short summary is included in Rossetti 2015, 140–144.

the origin of the world and its constituent ingredients. He came to establish, among other things, a significant point of contact between the ocean of Homer and the water of Thales. All this, as far as we can tell, he did without speaking of *philosophia*, perhaps because, according to the framework outlined by Gorgias, the type of knowledge surveyed by Hippias would have been classified as meteorology and not as philosophy. This fact suggests that philosophy remained outside his mental horizon. This, in turn, suggests an as-yet weak grasp of the term in the society of his time. Perhaps he complied with the choice of terminology of a colleague more famous and older than he, Gorgias, agreeing to consider his survey as foreign to philosophy.

(B7) Other “objective” traces concerning the person of Socrates, statements that purport to tell us something about a Socrates, though (rather) far away from the crisis that led to his death, emerge in **Xenophon**. Two passages look particularly significant: the conversation with Antiphon and the encounter with Critias.¹¹

In *Mem.* 1.6.2 Antiphon observes: “I thought that those who dedicate themselves to philosophy (*tous philosophountas*) necessarily become happier, but you give me the impression that you get the opposite from philosophy.” There follows the mention of bare feet and a coat not only cheap (*phaulon*) but also worn both in summer and winter. This statement clearly refers to Socrates’ way of being and self-presentation, one distinguished by a marked sobriety, dissonant with his status as an intellectual who enjoys considerable notoriety. In particular his manner of dress is treated as a result of counterproductive choices. “The passion with which you dedicate yourself to philosophy,” argues Antiphon, “does not produce the wealth that would logically follow.” Implicit conclusion: “this proves that you’re not a good teacher, therefore your followers would do better to leave and, if possible, come to study with me.” To recognize in this Socrates who “dedicates himself to philosophy” the one who literally introduced philosophy to Athens is attractive, and the passage has often been understood thus, but an objection immediately presents itself: if students of Socrates are implicitly invited to move from Socrates to Antiphon, this means that the two offer a roughly equivalent teaching. Thus the notion of philosophy introduced here has still to be very general.¹²

11 Other evidence from Xenophon will be reviewed in § 4. I discussed another passage of Xenophon where the word occurs in § 3 (sec. B1).

12 Sandra Peterson, in personal correspondence, has suggested that Antiphon may have considered dedicating himself to philosophy a way to become wealthy, so that he finds Socrates’ condition strange.

Worthy of note is the verb form *hoi philosophountes*, which we meet several times in Plato, for its ability to nurture potential ambiguities. Antiphon and other intellectuals of the time could be considered prestigious *philosophountes*, educated people who know and communicate well.

(B8) We come now to the dispute with Critias and Charicles (*Mem.* 1.2.29–37). In 1.2.31.2 Xenophon says that Critias, trying to get at Socrates, issued a regulation that forbade teaching the art of speech (*logôn technê*), and threw at him “the usual reproach with which people attack philosophers,” publicly slandering him. Similarly Plato in the *Apology* (23d) writes that people hostile to Socrates, finding themselves in difficulty in saying precisely what he does wrong, “say the usual things that are said against all philosophers,” that is, that he researches what is underground and that he does not believe in the existence of gods.

The two passages have historically been a principal argument for the conclusion that Socrates knew that he was and considered himself to be a philosopher. Dorion speaks, as some do, of “what the crowd says of the collection of philosophers” (2010, 100), but I think we can rule out this possibility. In fact, if it is the usual reproach, we have to assume that, in the opinion of Xenophon and Plato, it is a reproach extended to Socrates only with a stretch, an unjustified and impertinent reprimand, based on an exaggeratedly approximate idea of those who are philosophers. If the accusations were justified, one would not speak of the “usual reproach with which people attacked philosophers.” If this is the “usual reproach,” it is a generic one extended to Socrates as a pretext. But do Xenophon and Plato intend to suggest that it would in fact be *incorrect* to take Socrates to be a philosopher? Hard to say; it would anyway be a hasty inference.

On the other hand the logic of the speech implies something else, that in the case of Socrates, Critias did not have to go out on a limb when he prohibited the teaching of *logôn technê*. This is not the place to dwell on the many clues that would encourage Critias to recognize in Socrates a master of rhetoric; the expedient to which Critias appeals is not an unfounded judgment. But what authorizes concluding that someone who teaches the art of conversation is *not* a philosopher? This conclusion would seem hasty as well. After all, the little competition with Antiphon (B6) suggests quite the opposite.

What then is meant by philosophers here? One would say that what is evoked is the enduring distrust against those who reveal an intellectual vigor so pronounced as to preclude the possibility of either coping with or prevailing over them. More precisely, was it not the most coveted of compliments for the teachers in the *logôn technê* to be considered invincible in verbal competitions? Socrates was exactly that. Yet this immediately raises a sea of other issues.

(B9) From the *Memorabilia* there emerges a third testimony showing a trace of opinion predating Socrates' death. In a moment of embarrassment, a young man educated by his books, Euthydemus, declares: "But by the gods, Socrates! I firmly believed I was philosophizing a philosophy (*philosophian philosophhein*) thanks to which I felt that I was educated particularly well in the things that are fitting for those who aspire to excellence (*kalokagathia*)" (*Mem.* 4.2.23). The odd expression is, in itself, untranslatable, but the context is transparent. The reference to philosophy serves to indicate the commitment with which the young man professes to devote himself to reading books (a new resource, uncommon and quite expensive) with the prospect of reaching a relatively traditional excellence, expressly indicated by the very traditional term *kalokagathia*, which suggests a culture not directed towards the attainment of clearly identified results or benefits. We also note that Euthydemus has been able to give himself directives for his own education, and in the direction of cultivation for its own sake; and it is this that he characterizes as philosophy, even before (and therefore independent of) his first and unsought contact with Socrates. It is therefore clear that, in this case, Euthydemus makes a reference to philosophy that has nothing to do with Socrates or, *a fortiori*, with the Socratics, with Plato, etc., and that, not coincidentally, reflects an "old" meaning of the term.

(B10) A dissenting account comes from the story of the "discovery" of Socrates by Aristippus in Olympia. As reported by Plutarch (*De curios.* 2.516c = *SSR* IV A 2), likely drawing on the *Miltiades* of Aeschines of Sphettus, Aristippus was in Olympia during the games. Stumbling on the Athenian Ischomachus, who had heard of Socrates, he asks him how Socrates came to stir up the young and exert such a strong influence on them. Based on the little that Ischomachus was able to tell him (small samples, *mikr' atta tôn logôn autou spermata kai deigmata*), Aristippus suffered a disturbance such that he weakened and wasted away until he could leave for Athens and drink from that source, learning of the person, of the discourses and of the philosophy of Socrates (*kai ton andra kai tous logous autou kai tên philosophian historêsen*). The broad outline of this account does not lend itself to being invented, but in the reliability of the details there is much room for doubt; Plutarch or his source could easily have added the explicit reference to philosophy. Actually, this latter possibility is likely. Since Aeschines seems neither to have had his own philosophy nor to have identified a specific philosophy of Socrates, more likely "philosophy" comes from the centuries-old tradition which inspired Plutarch, who recognized in Socrates a full-blown philosopher who spoke in his characteristic way and had his own philosophy, his doctrine, his philosophical teaching. This is the Socrates of later periods; it cannot be what Ischomachus said to Aristippus! At that time, the notion of "philosophy of x" was far from having already taken shape.

(B11) Let us now turn to some Platonic testimonies. Sandra Peterson has already shown that Plato was able to deploy, from time to time, a meaning of philosophy very different from (or from what soon became) his own idea of philosophy.¹³ Plato thereby implicitly acknowledged the existence of another idea of philosophy, distinct from his, consolidated before and therefore not dependent on his own, the one to which he devoted the most assiduous care.

(B11.1) We can begin with the reference to philosophy found in the *Charmides*. The dialogue opens with an explicit reference to the battle of Potidea (432 BCE) in which Socrates, not yet forty, took part as a hoplite. Socrates has just returned with the expeditionary force, and all those he meets ask about the military events. Then, he says, “I began to ask questions, especially about the current situation with regard to philosophy (*peri philosophias hopôs echoi ta nun*), and about the young people, if by chance there was someone who was known for *sophia*, for beauty, or for both” (153d).

Plato is careful to use the term in a rather general sense: it clearly alludes to the public sphere; Socrates asks if new (i.e., interesting) ideas are circulating in the city and if there are promising young people who are beginning to be talked about. He therefore asks: “In these four to five months has anything changed? Are there some new features in our cultural circuit?” Interpreted in these terms, as they must be, the reference to philosophy is revealed as unusual for Plato in that it evokes, if anything, the cultural horizons of a bygone era, when talk of philosophy was still rare, and does so without imagining it from the distance of subsequent developments. This suggests that, in this case, Plato was able to maintain the atmosphere of another era and revive it without straining.

The question attributed to Socrates also assumes that new ideas may have taken form, or that there might have emerged attractive youths, even during his absence from Athens, and therefore without his stimulus. That fact is another clue to suggest that this is philosophy as it could have been conceived around 431, philosophy in the “lightweight” sense that, as we see, has characterized the pre- and non-Platonic stage.

Just to mention a possible corollary of these considerations: we have reason to wonder whether the *Charmides* was written at a time when Plato had not yet developed his notion of philosophy and therefore was not yet ready to move away from the notion of philosophy that he would soon attack and eventually obscure. Luckily for me, the context formed by these notes allows me to refrain from attempting to answer the question.

13 Peterson 2003, 2011. I find that Peterson's inquiry largely converges with the point of view adopted here.

(B11.2) A second testimony, also quite telling, emerges from the *Gorgias* where Callicles urges a “moderate” use of philosophy, understood as a valuable educational resource but not as an ideal of life (484c–485e). This is a point of view that even Isocrates could share.¹⁴ In any case, for the Socrates of the *Gorgias* it is the wrong idea, an idea actively to combat. Therefore, the meaning of pre- and non-Platonic philosophy is here identified before challenging it, recognizing that it is an idea that exists, has its supporters, has strings to its bow, and expresses a point of view that some defend.

(B11.3) I now recall *Apology* 23d. Here the opinion of Socrates’ accusers takes shape, who would say the same things that are said against philosophers (*philosophountôn*; cf. B6 and B7 above). To say that Socrates engages in strange research tasks, does not believe in the gods, and is dedicated to making the weak argument strong is to pick out activities representative of what makes philosophers detestable. This sense recalls the sense of philosophy adopted by *Gorgias* (cf. B3), and hardly seems Platonic.

(B11.4) Also noteworthy is *Apology* 29c–30a. Here Socrates famously hypothesized: “if you proposed to me to leave me alone provided I end my usual research and not to philosophize more, I would answer that I will not stop philosophizing,” and “in that case I would tell you what I usually say.” The philosophy that Socrates would not be able to give up is identified with a kind of exhortation that certainly is innovative with respect to the pre- and non-Platonic meaning of philosophy but, on the other hand, has little to do with the mature Platonic idea.

I should also note that here—and so in *Apology* 23d—the reference to *philosophhein* is attributed to the accusers, so it should reflect the idea that people have of philosophy, not the meaning preferred by Socrates (whatever it is). If so, the connotative field evoked will be (cannot not be) that usual for the era.¹⁵

Synthesis 2: In their diverse collection, the evidences examined so far hint at an idea of philosophy oriented toward intellectual curiosity, to the adventures of the mind, to *paideia*, to *otium*. This reveals positive connotations. But to evoke intellectual curiosity, or to cultivate it, one need not refer to the words of the group **philosoph-*. A desire to become a philosopher has not yet developed;

14 If I am not mistaken, commentators (e.g., Peterson 2011, 239ff.) do not detect this occasional but unmistakable proximity to the ideas of Isocrates.

15 As for Plato, here I limit myself to a few examples, especially in view of the extensive survey in Peterson 2011.

much less can you find books of “philosophy.” Moreover, far from suggesting a clear division from rhetoric, one glimpses a special closeness to the *logôn technê*.

In other words, what we encounter continues to be unmistakably an “old” meaning of philosophy, philosophy as intellectual vitality and the exercise of intelligence, possibly as an investigation without an immediate profit. This meaning we meet again in the pure state. The condition is highly significant, because here are conditions to speak of an *original meaning*.

What is more, Socrates seems to have played no role in the establishment of the verb and its first derivatives,¹⁶ nor in the exploitation of this terminology.

A paper by the late Michael Frede deserves to be mentioned here. He acknowledged that *before Plato* no full notion of philosophy was yet available (2003, 3–4), but then he stated that, *from Socrates onwards*, all philosophers took philosophy as a discipline (3 and 8). The immense prestige of Professor Frede helps us to realize how easy was for him, as well as for many other scholars, to fall into a patent contradiction when acknowledging that, before Plato, no full idea of philosophy was available *and* that Socrates was an accomplished philosopher. The present investigation deals precisely with what we should think of the latter, provided that these statements are mutually exclusive, as they are.

4 **Philosoph-* Immediately after the Death of Socrates

We continue with instances and absences of words in the group **philosoph-* in the years following 399 BCE. We will set aside the hundreds of occurrences found in Isocrates and Plato.¹⁷

(C1) What attracts our attention is first of all **Aristophanes’ *Ecclesiazusae*** 571–572. In 392, seven years after the elimination of the one who many still consider the philosopher *par excellence*, Aristophanes dramatized the Athenian women taking legal power over their city. They then had an urgent need to develop innovative ideas and get solutions, but plausible ones, not extravagant or ridiculous ones. The choir addresses Praxagora: “Now there is just need for you to keep awake your shrewd and philosophical spirit, that knows how to make ideas come (*puknên phrenā kai philosophon egeirein / phrontid’ epis-*

16 Wilamowitz wrote: “zwar Sokrates das wort φιλοσοφία gewiss nicht geradezu erfunden hat” (1880, 215).

17 On the latter see below, § 5.

tamenên) in defense of its friends.” The context helps us to decode the claim that, to translate in a different way, “you have a circumspect and philosophical *phrên*”: it is desirable that this *phrên* be both experienced and broad-minded, can imagine something utterly new, but can also come up with workable solutions. This interpretation suggests that the phrase does not look in the direction of the philosophy of the philosophers but evokes a relatively ancient meaning of the term, understood as a mindset that is creative, capable, resourceful, and with common sense (therefore anything other than unaware of the world).

(C2) To those same years we should date Polycrates’ *Accusation of Socrates* (*Katêgoria Sôkratous*) which put into writing, presumably on commission, the speech given by one of the three accusers (*katêgoroi*) at Socrates’ trial. Probably this was Anytus, who was really the only visible individual. We might assume that Polycrates freely reformulated what was said at the trial, improving the standing of the accusers at a time when the Socratics began to make themselves heard and, by presenting Socrates as a noble victim, Anytus and the others were falling into a bad light. As we know, in *Memorabilia* 1.2 Xenophon reports eight phrases attributed to Socrates’ accuser, drawing them, in all likelihood, from Polycrates’ pamphlet. Libanius did the same thing in his *Apology* at a distance of about seven and a half centuries. This gives us a not-too-rough idea of Polycrates’ reasoning. It is easily established that from those *excerpta* that there emerges no reference to philosophy. The detail is probably worth noting.

(C3) Alcidas, the author of the written speech *About the Authors of Written Speeches*, also known as *On the Sophists*, states: “In rhetoric as in philosophy, those who waste their lives in this activity I consider deficient” (2). In this case the comparison with rhetoric invites us to assume that philosophy is conceived as a very marked skill or excellence, if it is to exist at the same level as of *technê rhêtorikê*. This would then be the oldest trace of a professionalized meaning of philosophy.

Alcidas turns to the subject again in 15, when he states: “It is strange that one who exhibits philosophy (*ton antipoioumenon philosophian*) and promises to teach others, gives evidence of his wisdom only if he has tablets and books, while, if he does not have them at hand, he does no better than the ignorant; he can deal with an impromptu speech only if you leave him time; on a subject imposed on him he remains dumbest of the layman; and professing himself a specialist in speeches (*logôn technas epangellesthai*), he does not seem to have the slightest ability to speak.” Again we learn that there are people who insist on attributing to themselves something like the status of students of philosophy (but Alcidas does not write *philosophon einai*) and, on this basis, attribute to themselves the possession of *sophia* and the status of teachers.

The temptation to conclude that Alcidas reports on people who consider themselves professionals of philosophy is very attractive, but it is probably a temptation which we would do well to resist, because they fail to exhibit the traits that would differentiate philosophers from rhetoricians. This passage therefore comes to an unexpected convergence with the previously examined passages of Xenophon (B6 and B7), a convergence that deserves to be kept in mind when Plato opposes philosophy to rhetoric (e.g., in the famous pages of the *Gorgias*).

(C4) Far more complicated is the case of the orator Lysias. The TLG reports ten occurrences, a heterogeneous assortment if we also consider the assessments of those who have occasion to speak of Lysias.

(C4.1) I recall, to begin, that he apparently wrote an *Apology of Socrates* that, for the purposes of this investigation, provides no relevant data.¹⁸ The TLG's ninth instance of **philosoph-* words consists in a report by Diogenes Laertius: "to Lysias, who had written a defense for him, the philosopher replied: 'Beautiful speech, but it does not suit me,' because obviously it was mostly lawyer-like rather than philosophical" (2.40). These are two occurrences that for the purposes of this survey are completely irrelevant.

(C4.2) Closer to the world of philosophers is fr. 1 (Ath. 13.611e–612b = SSR VI A 16), where Lysias argues a case against a Socratic, Aeschines of Sphettus. In the piece of the oration that has reached us, Lysias gives the floor to his client, who reports: "[Aeschines] introduced himself to me begging me not to let goods be seized for the payment of interest. 'I'm setting up a perfumerie,' he said, 'and I need capital to start: I will pay an interest of nine oboli per mina.' I let myself be convinced by his words, because I thought that a man who had been a student of Socrates, and who had held many elevated discourses on justice and virtue (*peri dikaiousunês kai aretes pollous semnous legonta logous*), would never have dared to behave as do the most dishonest and unscrupulous of men." The evocation of an unscrupulous character ends with the words: "Behold the life of our sophist!" On the reliability of a dark portrait serving the interests of the accuser, we ought obviously to have reservations; all the same, these statements were made by a prestigious and experienced speechwriter—who at the time was no less than sixty years old—and thus the story told, as confirmed by witnesses, could at least be plausible in the eyes of jurors. The trial date of 390–385 has been conjectured for two reasons: it is about an Aeschines who is already publicly revealed as Socratic, and the label "Socratic" is perceived as a guarantee of honesty and reliability; on the other side, it seems that Lysias died (or stopped writing speeches) around 380.

18 Rossetti 1975 is one of the few studies on this topic.

The words used by the accuser of Aeschines are highly significant and authorize us to suspect that his reputation for repeated discourses about justice and virtue attached to the Socratics as a group. We note, however, that Lysias does not call them philosophers; it is as though this specification had not yet established itself, or was not yet considered a defining feature. The detail is surprising, and must therefore be taken into careful consideration.

The TLG associates with this story five **philosoph-* words from Athenaeus. Athenaeus wrote that “no one is farther from philosophy than so-called philosophers,” and then spoke of “your great arrogance, O philosophers,” then commented: “nice that the art of perfumery constitutes the end of happiness for a philosopher who was a follower of the philosophy of Socrates” (13.612a). These details are manifestly irrelevant.

(C4.3–4) The TLG identifies Lys. 8.11, where *philosophountas* clearly means “hair-splitting.” It is assumed that the oration is not the work of Lysias,¹⁹ but his most famous oration *For the Crippled Man* (24.10) includes an expression in all respects equivalent: “All those who have a disability focus their efforts and their thoughts on this (*touto zêtein kai philosophhein*).” We note, therefore, the use of the verb form as evocative of excogitations, whether ingenious and approved or not.

Of the ten occurrences reported, the only significant occurrence is therefore C4.4, which simply captures a fairly recognizable aspect of philosophizing in the “old” meaning: that disposition to produce ingenious gimmicks that we have already met in C1.

(C5) Now let us look through the individual Socratics beginning with Aeschines of Sphettus. Explicit references to philosophy are lacking in the considerable remains of the *Alcibiades* and other dialogues. The only hint seems an indirect one, from POxy 2890 back (= SSR VI A 80). Here we read that “it would be strange if, Euripides asking which of the artisans should Miltiades attend on to become able to advise on how best to become a shoemaker, I answer ‘those who work leather’ and ... [for] building a house, I answered ‘the manufacturers of houses,’ and now instead ...”. At this point the papyrus is interrupted, and for the inexperienced reader it is virtually irresistible to imagine that the speech could only continue with a question about who he should attend on to become expert in philosophy. But in Xenophon we find a very similar sentence, in response to Hippias. In *Mem.* 4.4.5 we read that “he encountered Socrates when he was explaining to someone that it was strange that, if you wanted someone taught to be a shoemaker or carpenter or blacksmith or horseman,

19 Cf. Medda 1991, 247.

he knew where to send him to achieve this, but if one wanted to learn either for himself what is right or have a child or a servant learn it, did not know where to go to get this result.” Since the setting of the sentence is exactly the same and two of the four examples given by Xenophon are also those found in Aeschines, Xenophon probably knew and took up Aeschines’ pattern of reasoning in the *Miltiades*. This is a good reason to think that Aeschines did not speak of philosophy even in this case.

(c6) More complicated is the case of **Phaedo**. We can start from a supposed statement of Socrates derived from Phaedo’s *Zopyrus*. In Alex. Aphrod. *De fato* 6 (cf. Euseb. *Praep. Evag.* 6.9.22),²⁰ Socrates admits that he would be, by nature, as Zopyrus says that he is—“if he had not become better than he would naturally be through the practice of philosophy” (ἦν γὰρ ἂν τοιοῦτος, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει, εἰ μὴν διὰ τὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀσκησιν ἀμείνων τῆς φύσεως ἐγένετο).²¹ This suggests a nature-philosophy contrast that presupposes a relatively evolved (neither pre- nor non-Platonic idea) of philosophy.

To frame the matter better we must also consider two other pieces of the puzzle: first, the way the story is presented by John Cassian (*Consolationes* 13.5.3, not included in *SSR*). According to Cassian, Socrates would have limited himself in responding to say: *παύσασθε ἑταῖροι· εἰμί γαρ, ἐπέχω δέ, id est quiescite, O sodales: etenim sum, sed contineo*. The phrase lets us imagine that Socrates has not needed to bring into the explanation the notion of philosophy; but the testimony of the Emperor Julian invites more caution. In fact he has occasion to write (*Ep.* 82.64–66) that, according to Phaedo, nothing is incurable thanks to philosophy; everything, including bad habits and passions, is or is likely to be purified by philosophy. Since this is a general statement and no further evidence helps us establishing how faithful his reference to Phaedo is (nor whether he refers to the *Zopyrus* or to a different writing), we are unable to make Phaedo’s ideas about philosophy more precise.

(c7) In the case of **Antisthenes** the result is the total lack of **philosoph*-words in the long list of his works (DL 6.15–18) and in the information available about the content of his writings and teachings.

There are a few rare but insignificant exceptions, as when Stobaeus relates that to the question, “What do you advise me to teach my son?” Antisthenes would respond: “If [you think] he is going to live with gods, [please make him a] philosopher; if with men, [please make him a] rhetorician” (*SSR* V A 173).

20 This and other sources of information about *Zopyrus* not found in *SSR* are listed in Rossetti 1980.

21 Other sources specify that Socrates had “pederastic eyes” and was *libidinosus, amans coitum et sim.* (frs. 11, 8, and 21–22 Rossetti).

This is baffling statement, since it is totally not in tune with Antisthenes' character. Rather than speculate on the dubious authenticity of the reference to Antisthenes—Stobaeus sometimes falls into great error, for example giving the same apophthegmata and citations to two different people—it will be worth noting here that philosophy is treated as a very special kind of higher level *paideia*, and thus as a well-established fact. But precisely this history remains a most isolated tile in the larger mosaic.

Among the few positive references there is a statement of Xenophon. In *Mem.* 1.2.19 we read: "Perhaps many of those who claim to be devoted to philosophy would argue that the right man can never become unjust, nor the man of moderation arrogant and that, in the context of things capable of being learned, one who has learned can never lose his knowledge." There is the strong impression that Xenophon is alluding to the beliefs professed by teachers and students of a school of philosophy, especially given that Diogenes Laertius (6.105) presents just this teaching—that virtue can be taught and, once acquired, cannot be lost—as a doctrine characteristic of the Cynics. Since we are dealing with a single comparison, it is hard not to think that Xenophon has Antisthenes and eventually his school in mind here. This would imply that they were already noted for some rather paradoxical doctrines and, what is significant in the present context, they considered themselves philosophers. Moreover, we would like to know when one could begin to say that of philosophers, good and bad, there were already *many*. At any event, what emerges in the anecdotes about Antisthenes cannot be considered representative of the uses of pre- and non-Platonic **philosoph-*.

(c8) In the case of **Aristippus** we must start with the structured series of anecdotes reported in Diogenes Laertius. What comes out of 2.66–83 is the portrait of a Socratic who is constantly on the defensive for his not despising riches, luxury, good food, or women, but who is fiercely proud of his ability to use everything without being used, without having to be bound, preserving his freedom, understood as an eminently Socratic legacy. This remarkably consistent sequence contains talk of philosophy.

§ 68: "What do you get from philosophy?" "To be able to deal with all without fear (*tharrountôs*)."

§ 68 again: "What do philosophers have more of [sc. than others]?" "If all laws were abolished, we would continue to live the same way."

§ 69: "How is it that philosophers are at the doors of the rich, while the rich do not go to the doors of the philosophers?" "Because they know what they need, while the others do not know."

§ 70: “How is it that philosophers are always seen at the gates of the rich?”
 “As doctors are seen at the gates of the sick, but no one would rather be sick instead of a doctor.”

§ 71: “We, the ordinary people, are not fearful; instead you philosophers are (*ou dedoikamen ~ deiliâte*)?” “Because we are not thinking about the same kind of soul.”

§ 73: Obligated by Dionysius to say something appropriate for a philosopher (*eipein ti tôn ek philosophias*), “It’s ridiculous that you come to inform yourself from me about talking about philosophical matters and then you also tell me when I have to speak [in that way].”

§ 79: those who have access to a wide-ranging education but not philosophy he compared to the suitors of Penelope, who were allowed to have Melanto, Polydora, and the other servants, anything rather than marry the mistress.

The idea of philosophy that takes shape in these exchanges is the idea of a society in which there are already many philosophers, and of a society with its curiosity aroused, trying to figure out what makes them special. But these are anecdotes, apophthegmata probably gathered from some admirer of Aristippus decades later. Therefore, even if one accepts them a source of information about Aristippus’ mental world (as even I would say), we should assume that these stories were collected and put in writing once the Plato cyclone had passed and had already excited the collective imagination. In addition, the virtual absence of independent evidence with which to compare what Diogenes Laertius gives us hampers any attempt to discern the genuine from non-genuine. There are therefore no means to estimate the degree of authenticity of the individual anecdotes. As a result, at least for our purposes, the information is almost unusable.

(c9) And now the sixteen occurrences found in **Xenophon**.²² Remember that he probably settled in Scillus (not far from Olympia) around 390, with ample access to the writings of other Socratics and prepared to turn to a wide range of works. These circumstances give special interest to his testimony.

22 Sandra Peterson, in her extreme generosity, shared with me her unpublished study of these sixteen occurrences.

Seven occurrences have already been discussed above (*Mem.* 1.2.19—C7; *Mem.* 1.2.31—B7, *Mem.* 1.6.2—B6, *Mem.* 4.2.23—B8, *Smp.* 8.39—B1); I will now examine the others in the order in which these occurrences appear in TLG.

(C9.1) *Oec.* 16.9: “I think, I said, O Ischomachus, I would gladly learn first—and it seems to me to be a desire of the philosopher—how I ought to cultivate the land if I wanted to collect much barley and wheat.” Here Socrates reminds Ischomachus that he is, and knows that he is, and knows that he is considered, a philosopher. He says this to claim that plenty of information about proper (and therefore profitable) cultivation of fields is already available or can be readily figured out, especially when talking to a person who knows how to ask appropriate questions (cf. 16.8 and 19.15–17). We might also be expected to see juxtaposed the idea that an open mind (such as Socrates’) knows things he thought he did not know. We are therefore in the presence of an emphatic certification of the status of Socrates. At the same time, the idea of philosophy that is suggested here recalls the wisdom and intellectual curiosity of a Solon or a Praxagora, not the great horizons of the idea of Platonic philosophy.

This statement and the one appearing in *Mem.* 1.6.2 (B6) are among the most explicit in suggesting the idea that Socrates passed for a philosopher and considered himself as such. However, they appear in not exactly reassuring contexts, and so they can be taken into account only with great caution.

(C9.2) *Symp.* 1.5: “You see in us some self-employed workers of philosophy” (some “do it yourselves”: *autourgous tinas tês philosophias*). In these curious terms, Socrates responds to Callias’ contrasting him and his circle to the sophists who, notoriously, were well paid. The self-characterization is somewhat puzzling, because there is no external evidence suitable to explain the meaning of *autourgoi tês philosophias*.

(C9.3) *Symp.* 4.62: “the rich Callias and the educated Prodicus: the first, in love with philosophy (*philosophias erônta*); the second, in need of riches.” The whole of chapter 4 requires our attention here, because in it each invited guest has the opportunity to boast of his best characteristic, and Socrates makes his justly famous descriptions of his imperfections, but no one evokes philosophy if not Socrates himself, and yet philosophy arises here only in relation to Callias and Prodicus. Whatever Xenophon might have had in mind, it is obvious that Callias in the time of Socrates sought philosophy not as a doctrine but as intellectual flexibility, creativity, wit, culture, art of speech, or something of that sort.

(C9.4) *Anab.* 2.1.13: when the Greek troops are asked to surrender and hand over their weapons, the Greek Phalinus, acting as emissary of Tissaphernes, replies to the Athenian Theopompus (according to whom surrendering their weapons would be a big mistake) and exclaims: “You seem like a philosopher

(*alla philosophôî men eoikas*), young man, and you say things that are not without grace. But know that you are stupid if you believe that your courage will prevail on the power of the king.”

According to Mather-Hewitt (1962, 360), value and virtue are notoriously themes dear to philosophers, but were they already then?²³ Most likely not, if only because this is perhaps the oldest occurrence of *philosophos* used as a singular noun. The Athenian Theopompus, moreover, does not exalt himself further, but points out the enormous (and obvious) difference between a large unit of soldiers in distress (because their leader, Cyrus, was just killed) but still armed, and that same band after handing over their weapons. Whoever dares to speak in these terms in the situation shown is offering creative considerations on the pros and cons of the situation, and in fact shows the way to a negotiation that will save the life of the band. Therefore here *philosophos* implies nothing about a professional group; it indicates only an open mind that can perceive the benefits of a policy full of dangers but not itself impractical (so that, soon after, Clearchus adopts the suggestion advanced by Theopompus).

(C9.5) *Cyr.* 6.1.41: “I am sure I have two souls, now that I have philosophized (*pephilosophêka*) with that evil sophist that is Eros. If the soul were one, it could not be simultaneously good and evil, responsible for greedy actions and honest actions, willing and not willing the same course of action; it is clear instead that there are two souls [etc.]”.

Again there emerges a certain ambivalence. In itself, the idea of philosophizing with Eros makes us think of a man who asks himself what to do, whether to accept or reject the proposals of Eros. It might seem, then, that the term is used in the weak way that was typical of the first phase of these linguistic uses. But the context suggests something else. The idea of having two souls is an original response to the problem of *akrasia* and the story of Heracles at the crossroads going back to Prodicus (*Xen. Mem.* 2.1.21–34). The context is doctrinal, so *philosophhein* should mean “reach a conclusion” or “give an explanation.” I assume that the *Cyropedia* was written many years after Plato’s *Republic*, perhaps around 360 BCE. This would explain the emergence of a meaning that is doctrinal in the broad sense of the term; it would not therefore represent the pre- and non-Platonic uses of **philosoph-*.

(C9.6) *Por.* 5.3–4: “In fact, if the city lives in peace, who will not need her, beginning with ship owners and merchants? And those who are in possession of large amounts of grain or wine or oil or livestock, and those who are

23 Sandra Peterson alerts me in personal correspondence to the fact that this *philosophôî eoikas* could also echo an expression actually used by Phalinus on that occasion.

able to get rich thanks to their intelligence and their money, and the craftsmen, sophists, philosophers, poets, and those who use their works, and those who want to see or hear things sacred and profane worthy of being seen or heard, also those who need to sell or buy a lot of goods without losing time, where could they get what they want better than in Athens?" The work is known to figure among Xenophon's last writings, and the author refers to the socio-economic reality of the moment. Therefore it is not surprising that, for the fact of being included among those who are able to get rich thanks to their intelligence, philosophers are treated as a well-defined professional class, indeed one not without economic potential. That is enough to show that in this passage there is no trace of the pre- and non-Platonic use of **philosoph-*.

(C9.7) *Cyn.* 13.6–9: "[Besides me] there are also many others who blame the Sophists and philosophers, because the Sophists spend their wisdom in words, not in ideas. I know that some of them will probably say that works written competently and consistently are not written competently nor consistently: it will be easy for them to criticize hastily and unjustly. Now the purpose of my writing is to support correct positions and to educate not skilled sophists but wise and good men: I do not want that what I have written seem useful, but that it be useful, so it appears forever irrefutable. The Sophists instead speak and write to mislead, in view of their income, and they do not make themselves useful to anyone in anything: none of them, in fact, has ever been a sage and none of them is, but each of them is content to be called sophist, a name that for men of sense is an insult. So I recommend being wary of the precepts of the sophists and instead holding in high regard the ideas of philosophers: the sophists in fact chase the rich and young, while philosophers offer their company to all and their friendship: they do not appreciate or despise whatever economic status men have."

The final most singular section of this little work comes to contrast the philosophers to sophists in a way that is unexpected and also difficult to understand. The contempt shown toward the sophists is surprising; it is surprising that Xenophon considers himself a (cordial) philosopher; and it is surprising that there is talk of philosophers that have a "Socratic" relationship with people. The absence of references to Socrates (a prototype of the "cordial philosopher") is worth noting. I have no response to any of this.

(C10) Something about the way Aristotle deals with Socrates seems worth mentioning here. Forty passages have been selected in *SSR I B* and elsewhere. In none of these entries **philosoph* words do occur. From this negative evidence we should probably infer, in the light of the above, that according to Aristotle Socrates had little to do with philosophy, whatever his merits. Besides, in

Metaphysics A the name of Socrates is already used as a generic noun, as at 981a19 and 983b13–18.

5 Philosopher Socrates? Two Different Meanings of *Philosophia*, an “Ancient” and a “Modern”

What are we to think of this collection of references? In our survey, occurrences of **philosoph-* found in pre-Platonic writings have been integrated with a set of references from Plato’s time, including some that are from Plato himself.²⁴ We had to distinguish between occurrences prior to Plato (a good dozen,²⁵ found in works of fewer than ten authors) and occurrences found in Plato and other fourth century sources. The custom has been not to dwell on the pre- and non-Platonic evidence, on the assumption, so I think, that philosophy was like a river, if not starting from Homer then at least from Thales (or at least from Anaximander, or from Heraclitus) and has become bigger and bigger, has known variations on the theme, but no clean break, no interruption. But *this* assumption is likely to have to be reconsidered, as a dozen bits of evidence from an assortment of authors (Herodotus to Lysias and Alcidamas) speak indisputably of a time when the Plato “cyclone” had not yet hit, plus some relatively late evidence (much from Isocrates, whom I have neglected here,²⁶ and some found in Plato himself and Xenophon), that also speak of that stage. **Philosoph-* words were, at the beginning, used infrequently, but their semantic field is anything but vague or inconsistent. Philosophy keeps meaning something like a creative, intelligent, witty way to put ideas together and into circulation, and eventually the art of speaking. But not much more.

A comparison with the idea of philosophy that was accredited by Plato is therefore helpful:

- In the pre- and non-Platonic phase there is philosophy but there are not philosophers²⁷

²⁴ Others have been identified and discussed in Peterson 2011.

²⁵ That a more thorough examination could bring out further relevant statements is at least possible.

²⁶ As for Isocrates, I note Nightingale 1995 and McCoy 2007. Reasons of space prevent me from a detailed comparison with these and other books on Isocrates.

²⁷ The expression *hoi philosophountes* makes its appearance with Xenophon, Isocrates and Plato; only in imperial times (with Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Athenaeus) does one begin to speak of *hoi philosophos*.

- In the “early period” philosophy is not a form of excellence or a way of life
- It is not a cultural institution where you study, get educated, and do research
- It does not qualify as a knowledge that can be taught or appropriated
- It is not a discipline in which you can specialize
- It is not identified with the particular teaching of a given intellectual (e.g., “the philosophy of x”)
- It is not contrasted to sophistry or to rhetoric
- It does not evoke a series of books
- It does not show a vision of the government of the *polis* and is not meant to foreshadow a different destiny for philosophers in the afterlife.²⁸

Thus emerges a different identity, without any serious risk of confusing old and new. On the one hand we have a new and irreversible beginning, designed and implemented with great success by Plato; on the other we have a good half-century during which there was occasional talk of philosophy, but in a sense dramatically different, much simpler and less ambitious. We can speak, therefore, of a “modern” idea of philosophy that differs clearly from what was then already in circulation, under a connotative overload and added value brought by Plato.

Therefore, a major and permanent change in the concept or conception of philosophy was made by Plato,²⁹ to the point that, since then, philosophy continues to move along recognizable coordinates. Indeed, we begin to understand that philosophy is not born with Thales or in wonder, but has had exactly two births: in Athens towards the end of the age of Pericles, then in Athens in the works of Plato. The change has been so definitive as to obscure the memory of a different idea of *philosophia*, the non- and pre-Platonic one, to the point that modern lexica do register the “primitive” meaning, but not its quick oblivion. And Aristotle was already able to suggest that a perennial philosophy took its first steps with Thales, while being seemingly unable to distinguish between old and new ideas of philosophy.

With reference to Socrates, the evidence examined suggests that cultivated Athenians began to speak of those who *philosophousin* when he was in his thirties, but not from an impulse due to him. On the contrary, even Socrates, to the extent that he used from time to time the term, gives the impression

28 Let me not even try to document this synthesis of linguistic uses of **philosoph-* in Plato, but only point out that I tried to give an idea of what, for Plato, philosophy is or should be.

29 Besides, the care with which Plato tried to mark the difference between philosophy and sophistry, and likewise between philosophy and rhetoric, may have been part of the process that led him to offer a completely new idea of philosophy.

that he was inspired to use language already in place, if not altogether deeply rooted. Moreover, it should be clear that the sort of *philosophhein* that was known when Socrates was alive had very little in common with the “modern” idea of philosophy.

Therefore we can neither say that Socrates made a significant contribution to the configuration of the semantic field of philosophy, nor that he recognized in that concept a special value or something that uniquely identified himself, nor that a more intensive use of the term philosophy took place thanks to him (since intensification took off sharply in the years after his death). Consequently, the special relationship of Socrates with philosophy (and in particular with a conception of philosophy that is unmistakably post-Socratic) seems established by Plato alone. This does not mean denying a Socratic form of conversing, but it does mean asserting that it probably was not considered philosophical by him, and that he could not have so considered it, because at that time philosophy was understood as something else, and no one had it in mind to say that conversations with Socrates were philosophical.

This is what escaped, among many others, to Wilamowitz when he wrote that “die sokratische philosophie die sophistik ablöste” (1880, 215). Even if Socrates in his late age began to perceive himself as not being a true sophist but something else (this is far from certain, but not impossible), he had no opportunity to qualify himself as a philosopher, because the substantive *philosophos* was not yet available during his lifetime. In the same vein, Dorion has written: “Le reproche le plus constant que l’on trouve sous la plume des detracteurs de Xénophon, et parfois même de ses défenseurs, est que l’auteur des *Mémoires* n’est pas un philosophe, de sorte qu’il n’a pas pu saisir les nuances et la complexité de la pensée de Socrate” (2010, xc). Unfortunately, if something of the sort occurred, it was not because Xenophon was not a philosopher while Socrates was!³⁰ *Philosophos* was a qualification of which Plato became particularly proud, but it cannot be extended to his beloved master. Besides, it is at least doubtful that the other Socratics were equally proud of considering themselves philosophers (the evidence collected above is against such a conjecture).

So, if it was Plato who made a *philosophos* out of a sophist or a *sophos* whose name was Socrates, and in many cases outlined a fictionalized Socrates, Wilamowitz was right when stating that Plato “war des gewartige dichter der diese gestalt fest und scharf gepraegt hat.”³¹ Clearly, a number of profound

30 Dorion is claiming that Xenophon deserves far more consideration but, as to the qualification of Socrates as a philosopher, he seems to have no objection.

31 Wilamowitz 1880, 217. In Rossetti 2015, 159–161, it occurred to me to exploit this idea which, as it happens, goes back to Wilamowitz.

consequences follow, as to Plato and the role he played in portraying *his own* Socrates, as well as for what may concern Socrates himself.

To this effect, a brief parenthesis on a strictly related topic, the pre-Socratics, may prove enlightening. Not unlike Socrates, they remained foreign to philosophy. According to A.A. Long, since none of them identified himself as a “philosopher,” what we need is just to “beware of attributing to them anachronistic conceptions of the scope of philosophy and its subdivisions” (1999, 3). Patricia Curd, in turn, remarked that “we need to determine if thinking of them as philosophers is helpful in understanding and interpreting their writings” (2003, 117). Now, there is ample evidence on how misleading has been their characterization as philosophers.³²

And there is more. The just published “new” Diels-Kranz—I mean the immense work of André Laks and Glenn Most, *Les débuts de la philosophie* (Paris 2016) and the twin set of nine new volumes in the Loeb Classical Library, namely the *Early Greek Philosophy* edited by the same authors (Harvard UP)—has a first-order new feature: their collection includes a whole chapter devoted to Socrates, and placed between those on Protagoras-Gorgias and those on Prodicus-Thrasymachus. Nothing comparable has ever occurred so far, and I can only welcome their decision, which is incontestably well-grounded. This fact is not without effects since, unexpectedly, it makes much more transparent what I was arguing in these pages. It resounds, indeed, as a sort of warning: beware of understanding Socrates through categories established only after his death.

Summing up: to treat Socrates as a philosopher in the Platonic meaning of the word would be not merely anachronistic, but positively misleading. Just consider how often scholars investigated his doctrines much as if he were an accomplished scholar; or how often Plato and other later sources associated him with rather well-established notions and points of doctrine—*akrasia* and *enkrateia*, *elenchus* and *aretê*, sophists and rhetoric, soul and afterlife, excellence and vices, *protreptikos logos* and *maieutikê*, etc.—and especially with the “modernized” notion of philosophy. It is at least likely (but in some cases it is certain!) that these notions were developed, named, and made identifiable only after (or well after) 399 BCE. Unfortunately, shared awareness of the need to distinguish carefully between what may have occurred before 399 and what was said and told some years (or decades) later, has been heavily mitigated by the

32 Be it enough to refer to Rossetti 2015, chapters 1 and 4–5. At present, happily enough, it is becoming common practice not to insist in qualifying the thought of, say, Anaximander or Parmenides as eminently philosophical in character. See for instance Bremer, Flashar, and Rechenauer 2013, Part 2.

presumption that Socrates was a philosopher and had a philosophy of his own. But he was not, and it is almost incredible that we still have to discuss so simple a point.

This way, a de-philosophized Socrates begins to appear. Once we give up looking at him through the eyes of Plato, a different Socrates surfaces, one not so well known, not so easily understandable, but no less interesting in his originality, creativity, and ability to surprise almost everybody. There is ample room for going in search of *this* Socrates and his virtual philosophy, provided that we acknowledge that the list of relevant sources is much more rich than usually presumed, as, for example, the present volume amply testifies.³³

References

- Bandini, M. and L.-A. Dorion *Xénophon: Mémoires*, II.1. Paris 2011.
 Bandini, M. and L.-A. Dorion *Xénophon. Mémoires*, II.2. Paris 2011.
 Bevilacqua, F. *Senofonte: Memorabili*. Torino 2011.
 Bollack, J. *Parménide: de l'étant au monde*. Paris 2006.
 Bremer, D., H. Flashar, and G. Rechenauer. *Frühgriechische Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike*, 1/1–2. Basel 2013.
 Brunschwig, J.-L., and G. Lloyd. *Le savoir grec*. Paris 1990.
 Burkert, W. *Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon*. Nuremberg 1962.
 Cambiano, G. *I filosofi in Grecia e a Roma*. Bologna 2013.
 Centrone, B. *Prima lezione di filosofia antica*. Roma 2015.
 Cerri, G. 'Le Nuvole di Aristofane e la realtà storica di Socrate', in: F. Perusino and M. Colantonio, *La commedia greca e la storia*. Pisa 2012, 151–194.
 Curd, P. 'The Presocratics as philosophers', in: A. Laks and C. Loguet, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie présocratique?* Lille 2003, 115–138.
 Dicksaut, M. *Le naturel philosophe*. Paris 1985.
 Flashar, H. *Die Philosophie der Antike*, 2/1. Basel 1998.
 Frede, M. 'The Philosopher', in: J. Brunschwig and G. Lloyd, *The Greek pursuit of knowledge*. Cambridge, MA 2003, 1–17.
 Fronterotta, F. *Eraclito: Frammenti*. Milano 2013.

33 This chapter is based on Rossetti 2015, chapter 3, with considerably new features. I extend my gratitude to Fiorenza Bevilacqua, Alessandro Stavru, David Murphy, and most especially to Sandra Peterson, who with Christopher Moore translated this chapter.

- Konstan, D. 'Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*', in: D.R. Morrison, *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011, 75–90.
- Laks, A. *Introduction à la 'philosophie présocratique'*. Paris 2006.
- Laks, A. and G. Most. *Early Greek philosophy*, I–IX. Cambridge, MA 2016.
- Laks, A. and G. Most. *Les débuts de la Philosophie*. Paris 2016.
- Long, A.A. 'The scope of early Greek philosophy', in: A.A. Long, *The Cambridge companion to early Greek philosophy*. Cambridge 1999, 1–21.
- Marcovich, M. *Heraclitus: Greek text with a short commentary*. Sankt Augustin 2000.
- Medda, E. *Lisia, Orazioni I–XV*. Milano 1991.
- McCoy, M. *Plato on the rhetoric of sophists and philosophers*. Cambridge 2007.
- Nightingale, A.W. *Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy*. Cambridge 1995.
- Patzner, A. *Der Sophist Hippias als Philosophiehistoriker*. Freiburg 1986.
- Peterson, S. 'An authentically Socratic conclusion in Plato's *Phaedo*: Socrates' debt to Asclepius', in: N. Reshotko, *Desire, identity, and existence: essays in honor of T.M. Perner*. Kelowna 2003, 33–52.
- Peterson, S. *Socrates and philosophy in the dialogues of Plato*. Cambridge 2011.
- Rossetti, L. 'Le Nuvole di Aristofane: perché furono una commedia e non una farsa?', *RCCM* 16 (1974), 131–136.
- Rossetti, L. 'Alla ricerca dei *logoi Socratikoi* perduti (II): l'apologia Sokratous di Lisia' *Rivista di Studi Classici* 23 (1975), 87–99.
- Rossetti, L. 'Ricerche sui "dialoghi socratici" di Fedone e di Euclide', *Hermes* 108 (1980), 183–200.
- Rossetti, L. 'Materiali per una storia della letteratura giuridica attica', in: D.F. Leão, L. Rossetti and M.G.Z. Fialho, *Nomos: direito e sociedade na antiguidade clássica: derecho y sociedad en la antigüedad clásica*. Madrid 2004, 51–73.
- Rossetti, L. 'I Socratici "primi filosofi" e Socrate "primo filosofo"', in: L. Rossetti and A. Stavru, *Socratica 2008: studies in ancient Socratic literature*. Bari 2010, 59–70.
- Rossetti, L. 'Parmenide filosofo?', in: L. Palumbo, *Logon didonai: la filosofia come esercizio del render ragione: studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano*. Napoli 2011, 127–137.
- Rossetti, L. 'Il logos amarturos', *Zbornik Matice srpske za klasicne studije* 14 (2012), 49–71.
- Rossetti, L. 'Il trattato di Anassimandro sulla terra', *Peitho* 4 (2013), 24–61.
- Rossetti, L. 'Elogio delle antilogie', in: E. Moscarelli, *Sofoi, sofisti: filosofi*. Napoli 2014, ix–vix.
- Rossetti, L. *La filosofia non nasce con Talete, e nemmeno con Socrate*. Bologna 2015.
- Sassi, M.M. *Gli inizi della filosofia: in Grecia*. Torino 2009.
- Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff, U. von. 'Der Markt von Kekrops bis Kleisthenes', in: A. Kiessling and U. von Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff, *Philologische Untersuchungen*, 1: *aus Kydaten*. Berlin 1880, 195–229.

A Literary Challenge: How to Represent Socrates' *Daimonion*

Stefano Jedrkiewicz
Rome

1 Introduction: Testimony and Text

The most idiosyncratic of all Socratic features, the so-called *daimonion*, is the object of divergent representations in the ancient literary tradition.¹ Describing a phenomenon of that sort requires answering some challenging questions. How does a superhuman visitation intrude into human thoughts and actions? What influence can it exert upon human behavior? No two textual depictions agree on the answers to these questions, although they may share some features. Worse, no ancient author seems even bound by inner consistency when describing Socrates' *daimonion*.² Not surprisingly, complete agreement seems to be lacking even today.³

The very lack of consistency exhibited by ancient testimonies may cause us to ask whether these were primarily meant to be factual. For sure, each implies or projects a specific image of "Socrates": the one the author attempted to produce, according to his own intentions, within a given context, while possibly producing a different one on some other occasion. Whatever its degree of factual reliability, any of these textual constructions, therefore, needed first of all to be conceived and put to use as a narrative answering the challenge to pro-

1 For a full list of the ancient depictions of the *daimonion*, see Ribbing 1870, 2–8. For the vagaries of Socrates' image in antiquity, see Gigon 1994, 163–166.

2 Cf., e.g., Joyal 2005, 111: "*The daimonion* in Plato's works is presented inconsistently, even incoherently, and is so often influenced by the demands or the conventions of the context that it is sometimes hard to know whether we are dealing with the same phenomenon from one of its appearances to another."

3 The ambiguity of the term *daimonion* is at once grammatical (is it a noun or an adjective?) and notional (what does it designate—an individual, a message, an event?). For the former, see notably MacNaghten 1914, 185–189. For the second, Dorion 2004 and Joyal 2005. In all, see Vlastos 1991, 280: "an adjective flanked by a semantic hole." Recent discussions of the Socratic *daimonion* tend to focus on the following question: "How could the eminently rational Socrates submit to such an apparently extra-rational impulsion?" On this question see the overviews by Partridge 2008, 291–296, and Lännström 2012, 33–39.

duce a convincing depiction of the Socratic *daimonion*. By considering some of the most significant among them, this chapter intends to examine the way different authorial orientations could in the end give life to discordant representations. It may appear, in particular, that the two undisputed founding fathers of all textual renderings of this phenomenon, Plato and Xenophon, at once shared some fundamental assumptions and implemented some remarkably distinct authorial strategies.⁴ This approach, therefore, excludes any notion like “textual recalcitrance.”⁵ It does not address extra-textual problems, for example, whether Socrates would have followed a glaringly absurd or immoral daemonic indication (an eventuality Plato and Xenophon apparently never thought worth imagining).⁶ Finally, it does not deal with the “reality” of the daemonic phenomenon, nor with the “historical” Socrates; on these matters, it may contribute, at best, some strictly preliminary remarks.

2 Plato’s and Xenophon’s Rejection of the Epiphanic Model

Plato and Xenophon agree that, whatever it may actually consist in, Socrates’ *daimonion* (i) doubtlessly has a divine origin; (ii) as such, must be benevolent and beneficial; (iii) is directly relevant to Socrates’ way of life, thought, and, especially, death; and (iv) confirms Socrates’ exceptional, “heroic” nature. In order to describe a divine visitation displaying such essential features there is at hand in antiquity an apposite pattern of representation, rendered canonical by epic and dramatic poetry. This is the “epiphany,” the extraordinary apparition to some exceptional mortal of an anthropomorphic god or goddess in person, as a vision or voice (or both). Unfortunately, this is precisely the model neither Plato nor Xenophon can think of reproducing, since it portrays an intrinsically ambiguous event. The recipient may be issued good or bad advice, an order, or

4 On the divergences between Plato’s and Xenophon’s image of Socrates, see Dorion 2004, 98–104.

5 As deplored by McPherran 1996, 197: “any account [of the *daimonion*] is bound to suffer from ... the recalcitrance of our texts,” and 203: “I must say that the texts are not as clear on this matter as we should like.” Cf. Brickhouse-Smith 2005, 61: “but perhaps there is not enough evidence to make any very confident judgment of [the *daimonion*’s] exact phenomenology.” All this is specifically aimed at the Platonic text, which is thus substantially treated as a flawed representation of the “real” Socrates’ life and ideas. One needs to resort to speculation in the attempt to close such gaps: cf., e.g., Brickhouse in Smith and Woodruff 2000, 194: “we have to imagine that Socrates ...”; “it may even be that Socrates ...”

6 See the judicious review of this debate by Lännström 2012, 44–47.

a threat: he can never be assured that the divine words, benevolent as they may sound (which is not always the case), will prove beneficial in the end. Whatever their outcome, all epiphanies eventually reassert that humanity is in the power of divinity.⁷ Neither Plato nor Xenophon have any use for divine guidance of this kind, as they depict Socrates.

The rejection of the epiphanic model causes the Socratic *daimonion* to be described as a most uncommon and mysterious phenomenon. In Plato, Socrates declares that "it practically happened to almost nobody else up to now" (*Resp.* 6.496c4–5);⁸ in Xenophon, he boasts of its exclusivity (*Ap.* 14).⁹ It is as familiar to Socrates as it is hardly understandable to all other characters. Plato's Euthyphro, although a religious expert, has nothing more precise to say than something like "you get the *daimonion*" (cf. τὸ δαιμόνιον ... σαυτῷ ... γίγνεσθαι, *Euthphr.* 3b5–6).¹⁰ Xenophon's Socrates has to press Euthydemus: you may understand that "I *do* tell the truth" (ἀληθῆ λέγω) if you just stop waiting for epiphanies (*Mem.* 4.3.13); Hermogenes, who marvels at the daemonic intervention before the trial, has to be told that there is nothing to marvel at (*Ap.* 5). In Plato's *Apology* (31c8–d1), Socrates assumes the judges to be utterly familiar with the word and unfamiliar with the meaning, so he explains: "this is a divine and daemonic thing, etc." Xenophon knows that everybody talks about it (cf. διετεθρύλητο, *Mem.* 1.1.2), yet elsewhere Socrates needs to explain the difference between authentic and spurious mantic activities, in order to prove that the gods do directly address those mortals whom they hold in favor (τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ οἷς ἂν ᾧσιν ἴλεω σημαίνειν, 1.1.9).

This is therefore the sort of thing that can easily be turned into a religious offense. In an authorial remark (μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν, *Mem.* 1.1.2), Xenophon puts it at the origin of the religious charges against Socrates, who rejects them expressly: "is that to introduce new *daimonia*, to say that the voice of god becomes manifest and points out to me what should be done?" (*Ap.* 12). Plato's Socrates does not even mention his *daimonion* as he discusses the legal charges (*Ap.* 25b–28a). He ironically supposes that Meletus fancied he could put that word, *daimonia*, in his *graphê*: as a result, he wrote (not a legal but) a comic, that is absurd, text on this subject (ἐπικωμωδῶν, 31d1–2).¹¹ Euthyphro had already

7 See Pucci 1994; Pucci 1998, 68–86.

8 All translations are mine, unless otherwise stated.

9 Socrates makes frequent use of a reflexive turn of phrase when talking about the *daimonion*: for Plato, see Jedrkiewicz 2011, 211 n. 11 and cf. *Thg.* 128d2, d4, e5; 129b6; 131a5. For Xenophon: *Ap.* 4, 12; *Mem.* 1.1.3, cf. 1.3.4 and 4.8.1.

10 A different reading in Brisson 2005, 2–3.

11 Usually rendered as "he made a joke out of it."

stated the main point: such nonsense is what the ignorant multitude (*hoi polloi*) will believe (*Euthphr.* 3b4).

3 Plato's and Xenophon's Differing Patterns of Representation

How is this *daimonion* to be depicted, then? Discarding the “visual” epiphanic pattern leads to locating the phenomenon in an aural dimension: both Plato and Xenophon denote it a “voice” (*phônê*).¹² But a substantial divergence appears immediately. Xenophon makes the most of one well-established principle of mantic communication: Socrates’ daemonic experience consists in perceiving a divine *message*; this implies a sender (although an unidentified one, in this case), a receiver, a meaning. Plato innovates: what he describes is an *event*, something that exerts its influence upon its recipient *ipso facto*, by its very coming into being. Xenophon attempts a *tour de force*: to normalize Socrates’ *daimonion* by bringing it into the class of recognized mantic practices, while explaining that some deviant forms of divine guidance may be granted to specially deserving individuals. Plato goes the opposite way and stresses Socrates’ irreducible peculiarity. In Plato’s *Apology*, this confers a special role to the *daimonion*: Socrates is extended an extraordinary divine support as he performs his extraordinary, divinely-ordained mission.

3.1. Xenophon’s Socrates rejects epiphanies by way of principle: the gods do not need to be seen by human beings in order to regulate the *kosmos* (*Mem.* 4.3.12–14). However, normalization may unwittingly loom in the occasional use by Socrates himself of a synaesthetic metonymy, derived from a current idiom, “to see a voice” (cf. θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται, *Ap.* 12).¹³ Such a “voice,” at any rate, is just one among many known prophetic phenomena, which also include “birds, utterances, chance meetings, prophets” (*Ap.* 13; tr. Pucci; cf. *Mem.* 1.1.3; *Symp.* 4.46). The difference is that *hoi polloi* speak of prophecies as being produced by birds, etc. (*Mem.* 1.1.3), but Socrates knows what he talks about (ὥσπερ ἐγίγνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε, *Mem.* 1.1.4) and so identifies the divine author of all such messages as *to daimonion*. His main phrase is *to daimonion semainein*

12 Xen. *Ap.* 12–13; Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.3; Pl. *Ap.* 31d3; Pl. *Phdr.* 242b5; *Thg.* 128d3–e5, 129b6, c2. Cf. Joyal 2005, 106–107. However, epiphanies may be purely aural, something Pucci 1998, 84, calls an “epiphony.” Partridge 2008, 287, rightly argues that tragic (usually visual) epiphanies are not to be assimilated to Socrates’ *daimonion*.

13 It is noted by Pucci 2002, 68 that this metonymy, here applied to a *phônê* (voice), is usually applied to a *logos* (speech).

(*Mem.* 1.1.2, 4.8.1). In other contexts, Xenophon can also use *semainein* (*prosemainein*), which is the standard term for the giving or making of signs by an oracle (Pucci 2002, 68), with the noun *theos* (or plural *theoi*) as the grammatical subject. Conforming to contemporary linguistic habits, by this terminology Xenophon points to Divinity as such, as opposed to any individual god (Dorion 2004, 170–171). Yet in the case of Socrates he also denotes this impersonal Divinity (*to daimonion*) as an individual agent engaging in the act of *semainein*.¹⁴ Socrates, exceptional in his knowledge of all things religious, is thus given the task of articulating Xenophon's belief that human beings can effectively perceive divine intentions through the whole array of mantic signs (teleological views standing in the conceptual background).¹⁵ It is an undisputable prerogative of divinity to send signals to any deserving human being, and there is nothing strange in being singled out for one's merits (cf. *Ap.* 13; *Mem.* 4.8.1). In other words: it is absolutely normal for an exceptional mortal like Socrates to benefit from such an extraordinary god-sent message (cf. Dorion 2004, 170–180).

What the *daimonion* brings to Socrates may be relevant to anybody's, not just Socrates', activities. In any case, it may signal "what should be done and what not."¹⁶ Whether this indication is a pragmatic or a moral one makes no difference. All Socrates needs to know is that omniscient divinity is benevolent (*Mem.* 1.4). Daemonic indications are fully reliable, and specially meant for a human agent facing a choice. In similar cases the gods extend to men *sumbouleumata*,¹⁷ actual contributions to the always risky activity of decision-making. Divinity thus fills the structural gap built into human knowledge.

Proof comes by experience. One will ignore such divine advice at one's own cost (*Mem.* 1.1.4). This must imply that the daemonic message (a) exerts no coercion and thus (b) *can* be rejected. Ordinary mortals can be foolish enough to do that. Yet even Socrates, for all his piety and knowledge, does it at a crucial moment: the *daimonion* needs to come *twice* in order to stop him as he prepares a formal apology to deliver in court (δὲς ἤδη ἐπιχειρήσαντός μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον, *Ap.* 4). This is Xenophon's only reference to an actual daemonic intrusion. Ironically, it may even cast some doubt on

14 This wording emphasizes the activity of delivering, not the object of the delivery: contrarily to Plato, Xenophon never calls Socrates' *daimonion* itself a *semeion*.

15 See notably Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.19; 1.3.4; 1.4 (teleology); 4.3.12–15; *Ap.* 12–13; *Symp.* 4.47–49 (spoken by Hermogenes).

16 Cf. *Mem.* 1.1.4; 4.3.12; 4.8.1. The formula applies to all divine prescriptions: *Mem.* 4.3.12; *Cyr.* 1.6.46.

17 *Ap.* 14; *Mem.* 1.4.18; 2.6.8; *Cyr.* 1.6.46 (akin to *Mem.* 1.1.9).

Socrates' devotional integrity, since it exposes Socrates' substantial disregard for the first of the two successive divine injunctions.

Xenophon provides no other factual description of the daemonic *semainein* as it affects Socrates on a given occasion. It is up to the reader to notice that this Socrates is no technical *prophetês*, no actual "translator" of divine messages into the sort of speech human beings can understand. The daemonic *phônê* must therefore utter some already formed and comprehensible sentence. This holds even more if the message needs to be relevant to other subject(s) as well; *sumboulemata* concerning a specific plan or activity could hardly avoid being articulated in human language.¹⁸ The daemonic voice thus seems to speak Greek to Xenophon's Socrates. This is nothing strange for an oracle, yet only this daemonic *semainein* is at once couched in unambiguous speech and perfectly safe to implement. This may be Xenophon's final touch: as a paradigmatic good and wise man, Socrates' distinctive function ultimately consists in relaying divine benevolence to humanity.

3.2. At *Apol.* 33c4–7, Plato's Socrates declares that divinity directs human existence by all sorts of mantic modalities, which he lists, omitting epiphany. His *daimonion* is definitely what an epiphany is not (Socrates argues elsewhere that the very notion is nonsensical).¹⁹ Nor is it the unequivocal *phônê* of Xenophon. It is just "a certain voice" (*phônê + tis*, *Ap.* 33d3; *Phdr.* 242b5), certainly no human speech.²⁰ Xenophon's usual phrase *to daimonion semainein* points to a superhuman speaker; Plato's usual verb is the impersonal *gignesthai*.²¹ The phenomenon is thus made more markedly aural than vocal, consisting in what Socrates hears, not in what somebody says to him. This "sort of voice," thus, requires neither a definite speaker nor a definite speech. Socrates is absolutely sure that this exerts a restraint, never an impulsion, upon some specific activity he is about to accomplish (*Ap.* 31d3–4). Yet he can denote what he perceives with no more precise terms than "a divine and daemonic something" (θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, *Ap.* 31c8). "Divine," then, because it has no natural origin; "daemonic," for it suddenly comes for no apparent reason, out of nothing and nobody, and yet produces an absolutely compelling inhibition.²²

18 Pucci 2002, 70. Cf. Long 2006, 72; Partridge 2008, 286–287.

19 He gives a full argument to that effect at *Pl. Resp.* 2.379–383a. At *Pl. Cra.* 425d5–6, he makes fun even of the dramatic *deus ex machina*.

20 A lasting denotation: cf. *Cic. Div.* 1.54.122; *Plut. de Genio Soc.* 588D–E; *Apul. de Deo Soc.* XIX, 163; *Julian. Or.* IV 6 p. 249 B; *Aristid. Or.* XLV vol. II p. 25 D.

21 *Ap.* 31d1, d3; *Euthyd.* 272e3–4; *Thet.* 151a4; *Phdr.* 242b9.

22 For Plato's concurrent use of "divine" and "daemonic" in denoting Socrates' experience,

How does this inhibition take effect? To his judges, Xenophon's Socrates exalts his daemonic occurrence as an extraordinary instance of supremely authoritative divine communication (*Ap.* 12–13; cf. *Mem.* 1.1.4–9). His Platonic counterpart seems to speak of a commonplace thing: it happened to him as a child (*Ap.* 31d2–3) and keeps coming even in very ordinary circumstances (40a5–6). Xenophon's text insists on such frequency (*Mem.* 1.1.3; 4.8.1), yet leaves any irony to other characters (Antisthenes: Socrates can make a pretext of the *daimonion* in order not to speak to him, *Symp.* 8.5). Plato's Socrates can occasionally sound almost jocular. As soon as he was standing up from a seat he had taken “thanks to some divine coincidence,” the usual sign came. So he sat down again (κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, ... ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμεν, *Euthyd.* 272e1–4).

At first sight, this *semeion* is not even absurd: it is wholly gratuitous. Who needs a divine intervention to find a seat or to sit down again when standing up? Why call that a *semeion* at all? The term may be adequate wherever some sort of meaning is eventually unveiled (cf. *Ap.* 40b1, c3; 42d6; *Phdr.* 242b5; *Resp.* 6.496c4); but this episode seems meaningless. Yet Socrates is giving a factual report. What he undergoes is the instantaneous arrest of a specific activity he was just about to implement. What he calls a *semeion* is the very event he denotes as daemonic. There is no divine message, either spoken or unspoken (Socrates does not even hear any “voice”); no individual divine agent, either as a messenger or an author; no divinely originated message of any sort. All this is precisely what Plato keeps out of the picture. Note that the modality of this *daimonion* is “the usual one” (εἰωθός). May this scene rank as the paradigm of *all* daemonic interventions? The underlying scenario would then be rather simple: Socrates is affected by a purely pragmatic datum, which consists in a sudden arrest either of his present words or actions or immediate projects (*Ap.* 40b2–4). This is a most strange *semeion*, if this term is to be equated with anything like “message” or even “indication.” It brings no information. It does not insert, so to speak, any idea or volition into Socrates' mind.²³ All in all, it leaves Socrates' present state of consciousness untroubled (cf. Jedrkiewicz 2011, 215–220; 235–237).

Why should Plato make such a deviant use of current oracular terminology? He causes his *semeion* to be intrinsically meaningless for the very reason Xenophon causes his *semainein* to be unequivocally meaningful: to let the

see Friedländer 1964, 35, 39; de Strycker-Slings 1994, 154 n. 6; Dorion 2004, 170 n. 7; Brisson 2005, 3–4.

23 For the apparent exception of the *Phaedrus*, see section 4 below.

daimonion produce its impact on Socrates. To this end, Xenophon represents Socrates as he receives an order or an advice couched in clear, unambiguous words, which may be either protreptic or apotreptic, and may eventually be relayed to other subjects. Plato represents Socrates as he experiences a sudden and irresistible arrest in the specific activity which he is presently considering or carrying on. Such an apotreptic impact can obviously be relevant to Socrates alone.²⁴

In Plato, the usual consequence of the lack of immediate meaning in a given daemonic *semeion* is to impel Socrates to intensify his ongoing investigation. After any daemonic experience, Socrates remains free to give himself a reason for what has just befallen him. In the *Euthydemus*, he has no such need. In other contexts, he proceeds to elaborate an interpretation, one that must always remain tentative and inferential. At any rate, the daemonic *semeion* can become meaningful *only* thanks to Socrates' own *mise en discours*. On a single occasion (*Ap.* 6–7), Xenophon too has Socrates stating the reason for the daemonic intervention (elsewhere, he just lets him utter some generalities about divinatory practices, reaffirming his competence in religious matters).²⁵ But it is only in Plato that an *ad hoc* interpretation of a given daemonic occurrence can go so far as to articulate Socrates' deep beliefs and overall way of life.

4 An Actual Daemonic Visitation: Plato's Rendering

Plato describes the actual perception of the “voice” by Socrates at *Phaedrus* 242b4–d2.²⁶ Socrates explains why the daemonic hindrance just prevented him from leaving his present location. He delivered a “wrong” *logos*, at once impious and untruthful, misrepresenting Eros' divine nature. He must now recant by means of a second, truthful *logos*, to be uttered, in good religious logic, exactly where he committed his fault.

Three details are unique: (i) the *daimonion* is called both *semeion* (again, “the usual one”: τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημείον) and *phônê tis* (τινα φωνήν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι); (ii) Socrates qualifies his aural perception as a subjective impression (cf. ἔδοξα); (iii) he describes and explains the event in a single sentence: “I thought I heard some voice, here and now, which would not allow

24 Pl. *Ap.* 31d5, 6; 40a6, b1, b4, c6; 41d5–6; *Phdr.* 242b8; *Tht.* 151a4 (with an apparently protreptic nuance: see 5.1. below). The context of *Resp.* 6.496c2–5 employs the verb ἀπείργω.

25 Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.3–4, 1.3.4, 4.7.1, 3.13; *Ap.* 12–13.

26 A wider discussion of the following Platonic passages is in Jedrkiewicz 2011, 221–234.

me to leave before I atoned, as I had actually faulted against divinity" (ὥς δὴ τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον, 242c1–3). The meaning is unclear. Does the phrase introduced by the conjunction ὥς explicate Socrates' own reflections or does it explicate the content of the daemonic message? In other words, does Socrates, as a consequence of being daemon-struck, immediately realize the nature of his fault out of his own understanding, or is such fault explicitly revealed in some speech uttered by the "voice"? The first reading seems preferable. As Socrates declares in the context, he was already feeling uneasy while delivering his "wrong" *logos*, that is, *before* the *daimonion* came to him; successively, he had the impression (cf. ἔδοξα) that he had heard his usual "sort of voice." This is then what happens: (a) Socrates suddenly feels like he is perceiving an aural phenomenon, to the effect of being stopped as he leaves his present location, a sacred grove; (b) he immediately realizes that this must be one of his familiar daemonic signs; (c) he instantly understands why he cannot leave: he needs first to atone for some religious fault he committed there (given the context, this is the only kind of fault he can have committed); (d) he identifies his *hamartêma* with the way he spoke about Erôs, and recalls his previous misgivings for a confirmation; (e) he now understands how to redress his mistake.

This narrative does not describe the actual addition of some divinely formed linguistic utterance into Socrates' thoughts. This is confirmed by his additional explanations: the human soul as such has the possibility of perceiving superhuman indications (μαντικόν γέ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ), and Socrates is himself a bit of a diviner (242c3–7). Whatever he says or thinks in the circumstance results from his own faculties, not from external impulsion. The episode stresses Socrates' activity, not his passivity, in respect of the *semeion*.

5 The Implications of the *daimonion* for Socrates "Heroic" Life: Plato's Construction

5.1. At *Theaetetus* 150b6–151d6, Socrates explains how his educational "midwifery" may be directly affected by the *daimonion*. He connects all progress achieved by his young interlocutors thanks to his laborious support (cf. 151a5–b1) to the help extended by Divinity (*ho theos*, 150c7, d4, d8). The daemonic event (τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον) comes specifically into play when Socrates needs to make a choice in a very particular (although apparently frequent) circumstance. Some of those youngsters who quit Socrates' company (*sunousia*) before having achieved the ability to "deliver" anything substantial may occasionally ask for a second trial, and beg for readmission into the Socratic circle.

They will be taken back only if the daemonic occurrence does not restrain Socrates from assenting. Since this is a yes-or-no choice—a lack of daemonic rejection is tantamount to positive acceptance (ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾶ)—both the daemonic manifestation and the absence of it get conflated with Socrates' own decisions. Daemonic rejection means, so Socrates explains, that the case is hopeless: to take back that young man would be a mere waste of time and toil. Yet a lack of daemonic opposition will not necessarily make life easier for Socrates. Since, in such cases, the applicant is certified by divinity as being “able to deliver,” the “midwife” has no other choice than to toil, once again, until “delivery” is achieved. No second failure is admissible. Divine assistance results in throwing responsibility onto Socrates' shoulders.

5.2. Plato's *Apology* explicitly describes how the daemonic *semeion* may disclose its own meaning: namely, by means of a discursive elaboration by Socrates. At *Ap.* 31c4–32a3, Socrates declares that the *daimonion semeion* prevented him from entering active politics; that happened *every time* (ὅταν, 31d3) he was about to do just that. He now states his belief that this opposition has been beneficial. Socrates' daemonic experience shows two additional features here.

First, a single daemonic intervention does not exert a permanent inhibition, but affects only one particular gesture or attitude at a given moment. Socrates thus could consider entering politics again and again (his propensity must have been strong, since it needed repeated daemonic interventions to be kept in check). The situation described by Xenophon, that a single daemonic indication may in fact be ignored, is given a more systematic treatment here. There is a major difference, however. Since for Xenophon the *daimonion* seems to issue a spoken message, Socrates' second attempt to prepare a formal defense-speech to use in court may be termed an act of “disobedience”; what the Platonic Socrates experiences, every time he takes to consider active political engagement, is just a factual impediment, as described in the *Euthydemus*.

Secondly, Socrates is giving his evaluation of all such past daemonic obstructions in the present tense (cf. παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, 31d6). That *may* imply that he did not feel an obligation to elaborate an interpretation before this day. Again, this may recall Socrates' behavior in the *Euthydemus*: it is always up to him to decide whether (and when) to produce some explanation of a given daemonic event.

At any rate, this is what Socrates understands now: had he entered the public arena, he would have necessarily antagonized the power-holders (demos or oligarchs) who care nothing about truth and justice, and would soon have been dead (two famous examples are produced, 32a4–e1). The daemonic interven-

tions kept him away from political engagement so that he would survive and devote himself to asserting truth and advocating justice in his private activity (ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν, 32a2–3).²⁷

However, in this case the explanation raises several questions. Is life *per se* what Socrates wishes to spare? Hardly, for he declares that death is nothing to be feared (*Ap.* 29a1–b6, 32d1–3, 34e1–2, 37b5–7, 38e–39b). Is his refusal to break the law, either as a magistrate or as an ordinary citizen, a purely *private* gesture, and is he not putting his life at risk, when opposing such refusals, precisely *without* any daemonic opposition? Will he not die a *political* death, inflicted on him by an Athenian public institution as a retribution for an assumed public crime? This is in fact a typical instance of Plato's narrative technique: the reader needs to reach the end of the *Apology* before being offered the possibility of a complete and convincing explanation.

6 The *daimonion* and Socrates' Trial

Both Xenophon and Plato stress the role of the *daimonion* at Socrates' trial. A defense could be successful, but the *daimonion* precludes such a "happy end," hardly compatible with Socrates' "heroic" status, let alone historical truth. Again, the respective narrative strategies diverge considerably. Xenophon relates an exemplary case of daemonic interference; Plato comes to suggest that even daemonic latency may be rendered meaningful.

6.1. After two daemonic interventions, Xenophon's Socrates abandons his intention to deliver a formal apology. Instead, he freely faces the jury with his haughtiness (*megalegoria*), boasts of exclusive divine favor, and seems to be doing his utmost to bring the judges to issue a death sentence. A most welcome outcome, he explains, sparing him the evils of old age, notably intellectual dissipation (*Ap.* 6–7). Divinity thus safeguards Socrates' identity to the full, and allows him to die a hero's death.

6.2. All through Plato's *Apology*, Socrates talks and acts in full accordance with his self-respect (no abasement in front of the jury) and his commitment to truth. There was no daemonic intervention on this day; once the trial has ended, Socrates explains such absence as if it were a factual datum (39e1–42d7).

27 This interpretation is expanded at *Resp.* 6.496c3–e2: political competence and "philosophical" competence are opposing faculties.

He had already anticipated that his behavior in court would be the ultimate cause of his death (cf. 38d3–e5). He now explicitly states a principle: the *daimonion* opposes those actions that would produce no “positive” outcome, something Socrates had already in his mind as he gave the reason for the daemonic anti-political stance. He concludes that he can have done nothing “wrong” on this day. This brings him to suppose that death may be (i) a good thing for himself, and (ii) a good thing in itself.

Socrates’ overall argument strives to make sense of the daemonic absence, which he considers an important indication (*tekmerion*) that he has been “acting well” all day long. This he takes to mean that, first, he has indeed been behaving as he should have according to his principles, whatever the practical outcome. Similarly, in the past the sign did not prevent Socrates from opposing the demos and the oligarchs, come what may. Secondly, the present outcome, death, may indeed be advantageous. In order to give meaning to the lack of a daemonic intervention, Socrates needs however to exploit some terminological and notional ambiguities: (i) the initial notion of *orthon* (“correct,” 40a6) is transmuted into the conclusive notion of *agathon* (“good,” 40b7, c3); (ii) the “action of dying” is conflated with the “situation of being dead,” being designated by the same verbal form *τεθνάναι* (which means “to be put to death” at 39e3 and “to be dead” at 40c1); (iii) the assertion “death may not be bad” is eventually equated to “death may be good.” And yet, Socrates’ conclusions are far from preposterous: what he states is just a hope (although a well-founded one) that to be dead may yield happiness.

This is the only context in which Socrates points to a divine intention behind the daemonic sign. He deploys two *hapax legomena*: ἡ ... μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαίμονιου (40a4), the term *mantikē* suggesting the communication of some identifiable pre-formed meaning; and τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον (40b1), which implicitly declares the daemonic “sign” to be the expression of some divine intention. At the same time, current divinatory procedures are turned upside down: the divine indication consists, not in the factual production, but in the factual omission of a *semeion*. This is confirmed at 42d5–6, where what Socrates conclusively calls τὸ σημεῖον *tout court* is precisely such an absence.

Yet all such paradoxes also shed light on Socrates’ preceding explanations, incomplete at best, of the daemonic anti-political stance. It now appears that Socrates may be daemonically sheltered from making “wrong” choices; all the “right” ones (if and how to face the demos, or the oligarchs, or his judges) he has to make and implement by himself. The reader may now understand that the series of daemonic interventions that had been keeping Socrates away from institutional politics spared him not only an untimely but also an *inappropriate* death. The ultimate latency of the sign now provides Socrates

with the opportunity to fulfill his life-long program. He chooses to end his life in the only modality that is fit to it, and which *ho theos* has been keeping in store for him: to die not as a political but as a philosophical hero.

7 Plato's Meta-narrative Use of the *daimonion*

That leaves a question standing. Why does Socrates, in the *Euthydemus*, neglect to give an explicit meaning to what he calls a daemonic *semeion*? Why does Plato attach a divine cause to the trivial gesture of standing up only to sit down immediately? The answer may be found at a meta-narrative level. This daemonic intervention results in keeping Socrates in his present physical location: he may thus witness all the discursive tricks of the two intervening sophists, and always remain unmoved, indeed confirmed in his awareness that truth necessitates a wholly different kind of speech. "Not to move," in this case, means not to be deflected by any number of rhetorical stunts. Such "immobility" is indeed worth a divine sanction. This wink to the readership is a paramount example of narrative manipulation of the Socratic *daimonion*. If the character "Socrates" does not himself attach a meaning to his sign, the narrator may well suggest one.

8 The *daimonion* and Socratic "Education": Banality and Parody

The relevance of the *daimonion* for Socrates' "educational" activity is a recurrent motif within the Platonic corpus. As already in the *Theaetetus*, in the *Alcibiades* and the *Theages* the daemonic intervention affects Socrates' usual engagement with his younger interlocutors.²⁸ These two texts do not describe the actual modalities of the daemonic event, focusing instead on the repercussions that it may reverberate upon other people.

8.1. As the *Alcibiades* opens, "a certain daemonic obstruction," opposing Socrates' own erotic, and human, impulsion (οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, an *hapax*, 103a5–6), has been keeping Socrates away from Alcibiades for years. This was a persistent inclination, not a series of individual acts in one direction, like Socrates' recurrent political temptations in the *Apology*.

²⁸ This may inform discussions about the problematic "authenticity" of both *Alcibiades* and *Theages*.

Socrates believes that such divine opposition is now definitely over, though he gives no reason for this belief. He now may proceed to “educate” Alcibiades.

But is this text really dealing with Socrates’ daemonic experience? The term *daimonion* appears only once, in the opening sentence, to designate a *permanent* divine hindrance, now being turned into a positive, equally permanent, impulsion (ἐφῆκεν, 106a1). The agent who did not allow Socrates to engage in dialogue with Alcibiades in the past is then called a *theos* (105d5–6, e5; e7; 124c8–9). It is designated as the guardian (ἐπίτροπος, 124c5) of the now permissible relationship. The individual daemonic occurrences described elsewhere within the Platonic *corpus*, in fact, play no role here: what matters to the author is to stress that Socrates’ guidance of Alcibiades will match the divine guidance constantly enjoyed by Socrates (124b9–10).

8.2. The *Theages*, by contrast, exploits the narrative potentialities of Socrates’ *daimonion* in an original way, provides his phenomenon with some uniquely bizarre properties, and puts it in the service of the authorial irony apparently dictating the whole plot (about the eponymous young man begging for *sunousia* with Socrates among other “associates”).²⁹ Here, the image of the *daimonion* may almost look like a parody.³⁰

A straightforward *phônê*, the *semeion* unveils some definite meaning (cf. σημαίνει, 128d2–7) by means of “speech” (cf. πείραν ... λαβεῖν τοῦ σημείου εἰ ἄρα τὶ λέγει, 129d3–4).³¹ It imparts a veto to a specific impending action, either by Socrates or by others (128d8–129d8). Ruin, either private or public, infallibly follows disobedience: see Charmides’ serious accident during his athletic training, the Athenians’ Sicilian disaster, and so on. An autonomous agent, the *daimonion* possesses a “dynamic *dunamis*” of its own, which is supreme in governing Socrates’ intercourse with the young people around him: in Socrates’ curiously redundant words, “the very power of this *daimonion* exerts a supreme power also on the relations (I entertain) with those who spend their time living with me” (ἡ δύνამις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνδιατριβόντων τὸ ἅπαν δύνανται, 129e1–3). An “educational” *sunousia* with Socrates may thus develop according to three different scenarios: (a) the *daimonion* manifests an opposition (ἐναντιοῦται, 129e3–4), with no profit for the “associate”; (b) if the *daimonion* cooperates (συλλάβηται, 129e7), there is aston-

29 Cf. Joyal 2000, 65–103; Bailly 2004; Döring 2004; Jedrkiewicz 2012; Lampe 2013; Joyal 2016.

30 Alternatively, Vlastos 1991, 281, speaks of a “monument to credulity.”

31 This may however simply mean “if it has any definite meaning.”

ishing progress; (c) but often the *daimonion* remains silent, the *sunousia* goes on, and the young man, in the end, learns nothing (129e3–132e).

The *Theaetetus* is the obvious model: premature interruption jeopardizes the whole educational process, and divinity oversees Socrates' relations with his "associates."³² The startling innovation, brought by the scenario of the daemonic silence, is that such a guidance may be erratic. In the *Apology*, Socrates had speculatively constructed daemonic latency as a positive datum. Here, the absence is not to be explained. Socrates is left facing an eventuality that he may just be wasting his time with a hopeless "associate." Such an authorial irony is further deployed in the treatment of two different characters.

Socrates quotes verbatim and without comment Aristides' description of his experience. This young man abandons the Socratic circle prematurely, only to discover that to remove oneself from the company of Socrates is to expose one's personal faculties and culture to increasing loss. Socrates, as he himself clarifies from start (127b3–4), is literally teaching nothing; his only competence is "erotic" (within the Platonic *corpus*, the reader will obviously refer to the *Symposium* for explanations). Still, in the first half of the dialogue Socrates displays his (purely inquisitorial and critical) distinctive ability, and submits Theages to an *elenchus* (122d6–127a10). Moreover, so Aristides asserts, anybody sharing Socrates' *sunousia* will find that his own advance in learning is determined by his own *physical* vicinity to Socrates. The nearer one is, the more knowledge one gains (130d3–e4). Aristides seems to believe that the educational daemonic *dunamis* is located within Socrates' body, and somehow radiates from it.

Is this a metaphor of the "spell" cast by Socrates while "instructing" his young companions?³³ Certainly not in Aristides' literal words. And Aristides has a point: his "corporeal" idea of the Socratic *dunamis* has been validated in advance by Socrates in person. As he explained as the *daimonion* works, Socrates recounted how Timarchus, an otherwise unknown character, lost his life in his attempt to kill a no less unknown Nicias against daemonic prohibition (129a7–c8). In order to implement his plan, Timarchus twice tried to take his leave at a symposium from a wholly unaware Socrates. Each time, Socrates perceived and relayed a daemonic opposition. Eventually, the would-be murderer managed to leave unseen, and went to his death. This last time, Socrates could not notice Timarchus' movements, so the *daimonion* could not veto anything.

32 On this relation, see Tarrant 2005.

33 An interpretation advanced notably by Friedländer 1964, 140, and Cobb 1992, 283. Cf. also Trabattoni 1998, 203–204; Bailly 2004, 44–45.

The idea of daemonic latency receives here a peculiar twist: a given action may be daemonically inhibited only if Socrates has the perception of it, a physical perception in this case. Socrates himself confirms that his *body* can work as an instrument by means of which the *daimonion* will affect other persons too.

Is the author playing with the very idea of Socrates' daemonic sign? At any rate, he has his reasons for making fun of an Aristides who believes in learning by physical proximity (and who only acquired, temporarily, nothing but the purely eristic ability to hold a discussion without being worsted: cf. 130c1–6). This character exemplifies the kind of “associates” who, although encountering no declared daemonic opposition, will be eventually unable to derive any lasting benefit from the Socratic *sunousia*: Aristides even describes this condition in extravagant terms. Young Theages risks as much. He will be taken into the Socratic circle. Yet, in order to propitiate all the needed daemonic assistance, he concludes, an express cult shall be rendered to the *daimonion* (131a1–7). Is he thinking of some anonymous divine person to be approached under Socrates' eyes? Is he using a metaphor (“I will work hard under Socrates' direction”), a real possibility here? In any case, the suggested authorial conclusion may be ironic: Theages may well duplicate Aristides as one of those many “associates” (or “disciples,” as they would consider themselves) whose failure in acquiring knowledge has been ominously anticipated by the daemonic silence.³⁴

9 *Daimôn* and Epiphany

An extremely cursory reference to Plutarch's dialogue *On Socrates' Daimonion* (*de Genio Socratis*) may wind up this review. In this piece of sophisticated bricolage, some of the denotations constructed by Xenophon and Plato are recast into a wider religious framework. Plutarch's method may recall Xenophon's method of encapsulating the Socratic peculiarity in current religious belief. Plato, by contrast, nowhere explicitly links his own accounts of Socrates' *daimonion* to any general discussion of the relation between divinity and humanity, nor of the daemonic influences which may be exerted upon the human *psuchê*. Not even in the *Phaedrus* are myths about the soul required to provide any formal explanation for the daemonic event befalling Socrates (cf. Joyal 2000, 70–71).

34 Zuckert 2009, 490 discusses the sovereign role given to the *daimonion* in the Socratic *sunousia* in connection with the lack of “the requisite intelligence or character” which may eventually be displayed by Theages (or by any other youngster).

Plutarch's solution consists in having an individual *daimôn* specially assigned to Socrates in order to provide him with good counsel. This leads to a question that may seem to inaugurate a problem hotly debated in recent times: how could Socrates, for all his commitment to "rationality," submit to the uncanny daemonic impulsion (*De gen.* 579B–582E)?³⁵ Socrates never gave an explanation of the daemonic event (588C). The characters in the dialogue are thus left to speculate about it.

According to Simmias, appropriately the same Pythagorean character found in the *Phaedo*, Socrates flatly rejected the possibility of visual epiphanies, but considered the perception of a supernatural "voice" as something real (588B–C).³⁶ What Socrates experienced, Simmias conjectures at first (588D), may have been the impression of a voice or the intuition of a discourse (φωνῆς τινος αἴσθησις ἢ λόγου νόησις). At any rate, he goes on, that perception was effective by itself (588E). "It pervaded [Socrates'] mind by its very manifestation" (ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτῷ τῷ δηλουμένῳ τοῦ νοοῦντος), although not necessarily with the modality of an articulated language (οὐ φθόγγον). Does that recall Plato's idea of a merely instantaneous event that requires no divine character to speak to Socrates? Simmias means the opposite. Each time, an individual (although obviously anonymous) *daimôn* instills into Socrates' intellect (*nous*) some wholly formed yet voiceless "discourse" (*logos*), that is a thought needing no words to be communicated.³⁷ Socrates, endowed with an exceptionally receptive soul, has no need to interpret anything: the appropriate meaning is just put instantly into his mind (Simmias soon produces some extended analogies with air and sound vibrations in order to explain how superhuman sounds can pervade the human *psuchê*, the location of *nous*, 588E–589D). This is why Simmias, throughout his explanation of what has now become "Socrates' *daimôn*," has no

35 Plutarch contrasts Socrates' belief in all things divine (τὰ θεῖα) with his search of the truth by means of lucid discourse (λόγῳ νήφοντι μετιέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, 580C). Socrates' "rationality" is further stressed by recalling that he faced the terrors of death with unflinching reasoning (χρῆσθαι δ' ἀτρέπτω τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ δεινόν, 581D).

36 *De gen.* 588C: Socrates judged those who claim to have such visions (δὲ ὅψεως ἐντυχεῖν θεῖω τινὶ) to be impostors (ἀλαζόνες), but was earnestly interested in representations of "aural" supernatural manifestations (τοῖς δ' ἀκοῦσαί τινος φωνῆς φάσκουσι προσέχοντι [= Soc.] τὸν νοῦν καὶ διαπυθνομένῳ μετὰ σπουδῆς). The character called Theocritus is obviously wrong in assimilating Socrates' perception of the *daimonion* to a vision (*opsis*) (*De gen.* 580C).

37 *De gen.* 588E: τὸ δὲ προσπίπτον οὐ φθόγγον ἀλλὰ λόγον ἂν τις εἰκάσειε δαίμονος ἄνευ φωνῆς ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτῷ τῷ δηλουμένῳ τοῦ νοοῦντος ("one may conjecture that what reached [Socrates] was not articulated language, but a formed thought [produced] by a *daimôn*, that silently pervaded [Socrates'] intellect by its very manifestation").

use for Plato's central term which reasserts the need for Socrates' own interpretive efforts, *semeion*.³⁸

Plutarch's approach, therefore, definitely deviates from Plato's notion of the *daimonion* as a mere event. He resorts to the agency of a fully-fledged *daimôn*, one of those innumerable superhuman agents whose function it is to allow the human *psuchê* to partake of the divine *nous*.³⁹ A considerable part of the dialogue (590A–594A) gives this interpretation its needed cosmological and daemonological background, from which an individual *daimôn* constituting Socrates' supersensible self emerges. The distance from Plato's and Xenophon's Socratic *daimonion* is considerable.⁴⁰ And it will grow on: focusing on the activities of Socrates' own *daimôn*, successive authors will find nothing wrong with exploiting the very narrative device which Plato and Xenophon had once discarded: epiphany in poetic style.⁴¹

A final point. The substantial divergence among the various representations of Socrates' "obedience" to the *daimonion* (to use a modern expression) may now be assessed. Xenophon's Socrates is free to disobey, as anybody else, and does so once. Plato's Socrates literally receives no "orders," just compelling instantaneous constrictions,⁴² whose meaning he may discover only thanks to his own subsequent interpretation: he neither obeys nor disobeys. Nor does Plutarch's *daimôn*, in fact, impart formal though speechless injunctions of any kind: to say that a divinely-originated thought is introduced into Socrates' *nous* is to say that this thought is directly made to blossom within the recipient's mind; it becomes *ipso facto* one of Socrates' *own* thoughts. By following his *daimôn*, so Plutarch may imply, Socrates follows his deeper (divine) self.

38 On the contrary, the term *semeion* recurs in the "wrong" explanation provided by Galaxidorus: 581F–582A. It bears no relation to Socrates at 578A, 585E, 586F (*aposemainein*), 594E.

39 For the semantic and notional evolution from *daimonion* to *daimôn*, see Joyal 1995, 43–55.

40 However, Long 2006, 71–72, rightly stresses Plutarch's indebtedness to Plato's descriptions of the structure and activity of the *psuchê*, notably at *Leg.* 1.644d–645b.

41 According to Maximus of Tyre, Homer "gives the *daimonion* the name of Athena" (Ἀθηνᾶν καλεῖ τὸ δαιμόνιον, *or.* 8, 5.6), to provide guidance to Odysseus. Apuleius describes a permanent daemonic companion, who could appear in full view (*coram: de Deo Soc.*, xvi 156), although only Socrates could see him, "in the same way as the Homeric Achilles [could see] Athena" (*ita ut Homericus Achilles Minervam: xx.166*). See in general Joyal 1995 and, for the late Platonists' attempt to explain Socrates' divine sign with the help of Homer's epics, Roskam 2014. Such conceptual confusion also reverberates on the contrasting representations of Socrates produced in early Christian literature: see Franek 2016.

42 On such non-prescriptive nature, cf. also Senn 2012, 17.

10 Conclusion: A Narrative Device

In attempting to reconstruct the “real” Socratic *daimonion*, or what has been called the “ancient, transdialogical literary figure” of Socrates,⁴³ it may be useful, before drawing any further inference, to ascertain whether the examined depictions were intended to produce the same meaning and reference in each of their original contexts. Some facts stressing the value of doing so have been recalled here. The implications Plato and Xenophon respectively give to the terms *semeion* / *semainein* are substantially different. The word *daimonion* in the *Alcibiades* means nothing like what it means elsewhere. The relevance of the daemonic influence for Socrates as an “educator” is a near travesty in the *Theages*. This multiplicity of authorial strategies may confirm that the representation of the Socratic *daimonion* (whatever the “real” thing might have been) could be considered within the Socratic literary tradition as an especially appealing and handy narrative device, apt for adding some bright touch to Socrates’ portrayed personality. The obscurity enveloping the supernatural Socratic *daimonion* may thus be considered as both the cause and the result of the considerable challenge, as well as of the ultimate freedom, felt by any individual author as he constructed his own textual “testimony” about this peculiar aspect of Socrates’ personality.

References

- Bailly J.A. *The Socratic Theages*. Hildesheim 2004.
- Brickhouse, T.C. ‘Socrates and his daimonion: correspondence among Gregory Vlastos, Thomas C. Brickhouse, Mark L. McPherran, and Nicholas D. Smith’, in: N.D. Smith and P. Woodruff, *Reason and religion in Socratic philosophy*. Oxford 2000, 176–204.
- Brickhouse T.C. and N.D. Smith. ‘Socrates’ *daimonion* and rationality’, in: Destrée and Smith 2005, 43–62.
- Brisson, L. “Socrates and the divine signal according to Plato’s testimony”, in Destrée and Smith 2005, 1–12.
- Cobb W.S., ‘Plato’s *Theages*’, *AncPhil.* 12 (1992), 267–284.
- Destrée, P. and N.D. Smith. *Socrates’ divine sign: religion, practice and value in Socratic philosophy*. Kelowna 2005.
- Döring, K. *Theages*. Göttingen 2004.
- Dorion, L.-A. ‘Socrate, le *daimonion* et la divination’, in: J. Laurent, *Les dieux de Platon*. Caen 2003, 169–192.

43 McPherran 1996, 14.

- Dorion, L.-A. *Socrate*. Paris 2004.
- Franek, J. 'Omnibus omnia: the reception of Socrates in ante-Nicene Christian literature', *Graeco-Latina Brunensia* 21 (2016), 31–58.
- Friedländer, P. *Platon*, 1. Berlin 1964.
- Gigon, O. *Sokrates: seine Bildung in Dichtung und Geschichte*. Basel 1994.
- Jedrkiewicz, S. 'Sign, *logos*, and meaning: the Platonic Socrates and his daemonic experience', *Métis* 9 (2011), 209–243.
- Jedrkiewicz, S. 'Sobre el diálogo *Teages*, atribuido a Platón', in: J. Martínez, *Fakers and Forgers of Classical Antiquity*. Madrid 2012, 145–157.
- Joyal, M.A. 'Tradition and innovation in the transformation of Socrates' divine sign', in: L. Ayers, *The passionate intellect*. New Brunswick 1995, 39–58.
- Joyal, M.A. *The Platonic Theages*. Stuttgart 2000.
- Joyal, M.A. 'To *daimonion* and the Socratic problem', in: P. Destrée and N.D. Smith, *Socrates' divine sign: religion, practice and value in Socratic philosophy*. Kelowna 2005, 97–112.
- Joyal, M.A. 'Problems and interpretation in the Platonic *Theages*', *ws* 129 (2016), 93–154.
- Lampe, K. 'Rationality, eros, and daemonic influence in the Platonic *Theages* and in the academy of Polemo and Crates', *AJPh* 134 (2013), 384–424.
- Lännström, A. 'Trusting the divine voice: Socrates and his daimonion', *Apeiron* 45 (2012), 42–59.
- Long, A.A. 'How does Socrates' divine sign communicate with him?', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*, Malden 2006, 63–74.
- MacNaghten, R.E. 'Socrates and the daimonion', *CR* 28, (1914), 185–189.
- McPherran, M. *The religion of Socrates*. University Park 1996.
- Partridge, J. 'Socrates, rationality and the *daimonion*', *AncPhil* 28 (2008), 285–309.
- Pucci, P. 'Gods' intervention and epiphany in Sophocles', *AJPh* 115 (1994), 15–46.
- Pucci, P. *The songs of the sirens*. Lanham 1998.
- Pucci, P. *Xenophon: Socrates' defense*. Amsterdam 2002.
- Ribbing, S. *Über Sokrates' Daimonion*. Uppsala 1870.
- Roskam, G. 'Voice or vision?: Socrates' divine sign and Homeric epiphany in late Platonism and beyond', *AJPh* 135 (2014), 359–385.
- Senn, S. 'Socratic philosophy, rationalism and "obedience": decision-making without divine intervention', *Plato* 12 (2012).
- Strycker, E. de and S.R. Slings. *Plato's Apology of Socrates: a literary and philosophical commentary*. Leiden 1994.
- Tarrant, H. 'Socratic *synousia*: a post-Platonic myth?', *JHP* 43 (2003), 131–155.
- Trabattoni, F. 'Sull'autenticità del *Teage* e del *Clitofonte* (pseudo)platonici', *ACME* 51 (1998), 193–210.
- Vlastos, G. *Socrates: Ironist and moral philosopher*. Ithaca 1991.
- Zuckert, C.H. *Plato's philosophers: the coherence of the dialogues*. London 2009.

The Logical Structure of Socrates' Expert-Analogies

Petter Sandstad
Universität Rostock

1 Introduction

Socrates' expert-analogies are frequent in both Plato's dialogues and the Socratic writings of Xenophon, and are also ascribed to Socrates by Aristotle and Aeschines. This is a group of arguments where Socrates makes an analogy from an uncontroversial expert, or an expertise, like the cobbler or ship-captain, to another often controversial expert like the statesman. The expert-analogy is a key component of Socrates' philosophical practice, and without a proper understanding of the expert-analogy we cannot fully understand Socrates.

Among the occurrences of Socrates' expert-analogy the fragments of Aeschines of Sphettus are the least known and discussed.¹ One reason is that they are fragmentary; another is that they are quite simple. But these reasons make them good starting-points from which we can move on to the more complex occurrences in the other sources.

“Do you consider that men have to begin by being ignorant of music before they become musicians? Or ignorant of horsemanship before they become good riders?” “I think they have to begin by first being ignorant of music and horsemanship.”

POxy. 1608 col. I, fr. 1 = *SSR VI A* 48; tr. *FIELD* 1948, 148

This is from Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, where Alcibiades criticizes the Athenian statesman Themistocles. One of Alcibiades' arguments must have been based on the common belief that Themistocles was far from perfect in his youth. Socrates replies that just as a musician or a horseman must start out ignorant of his relative subject, so also a statesman like Themistocles must start out ignorant of statesmanship.² Or take another fragment from Aeschines' *Miltiades*:

It won't be at all strange if the problem that stumps us doesn't stump him. For it's no surprise that, if I asked Euripides which craftsman he

1 Cf. Mársico and Brisson (in this volume) for biographical notes on Aeschines.

2 Cf. Field 1948, 147–148; Lampe 2015, 74–75.

should spend time with in order to deliberate best about making shoes, he could answer “cobblers”; or which he should spend time with in order to deliberate best about building houses, he could answer “architects.” But now ...

POxy. 2890 = *SSR* VI A 80; tr. *LAMPE* 2015, 63

Presumably, Socrates would here have continued the argument by asking Euripides the question: “But now, who should Miltiades spend time with in order to deliberate best about statesmanship?” Presumably, Euripides would answer that he should go to the expert of statesmanship, namely the statesman. To which Socrates would respond that just as we should learn shoemaking from the cobbler, so we should learn statesmanship from the statesman.³

There are good reasons for assuming that the expert-analogy has come down to us from Socrates. Aristotle says: “For two things may be fairly ascribed by Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science” (*Metaph.* M.4, 1078b27–29; cf. *PA* 1.1, 642a24–31). Here “inductive arguments” translates ἐπαγωγή, but the argument that Aristotle must be thinking of are better viewed as an analogy or illustrative parallel (παράβολη):⁴

The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. “Public officials ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes,⁵ instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship’s crew, as if we ought to

3 Rossetti (this volume) argues that this fragment is a parallel of Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.5, and that Xenophon there discusses justice (in contrast to philosophy). However, that story connects justice to laws and concludes by saying that Socrates was a teacher of justice: “By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those who resorted to his company” (*Mem.* 4.4.25)—and by implication, also a teacher of statesmanship (βασιλική τέχνη); cf. Peterson (this volume). Thus, both Aeschines’ fragment and the passage from Xenophon seem to contain such an expert-analogy. For further discussion see Rossetti 1984, 276–277; Lampe 2015, 63–64.

4 Aristotle’s discussion of induction (ἐπαγωγή), e.g., in *APr.* 2.23, fits very poorly for the Socratic expert-analogies, and *pace* most of the secondary literature (which implicitly or explicitly refer to *APr.* 2.23), the emphasis on induction is misleading. Problems with treating the expert-analogies as inductions will become apparent in the next section’s discussion of previous interpreters. I think the expert-analogies are much better seen as illustrative parallels, and will limit my discussion of ἐπαγωγή.

5 *Prima facie* the case of athletes is a poor example of experts, but cf. *Alc.* 119b1–e3; 2. *Alc.* 145c9–e5; and *Thg.* 123e12–15 (admittedly, all three of these are dubious; cf. the contribution by Tarrant in this volume).

take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it.”⁶

ARIST. *Rh.* 1393b4–8

Note that athletes and steersmen are different kinds of experts (τέχναι). The word that I translate as expertise (τέχνη) can also be translated as craft, art, science, trade, profession, skill, technique, cunning, or trick.⁷ I translate this term as an *expert* if referring to the practitioner, or an *expertise* if referring to the field that the expert is a practitioner of. Other commentators often translate it as “craft” or “art.” To translate it as “craft” usually makes it too narrow, giving the connotation of a maker of objects, such as the shoemaker. Likewise, “art” seems too narrow, as presumably mathematics is not an art, and it gives the connotations of fine art which is hardly representative of every expertise.

There is also strong evidence, however, that Socrates' expert-analogies were held to be highly objectionable among his contemporaries.⁸ “He’s always going on about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; he’s always making the same tired old points in the same tired old words ... But ... you’ll realize that no other arguments make any sense” (Pl. *Symp.* 221e4–222a3). “By the gods! You simply don’t let up on your continual talk of shoemakers and cleaners, cooks and doctors, as if our discussion were about them!” (Pl. *Grg.* 491a1–3). “You will have to avoid your favorite topic—the cobblers, builders and metal workers; for it is already worn to rags by you in my opinion” (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.37). Socrates' expert-analogy is so frequently used that Plato and Xenophon in these passages allow themselves to be ironic and make jokes about it (as both definitely wish to defend Socrates from this criticism). However, neither Xenophon nor Plato ever attempts to prove that Socrates' expert-analogies have a logical form such that the conclusion follows necessarily or with a high probability from the premises, and thereby prove Socrates' expert-analogies immune to criticism. Without such a proof, it is difficult to defend Socrates from criticism—in this

6 Xenophon in *Mem.* 1.2.9 also ascribes this expert-analogy to Socrates. A more complex form of the argument is found in *Prt.* 319b5–d7; and *Resp.* 6.488a7–489a6. This expert-analogy is discussed in section three below.

7 For a general discussion of τέχνη in pre-Socratics and Socratics, cf. Angier 2010, 1–35; Roochnik 1996.

8 Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.9, discussed below in Section Three. Euclides might also have criticized Socrates' expert-analogies: “He [sc. Euclides] rejected the argument from analogy (παραβολῆς)” (DL 2.107). But it is unclear if Euclides' view was meant specifically as a criticism of Socrates' expert-analogies, or as a general criticism of analogies. For biographical notes on Euclides, cf. Brisson (this volume).

case, that Socrates speaks incessantly about subjects (say the shoemaker) other than those which the discussion is concerned with, and thereby that Socrates is guilty of (possibly intentional) fallacious reasoning when he infers by analogy from, for instance, the shoemaker to a separate subject. Only by showing that the logical form as such is defensible can we defend Socrates' ubiquitous use of the expert-analogy. Put in another way, if, in contrast to Aristophanes⁹ and Socrates' other critics, we want to defend Socrates against the charge of being a sophist, then we have to prove that Socrates' frequent and characteristic expert-analogies are not sophistic. The stakes in this discussion are high—not only to defend Socrates against the charge of being a sophist, but also to understand a key component of Socrates' way of doing philosophy.

In the next section I will discuss four previous attempts at giving an interpretation and proof of the logical structure of Socrates' expert-analogies. In the third section I will present my own interpretation. In concluding I assess the consequences of my interpretation to our understanding of Socrates, especially to what extent we can defend Socrates against the critics of his expert-analogies.

2 Previous Interpreters

The most important previous interpreters are Robinson, Santas, Vlastos, and more recently McPherran.¹⁰ Each proposes his own interpretation of the expert-analogies, respectively as intuitive (Robinson), analytic (Vlastos), probabilistic (Santas), or statistically probabilistic (McPherran). I will present these interpretations in turn, and show for each of these that they cannot be the correct and complete interpretation.

2.1 Robinson—*Expert-Analogies as Intuitive*

Robinson thinks the number of cases of experts given is irrelevant, because the logical form will contain only one of the cases and from that case alone infer the conclusion. Thereby it is neither a probabilistic induction nor an induction enumerating all possible cases.

9 Aristophanes' *Clouds* portrays Socrates as teaching how to make the weaker argument appear to be the stronger: he teaches sophistic argumentation. There are no expert-analogies in the play, but there are other analogies, e.g., at 385–394 and 1286–1296. See also the contributions by Jordović and Rossetti in this volume.

10 For a brief summary of these interpreters (with the exception of Santas) cf. Warne 2013, 26–28.

Analogy seems to be essentially an argument from a single case to a single case. However many cases are available, the argument, if it is an analogy, chooses only one of them, or at any rate treats all that it takes as being for the purpose of the argument a single case. It is essentially not perfect epagoge; for that ascends to the universal. It is essentially not probable epagoge from a plurality of cases either; for it professes to be intuitive in character, to see into one thing by an insight obtained on another.

ROBINSON 1953, 207

The logical form of the expert-analogy is "since this x is y , that x is y ," such that for the expert-analogy we have something like "since this expert is y , that expert is y " (Robinson 1953, 207). From the first expert in the premise having " y " one infers to the second expert in the conclusion also having " y ." Further, one intuits the connection between the first expert and the second expert, namely that they are both experts, but this is only implicit in the analogy (and in the logical form) and must be seen through intuition: "Although no universal is mentioned, we vaguely suppose that one is present and identical in the two cases" (Robinson 1953, 208). On this view, Socrates would be concerned with enlightening his interlocutors, allowing them on their own to intuit the relevant universal. Robinson's view is, in sum, that the expert-analogies have a non-valid logical form, but that nonetheless the expert-analogies allow one to intuit a universal connecting the premise and the conclusion.

There are several problems with this interpretation. First, the suggested logical form is invalid. And although the analogy is meant to make one first presuppose and then intuit a universal connecting (I presume by logical necessity) the premise and conclusion, this universal is external to the logical form. Further, it is unclear how this universal is to be included in the logical form. Seemingly one could say that "this expert is y , and this expert is connected to that expert through the universal *Expert*, therefore that expert is y ," but this would still be invalid. Second, it is not clear how this intuiting of the universal is supposed to work. Third, it is not clear why having the universal implicit and then intuited would be preferable to making the universal explicit. Robinson's interpretation is thus far from being complete and satisfactory.

2.2 Vlastos—*Expert-Analogies as Analytic*

For Vlastos the number of cases is irrelevant not because, with Robinson, one case alone allows one to intuit the universal, but rather because the expert-analogy is not an inference at all. He says: "The truth of the conclusion is *built into the meaning of its critical term* 'master of a craft'" (Vlastos 1991, 268). The

conclusion is not inferred from the cases cited, and one case should be enough to exemplify the critical term. Any further cases can be eliminated without altering the truth of the conclusion.

Vlastos suggests that the expert-analogy “is straightforward argument by analogy: from some cases of *c* we argue by analogy to a further case of *c*” (Vlastos 1991, 268). This seems indistinguishable from Robinson’s view. What in fact distinguishes the two is that Vlastos does not think that one intuits the universal (which Vlastos calls “the critical term”)—instead, the universal is exemplified by the expert in the premise. And further, that “*Y*” is a part of the meaning of the universal, and thus that “experts are *Y*” is analytic. Even further, Vlastos claims that the expert-analogies cannot be falsified by experience, and are not subject to empirical confirmation, and therefore that “experts are *Y*” is analytic *a priori*. Vlastos’ full suggestion is then something like “since this expert is *Y*, and a thing is an expert if and only if a thing is *Y*, that expert is *Y*.” Under this interpretation, Socrates is seen as repeating tautologies, and thus would be closer to an annoying village-idiot than a profound philosopher, although he would be cleared of the charge of being a sophist.

While Vlastos is correct in his view that the conclusion is built into the critical term (namely, “expert”), he is mistaken when he denies that the expert-analogies are inferences.¹¹ Although the conclusion is built into the term it is not a mere restatement of the definition, since there will be many non-definitory attributes built into the term but not into the definition—even though these perhaps are never proved by Socrates with empirical support and cannot be falsified by experience. A proposition is not either analytic *a priori* (for instance that bachelors are unmarried) or *a posteriori* and falsifiable (for instance that Socrates was an Athenian citizen). There are also propositions like “Hesperus is Phosphorus” and “water is H₂O,” or for that matter “experts should not be selected by lot.” These are not analytic *a priori* propositions, yet arguably they are not the sort of proposition that might be falsified by experience. And it is interesting propositions like these that Socrates infers in his expert-

11 Vlastos does think some of the expert-analogies are inferences, namely those explicitly stating the general truth about the expert: “Here we go by *epagoge* to the general statement about all cases of *c* and then infer by syllogism that this would be true of this or that case of *c*” (Vlastos 1991, 268). Clearly the syllogism is an inference. But Vlastos is then faced with two unanswered problems: How is this type related to the non-inferential type? Why does one for this type have to presume that the cases work as an intuitive induction, instead of simply taking the universal as a stated premise which first is exemplified by the cases? Vlastos’ interpretation is unable to answer these questions.

analogies—rather than any exemplified tautologies which could hardly have engaged the interest and anger that Socrates beyond doubt provoked in his interlocutors.¹²

2.3 *Santas—Expert-Analogies as Probabilistic Inductions*

Santas (1979, 312) thinks the expert-analogies are strong, although Socrates cites only a few cases. Yet he thinks the number of cases in an expert-analogy is essential for the strength of the argument and the probability of the conclusion being true. Santas proposes the following logical structure:

- P1 each of a, b, c is known (observed) to have s and p
- P2 d is an s
- C1 Therefore, (probably) d is p.

SANTAS 1979, 140

Here “a, b, c” are cases inferred from, and “d” is the case inferred to. “s” and “p” are attributes. Thus it is an inference between two or more things having many similar attributes, but where one of them is known to have an additional attribute. Understood this way an analogy is a kind of induction, relying not merely on the number of cases cited but also on the number of attributes shared. As there is no necessary connection between having the shared attributes and having an additional attribute in common, this argument is at best probable.

Santas exemplifies his structure through discussing two cases: *Laches* 184d–185a and *Crito* 47a–48a. I will discuss these cases, with Santas' interpretation of them, in turn.

2.3.1 Santas on *Laches* 184d–185a

Socrates is asked to resolve a discussion on armed combat between the generals Nicias and Laches by “casting his vote.” Socrates rejects this request, arguing that one should follow the advice of the experts rather than the majority. He first gives this premise:

Socrates: Suppose there should be a council to decide whether your son ought to practice a particular kind of gymnastic exercise; would

¹² Warne 2012, 28, makes much the same point: “But if all the conclusions of this form of epagoge are tautologies, it appears to render mysterious the issue this communicative function is designed to overcome.”

you be persuaded by the greater number or by whoever has been educated and exercised under a good trainer?

Melesias: Probably by the latter, Socrates.

PL. *Lach.* 184d8–e4

Then Socrates makes the superordinate principle explicit: “So I think it is by knowledge that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule” (184e8–9). Socrates concludes that one should follow the experts on armed combat and not the majority.

Santas’ analysis of this argument is peculiar. He ignores the superordinate principle and ignores the fact that both the trainer and the expert on armed combat are experts. Instead he constructs, based on the succeeding discussion in 185b–e and 189e–190e, this premise: “The consultation as to whether our sons should learn fighting in armor is consultation about means to ends” (Santas 1979, 140). Since this premise is introduced subsequent rather than antecedent to our passage, I find Santas’ premise highly questionable.

I think it is more naturally read as: (1) one should be persuaded by the gymnastic trainer on issues within his expertise; (2) there is an expert on armed combat; therefore (3) one should be persuaded by the expert on armed combat on issues of armed combat rather than by the majority. This is a perfectly straightforward interpretation, adding nothing to what is said in 184d–185a, and giving what seems to be a valid deduction. This interpretation is further strengthened by Socrates’ follow-up question, asking who among them the expert on armed combat is.

2.3.2 Santas on *Crito* 47a–48a

Crito argues that if Socrates refuses to escape from prison, then the public opinion would be that he did not escape because of cowardice in himself and his companions—which would be contrary to the good. Socrates replies that the good is not to be concerned with the majority’s opinion: “Should a man professionally engaged in physical training pay attention to the praise and blame and opinion of any man, or to those of one man only, namely a doctor or trainer?” (47a12–b3). The rest of the argument is implicit. Following the opinion of the many in this respect would harm one’s body, and a life is not worth living if one’s body is in a poor state. But the part concerned with justice and injustice is even more important than the body, and if that part is in a poor state then one’s life would not be worth living. Socrates concludes: “We should not then think so much of what the majority will say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and injustice” (48a5–7).

Again Santas adds too much into his interpretation. He thinks he finds the following attribute shared between the doctor and the expert on justice: "It takes experience and knowledge to determine which actions promote virtue in the psyche and which destroy vice, i.e. which actions benefit the psyche and which harm it" (Santas 1979, 146). In addition he presupposes the analogy between the health of the body and the health of the soul from *Gorgias* 464a1–465e1. But our argument does not mention the soul, and Socrates does not say that it takes experience and knowledge to determine which actions promote virtue. And further, Santas ignores the second part of the argument.

Santas thinks the argument is based upon a strong connection between the two parts of the first premise, in that from the premise that he inserts into the text—that it takes experience to determine what promotes health—it is implied that one should follow the experts on matters of health rather than the public. And by parity of reasoning one should then grant that from the second premise—it takes experience to determine what promotes the just—one should accept the conclusion that one should follow the experts on the just rather than the public (Santas 1979, 146). This is Santas' closest formulation explaining why the analogy is strong; but it is hardly satisfactory. First, the premise that he reads into the text hardly seems even implicit in the text. Second, that premise seems not to be needed to infer the conclusion.

It is preferable to Santas' interpretation to take the argument thus: (1) In matters of physical training one should follow the expert on the subject, the doctor and trainer, and not that of the majority; (2) there is an expert on the just and unjust; therefore (3) in matters of the just and unjust one should follow the expert on the just and unjust, and not the majority. In 47e–48a there is a second argument: (1) In matters of physical training following the opinion of the majority rather than the expert (the doctor and trainer) will ruin one's body, and make life unlivable; (2) the part concerned with justice and injustice is more valuable than the body; therefore (3) in matters of virtue and vice following the opinion of the majority rather than the expert will ruin the part concerned with justice and injustice, and make life unlivable.

2.3.3 Concluding Remarks on Santas

On this interpretation Socrates would be seen as (usually) giving expert-analogies where the conclusion follows with high probability from the premises. However, this interpretation is, judging from Santas' two attempts, highly difficult to apply to actual occurrences of the expert-analogy. I have shown that Santas' interpretations have several problems, and that in general his structure matches very poorly with the actual argument of Socrates.

2.4 McPherran—*Expert-Analogies as Statistically Probabilistic Inductions*

McPherran (2007, 363) defines a probable induction as a “generalization employing a survey of coordinate cases involving intuition of the universal (but not yielding certainty, as in conception (A) [the view of Robinson and Vlastos] of intuition of the universal).”

This means, of course, that—contrary to Robinson’s account of ἐπαγωγή as (A) intuiting the universal where this yields *certainty*—Socrates saw such intuitions of a universal as standing in need of corroboration through a sampling of cases and as only providing probable results.

MCPHERRAN 2007, 362

He gives this example, which does not look anything like a Socratic expert-analogy: If one were to check the price of gasoline at several filling stations in a given county, and in all cases found the price to be higher than \$2 a gallon, then it would be highly probable that it is higher than \$2 in the whole county (cf. McPherran 2007, 361). McPherran thinks that the probability of the conclusion is strengthened the more representative the selection of cases is, and the more one can refer to statistical laws (a very un-Socratic notion). In contrast to Santas’ view where the probability depends on the number of shared attributes, McPherran thinks the probability depends on the representativeness of the selection of cases and on the statistical laws one can cite. This interpretation gives us a non-sophistic though very foreign and anachronistic Socrates, who surveyed representative cases and identified statistical laws—in short a Socrates who few, if any, would recognize.

In support of his interpretation McPherran cites only a few passages. He interprets *Crito* 46b–48b, in contrast to Santas, to be a case of complete enumeration, based solely on these few lines:

So with other matters, not to enumerate them all, and certainly with actions just and unjust, shameful and beautiful, good and bad, about which we are now deliberating.

PL. *Cri.* 47c8–11

In these lines, as the context makes evident, Socrates clarifies the superordinate principle and makes it clear that justice also falls under the principle. But I fail to see in these lines any enumeration of cases, only of synonyms. Socrates says that it holds as a universal characteristic for all experts, but does not give any indication that he thereby has checked every possible type of expert.

McPherran interprets other arguments as instances of probabilistic induction,¹³ and yet only one of these is a typical expert-analogy:

But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established laws by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsman (τέκτονι) for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft.

XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.9

McPherran's reason for thinking this a probabilistic argument is that "one can imagine a counter-example to its claim, namely, the existence of a craft whose expertise is sufficiently difficult to test for (say, the craft of divination), that it is better to leave the choice of its best practitioner to the lot" (McPherran 2007, 363). But the text nowhere mentions any test. The superordinate principle is that one ought to choose the one who has expert knowledge, rather than by lot. Exactly how one is to recognize this expert is unstated.

Thus there is no reason to accept McPherran's comprehensive claim, namely that Socrates' expert-analogies in general stand in need of empirical corroboration through the sampling of cases, and therefore that they provide only probable results. The examples that McPherran discusses do not in any way warrant such a broad conclusion, and many cases discussed elsewhere in this paper indicate that McPherran's claim is false.

3 Expert-Analogies as Deductively Valid Inferences

I have already discussed a fair number of expert-analogies. However, in presenting my own suggested interpretation I will discuss an expert-analogy that was only mentioned in the introduction and briefly discussed at the end of the

13 (1) *Chrm.* 159b5–160b9 is not a case of probabilistic reasoning; Socrates exploits the equivocity of ἡσυχῇ, which can mean both "quietly" and "slowly," and Socrates only disproves that temperance is slowness. (2) *Chrm.* 167c8–168b11 is not an expert-analogy, but rather an argument showing that Critias can think of no case where a perception or intentional attitude takes itself as its object. (3) *Euthphr.* 7a6–8a8 is simply guilty of the fallacy of false dichotomy. (4) *La.* 192b9–193d8 provides the *reductio* that if endurance is courage, then those without the relevant expertise (i.e., foolish endurance) will be more courageous than those with the expertise. But Socrates says that this is absurd, because courage is noble and not disgraceful.

previous subsection. It is ascribed to Socrates by Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393b4–8; see sec. 1), Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.2.9; see sec. 2.4), and Plato (*Prt.* 319b5–d7; *Resp.* 6.488a7–489a6). This is the analogy from the fact that the ship-captain should not be selected by lot to the conclusion that the statesman should not be selected by lot.

My suggested interpretation of the logical structure of Socrates' expert-analogies is as follows: the expert-analogy is an inference from one or more experts to another expert. The superordinate principle that validates the inference is that they are experts, together with the proposition that certain attributes are necessarily possessed by any expert.¹⁴ Thus, they will have the following form, where "E1" refers to one type of expert/expertise; "E2" refers to another; "E" refers to the genus *Expert/Expertise*; "P" is some predicate; "*qua*" is interpreted as neutral to any specific theory of *qua*-predication and equivalent to "because";¹⁵ and where the second premise is usually left implicit.

- (1) E1 has P *qua* E
- (2) E2 is an E
- (3) E2 has P *qua* E

Applying this logical structure to our analogy we arrive at the following:

- (1) The ship-captain (E1) should not be selected by lot (P) *qua* expert (E).¹⁶
- (2) The statesman (E2) is an expert (E).
- (3) The statesman (E2) should not be selected by lot (P) *qua* expert (E).

My interpretation shares some elements with Robinson's and Vlastos'. In contrast to Robinson, the intuitive aspect is much downplayed and the major weight of the argument is put on it being deductively valid. And while Vlastos is correct in his view that the conclusion is built into the critical term, and this critical term is that of the expert, he is mistaken when he denies that the expert-analogies are inferences.

14 It is thus similar to Aristotle's use of demonstrations from genus to species, cf. Lennox 2001, 9–13.

15 Though with the restriction that it is limited to exception-less *qua*-predication. For a discussion of *qua*-predication of exceptions, e.g., that penguins can fly *qua* birds, cf. Sandstad 2016.

16 Pace McPherran, let us hypothesize the truth of the premise, that no kind of expert should be selected by lot. We are interested in the premises' logical form, not their truth.

The particular experts that are inferred from and to exhibit a taxonomic rank, for example "the shoemaker," "the captain," and so on, as the species; "*Expert*" as the genus. Because of this taxonomic relation the expert-analogy is strong, not being based on mere similarity. The superordinate principle makes them, *qua* experts, identical. One is talking about the same thing, only that the expertise which one infers from is clearer, better known, and more available to us than the one being inferred to.

In an expert-analogy the premises predicate an attribute to a kind of expert. The truth of the premises depends on a correct conception of the expert. However, the logical structure of this type of analogy is not limited to the expert-analogy and is broadly applicable if one generalizes the structure. Thus one can show that Socrates' expert-analogies are true because of their logical form, rather than because of the subject-matter. Substituting "E1" with "S1," "E2" with "S2," and "E" with "M," we arrive at a logical structure which makes no mention of experts:

- (1) S1 is P *qua* M
- (2) S2 is M
- (3) S2 is P *qua* M

The interpretation of our analogy from the ship-captain to the statesman will of course remain unchanged. And clearly the genus "M" works as a middle term, thus connecting the subject "S2" with the predicate "P." Further, the terms are predicated univocally as required for a valid deduction, thus avoiding falling into a metaphor and a fallacious inference. The proposed structure of analogical inferences which I have suggested above seems valid, and if the premises are true the conclusion seems sound.

It is, however, far from being a syllogism, as it makes use of four terms instead of three, both "S1" and "M" acting as middle terms connecting the subject to the predicate.¹⁷ In addition, it is not from the structure evident where the *qua*-

17 Note the similarities to Aristotle's discussion of the illustrative parallel (*παράβολη*), and his discussion of the argument by example (*παράδειγμα*) which he says is the genus of the illustrative parallel (*Rh.* 2.20). First, Aristotle's analysis of the argument by example (in *APr.* 2.24) also has four terms. Second, Aristotle says: "When two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an example" (*Rh.* 1.2, 1357b29–30). Here *γένος* is translated as "order," but one could just as well have translated it with "genus." Thus, the captain is an example to be inferred from, and the statesman is what is inferred to, because they both fall under the same genus, "experts." This is consistent with my interpretation of the expert-analogies.

predication belongs. It could attach to the subject “s,” in which case one would have the complex subject “s *qua* M.”¹⁸ But in that case the logical form would be invalid, and thus that possibility must be rejected. Or it could attach to the copula, as restricting the way in which the predicate belongs to the subject. But then the copula in the second premise would be distinct from the copula in the first premise and the conclusion, and again the logical form would be invalid. Or lastly, it could attach to the predicate, such that one has the complex “P *qua* M” rather than the simple “P.” This, however, has the undesirable consequence that one will not be able to say that the subject has the predicate “P” as such, but only *qua* M.¹⁹ Summarizing, it is not evident that the proposed structure is valid. Therefore the logical structure must be further reduced.

We want to merge our two middle terms, “s₁” and “M,” into a single term and thereby have the three terms of a syllogism. I propose that this can be accomplished by interpreting “s₁” as a definition by paradigm²⁰ of “M,” such that “s₁” in the first premise represents “M”—and thus in this context that “s₁” is substitutable with “M,” without loss of truth. The first premise is thus a definition by paradigm (alternatively, example) of “M,” which further ascribes an uncontroversial attribute to belong to “M.” In this case the ship-captain is a typical uncontroversial case of an expert (simply standing in for any type of expert), and it is uncontroversial that one should not select a ship-captain (or any other uncontroversial expert) by lot.

I take the paradigm case to be a particular rather than a universal. One refers to an unspecified captain, and not to the universal *Captain* (which assuredly does not have knowledge of navigation and cannot be elected). I take “s₁” and “s₂” to be unspecified particulars. This distinguishes definition by paradigm from deictic or ostensive definition, in that the paradigm is an unspecified particular rather than a sensory particular that is pointed to. Also it is clearly a nominal rather than a real definition, in that the paradigm does not state what it is to be an expert, but rather gives an example of what the term applies to. In our example above both are particulars of two separate species under a common genus, but this is not required for the structure to be deductively valid.

18 It would thus be a *qua*-object, distinct from the simple object “s”; cf. Fine 1982, 100–104; Fine 1999.

19 This could, however, be a way of allowing for exceptions, cf. Sandstad 2016.

20 On definition by paradigm, see Robinson 1954, 108–117, 120–121. Rabbås 2004 discusses definition by paradigm and the what-is-it question in Socratic dialogues, but does not explicitly discuss Socrates’ expert-analogies, though he does briefly discuss arguments from analogy in forensic rhetoric (153).

One problem with definition by paradigm is that the definition is what Rabbås (2004, 153) calls semantically inarticulate, since not all the attributes belonging to the paradigm also belong to the *definiendum*. The ship-captain has knowledge of navigation, for example, while the cobbler does not. Thus the paradigm-definition to some extent already presupposes knowledge of the term defined, or it requires that one provide several paradigm-definitions of the *definiendum* in cases with a high degree of semantic inarticulateness. This might be a reason why Socrates usually provides two or three paradigms rather than just one, even though one is sufficient for the logical form.

Applying the suggestion to interpret “s1” as a definition by paradigm of “M,” we can substitute “s1” with “M” and eliminate the then superfluous “*qua* M,” getting the following valid syllogism (namely, *Barbara*):

- (1) M is P
- (2) S2 is M
- (3) S2 is P

Our analogy from the ship-captain to the statesman thus says:

- (1) The expert (defined by the paradigm of the ship-captain) (M) should not be selected by lot (P).
- (2) The statesman (S2) is an expert (M).
- (3) The statesman (S2) should not be selected by lot (P).

Someone might remark that this structure does not seem to fit the report of this analogy by Aristotle and Xenophon (*Rh.* 2.20, 1393b4–8; *Mem.* 1.2.9), in that both have the conclusion precede the premises. However, in Aristotle's application of syllogisms in *Posterior Analytics* he usually begins by stating the conclusion (the *explanandum*), and then afterwards constructs the syllogism with the middle term (the *explanans*). This indicates that it is to a certain degree optional whether one presents the conclusion first or last.

An alternative to this reduction to *Barbara* would be to insert an additional premise into the logical structure. Either, (4) ship-captains are paradigmatic experts; or an intermediate conclusion from the first premise, (5) experts should not be selected by lot. My interpretation is preferable to these two alternatives because the logical structure is simpler and more evidently valid, and because I think my interpretation is closer to Socrates' usage of the expert-analogies.

4 Conclusion

This paper has presented an interpretation of the expert-analogy as a valid deduction. It infers from one type of expert (for instance the ship-captain, which works as a paradigm definition of expert) to another type of expert (for instance the statesman), and the attribute inferred (for instance “should not be selected by lot”) belongs to these types of experts because they are experts. The general logical form, which makes no mention of the expert and which is valid in virtue of its form, infers from one or more species to another species of the same genus, and the attribute inferred is presupposed to belong as such to the genus rather than species.

On my interpretation, Socrates is convincingly defended from the accusation that his expert-analogies are sophistic arguments. They are seen in fact to exhibit a valid logical form such that the conclusion follows by necessity from the premises. Not only does this show that Socrates was, for his time, a good logician who made use of a valid logical form in his argumentation. It further shows that contemporary logicians have something important to learn from Socrates, namely this deductively valid form of analogies—a form which, if one is to believe our sources, Socrates was exceedingly adept at applying to any number of issues.²¹

References

- Angier, T. *Technē in Aristotle's Ethics: crafting the moral life*. New York 2010.
- Barnes, J. *The complete works of Aristotle*, I–II. Princeton 1984.
- Cooper, J.M. *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis 1997.
- Diogenes Laertius. *Lives of eminent philosophers*, I–II tr. R.D. Hicks. Cambridge, MA 1972.
- Field, G.C. *Plato and his contemporaries*. London 1948.
- Fine, K. ‘Acts, events and things’, in: W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer and J. Schank, *Sprache und Ontologie*. Wien 1982, 97–105.
- Fine, K. ‘Things and their parts’, *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 23 (1999), 61–74.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Lampe, K. ‘Rethinking Aeschines of Sphettus’, in: U. Zilioli, *The Socratics and the Socratic schools*. London 2005, 61–81.

21 Let me thank an anonymous reviewer of Brill, the editors of this volume, Ludger Jansen, and Øyvind Rabbås for comments and criticism to (parts of) this work, as well as audiences at Oslo and Heidelberg where earlier versions of this paper were presented.

- Lennox, J.G. 'Divide and explain: the *Posterior Analytics* in practice', in: J.G. Lennox, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology*. Cambridge 2001, 7–38.
- McPherran, M. 'Socratic *epagôgê* and Socratic induction', *JHP* 45 (2007), 347–364.
- McPherran, M. 'Santas, Socrates, and induction', in: G. Anagnostopoulos, *Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian studies: essays in honor of Gerasimos Santas*. New York 2011, 53–74.
- Rabbås, Ø. 'Definitions and paradigms: Laches' first definition', *Phronesis* 49 (2004), 143–168.
- Robinson, R. *Plato's earlier dialectic*. Oxford 1953.
- Robinson, R. *Definition*. Oxford 1954.
- Roochnik, D. *Of art and wisdom: Plato's understanding of techne*. University Park 1996.
- Rossetti, L. 'Le inferenze pseudoanalogiche', in: G. Santinello, *Metafore dell'invisibile: ricerche sull'analogia*. Brescia 1984, 271–283.
- Sandstad, P. 'Aristotle on exceptions to essences in biology', in: B. Strobel and G. Wöhrle, *Angewandte Epistemologie in antiker Philosophie und Wissenschaft*, AKA-einzel-schriften 11, Trier 2016, 69–92.
- Santas, G.X. *Socrates: the arguments of the philosophers*. Abingdon 1979.
- Vlastos, G. *Socrates: ironist and moral philosopher*. Cambridge 1991.
- Warne, C. *Arguing with Socrates: an introduction to Plato's shorter dialogues*. London 2013.
- Xenophon. *Xenophon: Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology*, tr. E.C. Marchant and O.J. Todd. Cambridge, MA 1923.

Crying for Help: Socrates as Silenus in the *Euthydemus*

Michael Erler

Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg

1 Dialogues and Comedy

Plato's dialogues prove that their author can turn the popular genre of the *Sôkratikoï logoi* into philosophical pieces of art. Plato does so by taking over structures, motifs, and language from other traditional genres.¹ He transforms, parodies, and integrates these alien elements in order to strengthen his philosophical message.

Plato borrows elements not only of contemporary prose genres but also of tragic and comic drama. In the *Gorgias*, for instance, allusions to Euripides' tragedy *Antiope* serve as a subtext of the discussion about the way one should live. Socrates plays a role similar to that of the artist and intellectual Amphion, and Callicles to that of the pragmatic Zetheus.² Motifs and features also are taken from comedy. It is sufficient to refer to the setting of the *Protagoras*, which seems inspired by Eupolis' *Colaces* ("Flatterers"), performed in 421 BCE.³ The openness to incorporating alien elements into the traditional form of the Socratic dialogue itself might be one of these motifs.⁴

Sometimes Plato's characters are modeled after typical figures in drama. Pride of place in that context, of course, belongs to Plato's protagonist Socrates.⁵ In *Gorgias* and *Theaetetus* his behavior is judged by Callicles as childish, slavish and unmanly. He is described as a person who does not know how to get along in daily life in Athens.⁶ Plato plays with the tragic aspect in the *Phaedo*, where Socrates is in a tragic situation and is expected to behave like a tragic hero. Here Socrates says that he does not wish to be regarded as such and indeed

1 Cf. Nightingale 2012, 60–92; Charalabopoulos 2012, 56–103.

2 Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 485e–486a, 506b; *Phd.* 115a; cf. Nightingale 1995; Kuhn 1941–1942; Dalfen 1979–1980; Charalabopoulos 2012, 66–68, 71–77, 90–103.

3 Cf. Pl. *Prt.* 314e–316a and Eup. fr. 157 and 158 PCG; see Manuwald 1999, 130–131.

4 Cf. Nightingale 1995, 133–171; Charalabopoulos 2012, 69.

5 Cf. Blondell 2002, 70.

6 Cf. Pl. *Grg.* 484c–e; *Tht.* 172d–175e; Michelini 2000, esp. 514–515; cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1015–1023.

he does not behave like a tragic person.⁷ On the other hand, Socrates' snub nose was recognized as resembling Silenus', the figure familiar from comedy or satyr plays (*Symp.* 215b), in particular in the *Theaetetus*.⁸

It might come as a surprise that Socrates' appearance has a comic flavor even in tragic dialogues like the *Phaedo*, because in the *Republic* Socrates warns his partners that the kind of foolishness portrayed in comedy is to be neither permitted nor imitated in the city.⁹ In the *Philebus* Socrates defines the comic as the unmasking of pompous individuals who pretend to a wisdom they do not really have. According to Plato one laughs at those who think they know something, if one realizes that they do not possess that knowledge. This discrepancy between apparent knowledge and what the audience recognizes is essential for comedy.¹⁰ But it also plays a role when one reads Plato's dialogues. One might think of characters in the dialogues such as *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, *Charmides*, or *Lysis* whose claim to knowledge Socrates exposes and unmasks by means of the *elenchus*. This unmasking of pretended knowledge is illustrated time and again in the so-called aporetic dialogues, but also in other dialogues like the *Euthydemus*.

One might well argue that this motif gives every Socratic dialogue a comic aspect. Plato's unmasking of the pretense of knowledge brings about a new kind of comedy, avoiding the dangers Socrates refers to in the *Republic*.¹¹ In the *Laws* Plato makes it clear that comedy is acceptable if the negative aspects of a character are evident. Such aspects invite the audience or the reader to laugh with and against the character on stage, that is, to laugh in sympathy with him as well as at his faults.¹²

2 *Euthydemus* as a Comic Drama

Diogenes Laertius claims that comedy was the only genre at which the youthful Plato did not try his hand (3.5). Readers of the *Euthydemus* might doubt this claim. Plato looks to have written this dialogue to compete with traditional comedy, which often targeted intellectuals, philosophers and, of course,

7 Cf. Erler 2011, 93–95.

8 Cf. Pl. *Symp.* 215b; *Tht.* 143e; 144d; Xen. *Symp.* 5.7; cf. Erler 1992.

9 Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 3.394b–395b, 10.606c.

10 Cf. Pl. *Phlb.* 48b–50b; see Frede 1997, 286–295. Cf. Miller 2008; McCabe 2010; Austin 2012.

11 Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 3.394d–397d; see Hyland 1995, 132; Fraenkel 1950, 614 (ad 1317).

12 Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 7.816d–e. Halliwell 2002, 82. I shall come back to this in a forthcoming paper.

Socrates.¹³ In the *Euthydemus* the unmasking of false claims to wisdom is a leitmotif. Plato wishes to refute Euthydemus' and Dionysodorus' claim to be in command of a knowledge that they in fact lack. This unmasking concerns both a pretended knowledge and the wrong use of method. One goal of the dialogue is to show the differences between the brothers' eristic method and Socrates' elenctic method—by which he undermines the eristics' wrongly-assumed knowledge. He then reproaches those engaged in eristics.¹⁴ In contrast to them, Socrates does not claim always to say something new, does not aim to transmit knowledge as quickly as possible, and does not strive for an audience that is as large as possible. He instead allows himself time for searching out the truth and accepts as conversation partners only those he judges suitable. He does not wish to be provocative for its own sake; he wishes to liberate through *aporia*.¹⁵ He allows for questions and for discussions.

The *Euthydemus* shows that the eristics misuse their method of testing opinions which in many aspects seems similar to what Socrates practices when unmasking his partners' pretensions. In fact, their method is a comic parody of a Socratic *elenchus* that is rehearsed without serious intentions. Socrates' fight with the eristics, and their discussion with Ctesippus, are full of comic aspects. The contrast between eristic and dialectic discourse reflects the difference between eristic play and philosophical earnestness rehearsed in comedy.¹⁶

We already mentioned that Plato presents the unmasking of wrong assumptions as one possible criterion of the ridiculous or comic. The structure of the dialogue, the language of the participants, and not least the figure of Socrates also clearly underline the comic character of the dialogue and signal that in the *Euthydemus* Plato wishes to rival traditional comedy. The language and motifs are taken in part from drama but mostly from comedy. Many motifs and formulations are borrowed specifically from Aristophanes,¹⁷ and echo both colloquial expressions and comic techniques occurring in his plays.¹⁸ One allusion might

13 Cf. Zimmerman 2008; Palpacelli 2009; on intellectuals and Socrates in comedy, see Bromberg (in this volume).

14 Cf. Szlezák 1985, 49–65.

15 Cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 303d–e; *Phdr.* 276e–277a; see Erler 1987, 213–256.

16 The reference to *paidia* and *spoudaia* is a leitmotif of the *Euthydemus* (278c, 283b, 288c, 293a, 294b, 300e, 304e).

17 On relations of the *Euthydemus* to Aristophanes and comedy see Winckelmann 1833, xlviv–xlvi; Greene 1920; Post 1926; de Vries 1949, 187–222; Brock 1990; about the duals and their comic effect in the *Euthydemus*, cf. Polleichtner 2009–2011. For structure see also Chance 1992, 211.

18 For colloquial language in Plato, cf. Jowett and Campbell 1894, 2, 283–285.

point to the *Thesmophoriazusae*, but allusions to the *Clouds* prevail.¹⁹ Small wonder, one should think, because here Socrates is parodied as a kind of proto-intellectual.

In the *Euthydemus* Plato transfers to Socrates' opponents sophistic language that Aristophanes' *Clouds* gives to Socrates.²⁰ The dialogue falls into five distinct scenes, with prologue and epilogue, which obviously should remind the reader of the five-part division of the comedy or satyr-play.²¹ The first eristic scene is destructive, the second raises problems about, for example, the meaning of learning, and the third is a burlesque full of absurd wordplay. Embedded are two Socratic scenes. The first is a kind of protreptic by which Socrates tries to persuade Clinias to be prepared to learn and to philosophize. In the second it is asked what kind of knowledge a person must gain in order to become happy. The search for an answer to that question fails, the interlocutors plunging into an *aporia*. It is telling that the pupils of the two eristics are described by Socrates as "a chorus" (276b). It was even suggested in antiquity that the *Euthydemus* was performed.²² The agonistic competition between the eristics and Socrates is full of comic moments, most of which occur in the final scene of the last discussion round.²³ Socrates reports that there was a lot of laughing and clapping by the spectators and pupils of the eristics (303b).

3 *Socrates comicus in the Euthydemus*

The figures in the *Euthydemus* reflect figures in comic plays; Ctesippus, for instance, functions as a buffoon (*bomolochos*).²⁴ More notable is the fact that Socrates has more comic moments here than he does in Plato's other dialogues. This is so even from his first appearance (272b–c), before he begins his narrative. He reports that he had lessons in music with Connus although he was already an old man. Connus came thus to be ridiculed as a teacher of old men,

19 Cf. Ar. *Thesm.* 149–159 and Pl. *Euthyd.* 284d–e. But allusions to the *Clouds* prevail (cf. Ar. *Nub.* 439–442, 453–454, and Pl. *Euthyd.* 285c–d; Ar. *Nub.* 143 and Pl. *Euthyd.* 277e; Ar. *Nub.* 254 and Pl. *Euthyd.* 277d; Ameipsias' *Konnos* and Pl. *Euthyd.* 272c, 295d), on which see Zimmermann 2011, 751–752.

20 Cf. Brock 1990, 43.

21 "A counterpoint to Aristophanes' *Clouds*" (Zeppi 1969, xc). For discussion of comic structure, see Nancy 1984, 59–60; Hawtrey 1981, 33; Palpacelli 2009, 239–254.

22 Cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 276b, d–e; see Charalabopoulos 2012, 113.

23 Cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 273d, 275c, 276d, 298e, 300b.

24 Cf. Pl. *Phlb.* 48a; see Brock 1990, 44.

as Socrates reports, and later we understand that Socrates, the late learner, was dismissed by Connus as a disobedient pupil.²⁵ When Socrates refers to the divine in the dialogue this might suggest a behavior which, at least in the *Republic*, Socrates himself attributes to old women.²⁶ This motif of Socrates as late learner serves to remind the reader of the comic topos of “youthful behavior by old men.” The reader also will realize that in the *Euthydemus* Socrates is not the impatient expert he is in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, but “an elderly novice.”²⁷ His teachers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are also elderly persons. They play childish word games that resemble the Socratic *elenchus*. Plato seems here to parody his own warning against entrusting this method to young people, given that they would turn it into an eristic game (*Ap.* 23c–e). Even the mixture of earnestness in the protreptic parts and the burlesque of the eristic word-play resembles Aristophanes’ use of tragic themes, language and structures in comic contexts.

In one scene Socrates has a comic appearance that, while it could be taken from comedy, could also be connected with satyr play. This little scene once again proves Plato’s ability to integrate elements of dramatic structures into the dialogue. A reference to the genre of the satyr play will not come as a surprise to the reader of Plato’s dialogue, the division of the *Euthydemus* into five sections reminding of the structure not only of comedy, but also of satyr play.

There are other elements of Socrates’ character and motifs that point even more strongly to a relationship between the dialogues and satyr play. One might think of the elderly Socrates in the *Lysis* being the *paidagogos* of young men (223b),²⁸ or of the entrance of the drunken Aristophanes in the *Symposium* (223a–b), who compares Socrates to a semi-divine creature. And in the *Theaetetus* his satyr-like face is mentioned and compared to the satyr-like face of Theaetetus (143c–144d).

Now, in the *Euthydemus* a passage (293a) deserves special attention, which is of importance from a “dramaturgical” point of view and transforms a motif occurring mostly in satyr play. In the second protreptic scene, the fourth of the narrated dialogue, Socrates debates which art can convey the knowledge that makes life happy, and what kind of knowledge this might be. This debate concerning the so-called kingly art fails and Socrates and Clinias fall into great difficulties. In an interlude Socrates and Crito ponder the question whether

25 Cf. *Euthyd.* 272b–e, 295d, see Michelini 2000.

26 Cf. *Pl. Resp.* 1.350e; see Michelini 2000, 521.

27 Cf. Cratinus fr. 28 *PCG*; cf. Philocleon in Aristophanes’ *Wasps* and Crichton 1993, 59–80; Michelini 2000, 519.

28 Cf. Charalabopoulos 2012, 70–71.

Clinias was right in saying that dialectic is the kingly art to which other arts and their results should be handed.²⁹ This is indeed a striking suggestion by the young man, because it exactly matches the kind of art that Socrates is looking for—and what he himself seems to be describing in the *Republic*, where the dialecticians, their knowledge and their ability to use other knowledges, play a role.³⁰

In the *Euthydemus*, however, the search fails because it ends up in a *regressus ad infinitum* (292b, d–e). Socrates himself comments on the helplessness he and Clinias experience at the end of their dispute, using a simile: “We were really quite ridiculous,” Socrates says to Clinias, “just like children running after crested larks; we kept thinking we were about to catch each one of the knowledges, but they always got away (αἱ δ’ αἰὲν ὑπεξέφευγον)” (291b4–8, tr. Sprague). Socrates, as well as the reader, feels as if he were in a sort of labyrinth, that is, in an *aporia* from which there is no way out. To quote Socrates again: “When we thought we had come to the end, we turned round again and reappeared practically at the beginning of our search in just as much trouble as when we started out” (291b–c, tr. Sprague). Trying to catch the knowledge and failing to get hold of it: this occurs time and again as a motif in the dialogues and this is what the aporetic dialogues are about. It is here that Socrates reports to Crito that he called upon the two eristics, as though they were the “Heavenly Twins,” to rescue him and the boy from the great flood of arguments. He once again transfers the two eristics to the area of the divine. For he says: “As far as I was concerned, Crito, when I had fallen into this difficulty, I began to exclaim at the top of my lungs and to call upon the two strangers as though they were the heavenly Twins to rescue both myself and the boy from the great flood and to endeavor in every conceivable way to make plain what this knowledge can be which we ought to have if we are going to spend the remainder of our lives in the right way” (292e–293a, tr. Sprague). This call for help corresponds to another passage later in the dialogue, where Socrates calls for help like Heracles had from Iolaos (297c–d). Calling for help is a motif that occurs often in the Platonic dialogues when a thesis is in danger or a definition cannot be defended. Of course, to defend a thesis well is a sign not only of a good rhetorician but also of a good philosopher. Usually this little reported “calling for help” scene has been interpreted in the light of what the *Phaedrus* has to say about a true

29 Cf. *Euthyd.* 291b–292a, which in many aspects seems similar to what Socrates practices when unmasking his partners’ pretensions.

30 Cf. *Pl. Resp.* 6.505a, 511b–d, 532b; see Hawtrey 1987, 128; Erler 1987, 240; Burnyeat 2002; McCabe 2002.

philosopher, namely that he should be able to help himself. The *Phaedrus* tells us that this “coming to help” follows a rhetorical strategy, and is of philosophical relevance (278c).³¹

4 Cry for Help: Socrates Playing Silenus

The little scene of the *Euthydemus* where Socrates cries for help has mostly been understood as described above. But it can be shown that there is more here. Plato is readapting and integrating a specific element of satyr play into his philosophical play. In drama, the “cry for help” (*boê*) motif mostly occurs to motivate and to explain the entrance on stage of a person or a group, for instance, the chorus.³² Characters have several important reasons for calling for help. Some of those reasons are juridical, for instance if one feels that he suffers an injustice. A person might wish to make sure to prove that he or she has been treated unjustly or to have someone who could function as a witness.³³ Or someone on stage feels that he suffers injustice and needs protection. In fact anyone in a difficult situation may call out for help.³⁴ Another reason to call for help might be a need for weapons. In Euripides’ *Heracleidae*, Iolaus sends the servant into the temple to bring him his arms.³⁵ It is no surprise that most of the surviving suppliant plays have a *boê*-motivated entry in which a person responds or answers the call for help. For instance, a protector who comes from abroad—often a powerful figure in the community—enters for rescue. In Aeschylus’ *Suppliques*, the Danaids call for help and are heard. Pelasgus comes to the rescue, although in this case the Danaids’ call for help might in fact have been directed toward Zeus.³⁶

People on stage may call for help when they feel deserted and nobody is there to be called upon. If there is no person that can be addressed the person in need may address a god and the prayer might function as a call for a rescue (*boetheia*).³⁷ Or the person might even address the elements, or objects like

31 Cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 297b; cf. 292e–293a and *Phdr.* 275e; cf. Szlezák 1985, 24–48.

32 Cf. Taplin 1977, 218–221, 418–420.

33 Cf. Steffen 1965, 38–43, esp. 38; for the functioning as witness cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1315–1319; Soph. *Ant.* 940–943; Eur. *Hipp.* 88.

34 Cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 776; *Or.* 1296.

35 Cf. Eur. *Heracl.* 698–699; Ar. *Ach.* 566–571; cf. Taplin 1977, 160.

36 Aesch. *Supp.* 911; Taplin 1977, 218.

37 Cf. Kopperschmidt 1971, 327 n. 29.

rocks.³⁸ Sometimes the help is delayed, as it is the case in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, where Theseus answers a call for help almost fifty verses after it occurred.³⁹ As a dramatic device, the "call for help" has been dealt with exhaustively by Wilhelm Schulze, who explains the social and legal background of the motif and how it was adopted not just by Attic tragedians, but also in comedy and satyr play.⁴⁰

The motif of calling for help as motivation for appearance on stage is used in Aristophanic comedies to motivate the chorus to appear on stage in the *parodos*. Sometimes the call is not successful, as for example in the *Birds*.⁴¹ Often people on stage call for help when somebody thinks he or she cannot achieve his aim without someone's help. In Aristophanes' *Peace*, Trygaeos calls for help because he feels unable to draw the goddess of peace out of the abyss.⁴² There also are examples in Greek New Comedy.⁴³ The motif "to call for help" was—or so it seems—also common in satyr plays. It was a recurrent prelude to the entry of a satyr chorus.⁴⁴ In satyr play it is often the satyrs who are called for assistance when a person on stage needs help to handle a situation properly.

It even has been argued that the "all for help" motif was derived specifically from satyr play.⁴⁵ Aeschylus' *Diktyulkoi*⁴⁶ deals with the arrival of Danae and her son Perseus in a case at the island of Seriphos. Two fishermen (*diktyulkoi*) try to draw the case ashore but are not able to do so. They call for help. A group of satyrs shows up, but they are not of great help. This motif—disappointed expectation of help—can also be found in the *Ichneutai* of Sophocles, where Apollo is searching for his cattle and asks for help. This motivates the appearance of the silens who are well prepared to help, but again prove to be useless.⁴⁷

38 Cf. Aesch. *PV* 88–100; Soph. *Phil.* 936–940, 986–988; see Taplin 1977, 218–221.

39 Cf. Taplin 1977, 219.

40 Cf. Schulze 1933, 160–189; see Fraenkel 1950, 614 (ad 1317).

41 Cf. Zimmermann 1984, 141–143; Ar. *Eq.* 242–277; *Pax* 296–345; *Plut.* 253–321; the call is not successful, for instance at Ar. *Av.* 227–266.

42 Cf. Trygaeos in Ar. *Pax* 296–300; see Zimmermann 1984, 30 for Ar. *Pax* 295–345.

43 Cf. Men. *Sam.* 325–326; Taplin 1977, 220; see Schulze 1933, 173–179.

44 Cf. Taplin 1977, 220.

45 Cf. Steffen 1965, but see Taplin 1977, 419 Anm. 1.

46 Cf. *TGF* 3, fr. 46a Radt; on which Wessels and Krumeich, 1999, 107–124; cf. Lämmle 2013, 295–305.

47 Cf. *TGF* 314, 45–544; on which Scheurer and Bielfeld 1999, 280–312; cf. Lämmle 2013, 313–320.

5 *Euthydemus* and Satyr Play

Seen against this background it becomes clear that Socrates' report about the *aporia* he and Clinias were confronted with at the end of the protreptic scene, and his consequent call for help, would remind the reader of a scene that was common in tragedy and comic drama. Now, Socrates obviously is not calling for help because he thinks that he is suffering injustice. He feels rather that he is confronted with a situation that he cannot manage well on his own. We are confronted here with the call for help situation where a person on stage needs help to handle a situation properly and calls satyrs for assistance. This kind of situation forms the background of the passage in the *Euthydemus*, where Socrates expects help from the twin brothers. Of course, dramatically speaking this call for help allows Euthydemus and Dionysodorus to appear on stage again. From a philosophical viewpoint their re-appearance turns out to be a disappointment. For as the following eristic scene shows, the only thing they have to offer are senseless eristic games, which by no means could help Socrates and Ctesippus to find a way out of their *aporia*.

Everyone who has read the first parts of the *Euthydemus* and the brothers' eristic tricks realizes that they will not be able to offer the help Socrates desires. This is exactly what happens in satyr plays. Socrates, whose physiognomy recalls that of a satyr,⁴⁸ plays the role of Silenus; the twin brothers play the role of the useless satyrs. So we are confronted with a situation in which someone is calling for help, believing that he cannot cope with the problem properly, hoping he will get support, but whose expectation is eventually disappointed. The reader who remembers what happens on comic stage will enjoy the way Plato uses this dramatic element once again to ridicule the eristics.

But there is more to it. For Plato sends a signal that help is available and that Socrates is able to provide it. Socrates signals it by using the metaphor of the "the third wave." The metaphor recalls the third wave that Socrates mentions in the *Republic*,⁴⁹ where he seeks rescue (as it happens, from philosophical dialectic rather than eristic). Something similar happens in the *Euthydemus*. Socrates and his partners have fallen into *aporia* because they could not find a knowledge that could both produce something and use that product in a proper way. Although the *Republic* was likely written later than the *Euthydemus*, there are interesting intertextual references between the two works that offer a way out of the *aporia*. Such references might already have been available for the

48 Cf. Pl. *Symp.* 222d; see Charalabopoulos 2012, 174–175 n. 48.

49 Cf. Pl. *Resp.* 5.472a.

reader of the *Euthydemus*, where the motif of crying for help addressed to the eristic silens turns out to be a cry for help which Socrates seems to address to himself. And this help will eventually prove useful, although he expects it from the eristics.

Again Plato is taking over a motif of drama, but he transforms it according to his understanding of the proper nature of comedy (as described in the *Laws*). By revealing the eristics' negative traits, Socrates invites the audience or reader to laugh at their faults. But the figure of Socrates is more complex. On one hand he suggests that because of his ignorance he falls into *aporia* as a silenus would. On the other hand it becomes clear that he is the one who knows the rules of the game. He can unmask the pretension of his partners and he even seems to know the way out of the problems raised in the discussion. His unmasking therefore points to a serious background of the eristic discussions and to the aporetic search for truth. In the *Laws* Plato argues that *mimesis* of the comic is acceptable exactly because of this connection between comic and serious aspects: "But it is necessary also to consider and know ... those which are intended to produce laughter in comedy, and have a comic character in respect of style, song, and dance, and of the imitations which these afford. For serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites" (*Leg.* 7.816d–e, tr. Jowett; see Schöpsdau 2003, 595–596). This might explain the comic character of the *Euthydemus* and the figure of Socrates in that dialogue, through which Plato wishes the reader to understand the serious by means of the laughable.

6 Conclusion

We have seen that the little scene about Socrates' calling for help has both philosophical and literary implications. Plato the author alerts the reader to the comic background of the scene. The scene is part of Plato's strategy to give the *Euthydemus* a comic flavor, which can also be observed in the structure, language, personnel, and content of the dialogue. At the same time Plato the philosopher uses the comic scene to point the reader to a serious philosophical problem and a solution. The same is true of Socrates as comic figure. As often in his dialogues, Plato the philosopher and Plato the author work hand in hand. This is most evident in the *Euthydemus*. Plato uses traditional elements of comic drama as a means to illustrate the differences between Socratic dialectic and eristics in order to unmask Euthydemus' and Dionysodorus' claim that they are in command of a knowledge that they do not in fact have.

References

- Austin, E.A. 'Fools and malicious pleasure in Plato's *Philebus*', *HPhQ* 29 (2012), 125–139.
- Blondell, R. *The play of character in Plato's dialogues*. Cambridge 2002.
- Brock, R. 'Plato and comedy', in: E.M. Craik, *Owls to Athens: essays on classical subjects presented to Sir Kenneth Dover*. Oxford 1990, 39–49.
- Burnyeat, M. 'Plato on how to speak what is not: *Euthydemus* 283a–288a', in: M. Canto-Sperber, and P. Pellegrin, *Le style de la pensée: recueil de textes en hommages à Jacques Brunschwig*. Paris 2002, 40–66.
- Chance, T.H. *Plato's Euthydemus*. Berkeley 1992.
- Charalabopoulos, N.G. *Platonic drama and its ancient reception*. Cambridge 2012.
- Crichton, A. "'The old are in a second childhood": age reversal and jury service in Aristophanes' *Wasps*', *BICS* 38 (1993), 59–80.
- Dalfen, J. 'Literarische Techniken Platons: Beispiele aus dem *Protagoras*', *Bolletino dell'Istituto di Filologia Greca dell'Università di Padova* 5 (1980), 41–60.
- Erlar, M. 'The happiness of the bees: affect and virtue in the *Phaedo* and in the *Republic*', in: M. Migliori, L.M. Napolitano Valditara and A. Fermani, *Inner life and soul: psyche in Plato*. Sankt Augustin 2011, 91–101.
- Erlar, M. *Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons*. Berlin 1987.
- Erlar, M. *Plato Euthydemus. Übersetzung und Kommentar (Platon Werke VI 1)*. Göttingen 2017.
- Fraenkel, E. *Aeschylus: Agamemnon*, III. Oxford 1950.
- Frede, D. *Platon, Philebos: Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Göttingen 1997.
- Greene, W.C. 'The spirit of comedy in Plato', *HSPH* 31 (1920), 63–123.
- Halliwell, S. *The aesthetics of mimesis*. Princeton 2002.
- Hawtrey, R.S.W. *Commentary on Plato's Euthydemus*. Philadelphia 1981.
- Jowett, B. and L. Campbell. *Plato's Republic*. Oxford 1894.
- Kopperschmidt, J. 'Hikesie als dramatische Form', in: W. Jens, *Die Bauformen der griechischen Tragödie*. München 1971, 321–346.
- Krumreich, R., N. Pechstein, and B. Seidensticker. *Das Griechische Satyrspiel*. Darmstadt 1999.
- Kuhn, H. 'The true tragedy: on the relationship between Greek tragedy and Plato I', *HSPH* 52 (1941), 1–40.
- Kuhn, H. 'The true tragedy: on the relationship between Greek tragedy and Plato II', *HSPH* 53 (1942), 37–88.
- Lämmle, R. *Poetik des Satyrspiels*. Heidelberg 2013.
- Manuwald, B. *Platon, Protagoras: Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Göttingen 1999.
- McCabe, M.M. 'Banana skins and custard pies: Plato on comedy and self-knowledge', in: J. Dillon and L. Brisson, *Plato's Philebus*. St. Augustin 2010, 194–203.

- McCabe, M.M. 'Developing the good itself by itself: critical strategies in Plato's *Euthydemus*', *Plato* 2 (2002).
- Michellini, A.N. 'Socrates plays the buffoon: cautionary protreptic in *Euthydemus*', *AJPh* 121 (2000), 509–535.
- Miller, M. 'The pleasures of the comic and of Socratic inquiry: aporetic reflections on *Philebus* 48a–50b', *Arethusa* 41 (2008), 263–289.
- Narcy, M. *Le philosophe et son double: un commentaire de l'Euthydème de Platon*. Paris 1984.
- Nightingale, A.W. *Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy*. Cambridge 1995.
- Palpacelli, L. *L'Eutidemo di Platone: una commedia straordinariamente seria*. Milano 2009.
- Polleichtner, W. '"Trialogical" duals in Plato's *Euthydemus*', *Bochumer philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* 14 (2011), 34–56.
- Post, L.A. 'Plato's *Euthydemus* and *Lysias*', *CW* 20 (1926), 29–31.
- Scheurer, S. and R. Bielfeld. *Ichneutai*, in: Krumreich, Pechstein, and Seidensticker 1999, 280–312.
- Schöpsdau, K. *Platon, Nomoi: Übersetzung und Kommentar*. Göttingen 2003.
- Schulze, W. 'Beiträge zur Wort- und Sittengeschichte II', in: W. Schulze, *Kleine Schriften*. Göttingen 1933, 160–189.
- Sprague, R.K. *Plato, Euthydemus*. Indianapolis 1993.
- Steffen, W. 'Der Hilferuf in den *Netzfischern* des Aischylos und sein Fortleben im griechischen Drama', *Eos* 55 (1965), 38–43.
- Strauss, L. 'On the *Euthydemus*', *Interpretation* 1 (1970), 1–20.
- Szlezák, T.A. *Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie*. Berlin 1985.
- Szlezák, T.A. *Das Bild des Dialektikers in Platons späteren Dialogen*. Berlin 2004.
- Taplin, O. *The stagecraft of Aeschylus*. Oxford 1977.
- Vries, G.J. de. *Spel bij Plato*. Amsterdam 1949.
- Wessels, A. and R. Krumreich. '*Diktyulkoï*', in: Krumreich, Pechstein, and Seidensticker 1999, 107–124.
- Winckelmann, A.G. *Platonis Euthydemus*. Leipzig 1833.
- Zeppi, S. *Platone, Eutidemo*. Firenze 1969.
- Zimmermann, B. 'Sokrates oder der Intellektuelle als komisches Sujet', in: W. von der Weppen, and B. Zimmermann, *Sokrates, die Sophistik und die postmoderne Moderne*. Tübingen 2008, 67–78.
- Zimmermann, B. 'Ameipsias', in: B. Zimmermann, *Handbuch der griechischen Literatur der Antike*, 1: *Die Literatur der archaischen und klassischen Zeit*. München 2011, 751.
- Zimmermann, B. *Untersuchungen zur Form und dramatischen Technik der Aristophanischen Komödien*, 1: *Parodos und Amoibaion*. Königstein 1984.

Socrates and Natural Philosophy: The Testimony of Plato's *Phaedo*

Jörn Müller

Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg

Although seeking the “historical Socrates,” especially in Plato’s dialogues, was for quite some time regarded by many scholars as a kind of anathema—an attitude championed, for example, by the skepticism of Olof Gigon¹—the last few years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in this topic.² Yet we have learned some things. It is advisable to limit the scope of inquiry right from the outset. Instead of discussing the whole “Socratic problem,” it seems more sensible to tackle specific aspects of it and to look at certain passages in Plato’s writings with a view to their potential usefulness for such an approach. One of the passages which stand out in this respect is *Phaedo* 95e–102a, which is framed as an “autobiographical” sketch of Socrates on his intellectual development.

In the following I will first sketch the contents and scope of this passage, raising its most important scholarly problems (§1). Then I will turn to the more specific aims of my analysis. I will show that at least the sketch from *Phd.* 95e–99c (henceforth called the “first sailing”) has a very “Socratic” ring to it and that we are therefore justified in linking the historical Socrates with natural philosophy despite some explicit disclaimers of this attachment in Plato and Xenophon (§2). Afterwards I will venture some reflections on Plato’s authorial intention for this Socratic autobiography in its conspicuous relation with natural philosophy; this will mainly address the “second sailing” (99c–102a) in its relation to what would be the “first sailing” (§3). In the conclusion (§4) I will highlight the most important finding of my paper. The autobiographical passage of the *Phaedo* serves an apologetic function in so far as it distances Socrates from Anaxagoras and Anaxagorean natural philosophy as much as possible, thus counterbalancing the accusation of impiety leveled at Socrates in his trial.

1 See esp. Gigon 1947.

2 For this development see Stavru 2013, who diagnoses a “comeback” (26) of this topic in recent literature. A useful sketch of the development is also provided, from the skeptical perspective, by Dorion 2011.

1 Exposition: Different Approaches towards *Phaedo* 95e–102a

Let us first recall the context and the basic contents of the passage in question. In Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates offers a series of arguments to substantiate his basic claim that the soul is immortal. Challenged by a bold objection brought forward by Cebes, one of his interlocutors, he “paused for quite some time and considered something by himself” (95e7–8),³ finally coming up with the following idea: in order to answer the objection, one has to study the cause of coming-to-be and perishing. Socrates embarks on this project in a peculiar manner. He does not present a philosophical argument from the outset but starts off by recounting his personal “experiences” (πάθη, 96a2) with the research into nature (περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν, 96a8) conducted by (mostly) Ionian philosophers. His account of these experiences can be divided into two parts.

First, Socrates considers several questions and answers given by “physicists” about natural phenomena (96a10–97b7). He finds that the physicists’ approach, based mainly on materialistic and mechanistic explanations, leaves him entirely dumbfounded. In his use of that approach, he failed to account for even the most basic processes—ones he thought obvious to anyone before—such as growth and nutrition. He is therefore “utterly blinded by that inquiry” (96c5). Socrates raises a set of further puzzles, admittedly Sophistic to some degree,⁴ that are intractable from the physicists’ perspective and thereby concludes that their approach has failed in his search for the cause of coming-to-be and perishing.

Second, Socrates stumbles upon another Pre-Socratic philosopher, Anaxagoras (97b8–99c6). Socrates entertains high expectations since Anaxagoras seems to offer intelligence (or mind: νοῦς) as the cause of everything. This looks attractive to Socrates, apparently because it promises to offer a non-materialistic account of nature, different from the former physicists. But Socrates’s “marvelous expectations” (98b7) are finally thwarted again. Anaxagoras makes no real use of intelligence in his explanations of natural phenomena, falling back into calling on the physical elements of air, aether, and water to account for everything. This does not square with Socrates’s understanding of a “true cause” and is consequently also set aside by him.

Since Socrates has thus been disappointed and left alone by the natural philosophers preceding him, he embarks on a “second voyage (δεύτερος πλοῦς)

3 I have used Sedley and Long’s 2011 translation and Rowe’s 1993 edition.

4 For a trenchant analysis of these arguments which to a certain extent rehabilitates them as genuine philosophical problems see Menn 2010.

in search of the cause" (99c9–d1), based on the method of hypothesis, and this leads him towards a theory of Forms as causes (99d4–102a1).

The whole discussion preparing the final proof of the immortality of the soul (which starts afterwards) has been hailed as a "scientific manifesto,"⁵ marking a full-scale attack on Ionian natural philosophy for failing to explain why things really happen. In its place, the passage introduces a completely novel understanding of causation, especially by distinguishing between different notions of "cause" (αἰτία).⁶ This approach involves many intricate philosophical problems that still concern philosophers. In the following, I will set aside the questions concerning the more complex philosophical issues to focus on a different though still controversial issue. Is the "autobiography" that Plato puts into Socrates's mouth in 96a1–99c6 a reliable source for our understanding of Socrates as a historical figure and especially for his actual dealings with natural philosophy?

For anyone who identifies the historical Socrates with the protagonist of most of Plato's dialogues the reply seems to be obvious: why not? Especially in the older literature on the "Socratic problem" we find a straightforward "autobiographical" reading of the passage in question, which is supposed to provide a true record of Socrates's actual "experiences" or dealings with Pre-Socratic natural philosophy.⁷ This may be backed up by some historical evidence from other sources. In Diogenes Laertius (2.16, 19), Socrates is named a student of Anaxagoras—who stayed in Athens till c. 450 BCE, overlapping with Socrates's youth—and/or of his disciple Archelaus, whom Diogenes credits with the move of Ionian natural philosophy to Athens. Furthermore, the portrait of Socrates in the *Clouds* by Aristophanes (around 423–418 BCE) also shows him as a kind of natural philosopher.⁸

5 Graham 1991, 2.

6 For thorough if contradictory readings of "causes" (*aitiai*) in the *Phaedo* see esp. Vlastos 1969 and Sedley 1998. For an illuminating survey of the issues raised in *Phd.* 95e–102a which also critically addresses the recent trends in scholarly literature see Horn 2011. See also Sebell 2015, esp. ch. 1, for a recent philosophical reading.

7 Proponents of this reading are, e.g., Burnet 1911 and Taylor 1932, esp. 64–73. For a useful overview of the pros and cons of Burnet's reading see Hackforth 1955.

8 The play was originally staged in 423 but substantially modified by the author himself in the following years. The depiction of Socrates in the *Clouds* certainly has to be treated with some care because it is not intended as an historical account but as a comic portrait. In Aristophanes, Socrates seems to stand in for different kinds of publicly visible "philosophers," including the Sophists whom he actually opposed. But would the Athenian audience have taken in this comic portrait of Socrates as a natural philosopher (and laughed at it) were

But there is some external and internal counter-evidence to this autobiographical view that comes down to two lines of argument. First, the Platonic Socrates himself renounces all contact with natural philosophy, especially in his *Apology* (19c–d), which is often regarded as a true “personal statement” by him.⁹ He criticizes Aristophanes for confusing him with a natural philosopher. He claims that he actually does not have any understanding of this kind of inquiry at all, and calls the Athenians as a witness that he has never talked of anything like this in his public discussions. This is corroborated—at least partially—*e silentio* by the early “Socratic” dialogues of Plato in which the conversation is almost exclusively centered around ethical notions—and not on natural causes. Even stronger disclaimers of any preoccupation with natural philosophy can be found in the Xenophontic Socrates. In the *Memorabilia* (esp. 1.1.11), he denies explicitly any involvement with this topic and even advises young men against pursuing these studies. This outright denial paves the way for Xenophon’s portrayal of Socrates as a philosopher who only deals with “human things” (περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων: *Mem.* 1.1.16), that is, as a full-blown ethicist—a description which is later mirrored in Aristotle’s as well as Cicero’s judgments about Socrates’s philosophical activities.¹⁰

Another major obstacle to a straightforward autobiographical reading is presented in the *Phaedo* itself. Strictly speaking, the “second voyage” or “sailing” (starting in 99d) on which he embarks after his failed attempts with Ionian natural philosophy is still a part of Socrates’s autobiography. But in this passage he relies heavily on the theory of Forms or Ideas which is often attributed as an innovation to Plato and not to Socrates¹¹ (although another “biographical” sketch in the *Parmenides* even shows the young [!] Socrates defending the theory of Ideas).¹² But if one accepts the theory of Ideas as a genuine touch-

it devoid of all possible reference to the historical Socrates?—For strong claims about the historicity of the portrayal of Socrates in the *Clouds* see Cerri 2012. Vander Waerdt 1994, 51, also argues “that the *Clouds*, when read with proper care and caution, ... provides important evidence to augment our meagre sources for Socrates’ intellectual biography.” On the *Clouds* as a source for Pre-Socratic doctrine see also Laks and Saetta Cottone 2013.

9 This view is championed by, e.g., Döring 1987, and supported to a certain extent by Kahn 1996, who terms the *Apology* a “quasi-historical document” (88). For a criticism of this view see Morrison 2000.

10 See Arist. *Metaph.* A.6, 987b1–4; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.4. But it has to be at least mentioned that in the penultimate chapter of his *Memorabilia* (4.7) Xenophon admits that Socrates was to a certain extent experienced with and not completely ignorant of geometry and astronomy, ancillary disciplines of natural philosophy.

11 For this position see, among many others, Ross 1933.

12 This ties in nicely with the second sailing of the *Phaedo* as a result of Socrates’ early

stone of Plato's philosophy, this drives a wedge between the earlier "Socratic" experiences (πάθη) in *Phaedo* 95e–99c, that is, the "first sailing," and the later "Platonic" second sailing (δευτερος πλοῦς), although both passages seem to form a continuous account. This reading throws doubts on the Socratic origin of the experiences related in the earlier part of the biographical account.

One way of dealing with this ambiguous state of affairs seems to be conveniently at hand. We might imagine that Plato does not tell us Socrates' story but recalls his own intellectual development, one that has led him toward the discovery of the central tenet of his philosophy. Thus, according to some scholars, *Phaedo* 95e–102a does truly offer an autobiography, but simply and solely of Plato.¹³ Consequently, the Socratic "experiences" would only prove to be a "rear projection" of Plato's own mental history.¹⁴ This seems to fit the bill. On the evidence of the middle and later (i.e., non-Socratic) dialogues, Plato was certainly no mere ethicist but involved with the whole range of philosophy, including physics (especially in the *Timaeus*); he is also reported by Aristotle (*Metaph.* A.6, 987a32–b1) to have been a student of the Heraclitean physicist Cratylus.

Now we know of no disclaimer of Plato's involvement with natural philosophy comparable to the ones offered for Socrates, especially by Xenophon. But one may also harbor some doubts about the accuracy of this "Platonic" reading of the autobiography. For instance, it has been pointed out that the Pre-Socratic problems discussed in *Phaedo* 96a–99d would really have been the talk of the town in Socrates' youth but already quite outdated in Plato's youth and in the ensuing fourth century, when the dialogue was composed.¹⁵ And why does the famous "autobiographical" *Seventh Letter* (324b, 325a) portray the young Plato as someone interested solely in ethics and public affairs, without mentioning any particular interest in natural philosophy? Diogenes Laertius tells us that Plato was engaged in writing tragedies before being drafted into the service of philosophy by Socrates.¹⁶ Is it really probable that this Plato "experienced" the disappointment with natural philosophy described in *Phaedo* 96a–99c in his

disappointment with natural philosophy. Note that the narrator of the *Parmenides* has just arrived from Klazomenai (*Prm.* 126a), the home town of Anaxagoras, from whom the young Socrates has just turned away, according to the *Phaedo*.

13 See, e.g., the account of the *Phaedo* presented by Ross 1953, 22–36.

14 For this view see, e.g., Frede 1999, 103–104.

15 For this argument cf. Burnet 1911, 98–109, esp. 99, 104, and 107.

16 Cf. DL 3.5. Another argument against this reading is the fact that the supposed way to the theory of Ideas is not consistent with Aristotle's account (in *Metaph.* A.6, 987a28–b18, and M.4, 1078b12–17) of the origin of Platonic metaphysics.

own youth? Another argument is that the *Phaedo* is about *Socrates'* death, and therefore the autobiography only makes sense as *his*!

One may be tempted to dissolve this Gordian knot by denying that the passage lacks any biographical information, be it of Socrates or of Plato. Perhaps the story is wholly invented for another purpose, either "as a conveniently dramatic way of presenting a collection of problems and solutions"¹⁷ or as a depiction of an "ideal" philosophical development *in abstracto* without being attached to any particular person (in which case the biographical setting would simply be a disguise).¹⁸

This anti-biographical exit strategy may have its merits but in the following I will leave it aside and argue instead that there are in fact good reasons to pay close attention to the (auto-)biographical dimensions of this passage.

2 The Socratic Touch of the Failed "First Sailing" (*Phd.* 96a–99c)

I will start by accumulating some evidence that links the autobiography with generally acknowledged and distinctive features of Socratic philosophy. None of these considerations provides a complete knock-down argument for a straightforward autobiographical reading but taken together they at least show that the passage breathes a lot of Socratic "spirit." The following four features stand out:

(1) *Stress on the autonomous character of philosophical inquiry.* In view of the fact that the *Phaedo* offers us an account of Socrates on his death-bed after a long journey of thought, one might expect a lecture on his major philosophical doctrines, especially in a passage like 96a–100d, where Socrates turns from dialogical questioning of his interlocutors to a monological exposition of his own intellectual development. But in fact Socrates does not style his autobiography as a mere didactic vehicle for imparting knowledge to his friends, for example, to spare them the hassle of going through the same stages. Quite to the contrary, his own story emphasizes the need to inquire oneself instead of relying on established authority.¹⁹

¹⁷ Rowe 1993, 229.

¹⁸ Dorter 1982, 116, who thinks that the stages in Socrates' intellectual development in this passage correspond to the levels of the divided line and to the ascent from the cave in the *Republic*.

¹⁹ For this and some other of the following aspects under (1) and (2) see Gower 2008.

This aspect is especially highlighted in his experiences with Anaxagoras, the towering figure in Athenian natural philosophy around 450 BCE, who is presented as a kind of failed teacher not living up to the high expectations that Socrates set on him. Socrates examines what he really has to say on important cosmological matters and is utterly disappointed by his falling back into the kind of physical explanations which had already failed Socrates before. When Cebes asks who will guide him and his friends after Socrates's impending death, Socrates advises him and the others to cooperate in this matter: "But you must yourselves work together as you search, because you may not easily find others more able to do this than you" (78a7–9). The message seems to be: "Philosophize by yourselves," instead of waiting for an alleged authority to come along.

The "experiences" of Socrates with the natural philosophers in his search for the causes of coming-to-be and perishing point in the same direction. The lesson to be learned is implied by the metaphor of the "second sailing" on which Socrates embarks after his shelving of Pre-Socratic physiology. When there is no wind to sail one has to take the oars and row. This metaphor has several dimensions (to which I will return later) but it surely emphasizes the strenuous effort involved and highlights the self-reliance of this activity.²⁰

Socrates's autobiography thus stands as testimony to the necessity of making up your mind on your own²¹—which includes, among other things, to question and eventually give up your own ordinary beliefs, as Socrates does in *Phaedo* 96c1–e7. This is the way "to become" a philosopher which he exemplifies himself in his general discussion of the causes of coming-to-be and perishing.

Accordingly, Socrates does not teach anyone (see *Ap.* 33a), at least not in the common sense of the word, namely, dogmatically. Rather, he provides in his discussions a model of questioning and eventually subverting the supposed knowledge of others, but not in order to supplant them himself as an unquestionable philosophical authority on his own. To the contrary, in the *Phaedo* Socrates repeatedly encourages his interlocutors to question him and asks them to continue the inquiry into the—thus far only hypothetical—theory of Ideas after his death (107b4–9). This anti-doctrinal style is corroborated by the way in which he fashions his own "experiences" with natural philosophy: "By offering an autobiography filled with intellectual failures and setbacks Socrates

20 See Hoinski 2008, 352, who also offers a partial criticism of Gower's approach.

21 Note that Socrates does not meet a teacher who helps him in the way that the philosopher-to-be in the cave of the *Republic* is assisted by an unnamed helper who unchains and turns him around. Therefore, I do not think that Socrates' autobiography is to be interpreted in the light of *Republic* 5–7, as Dorter does (see note 18).

appears to undermine his own potential status as a philosophical authority.”²² He even explicitly warns his interlocutors not to care for Socrates but for the truth (91b8–c5), and thus encourages their intellectual autonomy, an autonomy that he himself has displayed in his dealings with natural philosophy in general and with Anaxagoras in particular.

(2) *Self-examination and the limits of knowledge.* The pedagogical attitude sketched above is rooted in Socrates’s ability to examine himself in a thorough manner. This capacity presupposes a kind of distance from oneself keenly reflected by the manner in which Socrates describes his own youthful and naïve former self. He “thought he knew” (96c3–4; see also c6) many things and simply “supposes” his beliefs to be “satisfactory” (96d6, 8), while on a closer inspection they are revealed to be as flawed as the explanations by the physicists. His over-eagerness for Anaxagoras’ teaching and the delight he initially took in it because it suited his search for an intelligent cause are portrayed in a self-deprecating manner as are the thwarted expectations (see, e.g., 98b7).

Socrates has obviously learned two lessons from all this. On the one hand, he deems himself “unqualified” (ἀφύης, 96c2) for this kind of physicist inquiry into nature. This judgment does not necessarily indicate any lack of philosophical talent in Socrates. It points rather to the inadequacy of the whole approach (see 97b3–6). All the same, it implies too that Socrates somehow came to know his own limitations. This ties in with the second lesson. When asked by Cebes how he now thinks of the different problems to which he was “blinded” by the misguided inquiry by the physicists, he answers: “That I’m no doubt a long way indeed from thinking that I know (εἰδέναι) the cause of any of these” (96e6–7). It is true that the later “second sailing” is designed to answer some of the puzzles raised before, but his first reference to it is rather self-mocking in that he calls it “another confused jumble of a method of my own” (97b6–7).²³ This method is a rather “simple” but also the “safer” way to approach these phenomena, which does not satisfy all one’s explanatory wishes, as Socrates himself acknowledges (100d2–9; 101c9–d1). This second sailing thus leaves open the back door for an improved approach for which Socrates deems himself unfit up to now. The whole range of this statement will become clearer later (in §3), but it certainly also marks another limit of Socrates’s knowledge that he freely admits.

²² Gower 2008, 341.

²³ I have taken over this rather drastic translation by Rowe 1993, 234. See also Hackforth 1955, 124: “hot-potch of my own.”

Another understanding of *deuteros plous*, attested in the *Philebus* (19c), also has a very Socratic touch. In the absence of an all-embracing knowledge, one must do everything to know oneself in order not to overstretch one's epistemological limits. This ties in neatly with Socrates's autobiography in the *Phaedo*. With regard to natural philosophy in its own right, he is clearly distinguished from its champions like Anaxagoras by knowing that he does not know—which is again quite reminiscent of the overall attitude he displays in Plato's *Apology*.²⁴

(3) *Ethical intellectualism and teleological explanations*. In his criticism of Anaxagoras' falling back on mechanistic explanations of nature in the style of his predecessors, Socrates leaves no doubt as to what kind of explanation he would have expected from him. In order to explain Socrates' presence in the Athenian prison, it is insufficient to talk about the material conditions of this state of affairs (e.g., the composition and position of Socrates's bodily parts), but one has "to give the real causes (ἀληθῶς αἰτίαις), namely that, since the Athenians have decided that it was better (βέλτιον) to condemn me, on account of that I have also decided that it is better to sit here, and more just to stay put and suffer whatever punishment they decree" (98e1–5).

To generalize the nucleus of this idea: anyone who wishes to give the "true cause" of something has to explain why it is better (βέλτιον) or even best (βέλτιστον) that this state of affairs holds and not another one (see 97c6–d1). This is what Anaxagoras and the other physicists simply fail to do with regard to natural phenomena. When they talk of the position of the earth, for example, they do not explain why it is overall best that the earth is stationed in the manner they describe (99b4–c2). At first glance, all this may strike one as a terrible philosophical blunder. Socrates seems to look for the *reasons* that are called for in the explanation of human actions, but not for *causes* in the sense of scientific explanations. His explanatory principle of "the choice of the best" (99b1) seems to apply in action theory and ethics but not in physics.

But this is exactly the kind of explanation that Socrates expects from the start from Anaxagoras, namely teleological explanations that include value terms like "good" or "best" as causes. Things happen because it is good that they happen. To put it succinctly, Socrates approaches natural philosophy from the point of view of ethics. He "is concerned not so much with the ability of science to explain physical phenomena as with its compatibility with moral

24 This Socratic emphasis on the limitation of knowledge (also pertaining to natural matters) is backed by Xen. *Mem.* 1.11.13 and 4.7.6 (with a direct criticism of Anaxagoras).

phenomena.”²⁵ Therefore, it does not come as a complete surprise that the principle of “the choice of the best” as the supreme *aitia*, which Socrates applies to physics in the *Phaedo*, strongly resonates with some central tenets of Socrates’s ethical intellectualism, namely that everyone always aims for the good and that no one does wrong willingly (see esp. *Grg.* 466a–468e). In the search for causes, be it in ethical or in physical inquiry, Socrates suggests always to look for “the good.”²⁶

(4) *Natural theology and divine goodness.* In the *Phaedo*, “the good” (or “the better / best”) is not only the sole appropriate causal description of a state of affairs (αἰτία) but it also points to the agent responsible for this state of affairs (αἷτιον).²⁷ This is disregarded by the physicists “who neither seek it [i.e., the best] nor suppose that it has any divine might (δαίμονίαν ἰσχύν); ... they do not suppose for a moment that what is good and binding (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον) truly does bind and keep anything together” (99c2–6). The causal “choice of the best” presupposes some intentional entity that applies it to the natural world, since “only intelligent agents bring about certain states of affairs *because* they are good” (Lennox 1985, 198). Any teleological explanation of the whole physical universe will have to build into his account a “divine might” as the αἷτιον responsible for the resulting world. Once again, this explains the initial attractiveness of Anaxagoras’ theory for the young Socrates because the Ionian philosopher seemed to introduce intelligence (νοῦς) as a force that “orders and assigns each thing in whatever way is best” (97c5–6). Anaxagorean *nous* as a teleological principle over and above matter might have served as the universal cause of everything (97c3–4) for which Socrates looks in his search into the causes of coming-to-be and perishing; this background explains his grave disappointment when he discovers that Anaxagoras does not make any real use of intelligence in the explanation of natural phenomena (98b7–c1).

It may certainly be disputed whether this description of Anaxagoras as a cosmological teleologist *manqué* is historically correct.²⁸ But this does not

25 Graham 1991, 4, who traces the teleological character of Plato’s scientific project back to Socratic ethics.

26 In Plato’s *Apology*, Socrates repeatedly invokes the “good” or the “best” as norm for his decisions (e.g., 28d–e3; 35d6–8; 39d5–8); cf. also Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.6, 1.1.9.

27 For the difference between αἰτία and αἷτιον with regard to the *Phaedo* see Frede 1980; Lennox 1985, esp. 196–204.

28 This judgement is to a certain extent confirmed by Aristotle, *Metaph.* A.4, 985a17–21. But see Gerson 1990, 28–32, who situates Anaxagoras firmly within the tradition of natural theology. Sedley 2007, 8–30, takes Anaxagoras to be the first overt champion of a cre-

detract from the fact that Socrates portrays himself implicitly in the *Phaedo* as a kind of natural theologian who presupposes a divine intelligent cause that has ordered the universe in the best possible way. David Sedley (2007, 78–86) has convincingly demonstrated that this is one of the core convictions of Socrates as depicted by Xenophon—see esp. *Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3, where Socrates describes an order of the world established by the Gods in order to serve mankind, out of “philanthropy” (φιλανθρωπία). These descriptions also contain a lot of teleological explanation to account for the existence of something (a part of the body, for instance) by its function or purpose (e.g., to enable the survival of the individual), that is, by the good that it serves (cf. *Mem.* 1.4.5–6). This approach ultimately amounts to a kind of “argument from design,” to a proof of the existence of God by recourse to the intelligent design of the world. This requires a divine being “which orders the whole universe and holds it together (συνέχων), with all its fine and good things” (*Mem.* 4.3.13)—which comes quite close to the good that binds and holds all things together in the *Phaedo* (συνδέειν καὶ συνέχειν, 99c6).

Thus, Socrates appears to have been a creationist who did not simply repeat religious commonplaces but developed a highly original theology, the most distinctive feature of which is deeply rooted in Socratic moral intellectualism, namely in the unquestioned idea of divine goodness as the basis of cosmic order. This approach is consequently linked to the pervasive ontological and explanatory idea that “like only causes like,” in its application to the relationship between God and its creation: “Teleological causation is from start to finish a matter of the good bringing about the good” (Sedley 1998, 126). The idea of divine goodness as the basis of the best cosmic order, which is so fundamental to the project of Plato’s *Timaeus*, is thus also present in Xenophon’s description of Socrates, as well as the idea of a divine craftsman (δημιουργός, *Mem.* 1.4.7). The idea of divine intelligence as the basis of the best order of nature also figures in the *Phaedo*, not only in the expectations with which the young Socrates approaches Anaxagoras but also implicitly in the narrative pattern revealed by the little Aesop myth in *Phaedo* 60b–c.²⁹ Accordingly, Sedley (2007, 89) concludes with regard to his cross-examination of Xenophon’s and Plato’s Socrates and his relation toward natural philosophy and theology: “All this, then, rings historically true for Socrates’ youthful phase.”

ative cosmic intelligence but highlights the differences of his teleological programme to Socrates.

29 See the analysis by Betegh 2008, who shows that Socrates’ ideas about a good and trustworthy tale (μῦθος) always involve a rational and benevolent divine agent who acts for the best.

On the basis of the accumulated evidence presented above in (1) to (4), I am in full agreement with this judgment. Socrates's "experiences" with natural philosophical and their depiction in *Phaedo* 96a–99c show a distinctively Socratic touch. Therefore, we have good reason to take this portrait seriously, even on a biographical level. This does not necessarily pertain to every detail of this account. For instance, given the prominence that Anaxagoras had acquired during the thirty years of his stay in Athens, it is rather unlikely that Socrates just stumbled on his teaching in the accidental manner described in the *Phaedo* (see Bluck 1955, 105)—although I think that some of the details of this description can be explained in a different way (see below, §3). But the overall sketch that Socrates had a close encounter with Ionian natural philosophy in general—and with Anaxagoras and Archelaus in particular—that led him towards a kind of rebellion against Pre-Socratic physics based on his ethical and theological convictions seems highly plausible. Furthermore, it does not fundamentally contradict the disclaimers of Socrates's involvement with natural philosophy that stress that his abandonment of natural research (as it is mirrored in *Phd.* 97b3–7 and 99d1–6) and his subsequent turn toward ethics was motivated by his insight into the deficiency of this physicist approach (see also DL 2.20–21).

3 The "Second Sailing" (99c–102a): Some Reflections on Plato's Authorial Intention

As has become apparent in §1, I am inclined to agree with Diogenes Laertius. The outright denial of any involvement on Socrates's part with natural philosophy, which Xenophon and Plato ascribe to Socrates in some places, seems inconsistent. These complete disclaimers are contradicted to a certain extent even in their own writings, either implicitly or explicitly.³⁰ But how does this reflect on Plato as an author and his intentions in presenting us the Socratic autobiography in the *Phaedo*? Taken superficially, this seems to be a kind of strategic error, especially when we assume that the disclaimer in the *Apology* is intended to clear Socrates from the charge brought against him by his accusers that he is impious by investigating natural phenomena (supposedly to supplant the traditional gods, as the Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds* does).

30 See DL 2.45, who certainly depends up to a point on the *Phaedo*. For Xenophon see, e.g., *Mem.* 1.4.2, where Socrates is reported to have talked with Aristodemus about "divine" (and not merely human) things.

Is recounting the Socratic experiences with natural philosophy in the *Phaedo* not self-defeating on the level of authorial intention when it comes to defending Socrates, even if this is a historically truthful account (as I assume)?

In my opinion, the account in the *Phaedo* does not undermine the Socratic apology against these charges but rather supports it in a more refined and subtle manner. First of all, since these experiences are limited to Socrates's "youth" and abruptly end with his rebellion against Ionian natural philosophy, they are already somehow "disarmed" as a potential weapon against Socrates in 399 BCE (cf. Babut 1978, 58–59). They certainly cannot serve as a basis for accusing Socrates of abolishing the traditional Gods and spoiling the Athenian youth with natural philosophy in his later mature age.

But I also think that the *Phaedo* passage can even be read as a kind of complementary argument to the defense offered in the *Apology*. There, Socrates accuses Meletus of grossly mistaking him for Anaxagoras, because Meletus explicitly claims that Socrates held the opinion that the sun was only a stone and that the moon was simply earth (*Ap.* 26d)—this was one of the cornerstones in the accusations against Anaxagoras that led to his exile from Athens around 450 BCE (see DL 2.8). Anaxagoras was obviously regarded in Athens as the main source of the impious style of "freethinking" that influenced other philosophers (such as Diagoras of Melos), who were in turn persecuted in several trials in the second half of the fifth century even before the trial of Socrates.³¹ In order to clear Socrates, who was also taken to be such a "free-thinker" (as attested by Aristophanes' *Clouds* already in 423–418 BCE), from the charge of impiety, it was therefore of fundamental importance to remove him as far from Anaxagoras as possible.

This is exactly what Plato does in his portrait of the philosopher Socrates as a young man. The whole passage 96a–99c (and not only 97b8–99c6, where Anaxagoras explicitly comes into play) can be read as a kind of stand-off between Socrates and Anaxagoras, who represents the most advanced, state-of-the-art model of Ionian natural philosophy.³² The difference between the young Socrates and him is not only highlighted by the outright criticisms of single doctrines and his whole approach, which only appears to have a sound

31 For Anaxagoras' influence in this area and its impact on the trial of Socrates see Janko 2009.

32 Theories attributable to Anaxagoras (or his disciple Archelaus) apart from his ideas on *nous* can also be identified in 96b2–3 (coming-to-be of animals); 96d1–5 (the problem of growing); 99b6–8 (stationing of the earth). Menn 2010, 48, states that "Plato, throughout the whole reply to Cebes (say 96a6–107a1), is setting out his position in contrast with Anaxagoras."

basis in intelligence, but fundamentally goes astray in its actual application to the world of natural phenomena. Plato also chips in some narrative details which mark the distance between the two men.

- (1) It is to be noted that according to his autobiography Socrates never enrolls as a student with Anaxagoras, although Plato ascribes to him a fair acquaintance with his positions in several passages of his dialogues.³³ Socrates first attends a reading of his writings (probably by Archelaus)³⁴ and since what he hears pleases him, he goes on to buy and read Anaxagoras' books (actually only one: *DL* 2.6)—only to turn away from this approach without having taken the chance of talking to Anaxagoras in person, despite the fact that he was presumably still in Athens at that time. Note that Plato does not hesitate to show the young Socrates in direct personal contact with other Pre-Socratics, notably with Parmenides and Zeno in the *Parmenides*. But he conspicuously avoids any direct discussion between Socrates and Anaxagoras that might have spurred the idea of a student-teacher relationship between them. As we have seen in §1, Anaxagoras is used instead as part of an example showing how to subvert an authority-figure in order to make up one's own mind.
- (2) The difference between the two philosophers is also indirectly flagged by the example that Socrates chooses to demonstrate that causal explanations in the Anaxagorean style ultimately fall short. His argument that material conditions cannot explain why he awaits death in prison instead of having fled to Megara or Boeotia is very reminiscent of the *Crito* (53b4), especially in that Socrates invokes the principle of "choice of the best" in order to justify his course of action.³⁵ Socrates's decision to obey the verdict of the Athenian court and face death also reflects unfavorably on Anaxagoras and other natural philosophers who either avoided a trial or fled from the impending death sentence by going into exile.³⁶
- (3) The self-distance which Socrates establishes in recounting the experiences of his former self (who was first so enamored with Anaxagoras)

33 See, e.g., *Grg.* 465d; *Cra.* 409a–b and 413c; *Hi. mai.* 300e–302b; *Phdr.* 269e–270a.

34 On Archelaus as the teacher of Anaxagorean philosophy for Socrates see *DL* 2.16. For a detailed review of the testimonies of the relationship between Socrates and Archelaus see Patzer 2012, 163–212.

35 See esp. Socrates's basic tenet that he always follows the best argument (λόγος βέλτιστος, *Cri.* 46b5–6).

36 There is conflicting evidence about the trial against Anaxagoras and the question of whether he was formally sentenced or not; see *DL* 2.12–14.

also sets the two persons apart. One general attack that the Xenophonic Socrates launches directly against Anaxagoras is that he does not know the limits of human knowledge and simply over-reaches his capacities (*Mem.* 4.7.6–7; see also 1.1.13). The Socrates of the *Phaedo*, quite to the contrary, has examined himself and demarcated the borders of his own competence—which does not include the kind of natural philosophy that is claimed to be possible by Anaxagoras and others. This ties in neatly with his confession of ignorance and the stress on the difference between human and divine wisdom in Plato's *Apology* as well as in Xenophon. The message seems clear. Anaxagoras would have been better off embarking on the Socratic second sailing of self-knowledge instead of chasing natural phenomena on the basis of insufficient explanatory principles.³⁷

Summing up, the autobiography in the *Phaedo* certainly undermines an outright disclaimer of all involvement with natural philosophy in the style of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. But it is certainly motivated by the same apologetic intention on the authorial level, namely to show that Socrates is not to be mixed up with Anaxagoras. That Plato saw the need for this kind of clarification might also be explained as follows. Especially because there is a certain proximity between Anaxagoras and Socrates when it comes to the idea of natural theology (and even with Plato's theory of Ideas as formal causes as it is developed in the "second sailing"), the urge to renounce all possible bonds and bridges with him becomes even more pressing.³⁸ This not only strengthens the defense of Socrates against the charge of impiety but highlights at the same time the originality of his philosophy.

There remains one final difficulty with Socrates's dealings with natural philosophy that might in my view also be approached by taking recourse to the authorial intention of Plato. How are the "experiences" with natural philosophy in *Phd.* 96a–99c (the "first sailing") related to the "second sailing" starting afterwards? A complete answer to this question would involve a detailed discussion of the δεύτερος πλοῦς and the theory of Forms presented in it, which

37 See also the rather mocking references to Anaxagoras and his abundant talk on nature in *Phdr.* 270a.

38 For the proximities between Anaxagoras and Plato see Furley 1989, 47–65. Sedley 2007, 91–93, marks the following difference between Socrates and Anaxagoras: while the latter argues for a scientific creationism, at least Xenophon's Socrates proposes a fundamentally anti-scientific creationism, favoring instead a creationist piety.

is not possible here.³⁹ I will therefore focus on what this transition in the text may tell us about Socrates (and Plato) as a natural philosopher.

First of all, it has to be stated that the “first sailing,” which stands for a complete teleological account of the world, is not simply given up as an impossible project but is simply shelved by Socrates. The second sailing, which takes recourse to the Ideas as formal causes, is not intended to supersede entirely or to replace the teleological account for which Socrates had looked in vain in Ionian natural philosophy but is rather meant as a first step towards it.⁴⁰ This calls for a later unification of the first and the second sailing, for an integration of the theory of Ideas into a teleological account of the world that also pays attention to the other types of causality, including material and efficient causes. In my opinion, this project is completed later in Plato’s *Timaeus*, where the divine craftsman (δημιουργός) is introduced as an intelligent cosmic principle in order to bring the best possible order to the whole world by modeling it with a view to the intelligible world of the Ideas.⁴¹ The demiurge represents all the features of intelligent and divine goodness that Socrates had hoped to find in Anaxagoras’ *nous*; his high hopes for a complete creationist natural theology, which motivates his initial interest in natural philosophy in the *Phaedo*, are thus fulfilled in a later Platonic dialogue in which Socrates also takes part as an interlocutor.

But note that it is not Socrates who narrates the creation myth in the *Timaeus*, but the eponymous Pythagorean with whom he talks.⁴² This circumstance is certainly not accidental but expresses an authorial intention on Plato’s behalf which ties in neatly with the *Phaedo*. In the *Phaedo*, Socrates declares himself unsuited for composing tales that give a full-blown teleological account involving an intelligent creative force (see Betegh 2008). It is precisely for this reason that he embarks on the second sailing, since he was denied this by potential teachers like Anaxagoras and has not been able to find it by himself. But he

39 For a brave stab at the issues involved here see Kanayama 2000.

40 This is convincingly demonstrated by Horn 2011, 137–139. See also Wiggins 1986, esp. 16: “the *deuteros plous* is teleological in intention.”

41 See also Lennox 1985, esp. from 204. For Plato’s understanding of the divine craftsman see Müller 2012.

42 This is one of the reasons why Ebert 2004 interprets the whole *Phaedo* with its strong overtones of Pythagoreanism as a kind of rapprochement to this school intended by Plato. Ebert thinks that the whole autobiography of Socrates is a fiction that mainly serves the purpose of demonstrating the affinities between Socrates (as an *anima naturaliter Pythagorica*) and the Pythagoreans who have fulfilled Socrates’ quest for a teleological explanation of the world (esp. 346–349).

adds immediately: “Now I would gladly become anyone’s student to learn just what the truth is about that sort of [teleological] cause” (99c6–8). This strikes me as a rather thinly veiled reference to Plato and the *Timaeus*.⁴³ Socrates in the *Phaedo* just leaves open the back door for someone else to complete the cosmological project in which he has only progressed toward a certain step.⁴⁴

In the *Phaedo*, this conspicuous transition in 99c between the $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ and the $\delta\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, that is, between the first and the second sailing, thus might flag how and where Plato aspires to take over the torch in natural philosophy from Socrates. It is true that the myth told in *Phaedo* 107d–115a already seems to satisfy the requirements of a teleological tale for which Socrates deemed himself unfit. But it has to be noted that this myth is told after the transition in 99c and that Socrates does not make it up but reports it as something which is said ($\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, 107d5) by someone else—perhaps the absent Plato?⁴⁵

All this evidence points to a break in the text of *Phaedo* 95e–102a, situated in 99c, which marks the leap from the teleological aspirations in natural philosophy voiced already by the young Socrates toward a full-blown Platonic cosmology, which is developed in the *Timaeus* but takes its start with the $\delta\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ in the *Phaedo*. But this strategic move on the authorial level does not force us at all to discard the authenticity of Socrates’ experiences with natural philosophy in *Phaedo* 96a–99c. On the one hand, it indicates that the second sailing is already Plato’s achievement, later to be continued and completed. On the other hand, it is also an acknowledgment that (1) Plato’s own teleological theory of the universe is ultimately indebted to Socrates’ initial search for a natural theology based on divine goodness (see Bluck 1955, 111) and that (2) his own cosmology in the *Timaeus* is still very much informed by the ethical approach towards natural philosophy that was championed by his teacher (cf. Steel 2001).

43 This reading is also defended by Sedley 2007, 91–92. Contra: Betegh 2008, 97–98, who refers this passage to Socrates’ afterlife where he might possibly be taught by someone wiser than himself.

44 Note that in his famous “disclaimer” about natural philosophy in Pl. *Ap.* 19c Socrates also states that he does not wish to discredit all natural science but only to say that he has no part in it; there may be someone else “wise” in it. This certainly smacks a little bit of Socratic irony, but taken literally it also makes sense, namely as an anticipation of the *Timaeus*.

45 As Sedley 2007, 93–95, suggests.

4 Conclusion

According to my reading, the attempt to probe Socrates' "autobiography" in Plato's *Phaedo* for information concerning the historical Socrates—and especially his stance towards natural philosophy—is not a forlorn enterprise. Particularly the "first sailing" (*Phd.* 96a–99c) shows a distinctively Socratic touch (and can also be backed by historical testimonies with regard to Socrates' relationship towards Anaxagoras' teaching and/or his disciple Archelaus). Socrates' foray into physiology seems to have been sparked by his interests in teleology and the good life. The account of his "first sailing" thus does not stand in contradiction to the "ethical mission" which is the leitmotif of his *Apology*; the repeated references to the limits of (natural) knowledge, the importance of self-knowledge, and the emphasis on an intellectual autonomy that does not simply bow to (self-)proclaimed "experts" are also features of the account presented in the *Phaedo*.

When it comes to the "Socratic problem" in the confined area of natural philosophy, this result allows for some hermeneutical maneuvering space. At least it seems safe to say that the "disclaimers," which completely distance Socrates from natural philosophy in other Platonic writings and in Xenophon, are not to be overstated. They might rather be seen as part of an apologetic strategy that aims at subverting the claims brought forward in Socrates's trial (and echoing parts of the portrayal in Aristophanes' *Clouds*), according to which Socrates was another impious natural philosopher bent on abolishing the traditional gods. Now this rationale of defending Socrates also seems to be at work in the "first sailing," albeit pursued with a different strategy. Instead of renouncing every contact between Socrates and natural philosophy, the *Phaedo* account shows us a Socrates initially interested in but finally dissatisfied with Pre-Socratic thought who turns away from it at the end of his "youth."⁴⁶ That Socrates con-

46 I would at least like to hint at a problem which Alessandro Stavru has kindly pointed out to me: If (i) Socrates already went on a trip to Samos with Archelaus around 452 (as it is credibly attested by Ion of Chios; see Patzer 2012, 164–169)—which indicates a kind of teacher-disciple relationship between them—and if (ii) his intense involvement with physiological studies still seemed plausible to an Athenian audience attending the *Clouds* between in 423 (when Socrates was already about 47 years old), this would stretch his "youthful" involvement with natural philosophy to approximately 30 years—and this seems somewhat overblown. One might certainly question either (i) or (ii) to get out of this dilemma. Another option is to accept this state of affairs and to detect another apologetic maneuver by Plato. By limiting the attachment to natural philosophy to the "young" (νέος, *Phd.* 96a7) Socrates, the reader of the *Phaedo* gets the impression that this

sequently embarks on a “second sailing,” which is—at least in my view—in its focus on the theory of Ideas rather Platonic than Socratic, does not detract from this apologetic strategy.

Of particular importance in this apology is the way in which Plato distinguishes Socrates from Anaxagoras. The fact that Socrates is consistently portrayed as a student of Anaxagoras and/or of his disciple Archelaus by Diogenes Laertius proves that the linking of these figures was solidly present in the later biographical tradition; and we may gather from Aristophanes's *Clouds* that it was not completely alien to the public perception during Socrates' very lifetime. Socrates might have been seen as a figure similar to (or even mistaken for) Anaxagoras, especially with a view to the trials against them based on the accusation of impiety. Plato chose a very subtle strategy to discredit this similarity in the *Phaedo*, portraying Socrates as an independent thinker who had no personal contact with Anaxagoras and thus only inappropriately labeled a disciple or even an epigone of his. The autonomy and originality of Socrates's thought is emphasized by the efforts of the “second sailing” that lead him towards the hypothesis of Ideas. This hypothesis offers a kind of fulfillment of Socrates' search for a teleological explanation of the natural world. That Socrates might thus be mistaken for Plato himself does not seem to be Plato's worry. Continuity in this area between Socrates and his student rather emphasizes again the distance between the mature Socrates and his alleged teacher Anaxagoras.

References

- Babut, D. ‘Anaxagore jugé par Socrate et Platon’, *REG* 91 (1978), 44–76.
- Betegh, G. ‘Tale, theology and teleology in the *Phaedo*’, in: C. Partenie, *Plato's Myths*. Cambridge 2008, 77–100.
- Bluck, R.S. *Plato's Phaedo*. London 1955.
- Burnet, J. *Plato's Phaedo*. Oxford 1911.
- Cerri, G. ‘Le Nuvole di Aristofane e la realtà storica di Socrate’, in: F. Perusino and M. Colantonio, *La commedia greca e la storia: atti del Seminario di Studio. Urbino, 18–20 maggio 2010*. Pisa 2012, 151–194.

was a rather short-lived period which the “mature” Socrates left behind him long ago. The credibility of such a move by Plato would certainly be of questionable worth as long as some contemporary witnesses are still alive but might prove effective in the long run. However, I do not intend to give a final verdict on the issue of when exactly Socrates's naturalistic phase (as well as its peak and its turning-point) has to be situated.

- Döring, K. 'Der Sokrates der Platonischen Apologie und die Frage nach dem historischen Sokrates', *WJA* 14 (1987), 75–94.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The rise and fall of the Socratic problem', in: D. Morrison, *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011, 1–23.
- Dorter, K. *Plato's Phaedo: an interpretation*. Toronto 1982.
- Ebert, T. *Platon: Phaidon*. Göttingen 2004.
- Frede, D. *Platons 'Phaidon'*. Darmstadt 1999.
- Frede, M. 'The original notion of cause', in: M. Schofield, *Doubt and dogmatism: studies in Hellenistic epistemology*. Oxford 1980, 217–249.
- Furley, D. *Cosmic problems*. Cambridge 1989.
- Gerson, L. *God and Greek philosophy*. London 1990.
- Gigon, O. *Sokrates: sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte*. Bern 1947.
- Gower, O.S.L. 'Why is there an autobiography in the *Phaedo*?', *AncPhil* 28 (2008), 329–346.
- Graham, D.W. 'Socrates, the craft-analogy and science', *Apeiron* 24 (1991), 1–24.
- Hackforth, R. *Plato's Phaedo*. Cambridge 1955.
- Hoinski, D. 'Context, decision, and autobiography in Plato's *Phaedo*', *AncPhil* 28 (2008), 347–355.
- Horn, C. 'Kritik der bisherigen Naturforschung und die Ideentheorie (95a–102a)', in: J. Müller, *Platon: Phaidon*. Berlin 2011, 127–142.
- Janko, R. 'Socrates the freethinker', in: S. Ahbel Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*. Malden 2009, 48–62.
- Kahn, C. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue*. Cambridge 1996.
- Kanayama, Y. 'The methodology of the second voyage and the proof of the soul's indestructibility in Plato's *Phaedo*', *OSAPh* 18 (2000), 41–100.
- Laks, A. and R. Saetta Cottone, *Comédie et philosophie: Socrate et les 'Présocratiques' dans le Nuées d'Aristophane*. Paris 2013.
- Lennox, J. 'Plato's unnatural teleology', in: D. O'Meara, *Platonic investigations*. Washington 1985, 195–218.
- Menn, S. 'On Socrates' first objections to the physicists (*Phaedo* 95E8–97B7)', *OSAPh* 38 (2010), 37–68.
- Morrison, D. 'On the alleged historical reliability of Plato's *Apology*', *AGPh* 82 (2000), 235–265.
- Müller, J. 'Der Demiurg würfelt nicht: die Erschaffung der Welt in Platons *Timaios*', in: C. Mayer and C. Müller, *Augustinus—Schöpfung und Zeit*. Würzburg 2012, 17–45.
- Patzner, A. *Studia Socratica: zwölf Abhandlungen über den historischen Sokrates*. Tübingen 2012.
- Ross, W.D. 'The problem of Socrates', *PCA* 30 (1933), 7–24.
- Ross, W.D. *Plato's theory of ideas*. Oxford 1953.
- Rowe, C.J. *Plato, Phaedo*. Cambridge 1993.

- Sebell, D. *The Socratic turn: knowledge of good and evil in an age of science*. Philadelphia 2015.
- Sedley, D. 'Platonic Causes', *Phronesis* 43 (1998), 114–132.
- Sedley, D. *Creationism and its critics in antiquity*. Berkeley 2007.
- Sedley, D. and A.A. Long. *Plato: Meno and Phaedo*. Cambridge 2011.
- Stavru, A. 'The present state of Socratic studies: an overview', in: F. de Luise and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 11–26.
- Steel, C. 'The moral purpose of the human body: a reading of *Timaeus* 69–72', *Phronesis* 46 (2001), 105–128.
- Taylor, A.E. *Socrates*. London 1932.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. 'Socrates in the Clouds', in: Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*. London 1994, 48–86.
- Vlastos, G. 'Reasons and causes in the *Phaedo*', *PhR* 78 (1969), 291–325.
- Wiggins, D. 'Teleology and the good in Plato's *Phaedo*', *OSAPh* 4 (1986), 1–18.

Bios Praktikos and Bios Theôrêtikos in Plato's *Gorgias*

Ivan Jordović
University of Novi Sad

The impression gained from sources of the late-fifth and early-fourth-centuries BCE is that in Athens there was a widespread notion of two paths, two ways of life and education to be chosen by the youth of the upper classes.¹ The same sources reveal considerable controversy over the role of *polupragmosunê* (“meddlesomeness”) and *apragmosunê* (“love of a quiet life”) in political life.² While the democrats greatly favored a politically active life, among many men of substance the prevailing sentiment was for a quiet life apart from public affairs.

The present chapter attempts to establish the intertextual connections between the third part of Plato's *Gorgias* and some texts of the late-fifth century BCE that reflect these polarizations, notably those of Aristophanes, Euripides, and Thucydides. This approach has a fourfold objective: to show that Plato had a profound insight into these divisions; to argue that in the *Gorgias* Socrates personifies the *bios theôrêtikos*, while his interlocutor Callicles stands for the *bios praktikos*; to demonstrate that through the inversion of the democratic perception of the *vita activa*—*vita contemplativa* dichotomy Plato intends to set up philosophy as an alternative to traditional politics; and, finally, to claim that by the same inversion Plato develops an alternative framework for evaluating success and failure and that by this means he, in turn, justifies Socrates' failure in court. The anticipated results are relevant because they show the impossibility of shedding light on some important aspects of the Socratic dialogue without taking into account the polarizations which shook Athens and its democratic ideology in the late-fifth and early-fourth centuries BCE. These results are for yet another reason relevant. Plato was not the only Socratic who paid close attention to the *bios praktikos*—*bios theôrêtikos* dichotomy. The main topic of the first conversation between Socrates and Aristippus in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* is the choice between three ways of life: one who

1 See Connor 1971, 175–198, esp. 196–197; Donlan 1980, 174; cf. Apelt 1998, 9; Scholz 1998, 101.

2 See Nestle 1926, 129–140; Ehrenberg 1947, 46–67; Dienelt 1953, 94–104; Adkins 1976, 301–327; Allison 1979, 10–22; Lateiner 1982, 1–12; Carter 1986.

rules, one who is being ruled, and one who leads an apolitical life.³ Thus, the findings of this study should also allow a better understanding of other Socratics, such as Xenophon, who less explicitly address the *vita activa*—*vita contemplativa* dichotomy.

1 Socrates, Callicles and the *Agôn* of *Logoi* in the *Clouds*

In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, a work which all sources confirm was familiar to most of its contemporaries, the Better and Worse Arguments compete over which is the superior or more useful. The Better Argument, which claims to represent justice, favors the old education that prevailed when *sôphrosunê* was the accepted custom. Supposedly, young men were once brought up in a spirit of chastity (*sôphrosunê*), shame (*aidôs/aischunê*), respect for their elders, suppression of lust, and development of physical strength and manliness.⁴ In keeping with this, the relationship between a boy and his lover would be full of carnal restraint.⁵ The Better Argument argues that youths should spend time in the gymnasias and the Academy instead of chattering idly in the agora and litigating in the courts (961–1023). Accordingly, the Better Argument links *sôphrosunê* with *apragmosunê*, which is the quality of the incorruptible, loyal and old-fashioned moderate citizen (1006–1007).⁶ Traditional education in the *Clouds* is associated with democracy, since the former had reputedly produced the heroes of Marathon, Athens' most illustrious sons.

The Worse Argument advocates a new kind of upbringing in the form of a sophistic education. This denies the very existence of justice, glorifies a life of selfish hedonism, indecency, wantonness, and effeminacy, and claims that there is nothing one should be ashamed of if only one responds to the necessities of nature (*phuseôs anankas*).⁷ The Worse Argument rejects *sôphrosunê* and its use in controlling desires (1060–1074).⁸ The degree to which everything has been turned upside down may be seen in the appeal to the example of Heracles. The Worse Argument uses the greatest and manliest of the Hellenic heroes to prove the advantages of effeminacy. A youth who takes this path is obviously

3 Xen. *Mem.* 2.1, esp. 2.1.1, 7–17; cf. O'Connor 1994, 162, 175; Johnson 2009, 212.

4 The notion *sôphrosunê* carries in the *Clouds* a strictly moral connotation in the sense of "chastity" or "purity"; see North 1966, 99.

5 Ar. *Nub.* 961–984, 1014–1023, esp. 991–995.

6 See North 1996, 98.

7 Ar. *Nub.* 1043–1079; see also 1015–1023.

8 See Rademaker 2005, 229.

totally unbridled in sexual terms, as may be seen from the epithet “wide-assed” (*euruprôktos*) applied to him in the *Clouds* (1085).⁹ Finally, the Worse Argument argues that as much time as possible should be spent in the agora “exercising the tongue,” that is, in rhetoric. In the comedy, Socrates appears as the ambassador of this new education.¹⁰

If Plato is to be believed, Socrates himself was convinced that Aristophanes’ depiction of him as a sophist—and thus a proponent of the Worse Argument—had greatly contributed to many Athenians’ belief that he really was corrupting their youth (*Ap.* 18b–d, 19b–20c, 23d). The Socratics invested much effort in disproving this image. In Plato’s *Apology*, Socrates is declared to be the only true educator in Athens.¹¹ A similar sentiment is expressed in Xenophon’s *Apology* (3, 5, 19–23, 26, 34, esp. 19–21, 26). In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon describes how Socrates related Prodicus’ story of Heracles’ choice between the path of virtue and the path of vice in order to lead his interlocutor to virtue (2.1.21–34). More importantly, the same work explicitly states that Socrates had had a positive influence on the young Critias and Alcibiades, the latter of whom some believe to be concealed behind Callicles, the protagonist of the right of the stronger (1.2.12–18, 24–26, 29–47).¹²

9 The term *euruprôktos* is related to the notion of *kinaidos* (“catamite”) as may be seen from the usage of the term *katapugôn* (“lecher”), denoting a young men taking the path suggested by the Worse Argument (*Ar. Nub.* 1023); cf. Ludwig 2002, 247–250, esp. 249. Moreover, the notion of *euruprôktos* can be associated with a democratic politician (*Ar. Eq.* 423–428; 1240–1243); see Ludwig 2002, 43. The Worse Argument has turned everything upside down. Hence the Better Argument can say that the Worse Argument will persuade a young man to consider all that is foul fair and all that is fair foul (*Ar. Nub.* 1020–1022); Ludwig 2002, 246.

10 The portrayal of Socrates in the *Clouds* as a typical representative of the new education was facilitated by two circumstances. Firstly, Socrates was to the average Athenian a far more familiar figure than any representative of the sophistic movement. The reason for this was that he, contrary to the sophists, often talked with the common people. Secondly, the average Athenian might not have been able to tell the difference between Socrates and the sophists. Due to these circumstances, it was easy for Aristophanes to depict Socrates as a sophist who practiced *physiologia* and had Pythagorean/Orphic traits (*Pl. Apol.* 17c–d, 19c–20d, 22d–23a, 23e–24a, 28a, 30a–b, 30e–31a, esp. 19d, 22e–23a; *Ar. Nub.* 331–334, 360, 1111; *Ran.* 1491–1499); see Henderson 1990, 304; Jordović 2008, 16–17; Rutherford 1995, 41; Edmunds 2006, 414–424.

11 Cf. de Strycker 1994, 8–13; see also Ober 2001, 179–180.

12 See Gray 1998, 41–59, esp. 48. On the numerous attempts to identify the Athenian (e.g. Critias, Alcibiades) concealed behind Callicles’ name, see Gauss 1956, 58–59; Dalfen 2004, 132–137.

Although it is not immediately obvious, Plato's *Gorgias* is also intended to defend Socrates from the charge of corrupting youth and thus from implicit or explicit association with the Worse Argument's educational program. This is evident from the fact that each time Socrates and Callicles refer to the *vita activa*—*vita contemplativa* dichotomy, both of them allude to the trial of 399 BCE.¹³ Accordingly it comes as no surprise that the contest between the Better and the Worse Argument in the *Clouds* serves as a base for the debate between Socrates and Callicles, except that like a reflection in a mirror, right becomes left and left becomes right.

The young Callicles follows in the *Gorgias* the path extolled by the Worse Argument.¹⁴ He listens to the sophists and learns rhetoric (447a–c, 449a). He claims that doing wrong is better than suffering it, and calls upon the laws of nature and openly rejects justice (483a–484a). He is governed by the bad *erôs*, because of which he demands a free rein for desires and the rejection of all shame (482e, 487b, 494d). He dismisses *sôphrosunê* and its use in controlling pleasures and desires (491d–492b). The fact that Plato uses the term *kinaidos* for the life towards which Callicles strives also indicates unbridled sexuality (494e). Callicles calls upon the mythical hero Heracles to prove the sound basis of the doctrine of the right of the stronger (484b–c).¹⁵ The young Athenian wants to take part in public life and obviously attaches great importance to the ability to win a case in court (484d, 485d, 486a–d). Notwithstanding all the concurrences, there is a real difference between the *Gorgias* and the *Clouds*. Callicles has become what he is, not because Socrates was his teacher, but because he adopted democratic values.¹⁶ This thought lay heavy with Plato, since in the *Republic* his brothers agree with Socrates' claim that the best natures, those particularly gifted for philosophy, turn into arrogant villains who inflict the greatest evils on the city, due to their education by the masses.¹⁷ Plato also mentions the sophists in this context, but says that their contribution is incomparably less relevant than the influence of democracy, as the sophists actually teach adjustment, that is, subordination to the rule of *demos* (*Resp.* 6.492a–c).

13 *Grg.* 484c–486c, 520a–522e, 524b–526e; esp. 486a–b, 521b–522e, 526c–e; cp. *Apol.* 28a–e, 30c–31a, 38d–e; see Ober 1998, 210–211; Danzig 2003, 285, 290; Dalfen 2004, 340, 475–478, 498.

14 See North 1966, 97; Rademaker 2005, 229.

15 Callicles incorrectly quotes Pindar; see Dodds 1959, 270–271; Hornblower 2004, 84–85; Dalfen 2004, 332–333.

16 *Grg.* 481d–e, 513a–b, 518a–b, 518e–519a; see Ober 1998, 202–209.

17 *Resp.* 6.489d–495c, esp. 492a–c, 494c–d, 495a–b; cf. also *Grg.* 525e–526a; *Leg.* 3.691c–d.

Socrates shares many qualities with the Better Argument. He harshly criticizes the sophists and their teachings, especially rhetoric. Justice is most important to him. He praises prudence (*sôphrosunê*), shame (*aischunê*), and self-control, the mastery of one's needs (*enkrateia*).¹⁸ In the *Apology* Socrates always converses with the common people in the agora, but this is only implied in *Gorgias*.¹⁹ In this dialogue Socrates rejects a public political life and is not prepared to use his oratorical skill ("tongue") to win in court, not even to save his life (*Grg.* 473e, 522d–e).²⁰ Socrates teaches the youth real values and not democracy, which he equates with the sophists.²¹ Thus, in *Gorgias* Plato has turned Aristophanes' *agôn* of the *logoi* upside down—Socrates now embodies the ideals of the Better Argument, while his opponent stands for the values of the Worse Argument.

2 Socrates, Callicles and the "Great Debate" in Euripides' *Antiope*

Callicles and Socrates, however, not only represent two different kinds of education but also two paths between which young aristocrats under democracy can choose.²² The importance of this subject for *Gorgias* may be seen in the discussion between Callicles and Socrates, which deals with the difference between *bios praktikos* and *bios theôrêtikos*.²³

One path leads to a philosophical way of life, which strives towards justice and turns its back on the daily political life of the *polis*.²⁴ In *Gorgias*, the

18 *Grg.* 491d–492c, 494c, esp. 491d, 494c. The meaning of the notion *sôphrosunê* changes in course of the dialogue, meaning both prudence and temperance; see Rademaker 2005, 312–315, esp. 314.

19 *Apol.* 19d, 29d–31a, 33b, 36b–c; *Grg.* 447a.

20 See Ober 1998, 210.

21 *Grg.* 520b; see also *Resp.* 6.492a–b.

22 See Donlan 1980, 174. Connor 1971, 175–198, esp. 196–197, speaks of a choice between two paths: conforming to the rules of a democratic political life or withdrawing from politics; cf. Apelt 1998, 9; Scholz 1998, 101. For Plato, Alcibiades' path is that of accepting the rules of democratic political life.

23 *Grg.* 484c–486d, 500c–d, 506b, 510a–511b, 512d–513e, 521d–522e; cp. Kahn 1996, 126–127, 134.

24 *Grg.* 473e, 500c, 507d–508a; cp. *Resp.* 6.495b–c; *Xen. Mem.* 4.1.3–5; see Scholz 1998, 79; Apelt 1998, 7–9; Ober 1998, 186, 236. Plato's mentioning of Aristides as an example of a good statesman is no proof that he does not distance himself from the political life of his *polis*, since the return to the conditions prior to the Persian wars is impossible (*Grg.*

philosophical life is personified in the character of Socrates. Callicles, as the protagonist of the right of the stronger and consequently a paradigm of injustice, embodies the opposite path. It is the path of public life and adjustment to the democratic rules of the game. Due to the upheavals of 411 and 404/403, this adjustment was interpreted in both ancient and modern times as only a seeming submission on the part of the young aristocrats. However, this interpretation is precisely what Plato wishes to refute in *Gorgias*.

Plato gestures at the term *apragmosunê* to show that Callicles has opted for the *bios praktikos*, and does not know the *bios theôrêtikos*, having completely fallen under the influence of democratic ideology. The notion *apragmosunê* is not mentioned *expressis verbis* anywhere in the dialogue. Plato, however, uses its synonym, *idiôtês*, as well as its negated antonym, *ou polypragmonêsantos* (*Grg.* 525e, 526c; *Ap.* 32a, 40d).²⁵ Callicles depicts the difference between *bios praktikos* and *bios theôrêtikos* by comparing himself with Zethus and Socrates with Amphion from *Antiope*, one of Euripides' last plays, performed in about 409 BCE.²⁶ In this tragedy, like an echo of the debate on the place of *apragmosunê* and *polupragmosunê* in Athenian democracy, one of the central questions is the opposition between the man who is heading towards public life and the man who opts for a withdrawn life devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and art.²⁷ Zethus harshly condemns the quiet life. He believes that the withdrawn life renders man incapable of helping his *polis* and friends with advice and action, of debating legal matters, and of taking part in war. Consequently, the man's character is corrupted, he becomes unmanly, and his house is ruined.²⁸ Amphion's reply follows, according to the rules of oratorical contest. He rejects the criticism of his twin, Zethus, pointing out that the *apragmôn* is a true friend of his *polis* and friends. In fact, notwithstanding his reclusive life, his moderation and prudence enable him to provide better advice than the rash leaders of

526b). Besides, Plato criticizes Aristides in *Meno* for failing to educate his son properly (*Men.* 94).

25 See Gigon 1981, 387–388; cf. Adkins 1976, 301–327, esp. 325–327.

26 Pl. *Grg.* 484e–485e; Eur. *Ant.* 183, 185–186, 188; see Carter 1986, 163, 173; Dodds 1959, 275–276; Wassermann, 1968, 403; Dalfen 2004, 336, 338–339.

27 Eur. *Ant.* 184–188, 193–194, 196, 200, 202, 219, 227 (910); see Nestle 1926, 129–140; Ehrenberg 1947, 46–67; Dienelt 1953, 94–104; Allison 1979, 10–22; Carter 1986, 163–173. Some modern scholars, however, argue against the identification of Zethus and Amphion with the dichotomy *vita activa*—*vita contemplativa*. Gibert 2009, 23–34, suggests that Zethus is not the opposite of a type of quietist; on the contrary, his ideal represents just another variety of quietism, one that is complementary to that of Amphion.

28 Eur. *Ant.* 184–188, 193–194, 196, 219; see Carter 1986, 164–167, 172.

the people and the ignorant mob.²⁹ Zethus wins the discussion, but in the end the play proves Amphion right.³⁰

Socrates points out that his own views coincide with Amphion's (*Grg.* 506b). He calls the masses ignorant, while saying of rhetors and politicians that they have the skill of persuasion but not true knowledge, and that their own gain is more important to them than the welfare of the community.³¹ He asserts that he is one of the rare Athenians who undertakes the true political art (*politikê technê*), and the only one who works for the good of the city (*politika*), since he strives for the best, for prudence, that is, temperance (*sôphrosunê*) and justice (*dikaïosunê*).³² The following three quotations best exemplify the profound difference between Socrates and Calicles on the *bios praktikos*—*bios theôrêtikos* dichotomy.

[1] I think I am one of the few Athenians—not to say the only one—who undertake the real political craft (τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ) and practice politics (τὰ πολιτικά)—the only one among people now. I don't aim at gratification with each of speeches I make, but aim at the best, not pleasantest, and I'm not willing to do "these subtle things" that you advise me. That's why I won't know what to say in court.³³

Grg. 521d–e

According to Socrates, the judgment of the dead as envisioned in the after-life myth shows that the life of an ordinary citizen or philosopher who rejects *polupragmosunê* is in every respect better than the life preferred by Calicles.

29 Eur. *Ant.* 193–194, 196, 200, 202, 206, 227 (910); see Carter 1986, 167–171.

30 See Grote 1994, 27.

31 *Grg.* 502d–e, 510b–511a, 513b–c, 517a–c, 518e–519a, 520a–b, 521b, 526d, see also 455a–d, 459.

32 *Grg.* 502e–503a, 504d–e, 507a–b, 515b–c, 517b–c, 519a, 521d–522a, 526a–b, 527d, esp. 507a–b, 521d–522a; cf. Dodds 1959, 369; Jaeger ⁵1973, 738–739; Irwin 1979, 191, 220–221; Dalfen 2004, 424–425. In the discussion between Socrates and Calicles *sôphrosunê* means the control of pleasures and desires, as well as prudence, on which see Rademaker 2005, 312–315, esp. 314. In the *Gorgias* the notion *sôphrosunê* is closely related to the value term *enkrateia* (Pl. *Grg.* 491d–e; cf. *Resp.* 6.430e), per Dalfen 2004, 360–361. The question whether Socrates here claims to have true political expertise is of secondary importance. For the present chapter it is more important that Socrates expresses an understanding of the political craft that is diametrically opposed to the traditional perception of political expertise; see Shaw 2011, 187–217, esp. 191–194.

33 This and the following passages from the *Gorgias* are translated by Terence Irwin (1979).

[2] But sometimes he [Rhadamanthys] noticed another soul that had lived piously and with truth, of a private man (ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου) or of someone else; but most of all, so I say Callicles, of some philosopher (φιλοσόφου) who did his own work and was no meddler during his life (οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ); then admired this and sent him off to the Isles of the Blessed ... For myself, then, Callicles, I am persuaded by these accounts, and I consider how to present my soul as healthy as possible before the judge. And so I dismiss the honours accorded by most men. I practice the truth. And I will try to be really the best that is in my power in life and, whenever I die, in death. And I call all other men, as far as it is in my power—yes, I call you, Callicles, in reply to your call—to this life and this contest, which I say is worth more than all the contests here. And I reproach you because you won't be able to defend yourself when you face that court of justice and that judgment I was speaking of just now.

Grg. 526c–e

Callicles comes out with opinions that could easily be those of Zethus. Philosophy is fine, but only in one's youth. If a man continues practicing it later, then his noble nature is corrupted. He becomes a coward, unmanly, and his house remains empty. Such a man is not only incapable of helping his *polis* or anyone else with advice, he is not even able to save himself if he finds himself in mortal danger.

[3] Well, philosophizers strike me the same way too. For when I see philosophy in a young boy, I admire it, I find it suitable, and I regard him as a free man, and a non-philosophizer as un-free, someone who will never expect anything fine or noble from himself. But when I see an older man still philosophizing and not giving it up, I think this man needs a beating, Socrates. For, as I was saying just now, this person is bound to end being unmanly, even if he has an altogether good nature; for he shuns the city centre and the public squares where the poet says men win good reputations ... Now, Socrates, I'm quite friendly towards you. And so I find you strike me now as Amphion struck Zethus in Euripides, whom I recalled just now ... For as it is, suppose someone arrested you, or some other philosopher, and threw you into jail, claiming you were doing injustice when you were doing none; you know you'd have no idea what to do with yourself; you'd be dizzy, you'd gape, not knowing what to say; you'd go into court, to face some inferior wretch or an accuser, and you'd be put to death if he wanted the death penalty for you? ... My excellent friend,

listen to me; “stop these examinations, practice the culture of the world’s affairs”; practice what will earn you the reputation of wisdom; “leave these subtleties to others”—“from which you will live in an empty house.”

Grg. 485c–486c

The fact that Plato reflects on the *bios praktikos* and *bios theôrêtikos* in the context of Socrates’ trial, and that he alludes to the ignorance of both the masses and the politicians, shows that he uses this dichotomy to establish an alternative framework for evaluating (ethical as well as political) success and failure. This framework, in turn, indicates that the demos by definition was incompetent to judge Socrates’ conduct in life. The coincidence of Callicles’ views with those of Zethus shows that the young Athenian, despite his vehement support for the right of the stronger, is willing to subordinate himself to the democratic rules of public life.

3 Socrates, Callicles and the Democratic Rejection of *Apragmosunê* in Thucydides

The unusual concurrence of Plato’s views with Euripides’, of whom he otherwise has nothing good to say, would be astonishing were it not for the following circumstance.³⁴ Callicles’ favorite, Zethus—and therefore he himself—exhibits many parallels with the Pericles and Alcibiades whom Thucydides presents.³⁵ In the *Funeral Oration*, having said of the Athenians that they are lovers of beauty (*philokaloumen*) without extravagance and wisdom (*philosophoumen*) without weakness, Pericles claims that according to the general opinion an individual who takes no part in public affairs and who minds his own business (*apragmôn*) is useless.

[4] For we are lovers of beauty yet with no extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without weakness ... And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in

34 Since Euripides is the only tragedian whose work is discussed in the *Gorgias* (484e, 485e), and because he is directly criticized by Plato in the *Republic* (8.568a–b), it is safe to assume that Socrates’ critique of the composition of tragedies in the *Gorgias* primarily refers to him (502b–d; cf. *Ap.* 22a–c).

35 Cf. Carter 1986, 172.

public affairs, not as one who minds his own business (οὐκ ἀπράγμονα), but as good for nothing.³⁶

THUC. 2.40.1–2

These parallels are not superficial, as *apragmosunê* has another no less significant aspect. This is revealed by Pericles in his last speech, when he calls the Athenian *archê* (empire) a tyranny and says that *apragmones* are useless, cannot protect themselves, and are a danger to the Athenian empire. He goes on to state that an *apragmôn* despises the greatness of Athens, whereas he who wants to achieve something—emulates Athens' greatness.

[5] From this empire, however, it is too late for you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, through fear and shrinking from action (ἀπραγμοσύνη) does indeed seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time the empire you hold is a tyranny (τυραννίδα), which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is dangerous to let go. Men like these would soon ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to their views, or if they should settle in some other land and have an independent state all to themselves; for men of peace (ἄπραγμον) are not safe unless flanked by men of action; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, but only in a vassal state, to seek safety by submission. The memory of this greatness ... will be left to posterity forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest wars held out against our foes whether united or single, and inhabited a city that was the richest in all things and the greatest. These things the man who shrinks from action (ἀπράγμων) may indeed disparage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accomplish something will make them the goal of his endeavour, while every man who does not possess them will be envious.³⁷

THUC. 2.63.2–64.4

Enemies of Athens also believed that *apragmosunê* was incompatible with the Athenian imperialistic policy, as is confirmed by the Corinthians' speech in Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.70.8–9). Alcibiades goes furthest in the "Sicilian debate." For him *apragmosunê* and its related *hêsuchia*

36 This and the next translation are by Charles Foster Smith (1969); cf. Carter 1986, 27; Raaflaub 2006, 196. On the meaning of the verb *philosophein* in the *Funeral Oration* see Rossetti (in this volume), 274–275.

37 Cf. Ehrenberg 1947, 48; Carter 1986, 38–39.

have become antonyms to the spirit of limitless expansion (Thuc. 6.18.2, 6–7).³⁸ The degree to which Alcibiades interprets *apragmosunê* as the antithesis of radical expansionism is demonstrated by his accusation that Nicias is upholding the policy of *apragmosunê* (Thuc. 6.18.6). In reality, however, Nicias advocated only taking a more cautious policy, not the abandoning of the expansion of Athenian *archê*.³⁹ In his speech in Camarina, Euphemus states confidently that *polupragmosunê* is one of the main traits of the general character of the Athenians and the Athenian imperialistic foreign policy.⁴⁰ Apart from linking it in another way with democratic ideology, Callicles' criticism of *apragmosunê* is also significant because it directly connects him with the imperialistic spirit (tyrannical character) of the Athenian empire (*archê*).⁴¹

4 The *Bios Theôrêtikos* and the Transformation of Politics

The debate whether the superior life should be a *bios praktikos* or a *bios theôrêtikos* is a major topic in the final part of *Gorgias*. It paves the way for the development of philosophy into an alternative politics.⁴² Socrates begins with the relocation of ideas from the political sphere to the metaphysical, which up to then had not been considered a part of politics. In his conversation with Polus, Socrates transposes political notions to the "soul."⁴³ Concern for the welfare of the soul is declared *politikê technê*, while legislation (*nomothetikê technê*) and administration of justice (*dikastikê technê*) are its corrective

38 See Ehrenberg 1947, 50. Thucydides demonstrates himself that *hêsychia* is synonymous with *apragmosynê* (Thuc. 1.70.8); see Ehrenberg 1947, 46; Dickie 1984, 84 with n. 3; Hornblower 1991, 77.

39 The same conclusion can be reached on the basis of Thucydides' statement in the "Obituary for Pericles" (2.65.7), according to which Pericles was dormant (*hêsuchazontas*), but the Athenians acted contrary to his advice, which is an obvious reference to the Sicilian expedition; cf. Hornblower 1991, 343.

40 Thuc. 6.87.2–4; see Ehrenberg 1947, 47; Adkins 1976, 311–313; Allison 1979, 15.

41 This can be also inferred from the fact that, in seven out of eleven instances we have in Thucydides, *apragmosunê* and *apragmôn* are mentioned only by Pericles and Alcibiades, who are apparently the only Athenians to condemn them: 2.40.2, 63.2–3, 64.4; 6.18.6–7; see Allison 1979, 13. Athens as *polis turannos*: Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3; 2.63.2; 3.37.2; 6.85.1; Ar. *Eq.* 1111–1114, 1329–1330, 1333. For dating of the phrase *polis turannos* see Raaflaub 2004, 141–143. For the identification of the Athenian *archê* with tyranny see also Schuller 1978, 10–12; Barceló 1990, 416, 419–424.

42 Cf. Ober 1998, 165, 190–191.

43 See Dodds 1959, 226; Trampedach 1994, 166–167; Dalfen 2004, 242–243, 247–248.

elements (464b–c, 465b–d).⁴⁴ The entire dialogue is characterized by a fundamental criticism of existing political theory and practice. This leads Socrates to negate the existence of an independent political sphere that would be separate from ethics.⁴⁵ Hence Socrates can claim that the key criterion in evaluating a politician is whether he makes the citizens better (502e–503c, 516b–e). Even with this deviation from the traditional understanding of politics, the Socrates of the *Gorgias* still moves within the frame of the Socrates of the *Apology*.⁴⁶ However, in completely rejecting *bios praktikos* and giving absolute priority to *bios theôrêtikos* in the third part of *Gorgias* Socrates goes another important step further.⁴⁷ This may be observed from the change in the way Socrates' attitude to political life is presented. To underline the shift and the difference between this new position and Socrates' political beliefs in the *Apology* and *Crito*, we may "distinguish" between "two" Socrates in *Gorgias*. Accordingly, the purpose of this distinction is not in any way to address issues related to the so-called Socratic problem, since the question of whether Plato became emancipated from his teacher or not in the course of time is of secondary importance for the argument presented here.⁴⁸

The "first" Socrates stays in the agora, is well acquainted with the oratory of the courts, is appointed *prytanis* in 406, takes part in the work of the *ekklesiá*, and listens to Pericles' orations (*Grg.* 447a, 455e, 471e–472b, 473e, 503c). In spite of this, he says of himself that he is not a politician (*Grg.* 473e). This "first" Socrates outstrips Gorgias and Polus in dialogue. He has many features in common with the Socrates of the *Apology* and *Crito*. In these dialogues, Socrates does not take part as a politician in public life but is well acquainted with his fellow citizens, since he frequents public places trying to improve them (*Ap.* 29c–30b, 30e–31b, 31d–32a). He does not manage affairs of state, since that would have cost him his life and he would be of no use to anyone. Nevertheless, Socrates is a *polupragmôn*, but only because on a personal level he

44 See also Marshal 2000, 16–19.

45 This is important insofar as the primary expression of the demos' identity during the fifth-century BCE was political: see Meier 1995, 249–261; Raaflaub 1983, 529, 535. Many social and economic inequalities continued to exist in Athens in spite of the egalitarian elements of democratic ideology. The demos did not aspire to address such inequalities, since they were of secondary importance for the citizen's political identity: see Raaflaub 1996, 139–159, 1983, 529–536.

46 *Ap.* 30a–b, 32d–33a, 36c–d; cf. *Prt.* 319e–320c; see Ober 1998, 168–177.

47 Cf. Trampedach 1994, 169; Ober 1998, 178, 190–192, 211.

48 A detailed account of Plato's attitude towards Socrates and the different interpretations of it can be found in Rowe 2007.

works to make his fellow citizens better, as a gadfly persistently wakes a noble but sleepy horse (*Ap.* 30e, 31c–32a, 36b, 37d).⁴⁹ Therefore, a quiet life (*hêsuchia*) is unacceptable to him (*Ap.* 37e–38a). From all of the above, it appears that Socrates serves his *polis* in two ways. The first form of public service is to be *prutanis*, to serve in war and to take part in the work of the assembly. The second is to speak to the fellow citizens in order to “improve them,” where philosophizing is a form of public service.⁵⁰ The “first” Socrates is not an actual *polupragmôn* in the strict democratic sense of the term, but he is also not a complete *apragmôn*.

The “second” Socrates certainly shares many of the characteristics of the first, but there are visible differences. According to Callicles, he avoids the agora because he lacks experience, he is unfamiliar with the laws, and does not know how to communicate with people (*Grg.* 484d, 485d).⁵¹ What Callicles says is, of course, not true, but it serves to point out that the “second” Socrates is a complete *apragmôn*. He is no longer a gadfly who constantly wakes his fellow citizens, since when he comes before court he will not be able to say: “I do all this only for your sake, judges,” which is Socrates’ main thesis in the *Apology*.⁵² Consequently, he does not succeed in convincing Callicles.⁵³ The “second” Socrates says that he has taken up politics, but by claiming that he is the only one to do so and that ethical standards are the only relevant ones, he shows that the divide with traditional politics is absolute.⁵⁴ The souls of politicians, then, will not go to the Isles of the Blessed, but the soul of the philosopher, whose entire life has been spent not interfering in other people’s affairs (*ou polupragmonêsantos*), will (*Grg.* 525d–e, 526c).⁵⁵ Thus politics, as the “second” Socrates understands it, is actually nothing other than philosophy, which possesses the possibility of transforming politics into politics as it should be.⁵⁶

49 See Carter 1986, 185; Strycker 1994, 337; Heitsch 2002, 125 with n. 228, 129. Scholfield 2006, 22, 24, rightly points out that by general standards Socrates is an *apragmôn*, and that he makes considerable effort to distance himself from such an image in the *Apology*.

50 See Schofield 2006, 25–26.

51 Cf. Ober 1998, 201.

52 *Grg.* 521e, 522c; *Ap.* 29c–30c, 30e, 31c–32a, 36b, 37d; Ober 1998, 211–212; Kahn 1996, 130.

53 *Grg.* 499b, 505c–d, 506b–d, 507a, 510a, 516b–d, 519d, 522e, 527c–e; see Ober 1998, 193, 206, 214–215.

54 *Grg.* 521d–522a, cp. also 503a, 507c–509c, 515b–c, 517b–c, 519a, 521d–522a, 526a–b, 527d; see Trampedach 1994, 168.

55 Cf. Ober 1998, 211–212.

56 See Schofield 2006, 66.

The dialogue ends with the “second” Socrates telling Callicles that the way of life the latter recommends is worthless, proposing instead that his fellow citizens should take up politics only when they acquire an adequate (obviously philosophical) education, and even then only if it is necessary, and if they are capable of giving advice (*Grg.* 527d–e).⁵⁷ This prompts a recollection of Socrates’ statement in the *Republic* that philosophers lead a quiet life, at a remove from political daily life, no longer interested in the city as it is but, in keeping with their search for true knowledge, in the city as it should be.⁵⁸ Therefore Plato, by thematizing the notions of *bios praktikos* and *bios theôrêtikos*, takes on an approach diametrically opposed to the prevailing democratic ideology of his time, with the aim of replacing the traditional understanding of politics.

5 Conclusion

To sum up, the debate between Socrates and Callicles on the best way of life is strongly influenced by Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, Euripides’ *Antiope*, and Thucydides. Intertextual connections show that Plato had an intimate knowledge of other authors of his time and of the Athenian democratic ideology. These connections also reveal Plato’s polemical motive in addressing the *vita activa*—*vita contemplativa* dichotomy in the *Gorgias*. Through the inversion of the late-fifth century BCE democratic understanding of the notion of two paths, two ways of life and education, Plato allows an alternative framework for evaluating success and failure to develop. By proclaiming that *bios theôrêtikos*, and not *bios praktikos*, is in truth ethically superior and tantamount to true political expertise, Plato makes philosophy into an alternative politics. Furthermore, by establishing an alternative framework for evaluating success and failure, Plato fundamentally delegitimizes the court verdict of 399 BCE. Since the *bios praktikos*—*bios theôrêtikos* dichotomy exposes the fallacious nature of the democratic understanding of a good citizen and politician, then the jury, composed of members of the demos, was by definition incompetent to pass a fair judgment on Socrates’ conduct of life.⁵⁹

57 See Trampedach 1994, 169, 173; Kahn 1996, 128, 131; Ober 1998, 242–243.

58 *Resp.* 5.473c–474a, 6.485a–d, 487c–d, 488a–489a, 496c–497c, 500b–501d, 9.592a; see Schofield 2006, 27–30, 155–156, 158–164, esp. 30, 158; Dodds 1959, 16–17; Irwin 1979, 6–7; Klosko 1983, 580–581; Kahn 1996, 128. This is an opposite to the approach of a sophist (*Pl. Resp.* 6.493a–c).

59 In the *Apology* Plato also argues that the court was incompetent: see Danzig 2003, 315.

References

- Adkins, A.W.H. 'Polupragmosune and "minding one's own business": a study in Greek social and political values', *CPh* 71 (1976), 301–327.
- Allison, J.W. 'Thucydides and Polypragmosyne', *AJAH* 4 (1979), 10–22.
- Apelt, O. 'Einleitung zu der Übersetzung von Platon: *Gorgias*', in: O. Apelt, *Platon: Sämtliche Werke*, I. Hamburg 1998.
- Barceló, P. 'Thukydides und die Tyrannis', *Historia* 39 (1990), 401–425.
- Carter, L.B. *The quiet Athenian*. Oxford 1986.
- Connor, W.R. *The new politicians of fifth century Athens*. Princeton 1971.
- Dalfen, J. 'Gorgias: Übersetzung und Kommentar', in: E. Heitsch and C.W. Müller, *Platon Werke: Übersetzung und Kommentar*, VI.3. Göttingen 2004.
- Danzig, G. 'Apologizing for Socrates: Plato and Xenophon on Socrates' behavior in the court', *TAPhA* 133 (2003), 281–321.
- Dickie M.W. 'Hêsychia and Hybris in Pindar', in: D.E. Gerber, *Greek poetry and philosophy: studies in honour of Leonard Woodbury*. Chico 1984, 83–109.
- Dienelt, K. 'Apragmosyne', *ws* 66 (1953), 94–104.
- Dodds, E.R. *Plato, Gorgias: a revised text with introduction and commentary*. Oxford, 1959.
- Donlan, W. *The Aristocratic ideal in ancient Greece: attitudes of superiority from Homer to the end of the fifth century B.C.* Lawrence 1980.
- Edmunds, L. 'What was Socrates called?', *CQ* 56 (2006), 414–424.
- Ehrenberg, V. 'Polypragmosyne: a study in Greek politics', *JHS* 67 (1947), 46–67.
- Gauss, H. *Philosophisches Handkommentar zu den Dialogen Platons II/1*. Bern 1956.
- Gibert, J. 'Euripides' *Antiope* and the quiet life', in: J.R.C. Cousland and J.R. Hume, *The play of texts and fragments: essays in honour of Martin Cropp*. Leiden 2009, 23–34.
- Gigon, O. 'Idiôtês', in: E.C. Welskopf, *Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt. Vol. III: Untersuchungen ausgewählter griechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe*. Berlin 1981, 385–391.
- Gray, V.J. *The framing of Socrates: the literary interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia*. Stuttgart 1998.
- Grote, D. 'Callicles' use of Pindar's ΝΟΜΟΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ: Gorgias 484b', *CJ* 90 (1994), 21–31.
- Heitsch, E. 'Apologie des Sokrates: Übersetzung und Kommentar', in: E. Heitsch and C.W. Müller, *Platon Werke: Übersetzung und Kommentar*, I.2. Göttingen 2002.
- Henderson, J. 'The demos and comic competition', in: J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin, *Nothing to do with Dionysios? Athenian drama in its social context*. Princeton 1990, 271–313.
- Hornblower, S. *A commentary on Thucydides, Vol. I: Books I–III*. Oxford 1991.
- Hornblower, S. *Thucydides and Pindar: historical narrative and the world of Epinikian poetry*. Oxford 2004.

- Irwin, T. *Plato: Gorgias, translated with notes*. Oxford 1979.
- Jaeger, W. *Paideia: die Formung des griechischen Menschen*, 1. Berlin 1973.
- Johnson, D.M. 'Aristippus at the crossroads: the politics of pleasure in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*', *Polis* 26 (2009), 204–222.
- Jordović, I. 'A generation gap in late fifth-century BC Athens', *Balkanica* 38 (2008), 7–27.
- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Klosko, G. 'The insufficiency of reason in Plato's *Gorgias*', *Western Political Quarterly* 36 (1983), 579–595.
- Lateiner, D. '"The man who does not meddle in politics": a topos in Lysias', *CW* 76 (1982), 1–12.
- Ludwig, P.W. *Eros and Polis: desire and community in Greek political theory*. Cambridge 2002.
- Marshal, E. 'Death and disease in Cyrene: a case study', in: V.M. Hope and E. Marshal, *Death and disease in the ancient city*. London 2000, 8–23.
- Meier, C. *Die Entstehung des Politischen bei den Griechen*. Frankfurt am Main 1995.
- Nestle, W. 'Apragmosyne', *Philologus* 81 (1926), 129–140.
- North, H. *Sophrosyne: self-knowledge and self-restraint in Greek literature*. Ithaca 1966.
- Ober, J. *Political dissent in democratic Athens: intellectual critics of popular rule*. Princeton 1998.
- Ober, J. 'The Athenian debate over civic education', in: Y.L. Too, *Education in Greek and Roman antiquity*. Leiden 2001, 175–207.
- O'Connor, D.K. 'The erotic self-sufficiency of Socrates', in: P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994, 151–180.
- Raaflaub, K.A. 'Oligarchy and the concept of the "free citizen" in late fifth-century Athens', *Political Theory* 11 (1983), 517–544.
- Raaflaub, K.A. 'Equalities and inequalities in Athenian democracy', in: J. Ober and C. Hedrick, *Dēmokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and modern*. Princeton 1996, 139–174.
- Raaflaub, K.A. *The discovery of freedom in ancient Greece*. Chicago 2004.
- Raaflaub, K.A. 'Thucydides on democracy and oligarchy', in: A. Rengakos and A. Tsakmakis, *Brill's companion to Thucydides*. Leiden 2006, 189–222.
- Rademaker, A. *Sophrosyne and the rhetoric of self-restraint: polysemy and persuasive use of an ancient Greek value term*. Leiden 2005.
- Rowe, C. *Plato and the art of philosophical writing*. Cambridge 2007.
- Rutherford, R.B. *The art of Plato: ten essays in Platonic interpretation*. London 1995.
- Schofield, M. *Plato: political philosophy*. Oxford 2006.
- Scholz, P. *Der Philosoph und die Politik: die Ausbildung der philosophischen Lebensform und die Entwicklung des Verhältnisses von Philosophie und Politik im 4. und 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Stuttgart 1998.

- Schuller, W. *Die Stadt als Tyrann: Athens Herrschaft über seine Bundesgenossen*. Konstanz 1978.
- Shaw, J.C. 'Socrates and the true political craft', *CPh* 106 (2011), 187–217.
- Smith, C.F. *Thucydides: history of the Peloponnesian war*. Cambridge, MA 1923.
- Strycker, E. de. *Plato's Apology of Socrates: a literary and philosophical study with a running commentary. Edited and completed from the papers of the late E. de Strycker by S.R. Slings*. Leiden 1994.
- Trampedach, K. *Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenössische Politik*. Stuttgart 1994.
- Wassermann, F.M. 'Thukydides und die moralische Krise der Polis', in: H. Herter, *Thukydides*. Darmstadt 1968, 400–411.

The Socratic *Dubia*

Harold Tarrant

University of Newcastle Australia

1 Introduction

It is hard to be sure about the authenticity of several of the dialogues within the Platonic corpus. Most of these employ Socrates as principal speaker, and seem genuinely interested in aspects of the historical or at least the Platonic “Socrates” and his methods, and my title refers to these collectively. I am neither claiming that they offer special insights into the historical Socrates, nor that they should always be treated as a group. Rather I would claim that there is some merit in examining them together from time to time, revealing their similarities, and discussing whether some or all might have found their way into the corpus by a common path. Any such examination would naturally include discussion of the portrait of Socrates that they paint, both collectively and individually. If these works were designed by Plato or were given his approval then they have received the imprimatur of a follower of Socrates. If they have no close connection with Plato, nor with any other follower of Socrates, then they may rather be important as indications of what Socrates had come to mean for those who had not known Socrates themselves.

The shape of the Platonic corpus, as we now know it, cannot with certainty be traced back before Thrasyllus (d. 36 CE),¹ but even then several works were already agreed to be spurious (DL 3.62).² Several survive in the *Appendix Pla-*

1 I have treated Thrasyllus’ activities in Tarrant 1993, and I included the testimonia there. Mansfeld 1994 offered a different account on some matters; Sedley 2009 has published a papyrus that may well reflect Thrasyllus’ explanation of the second tetralogy (*Cratylus-Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman*). I revisited several issues in Tarrant 2013a, while Brisson 2013 examines the relevant text of Diogenes Laertius with more interest in the interpretative than the historical perspective. My present position is that Plato’s work, including many dialogues not yet circulating, was arranged in the Academy after Plato’s death, and was passed down, with some accretions, by those charged with keeping his books, until the break-up of the Academy in 88 BCE. The tetralogies represent Thrasyllus’ (or Dercyllides’) attempt to explain the order in which they had been transmitted, which had not been adequately explained before, and it may have involved slight changes of order, particularly in respect of *Theages* and *Erastae* (on which see below).

2 The strong adverb *homologoumenós* qualifies *notheuontai* (“are excluded as spurious”), imply-

tonica, a collection of related works such as *Axiochus* and *Definitions* transmitted in some manuscripts. The existence of agreed *spuria* does not imply that everything within the Thrasyllan corpus was agreed to be genuine. The most important dialogue of which this was not so was the *Epinomis*, which some sources ascribed to Philip of Opus, who is also credited with having prepared the *Laws* for publication and arranged it in its present twelve-book form.³ While the *Epinomis* does not employ Socrates as a speaker, some dialogues in which Socrates is the principal speaker are preserved within the corpus but were also questioned, and I would number among these *Alcibiades II*, *Hipparchus*, and *Erastae*.⁴ Thrasyllus identified a polymath referred to in this last as Democritus, adding “presuming that the [Ant]erastae is by Plato,”⁵ a *caveat* implying that some others doubted its authenticity. We can perhaps guess why the last two of these works should have been doubted, for the interlocutors (as also in *Minos*) remain unnamed, contrary to Plato’s usual dramatically-inspired practice; and the second *Alcibiades*, apart from being a second dialogue with that title,⁶ has linguistic oddities (particularly the forms οὐθεις/μηθεις for οὐδεις/μηδεις) that suggest a different writing, editing, or transmission process from the rest of the corpus.

ing considerable consensus, at least by Diogenes’ time. In spite of some excellent work in this area by Müller 1975, we do not know the process by which such consensus had arisen, and it did not stop authors from referring to spurious works as “Plato’s” if it suited them. One work, the *Halcyon*, which was included in Diogenes’ list, has been transmitted to us both through some manuscripts of Plato and through those of Lucian, while according to Diogenes (DL 3.62) Favorinus had regarded it as the work of the Academic Leon. It is interesting in that it is the sole surviving dialogue to make Socrates’ early friend Chaerephon (on whom see Brisson in this volume, p. 000) an interlocutor.

- 3 Evidence (e.g. D.L. 3.37, anon. *Proleg.* 24.13–16, cf. 25.6–7, and Plut. *Moralia* 370f) is available in an appendix to the edition of Tarán 1975.
- 4 Ael. VH 8.2 (*Hipparchus*), Ath. 11.506c (*Alcibiades II*, then sometimes said to be by Xenophon); for *Erastae* read on.
- 5 See DL 9.37 = T18c. The work (on which see Peterson in this volume) was often known as *Anterastae*, meaning “rival lovers”, and may today be referred to as *Lovers* or *Rivals* (Fr. *Rivaux*, It. *Rivali*); the *caveat* does not imply Thrasyllus’ own doubt (Peterson, p. 412).
- 6 There is also a second *Hippias*, but few now insist that either is spurious even though there is a simple reference to “the *Hippias*” at Ar. *Metaph.* Δ.29, 1025a6, where the verb χαλαίνω (1025a10–11), otherwise absent from Aristotle, picks up *Hip. mi.* 374c7 in the Platonic text; it has been suspected that such a reference would not have been made in this form if Aristotle had known two *Hippias*-dialogues (and hence that *Hippias Major* might be spurious), but see next note.

Once one accepts the principle that some works *within the Thrasyllan corpus* may not be from Plato's pen, then where must our questioning stop? Obviously those works to which Aristotle indubitably refers as Plato's should be beyond question,⁷ but he refers only to a minority, and other early evidence is generally lacking. By a kind of *sorites* argument one can ask why one should regard the *Hipparchus* as spurious, but not the similarly structured *Minos*; why one should regard the *Minos* as spurious, but not *Clitophon*, which seems also to introduce a long political dialogue; why one should doubt these three short dialogues and not doubt others of similar length. Avoiding such questions, some, including many Straussians and Altman (2010, 2012), express confidence that *all* dialogues in the Thrasyllan corpus are genuine, regardless of problematic linguistic, historical, or philosophic features. Others regard Thrasyllus' testimony as worthless, making a presumption neither of authenticity nor of spuriousness. Some established scholars have been prepared to declare works authentic or spurious on the basis of their personal familiarity with Plato, trusting in their excellent judgment. The danger of this approach is revealed in their ability to disagree radically, and the result is a tendency for the portrait of Socrates in affected dialogues to be unnecessarily neglected.

Rather than declare that a given work is authentic or spurious, I prefer to say how I feel about certain passages. On reading the introduction to the *Alcibiades*, in which Socrates attempts the philosophical seduction of Alcibiades, I find myself responding exactly as I would to genuine Plato, and I find nothing alien in the central section that appeals to the sentiments of the queens of Sparta and Persia. However, I feel little confidence that Plato was responsible for writing up the arguments of the dialogue, which are often regarded as lightweight, and perhaps even as betraying an important misunderstanding of Plato.⁸ In many ways I would like to discard some sections of the dialogue while retaining others, a tactic that was once tried by Pamela Huby (Clark 1955)—though not of course regarding the same sections as spurious as I was inclined to. What was completely unexpected is that, when I tried

7 These are mostly longer works, such as *Republic*, *Timaeus*, and *Philebus*; I do not include one that is usually taken as an obvious exception, *Hippias Minor*, because it is most unusual for Aristotle to make reference to the Platonic works of lesser importance, because *Metaphysics* Δ (the “philosophical lexicon”) could easily have had entries added by later Peripatetics, and because the reference occurs at the end of an entry and sounds like a gloss that introduces polemical material in an inappropriate context. In short, I doubt that Aristotle wrote the relevant lines (1025a6–13).

8 See Kurihara 2012. For discussion of Socrates' awareness of his ignorance see Benson 2000, 167–188; Fine 2008.

applying authorship tests similar to those applied by colleagues in English and based on recurrent non-technical vocabulary,⁹ I discovered that these doubtful dialogues showed much greater similarity to authentic Plato in some parts than in others.¹⁰ Most of them also showed significant common trends in their less Platonic parts. Might there actually be a group of dialogues that is somehow partly reflective of Platonic style and partly dependent on his successors? The idea seemed strange,¹¹ but it needed to be thought through, in part because it had significant implications for our evaluation of Socrates and our picture of the growth of the mythology surrounding Socrates.¹² One dialogue that has often been suspected, the *Hippias Major*, actually presents two competing views of Socrates, one seemingly genteel, the other impatient and aggressively critical. However, this work displays no obvious stylistic signs of a second hand and is usually accepted as Plato's today. More important will be a group of disputed dialogues occupying the same region of the corpus, from the first dialogue of the fourth tetralogy to the first of the fifth. These make much of Socrates' claim to be a philosophic lover or love-expert, themes that are raised only in a more subdued and problematic fashion in the undisputed dialogues.¹³ Any dialogue that cannot confidently be attributed to *somebody* who knew Socrates at first hand cannot be used with comparable confidence as evidence for Socrates, precisely because those who did not know Socrates were likely to depend on dialogues already written or established Socratic stories for their portraits. Perhaps we could be more confident

9 See on this Tarrant and Roberts 2012. Stylistic testing had hitherto proved inconclusive: see Denyer 2001, 17–20.

10 This might have been anticipated from the well known fact that the *Alcibiades* uses some vocabulary typical of what we think of as the “early” dialogues, and other forms considered as “late”; as Denyer 2001, 22, is able to say of the second dialectical section, “This passage contains both of the dialogue's occurrences of the ‘middle’ δῖλον, and all of its five occurrences of the ‘late’ τί μῆν;”.

11 It is true that Thesleff 1982 has argued at great length and with some conviction that several dialogues have been reworked before they have reached their final versions, but this theory was applied largely to the longer dialogues. I have followed him in respect of the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus*: see Tarrant 2010, 2012, 2013b.

12 Two aspects of the “Socrates” of the Neoplatonists, his role as an agent of divine providence in the education of the youth, and his exemplification of philosophic love as a tool in saving young men, have much to do with this group of dialogues, particularly the *Alcibiades*. See further Layne and Tarrant 2014, Renaud and Tarrant 2015.

13 The works concerned are *Alcibiades*, *Alcibiades II*, *Hipparchus*, *Erastae*, *Theages*; note that the love-interest in the *Hipparchus* is confined to the historical digression; on similar themes in authentic dialogues see Blyth 2012.

if we were able to offer approximate dates for works whose authorship is disputed, yet in spite of good work that has been done between the researches of Müller (1975) and the recent edition of Aronadio (2008), firm dates remain elusive.

2 The Notion of Authenticity

First, it may be useful to examine our preconceptions about the distinction between genuine and spurious dialogues. In modern times literature is expected to result from the controlling vision of a single individual. Scientific papers may be multi-authored, and credit shared, but it is usually presumed that a creative work is conceived, sketched, executed, and ultimately published by a single author. In Plato's time, "publication" cannot have meant what it means today, and in particular an author did not earn his livelihood by collecting royalties. The majority who encountered a work would have done so through attending a reading, given either by the author or somebody otherwise qualified to present it. We do not know whether all Plato's works were intended for "publication," though we do know that some became known during his lifetime, usually higher-profile works, often with some political relevance.¹⁴ It is conceivable that many others were intended rather for use within Plato's school, and that others served more like entertainment.¹⁵

14 It would make good sense that Isocrates *Helen* 1 should be referring to Plato's *Protagoras* in particular, as well as Antisthenes' *Sathon*; and Gell. *NA* 14.31.4 refers to the alleged responses of Plato and Xenophon to one another's political works, particularly Xenophon's response to "the first two books of [the *Republic*] to go into general circulation"; my position is that in Plato's earlier career, besides the *Apology*, dialogues in narrative form (including *Charmides* and *Republic*) are mostly likely to have been circulated publicly since the narrator can assist the less experienced reader to appreciate the nuances.

15 The entertainment factor must, I believe, be taken into consideration by anybody acknowledging the "performance" aspect of dialogues, Platonic and otherwise; this theme has recently been explored by Charalabopoulos 2012; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 711b–c gives a lively picture of how the dramatic reading of Plato's dialogues had once flourished at Rome as sympotic entertainment. Charalabopoulos also discusses internal evidence in the Platonic dialogues, especially the *Symposium* at 70–77, and for the voice of Plato combined with the Silenic statue of Socrates, presumably intended to entertain, 175–178. Anybody who would deny that Platonic and by extension other Socratic literature could function as a kind of educated entertainment should reread *Phdr.* 276b1–8 and d1–8, where literature is treated as a source of pleasure (ἡσθήσεται, d4–5) and as play (παιδιά), analogous to ordinary persons' symposia.

Socratic works are particularly unsuited to the modern notion of publication and authorship.¹⁶ We have ample evidence from the introductions to *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, and *Symposium* of a culture of storytelling among those who remembered Socrates with fondness, reminding us that they stand at the cross-roads between an oral and a written culture. Though the introduction to *Theaetetus* shows how the desire to preserve the story in detail leads to its being written down, the *Symposium* shows instead how even Socratic stories were passed orally from one narrator to one or more others, diminishing in accuracy as first-hand knowledge of the events disappears and as memory is stretched. The first-hand account of a banquet given by Aristodemus, who had failed to remember some speeches including apparently his own (*Symp.* 180c), is passed down to Phoenix and to Apollodorus who had not been present (170b1), and from Apollodorus first to one Glaucon and second to the unnamed companion who speaks at 173d–e. Ultimately a written version is passed down to us, probably with no intention of allowing historical accuracy to stand in the way of philosophic objectives, by Plato—who cannot himself have been present and whom we conceive of as its “author.” While there is interesting overlap with a Socratic banquet reported by Xenophon in his own *Symposium*,¹⁷ the Platonic *Symposium* is mostly very different and seems to bear the stamp of Plato’s own style and philosophic expertise. The highly flexible oral storytelling has ultimately passed into its definitive written version. Yet, if we were to believe Plato’s account of the story’s provenance, whose story would it really be? And can we be so sure that its flexibility was lost as soon as Plato committed it to writing? In the *Theaetetus* Euclides has spent time refining his written account of Socrates’ meeting with Theodorus and Theaetetus, some in consultation with Socrates himself. Likewise in the *Panegyricus* (200) Isocrates had made changes to his work after consulting his followers.¹⁸ The flexibility of the oral medium was not surrendered easily by those who resorted to writing.

One reason why this is important is that it is easy to imagine Plato at some stage having shared stories orally with various acquaintances, whether for reasons connected with entertainment or teaching. His auditors would at that stage have had a greater facility for remembering tales than we do, and Platonic stories might conceivably have endured without any written witness. Certain

16 On the pragmatics of publication in the fourth century and the evidence concerning Plato’s introduction of his works to others, see Charalabopoulos 2012, 129–154.

17 The overlap perhaps testifies to the prior existence of some common pool of stories that somehow spawned both works, however much original material they may also contain.

18 Collins 2012 draws attention to this passage of Plato’s contemporary educator, and such revision after consultation may be normal practice.

parts of the story might have been more difficult to remember, such as details of complicated arguments or polished set speeches, requiring that the story-teller should, like Apollodorus, be “not unpracticed” (οὐκ ἀμελέτητος, *Symp.* 172a1). What better reason for ensuring that the necessary steps are written down and able to be reproduced reliably in oral performance? Suppose that these oral performances are given the partial support of written material, now written discursively, now merely in note form. Academics today often do precisely this when they give lectures, and, when an academic’s study is finally cleared, bundles of such lecture notes might provide, as the main dialogue of the *Theaetetus* is supposed to do, a *partial written record* of his or her performances in the lecture-theatre, even though they had never dictated it. Over time the lecture based upon the same set of notes could be given in very different forms depending upon the interaction of lecturer and audience.

What Plato left behind him at his death is a matter of speculation, but to deny outright that he left any incomplete written passages, whether connected with oral performance in this way or discarded passages from works that ultimately did not require them, would seem just as speculative. One thing, however, seems certain: any substantial passages left behind by Plato at his death would somehow have been salvaged by his followers if they had been able to do so. Filling any gaps might have been easier if what survived was connected with oral performances that some could still remember or had made some record of,¹⁹ but a little ingenuity might have provided a new context for any valued passage. Somehow, as we are now more aware since the publication of the new *Oxford Classical Text* (vol. 1), material that does not belong in the final version of *Cratylus* has nevertheless survived within the text, perhaps as a result of the reinsertion of what survived only in the margin.²⁰ Yet superseded material may have been placed in margins from an early belief that nothing from Plato’s hand should be lost. An alternative proem to *Theaetetus* was known to the anonymous papyrus commentator on that work (col. III), but was not deemed attractive and has not survived. The six-book version of Plato’s *Republic* known to the anonymous Antiatticista may have had a number of

19 It is not only Socrates whose conversations were recorded by others. Philodemus (*Acad.* x 43–44, xxii 37–xxiii 6, and o 32–35) speaks of several lesser Academics who wrote up the educational discussions of Arcesilaus, Telecles and Carneades. The word used is ἀναγράφειν, and Philip of Opus appears to be referred to as Plato’s ἀναγραφεὺς at *Acad.* iii 38–39: γεγονὼς ἀναγραφεὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἀκουστής. Hence even Plato could have had his work written up by others.

20 See Duke 1995 at 385b–d and 437d–438b; the material is well discussed by Sedley 2003, 7–13.

comparatively unusual terms that are not to be found in our text, and may also have omitted some material that is covered by our text (see Tarrant 2012). It may also be that this author's text of the *Gorgias* was rather different from our own (see Tarrant 2012, 57–58). In my view the absence of surviving alternative versions (*Meno* excepted)²¹ is not determined by any Platonic aversion to revisions,²² but by the Academy's success in promoting Plato's final intentions or something very close to that.

3 The Language of the Socratic *Dubia*

I should not have been thinking along quite the same lines had I not observed that both the *Alcibiades* and the *Theages* employ approximately the same working vocabulary, including similar frequencies of many common words,²³ as is found in early Plato, while other parts employ a rather different linguistic mix, and one which is plausibly regarded as later (whether in or after Plato's lifetime). The initial results achieved by considering separately that part of the *Alcibiades* that Olympiodorus regards as protreptic in nature (119a–124b) and by splitting the *Theages* into two equal halves were already described in an appendix to a volume focused on the former dialogue.²⁴ However, I later had cause to carry out multivariate cluster analysis, designed to separate blocks of text into families and sub-families whose working vocabulary was broadly similar, based on much smaller blocks of text,²⁵ involving the Socratic *dubia* and a similar amount of early material that was considered authentic, plus the

21 One work from the *spuria*, *On Virtue*, makes blatant use of the material on the teaching of virtue from *Meno*, but I do not argue that Plato himself was responsible for it; oddly (in view of the amount of direct borrowing) linguistic differences from *Meno* are sufficient to suggest that it is not genuine.

22 Such as was claimed for Plotinus by Porphyry (*Plot.* 8).

23 All words came from the commonest two hundred words among the dialogues analyzed; only “function-words” were employed, i.e., those that serve to bind the subject-specific words, and would naturally occur in any work of the same genre, whatever the subject. In practice this meant mainly articles, indefinites, interrogatives, particles, prepositions, demonstratives, adverbs, and pronouns; usually a very few common verbs were included, but never nouns. All inflections of the same verb, noun, adjective or pronoun were regarded as the same word, as I take to have been the case in Plato's *Cratylus*. Adverbs formed regularly from an adjective were also treated as inflections of the adjective.

24 Tarrant and Roberts 2012; see also Tarrant 2013a.

25 I have used a program that separates texts into blocks of a given number of words, with any remainder being added to the last complete block. I work usually with 2000-word blocks,

Hippias Minor since part of it had previously yielded results rather closer stylistically to the *dubia* than expected. I narrowed the number of variables, that is, the individual words included in the analysis, down from around a hundred to just twenty seven that appeared to have most discriminatory power, and I then excluded the affirmative response “yes” (ναί) whose amazing frequency in the *Hippias Minor*²⁶ we suspected of having had the greatest effect on its earlier unexpected result. I asked for the material, 103 blocks of text in all, to be separated into four clusters (or family groups related by similarities) according to Ward’s method of analysis, which is often used in literary and linguistic computing.²⁷ This was the result:

TABLE 1 *Distribution of 500-word blocks of selected dialogues*

Dialogue	No. blocks	Clus1	Clus3	Clus2	Clus4
<i>Alc.</i>	20	5	2	12	1
<i>Alc. II</i>	8	3	0	1	4
<i>Hprch.</i>	4	3	0	0	1
<i>Erast.</i>	4	4	0	0	0
<i>Theag.</i>	6	1	3	2	0

but when small pieces of text are to be excised and treated separately a smaller block-size, such as 500 words, is preferable. The program automatically calculates the percentages in each block of text of all words asked for, usually in the commonest two hundred, and the results are then copied to a spreadsheet. Next, all words that are determined by subject-matter are eliminated, leaving only those that could theoretically be found at similar frequencies in any work from the same author and in the same genre. After initial vetting the results are then copied into a statistics program, either Minitab or SPSS. These programs run multivariate analyses. The use of these programs is relatively easy compared with the complexities of the calculations that the processes involve, but skill in the interpretation of results only comes with experience.

26 It has occurred to me that this dialogue may originally have been written without the inclusion of the simple interlocutor's responses, and then fleshed out in too simple a fashion when the Academy produced a more standardized edition as part of Plato's collected works.

27 On Cluster Analysis in general see Everitt et al. 2011, especially 88–92. Several methods of calculating the clusters are available; I understand that Ward's is the preferred method of the University of Newcastle's Centre for Literary and Linguistic computing, and it has previously been used in Plato studies by Brandwood 1990, 238–242. For Ward's method, see Ward 1963.

Dialogue	No. blocks	Clus1	Clus3	Clus2	Clus4
<i>Minos</i>	5	3	1	1	0
<i>Apol.</i>	17	14	3	0	0
<i>Chrm.</i>	16	9	2	1	4
<i>La.</i>	15	9	5	0	1
<i>HpMi.</i>	8	7	0	0	1
Total	103	58	16	17	12
Genuine	48	32	10	1	5
Suspect	47	19	6	16	6
<i>HpMi.</i>	8	7	0	0	1

Cluster 1 attracted over half the blocks of all genuine dialogues, and also of *Hipparchus* and *Erastae*. However, three fifths of the blocks of *Alcibiades* were placed in cluster 2, half the blocks of *Alcibiades II* were placed in cluster 4, and half the blocks of *Theages* were placed in cluster 3, the closest to cluster 1 according to this analysis.²⁸ Cluster 2, the one remotest from cluster 1, contained 16 blocks from the *dubia*, but only one block from a dialogue agreed to be genuine. Though dominated by the *Alcibiades*, this cluster also attracted blocks from *Alcibiades II*, *Theages*, and *Minos*. All dialogues were represented in cluster 1, so that there was no dialogue so bereft of Platonic style that it would not look genuine in parts, whereas doubtful dialogues were far more likely to have a presence in cluster 2, or failing that, in the loosely related cluster 4. From the *Alcibiades* it was blocks 1–2, 7, 11, and 19 that were placed in cluster 1.²⁹

28 For those interested in technicalities, the following separation between cluster centroids (as opposed to any given members of the cluster) was noted:

Separation from:	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Cluster 1	0	4.50	2.89	3.52
Cluster 2	4.50	0	6.18	3.99
Cluster 3	2.89	6.18	0	5.20
Cluster 4	3.52	3.99	5.20	0

29 Blocks 1–2 = words 1–1000 (–106c9), block 7 = words 3001–3500 (112e10–114c1), block 11 = words 5001–5500 (119a3–120d6), block 19 = words 9001–9500 (131e10–133c8); it will not

Blocks 12–13 (words 5501–6500, 120d6 to 123d5) were also placed in cluster 3, relatively close to cluster 1.

I have some reservations about using only one block-size,³⁰ and accordingly looked at the equivalent details for 700-word blocks, with a result as follows:

TABLE 2 *Distribution of 700-word blocks of selected dialogues*

Dialogue	No. blocks	Clus1	Clus2	Clus3	Clus4
<i>Alc.</i>	14	4	8	1	1
<i>Alc. II</i>	5	2	2	0	1
<i>Hprch.</i>	3	1	0	1	1
<i>Erast.</i>	3	1	0	2	0
<i>Theag.</i>	4	3	1	0	0
<i>Minos</i>	4	1	0	3	0
<i>Apol.</i>	12	11	0	0	1
<i>Chrm.</i>	11	4	0	2	5
<i>La.</i>	10	7	0	1	2
<i>HpMi.</i>	5	2	0	2	0
Total	71	36	11	13	11
Genuine	33	22	0	3	8
Suspect	33	12	11	7	3
<i>HpMi.</i>	5	2	0	3	0

Again, all dialogues were represented in cluster 1, and now *only* doubtful dialogues appeared in cluster two. However, cluster 3 came to look particularly interesting, since *Erastae*, *Minos*, and *Hippias Minor* were curiously well represented here, while one of just three blocks of *Hipparchus* was also present.³¹

escape readers that this last passage is the one that seems to add most to the Platonic corpus, with its notions of self-care and of the supreme part of the soul as the true “self.” It is therefore perhaps the one that is argued over most, with the exception of the theological corollary to this same passage at 133c8–17 known exclusively from Christian secondary sources.

30 Changes of style may be obscured if they are spread from the middle of one block to the middle of the next, and a different block-size will shift the boundaries, potentially helping the differences to stand out.

31 Cluster three centroid, though well separated from cluster 2, was closer to it than other centroids:

In the *Alcibiades* it was blocks 1, 5, 8, and 9 that had been placed in cluster 1.³² So both these tests were giving a more normal Platonic appearance to (1) the introduction (to around 106a), (2) some of the material between 112b and 114c (of which I note that 113b8–114c3 involves some more discursive contributions), and (3) the protreptic digression.

It was especially noticeable that cluster 2 consisted primarily of *Alcibiades*-dialogues, and the questions therefore arose whether there was anything special about such dialogues. For instance, if they belonged to particular sub-genre that might explain the need for a somewhat different mix of vocabulary. Accordingly I repeated both tests with the addition of longer quotations from Aeschines' *Alcibiades*. I employed all direct quotation in SSR VI A 50 for one file of just over five hundred words; and I combined VI A 48 with the direct quotations in VI A 53 to yield another file of just under half that size. If both files yielded similar results then I would expect that to give us a good indication of whether the style was closer to most undisputedly Platonic works employing Socrates, closer to the other *Alcibiades*-dialogues, closer to some other cluster, or simply *sui generis* as the work of a different author might well prove to be. Both tests placed both blocks of Aeschines' *Alcibiades* in cluster 1 with the bulk of Plato.³³ Hence on the criteria employed, the working vocabulary of Aeschines seemed a great deal closer to undisputed Plato (of the putative "early" period) than to the *Alcibiades*-dialogues of the Platonic corpus. Aeschines and Plato, one imagines, would have been directly influenced by the language of Socrates himself, but could it be that the *Alcibiades*-dialogues were later and less directly influenced by late fifth-century conversation?

Distance from:	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Cluster 1	0	6.13	3.56	3.82
Cluster 2	6.13	0	4.20	4.72
Cluster 3	3.56	4.20	0	3.69
Cluster 4	3.82	4.72	3.69	0

32 i.e. words 1–700 (up to 105d5), 2801–3500 (112b2–114c1), and 4901–6300 (118d6–123a6).

33 Almost certainly, if dialogues like the *Apology* and *Charmides* could be separately tested against a much larger sample of Aeschines one could identify a similar sub-set of words that would have some value in discriminating these two authors. I would, however, expect that Aeschines would, like Xenophon, seem closer to works of Plato that paint a realistic portrait of Socrates than those dialogues are to Plato's hiatus-avoiding style.

While the results for Aeschines cannot be used to show that other known Socratic writers from among Socrates' companions cannot be responsible for the *dubia* in the Platonic corpus, one must stress that both sides of the authorship debate concerning the *Alcibiades* note its many important connections with other dialogues of the Platonic corpus,³⁴ making it unlikely that it originated outside the environment of the Academy, while the *Alcibiades II* is generally treated as indebted to the *Alcibiades*. *Theages* likewise quotes the *Apology* directly, at 127e–128a and at 128d, while *Clitophon* appears somehow related to *Republic* book I. So it seems that they are not found in the Platonic corpus by accident, but because of some actual connection with Plato's school. Accordingly most of the literature on authorship has centered on the Academy, whether during or after Plato's lifetime.

With this in mind and on the basis of the stylistic testing described, two main possibilities now suggested themselves for further research. First, it might simply be that the *dubia* are post-Platonic, and that later generations found the rapid question-and-answer passages of many of Plato's dialogues fundamentally more difficult to imitate than discursive passages. The second is that Plato himself had left a full written version of some passages, usually discursive ones, but had left at best sketches of other parts, which therefore needed to be fleshed out if there was to be any publishable whole. Provision might have been made for their completion either late in Plato's life, by his helpers, when the master had resigned himself to leaving a more extensive written legacy than originally planned, or after his death when pupils themselves wanted to make sure that as much as possible was left to posterity.

The former theory required that other doubtful dialogues should also seem more Platonic in the discursive parts than in rapid question-and-answer exchanges. In addition to the *Alcibiades*, it so happened that *Alcibiades II* (two sections), *Hipparchus*, *Theages*, and *Minos* all had both simple dialogic exchanges and longer speeches. It also happened that when these were separated and analyzed alongside their dialogic contexts and a variety of dialogues usually thought to be Platonic and early, it was very noticeable that the difference between monologic and dialogic material in the *dubia* was greater than that between the early dialogic part of the *Crito* and the later part beginning with Socrates' monologue, or between dialogic parts of *Ion* and Socrates' two "magnet" speeches. In factor analysis employing 112 words, the differences were

34 See Denyer 2001, 15–16. It is important that the work is not using these Platonic connections in order to offer a fundamentally different view, as is generally the case where Xenophon appears to allude to Platonic dialogues.

instantly apparent on factor 1, the most important complex of discriminatory influences across the group as a whole.³⁵ Accordingly I give here the difference between dialogic and monologic parts of the same dialogues as calculated by factor 1:

TABLE 3 *Factor 1 differences between the dialogic and monologic parts of seven dialogues*

Dialogue	Difference	Dialogic	Monologic
<i>Hipparchus</i>	3.08	1.18	-1.90
<i>Alc.</i>	2.70	1.35	-1.35
<i>Alc. II</i>	2.18	0.12	-2.06
<i>Theages</i>	1.86	0.35	-1.51
<i>Minos</i>	1.53	0.47	-1.05
<i>Ion</i>	0.80	0.03	-0.77
<i>Crito</i>	0.36	-0.75	-1.11

The distinct impression is that the calculated difference between dialogic and monologic parts of undisputed dialogues, though varying a little (and always in such a way that the figure for dialogic speech was greater than that for monologues), was much less pronounced than the difference between these parts of the five relevant doubtful dialogues. Furthermore, I was conscious that some of the material left in the “dialogic” sections of most of the *dubia* still included speeches of up to a page of the Oxford Classical Texts, with the *Hipparchus* being the only doubtful dialogue where the distinction between dialogic and monologic parts could be sharply drawn. Only one part of an undisputed dialogue exceeded the positive values of the dialogic parts of *Alcibiades* and *Hipparchus*, and that was the examination of the slave in the *Meno* (2.50), where Socratic conversation has given way to the language of simple mathematical

35 Factor analysis does not content itself with assessing similarities, but calculates a specified number of different factors, or ways in which the differences within the total group are manifested; many variables will make a substantial contribution to the calculation of each of these differences. For instance, if authors A and B are being tested, and they differ in so far as A generally chooses “since” and B “because,” while A chooses “But” and B “However,” all these four terms are likely to feature prominently in the list of discriminatory variables on the first factor, assuming that the authorship rather than, for example, genre or date accounts for the greatest measurable difference across the group as a whole.

proofs. At the other extreme the initial blocks of *Laches* and *Hippias Major* (both of which include some fairly long contributions, preceding the argument proper) had the greatest negative values among the genuine dialogues analyzed, -1.16 and -1.18, while even the *Clitophon* only registered -1.08. Of 42 blocks included in the analysis, usually of 2000 or more words, 13 were from the *dubia* and 27 from fairly uncontroversial dialogues.³⁶ Yet while of the *dubia* ten blocks (76%) exceeded ± 0.9 , only four blocks (15%) of the “genuine” group did so. The *dubia* were more deliberately adopting a different linguistic register for monologues. In that sense they were more “many-voiced.” What does that tell us?

4 Socratic Voices

At *Apology* 17b9–d1 Socrates famously declares his intention to speak in his customary conversational manner. The court context will not make him resort to the rhetorical embellishments with which the Athenians were familiar—particularly from seasoned public speakers. Though we occasionally feel that there is a little mockery of standard court maneuvers in this work, it is more difficult to claim that the *language* becomes rhetorical. Obviously, aside from the short examination of Meletus, the work is monologic, but this does not stop it from sounding rather like an extended chat with the jury. My stylistic tests can distinguish the monologic diction, largely by the absence of such words as are required for assent or dissent, and the relative infrequency of words that are common in questions and in framing responses.³⁷ All these can be omitted from the analysis as required, and when this is done the diction of the

36 Note that there were four dialogic blocks of *Alcibiades*, and I have not included the single-block *Clitophon* in the figures for either group. Works of Plato included in the analysis included *Charmides*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Hippias Major*, *Ion*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, and *Meno*.

37 A glance at the 67 words given to Meletus will show what is meant. The word $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ occurs in four positive responses, $\xi\gamma\omega\gamma\epsilon$ occurs in two, and $\gamma\epsilon$ in two; $\circ\acute{\upsilon}(\chi)$ is required four times in negative responses, and $\mu\acute{\alpha}$ $\Delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ twice; that means that six words account for 24% of Meletus' vocabulary; less emphatically, Socrates addresses Meletus 19 times using ω from 24c10 to 27b8, so that about one quarter of the occurrences of this word in the *Apology* occur here in less than three of the twenty-five Stephanus pages. While special requirements might cause any one of these words to be used very frequently in a monologic passage, where their rates all rise simultaneously the passage concerned will almost certainly be dialogic—and this is the whole point of multivariate analysis, that it detects where a number of variables (in our case words) rise or fall in frequency *together*, indicating changes of significance (in our case changes in diction).

Apology does not look so different from that of Socrates in other putatively early dialogues of Plato. Elsewhere among these dialogues we have seen how little the rather monologic pages of the *Crito* (after 50a) differ from what precedes, and this, I believe, can be attributed to the fact that the conversational tone is never dropped. The Laws of Athens converse with Socrates within the monologue, and it would be inappropriate for Socrates to break into rhetorical discourse when addressing his close friend Crito. There are some instances in other dialogues, usually those with rival educators as interlocutors, where Socrates has to abandon his usual preference for brachylogy (brief-speaking), but it is only the opponents who resort to something like an oration in the hope of impressing rather than convincing.³⁸ It is noteworthy that in the *Symposium* Plato avoids presenting a rhetorical contribution from Socrates by having him give an extended story about his education with Diotima. He makes explicit his preference for avoiding a formal encomium, and resorting to ordinary conversational language (199a–b).

The account of Diotima's teaching will not be entirely typical of Socrates' language, for he takes on the role of interlocutor, a woman is in theory the protagonist, and the language can have mythic (203b–e) or visionary (210a–212b) qualities. So linguistic analysis is inclined to place the Diotima episode closest to *Menexenus* (where the voice of Aspasia is notionally the voice that one hears) while the Poros and Penia story follows the same trend as Socrates' myths elsewhere in Plato (see Johnson and Tarrant 2014). Socrates' myth-telling voice, perhaps first encountered in the *Gorgias* (493a–c, 523a–527a), regularly involves a much higher rate of the definite article and of prepositions, and a lower rate of negatives (see Tarrant, Benitez, and Roberts 2011). Any passages in which Socrates claims to be inspired by external forces, such as Euthyphro in the *Cratylus* (396a to at least 410e; see Tarrant 2013c) and different inspiring forces in the *Phaedrus* (237b–241d with 241e, 244a–257b), are also liable to stand out as being linguistically different when subjected to cluster analysis. Such passages where Socrates adopts a different voice tend to emerge with what are known as “middle-period” dialogues, being less prominent in the shorter dialogues. Even so, Socrates does not seem to adopt a rhetorical voice for any prolonged period, even though Plato employs such a voice in several speeches in the *Symposium* and for Lysias' speech in the *Phaedrus*.

38 My impression is that Socrates can speak at greater length without being rhetorical in Xenophon's works, including parts of his *Apology of Socrates* and *Symposium* 8, and Aeschines *SSR* VI A 50 and 53 also seems to employ monologue that retained a conversational flavor.

The almost anti-rhetorical Socrates of most undisputed dialogues may be contrasted with his greater readiness to sound rhetorical in the *dubia*. For the present I will focus on *Hipparchus* and *Minos*. Consider the following: “Who is knowledgeable about the value of plants—the season (ῥα) and ground (χώρα) in which it’s best to plant them? [I say this] so that we too may employ some of the clever phrases with which the clever law-court types beautify their speech” (*Hipparch.* 225c). It is odd for Plato’s Socrates to deliberately use such puns, though the author is almost certainly trying to imitate Plato, for in the *Symposium* we meet a similar pun together with a similar explanation: “With the pausing of Pausanias—it’s phrases like that, you see, that the wise teach me to use” (*Symp.* 185a4). The difference is that this last passage comes from the narrator Apollodorus, not from Socrates. My claim is that the *Hipparchus* probably comes from a time when philosophic discussion has become more conscious of rhetorical issues, and in particular of types of speech, but less conscious of (or less committed to) language appropriate for Socrates.³⁹ In fact the general indifference of the author to issues of character is revealed in the fact that we are told nothing but the age of the unnamed interlocutor, who is barely characterized at all. If this is reminiscent of anything in Plato then it would have to be the “late” *Philebus*, where Socrates is much less vividly characterized and the interlocutors have names that seem to have been determined principally by their roles in the dialogue. It is also something of a surprise to find Socrates adopting such an argumentative stance with an interlocutor who is much younger (225d5–226d1). At 227d4 he calls him “sweetie” (γλυκύτατε), which seems very provocative, given that the young man is polite, while at 231a3 he ironically calls him “bravest of all men,” a reproach for brazenness rather than a compliment for manly virtue—for the term ἀνδρείος was becoming more ambiguous by the end of Plato’s life (see Benitez 2012, 126). Socrates is actually the first to accuse the other of willful deceit (225d5, 228a6–7), before the other reciprocates (228a8–10, 229e1–2). Socrates is also readier than he usually is to speak of what they have managed to “refute,” using the strong verb ἐξέλεγχεν (226e4). He invites his opponent to take his move back, as if playing checkers (229e), as if dialectic were simply a competitive activity. Overall Socrates in this work is more aggressive and more antagonistic than he usually is with younger persons, and largely devoid of the graces that allow him to press similar messages more subtly elsewhere. Nor does the interlocutor supply any such grace

39 Even so, Antisthenes was quite capable of being rhetorical in tone when required, and there must have been considerable differences in the ways that various Socratics had chosen to present Socrates.

that we may feel is missing. All the grace and most of the ingenuity are reserved for the digression on Hipparchus, which reduces a foundation-legend of Athenian democracy to an “elegant” tale of how a love’s rivalries resulted in the death of an enlightened ruler. It is rather as if the dialogue had been intended primarily as a vehicle for this one passage (228b–229d).

The features to which I have drawn attention lead D.S. Hutchinson to claim that “from the formal point of view, *Hipparchus* is composed of dry Academic dialectic together with a literary-historical excursus on Hipparchus,”⁴⁰ yet Hutchinson uses the same language to describe *Minos* later. I would agree to the extent that I find the dialogic exchanges in both works somewhat mechanical and colorless. The *Minos*, another dialogue whose first line is a Socratic request for a definition of a topic in moral philosophy, actually reveals even less about its interlocutor. While it is possible that a narrative setting would have given the dialogue rather more dramatic force if the author had cared to supply one, without that setting (such as lightens the tone of *Erastae* and dramatizes it even in the absence of the names of speakers), the *Minos* too lacks the very qualities that set apart Plato and Aeschines, for instance, from most subsequent philosophic writers. Both are dialogues of definition, asking for a definition of profit and of law, but in Plato at least such dialogues normally discuss some quality or art that the interlocutor has a claim to possess. Yet the interlocutor of *Hipparchus* would deny that he was a profiteer (227b), and the respondent of *Minos* has no special claim to be lawful. The discussion of law is a little less aggressive than that of profit, but even so one still wonders whether the revisionist digression concerning Minos, and on his sophistic education in *logoi* at Zeus’ side (319c–e), is not the principal point of the work. Most of the charm and cleverness within the dialogue is to be found here. So what status does the excursus have in dialogues of this type?

5 A Sympotic Background?

In situations like this, it may be the case that dialogues like the *Hipparchus* and *Minos* have actually been built around a Platonic core, that core being the revisionist positions that might, if taken seriously, salvage the reputations of Hipparchus and Minos respectively, particularly their credentials as educators. There are a few difficulties for such a position, for the statistics showed that the language of the monologic section of *Hipparchus* was far removed from

40 See Cooper 1997, 609; Hutchinson is Associate Editor. Compare, on *Minos*, 1307.

that of its dialogue, while there are some suspicious items of vocabulary in the digression about Minos.⁴¹ However, if one were to embrace this theory one should acknowledge the likelihood that any Platonic material would have had to undergo revision as it was adapted for a new context. Such material need not always have been written up by Plato himself, for just as there had been others willing to remember and ultimately record sympotic performances by Socrates, so too I imagine some of Plato's devotees would have striven to remember and record Plato's own sympotic performances. It so happens that references to erotic relationships (*Hipparch.* 229c–d) and symposia (*Minos* 320a) within an educational context are appropriate material for sympotic contributions, while we encounter several counter-intuitive theses in Xenophon's *Symposium*,⁴² and find revisionist mythology promoted by both Agathon and Socrates in Plato's *Symposium* (195a–c, 201e–204a). Xenophon's *Symposium* is particularly good evidence for the highly competitive atmosphere of such gatherings, often seen most clearly in the contributions of Antisthenes and Philip, but present in Plato's *Symposium* too.⁴³

Perhaps just as relevant here, Socrates makes a literary-historical speech at *Protagoras* 342a–347a, full of cleverness in promoting counter-intuitive theses relevant to the politics of education. The debate of which this speech constitutes part, while not a symposium, is nevertheless taking place before an audience occupying couches and benches (317d). Protagoras has proposed a topic (338e–339a) to which Socrates must make an effective impromptu contribution. After impressing the audience he immediately launches into an attack on the criticism of poetic thought declaring it to resemble above all those at unsophisticated symposia who listen to flute-girls because they are incapable of entertaining one another through the sound of their own voices (347c–e). Clearly he considers his speech on the rivalry between Simonides and Pittacus to be *of the same kind* as a sympotic contribution. He has correctly read his situation as one in which he must both impress and entertain; he has depicted the Cretans and Spartans (of all people) as the wisest of the Greeks before an intel-

41 Here I think particularly of συνουσιαστής (319e1, e2); the embrace of the terminology of συνουσία (319c5, d4, 320b3) seems to belong to the Academy rather than to Plato, as I have pointed out with regard to the *Theages* in particular: Tarrant 2005.

42 Such as Callias' pride in improving people (3.4, 4.1–3); Antisthenes' pride in his wealth (3.8), with his sympotic speech on the subject (4.34–44); Charmides' pride in his poverty (3.9), and Socrates' pride in his pimping (3.10, cf. 4.56–64). Topics relating to women, wine, and love contribute to the sympotic atmosphere, as does the general combination of παιδιά μετὰ σπουδῆς (cf. Pl. *Symp.* 197e7).

43 See for instance 175e, 180c–d, 185e–186a, 194a, 195a.

lectual audience; he has bent the truth in support of his own moral themes; and he then dismisses the whole thing as a party-piece.

Do stylistic tests support the idea that this monologue has something in common with the monologic digressions in the *dubia*? In order to determine this it would be necessary to see whether these monologues, considered in isolation, differed in similar ways from the rest of the dialogues that provided their context. I carried out both factor analysis (based on thirty-seven common words as variables) as well as cluster analysis. I separated the monologic extracts in the *dubia* from their dialogic surroundings, isolated the Simonides-interpretation and Protagoras' myth as separate blocks, and divided the other parts of the *dubia* concerned, plus the entire *Protagoras*, into 1000-word blocks.⁴⁴ There were thus a total of 38 blocks, 19 from *Protagoras* (17 regular blocks plus the myth and the Simonides passage), 9 from *Alcibiades* (eight regular plus the monologic extract), 5 from *Alcibiades II* (three regular and two separate extracts), 2 from *Hipparchus* (one of each) and 3 from *Minos* (two regular, plus one extract). Factor analysis was immediately revealing. The first factor—that combination of influences that is statistically most significant—placed all monologic extracts including the Simonides passage in the minus range (-0.68 to -2.17), and all other *dubia* material in the range -0.14 to +2.05, either in the plus range or very close to it. Hence there was clear separation of monologic and dialogic material from the *dubia*. Material from the rest of the *Protagoras* was widely scattered (as one might expect of a dialogue with numerous changes in diction) between -1.95 for 324d–327e (Protagoras' own set speech following the myth) and +1.11 for 330d–333d (Socrates refuting Protagoras).⁴⁵ The results of cluster analysis appeared compatible with this, though it was generally less revealing.

While the *Protagoras* proved less predictable in many ways than the *dubia*, the overall impression was that Socrates' exegesis of Simonides' poem stands in the same relation to most other material in its context as the extracts within the *dubia* do in relation to the surrounding dialogue. This confirmed that those who (1) suspect that the *dubia* usually show non-Platonic linguistic trends, yet (2) prefer to connect the monologic digressions of the *dubia* with Plato himself, have the option of appealing to the oral and/or incomplete preservation of Platonic sympotic material. Such material may be readily identified by revisionist or even agonistic theses and by the presence of suitable topics such as

44 Allowing the final block to extend as far as 1999 words if necessary.

45 Yet I note that no blocks of the *Protagoras* were placed as far in the plus range as the more extreme dialogic blocks of *Alcibiades*, *Minos*, and *Hipparchus*.

wine, female impersonation, and song. Just as many anecdotes were preserved about the words of various Socratics, and the substance of longer discourses such as Plato's "Lecture on the Good" could stay in the minds of admirers for quite some time, so one would expect some of Plato's own sympotic contributions to have left their mark on friends and pupils—for his depiction of Socrates at a symposium clearly illustrated his ability to offer intellectual entertainment.

The voices of women and foreigners, and an unusually high regard for their wisdom and education, are present in Socrates' deflating address to Alcibiades at *Alcibiades* 121a–124b, in addition to the erotic interest that continues throughout the work. But the change of tone had actually occurred as early as 119a8, which Olympiodorus sees as the start of the "protreptic" section of the work. There is a hint of comedy in the reference to "Meidias the quail-striker" at 120a9, and a foretaste of female voices at 120b2–3. This should remind us that "sympotic" speeches are often prepared for by some dialogic material, like Socrates' cross-examination of Agathon in the *Symposium* (199c–201c), which precedes the long narrative in which Diotima's female voice prevails, or like Socrates' dialogic defense of his opinion on Simonides at 339e–342a, preceding his contentious and self-indulgent monologue. It is entirely possible that Plato's followers preserved something of the context of his sympotic monologues as well as those monologues themselves, and that these contexts involved a little dialogic argument too. But the memorization of speeches was surely a more familiar part of fourth-century Athenian culture than the precise and detailed memorization of prose dialogue.

I have only argued this case in any detail for *Hipparchus* and *Minos*, but together with Elizabeth Baynham I have briefly explored the idea of a sympotic background to the *Alcibiades* also (Baynham and Tarrant 2012). One can imagine that, at least since the writing of Plato's *Symposium*, and quite possibly before Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates* that is criticized by Isocrates at *Busiris* 5, the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades had been conceived of as highly suitable sympotic material. The *Alcibiades II* is a problematic case, and I doubt that much of it can be properly understood without reference to the career of Alexander the Great, but the second passage appeals to Spartan wisdom (148c–149b) and to a foreign oracle (149e–150a), and draws an analogy between the Trojan experience of grand religious practices and the Athenians' (149d–e)—tactics that would have seemed destined to shock an Athenian public by defending a thesis offensive to traditional Athenian piety. If this passage has sympotic origins, as I suspect, then I am still not convinced that it has much to do with Plato. This should act as a warning. Though certain of the *dubia* have affinities in language and design, there is no need to postulate a single theory of

their origins. As for the *Theages* I suggest elsewhere that the monologic material at the end of the dialogue, after drawing surprisingly directly on the *Apology* at 127e–128a and 128d, goes on to make use of material discarded from the original ending of the *Theaetetus*; but this thesis is beyond the present discussion (Tarrant 2013d).

6 Conclusion

I should like to conclude on a cautionary note. Though I have seen fit to explore these possibilities with the reader, and particularly with the reader who may feel that the presence of a dialogue within the corpus does suggest that it is closely related to Plato's own endeavors, I prefer to adopt an agnostic approach to such matters. In particular I want to emphasize the gulf between the relatively precise quantitative data that lie behind the linguistic statistics and any theories of authorship, genre, or chronology that such data lead to. But supposing that I were right? Supposing there is a Platonic kernel within some of these works that goes back to the master himself, would that make us able to rely on Plato's message having been the same as the message that seems to be conveyed by the dialogue as it has come down to us? In my view it would do no such thing, because the rescue of otherwise unwritten or unpublished Platonic material by admirers would almost inevitably mean that its context was not appreciated and in particular that any ironies (which would almost certainly be present) would be lost. If we had a short dialogue that had been written mainly in order to give a home to *Protagoras* 342a–348a it might easily give the impression that Socrates was being quite serious about views that had in fact been placed in a context that demonstrates how contentious he could be. In other words, it would mislead us not only about Plato's tactics in this playful passage but about Socrates' tactics in adopting such themes too.

Furthermore, whenever somebody with any literary sensitivity seeks to place written or oral material in a different context, that person has to be open to modifying the material in certain ways. The original may have contained passages that depended on its previous setting in order to be understood at all, let alone to be understood correctly. It may have had references to contemporary events that have been forgotten, and some kind of substitution may be required. Even if some of the monologic material in these dialogues does appear to be more plausibly Platonic linguistically, that can only be judged over passages of several hundred words, and it does not mean that everything within it, both all the language and all the content, can safely be attributed to Plato. The content includes, but is not of course limited to,

a representation of Socrates and a voice that Socrates adopts. The Socratic legend developed quickly, and every subsequent generation would have tended to see Socrates through different eyes. As for Socrates’ various voices they would have developed as the written tradition developed. The picture of Socrates in each of these dialogues is of interest, but it is of interest because it adds to our picture of how Socrates could be perceived, not of how Socrates actually was.⁴⁶

Appendix 1

A *Blocks Appearing in Clusters of a Broadly Platonic Appearance*

Dialogue	No. of words	Blocks	Reference	Character
<i>Alcibiades II</i>	500	3, 7, 8	141c3–143a7, from 147d3	mostly monologue
<i>Alcibiades II</i>	700	2–3, 5	140c6–145a1, from 147b2	not very dialogic
<i>Hipparchus</i>	500	1–3	all to 230b4	dialogic, then monologue
<i>Hipparchus</i>	700	1–2	all to 230a2	dialogic, then monologue
<i>Erastae</i>	500	1–4	All	dialogic, set in narrative
<i>Erastae</i>	700	2	134a9–136b3	dialogic, set in narrative
<i>Theages</i>	500	1, 4–6	to 122d5, from 126d13	mostly longer speeches
<i>Theages</i>	700	1, 3–4	to 123b3, from 125c6	mostly longer speeches
<i>Minos</i>	500	2–5	from 314e3	dialogic, then monologue
<i>Minos</i>	700	4	from 319d2	mainly monologue
<i>Hippias Mi.</i>	500	1–2, 4–8	to 366c7, from 368a7	mainly dialogic
<i>Hippias Mi.</i>	700	1, 4	to 365d3, 370a2–372e3	mainly dialogic

46 This paper was an offshoot of projects funded by the Australian Research Council (DP120102425: “Plato’s Myth Voice,” and DP0986334: “Academies under Stress”). Its assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

B *Blocks Appearing in Clusters of More Typically Doubtful Material*

Dialogue	No. of words	Blocks	Reference	Character
<i>Alcibiades II</i>	500	1–2, 4–6	to 141c3, 143a7 to 147d3	dialogic
<i>Alcibiades II</i>	700	1, 4	to 140c6, 145a1–147b2	fairly dialogic
<i>Hipparchus</i>	500	4	from 230b4	dialogic
<i>Hipparchus</i>	700	3	from 230a2	dialogic
<i>Erastae</i>	700	1, 3	to 134a9, from 136b3	dialogic, set in narrative
<i>Theages</i>	500	2–3	122d5 to 125d13	dialogic
<i>Theages</i>	700	2	123b3 to 125c6	dialogic
<i>Minos</i>	500	1	to 314e3	dialogic
<i>Minos</i>	700	1–3	to 319d2	mostly dialogic
<i>Hippias Mi.</i>	500	3	366c7 to 368a7	mainly dialogic
<i>Hippias Mi.</i>	700	2–3, 5	365d3–370a2, from 372e3	mainly dialogic

References

- Altman, W.H.F. 'The reading order of Plato's dialogues', *Phoenix* 64 (2010), 18–51.
- Altman, W.H.F. *Plato the teacher: the crisis of the Republic*. Plymouth 2012.
- Aronadio, F. *Dialoghi spuri di Platone*. Torino 2008.
- Balansard, A. and Koch, I. *Lire les dialogues, mais lesquels et en quel ordre: définitions du corpus et interprétations de Platon*. Sankt Augustin 2013.
- Baynham, E.J. and H. Tarrant, 'Appendix 1: fourth century politics and the date of the *Alcibiades I*', in: Johnson and Tarrant 2012, 215–222.
- Benitez, E.E. 'Authenticity, experiment or development: the *Alcibiades I* on virtue and courage', in: Johnson and Tarrant 2012, 119–133.
- Benson, H. *Socratic wisdom: the model of knowledge in Plato's early dialogues*. Oxford 2000.
- Blyth, D. 'Socrates and Platonic models of love', in: Johnson and Tarrant 2012, 30–44.
- Brandwood, L. *The chronology of Plato's dialogues*. Cambridge 1990.
- Brisson, L. 'Les classifications des dialogues chez Diogène Laërce', in: Balansard and Koch 2013, 43–57.
- Charalabopoulos, N. *Platonic drama and its ancient reception*. Cambridge 2012.
- Clark, P.M. 'The Great *Alcibiades*', *CQ* 5 (1955), 231–240.

- Collins II, J.H. 'Prompts for participation in early philosophical texts', in: E. Minchin, *Orality, literacy and performance in the ancient world*. Leiden 2012, 151–182.
- Cooper, J.M. *Plato: complete works*. Indianapolis 1997.
- Denyer, N. *Plato: Alcibiades*. Cambridge 2001.
- Duke, E. et al. *Platonis Opera* I. Oxford 1995.
- Everitt, B. et al. *Cluster Analysis*. Chichester 2011.
- Fine, G. 'Does Socrates claim to know that he knows nothing?', *OSAPh* 35 (2008), 48–85.
- Johnson, M and H. Tarrant. *Alcibiades and the Socratic lover-educator*. London 2012.
- Johnson, M and H. Tarrant. 'Fairytale and make-believe, or spinning stories about Poros and Penia in Plato's *Symposium*: a literary and computational analysis', *Phoenix* (2014), 291–312.
- Kurihara, Y. 'Socratic ignorance, or the place of the *Alcibiades* I in Plato's early works', in: Johnson and Tarrant 2012, 77–89.
- Layne, D.A. and H. Tarrant. *The Neoplatonic Socrates*. Philadelphia 2014.
- Mansfeld, J. *Prolegomena: questions to be settled before the study of a text, or an author*. Leiden 1994.
- Müller, C.W. *Die Kurzdialoge des Appendix Platonica*. München 1975.
- Renaud, F. and H. Tarrant. *The Platonic Alcibiades 1: the dialogue and its ancient reception*. Cambridge 2015.
- Sedley, D. *Plato's Cratylus*. Cambridge 2003.
- Sedley, D. 'A Thrasyllan interpretation of Plato's *Theaetetus*', *POxy* 73 (2009), 65–71.
- Tarán, L. *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus and the pseudo-Platonic Epinomis*. Philadelphia 1975.
- Tarrant, H. 'The *Theaetetus* as a narrative dialogue?', in: N. O'Sullivan *ASCS* 31 *Proceedings*, 2010: classics.uwa.edu.au/ascs31/Tarrant.pdf.
- Tarrant, H. *Thrasyllan Platonism*. Ithaca 1993.
- Tarrant, H. 'Socratic Synousia?', *JHPh* 43 (2005), 131–155.
- Tarrant, H. 'The origins and shape of Plato's six-book Republic', *Antichthon*, 46 (2012), 52–78.
- Tarrant, H. 'Tetralogies IV and VII: key to the Thrasyllan reading-order', in: Balansard and Koch 2013, 1–24. (= 2013a)
- Tarrant, H. 'Narrative and dramatic presentation in *Republic* III', in: N. Notomi and L. Brisson, *Plato's Republic: selected papers from the ninth Symposium Platonicum*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 309–313. (= 2013b)
- Tarrant, H. 'Socrates' other voices: "Euthyphro" in the *Cratylus*', in: C. Collobert, *Platon et l'art d'écrire*. Paris 2013, 507–523. (= 2013c)
- Tarrant, H. 'L'importance du *Théétète* avant Thrasyllle', in: D. el Murr, *La mesure du savoir: études sur le Théétète de Platon*. Paris 2013, 243–266. (= 2013d)
- Tarrant, H. and T. Roberts, 'Appendix 2: report on the working vocabulary in the doubtful dialogues', in: Johnson and Tarrant 2012, 223–236.

- Tarrant, H., E.E. Benitez and T. Roberts, 'The mythical voice in the *Timaeus-Critias*: stylometric indicators', *AncPhil* 31 (2011), 95–120.
- Thesleff, H. *Studies in Platonic chronology: commentationes humanarum litterarum*. Helsinki 1982.
- Ward Jr., J. 'Hierarchical grouping to optimize an objective function', *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 48 (1963), 236–244.

Notes on *Lovers*

Sandra Peterson

University of Minnesota

The *Lovers* (*Erastai, Anterastai*: “*Rival Lovers*”) has disputed author and date.¹ Diogenes Laertius 3.59 lists the *Anterastai* as the fourth dialogue of the fourth of Thrasyllus’ tetralogies of Plato’s dialogues. Souilh  1930, vii and 107, takes as an external reason to doubt its authenticity Diogenes’ comment in 9.37 that Thrasyllus said, “If indeed (*eiper*) the *Anterastai* is Plato’s, Democritus would be the unnamed person present.”² Souilh  takes *eiper* (“if” or “if indeed”) to imply doubt. If indeed our dictionaries and grammars are correct to assign “if indeed” as a translation of *eiper* into English, the word can occur to confirm, not to doubt, the clause that follows.³ Grote and Mansfeld understand *eiper* so.⁴

The various titles refer to the speakers, not to their topic. Examples of other Socratic works with *erastai* as characters are Plato’s *Lysis*, *Symposium*, and *Gorgias*, and Xenophon’s *Symposium* and *Memorabilia*.

The dialogue intrigues not only for its various accounts of philosophy that one ambitious youth favors, but also for the subtle and sensitive interaction of its Socrates with a young wrestler.

1 132a1–4

I went into Dionysius the grammar teacher’s, and I saw there those of the young (*ne n*) who were reputed best in looks and of the most distinguished fathers, and their lovers (*erastas*).

Socrates narrates, giving no clue of hearer or date.

1 The text is Carlini 1964. *Anterastai* appears as title in the margin of one manuscript. Others have *Erastai*. The former title captures the relation of the two young speakers. The latter respects the author’s choice. In undisputed Plato, the word *anterastai* occurs only at *Resp.* 521b.

2 For other doubts see M nnlein-Robert 2005.

3 See LSJ s.v. and Smyth 1974 §2246.

4 Grote 1867, 452–453; Mansfeld 1994, 66–67, n. 115; 100. On other grounds for athetizing see Pageau St. Hilaire 2014, 3–6. Annas 1985, 111–112, judges that the burden of proof falls on doubters.

His word *erastai* might range in meaning from “fans” or “admirers”—its likely force here—to “lovers” in some sexual or quasi-sexual sense.⁵ I would tentatively compare these *erastai* to today’s recruiters or scouts for sports or show business that court young potential stars. Ancient *erastai* courted for personal alliance, differently from today’s scouts recruiting for an organization.

Socrates is at the grammar school so far as we know uninvited. Contrast Plato’s *Lysis* 204a1, where someone calls Socrates into a wrestling school. Perhaps here Socrates plans to talk with young people. Perhaps he seeks a particular young person.

2 132a4–b3

Two of the boys (*tôn meirakiôn*) happened (*etugchanetên*: a dual form) to be disputing (*erizonte*: dual)—but about what, I wasn’t hearing much. But they appeared (*ephainesthên*: dual) to be disputing (*erizein*) either about Anaxagoras or about Oinipides; at least they appeared (*ephainesthên*: dual) to be drawing circles and they were imitating (*emimounto*: plural) certain inclinations with their hands, leaning forward (*epiklinounte*: dual) and being very eager (*espoudakote*: dual).

As I indicate, the Greek attaches both dual and plural verbs somewhat unusually to the same subject. Plato’s *Phaedrus* 256c similarly has dual and plural for the same subject.⁶

Grammar school was for those up to the age of 16 or possibly 18.⁷ The *erastai* are slightly older than the schoolboy they admire: Socrates calls one *erastês* “young man” (*neania*: 132c1).⁸ These *erastai* are, like Charmides in Xenophon’s *Symposium* (8.2), of an age to be also the beloveds of more mature men.

The verb *erizein* suggests a common boyhood sport, competitive conversation. Plato’s *Lysis* 204a notes schoolboys’ pastime of verbal contest. Menexenus is *eristikos* (211b8).

5 See Halperin 1996.

6 See Smyth 1974 § 955 and § 956. The *Lovers* uses mixed duals and plurals both of the disputing schoolboys and of the two rival lovers.

7 Nails 2009 2 says the *Lysis*’ setting, 409 BCE, when Plato was about 15, and the *Euthydemus*’ setting, 407 BCE, give “insight into Plato’s school-age years.”

8 Nails 2002 174 says Hippothales, about 16 in the *Lysis*, called *neaniskos* at 203a, is “fixated on the apparently slightly younger *Lysis*.”

The *erastai*, if not students at the school, may be recent former students, visiting their old school to watch a new star.

Seeing the youngsters gesturing circles and slopes, Socrates thinks of Anaxagoras and Oinopides, perhaps for their astronomical views.

3 132b3–6

And I—for I had sat next to the lover of one of the two—nudging him with my elbow, I asked whatever the youngsters were (*eitên*: dual) so eager about.

I call this first-mentioned *erastês* “the wrestler” since 132c says he gets himself into neck holds.

The lack of introduction or greeting between Socrates and the wrestler before Socrates speaks to him suggests previous acquaintance.

Further, Socrates’ sitting next to and nudging the wrestler with his elbow suggests marked familiarity and ease with the wrestler. In undisputed Plato *Phaedo* is the sole person whom Socrates deliberately touches, stroking his hair (*Phd.* 89b).

4 132b6–7

and I said: “Is it something great and fine about which they have worked up so much eagerness?”

Socrates’ question invites the wrestler’s judgment about an important matter: is this absorbing activity “great and fine”?

5 132b8–10

And he spoke; “What!” he said, “Great and fine? They babble (*adolesc-housi*) about things in the heavens (*meteôrôn*) and they drivel on (*phloua-rousi*) philosophizing (*philosophountes*).”

Socrates uses two verbs of saying, when one would do: perhaps they signal an accurate quotation from the wrestler. Compare *Phaedo*’s three verbs of saying at 118a6–7 at Socrates’ last words.

Though my translation, “philosophizing,” for *philosophountes* is conventional, I deliberately do not assume that our translating word means the same as its ancient counterpart.⁹ Rather, the dialogue is an opportunity to learn the participants’ conception of *philosophhein*.

The wrestler does not hesitate to count philosophizing as driveling as he answers Socrates. If the wrestler deems Socrates a philosopher, his comment insults Socrates. The dialogue gives us no reason to think he wants to insult Socrates. It seems likely that the wrestler does not think Socrates self-identifies as a philosophizer.¹⁰ If, however, the wrestler thinks Socrates to be a self-described philosopher, the wrestler might be trying to goad Socrates into conversation.

We do not know the ground on which the wrestler calls “philosophizing” what the narrator called “disputing.” It might be the content, astronomy, or the manner of discussion, disputing.

So far the dialogue tells us at least that the wrestler either is not interested in astronomy or is not interested in disputing.

The Socrates of Plato’s *Apology* uses the same word, “drivel” (*Ap.* 19c), as he alludes to the character Socrates that speaks about matters in the sky in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*.

The wrestler’s “babble” and “drivel” are not duals. Possible explanations: (a) the dual (see note 4) is optional; (b) the wrestler’s verbs include all the youngsters, not just the two actually disputing; or (c) the wrestler is not interested in, or makes a show of resisting, optional linguistic niceties.

6 132C1–3

And I, wondering at his answer (*apokrisin*), said: “Young man, do you think philosophizing (*to philosophhein*) shameful? Or why do you speak so harshly?”

9 Bruell 1987, 91–110, finds the unelaborated mention of Anaxagoras and Oinopides a sign that Socrates’ audience is (a) “familiar with philosophy” and (b) “friendly to it.” But (a) we do not learn until the wrestler speaks that the talk here counts as *philosophhein*, and (b) we do not see the audience’s stance toward it.

10 Edmunds 2006 usefully considers the question what Socrates was called in his lifetime and does not arrive at “philosopher.” Rossetti 2011, 270 says that the Socratics treat Socrates as a philosopher. See Peterson 2011, 214–215 and ch. 9, 236–259 for another view of various uses of *philosoph-* words in Plato, many of them not applicable to Socrates.

Socrates' surprise at the wrestler's answer suggests that Socrates expected that the wrestler would not consider philosophizing shameful. It does not show that Socrates himself thinks philosophizing is fine. We cannot tell if Socrates thinks it fine, shameful, or neither. He might simply be surprised at the wrestler's lacking this usual interest of his age group. Similarly, if I say with surprise to a young person today who expresses contempt for sending many text messages per hour, "Do you think texting a bad thing?" I do not imply my approval of texting. I simply register surprise at the unconventionality of the young person.

If Socrates already knows that the wrestler detests philosophizing, Socrates might simply be trying to spark a reaction by directly inviting the wrestler to explain his evaluation.

7

132c4–11

And the other one—for he happened to be sitting near him, since he was a rival lover (*anterastês*)—hearing me asking (*eromenou*) and the other answering (*apokrinomenou*) said, "You don't do [anything] for yourself, Socrates, by asking this one if he thinks philosophy (*philosophian*) is shameful. Or don't you know about him that he has spent his whole life getting himself into neck holds and stuffing himself [with food] and sleeping? So what do you think he would answer but that philosophy (*philosophian*) is a shameful thing?"

I will refer to this new interlocutor as "the intellectual" because Socrates will say that he has spent time "in cultivation" (132d1).

The intellectual's addressing Socrates by name without introducing himself shows previous acquaintance.

The intellectual implies that great interest in wrestling precludes either time or respect for philosophy.

Both Socrates' narration and his quotation from the intellectual use the words "ask" and "answer." This vocabulary belongs to question-answer contest. Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.2.46 suggests that the practice was alive in Pericles' youth (*esophizometha*): Pericles says he was clever at such talk when he was young. In Plato's *Euthydemus* (275c) Clinias is familiar with question-answer contest. Socrates assures the experts in verbal dispute, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, that the young Clinias is ready to answer (*apokrinesthai*) and that people often question (*erôtôsi*) him and discuss (*diagegesthai*) with him.

The contests of Socrates' era were ancestors of the contests of Aristotle's era. Aristotle collects conventions and strategies of disputation in his *Topics*.¹¹ The *Gorgias* shows use of a rule Aristotle records.¹²

Plato's *Alcibiades* (113a–b) says that in such contests the questioner does not own what he elicits from the answerer.¹³ We then cannot expect to learn the views of Socrates the questioner from the responses he elicits from the intellectual here.

The dialogue's rival lovers are unnamed. Few of Plato's dialogues have unnamed participants. An unnamed interlocutor in the *Euthydemus*, however, grumbles about philosophy as our wrestler does here.

The wrestler does not answer Socrates' question before the intellectual speaks. Is the wrestler slow at response? More thoughtful and reflective than the intellectual? Reluctant to be answerer to Socrates in a contest? Or simply willing to watch another answer Socrates?

8 132d1–3

Now this one of the [two] lovers was one who had spent his time in intellectual cultivation (*mousikên*), but the other, whom he was abusing (*eloidorei*), on training (*gumnastikên*).

Socrates reports a personal pastime (*diatetriphôs*) of each lover. It seems that he knew their habits before now.

Gumnastikên is expertise about exercise or training. In Mitscherling's translation (in Cooper 1997), "athletics" comes from *athla* ("prizes"). The translation "training" assumes less: one might train for military preparedness while not seeking prizes.

The intellectual's abuse of the wrestler is indirect, since the intellectual has spoken only to Socrates.

11 Brunschwig 1986 argues that Aristotle wanted to modify the practice to be less agonistic.

12 At *Grg.* 475a Socrates secures the premise that the fine is to be defined via pleasure and good. He deduces that the shameful is to be defined in terms of the opposites of pleasure and good, namely pain and evil. Arist. *Top.* 113b27–28 records the inference principle that if A belongs to B then the contrary of A belongs to the contrary of B. See below on *Lovers* 137a2–3.

13 Frede 1992.

9 132d3–7

And it seemed to me that I ought (*chrênai*) to let off (*aphienai*) the one that was getting questioned [by me], because he did not profess to be experienced in discussions (*logôn*), but in deeds, and to question thoroughly (*dierôtêsai*) the one professing to be wiser, so that if I could in some way I might be benefited by him.

Again the words “questioned” and “question thoroughly” evoke verbal contest.

That Socrates will question the one who “professes to be wiser” reminds us of the Socrates of Plato’s *Apology*, who says he questioned reputedly wise people.

Does the “ought” in Socrates’ thought that he ought to let the one youth off and to question the other suggest a strong motive?

The intellectual has not said in this dialogue, “I profess to be wiser.” Socrates’ view that the intellectual professes to be wiser is either prior information or an inference from the intellectual’s sarcasm about the wrestler. Similarly Socrates is already aware that the wrestler does not “profess to be experienced in discussions,” that is, to rapid contest of the question-answer sort that will ensue. That awareness seems more evidence of Socrates’ previous acquaintance with the wrestler, for the earlier information about devotion to physical training would not imply disavowal of verbal contest skill. Compare the multi-skilled Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Plato’s *Euthydemus*.

What benefit does Socrates expect from conversation with the intellectual? Some possibilities are:

- (a) Socrates will learn the answers to his questions.
- (b) Socrates will learn what a certain youth thinks are the answers to his questions.
- (c) Socrates will learn what follows from the intellectual’s proposals plus his other admissions.
- (d) Socrates will thus learn about himself what granting those proposals and premises would commit him to.

Learning (d) would be a clear benefit. (b) and (c) are means to (d). The discussion yields all but (a).

10 132d7–11

Then I said to that: “I was asking the question [to both of you] in common (*eis koinon*); but if you think that you answer (*apokrinasthai*) in a finer

way than this one, I question (*erôtô*) you on the very same point as him, whether it seems to you that philosophizing (*to philosophhein*) is a fine thing or not.”

As the vocabulary (“question,” “answer”) of stylized question-answer exchange piles up, it becomes more and more clear that the conversation is a little contest.

11 133a1–7

Pretty much as we were saying these things the two youngsters, overhearing, grew silent, and stopping from their debate (*eridos*), they became hearers of ours. And what the *erastai* felt, I don’t know, but I myself was stunned. For I am always, ever, stunned by the young and the beautiful (*kalôn*). The other *erastês* seemed to me to be struggling (*agônian*) not less than I; yet he answered me, even very much in an honor-loving way (*philotimôs*).

The youngsters turn from their intense talk. Evidently they see that Socrates initiates a verbal contest. They show their interest in contest.

12 133a8–b4

“Whenever, Socrates,” he said, “I were to think philosophizing to be shameful, I would not consider myself to be a human being, nor anyone else so disposed,” as he pointed to the rival lover, speaking in a loud voice, so that his darling (*ta paidika*) might hear him.

The intellectual’s remark here, intended to impress his beloved, displays the honor-loving manner Socrates has noted.

The remark continues the intellectual’s abuse of his rival, the wrestler. The insult illustrates another kind of verbal contest of Socrates’ era, the exchange of insults, in which the victor gains prestige.¹⁴

14 Hesk 2007 speaks of an “oral culture of the fifth and fourth centuries where the witty riposte or put-down is valued and recalled” (137 n. 41). “Capping genres of discourse were ... a very pervasive and important part of Athenian life” (142). Hesk compares such

13 133b5–c3

And I said, “Philosophizing then seems to you a fine thing?”

“Totally,” he said.

“Why then,” I said, “does it seem to you to be possible to know that anything whatever is either fine or shameful, for which you do not know from the start what it is?”

He said no.

“You know then,” I said, “what philosophy is?”

“Totally,” he said.

“What then is it?” I said.

Compare this exchange with an exchange in Plato’s *Meno*. Meno, abruptly asking whether virtue is or is not teachable (70a1–2), issues the disjunctive challenge that Aristotle later catalogues as the start of question-answer duel (*Top.* 101b). Socrates does not know (71a). Socrates then asks: “Of that which I do not know what it is, how would I know whatsoever sort of thing (*hopoion ge ti*) it is?” (*Meno* 71b3–4). Contrast the *Lovers’* exchange with the *Hippias Major*. There Socrates recalls that when he said some speeches were fine and shameful, he was annoyed to realize he did not know and could not say what the fine was (*Hip. mai.* 286c). In the *Meno* and *Lovers* Socrates’ “What is it?” question is about the subject called fine; in the *Hippias Major* the question is about the attribute, being fine.

To know what something is “from the start” I take to require at least a minimal explanation of what it is. It is not merely to have an identifying description such as “whatever they were doing just now” or “that activity called ‘philosophizing.’”

The intellectual’s agreement that you cannot know that something is fine if you do not what it is “from the start” is reasonable. How could you know that philosophizing is fine, that is, a fine activity to spend your time at, if you do not know minimally what it is? The parallel claim is not plausible for all other attributes: we might very well know that something is expensive, smelly, heavy, poisonous, or green without knowing what it is.

duels, including insult exchange duels, to verbal duels in other cultures, including hip-hop today (125). Aristophanes’ *Clouds* parodies such duels to convey that sophistic education encouraged victory-at-all-costs duels instead of “proper training in civic argument and refutation” (156–157).

14 133c9–11

The intellectual, quoting Solon (133c6), offers as his first account that philosophizing is learning at any age, “so that one gets taught as much as possible in life” (133c9). Socrates narrates:

And to me at first he seemed to be saying something, then having somehow thought it over I asked him if he thought philosophy (*tên philosophian*) was much learning (*polumathian*).

133c9–11

Socrates’ phrasing, “thought it over,” implies that he considers and reflects, and that he had not pre-planned the course of the conversation. The conversation is impromptu and spontaneous. Students often have the different impression from Plato’s dialogues that from his first sentence Socrates knows exactly how his conversation will go.

If we think that Socrates does not describe himself accurately, and that he had in fact planned ahead, we can ask why he would want to mis-describe himself here.

15 133d1–e2

The next exchange leads to a problem for the intellectual’s proposal:

“And do you think philosophy to be fine only or also good?” I said.

“Also good,” he said, “totally.”

“Then do you see this as a peculiarity in philosophy (*philosophia(i)*), or do you think it holds thus also in other areas? For example, do you think love of training (*philogumnastian*) not only fine or also good? Or not?”

And then he said two things, very much in the manner of an expert at dissembling (*eirōnikōs*).¹⁵ “To *him* I would say that it is neither; but to *you*, Socrates, I agree both fine and good; for I think that is correct.”

15 Other translations for *eirōnikōs* are “slyly,” “sarcastically,” “ironically.” My translation observes the relation of *-ikōs* to *-ikê*, suggestive of an implicit *technê*. An *eironikê technê* would be the art of being an *eirôn*, a dissembler.

In this context where the intellectual claims experience, his capacity to give two answers, to respond differently to different questioners, shows his expertise. He can if necessary defend an answer he does not believe. The intellectual has already expressed his contempt for exercising. To avoid inconsistency with his expressed contempt he would, if questioned by the wrestler, deny that wrestling is either fine or good. But in answering Socrates the intellectual says what he believes. Perhaps he expects from past talk with Socrates that Socrates wants people to say what they believe. Perhaps also he is not strongly invested in being victor over Socrates, who is not competing with the rivals for the admiration of their boy.

16 134a3–b4

Socrates elicits the intellectual's agreement that (a) love of training (*philogumnastian*) is much exertion (*poluponian*), just as (b) love of wisdom (*philosophian*) consists in much learning (*polumathian*); (c) those who love training want nothing else than to put themselves in good bodily condition; (d) many exertions produce good bodily condition (133e3–134a2). Socrates now draws the wrestler into the conversation.

And it seemed to me just then best that the lover of training should get stirred up (*kinêteos*), so that he might assist me through his experience of training. And then I asked him, "Why are *you* silent for us, excellent [fellow], when he is saying these things? Or to you also do men seem to have their bodies in good condition from many exertions, or from the right amount (*tôn metriôn*)?"

He said, "I thought, Socrates, as the saying [goes], that even a pig would know that exertions of just the right amount make for good bodily condition, so why not a man sleepless and unnourished and with an unscraped neck and thin from obsessings?" And while he said these things, the youngsters also laughed, and the other [rival] got red.

That Socrates has the impulse to stir up the wrestler may be compared to Plato's *Lysis* (223a) where Socrates thinks of stirring up (*kinein*) one of the older people present. The Socrates of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 4. 2.2 makes a provocative assertion to stir up Euthydemus.

Socrates' asking for a choice between "much" and "the right amount" obviously invites the answer "the right amount" that the wrestler then gives.

The wrestler's reply includes a delayed response to the intellectual's previous insults. The wrestler begins by matching the intellectual's quotation of Solon's

edifying statement with a contrastingly earthy, apparently proverbial expression, “even a pig would know.”

The wrestler takes up the intellectual’s previous mention of humankind (“not count myself a human being”) with reference to another species, implying that the intellectual cannot count even as having the status of a pig.

Then the wrestler responds to the intellectual’s insulting description, “getting himself into neck holds, stuffing himself, and sleeping,” with corresponding descriptions of the intellectual’s neck, his eating habits, and his sleep habits, in reverse order. The wrestler’s statement in Greek is more elegant than my translation, since it uses three alpha-privatives: *agrupnon te kai asiton kai atribê tôn trachelôn*. It is more elegant than the intellectual’s insult.

The wrestler’s insult in those several ways meets the convention for exchange of insults that a reply to an insult should allude to or parallel the insult to which it responds.¹⁶ The wrestler even goes beyond the intellectual’s three barbs with a fourth: “thin from obsessings.”

The laughter of the youngsters and the blush of the intellectual testify to the success of the riposte.

Despite the wrestler’s not professing to be experienced in competitive verbal exchanges—as we understood *logôn* at 132d4–5—the wrestler has very neatly matched and outdone the intellectual’s words. Perhaps this is the sort of verbal crafting that the Socrates of Plato’s *Apology* says young people do (“fabricating statements [*plattonti logous*] like a young man” (17c5–6)). The passage is a sharp description of vying adolescents.¹⁷

The insult exchange does not continue. Socrates does not quote the wrestler again.

17 134b5–c7

Socrates takes the intellectual’s blush to indicate withdrawal of his earlier claim.

And I said, “What then? Do you now agree that neither many nor few exertions put men in good bodily condition, but [exertions] of just the

16 Hesk 2007, 127, says: “The ripostes must linguistically and stylistically parallel the previous [remark of one’s opponent] and yet go one better than the preceding effort.”

17 Heidel 1976 [1902], 50, finds 132c and 133a–b “marked violation of Plato’s wonted urbanity.” Not so: compare Thrasymachus’ insult at *Resp.* 1.343a2–8 and Socrates’ implied insult at *Grg.* 495e.

right amount? Or would you continue to fight (*diamachê(i)*) about the statement—when there are two of us?”

He said, “Against *him* I would gladly battle it out (*diagônisaimên*), and I know very well that I would be sufficient to support the hypothesis that I hypothesized, even if I had hypothesized a weaker one—for he is nothing—but against you I have no need to strive for a victory (*philonikein*) contrary to belief, but I agree that not many but just the right amount of exercises produces good condition in men.”

The intellectual’s petulant and weak response, “He is nothing,” seems more evidence that the wrestler won the little contest of insults.

Here Socrates’ dual (“when there are two of us”: *duoin ontoin nô(i)n*) pairs the wrestler emphatically with Socrates as his ally in the verbal combat.

The intellectual perhaps shows here that he treats seriously his conversation with Socrates. He retracts his earlier position in the face of a good reason to do so. He says there is no need to strive for a victory “contrary to belief.” He might mean that he is not going to give answers that he does not believe. Or he might mean that he is not going to defend an initial paradoxical thesis, as an expert competitor might do to show skill. In either case, he indicates that his contest with Socrates differs from contests with others. Yet the vocabulary of fighting it out and the contrast he draws between talking with the wrestler and talking with Socrates shows the intellectual’s familiarity with verbal competition in which the only goal is victory.

The phrase “the hypothesis that I hypothesized” is likely technical phrasing for the initial assumption that an answerer tries to maintain. *Hypothesis* is a technical term in Aristotle’s later codification of the contest practice of the earlier era that we see here (*Top.* 108b8, b17, 119b35, 158a32, 163b33).

18 134d1–134e6

Socrates gets the intellectual to agree that what is beneficial in bodily matters is just the right amount. Socrates says, “I compelled him to agree” (134d1). The verb “compelled” suggests standards of argument that constrain verbal contests.

Similarly with respect to the soul just the right amount of studies, not many studies, are beneficial (134d5–12).

Socrates asks who would be the appropriate person to ask what sort of foods or exertions are appropriate for the body. He says “the three of us agreed” (134e3) that it must be a doctor or trainer. The wrestler still counts as part of the conversation, even though we hear no more of his actual words.

19 134e7–135a7

“And whom, with regard to sowing and planting lessons in the soul, would we rightly ask how many and what sort are the right amount?”

Then we were all full of puzzlement (*aporias*); and I, joking with them, asked, “Do you wish,” I said, “since we are in puzzlement, that we ask these boys? Or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer said of the suitors, not deeming there to be someone else worthy who will stretch the bow?”

Then since they seemed to me to be losing their spirit (*athumein*) for the discussion, I tried to consider [matters] in another way.

The shame that Socrates mentions perhaps signals the rivals’ flagging interest. The last sentence shows that Socrates wants to keep discussion going.

20 135a7–9

Socrates asks what the philosopher should learn; he gets this answer at 135b1–7.

The wiser one, replying, said that the finest studies and suitable ones would be those from which he would get the most reputation (*pleistêndoxan*) for philosophy; and he would get the most reputation if he should seem to be experienced in all the arts, and if not [all], as many as possible and the most noteworthy, learning of these the ones which are fitting for the free to learn, such as pertain to understanding (*suneseôs*), not to manual labor.

It is unclear whether the intellectual intends his account of philosophy to count Socrates as a philosopher. We have seen no evidence that Socrates seems experienced in “all the arts” or “the most noteworthy.” If, however, the intellectual has seen Socrates refute all kinds of people, and if, like people Socrates mentions in Plato’s *Apology* (23a3–5), the intellectual thinks Socrates knows subjects on which Socrates refutes others, then perhaps the intellectual here does include Socrates as a philosopher.

It would be a topic for another study to consider to what extent Socratic literature presents Socrates as a *philosophos*. For example, Xenophon does not present Socrates as a *philosophos* (cf. Nightingale 1995, 17). Xenophon does not urge *philosophein* (cf. Dorion 2012, 473). Socrates perhaps only defiantly accepts the way his detractors inaccurately describe him when he says, “I won’t stop philosophizing” in Plato’s *Apology* (cf. Peterson 2011, ch. 9).

21 135d3–8

Socrates asks if it is not impossible for the same person to learn even two arts (135c). The intellectual expands his answer. He did not mean that one who philosophizes knows precisely (135c1), like the person who actually has the art: he meant that the philosopher should know fittingly for a free and educated man (135d2–3).

[He should] be able to follow what is said by the workman in a way that distinguishes him from those present and [be able] himself to contribute an opinion (*sumballesthai gnômen*), so as to seem to be the most charming (*chariestaton*) and cleverest (*sophôtaton*) of any of those present among those speaking about or practicing the arts.

The intellectual, claiming that philosophers seem most charming and clever, shows his focus on prestige.

The intellectual thinks a philosopher would offer opinions on technical skills, perhaps a specific judgment that some technical product was better than another, or since a *gnômê* can also be a maxim, perhaps a saying like, “Absolute power corrupts absolutely” in a political discussion, or “A chain is only as strong as its weakest link” in a military discussion.

22 136a5–b2

To clarify, Socrates compares philosophers to pentathletes. Racing with racers, or wrestling with wrestlers, the pentathlete loses. Running or wrestling against athletes other than runners or wrestlers, the pentathlete wins. “The man who has philosophized is just under the top in everything” (136a3–4). The intellectual says,

He is simply such as not to be a slave to any occupation (*pragmati*) nor to have worked through anything to exactness, so as not to leave behind all other [occupations] because of this one concern, as the workmen [do], but to touch on all in a measured way (*metriôs*).

We might expect Socrates to raise again the question of 134c about who would decide the proper measure. But Socrates instead asks whether good men are useful or useless (136b10). It was earlier agreed that philosophy is good (133d), and so presumably too that philosophers are good. The intellectual offers

that philosophers are “most useful” (136c). But the intellectual assents when Socrates asks, “While there is some workman, the philosopher is not useful?” (136d)

This result seems troubling enough. Socrates will soon get an even more extreme result from new agreements.

23 136e9–137a10

Socrates marks a number of agreements. The many mentions of agreement (136e9; 136e10; 137a4; 137a6; 137a8) show that question-answer competition yet involves much agreement on what is taken as a premise and what ensues.

Philosophy is fine. (137a1)

Philosophers are good. (137a2)

The good are useful. (137a2–3)

The wicked are useless. (137a3)

When there are workmen, philosophers are useless “by your argument.”
(137a8–b2)

There are always workmen. (137a5)

So philosophers are useless. (137b1)

So philosophers are wicked. (137a10)

One wonders why the intellectual agrees to the faulty move from “the wicked are useless and philosophers are useless” to “philosophers are wicked.” The doubtful-looking move from “the good are useful” to “the wicked are useless,” however, instantiates the same rule as in Plato’s *Gorgias* (see note 12 above).

The phrases “by your argument” (137a8–9) and “in the way you say” (137a10) emphasize that these results are conditional on what the intellectual has agreed to. The results belong to him.

24 137b1–6

Socrates says,

“But it *might* not be that way, friend,¹⁸ and philosophizing might not be this—to live bent over technical skills, nor to have gotten eager about

18 “Friend” is the third of four vocatives with which Socrates addresses one of the rivals

much learning nor practicing many [arts],¹⁹ since I thought this is a disgrace and those who have concerned themselves with the crafts are called mere smiths (*banausous*)."

Socrates here doubts the proposal that philosophizing is having second-best skill for many arts. With his phrasing, "I thought," meaning "I thought that according to you," he reminds the intellectual that the intellectual earlier implied that focus on crafts or technical skills is not for a free and educated man (135d1–2; 136a7–8). *Per* LSJ *banausos* possibly comes from the word for forge (*baunos*), plus a word for lighting a fire (*auô*). Hence my translation "mere smith."²⁰

25 137c–139a

Socrates elicits another argument from the intellectual's agreements to show that philosophizing cannot be much learning. I rephrase, rearrange, and summarize selectively to condense an extended exchange.

The art of correct chastising makes men better. (137b9–d2)

That art requires distinguishing good men from bad, whether one or many. (137d2–10)

Justice is the art of correct chastisement in a city. (137d11–16)

Justice is the same as statecraft and the kingly art (*basilikê technê*).²¹ (138b7–18)

The man who distinguishes the many as good or bad must know whether a single person, for example, himself, is good or bad. (137d5–10)

Knowing oneself is practicing sound-mindedness (*sôphronein*) and justice—as the Delphic oracle says. (138a8–10)

The art of governing one's own household is the same as the *basilikê technê*. (138b1–18)

(132c1; 134a6; 137b2; 139a4). Halliwell 1995 discusses Plato's depiction of Socrates' use of vocatives.

19 Accepting Giorgetti 1968, 158–160, for the text of 137b3–4.

20 Lamb 1927 note that the word expresses contempt for manual workers.

21 Plato's *Euthydemus* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* discuss the kingly art. See Dorion 2004, 61, which concludes that the *basilikê technê* was a topic of great debate among the Socratics.

It would be disgraceful for the philosopher to be second-best in matters of managing his own household—which of course includes himself.
(138e1–7)

The overall result is that if the philosopher is as prestigious as the intellectual has claimed, the philosopher must be in first place at self-management, which is also the *basilikê technê*.

For a second time Socrates has reduced to absurdity the intellectual's current proposal that the philosopher must be highly conversant with, but second best at, many arts.

26 139a4–5

Socrates explicitly states the conclusion:

“So, best fellow, philosophizing is far from being much learning and occupation with technical skills.”

The result is of course conditional on the intellectual's premises.

I reiterate that Socrates in the role of questioner is not committed to what he has extracted from the answerer in this verbal contest. We have learned nothing about Socrates' positive views. We have learned only what ensues upon the intellectual's admissions.

Similarly, we have no reason to think the author is committed to what he presents Socrates as extracting. The author gives us no positive conclusion.

27 139a6–8

Socrates concludes his narration:

When I said these things, the intellectual (*sophos*), ashamed of what he had said earlier, was silent, but the unlearned one (*amathês*) said it was that way. And the others praised what had been said.

Though the dialogue makes no explicit statement of *aporia*, we are in fact still in the same *aporia* as at 134e. We do not know what philosophy is, or what to study to benefit the soul, that is, to manage our own household.

28 139a7–8

The narrative ends with the understated satisfaction of the wrestler at this conversation in which Socrates acts as the ally of one who did not profess to be good at discussion. Perhaps the wrestler wrote the narrative, to save the memory of an actual occasion.²²

References

- Annas, J. 'Self-knowledge in early Plato' in D. O'Meara. *Platonic Investigations*. Washington 1985, 111–138.
- Bruell, C. 'On the original meaning of political philosophy: an interpretation of Plato's *Lovers*', in: T. Pangle, *The roots of political philosophy*. Ithaca 1987, 91–110.
- Brunschwig, J. 'Aristotle on arguments without winners or losers', in: P. Wapnewski, *Wissenschaftskolleg Jahrbuch 1984/85*. Berlin 1986, 31–40.
- Burnet, J. *Platonis Opera*, I–IV. Oxford 1907.
- Carlini, A. *Platone: Alcibiade, Alcibiade secondo, Ipparco, Rivali*. Turin 1964.
- Cooper, J.M. *Plato: complete works*. Indianapolis 1997.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Socrate et la *basilikê tekhnê*: essai d'exégèse comparative', in: V. Karasmanēs, *Socrates: 2400 years since his death*. Athens 2004, 51–61.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The nature and status of *sophia* in the *Memorabilia*', in: F. Hobden and C. Tuplin, *Xenophon: ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Leiden 2012, 455–475.
- Duke, E.A. *Platonis Opera*, I. Oxford 1995.
- Edmunds, L. 'What was Socrates called?', *CQ* 56 (2006), 414–425.
- Frede, M. 'Plato's arguments and the dialogue form', *OSAPh* 9 (1992), 201–219.
- Giorgetti, G.P. 'Review of Carlini 1964', *JHS* 88 (1968), 158–160.
- Grote, G. *Plato and the other companions of Socrates*. London 1867.
- Halliwell, S. 'Forms of address: Socratic vocatives in Plato', in: F. de Martino and A. Sommerstein, *Lo Spettacolo delle Voci*. Bari 1995, 87–121.
- Halperin, D. 'Homosexuality', in: S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edition. Oxford 1996, 720–722.
- Heidel, W.A. *Plato's Euthyphro with introduction and notes and Pseudo-Platonica*. New York 1976.
- Hesk, J. 'Combatic capping in Aristophanic comedy', *PCPhS* 53 (2007), 124–160.
- Hicks, R.A. *Diogenes Laertius: lives of eminent philosophers*. Cambridge, MA 1991.

22 For ancient stories that Plato was a wrestler see Riginos 1976, 41–42.

- Lamb, W.R.M. *Plato VIII: Charmides, Alcibiades I and II, Hipparchus, The Lovers, Minos, Theages, Epinomis*. London 1927.
- Männlein-Robert, I. 'Zur literarischen Inszenierung eines Philosophiekonzeptes in den pseudoplatonischen *Anterastai*,' in K. Döring, M. Erler, and S. Schorn, *Pseudoplatonica*. Stuttgart 2005.
- Mansfeld, J. *Prolegomena: questions to be settled before the study of an author, or a text*. Leiden 1994.
- Marchant, E.C., O.J. Todd, and Henderson J. *Xenophon: Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology*. Cambridge, MA 2013.
- Nails, D. 'The life of Plato of Athens,' in: H. Benson, *A companion to Plato*. New York 2009.
- Nails, D. *The people of Plato*. Indianapolis 2002.
- Nightingale, A.W. *Genres in dialogue: Plato and the construct of philosophy*. Cambridge 1995.
- Pageau St Hilaire, A. 'La double signification de la philosophie politique socratique dans *Les Amoureux rivaux*,' *Ithaque* 14 (2014), 1–24.
- Peterson, S. *Socrates and philosophy in the dialogues of Plato*. Cambridge 2011.
- Ross, W.D. *Aristotelis: Topica et Sophistici Elenchi*. Oxford 1958.
- Rossetti, L. 'Les socratiques "premiers philosophes" et Socrate "premier philosophe",' in: L. Rossetti, *Le dialogue socratique*. Paris 2011, 265–277.
- Slings, S. *Platonis Rempublicam*. Oxford 2003.
- Smyth, H.W. *Greek grammar*. Cambridge, MA 1974.
- Souilhé, J. *Platon: œuvres complètes, XIII 2: dialogues suspects*. Paris 1930.
- Swift Riginos, A. *Platonica: the anecdotes concerning the life and writings of Plato*. Leiden 1976.

PART 4

Xenophon



How to Defend the Defense of Socrates?

From the *Apology* to *Memorabilia* Book 1

Pierre Pontier
Sorbonne University

In the *Apology of Socrates* and the first part of Book 1 of the *Memorabilia* Xenophon assumes the role of a witness in order to rebut accusations and to correct representations of Socrates that he believed to be wrong. This straightforward rhetorical choice, which distinguishes Xenophon from Plato,¹ positions the portrait of Socrates that emerges from these two writings near judicial rhetoric and toward the rhetoric of prose eulogy.

The literary form of the two works is different. The *Apology of Socrates* is Xenophon's shortest writing; and in contrast to what the title might lead one to think,² it does not just present Socrates' discourse before his judges. It devotes itself above all to justifying the way Socrates chose to defend himself and to die, as we will show by first analysing the use and the real meaning of the word *megalegoria* in the *Apology*.

Book 1 of the *Memorabilia* is conceived in two parts, a division which for a long time seemed proof of different dates of composition: the first two chapters relate to the accusations made against Socrates, while the last five seek to demonstrate the philosopher's "utility" in both word and deed. Beside the aspect of apology common to the two works, the *Memorabilia* and the *Apology of Socrates* are a rare example of rewriting in the ancient world: at the beginning and at the end of the *Memorabilia*³ Xenophon borrows and adapts passages

1 See Vander Waerdt 1994, 10–12; Bandini and Dorion 2000, lxvii–lxix; and Danzig 2010, 5–8 on this point. *Oeconomicus* and *Symposium* lack the direct apologetic orientation of the *Apology* and *Memorabilia*.

2 Wilamowitz 1897, 99.

3 1.1–2 and 4.8. On these "parallel passages" see Bandini and Dorion 201b, annexe 6, 243–250. Xenophon, like Isocrates in his *Antidosis*, is familiar with rewriting his own work, since he picks up elements of *Hellenica* in the *Agesilaus* (the eulogy of the king of Sparta, like the *Apology*, was considered suspect in the nineteenth century because of these repetitions; see Breitenbach 1967, col. 1894). On the *Apology* supposedly antedating *Memorabilia*, we take the prevailing view, even if as Bandini and Dorion 201b, 243, emphasises, "it is a matter of little interest in that there are no doctrinal discrepancies between the two texts." See also Stokes 2012 on this chronological question.

from the *Apology*. The *Memorabilia* is inscribed within the apologetic context of Socrates' end but also has much larger aspirations: the choice of discussants and the place and form of the discussions aim to situate Socrates in his time and in relation to his city as well as to provide a portrait of him. This we shall show by examining the case of his three dialogues with "Antiphon the Sophist" (1.6).

1 Socrates' Megalegoria and Xenophon's Defense

In the *Apology of Socrates* Xenophon treats what is common to all those who have reported Socrates' language as evidence of his *megalegoria*, and then reproaches them for failing to represent that language as anything other than insupportable arrogance (1–2). Xenophon, who was absent at the time of Socrates' trial, relies on the evidence of Hermogenes to report a conversation between him and Socrates. During that conversation Socrates justifies his decision not to prepare his defense by appeal to being twice opposed by his *daimonion* (2–9). Then there is a selection of utterances of Socrates at the time of his trial, responding to the two principal accusations of impiety and the corruption of youth (10–26), and contrasting portraits of the attitude of Socrates after the trial and that of his accuser Anytos (27–31). Xenophon concludes with a short recapitulation in the form of an *enkômion* (32–34).

The purpose of Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates* is not to report the entirety of Socrates' discourse in his defense before the judges, but to make sense of his *megalegoria*, by demonstrating the coherence between his utterance and his conduct.⁴ This is the rhetorical attitude Xenophon seeks to clarify. What is the meaning of the term? Etymologically, the second part of the compound word refers to public utterance.⁵ The first part of the term draws close to the often pejorative μέγα λέγειν, "to speak big" (LSJ). The implications of the term in the rhetorical sense, as "elevation," are post-classical.⁶ The solutions various translators and commentators have adopted are by no means uniform. They reveal three possible semantic orientations: one ("pride in language"⁷) gives primacy to Socrates' posture and tone (the loftiness of his views), perhaps because it is mindful of the term's rhetorical future; another ("big talk," "high-

4 See *Ap.* 1–2. On the possible rhetorical background to this idea, see Gray 1989.

5 Cf. Chantraine, *DELG*, s.v. ἀγορά, 13.

6 See, e.g., Dem. *De Eloc.* 29.

7 See Talbot 1859; Chambry 1933–1935; Ollier 1961.

mindedness,”⁸ “boastfulness”⁹) lingers more on the content of the discourse, the praising of his own deeds (boastfulness); the third (“arrogant speech”) opts for the way the discourse is received and perceived by the auditor, as a provocation.¹⁰

Louis-André Dorion interprets the term like this: “Since *megalegoria* does not designate the tone adopted by the speaker so much as the very act of openly attributing to oneself great merits, it is the term ‘boastfulness’ that seems to be the most adequate to translate *megalegoria*. To the extent that *megalegoria* consists in praising oneself for the virtues and merits that one believes to be one’s own, and that Socrates, moreover, neither desires nor is permitted to defend himself except by insisting on the exemplarity of his life, the *megalegoria* that he displays at his trial is nothing but a form of boastfulness, the goal of which is to exalt the *ergon* of his life.”¹¹

Megalegoria would thus be a kind of boastfulness which Xenophon would legitimate from a religious point of view by showing that it is provoked at the appropriate time by the *daimonion*, which enables him to reconcile the non-rhetorical *logos* of his defense and the *ergon* of his life. We shall adhere to this point of view, while remaining aware of the term’s ambivalence.¹² Besides, its deployment by Xenophon raises a problem that is both ethical and rhetorical: is it acceptable for one to deliver a eulogy of one’s own deeds? Put differently, how can Socrates’ *megalegoria* be defended?

First, let us look at the cognates of this term and their function. It is found in only two passages in the classical period, by Aeschylus and by Euripides. The first appearance of the adjective features in *Seven Against Thebes* (565), when the chorus of Theban women voice their fear and curse boasters. The chorus pinpoints the fifth warrior preparing to launch himself into the attack, Parthenopaeus the Arcadian, whom the messenger has just reported as swearing by his lance to strike the city down. The boast is associated with impiety, the warrior issuing a challenge to Zeus and all the gods.

In Euripides’ *Heracleides* the noun occurs in the plural in the words of the chorus of the old men of Marathon. When Iolaos has come to Attica to beg protection for himself and the children of Heracles, the herald of Eurystheus tries to tear the old man and the children from the altar of Zeus and threatens to

8 Gray 1989; see LSJ s.v.

9 Shero 1926; Vander Waerdt 1993; Dorion 2005.

10 Danzig 2010, 25–26. See also Hogenmüller 2011.

11 Dorion 2005, 132–133.

12 Pucci 2002, 22–25 believes that we have to consider two connotations for the term, “a negative, unflattering one, and a positive, flattering one.”

annihilate Athens with the Argive armies. After his departure the chorus starts to speak of what it sees as “boasts” (356) that express the bravado of a warrior keen to establish a balance of power.

These two texts have several shared points. The characters are strangers who exhibit *megalegoria*. They seek to create fear by utterances that anticipate their victory. Commentators consider their language impious and excessive. Lastly, the imputation of *megalegoria* is made in both cases by a chorus who comments on the utterances in a negative fashion, and that brings to mind the pejorative connotation of the expression μέγα λέγειν.¹³

What is it that makes *megalegoria* of the Euripidean and Aeschylan characters similar to that of Socrates? First, the verbal confrontation of an individual and a group. Moreover, Socrates’ *megalegoria* is a conviction of boastfulness made by commentators or hearers who had written on Socrates, or were among the judges or the public at the trial. The religious aspect is also essential, as we shall see.

Throughout Xenophon’s writings *megalegoria* is somewhat ambivalent. Xenophon condemns it in the *Anabasis*,¹⁴ stigmatizing those guilty of excessive pride to the detriment of the gods. On the other hand circumstances may oblige Xenophon’s heroes to display *megalegoria* when appropriate. For instance, Agesilaus, who is described as least likely in all the world to be boastful (μεγαλγορεῖν), listens calmly when others eulogize themselves because in his eyes they are valorous and powerful men (*Ages.* 8.2).¹⁵ According to Xenophon he had himself shown “lofty judgment” (μεγαλογνωμοσύνη) wisely (εὐκαίρως) in his private relations with the Great King (8.3). Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia* is also a powerful instance. When he advises Abradatas before the decisive battle near Babylon, Cyrus relies on the support of the gods in anticipating the rout of his enemies. According to Xenophon, the reason for Cyrus’ *megalegoria*—which is a rare attitude for him—is the imminent start of the decisive battle; that in itself constitutes a suitable occasion (7.1.17).¹⁶ To summarize, while it is not

13 Hom. *Od.* 3.227, 16.243, 22.288.

14 “And it may be that the god is guiding events in this way, he who wills that those who talked boastfully, as though possessed of superior wisdom, should be brought low, and that we, who always begin with the gods, should be set in a place of higher honour than those boasters” (*An.* 6.3.16, tr. Brownson).

15 The passages from *Agesilaus* 8.2 and *Cyropaedia* 4.4.2–3 are parallel: the reaction of the two chiefs to *megalegoria* is the same. See Humble (in this volume) about the necessity to treat “Xenophon’s corpus as a whole rather to split it into Socratic and non-Socratic parts.”

16 See Plutarch’s commentary (*Mor.* 545b–c) on this passage, and Demont 2014, 200.

good always to exhibit *megalegoria*, the *kairos* and one's privileged relation with the gods may legitimately require it as the best attitude to adopt in a given moment.

Xenophon keeps the use of the noun for the *Apology*: perhaps other authors had used it before him to characterize Socrates' utterance, or perhaps it had come to him from Plato's version of the *Apology*, as the following similarities indicate.

From the outset of Plato's *Apology*, Socrates exhibits the distinctive character of his defense, one that distinguishes it from the accustomed rhetoric of the apologetic genre: he is well aware of the negative reactions this kind of defense might excite, to the point that he anticipates them several times (17d, 20e–21a, 34c–d, 36d–37a). The second of these passages is closest to Xenophon's *Apology*, as has been noted.¹⁷ Plato here mentions the judges' reactions in the guise of a double request to them not to make a noise:

And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting (μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν); for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don't make a disturbance again at what I say (καὶ ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε); for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

PL. *Ap.* 20e–21a (tr. FOWLER)

The expression *mega legein*¹⁸ used at the beginning of this passage recalls the verdict of *megalegoria* in the *Apology* of Xenophon; the warning comes at the moment when Socrates announces he will produce a credible witness, the Delphic god.

¹⁷ See von Arnim 1923, 15.

¹⁸ Also at *Alc.* 110b, *Phd.* 95b, 101c, *Phdr.* 260d, *Resp.* 5.449b, *Symp.* 198d, 212d, *Thet.* 152d; see Waterfield 2012, 274.

In Xenophon's version the uproar and the outcries of the judges are highlighted by the dramatic effect of the double interruption of Socrates' discourse:

"Moreover I have this further proof that I am not telling lies against God: I have reported God's counsels to numerous friends, and never yet have I been proven mistaken." When this was heard by the jurors, and caused uproar (ἐθορύβουν), with some disbelieving (ἀπιστοῦντες) his words, and others jealous (φθονοῦντες) especially that he was receiving greater benefits from gods than they themselves, Socrates resumed: "Come now, let me tell you something else, so that those of you so wishing may believe even less in my having been honoured by gods. For once, when Chaerephon enquired about me at Delphi before many witnesses, Apollo pronounced in reply that no man was more free-spirited or juster or more prudent than I." When these further statements were heard by the jurors and predictably caused still greater uproar (ἐθορύβουν) among them, Socrates spoke again, saying: "But, gentlemen, the god had greater things to say (μείζω ... εἶπεν) in oracles about Lycurgus, the lawgiver to the Spartans, than he did about me. For it is said that when he was entering the temple, the god addressed him saying 'I am pondering whether to call you a god or a man.' But *me* he didn't liken to a god, merely judging me to be far superior to other men."

XEN. *Ap.* 13–15 (tr. MACLEOD, slightly modified)

This two-fold narrative of uproar among the judges in a context similar to that of Plato's *Apology* prompts one to find similarities between the two passages. The "uproar" (*thorubos*)¹⁹ emphasizes the effect of the discourse on the public. As in the tragedies, *megalegoria* seems to imply a balance of power or a challenge between a speaker and his audience. The two *Apologies* dramatize the scene by showing the semantic relation between *mega legein* or *megalegoria* and *thorubos*. In both cases the dramatic highpoint corresponds to the revelation of the words of the oracle. But Xenophon's approach has three specific features:

1. There is probably a word-play in the evocation of the example of Lycurgus, thanks to the use of the expression μείζω λέγειν, that indicates how

19 See Bers 1985; Pontier 2006, 24–26; and Wallace 2004, 225: "In the assembly, *thorubos* had the practical purpose of regulating debate ... *Thorubos* was a negative vote by the people, constituting the fundamental power of the community to decide what it would listen to."

the god would have expressed himself on behalf of the Lacedaemonian legislator. The supreme *megalegoria* is thus placed in the mouth of the god, as in Plato. But where Plato's Socrates reminds us who Chaerephon was, Xenophon's Socrates recalls the case of Lycurgus, thus comparing himself, by way of the interposed oracle, to the founder of Sparta. Was this received as a deliberate provocation of the Athenian public after thirty years of war against Sparta?²⁰ It is very likely (cf. Hdt. 1.65). However, Socrates does not actually liken himself either to Lycurgus or to a god, stressing that according to the god he occupies an intermediate rank between men and gods. Above all, the comparison serves the purposes of Xenophon's discourse, to show that Socrates tried as much possible to make his own conduct godlike.²¹ Thus he is offering an interpretation of Socrates' *megalegoria* that differs from the one operating in Plato's *Apology*.

2. The utterances that unleash the first uproars are of very different tenors: in Xenophon's version Socrates speaks of the nature of *daimonion*, while Plato advances the assertion that Socrates had an *anthrôpinê sophia*, "human wisdom."²² In Xenophon, Socrates insists upon the specific relationship with the god that allows him to warn his friends about the future and to give them infallible advice. By contrast, in Plato, Socrates tries to prevent or anticipate the uproar reacting to the words of the oracle.²³ The second outbreak of tumult corresponds overall to the reply of the oracle in the two authors. Xenophon is more emphatic about the religious context of *megalegoria* in dramatizing the scene: it is the defense against the accusation of impiety and the invocation of the oracle that more absolutely crystallizes the verdict of *megalegoria*.
3. The judges' reactions bring to mind the reflections of the two choruses in the tragedies cited. There *megalegoria* excites the emotions of the audiences, fear or outrage. This is also what emerges from Xenophon's first narrative comment:

20 Cf. Vander Waerdt 1993, 31: "yet it is hard to imagine a more provocative comparison than to impute divinity to the father of the regime which had recently destroyed Athens' political power after decades of war."

21 See also *Mem.* 1.6.10.

22 Von Fritz 1930, 65, notes the difference between Xenophon and Plato, but puts it down to an editorial awkwardness; see also Breitenbach 1967, col. 1889.

23 Von Arnim 1923, 15 and 86.

When this was heard by the jurors, and caused uproar (ἐθορύβουν), with some disbelieving (οἱ μὲν ἀπιστοῦντες) his words, and others jealous (οἱ δὲ καὶ φθονοῦντες) especially that he was receiving greater benefits from gods than they themselves, Socrates resumed.

XEN. *Ap.* 14 (tr. MACLEOD, slightly modified)

The uproar among the judges is thus explained by two kinds of emotion: *apistia*, defiance or disbelief in respect of the words spoken, and *phthonos*, envy at the notion that Socrates might have more than themselves. The first feeling is implicit in the parallel passage in Plato; Socrates makes this clear in the precautionary language that comes just before mention of the uproar: “And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you” (20d, tr. Fowler). But this observation comes before the assertion that he possesses “a human wisdom,” as against that of the sophists, which is “greater than human.” By contrast, in Xenophon’s version, incredulity attaches to the privileged relation between Socrates and the deity.

There is also envy. Because it seems difficult to be at the same time both incredulous and envious, we should distinguish two groups reacting differently to Socrates’ utterances. Should one accord greater importance to the second because of the presence of the intensifier *kai*? The translations which we have consulted do not do so. In his review of the Budé Xenophon’s *Symposium*, Kerferd notes that the word καί is not translated in an exactly parallel passage from chapter 1.²⁴ Xenophon there shows Socrates and his companions all going to the house of Callias, some after exercising and being rubbed with oil, others going just to take a bath—a striking detail that recalls the bath which, exceptionally, Socrates took before going to Agathon’s house in Plato’s version of the *Symposium*.²⁵ One can find many other passages where the presence of καί is not anodyne, among them the one in the *Apology*. It often signifies a gradation or an emphasis on the second part of a phrase.²⁶ This nuance may be a simple addition or it can mark a contrast.²⁷ Καί thus has a sense very close to the adverb ἄν, “on the other hand, on their side.”

24 Kerferd 1962, 21–24.

25 See *Symp.* 1.7, and the preceding possibly ironic reaction of Callias (1.4). See also Pl. *Symp.* 174a2.

26 See *Symp.* 1.9; *Hell.* 4.4.11, 4.5.14; *Mem.* 1.3.1; *An.* 1.3.13, 5.3.10, 5.6.11, etc.

27 Denniston 1954, 305.

So there is a gradation, or at least a clear insistence on the second (and thus principal?) cause for uproar among some judges: envy. Why does Xenophon foreground the judges' envy in this passage as in the recapitulation of the *Apology*?²⁸

Socrates, by glorifying himself (διὰ τὸ μεγαλύνειν ἑαυτὸν) at his trial, to bring the ill-will (φθόνον ἐπαγόμενος) of the jurors upon himself, made them readier to condemn him (μᾶλλον καταψηφίσασθαι ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε τοὺς δικάστας); but to *me* he seems to have met with a fate favoured by the gods; for he left the most difficult part of his life, but gained the easiest of deaths.

XEN. *Ap.* 32 (tr. MACLEOD)

One can detect several reasons. In fact it is rather unacceptable to eulogize oneself in public because of the jealousy it can excite, and we have in this passage, a repetition of a rhetorical commonplace already present in Pindar (*Ol.* 9.38) and of which one finds plenty of instances in Plutarch's treatise *De laude ipsius*. There may be a political reason connected to the importance of the *phthonos* at the end of the Peloponnesian War.²⁹ And there is a social reason. As Xenophon himself emphasises in the *Memorabilia*, the desire to have more leads to envy, while the sage or the *kalos kagathos* rightly succeeds in "eradicating" *phthonos*.³⁰ In this passage it is "fools" who are the prey of envy, and so one deduces that the narrator also considers the judges in the *Apology* to be "fools." The negative image of a jury fit to let themselves be fooled, to condemn the innocent and to exculpate the guilty, underlies Xenophon's narrative from the first conversation of Socrates with Hermogenes.³¹ Envy is a central fact of the verdict, whose probity it calls into question.

And so should we consider that Socrates' eulogy of himself in place of an apology amounts to a suicide by means of judicial verdict?³² This would introduce a direct causal relationship between the *megalegoria* and the judges' verdict: Socrates did his utmost to be put to death. But the text of the *Apology* is

28 The theme of jealousy is present in the comparison Socrates makes with the death of Palamedes (26); see also the parallel passage in Plato (*Ap.* 41b) and *Mem.* 4.2.33.

29 See Azoulay 2004, 234.

30 See *Mem.* 3.9.8 (tr. Todd): "Considering the nature of Envy, he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend's misfortune, nor at an enemy's good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at their friends' successes ... This, however, could not happen to a man of sense, but it is always the case with fools." See also 2.6.21–24.

31 *Ap.* 4 and 23.

32 See Vlastos 1992, 397; Azoulay 2004, 272; Waterfield 2012.

more ambiguous than it seems, as is shown by the adverb μάλλον in the extract already cited (32). The *Apology*, in not limiting itself to Socrates' own discourse to the judges, reveals the coherence of his attitude: before the trial, he says to Hermogenes that he will explain to the judges his way of life, preferring to die instead of begging for a prolongation of his existence (9). In following the divine sign Socrates asserts that he is doing nothing to provoke the judges: it is they who through weakness of spirit are in the wrong to be envious. Circumstances (his age and the sign from the god) make him deem it the right "moment" to die (ἐν καιρῷ, 7; καιρόν, 23). Thus he does not exhibit an untimely presumption. Xenophon judges his conduct appropriate and linked to the occasional positive instances of *megalegoria* we have already seen.

Socrates' *megalegoria* is presented in the context of the double reaction of the judges that precedes and corresponds to the words of the oracle. The causes of the uproar are slightly different in Plato and Xenophon, as is the articulation of *megalegoria*. The judicial context and the reflection on the search for arguments and on the elaboration of the line of defense show clearly that this is rhetorical debate echoing a judicial debate. Socrates' argument is revelatory: if he is condemned to death it is not so much because of the tenor of his defense as because the foundations of Athenian justice are undermined from the outset. The stance is political: in justifying Socrates' attitude towards his judges, Xenophon emphasises—in the name of both the divine sign and the coherence of his words and actions—the limits of Athenian judicial institutions and the negative reactions of the hearers, their jealousy and even their mediocrity.

2 The Defense of Socrates and the Role of Antiphon in *Memorabilia* Book 1

The apologetic discourse in the *Memorabilia* is more general than in the *Apology*: the defense of the first two chapters ("*Schutzschrift*")³³ refuting the two principal accusations extends into a looser but none the less apologetic eulogy in the following chapters.³⁴ At the same time, in Book 1 Xenophon uses the language he attributes to Socrates in the *Apology*. He reformulates the well-known *topos* of "astonishment" as way of seizing the attention of an audience or readership and of questioning the substance of the accusation (*Ap.* 11, 25; *Mem.* 1.1.1,

33 Maier 1913, 22.

34 See Bandini and Dorion 2000, clxxxvi–cxcii, on this point, and Erbse 1961.

1.1.20, 1.2.1).³⁵ Furthermore, in the third person, he rehearses two arguments used by Socrates, in the first chapter and in the course of the second chapter.³⁶ He sketches the lineaments of a Socrates of unimpeachable piety (chapter 1), master of himself and exempt from corruption (chapter 2).

The defense in the *Memorabilia* responds to other accusations that were doubtless elaborated after Socrates' death by an "accuser" (κατήγορος, 1.2.9, 1.2.12, 1.2.26, 1.2.49, 1.2.51, 1.2.56, 1.2.58), behind whom we could see Polycrates:³⁷ Socrates persuaded his pupils to flout established laws (9); he had Critias and Alcibiades as pupils; he taught his companions to despise their fathers (49) and instructed them in crime and tyranny by way of pernicious interpretations of certain poetic references (56). Xenophon devotes long passages to the cases of Critias and Alcibiades: he is careful not to show the former as on good terms with Socrates, just as he does not have the latter converse with the philosopher.³⁸

The principal design of the second section of Book 1 is to demonstrate that Socrates' *enkrateia* is "useful" to his entourage.³⁹

As for the ways by which, in my opinion, he did indeed benefit (ὠφελεῖν) his companions, partly in practice by demonstrating his own character, and partly also by his conversation, I shall write down (γράφω) the examples I remember.

XEN. *Mem.* 1.3.1 (tr. MACLEOD)

-
- 35 See *incipit*: "I have often wondered what were the arguments used by Socrates' accusers to persuade the Athenians that he deserved a state execution" (*Mem.* 1.1.1, tr. Macleod). On the use of this commonplace, henceforth see Humble 2014, 223–225.
- 36 See Bandini and Dorion 2011b, annexe 6, 246–248, for a clear picture of the correspondences between the two works.
- 37 See first Cobet 1858; Gigon 1953, 36; Bandini and Dorion 2000, 79–81 n. 77.
- 38 See 1.2.29–38 (Socrates and Critias); in the case of Alcibiades, Xenophon chose to develop a refutation of Pericles by Alcibiades (1.2.40–46).
- 39 This second section which begins in 1.3 extends until 2.1, the long discussion between Socrates and Aristippus seeming to conclude this suite of discussions on *enkrateia*. See von Arnim, 1923, 109, following Richter; Erbse 1961, 273–274; Gray 1998, 129–130; Bandini and Dorion 2000, ccxxi–ccxxiii (according to whom 11.1 serves as transition); Bevilacqua 2010, 44–45; Moore (in this volume), 511–513; Dorion (in this volume), 527: "*enkrateia* is in the ethics of Xenophon's Socrates the equivalent of *sophia* in the ethics of Plato's Socrates." The *topos* about the utility of Socrates to his friends occurs in the *Apology*, particularly in the last phrase (34). See here Danzig (in this volume), esp. 467–472, on the same topic in *Memorabilia* 2.

This transition rests on the principle of the exact conformity between Socrates' acts and his words, which goes with one of the postulates of the *Apology* (2). On this basis Xenophon begins by recounting a series of attitudes and statements on his conduct in respect of the gods (1.3.1–4), and then on his style of living (1.3.5–15) founded on *enkrateia*, the “basis of virtue” (1.5.4). In this passage Xenophon performs his act of writing (γράφω) in response to the act of accusation (γραφή), and simultaneously distinguishes himself from other witnesses (ἐνιοι γράφουσι, 1.4.1) who said that Socrates excelled at exhorting men to virtue, but could in no way lead them to it.⁴⁰

From then on, the plan of the rest of Book 1 (1.3–1.7) operates around alternations between discourses without any specified audience and more enacted conversations. The first of these presents Critobulus, Xenophon himself, and Socrates (1.3); it is followed by a long discussion with Aristodemus on religion and divine intelligence (1.4), and then a brief general account of *enkrateia* (1.5); then there is a block of three discussions with Antiphon “the sophist,” who criticizes Socrates and his life-style (1.6), and a general discussion on deception (1.7). These precede the great conversation with Aristippus, to which Socrates responds by recalling Prodicus' famous apologue about Heracles at the cross-roads (2.1).

In this section of the *Memorabilia* (1.3–2.1) Socrates' interlocutors are pupils and friends with only the exception of Antiphon in 1.6. Antiphon has long been characterized as “a typical sophist, adversary of Socrates.”⁴¹ While most of the other interlocutors are relatively well-disposed with respect to Socrates' argument (while not necessarily up to the high moral plane of the discussion),⁴² Antiphon, who is there to criticize his competitor, is aggressive. Each of the three discussions between Antiphon and Socrates is constructed in the same way. Antiphon's criticisms receive a more or less elaborated response from

40 See Bandini and Dorion 2000, cxxvi–cxliv, for an analysis of this passages directed at Plato's presentation of Socrates and *elenchus*, and 137 n. 226 for the textual comment on 1.4.1 (with which Bevilacqua 2010, 247–248, agrees).

41 Bandini and Dorion 2000, 152, takes up the expression of Gigon 1953, 165. He also notes the rarity of this sort of dialogue in *Memorabilia*, where the interlocutor takes the initiative with the clear aim of attacking Socrates (153).

42 Aristippus and Critobulus are models of intemperance in respect of Socrates' *enkrateia*. The choice of pupils in Book 1 is not by chance: the very presence of Xenophon can be understood as a literary concern to take the role of a witness, even if it does not redound to his glory (Socrates treats him as “poor fellow” [τλήμων] in 1.3.11, and as “stupid fellow” [μῶρε], the sole occurrence in the corpus, at 1.3.13).

Socrates, along the lines of the same pattern of argument in the first section of Book 1: an element of accusation, and then defense.⁴³

The only dialogue in the *Memorabilia* which might formally be a counterpart to 1.6 is 4.4.5–25, the conversation on justice between Socrates and another sophist, Hippias, in the presence of a group of friends.⁴⁴ These are the only two dialogues in which great intellectual figures or Socrates' rival teachers take part.⁴⁵ Their places in their respective books raise the same problems: the insertion into Book 4 of the exchange between Hippias and Socrates seems to interrupt the pedagogic sequence about instructing Euthydemus (4.2–3; 5–6).⁴⁶ The discussion with Antiphon interrupts the series of discussions or discourses aimed at pupils and illustrating Socrates' virtues (1.3–5; 1.7–2.1).

Let me turn to the substance of the two dialogues. In 4.4 Hippias attacks Socrates' discourses, which according to him always repeat the same things, and his pedagogic method founded on questioning and *elenchus*, which allows him to deride others without revealing his own ideas (4.4.9). Xenophon's defense aims at showing, to the contrary, that Socrates did not at all conceal his opinion on the matter (4.4.1; see also 4.4.25). In 1.6, Antiphon, explicitly defined as a "sophist," criticizes Socrates' concept of "philosophy," accusing him of being a "master of unhappiness" by virtue of the style of living he follows and promotes (1.6.3). The attack, which recalls the satire of *Clouds*, focuses on his food, drink, and garments, all characterized as mediocre or cheap; and above all it takes issue with the fact that Socrates does not take money for the teaching he dispenses. For, according to Antiphon, money "gladdens its recipients and ensures its possessors a more independent and pleasant life" (1.6.3). Socrates' responses, to Hippias as to Antiphon, aim at defending himself. This is striking in the discussions with Antiphon, where he invokes his virtuous choice of life in the first person, contrasting his quest for self-sufficiency with the *philarguria* of his interlocutor, while in the discussions preceding and following 1.6 he speaks in a general fashion and alludes less directly to his own case.⁴⁷

43 See the analysis by Gray 1998, 125–128, and the way Socrates seems able to impose himself verbally.

44 Narcy 1997, like Stokes 2012 (253 n. 30), readily puts these passages in parallel, for quite different reasons. For further bibliography on this chapter and the problems it arouses, see (in this volume) Moore, "3. *Dikaiosune*," in his thorough analysis of *Memorabilia* 4.

45 I do not mention Aristippus (2.1 and 3.8), because he is a pupil of Socrates, unlike Hippias and Antiphon.

46 See Bandini and Dorion 2000, ccxxxi–ccxxviii.

47 We meet this way of arguing from his deeds again at 4.4.10–11.

In the first discussion, Socrates' principal argument rebuts the notion of liberty invoked by Antiphon: for Antiphon, money is a very great source of liberty, while for Socrates money is enslaving, or more exactly, not receiving money for the teaching he offers allows him more liberty in his choice of pupils (1.6.5; cf. also 1.2.5–6; *Symp.* 1.5; *Ap.* 16).⁴⁸ It is also in this first discussion that Socrates attacks the sophist most vigorously, condemning his alimentary and vestimentary regimes (5, 6), his lack of physical exercise (7), and finally contrasting his own position of self-mastery with his interlocutor's ideal of happiness:

You seem to think, Antiphon, that happiness (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) consists in luxury and an expensive lifestyle (τροφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν), but I think that needing nothing is godlike, that needing as little as possible is closest to the godlike, that the godlike is best of all, and that the closest to the godlike is closest to the best of all.

XEN. *Mem.* 1.6.10 (tr. MACLEOD)

The sophist here represents the opposite of the Socratic model, the intemperate slave of his desires, of whom Socrates gave a general vision in the preceding chapter (1.5). In the second discussion, where Antiphon begins by deprecating Socrates' *sophia* on the grounds that it is of no value to him because it is not "marketable," he is categorizing himself as one who is closer to a *kalos kagathos* than to a sophist who trades with his knowledge (1.6.13; *Symp.* 4.62). His function is to teach his friends what is good, as they are his real wealth. As for the treasure he possesses, it consists in riches garnered in the works of the ancients: he pools them with his friends. This spiritual conception of gain is developed in a metaphorical fashion in relation to the material conception of knowledge revealed by Antiphon.

This second discussion concludes with an intervention by Xenophon, who characterizes Socrates as "most happy" (*makarios*, 1.6.14). The adjective is a response to Antiphon's first attack, which treated Socrates as a "master of unhappiness," but it is also an echo of Socrates' discourse that contrasted his own lifestyle with that which Antiphon deemed himself "most happy" to lead (μακαρίζεις, 9; see also 10 cited above). One can also think of the conclusion of Virtue's address to Heracles at the end of Prodicus' apologue: "O Heracles, you son of goodly parents, if you will labour earnestly on this wise, you may have for your own the most blessed happiness" (τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν,

⁴⁸ See also Muller 2001, 315.

2.1.33, tr. Marchant).⁴⁹ This deliberate lexical echo confirms the unity of section 1.3–2.1 and the link with 2.1. One then has to recall the conclusion of the *Apology* when Xenophon challenges his readership by saying that if anyone has met a man of more utility to him than Socrates then he must be reckoned an extremely happy man (ἄξιομαχαριστότατον, 34). One knows at least since Herodotus (1.32) that happiness can be judged only posthumously; but it is a choice of life, even a choice of *sophia* that Xenophon displays in this chapter of *Memorabilia* in drawing the parallel between Antiphon and Socrates and taking sides himself. One final feature corroborates the close relationship between 1.6 and 2.1: Xenophon establishes a parallel between two intellectual figures by a play of qualifiers. At the end of the discussion with Aristippus, Socrates relays respectfully the words “Prodicus the wise,”⁵⁰ a qualifier which contrasts with “Antiphon the sophist.”

Our analysis has sought to cast light on the effects of symmetry between 1.6 and 4.4, in the general structure of the *Memorabilia*, in the general orientation of dialogues, and in the technique of the portrait of Socrates which is built to contrast with the criticism of Antiphon (and of Hippias). The principal themes addressed in Book 1 relate to philosophy, education, happiness, and money.

3 Antiphon *versus* Socrates

Let me now turn to the uncertainties which remain about the identity of “Antiphon the sophist.” Since Antiquity questions have been asked about the contemporary existence of several Antiphons.⁵¹ Among them, besides a poet,

49 There are just three occurrences of the family of terms in *Memorabilia*. On Xenophon's *eudaimonia*, see now Gray 2013.

50 Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφός, *Mem.* 2.1.21; see also *Symp.* 4.62 and *Ar. Nub.* 360–363. The similarity between Antiphon “the sophist” and Prodicus “the wise” weakens the argument of Pendrick 1993, 221, who analyses the presence of the article in 1.6.1 as proof of the identification with an Antiphon known as a professional sophist. See also Pendrick 2002, 3, and Gergel 2006, 411–412.

51 One can enumerate at least three contemporary Antiphons if one trusts the different death accounts available (411 and 403 at Athens, and a slightly later unknown date at Syracuse). We set aside the question of Antiphon the poet and stick with the two other Antiphons. The principal evidence in antiquity is attributable to Hermogenes (*De Ideis* 2.11, Rabe 399.18–400.21). Re-examining the distinction between the two Antiphons made

there appear the most famous, Antiphon of Rhamnus (one of the ten Attic orators, implicated in the oligarchic revolution of 411 and condemned to death) and perhaps “another Antiphon” (to whom we owe the treatises *On Truth* and *On Concord*). In the modern era attempts have been made to distinguish the orator and the “sophist.”⁵² Since Antiquity the evidence of Xenophon has been at the center of all these discussions, because of the specificity (“Antiphon the sophist,” 1.6.1) that he gives to his presentation of the individual.⁵³ For “separatists” this specificity served to differentiate the individual presented from the orator.⁵⁴ For some years, however, the “separatist” position has retreated before the “unitary” position.⁵⁵

In our analysis of the dialogues it seemed that the qualifier σοφιστής does not necessarily have the (sole?) function of distinguishing two individual contemporaries of Socrates with the forename Antiphon. And even if that is the case,⁵⁶ the specification seems to inscribe the transmission of knowledge⁵⁷ into the logic of the situation of the dialogue and its thematic substance. In fact Antiphon is presented from the outset as a teacher of *sophia*, a rival of Socrates. He criticizes him above all for his conception of “philosophy” and the happiness he draws from it. He presents a pose of a specialist in “wisdom” exactly in conformity with the label Xenophon has given him. In several passages in Book 1, just as in the defensive discourse in the *Apology*, the sophist is, unlike

by the grammarian Didymos for stylistic reasons, Hermogenes presents them both as sophists (οἱ σοφιστεύσαντες, Rabe 399.21–22), while questioning the real value of these stylistic variations (see, however, the reservations of Pendrick 2002, 12–13, about Hermogenes’ view, though it is hard to argue from the lost text of Didymos).

52 See Narcy 1989. Gagarin 1990 updated in Gagarin 2002a, 37–52, and 2002b, Wiesner 1994, and Narcy 1996 represent the “unitarists” (see also Cassin in his article in the *Neue RE*; and Narcy 1996 and 2002 on the intellectual history of Antiphon in the twentieth century). Among the opponents of this unitary vision of Antiphon see Pendrick 1987 and 1993, and the introduction to his edition of the fragments of “Antiphon the Sophist” in 2002 (1–26 above all for the discussion of Xenophon’s text).

53 See especially Ps.-Plutarch, 832b–834b, citing the passage from *Memorabilia*.

54 Cf. Pendrick 1993, 219: “Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.1–15 provides the strongest support for the separatist thesis” (see his analysis of the passage, 219–222).

55 Gagarin 2002a and Hourcade 2001. See also Johnstone 2006, 269–271; Bertrand 2007.

56 According to Croiset 1917, 15, Xenophon here distinguished Antiphon of Rhamnus from a poet Antiphon, put to death by Dionysus of Syracuse.

57 In a famous passage in the *Cyropaedia*, an anonymous individual, killed by the father of Tigranes, is very like Socrates: he is described as σοφιστής (3.1.14), which in that context indicates a kind of tutor, a “knowledge professional” entrusted with the education of Tigranes.

Socrates, defined as a “merchant” who sells his knowledge to any pupil—as long as he pays.⁵⁸ From this point of view the characterization of the “sophistic” style of living is consistent with Platonic and Aristotelian criticism.⁵⁹ In the same chapter, Socrates compares the generic sophist (σοφιστής) to a prostitute (1.6.13), since he sells his knowledge as others sell their bodies to any client. This comparison explains the initial descriptive detail in the dialogue, when Xenophon shows that Antiphon’s main aim is to convince Socrates’ pupils to come with him.

A unitarian position on Antiphon is not indispensable to interpreting this chapter. In a classic way, the celebration of Socrates’ self-mastery and teaching method has its counterpart in the critique of the sophistic lifestyle, which is founded on an unending quest for wealth by any possible means.

However, taking note of the position of the chapter in Book 1, of the sense of the qualifier, and of the tenor of the discussion, it appears that the interpretation takes on a sharper and notably political relief if one posits that Socrates is confronting Antiphon the oligarch, who died condemned to death after the political coup of 411, and whose oratorical talents were admired by Thucydides. As Michael Gagarin demonstrated, Antiphon and Socrates had parallel fates: at an interval of ten years both chose to face a political trial rather than to flee, and according to Thucydides’ famous testimony both were condemned to death after having defended themselves in an exemplary and memorable fashion.⁶⁰

The real author and maturer of the whole scheme, who had been longest interested in it, was Antiphon, a man inferior to none of his contemporaries in specific personal excellence, and possessed of remarkable powers of thought and gifts of speech. He did not like to come forward in the assembly, or in any other public arena. To the multitude, who were suspicious of his great abilities (διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος), he was an object of dislike (ὑπόπτως); but there was no man who could do (ὠφελεῖν) more for any who consulted him, whether their business lay in the courts of justice or in the assembly. And when later the decisions of the Four Hundred were reversed and were being savaged by the people, and he being accused of taking part in the plot had to speak in his own case, his defense was

58 See 1.2.5–7, 1.5.6; *Ap.* 16.

59 See Narcy 2008, 121–123 with references, and 124: “What set philosophers and sophists apart was firstly their attitude to money.”

60 See Gagarin 2002b.

undoubtedly the best (ἄριστα) ever made by any man tried on a capital charge down to my time.

THUC. 8.68.1–2 (tr. JOWETT REV. HORNBLOWER)⁶¹

Thucydides reveals how Antiphon was regarded with some suspicion by the mob; he defends him in the name of his “utility” to the public. This argument may be not unusual, but it can nonetheless bring to mind the kind of defense Xenophon chooses in Book 1 of the *Memorabilia*, albeit with one difference: Socrates is useful to all, primarily to his circle of friends, but also to everyone he sees in public, and not only in debates in tribunals or in the public assembly. Besides, it seems that Antiphon made a remarkable speech in his own defense during his trial,⁶² eulogizing his own actions and decisions in life without begging for the judges’ pity, which is very close to what we know of Socrates’ defense. In distinction from Antiphon, however, Xenophon’s Socrates left no written discourse and did not, as the *Apology* makes clear, design his defense according to the rules of rhetoric (4).

How then to interpret the exchanges with Antiphon? Here are two intellectuals of virtually the same generation put to death for political reasons. Both aroused the people’s suspicion in different degrees. One was directly engaged in the political coup of 411, the other one was accused of having educated Critias and Alcibiades. At *Mem.* 1.2.29–38 Xenophon has dealt with Socrates’ relations with the leader of the Thirty; now he just has to show what distinguishes Antiphon and Socrates, both “sophists” in Athenian eyes. According to him they differ above all in their lifestyles, their notion of money, of happiness and of *sophia*, as well as in their engagement in politics.

This last point is tackled in the final brief discussion (1.6.15). Antiphon asks Socrates why he values training men in politics while not engaging in politics himself if he knows so much about it. In reply, Socrates asks him which he considers the better kind of political engagement: engaging in it as a single individual, or applying oneself to making as many men as possible capable of doing it. There are other versions of this apophthegm with other interlocutors, and its insertion has been perceived as clumsy, as much in a literary as an apologetic sense.⁶³ In fact it comes after a comment which seems like a general

61 See Hornblower 2008, 956–958, on the textual difficulties of this passage. The posterity of Thucydides’ judgment on Antiphon’s defense is extensive: see Cic. *Brut.* 12.47 (relying on a lost text of Aristotle) and Quint. *Inst.* 3.1.11.

62 Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1232b7–9.

63 Bandini and Dorion 2000, 167–168 n. 322: “it is a matter of anecdotal material passed from one author to another.”

conclusion: “As I listened to these words, it seemed to me that he was really fortunate himself (μακάριος) and was guiding his listeners towards becoming perfect men” (1.6.14).

However, the discussion is coherent with the two that precede it. Maintaining the discursive style of an expert in wisdom, Antiphon questions the wisdom (ἐπιστήμη) of Socrates in the matter of politics,⁶⁴ after having taken issue with his practice and teaching of philosophy (φιλοσοφία) and the “worth” of his wisdom (σοφία). Socrates’ response, which sticks judiciously to the rejection of any direct engagement in politics,⁶⁵ is less banal or incoherent if Antiphon is endowed with extensive and publicly-known political experience that he flaunts indirectly in front of Socrates’ pupils.⁶⁶ Moreover, Xenophon’s reader can do what Socrates’ pupils could not do in the dramatic moment of the discussion, looking back on Antiphon’s whole career, his political experience prior to 411 (perhaps his activity as a counselor in public and judicial debates, whose value Thucydides praises in 8.68.1), and also and above all the troubled events that brought about his end. The place of this discussion at the end of the chapter, just after an observation stressing Socrates’ “happiness,” seems quite legitimate, as it suggests taking a retrospective view of both men and their happiness *post mortem*.⁶⁷ From this perspective the true happy man is assuredly Socrates, as his style of living is more moderate and closer to that of the gods.

Besides, the dramatization of the dialogues between Antiphon and Socrates readily makes allusion to comic theatre. Lexical allusions by Antiphon to Socrates’ lifestyle have often been pointed out: they recall the satire of *Clouds*. Similarly, Xenophon responds to this satire by caricaturing Antiphon and his taste for money, a taste also mocked by dramatic authors (Plato Comicus among others, and surely Aristophanes).⁶⁸ The depiction of Antiphon hunting for pupils is not without irony and humour, as are his words at the beginning

64 Among the list of works attributed to Antiphon is a treatise entitled *Politics* of which only some fragments are extant (see Pendrick 2002, frs. 72–77).

65 *Mem.* 1.2.39 stresses that Critias and Alcibiades conversed more willingly with major figures in political life than with Socrates.

66 Croiset 1917, 16; Morrison 1961, 58; Avery 1982, 151.

67 This is how I interpret the elliptical remark by Croiset 1917, 16: “Antiphon’s reproach would be less at home on the tongue of a sophist concerned with physics and metaphysics than on that of a man who was, as Thucydides says, the soul of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred.”

68 *Plut. Mor.* 833c and *Philostr. vs.* 1.15.2; see Avery 1982, 152–153 and Pirrotta 2009, 232–234, who notes the interesting parallel between Plato Comicus’ satire and the dialogue in the *Memorabilia*, dating the comedy to the end of the 420s. See also *Ar. Vesp.* 1270, 1301.

of the second discussion. His argument is based on money and, as he sees it, the material value of things and knowledge (1.6.11). Antiphon's presence takes on another aspect if we think of the fragments of his defense, where he reveals that his accusers condemned him for enriching himself under the democratic regime by his activities as a logographer. Again, this echoes (for him too) criticisms in the comic writers.⁶⁹

In this chapter of the *Memorabilia* Socrates' remarks constitute a kind of rehearsal of his defense before the judges. Antiphon is a stooge for him, as he is at the same time like him (an Athenian, a dispenser of wisdom, distrusted by the people) and different, even in his conception of the law. A recent article has made a point of a recurrent feature of Antiphon's mindset, his taste for obscurity in what he sees as an over-inquisitive society: "escaping from scrutiny is a central preoccupation of Antiphon's political personality."⁷⁰ In fragments traditionally attributed to "Antiphon the sophist," the opposition between law and nature evokes Hippias' position in *Memorabilia* 4.⁷¹ Accordingly, it seems that obedience to the laws of the city is required only insofar as there are witnesses, a claim utterly incomprehensible for Xenophon's Socrates. For him, the eye of god is always watching.⁷² One can emphasize that by contrast in the *Memorabilia* Socrates is described as someone whose temperance and piety were always on public view. Xenophon's intention in this book of the *Memorabilia* is to defend Socrates' political stance by distinguishing him from real public enemies.⁷³

The most convincing argument for this identification of Antiphon seems to derive from a parallel between Thucydides' evidence on Antiphon and Xenophon's evidence on Socrates. In fact, at the end of *Memorabilia* Xenophon reports the last moments of Socrates' life, showing that "he won glory by the moral strength revealed in the extreme honesty and frankness and probity of

69 In its form and its possible comic allusions the exchange between Antiphon and Socrates recalls the dialogue between the Syracusean moved by "jealousy" (*φθονῶν*) and Socrates in Xenophon's *Symposium* (6.6–10).

70 Bertrand 2008, 15.

71 Croiset 1917, 10–11, emphasises that Xenophon could have "adapted" an idea of Antiphon's and put it into Socrates' mouth (4.4.19–22).

72 Narcy 1997, 24–26: "one can certainly avoid the eyes of man, but not those of the gods; consequently, one may escape from the law of the city, but not the laws of the gods. Socrates' gods hear the *nomimon* of all the cosmos; it is the opposite of his notion of providence."

73 A little earlier (*Mem.* 1.2.60) Socrates is characterised by Xenophon as being "popular" and a "friend of mankind," notably because he could converse with anybody.

his defense (τήν τε δίκην πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀληθέστατα καὶ ἐλευθεριώτατα καὶ δίκαιότατα εἰπών), and in the equanimity and manliness with which he bore the sentence of death" (4.8.1, tr. Todd).⁷⁴

I hinted at the fact that Thucydides praised the skill of Antiphon, who seemed to him to have spoken "the best" defense of his era.⁷⁵ Xenophon must have been aware of the symmetrical trajectories of the defenses of Socrates and Antiphon: a similar wish to make one's own eulogy, an immediate failure before the judges, celebration by posterity. What is more, the writer of the *Hellenica*—who was perhaps the editor of Thucydides, too, according to Diogenes Laertius⁷⁶—knew his predecessor's work too well not to have been aware of his judgment on the qualities of Antiphon and of his defense. One can read the eulogy at the end of the *Memorabilia* as an echo of this judgment, in an outbidding of superlatives which establish the superiority of the philosopher over the orator: the "best" defense is outclassed by "the truest" defense, "the most free and most just." Two of these three superlatives allude to the famous judgment of the oracle invoked by Socrates in the middle of the *Apology* (14), giving rise to uproar among the judges: Apollo replied to Chaerephon that nobody was more free, more just or more temperate than Socrates. The adjective ἐλευθέριος is to be understood in relation to Socrates' conception of money, as is shown later in the *Apology* (16); we have seen this theme to be central in the dialogue setting Antiphon against Socrates (1.6.1–10). The other adjective, pointing up the "truth" of Socrates' defense, refers to his care to show his thought and life, his ideal of temperance, without any polishing, and in doing this not to deploy his mastery of rhetoric.⁷⁷

In *Memorabilia* 1.6 Xenophon seeks to distinguish Socrates from the teachers with whom he was in competition. The place of the three discussions in the middle of the catalogue of Socrates' virtues gives Antiphon the role of negative counterpart in respect of philosophy and temperance. If Antiphon is indeed the oligarch who dies in 411, the interpretation of this chapter is enhanced by

74 See Bandini and Dorion 2011b, 220 n. 7, and Narcy 2005, 117–119, on the link between Socrates' defense and the divine sign.

75 See Thuc. 8.68: ἀρίστα φαίνεται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων αἰτιαθεῖς, ὡς ξυγκατέστησε, θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος. The superlative ἀρίστα may indicate as much the excellence of the discourse as the courage evinced by the individual, a point Xenophon develops about Socrates' strength of soul at *Mem.* 4.8.1.

76 DL 2.57.

77 This adjective is a response to the accusation of lying we find at the start of the passage (4.8.1). See also *Mem.* 1.1.4; *Ap.* 13.

a considerable political dimension. Having brought Critias onstage and contrasted him with Socrates in the first part of Book 1, Xenophon deliberately brings the two characters together, and demonstrates that the private and public conduct of Socrates is in no way identifiable with that of Antiphon of Rhamnus, and that they should not be confused, any more than their defenses, even if their fates seem comparable. Only Socrates warranted the title *makarios*.

References

- Arnim, H. von. *Xenophons Memorabilien und Apologie des Sokrates*. Copenhagen 1923.
- Avery, H.C. 'One Antiphon or two?', *Hermes* 110 (1982), 145–158.
- Azoulay, V. *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir: de la charis au charisme*. Paris 2004.
- Bandini, M. and L.-A. Dorion. *Xénophon: Mémoires*, I. Paris 2000.
- Bandini, M. and L.-A. Dorion. *Xénophon: Mémoires*, II.1. Paris 2011. (= 2011a)
- Bandini, M. and L.-A. Dorion. *Xénophon. Mémoires*, II.2. Paris 2011. (= 2011b)
- Bers, V. 'Dikastik thorubos', in: P.A. Cartledge and F.D. Harvey, *Crux: essays presented to G.E.M. de Sainte Croix*. London 1985, 1–15.
- Bertrand, J.-M. 'Réflexions sur la doctrine d'Antiphon, la Révolution des Quatre Cents et la tyrannie des Trente', *PhilosAnt* 8 (2008), 9–21.
- Breitenbach, H.R. 'Xenophon von Athen', in: *RE IX A2* (1967), coll. 1569–2052.
- Chambry, P. *Xénophon: œuvres complètes*. Paris 1967.
- Cobet, C.G. *Novae Lectiones*. Lyon 1858, 662–666.
- Croiset, A. 'Les nouveaux fragments d'Antiphon', *REG* 30, 1917, 1–19.
- Danzig, G. *Apologizing for Socrates*. Lanham 2010.
- Demont, P. 'Remarques sur la technique du dialogue dans la *Cyropédie*', in: Pontier 2014, 195–210.
- Denniston, J.D. *The Greek particles*. Oxford 1954.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The *daimonion* and the *megalegoria* of Socrates in Xenophon's *Apology*', *Apeiron* 38 (2005), 127–142.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'La nature et le statut de la *sophia* dans les *Mémoires*', in: L.-A. Dorion, *L'autre Socrate*. Paris 2013, 122–146.
- Erbse, H. 'Die Architektonik im Aufbau von Xenophons *Memorabilien*', *Hermes* 89 (1961), 257–287.
- Fritz, K. von. 'Zur Frage der Echtheit der xenophontischen *Apologie des Sokrates*', *RhM* 80 (1931), 36–68.
- Gagarin, M. *Antiphon the Athenian: oratory, law and justice in the age of the Sophists*. Austin 2002. (= 2002a)
- Gagarin, M. 'Socrates and Antiphon: intellectuals on trial in classical Athens', in: J. Stran-

- gas and S. Adam. *Mélanges en l'honneur de Panayotis D. Dimakis: droits antiques et société*. Athènes 2002, 397–404. (= 2002b)
- Gergel, T. 'One Antiphon or two?', *CR* 55 (2005), 411–413.
- Gigon, O. 'Xenophons Apologie des Sokrates', *MH* 3 (1946), 210–245.
- Gigon, O. *Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien*. Basel 1953.
- Gray, V.J. 'Xenophon's defense of Socrates: the rhetorical background to the Socratic problem', *CQ* 39 (1989), 136–140.
- Gray, V.J. *The framing of Socrates: the literary interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia*, Stuttgart 1998.
- Gray, V.J. 'Xenophon's eudaimonia', in: F. de Luise and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 56–67.
- Hobden, F. and C. Tuplin. *Xenophon: ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Leiden 2012.
- Hogenmüller, B. 'Die Verurteilung des Sokrates: die Bedeutung des μεγαληγορία', *SO* 85 (2011), 169–183.
- Hornblower, S. *A commentary on Thucydides*, III. Oxford 2008.
- Hourcade, A. *Antiphon d'Athènes: une pensée de l'individu*. Bruxelles 2001.
- Humble, N. 'L'innovation générique dans la *Constitution des Lacédémoniens*', in: P. Pontier, *Xénophon et la rhétorique*. Paris 2014, 213–234.
- Joël, K. *Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates*, I–III. Berlin 1893–1901.
- Johnstone, S. 'Sophistical wisdom: πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ and *logosophia*', *Ph&Rh* 39 (2006), 265–289.
- Kerferd, G.B. 'Review of Ollier 1961', *Gnomon* 34 (1962), 21–24.
- Macleod, M.D. *Xenophon: Apology and Memorabilia I*. Oxford 2008.
- Maier, H. *Sokrates: sein Werk und sein geschichtliche Stellung*. Tübingen 1913.
- Morrison, J.S. 'Socrates and Antiphon', *CR* 5 (1955), 8–12.
- Morrison, J.S. 'Xenophon: *Memorabilia* I, 6. The encounters of Socrates and Antiphon', *CR* 3 (1953), 3–6.
- Morrison, J.S. 'Antiphon', *PCPhS* 7 (1961), 49–58.
- Muller, R. 'La liberté socratique', in: G. Romeyer Dherbey and J.-B. Gourinat, *Socrate et les socratiques*. Paris 2001, 309–329.
- Narcy, M. 'Antiphon d'Athènes', *DPhA* (1989), 225–244.
- Narcy, M. 'Les interprétations de la pensée politique d'Antiphon au xxe siècle', *RFHIP* 3 (1996), 31–45.
- Narcy, M. 'La religion de Socrate dans les *Mémoires* de Xénophon', in: G. Giannantoni and M. Narcy, *Lezione Socratiche*. Naples 1997, 15–28.
- Narcy, M. 'Du bon usage de la sophistique en temps de guerre', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* (2002), 300–313.
- Narcy, M. 'Socrates sentenced by his *daimôn*', in: P. Destrée and N.D. Smith, *Socrates'*

- divine sign: religion, practice, and value in Socratic philosophy*. Kelowna 2005, 113–125.
- Narcy, M. 'La sophistique, une manière de vivre?', *PhilosAnt* 8 (2008), 115–135.
- Ollier, F. *Xénophon: Banquet, Apologie de Socrate*. Paris 1961.
- Pendrick, G.J. 'Once again Antiphon the Sophist and Antiphon of Rhamnus', *Hermes* 115 (1987), 47–60.
- Pendrick, G.J. 'The ancient tradition on Antiphon reconsidered', *GRBS* 34 (1993), 215–228.
- Pendrick, G.J. *Antiphon the Sophist: the fragments*. Cambridge 2002.
- Pirrotta, S. *Plato comicus: die fragmentarischen Komödien*. Berlin 2009.
- Pontier, P. *Trouble et ordre chez Platon et Xénophon*. Paris 2006.
- Pontier, P. *Xénophon et la rhétorique*. Paris 2014.
- Pucci, P. *Socrates' defense*. Amsterdam 2002.
- Raalte, M van. 'Socratic parrhesia and its afterlife in Plato's Laws', in: I. Sluiter and R.M. Rosen 2004, 279–312.
- Shero, L.R. 'Plato's *Apology* and Xenophon's *Apology*', *CW* 20 (1926), 107–111.
- Sluiter, I. and R.M. Rosen. *Free speech in classical antiquity*. Leiden 2004.
- Stokes, M. 'Three defenses of Socrates: relative chronology, politics and religion', in: Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 243–268.
- Talbot, E. *Xénophon: œuvres complètes*. Paris 1859.
- Tsakmakis, A. 'Von der Rhetorik zur Geschichtsschreibung: das "Methodenkapitel" des Thukydides (1.22.1–3)', *RhM* 141 (1998), 239–255.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. 'Socratic justice and self-sufficiency: the story of the Delphic oracle in Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates*', in: *OSAPh* 11 (1993), 1–48.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. *The Socratic movement*, Ithaca 1994.
- Vlastos, G. *Socrate: ironie et philosophie morale*, tr. C. Dalimier. Paris 1994.
- Wallace, R.W. 'The power to speak—and not to listen—in ancient Athens', in: Sluiter and Rosen 2004, 221–232.
- Waterfield, R. 'Xenophon on Socrates' trial and death', in: Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 269–306.
- Wiesner, J. 'Antiphon, der Sophist und Antiphon, der Redner—ein oder zwei Autoren?', *WS* 107 (1994), 225–243.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von, 'Die xenophontische *Apologie*', *Hermes* 32 (1897), 99–106.

Nature, Culture and the Rule of the Good in Xenophon's Socratic Theory of Friendship: *Memorabilia* Book 2

Gabriel Danzig
Bar-Ilan University

1 Introduction

In this paper I analyze some central themes of Book 2 of the *Memorabilia*.¹ The book responds to charges against Socrates, especially the charge that he encouraged his companions to disparage useless family members (1.2.51–55) and the charge that he encouraged his companions to engage in shameful activities (1.2.56–57). In chapters 2–3, Xenophon argues that Socrates was right to place utility above other values. He did not encourage children or brothers to reject their relatives for a lack of utility, but rather encouraged them to show gratitude towards beneficial relatives, such as mothers, and to enlist them as subordinates in mutually beneficial alliances. In chapters 4–6, he shows how Socrates' emphasis on utility enabled him to promote moral virtue and behavior by encouraging his companions to make themselves useful to others. As he argued, moral virtue provides the basis for forming a powerful network of friends capable of taking charge of public affairs in the city. In chapters 7–10 Xenophon acknowledges that Socrates encouraged his companions to engage in shameful activities, but argues that he was right to do so, and that this kind of activity is useful and honorable when performed by and for a gentleman. Throughout the book Xenophon's Socrates displays an intellectual freedom from contemporary cultural norms that enables him to discover rational, utilitarian solutions to social and economic troubles, as well as the rhetorical ability to put his unconventional proposals in normative-sounding terms. In contradiction to the widely-held opinion that Xenophon whitewashes the image of Socrates, this portrait shows how offensive the opinions and behavior he promoted could have proved to his neighbors. Rather than waste his time white-

1 In this paper I use the terms “rational,” “utilitarian,” and “natural” to describe the social arrangements that Socrates promotes. My focus on Xenophon's interest in utility owes much to the wise words of my late colleague Prof. David Sohlberg, obm. I thank the editors, Alessandro Stavru and Christopher Moore, for useful comments on the earlier draft.

washing his master, Xenophon uses the necessity of a defense to offer his own broad vision of Socrates, and this means that he offers us many more lessons than the narrowly apologetic ones.

2 The Foundation

The first chapter of *Memorabilia* 2 reports a conversation between Socrates and Aristippus² concerning the virtue and necessity of hard work, and ends with a lengthy description of Hercules' choice between the path of virtue and the path of vice, which Xenophon ascribes to Prodicus. Much effort has been spent to determine how accurate a representation of Prodicus' story this is.³ More important for us is the place of this chapter in the composition as a whole. We do not know who was responsible for the division of *Memorabilia* into books, but there is a large degree of unity in Book 2: all the conversations in this book are concerned in one way or another with friendship—except for this chapter. V.J. Gray has argued that this chapter should be seen as the final conversation of the section 1.4–2.1, but one which, by mentioning Hercules, who was famous for his friendship, also introduces the conversations to follow.⁴ L.-A. Dorion has suggested that it is an appropriate introduction to the chapters on friendship since it concerns *enkrateia* (self-control), a quality of prime importance for friendship.⁵ Of course, *enkrateia* is fundamental not only to friendship but also to just about every other worthwhile aim: leadership, economic success, pleasure, wisdom, and the mastery of the arts. Moreover, although *enkrateia* is an important subject here, the central concern of the chapter is the necessity and virtue of the active political life.⁶ The message to Aristippus is not merely

2 Aristippus of Cyrene is one of the important figures in the circle around Socrates. Although the humor found in his portrait in Diogenes Laertius is absent from Xenophon, his reputation as a hedonist and sexual adventurer does have some basis in the present conversation where he loudly affirms the importance of food (2.1.1) and receives a lengthy diatribe on the dangers of adultery (2.1.4–5). See Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.116–117 n. 3; Nails 2002, 50–51.

3 See Dorion, 2001–2011, 2.1.152–154 n. 3. The use of a mythological or literary exposition to wrap up a philosophical discussion has parallels in Platonic dialogues such as *Crito*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, and *Republic*.

4 Gray 1998, 124–130.

5 See Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.168–169 n. 4; 180 n. 5; 184 n. 6; 194 n. 5; 2006a, 98; see *Mem.* 2.6.1.

6 One may object that in his introductory words Xenophon says that this conversation shows how Socrates “inspired his companions to practice *enkrateia*” (2.1.1). However, when reading the author of *Anabasis* and *Cyropaedia*, one must bear in mind that the subject initially mentioned does not necessarily reflect the central theme of the composition as a whole.

that he must develop *enkrateia*, but that political activity is a necessity, and that he must develop *enkrateia* as a means to creating the alliances and friendships that will enable him to survive and flourish in a political community. This chapter provides a good introduction to the chapters on friendship, then, because *friendship is conceived by Xenophon primarily as a political relationship*.⁷ And for this reason, the conversation provides an introduction not only to the chapters on friendship in Book 2, but also to the chapters on politics in Book 3,⁸ and indeed to Xenophon's political theory in general. Throughout his works, Xenophon takes it for granted that it is worthwhile to strive to be a successful leader of men. This chapter is the one place where he considers this assumption explicitly and at length, showing that the necessities of politics provide a spur to the acquisition of virtues, which Xenophon conceives, almost exclusively, as qualities useful for economic, military, and political success.

3 Beyond Cultural Norms

Because this paper aims to provide a survey of Book 2, I will not enter into a more detailed analysis of chapter 1,⁹ but will focus instead on the remaining chapters of the book, which discuss family relations, friendships, and partnerships: in short, *philia*.¹⁰ The useful advice Xenophon's Socrates offers has made him seem quite conventional to many readers, and John Burnet once said that if Socrates were really what Xenophon describes it would be impossible to explain how he could have been put to death (1914, 120). In this volume, Dorion continues the trend of interpreting Xenophon's Socrates as a conventional figure by equating him with the Athenian farmer-gentleman, Ischomachus.¹¹ In fact, however, the rationalistic conception of utility that underlies Socrates'

7 Erotic friendship is generally played down by Xenophon, especially in these chapters.

8 See Bevilacqua 2010, 43–44, for the same insight. The political content of this section ends at 3.8, the second conversation with Aristippus providing the end to a section that began with the first conversation with Aristippus (see Gray 1998, 143). On the unity of section 2.1–3.7 see Dorion 2001–2011, 1.clxxxiii–ccxl.

9 Recent treatments include Narcy 1995; Johnson 2009; Tamiolaki 2009; for my views see Danzig 2013, 371–378. For further references, see Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.116–117 n. 3.

10 On the order of the friends discussed here, and the omission of any treatment of relations between husbands and wives, see Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.168–169 n. 4.

11 In his chapter (in this volume), Dorion responds to my own treatment of the *Oeconomicus* in Danzig 2010 (239–263), rejecting the argument that Socrates and Ischomachus represent different ways of lives on the grounds that Socrates' advice to Critobulus agrees with Ischomachus' advice on at least sixty-two general points. This superficial agreement is

words and deeds puts him at odds with cultural values held dear by most of his fellow citizens in Athens. To use a term introduced by Karl Polanyi, Socrates dis-embeds social relations from their conventional cultural context, and places them in a new context, based almost completely on utility.¹² In chapters 2 and 3, Xenophon affirms that Socrates made utility the basis of good relations among family and friends, thus acknowledging a degree of truth in this charge (see 1.2.51–55). In chapters 4–6 he shows how the pursuit of utility can serve as an incentive to the cultivation of virtue and friendship. In chapters 7–10 he shows how Socrates encouraged his companions to set aside their honor and engage in economic activities ordinarily seen as shameful for the sake of utility or benefit (see *Mem.* 1.2.56–57; Gray 1998, 137). If there is any connection between Xenophon's portrait of Socrates on this point and the historical Socrates, this kind of behavior must be recognized as an important element in the conflict between Socrates and the city of Athens.

In general terms, Socrates offers advice that aims at mutual benefit by promoting asymmetric relationships in which one person is the leader or manipulator of the other. The potential leader is not necessarily the one in the conventionally dominant position (parent or boss) but rather the one who possesses the moral virtue and wisdom that are necessary to manipulate those around him in mutually beneficial ways. By these means, Socrates shows himself a good friend and a leader who offered benefit to others through useful advice. This is a Socratic variation on the empire-building of Cyrus: economic, military, and

not surprising: Socrates recalls his conversation with Ischomachus to Critobulus precisely because the advice Ischomachus has to offer is exactly the advice Socrates wishes Critobulus to hear. But it is a mistake to assume that because Socrates holds up Ischomachus as a model to Critobulus, he must view it as the best possible life or that he embodies it in his own personal behavior. While Socrates does exemplify many of the raw virtues he recommends to Critobulus, he does so in practices that diverge markedly from those of Ischomachus. Unlike Ischomachus, Socrates displays his virtues, including *enkrateia*, in activities that do not involve toil (*ponos*) for the sake of economic gains. Because of this divergence, Socrates is able to be critical of Ischomachus and to reject his way of life for himself even while holding it up to Critobulus for emulation. Since Dorion does not offer arguments to erase the obvious differences between the lives of these men, his argument that they represent the same way of life lacks a foundation. In his conclusion, Dorion finds a contradiction in the fact that while in the bulk of my paper I distinguish Socrates from Ischomachus, at the end I equate Xenophon with Ischomachus. But there is nothing contradictory about that. It should be obvious that my identifying Xenophon with Ischomachus does not contradict my distinguishing him from Socrates.

12 Polanyi of course spoke about the embeddedness of the economy. See Polanyi 1957; Dalton 1968.

political advice takes the place of the more tangible benefits that Cyrus provided. Socrates puts great effort into persuading others to adopt his point of view. As much as possible he justifies the unconventional attitudes he promotes in terms of contemporary values his companions find dear, referring frequently to aspects of Athenian law and practice that can be interpreted as supporting his advice. This may have added to the impression that the advice he offers is conventional.

4 Disembedding Family Relations

James Tatum's comments on the attitudes of Xenophon's Cyrus towards family and friends may serve as an introduction to Socrates' advice on family relations: "We shall find it hard to see any difference in Cyrus' treatment of his family, friends, or enemies. At every stage of his career, and at every level of involvement with others, he has a curious detachment about other people" (1989, 71). Socrates not only shows a similar detachment, he teaches others to adopt such an attitude toward others, including toward members of their own families.

Xenophon responds to the charge that Socrates taught children to despise useless parents and relations by arguing that the emphasis he placed on utility was designed to encourage children to make themselves useful to their parents, not to make them despise their parents (1.2.51–55). Socrates persuades his own son to view his mother¹³ as a useful ally, emphasizing the gratitude that Lamprocles owes her (2.2.1–6) by arguing that children are not the side-products of lust, but the aim and goal of responsible parents.¹⁴ The sense of gratitude Socrates encourages is not merely a moral issue but also a utilitarian political issue, since gratitude is the very foundation of good politics (*Cyr.* 1.2.7; see

13 Some ancient writers claimed that Socrates had two wives: Xanthippe and Myrto. However, the absence of any contemporary echo of any such situation in Plato or Xenophon, or even in the comic remains, is a strong argument against it. There is no reason to doubt that the mother about whom Lamprocles complains is the harsh wife of Socrates mentioned in *Symp.* 2.10. See Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.169–170 n. 5; Nails 2002, 208–210, 299–300.

14 Some have seen a contradiction between Socrates' affirmation of the goodness of existence as a reason for gratitude and Socrates' words in Xenophon's *Apology* where he sees death as a boon (6–9; 23; see Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.172 n. 6). However, in *Apology* Socrates speaks only of existence under the harsh condition of old age, not of existence generally. There may indeed be a contradiction, however, even a deliberate one, with Plato's very different suggestion that death is better than life (*Pl. Ap.* 40a–41d; *Phd.* 64a–69e).

also 8.3.49, *Mem.* 4.4.24).¹⁵ A lack of gratitude makes beneficent relationships unprofitable, and hence impossible, since people will only prove beneficial if it works to their advantage.

Comparing the mother favorably to a wild and dangerous beast, which may cause real physical harm, Socrates attempts to persuade his son that his mother's harsh words cause no serious damage. But Lamprocles objects that his mother's words are emotionally unbearable. The Greeks did not share the modern attitude reflected in the English saying "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never harm me." Like other shame-cultures, they took words very seriously. By advising Lamprocles to consider his mother's words as if they were spoken by an actor on stage, Socrates encourages him to develop an inner indifference, and ultimately to disengage from a whole range of personal and cultural attachments, adopting an attitude more familiar in today's shameless cultural context.

A comparison of the reasons that Socrates gives for his own toleration of this difficult woman (*Symp.* 2.10) with those by which he attempts to persuade his son to tolerate her reveals subtle differences but no real conflict. Gratitude of course plays a larger role with the son, since a mother's benefits are more one-sided than those of a wife. This difference also explains the supposed contradiction between his reference to her as one of the "good things" here (2.2.10) and the description of her in the *Symposium* as "most harsh" (*chalepôtatê*; see Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.176 n. 2). As Heraclitus understood, the same thing may have opposite characteristics in relation to different beings. But the strategies Socrates recommends to his son reflect the very goals he himself pursued in marrying her. By telling his son to regard her words like the words of actors on stage, he gives him advice that will enable him to learn toleration, the very purpose for which he claims that he married her (*Symp.* 2.10).

Offering lessons in leadership, Socrates encourages Lamprocles to pursue further benefits from his mother, pointing out that even seemingly unimportant people, such as a neighbor or a fellow traveler, can be useful (2.2.12). Placing the mother in this category, and making utility the basis for the relationship between mother and son,¹⁶ involves abstracting from conventional attitudes towards parents. Furthermore, by encouraging the child to seek mutual benefit for himself and his mother, Socrates places him in the role of leader, thus invert-

¹⁵ See also Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.171 n. 2.

¹⁶ See Dorion 2006b, 272. See also Bevilacqua 2010, 156–157, who points out that the Socratic position does imply the rejection of useless parents.

ing the traditional relation between parents and children. Rather than offering advice to parents about controlling their children, Xenophon's Socrates does the reverse.¹⁷

Perhaps because his theories seem so unconventional, Socrates concludes his conversation with Lamprocles by pointing to the agreement between his suggestions and the moral institutions of the city. He points out that the city imposes penalties on those who fail to treat their parents properly, including in the treatment of their graves (2.2.13). Although this may seem to show that the city's concern with gratitude is moral rather than political, Xenophon offers evidence that the law has practical political benefit in mind, noting that the penalty imposed on those who fail in this obligation is expulsion from public office (2.2.13). Those who do not show gratitude to parents and their graves cannot be trusted to show gratitude to the city either. By this argument, Socrates persuades his son that the rationalistic attitude he promotes is identical with the attitude that underlies the laws and customs of Athens, even if most contemporaries would not perceive it as such. The true conflict is not between Socrates and the city, but between Socrates' correct understanding of the rational principles of politics, which he shares with the city's customs, and the misunderstandings of his contemporaries. In a similar way, Xenophon illustrates the true meaning of Persian customs, also coinciding with his own conception of the rational principles of politics, in *Cyropaedia* (see especially 8.1–2 and see below, p. 466–467, 472–478).

In chapter 3, Socrates encourages a young man to take steps to reconcile with his brother.¹⁸ As in the previous chapter, Socrates addresses the abused, socially inferior person rather than the abusive superior, offering advice for making the best of the situation by taking charge.¹⁹ Socrates explicitly says that he chose to speak to Chaerecrates because he would be the better able to succeed in reconciling his brother Chaerephon (2.3.14).²⁰ This pattern, in which

17 It is a fundamental tenet of Xenophon's political science that the more useful member of a group is also the natural leader. See Azoulay 2004, 60–72.

18 Note Bevilacqua's acute observation (2010, 26–27) that this chapter contains a passage (2.3.4) that was written most likely after *Cyropaedia* 2.1.28.

19 Noted by Strauss 1972, 42. It is striking that in both cases the abusive, offensive member of the family is one of Socrates' closest companions. Perhaps this is meant to illustrate Socrates' own indifference to the claims of familial bonds and bonds of friendship.

20 Chaerephon was a friend of Socrates from his youth and a partisan of the democratic party in Athens. He was a great admirer of Socrates, and asked the oracle at Delphi about Socrates' wisdom (Pl. *Ap.* 21a; Xen. *Ap.* 14). See Dorion 2001–2011, 1.111 nn. 144–145; Nails 2002, 85–87. Just as in the previous chapter, where Socrates turned to his son rather than

a superior person who is socially inferior is mistreated by his social superior, reminds us of Xenophon's two Cyruses, and Socrates' effort to transform the better person into the leader fits well with the narratives described there. In *Cyropaedia*, for example, Xenophon depicts Cyrus the Great taking control of his superiors (his mother, his grandfather, and his uncle) by methods similar to those advocated by Socrates. In all these cases, Xenophon emphasizes the importance of recognizing and respecting the honor of those in a superior social position even while taking control.²¹

Unable to speak of gratitude because of the lack of debt between brothers, Socrates instead invokes reciprocity and mutual benefit. Comparing brothers to inanimate possessions and to non-relatives, he argues that common parentage and upbringing provide strong bases for their bond, and that cooperative brothers are respected and feared by outsiders (2.3.4). Again making use of animal imagery, he places Chaerephon's behavior in the perspective of nature: just as one does not get angry at an animal that misbehaves, but rather considers the best means to control it, so too one should consider the best means to control one's brother.

Although he is not completely confident about it (2.3.17), Socrates relies on the assumption that Chaerecrates' brother will respond positively to acts of beneficence. In order to persuade Chaerecrates to take the first step, however, Socrates must overcome the culturally-induced beliefs that it is shameful (*aischros*) to be first in performing a favor (2.3.14), that an older brother should take the lead (2.3.15), and that it is shameful to offer benefits if they are not ultimately reciprocated by the other party (2.3.17). To overcome these beliefs, Socrates adduces a contrary cultural principle, namely that the younger must make way for the elder (2.3.16). He also argues that even if Chaerephon fails to reciprocate, Chaerecrates will have nothing to be ashamed of, since he will have shown his superiority to his older brother (2.3.17). Gigon (1956, 116) notes that this would be a rare example of a purely moral accomplishment. Moral accomplishments do, however, play an important role in Xenophon's theory of happiness (see *Mem.* 2.1.32–33). And in any case, Socrates' words are

his wife to repair relations, so too here he turns not to his close friend Chaerephon but to Chaerephon's younger brother. Christopher Moore points out to me that Socrates' praise of Chaerecrates as the superior brother might be a rhetorical device. It is unlikely, however, that the theory Socrates expresses, that the morally superior individual should take the initiative in pursuing mutual benefit regardless of status, is disingenuous, as it is reflected throughout Xenophon's work. One may presume, then, that Socrates turns to Chaerecrates rather than his older brother for this reason.

21 See Danzig 2012, 536–537.

meant only to respond to Chaerecrates' fear of humiliation, so they need do no more than show that his actions will merit praise. Socrates also claims that Chaerephon will not fail to reciprocate, since he is a man of honor (*philotimos* and *eleutheros*; 2.3.16). Here we see the importance of good character, especially honor, in the creation of reliable interpersonal bonds (see also *Cyr.* 1.2.1; Sandridge 2012, 21–44).

Finally, Socrates offers a peroration on the virtue of mutual assistance between brothers, comparing them to a natural phenomenon such as a pair of hands or feet, designed by nature to work together.²² Like previous arguments we have seen, this argument seeks to overcome culturally-induced attitudes by comparison with beneficial natural phenomena.

5 The Morality of Utility and Vice-Versa

Chapter 4 is a rare example of a Socratic conversation with no particular interlocutor. Xenophon introduces this chapter as containing advice that would be useful for acquiring friends and making good use of them (2.4.1). This comment might serve better as an introduction to chapters 4–6 together, since Socrates' words in this chapter seem to aim more at arousing the desire to acquire friends than at offering advice for acquiring them.

The central innovation in this chapter is the comparison of a friend to a useful piece of furniture. Rather than argue that the friend is an end in himself or herself, while a piece of furniture is merely useful, Xenophon compares the friend favorably to the furniture as a useful object. This is not a frivolous joke. In one place Xenophon's Socrates does make comments that imply that friends

22 As Strauss 1972, 43, points out, Socrates' argument here is weakened by the fact that it applies uniquely to the case of a family with two brothers. In explaining brothers' mutual assistance, Xenophon offers a reply to one of the arguments used by Socrates in Plato's *Lysis* against the possibility of friendship between the good. There Socrates argued that those who are good and similar cannot be friends since they have no need of that which they already have (214e–215c). Xenophon's Socrates here explains that there may be tasks that require a plurality of agents. A single person cannot simultaneously handle distant objects (2.3.19). Similarly, a good mover might need a second good mover with exactly his qualities in order to move a large bulky object. Aristotle will take this idea in his own direction by proposing that the special benefit offered by a good friend is providing another example of virtue more easily contemplated than the self (*Eth. Nic.* 1169b28–1170a4). In both cases it is the numerical difference which creates the usefulness of the friend, but for Xenophon the usefulness is practical in nature while for Aristotle the emphasis is on moral benefit.

can be ends in themselves. He claims that he enjoys friends just as others enjoy horses, dogs, and birds, animals that are prized not only for their usefulness, but even more so because they are desirable objects in themselves (1.6.14; contrast 3.11.5, which compares friends to more useful animals). In that context Socrates speaks about friends helping each other in the acquisition of virtue, which is a different kind of usefulness (moral usefulness) than that provided by a table. But aside from this lonely passage, in the vast majority of his writings Xenophon treats friends as objects of practical use, and there is no reason to see irony in this attitude. While friends may in some rare cases and for some rare spirits be objects worth cultivating as ends in themselves, or as morally useful agents, that does not imply that they are not worth cultivating for their practical usefulness. For most people, as even Aristotle agrees (*Eth. Nic.* 1156b25), utility and pleasure are the main attractions in friends.²³

Xenophon has thought a lot more than Aristotle about the way useful friendship might encourage good character. For Xenophon, good character is primarily a matter of behavior, not inner psychological harmony. Since the most valued traits in others are those that make them useful to oneself, cultivating such traits in oneself, and thus making oneself useful to others, is the best way to acquire friends and allies. By seeking to *be* useful, even for self-interested reasons, rather than merely to take advantage of the usefulness of others, one is compelled to develop some, if not all, of the important moral qualities.²⁴ In contrast to Aristotle, who has little use for friendship based on utility, for Xenophon the desire for useful friends is a prime catalyst for the pursuit of moral perfection.

This aim of transforming people into morally perfected beings by appealing to their desire for friends helps explain a seeming contradiction in chapter 4. Socrates offers two very different portraits of the friend. On the one hand he argues that friends are more valuable than most material possessions, since they offer unique forms of assistance (2.4.5–7).²⁵ On the other hand he argues

23 Van Berkel 2010 has argued that Socrates does not quite reduce friendship to a market commodity, but rather assimilates it to the household economy. I thank Dave Johnson for this reference.

24 Xenophon never says that virtue is worth cultivating as an end in itself. But since the moral qualities are always useful, it would be wrong to say that he encourages the pursuit of utility at the expense of moral virtue.

25 He claims that a friend will provide everything his friend needs, doing even things that a person cannot do for himself (2.4.7; omitted by Marchant from his translation). This indicates the unusual intimacy that Socrates encourages between good men who are friends.

that people do not value their friends or provide them with proper care. If friends are so careless, sending for doctors to cure servants while letting friends languish, how can Socrates claim that friends are so useful? What is so useful about a friend who does not bother to help his or her friends?

The answer seems to be that Socrates is contrasting two kinds of friends. When Socrates speaks of the benefits of friends, he means the good friend, not the vast majority of actual friends. When he speaks of those who neglect their friends, he is speaking about most friends. But that only sharpens the problem: if most friends are not useful, why should anyone make an effort to win and retain their friendships? And if Socrates expects us to limit our efforts to those potential friends who are worth winning and retaining, why does he need to engage in any persuasion at all? As he himself says, no one ever abandons a good, useful friend (2.5.5). May one not presume that everyone already pursues good, useful friends? Does anyone need to be told to pursue the friendship of those rich and powerful people who are inclined to be generous with their wealth and power?

The answer is to be found in the transformational motive underlying these conversations. Socrates' aim is not merely to render his interlocutor a better friend to others, but also to enable him to transform those others into better, more useful friends for himself by awakening the instinctive desire to repay kindness with kindness. In founding the Persian empire, Cyrus relies heavily on the instinct of reciprocity found in the Persians (*Cyr.* 1.2.7). Aristotle also emphasizes this almost universal instinct in his discussion of reciprocity and the shrine of the Graces (*Eth. Nic.* 1133a3–5). Xenophon himself mentioned it in the previous chapter (*Mem.* 2.3.14). Socrates seeks to create a party of good friends by encouraging acts of generosity among his associates, grounding this generosity not in altruism but in the insight that generosity creates reciprocity and mutual benefit. He envisions a political dimension to this transformed mode of friendship when he speaks of friends as advancing each others' public careers (2.4.6), a statement that looks forward to his more detailed plan for a cooperative association of good men (2.6.24–27).

A similar contradiction has been identified in chapter 5. Here Xenophon presents a conversation between Socrates and Antisthenes that he says aims at causing an unnamed listener to examine himself to see how much he is worth to his friends.²⁶ The goal of this conversation is to induce the listener to develop

26 Antisthenes was an important member of the Socratic circle and an author of Socratic dialogues. He figures prominently in Xenophon's *Symposium* where he plays the role of an admirer and close companion of Socrates, but one whose imitations of the master seem

the moral virtues that will make him worth more to his friends (see 1.2.55) and hence will enable him to increase his own network of useful friends and allies. Recounting having heard of a friend who was sacrificed for a profit of one *mina*, Socrates observes that those who are not worth much to their friends run the risk of being betrayed, while those who are worth much run little risk. It seems that Socrates is warning the listener that he will only have himself to blame if he proves useless to others and is abandoned by them. Such a lesson fits well with Socrates' general lack of sympathy for those who complain of mistreatment by others (see also Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1164a3–7) and his insistence that his interlocutor, whoever it may be, take responsibility for obtaining benefit from any given situation.

This simple account of the chapter faces a serious difficulty. Xenophon says that the listener Socrates had in mind was neglecting a poverty-stricken friend, not that he was in danger of being abandoned himself. If Socrates wished to encourage a poverty-stricken and neglected friend to make himself useful to others, not only should he have made the point more clearly, he also should have held the conversation in the presence of such a person. It is no wonder that Gigon (1956, 123–125) suggested that this chapter results from a sloppy editing job by a plagiaristic Xenophon.

The conversation makes sense, however, if we assume that the neglecter, to whom it is addressed, is in fact in danger of being abandoned by his poverty-stricken friend.²⁷ Although it may seem improbable for an economically successful person to worry about being abandoned by an impoverished friend, Xenophon strongly believed that those in bad circumstances are worth more than they seem, and that a small investment here can bring great dividends.²⁸ Socrates advises Theodote to make a special effort to visit friends when they are sick (*Mem.* 3.11.10; see also *Cyr.* 1.4.2). Cyrus' father argues that sharing the feelings of friends in times of success or of failure is a relatively inexpensive way to gain deep allegiance (1.6.24). Xenophon concludes Book 2 with a conversation in which Socrates argues explicitly that it is especially worthwhile to befriend those in distress (see 2.10.4). The reason to invest in distressed people

to miss the mark. This minor role is his only appearance in the *Memorabilia*, although he is mentioned again at 3.11.17; the Antisthenes in *Mem.* 3.4 appears to be someone else. See Gera 2007; Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1188, n. 7, 190; Nails 2002, 34–36.

27 Gray 1998, 134. Contrast Dorion who argues that he risks being abandoned by Socrates and Antisthenes (2001–2011, 2.1191–192 n. 1). Since the unnamed listener is not said to be a useless friend to Socrates or Antisthenes, however, this seems an unlikely eventuality.

28 This idea fits well to the argument of van Berkel that Socrates is encouraging a long-term appreciation of the value of friends.

is that distress, whether in the form of poverty or sickness, is often a passing phenomenon. Befriending and assisting a poverty-stricken friend can be an excellent way of avoiding abandonment by someone who may be quite useful one day.²⁹

Socrates' conversation in chapter 6 with Critobulus,³⁰ a somewhat lazy and unambitious young man from a wealthy family, with a special predilection for kissing beautiful young people,³¹ deserves much more attention than I can offer here. It resembles the conversation with Aristippus in *Memorabilia* 2.1. In both cases, Socrates initiates the conversation for specific educational purposes: with Aristippus the announced aim is to reform his moral character, and with Critobulus the aim is to show him how to test the value of friends. However, Socrates' real aim in discussing the value of friends is not merely, if at all, to enable Critobulus to test the value of his friends, but rather to persuade him that he ought to make himself more useful to others by improving his own character (2.6.14, 37). This is part of Xenophon's response to the charge that by elevating the value of utility Socrates caused the moral corruption of his companions.

Socrates argues that in order to win good friends, Critobulus must develop virtues of speech and deed (2.6.10–14). In an effort to evade this necessity, Critobulus raises objections from both sides, first arguing that one can win friends without being good (2.6.15), and then raising doubts, reminiscent of Plato's *Lysis*, whether friendship is possible at all (2.6.16–20).³² Socrates responds by outlining his theory of virtuous friendship and its potential role in political life. Here he shows that the morally good (*kaloikagathoi*) are uniquely capable of friendship because of their rational insight into their own true benefit³³ and their possession of the moral virtues, especially self-mastery (*enkrateia*), that enable them to pursue it. The ability to sacrifice immediate personal interest for the sake of group benefit makes good people (*kaloikagathoi*) uniquely capa-

29 A similar sentiment, without the economic language, may be found in the Mishnah, *Avot* 4.3, and in the Aesopean fable of the Lion and the Mouse (150 Perry).

30 Critobulus is the son of Crito, one of Socrates' close companions (*Mem.* 1.2.48), and a frequent object of Socrates' educational efforts in *Mem.* 1.3 and 2.6, *Oeconomicus* and *Symposium*. In *Mem.* 1.3 Xenophon takes Critobulus' side against Socrates' warnings about kissing beautiful young men. See Dorion 2001–2011, 1.130 n. 207; Nails 2002, 116–119.

31 See also *Mem.* 1.3, *Oec.* 2.7, *Symp.* 4.10–18.

32 For parallels to *Lysis*, see Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1, annexe 2, 415–417.

33 Socrates' ability to perceive self-interest even when it conflicts with other values is illustrated throughout *Memorabilia*. In *Mem.* 2.9.3 he refers explicitly to this ability as ensuring the possibility of a mutual beneficial partnership.

ble of forging a powerful political force within the city and most capable of engaging in war (2.6.24–27; see Pl. *Resp.* 422e–423b). This political program is the real bait that Socrates has to offer.³⁴ It is the complement of the conversation with Aristippus: whereas Socrates encouraged Aristippus to pursue virtue from fear of harm, he encourages Critobulus to pursue it out of hope of advantage. In both cases personal benefit, obtained by means of political association, provides the incentive to friendship and hence to moral improvement.

This speech, however, like the earlier speech to Aristippus, has little effect on the listener, Critobulus, who explains that he wishes to gain this knowledge in order to catch not only someone with a good spirit, but also someone with a beautiful body. Critobulus remains devoted to his private erotic pleasures and indifferent to the incentives to virtue that political ambition is meant to inspire.

6 Degrading Oneself for Personal Gain

The last four chapters of Book 2 provide a response to the charge that Socrates encouraged his associates to engage in shameful economic activities (see 1.2.56–57).³⁵ As usual, Xenophon acknowledges the facts—Socrates did encourage them to engage in certain activities—but argues against their being necessarily shameful, and that Socrates deserves praise and not blame for encouraging them. By encouraging these economic bonds between men of good moral character Socrates also takes steps to institute the political program he described in chapter 6.

In chapter 7, Socrates saves from starvation some aristocratic ladies who took up residence with the overburdened Aristarchus³⁶ as a result of the civil war of 404.³⁷ The main obstacles to their productive occupation are conven-

34 See Bevilacqua forthcoming. I believe that Xenophon illustrates the mechanism for forming this network in the following chapters.

35 On the order of these chapters, see Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1, 240–241 n. 10. Chapter 7 begins with a reference to Socrates' ability to solve *aporiai*, but the *aporiai* here are financial rather than intellectual problems.

36 What little is known about Aristarchus is mainly culled from the present chapter. See Nails 2002, 46–47. There may be an apologetic aim in showing Socrates offering assistance to a family that was forced to flee from the Thirty Tyrants.

37 Socrates of course does not speak directly to these women, but to his friend Aristarchus who is responsible for them. The only woman that Socrates addresses in Xenophon's writings is the *hetaira* Theodote. The conversation with Ischomachus' wife in *Oeconomicus* is reported by her husband.

tional attitudes concerning class status: the ladies are not prepared to perform economic functions deemed appropriate only for slaves. Xenophon's Socrates, having little respect for these class divisions and believing that enslavement itself can be morally beneficial (*Oec.* 1.23; *Mem.* 1.5.5; see *Symp.* 3.2 and *Cyr.* 1.6.25), encourages them to undertake these tasks (2.7.6–7).

Rather than confronting the ladies with the stark necessity of performing shameful deeds, Socrates justifies his plan as virtuous, thus enabling them to perform their new duties with pride.³⁸ By himself expressing the fear of disgrace that must be presumed to animate the women (2.7.10), Socrates reassures them that his advice comes from a reputable source and is consonant with their own highest ideals. To avoid unnecessary conflict, Socrates pursues only limited aims, seeking to overturn only those elements of popular prejudice that he must. He does not suggest that the women learn skills such as courtesanship, however lucrative that profession might be, and even though he does not have any special prejudice against it.³⁹ He allows contemporary cultural values to affect the program he proposes, suggesting that the women occupy themselves in precisely those activities they learned previously, such as preparing food and clothing (2.7.5). This choice of activity will make it easier for Socrates to persuade them that they are not sacrificing their honor by pressure of necessity.

Socrates makes it clear that he is not advocating a slavish occupation, but rather one that is fit for free people.⁴⁰ He points out that employment is preferable to idleness for free people and that a productive occupation contributes to worthwhile things, such as learning what one ought to know, keeping oneself healthy and strong, and gaining objects of practical use (2.7.7). Being useful breeds virtues such as *sôphrosunê* and justice (2.7.8), and will restore love and affection between the ladies and Aristarchus (2.7.9). The fact that the ladies

38 Compare Cyrus, who includes considerations of justice in his exhortation to his troops (1.5.13–14). The preference for persuasion over force is a fundamental principle of Xenophon's leadership theory (see Danzig 2009, 271–295).

39 See 3.11, where he offers advice on courtesanship; in 1.6.13 he expresses opposition only to indiscriminate prostitution. See also 1.2.6 and 1.3.14. See Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.122–123 n. 7.

40 Johnston 1994, 219–240, argues that Xenophon made a sharp distinction between virtuous toil and vicious work. It can better be argued that he breaks down the artificial distinction between elite activities and those performed by the lowest members of society, even suggesting that slavery can improve the character of a free man (*Oec.* 1.23; *Mem.* 1.5.5), and that a virtuous woman may properly use a man as a servant (*Oec.* 7.42). His words seem fully consistent with the belief in virtuous activities that transcend class distinctions.

learned these traditional productive skills in order to use them (2.7.8)⁴¹ shows not only that they are respectable, but also that Athenian culture is founded on productive insights that are identical to those promoted by Socrates, even if they have fallen into disuse over the years.⁴² Just as Cyrus used the exigencies of war to encourage the reorganization of the social fabric of Persia (*Cyr.* 2.1.11), so too Socrates uses economic pressure to persuade the ladies to change their attitude. In order to provide effective persuasion, and to limit the adverse effects of too-radical cultural change, both leaders find values within the existing culture that support the new mode of behavior that they advocate. Socrates is so effective in instilling a democratic work ethos in these ladies that he finds himself forced to justify the privileges enjoyed by contemporary aristocratic leaders by means of a story that allows only for an aristocracy that provides effective protection for the people (2.7.13–14).

In chapter 8, Socrates encourages Eutherus to undertake a shameful economic occupation. Having lost all his possessions in the war, Eutherus is reduced to supporting himself by manual labor. Steven Johnston (1994, 236) treats Eutherus' original plan to engage in manual labor as shameful, but if Eutherus were willing to take a shameful occupation he would not object to Socrates' plan. In fact, manual labor is a relatively respectable option. Having no collateral to obtain a loan for starting some lucrative enterprise, and being unwilling to beg (2.8.1), Eutherus actually chooses the most respectable plan available to him, allowing considerations of honor to impose limitations on his ability to pursue economic security.

After noting the long-term disadvantages of harsh physical labor, Socrates suggests an occupation that is useful but conventionally shameful. Eutherus

41 This argument bears a resemblance to Cyrus' argument that his troops learned the art of war in order to use it (*Cyr.* 1.5.9; see also 1.6.11). Just as the ladies need Socrates' assurance that their new economic activities are morally upright, so too Cyrus' troops need assurance that seeking gain by means of war is the right thing to do.

42 In making this argument, Socrates obscures or ignores the important cultural distinction between production for the market and production for private consumption (see van Berkel 2010; Bevilacqua 2010, 168–169), a distinction he presumably would dismiss as baseless. As Bevilacqua notes, there is a great difference between using these skills for the benefit of father, husband, and children, and making them into a source of commercial exchange (2010, 468–469 n. 13). This corresponds to the Aristotelian distinction between use value and exchange value. It may also be compared to the difference between expressions of love for one's spouse or lover and the commercial exchange of sexual favors. But since Socrates is interested in encouraging these women to make use of their economic skills, he understandably does not draw this comparison.

should offer his services as a private estate-manager to a wealthy man. Commentators have had difficulty understanding why Eutherus thinks that this would involve him in slavery (*douleia*).⁴³ It is true that slaves served frequently as estate managers in ancient Greece, and this alone would make the task a humiliating one for a free man to undertake, but there is more to it than this. A managerial position involves a higher degree of personal service or servitude than does manual labor, since a manager is under the direct order of the boss, serving his personal interest rather than performing some set task. As Edward Cohen has shown, working consistently for a single individual, rather than as a free-lance contractor for many, was considered comparable to slavery.⁴⁴ It is an abnormally intimate relationship between free adult males. Even today, the idea of offering one's undefined services to a wealthy private individual sounds humiliating. A laborer on the other hand is normally hired for a specific short-term task, is not under the control of a single long-term boss, and therefore retains his freedom and independence. These two kinds of relation correspond to van Berkel's distinction between long-term and short-term economic relationships, and it is no surprise that Socrates encourages the more shameful long-term relation over the less beneficial short-term one.

To persuade Eutherus, Socrates draws a parallel between the personal manager and the political leader:

And yet those who manage cities and take care of public matters are not considered more slavish for that reason, but rather more free.

Mem. 2.8.4

As Aristippus noted, leaders are treated by their cities in the same way that slaves are treated by their masters: they are expected to serve their master's interest and not their own (2.1.8–9). In this way they resemble the personal estate-manager of a wealthy man. But many in ancient Athens would have acknowledged with Socrates that, despite the shortcomings, political leadership is a respectable occupation and they would therefore be able to credit his argument that private management is also respectable. By making this argument, Socrates ignores or effaces the important difference between public and private service, just as he ignored the difference between production for the family and for the market in chapter 7, perhaps viewing this distinction as conventional and non-beneficial.

43 See Gigon 1956, 182; Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.249 n. 3.

44 See Cohen 2001. I thank Stephanie Budin for the reference.

Socrates has further advice for avoiding painful criticism from Eutherus' potential boss. The reader of chapter 2 may expect Socrates to tell Eutherus not to take such criticism personally. But Xenophon is interested in illustrating the possibility of an alliance among people of good character (2.6), so his Socrates advises him to avoid unjust criticism by choosing a wealthy patron who is not inclined to blame others.⁴⁵ The humiliation of such a position can be mitigated when the roles are filled by men of good character. Although it is impossible to avoid all criticism, since everyone makes mistakes, such a man will display what we would call sensitivity to the feelings of his manager. Between gentlemen, abnormally intimate relations are possible and can provide great benefit. Socrates adds that Eutherus should only undertake such tasks as he is capable of performing (a reference to the importance of self-knowledge: see *Mem.* 3.7-9, 4.4.24-30) and that he should make his best effort in everything he does. This seems to imply a reliance on the efficacy of gratitude, which is reasonable as long as Eutherus finds a master who is a gentleman, as Socrates has urged.

After having invented a new profession for free persons in chapter 8, the private estate-manager, Socrates invents another new profession in chapter 9, akin to that of a personal attorney. Here Socrates offers advice to a wealthy man in need of services rather than a poor man in need of income. In this chapter, Xenophon demonstrates that his political program is realistic by illustrating the ability of men of good character to take the initiative in creating the kind of useful intimate economic relations that are necessary for its success.

Socrates' suggestion that Crito deal with extortionists by engaging a counter-extortionist of his own involves forging a relationship of abnormal intimacy between free adult males. Making use of naturalistic imagery, Socrates compares the position he has in mind to that of a sheep dog that guards against predators (2.9.2). As the superior member of the proposed alliance, Crito will not undergo much personal humiliation, and therefore he does not need much persuasion on this point. His problem is chiefly a practical one: such an intimate assistant might use his knowledge against Crito. Socrates reassures Crito that the assistant will be loyal since he will perceive that he is better off as Crito's servant than he would be if he quarreled with him.

Undoubtedly, some servants might reach this conclusion,⁴⁶ but would all servants necessarily do so? Here the importance of good character for the

45 Marchant translates this as "grumblers." *Philaitioi* are those who are too free with their blame, and refers in this case not to powerless subordinates but to bosses with an inclination to find fault.

46 See 1.6.21, where the *kaloikagathoi* recognize and choose their self-interest by preferring the security of moderate possessions to rule through war.

formation of useful relationships becomes clear from a new point of view: not only must a poor worker seek out a gentleman to serve but also a wealthy man must seek out a poor man of good character if he wishes to use him for this kind of intimate service. Socrates does not make this point explicitly, but he does join Crito in finding Archedemus,⁴⁷ who is capable, poor, and honest.

In this episode, many of the decisions are left up to the actors, who show themselves to possess the virtues and sensitivities needed for creating these long-term intimate economic bonds. Crito⁴⁸ appears to know how to recruit such a man without any instruction from Socrates.⁴⁹ Rather than approach his quarry directly with his bizarre request, Crito takes a circuitous route. He displays a personal interest in Archedemus, sending him presents and inviting him to join in religious celebrations, making Archedemus feel like a member of the family. Once Archedemus discovers the frivolous lawsuits being brought against Crito, he takes his own initiative in launching a counter-attack, as a true gentleman would do. Archedemus' services prove so successful that many of Crito's friends ask to share in them, just as shepherds like to make use of the good dog of another.⁵⁰

Archedemus naturally suffers reproach for what we would call the "sycophantic" behavior he displays in serving Crito's interests. He formulates a response to this reproach that contains the essence of the political and economic theory espoused by Socrates in chapter 6: "Which is disgraceful? To make friends with good people by exchanging favors with them, and to endure conflict with the bad, or to injure good people and make them into enemies while trying to make friends with the bad by cooperating with them and relying on them instead of the others?" (2.9.8; compare 2.6.27). Archedemus instinctively grasps the necessity of alliances in the competitive world of the *polis*, as Socrates outlined in his conversation with Aristippus (*Mem.* 1.2). Given that, there is no choice but to form alliances either with the good or with the bad. There is no option in Xenophon's vision for a heroic man of honor who stands alone. By showing that intimacy between good men is beneficial and honorable, and by showing that good men are capable of forming and defending

47 This may be the same Archedemus who was a leader of the democratic faction in Athens in 406 (*Hell.* 1.7.2). See Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.254 n. 9; Nails 2002, 41.

48 Crito is a close friend of Socrates who appears also in Plato (notably in *Crito*). See Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.110 n. 143; Nails 2002, 114–116.

49 This is a quality Crito did not transfer to his son Critobulus, who needed detailed instructions on the selection and recruitment of friends in chapter 6.

50 Being compared to a dog or other animal is not necessarily a bad thing; see Gray 2011, 48–51.

such relations on their own initiative, the chapter teaches that Socrates' political program is not fantastic, but is based on realistic sentiments and behavior shared by true gentlemen.

The final chapter makes explicit what was only implicit in chapter 5, namely that it is worthwhile to offer assistance to a friend in distress. Socrates encourages Diodorus⁵¹ to assist his impoverished friend Hermogenes out of self-interest, pointing out that a good friend is worth more than a servant, especially because a friend is willing to perform favors unbidden (2.10.3; see 2.4.5–7, *Cyr.* 8.4.11). Reminding us again of his political program, Socrates points to Hermogenes' good character as a key component in his potential usefulness (2.10.3). In Socrates' view Hermogenes' distress offers an excellent business opportunity for Diodorus: he can now purchase a good friend for a very small cost. So convinced is Socrates that acquiring an impoverished friend of this quality is a good deal that he insists that Diodorus go and invite Hermogenes personally, rather than merely sending for him to come.⁵²

7 Conclusion

In *Memorabilia* 2 Socrates shows himself a good friend by teaching others how to create mutually beneficial bonds of friendship. Socrates' advice is non-conventional: he dis-embeds social relations from their conventional patterns, re-conceiving friendships and family relations as utilitarian relationships. This enables him to outline a plan for cooperation between good men that not only offers mutual benefits to its participants, but also holds out the possibility of dominating political life in Athens and bringing great benefit to the city. By mobilizing a limited group of gentlemen to forge enlightened relationships of mutual benefit, Socrates sought to place political life in Athens on a different footing, and thereby to promote both the economic well-being and the moral excellence of the Athenians.

Because this plan involved encouraging abnormally intimate economic relations between free male adults, Socrates' advice brought him into conflict with powerful contemporary cultural attitudes. Socrates not only had the insight to discover such useful arrangements, he also had the ability to persuade others to accept his suggestions by appealing to their self-interest and by connecting

51 Virtually nothing is known about Diodorus. See Dorion 2001–2011, 2.1.256 n. 3; Nails 2002, 126.

52 Gray 1998, 136, suggests that this chapter may also contain an implicit response to the charge that Socrates taught his companions to abuse the poor (1.2.58–59).

his advice to culturally-accepted values. Although this behavior aroused antagonism against Socrates, Xenophon shows that he was promoting the mutual interest of all involved, that he was calling Athenian society back to its own fundamental principles, principles that are identical to the utilitarian principles that underlie all human societies, and that he was encouraging the acquisition and practice of moral virtue. The fact that Socrates rejected some contemporary practices and promoted non-conventional beneficial ones supports those who argue that the unwritten law of nature takes precedence over the conventional written law in cases of conflict.⁵³

References

- Azoulay, V. *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir*. Paris 2004.
- Berkel, T.A. van. 'Pricing the invaluable: Socrates and the value of friendship', in: R.M. Rosen and Ineke Sluiter, *Valuing others in classical antiquity*. Leiden 2010, 249–277.
- Bevilacqua, F. *Memorabili di Senofonte*. Torino 2010.
- Bevilacqua, F. 'An explicit political plan: *Mem.*, II, 6, 22–27', in: G. Danzig, D. Johnson, and D. Morrison, *Plato and Xenophon: Comparative Studies*. Leiden (forthcoming).
- Burnet, J. *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato*. London 1914.
- Cohen, E. 'An unprofitable masculinity', in: P. Cartledge, E. Cohen, and L. Foxhall, *Money, labour and land: approaches to the economics of ancient Greece*. London 2001, 100–112.
- Dalton, G. *Primitive, archaic and modern economies: essays of Karl Polanyi*. New York 1968.
- Danzig, G. 'Big boys and little boys: justice and law in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Memorabilia*', *Polis* 26 (2009), 271–295.
- Danzig, G. *Apologizing for Socrates: how Plato and Xenophon created our Socrates*. Lanham 2010.
- Danzig, G. 'The best of the Achaemenids', in: F. Hobden and C. Tuplin, *Xenophon: ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Boston 2012.
- Danzig, G. 'Review of Dorion 2011', in: F. de Luise and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: a conference on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 371–378.
- Dorion, L.-A. *Xénophon: Mémoires*. Paris 2001–2011.

53 *Mem.* 4.4.21–24; for this debate, see Strauss 1939; Dorion 2001; Johnson 2003; Stavru 2008; Danzig 2009.

- Dorion, L.-A. 'L'exégèse straussienne de Xenophon: le cas paradigmatique de *Mémorables* IV 4', *PhilosAnt* 1 (2001), 87–118.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Xenophon's Socrates', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*, Malden 2006, 93–109. (= 2006a)
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Socrate et l'utilité de la amitié', *Revue du M.A.U.S.S.*, n. 27, *De l'anti-utilitarisme. Anniversaire, bilan et controverses* 269–288. (= 2006b)
- Dorion, L.-A. *L'autre Socrate: études sur les écrits socratiques de Xénophon*. Paris 2013.
- Gera, D. 'Xenophon's Socrates', in: M. Trapp, *Socrates from antiquity to the enlightenment*. Aldershot 2007, 33–50.
- Gigon, O. *Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien*. Basel 1956.
- Gray, V.J. *The framing of Socrates*. Stuttgart 1998.
- Gray, V.J. *Xenophon's mirror of princes: reading the reflections*. Oxford 2011.
- Johnson, D. 'Xenophon's Socrates on law and justice', *AncPhil* 23 (2003), 39–73.
- Johnson, D. 'Aristippus at the crossroads: the politics of pleasure in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*', *Polis* 26 (2009), 204–222.
- Johnston, S. 'Virtuous toil, vicious work: Xenophon on Aristocratic style', *CPh* 89 (1994), 219–240.
- Marchant, E.C. and O.J. Todd. *Xenophon: Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology*. Cambridge, MA 1923.
- Nails, D. *The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics*. Indianapolis 2002.
- Narcy, M. 'Le choix d'Aristippe (Xénophon *Mémorables* II 1)', in: Giannantoni et al., *La tradizione socratica: seminario di studi*. Naples 1995, 71–87.
- Polanyi, K. 'Aristotle discovers the economy', *Trade and market in the Early Empires: Economies in history and theory*. Glencoe 1957, 64–94.
- Sandridge, N. *Loving humanity, learning, and being honored: the foundations of leadership in Xenophon's education of Cyrus*. Washington 2012.
- Stavru, A. 'Socrate et la confiance dans les *agraphoi nomoi* (Xénophon, *Mémorables*, IV, 4): réflexions sur les "socratica" de Walter F. Otto', in: M. Narcy and A. Tordesillas, *Xénophon et Socrate: actes du colloque d'Aix-en-Provence (6–9 novembre 2003)*. Paris 2008, 65–85.
- Strauss, L. 'The spirit of Sparta or the taste of Xenophon', *Social Research* 6 (1939), 502–536.
- Strauss, L. *Xenophon's Socrates*. Ithaca 1972.
- Tamiolaki, M. 'Public et privé dans le dialogue de Socrate avec Aristippe (Xén. *Mém.* II 1, 1–33)', *Etudes Platoniciennes*, VI: *Socrate: Vie privée, vie publique*. Paris 2009 141–151.
- Tatum, J. *Xenophon's imperial fiction: on the education of Cyrus*. Princeton 1989.

From Generals to Gluttony: *Memorabilia* Book 3

David M. Johnson

Southern Illinois University Carbondale

The third book of the *Memorabilia* begins with the noblest of ambitions and ends with a dubious etymological argument about Athenian feasts. The book falls into three parts, none of which is obviously connected to either of the others, and two of which themselves contain rather disparate items. These structural problems are not simply an artifact of awkward book divisions imposed after Xenophon's time. For the first chapter of the third book marks a clear break with what came before, announcing what will indeed be the theme of the first seven chapters: Socrates' success in making those who pursued noble goals (*ta kala*) more diligent in pursuit of those goals. The first chapter of the fourth book will introduce a new, and rather more unified book, which will center on the education of a model student, Euthydemus. Of course Xenophon may not have thought his *Memorabilia* needed much in the way of formal unity. Certainly all of what Socrates says here is in keeping with the most general goal of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon's effort to show how Socrates helped all who spoke with him (*Mem.* 1.3.1). The very variety of topics and interlocutors here may help demonstrate Socrates' all-around usefulness in a way a more unified piece of writing could not. In book three the *Memorabilia* shows its greatest kinship with wisdom literature, especially in its use of brief exchanges in the form of the *chreia*, a pithy bit of advice offered by a wise man. Works in this genre aimed at broad utility rather than depth, and ancient readers accustomed to this genre will have found this section of the *Memorabilia* less problematic than we moderns do—especially if we approach the book looking for the sort of organic, dramatic whole we find in Plato's Socratic dialogues, or in Xenophon's own *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus*.¹

Book 3 does begin clearly enough with seven chapters about leadership, primarily leadership in war (3.1–7). Leadership is an issue of tremendous concern to Xenophon throughout his works, including the Socratic ones: elsewhere in

1 On the structure of the *Memorabilia* as a whole, see Dorion 2001–2011, 1. clxxxiii–ccxl. On the *chreia* and wisdom literature, see Gray 1998, discussing the structure of Book 3 at 138–149.

the Socratica it emerges as the culminating concern of the *Oeconomicus*.² We next turn, rather abruptly, to two chapters that are more obviously philosophical in interest, but which are puzzling in themselves and seem to be largely unrelated to one another. 3.8 appears to saddle Socrates with something very much like Protagorean relativism, and while 3.9 clearly articulates a central Socratic tenet, that virtue is wisdom, it does so in a rather breezy discussion that starts with courage, wisdom, and virtue, only to jump to still briefer discussions of madness, envy, and leisure. Finally, the last five chapters of the book are still harder to connect to one another. The first consists of a series of conversations with artists (painter, sculptor, cuirass maker: 3.10); in the second, Xenophon regales us with Socrates' visit with an artist of another sort, the glamorous *hetaira* ("courtesan") Theodote (3.11). We turn then to two conversations on physical fitness (3.12, 3.13) and one on gluttony (3.14). The closest thing to a common theme in these last five chapters is the relationship between the body and the soul. Artists reveal not only bodies but the souls within them; Theodote is to please her "friends" not only with her body but with her soul; and physical fitness is required not only for bodily health but psychic well-being. It is difficult to find any overriding theme unifying the three chunks of text that make up *Memorabilia* 3. One can, however, as we will see, identify larger units of text running back to the first and second books of the *Memorabilia*. The *Memorabilia* is not so much unstructured as loosely held together by multiple and somewhat overlapping links that cross the boundaries of the traditional book divisions.

1 Leadership (3.1–7)

Xenophon's first few words in book three provide importance guidance for how to read what follows.

I will now show that he [Socrates] benefitted those who desired noble ends by making them more diligent in the pursuit of those ends.

XEN. *Mem.* 3.1.1

The noble ends (*ta kala*) turn out to be leadership positions in the city, particularly the elected offices of general and cavalry commander. Socrates ben-

2 For some recent work on Xenophontic leadership, see Tamiolaki 2004; Gray 2011; Sandridge 2012.

efits would-be generals not by teaching them what they need to know, but by making each of them more diligent in their own pursuit of what they need to know. This distinction is worth mulling over for two reasons. First, Xenophon's approach here is more Socratic than it may seem at first glance, as Xenophon's Socrates is not only handing out advice but doing so in a way designed to lead each interlocutor to recognize the limitations of his knowledge and to take steps to overcome those limits.

Second, the men Socrates speaks to are a mixed lot, so he says different things to different interlocutors. They include ambitious but ill-informed young aristocrats at various points in their military-political careers (the anonymous interlocutors of 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, and Glaucon in 3.6); an able aristocrat who shuns politics (Charmides in 3.7); and a veteran officer (Nichomachides in 3.4) who is outraged that he has lost an election for the post of general to a businessman (*oikonomikos*) with no military experience. As Socrates emphasizes different things at different times, the reader cannot safely take any single passage as delivering *the* Socratic teaching on generalship. With the veteran Nichomachides, for example, Socrates emphasizes the importance of logistics and the ability to identify relevant experts, minimizing the importance of Nichomachides' military experience. He argues that a man who has made a success of producing plays, particularly when he has done so despite knowing nothing special about drama, is better qualified to lead an army than a veteran army officer would be. Socrates thus pushes the argument toward paradox: while any sort of management experience is no doubt valuable, Socrates' argument here would suggest that a general needs no expertise in military affairs. The paradox is lessened, however, if we allow Xenophon's Socrates to do what Xenophon says he was doing, motivating would-be generals to learn what they need to learn. For if Nichomachides already understands the military side of things well enough, it is fitting to play up the management skills of the general at the expense of military expertise. The *Memorabilia* is not particularly rich in characterization or scene setting—judged not only by Plato's example but by the standard of Xenophon's *Symposium* and *Oeconomicus*. But when Xenophon does provide information on interlocutors in the *Memorabilia*, he does so for a reason.

For the most part, each chapter within this section adds new material rather than reiterating earlier points, even at the risk of making the new points appear to replace the earlier ones. The motive for the introduction of new material is usually resistance by an interlocutor. This is not yet necessary in 3.1, where the anonymous interlocutor needs to be encouraged even to study the most fundamental of military tasks, tactics, and the arrangement of troops; Socrates does however go on to encourage him to ask his teacher follow-up

questions, given the superficiality of the lessons the interlocutor received. In 3.2 another anonymous figure, this time a man who had been elected general, does not have any lines, but Socrates emphasizes the general's need to concern himself with the well-being of the entire community, not just his own; the best general is not simply the best warrior in a group, but the man best able to lead his men to victory and improve their lot. The anonymous man elected to serve as cavalry commander in 3.3 does not think training horses is his business, or that he needs much skill in public speaking; Socrates shows him otherwise. Nichomachides (3.4), as we have seen, deprecates logistics and the selection of expert subordinates, while the younger Pericles (3.5) needs to be convinced that Athens is not beyond repair, though it has fallen from its former glory, and he is provided with arguments he could use to persuade the Athenians to revive their ancestral valor.³ In 3.6 Glaucon seems to have absolutely nothing going for him, and has made a laughing-stock of himself by his attempts at public speaking. But Socrates intervenes for the sake of Glaucon's uncle Charmides and his brother Plato—who is here mentioned for the only time in Xenophon's writings. While Socrates could presumably have refuted Glaucon on any topic relevant to generalship, he adds to the store of things generals must know by quizzing Glaucon on the financial and military resources of Athens. Finally Charmides (3.7) has sound advice to give, but fails to share it in public, out of a mixture of fear of and contempt for the mob; Socrates encourages him to be bold enough to enter Athenian

3 3.5.2–4 are taken by most scholars to show that the *Memorabilia* was published in its current form only after 371, when the Boeotians became the dominant power in Greece following their victory over Sparta at the battle of Leuctra. For Socrates introduces the Boeotians, rather than the Spartans, as the rivals of Athens. Scholars argue that this was an anachronism at the dramatic date of the conversation, Pericles' election as general in 406, when Sparta was Athens' main rival. So Dorion 2000–2011, 1.xlvii and 2.71 n. 7. Anachronism is of course hardly unknown in Socratic works (one example is Xenophon's claiming to have heard Socrates discuss Cyrus' death in the *Oeconomicus*, an event which took place after Xenophon had left Athens, never to see Socrates again). But neither history nor the passage itself requires us to see an anachronism here. There was a longstanding rivalry between the Athenians and her neighbors in Boeotia, and Xenophon's Socrates mentions relevant battles in this rivalry (Cornea in 446, Delium in 424). More importantly, Socrates is trying to show Pericles that Athens can recover her former glory by once again dominating a rival on land (at 3.5.18 the two men agree that the Athenian fleet is still well disciplined, but that Athens' infantry and cavalry lack discipline). Athens had dominated Boeotia from 457–447, but she had never dominated Sparta. Socrates could not have made his point with the Spartans: indeed, an argument claiming that Athens could dominate Sparta by land would have been the real anachronism.

politics. Where the others in this section lack the diligence to apply themselves to learning what generals need to know, Charmides lacks the diligence to apply himself to the public realm where such knowledge can prove most beneficial.

While no individual interlocutor is given a complete Socratic course in generalship, we readers are presumably expected to attempt some sort of synthesis. If we do so three themes come to the surface. The first is the need for the general to have a good deal of expertise. This starts with his ability as a soldier which, while not stressed, is assumed on several occasions (3.2.2; 3.3.9–10). His knowledge as a general begins with tactics, which is, however, a fairly simple matter of putting the best troops in the front and back of formations. One must also understand which formation to use where, and how to identify the best troops; the best are not the most skilled but the most desirous of glory (3.1.10). More in need of emphasis, presumably because such matters received rather less attention than leadership in formal battles, are the mundane matters of preparing the army for war by training men (and horses) properly (3.3), motivating men to fight for honor (3.3, 3.5), keeping the army supplied (3.4), properly placing garrisons (3.5), and managing the financial and military resources of the city (3.6). One must, finally, have the self-knowledge to know whether one does (like Charmides in 3.7) or does not (like Glaucon in 3.6) have what it takes to be a leader.

All this expertise, however, is only valuable in a leader who can persuade others of his capacity to lead (3.3, 3.6). Socrates discusses this, our second theme, at greatest length with the man elected to command cavalry, who was surprised to hear that a good leader of cavalry must also be a good public speaker (3.3.11). But it also comes up in the conversation with Glaucon who, among his many other follies, thinks that he can persuade the assembly to let him manage Athenian public business when he cannot even manage to convince his uncle to let him run his household (3.6.15). Hence the importance of the persuasive power Charmides has, and Socrates' regret that Charmides only employs it in private conversations (3.7).

The third and most striking theme is that of the carryover from civilian to military leadership. Xenophon is quite fond of reiterating the point that the same virtue enables a man to manage his life, his household, and his city (e.g., *Mem.* 1.2.64, 4.2.11), but here this Xenophontic staple takes on a new urgency. Socrates argues that a veteran officer is not as well qualified to serve as general as is a wealthy and capable estate manager (the *oikonomikos*, 3.4). Even if he lacks military experience, the ability of the *oikonomikos* to choose able subordinates, motivate them, and provide them with what they need to succeed will win out.

For taking care of public matters differs from taking care of private affairs only in scale, while everything else is very similar, particularly the most important point: in neither case does anything get done without working with others—and it's not as if there's one set of people who do public business and another who do private business.

Mem. 3.4.12

Similarly, Charmides, who can perform well in private conversations about politics, should also be able to contribute to public debates about policy. In some respects Xenophon appears to be an early believer in the power of management, the would-be master science of our own age, which holds that skilled managers are capable of improving productivity in any field they enter: warfare, business, politics, academia—it's all about management.

A reader of a volume on Socrates may naturally ask how much of this is Socratic in any meaningful sense. The term "Socratic" is contested and Protean; I'll attempt no definition here, but will try out some hypotheses. One approach would be to look to parallels between conversations in this section and other Socratic conversations in Plato, and conversations in Xenophon that are *prima facie* more philosophical (and hence more liable to be labeled Socratic). Book 3 begins with Socrates talking to Dionysodorus, one of the eristic brothers in Plato's *Euthydemus*. But Xenophon tells us only that Dionysodorus teaches tactics, while Plato, though he also notes Dionysodorus' skill in that regard (*Euthyd.* 271d–272a), shows him engaged in eristic. We appear to have the standard contrast between Xenophon the practical soldier and Plato the philosopher. Yet in both Xenophon and Plato Socrates shows himself Dionysodorus' better by providing rather deeper insights than the superficialities dished out by the sophist. Socrates' protreptic in the *Euthydemus* (278e–282d) contains some of the most substantive positive teaching in all of early Plato, and in Xenophon Socrates goes beyond tactics to consider the character of the good general and that of the best sort of soldier. Later in the book Glaucon's premature entry into politics resembles that contemplated by Alcibiades in the Platonic *Alcibiades* (cf. 3.6.1 with *Alc.* 123d). But while Alcibiades is told that he must understand justice, above all, before daring to enter the political arena, Xenophon's Socrates tells Glaucon that he had better learn the facts about Athenian manpower, troop dispositions, and finances. Xenophontic practicality contrasts with Platonic morality. But the central lesson Socrates has for Glaucon is, arguably, the importance of self-knowledge (*Mem.* 3.6.16). This lesson is rather clearer in *Memorabilia* 4.2, where Socrates grills the young and beautiful Euthydemus (another figure with resemblances to Alcibiades) on why he believes he is ready to succeed in the public arena. There he speaks

at length about justice and self-knowledge. Self-knowledge in *Memorabilia* 4.2 is not knowledge of the true self, the godlike soul, that we see in the *Alcibiades*, but rather knowledge of what one knows and does not know, and what one can and cannot do, with an explicit analogy to cities that know whether they are powerful enough to take on their enemies—which would require knowing precisely the sorts of things Xenophon's Glaucon fails to know in 3.6. Thus in these representative passages, we see Socrates engaged in some of the same moves (turning to self-knowledge and showing the superficiality of a sophist) despite differences in the subject matter under consideration (troop levels, tactics, and finances in Xenophon, contrasted with knowledge of the true self in the *Alcibiades* and philosophical protreptic in the *Euthydemus*).

Instead of looking at parallel passages, we could ask about the teaching of Socrates. Does Xenophon's Socrates teach the same lessons that his Platonic counterpart does? Whatever else we mean by Socratic, after all, that adjective presumably ought to apply to substantive agreements between Plato and Xenophon. In recent work on Xenophon's Socrates, though, the most common mode has been not to look for similarities between Plato and Xenophon, but to identify the most significant differences. Louis-André Dorion, in his commentary on the *Memorabilia* (2011, 63 n. 4), points out that the ends sought by Xenophon's Socratic leaders are practical in nature, rather than the moral improvement sought by Plato's Socrates. The general's task is to see to the happiness (*eudaimonia*) of his followers (3.2); an earlier commentator, Armand Delatte (1933, 29), had argued that this happiness is to be identified in moral rather than material terms, but Dorion is right to doubt this. Delatte fell prey to the temptation to read Plato into Xenophon; for Xenophon's Socrates, the best leader is the best *oikonomikos*, not a philosopher-king. But we should also note that Xenophon's understanding of *oikonomia* is rather more complex than it may seem; in his fullest discussion of the term, the first few pages of the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates argues that one's property—the *oikos* (household) that the *oikonomikos* manages—consists only of things one knows how to use to one's advantage. Thus money may not count as property, if one does not know what to spend it on, while one who knows how to profit from enemies may count them as property (*Oec.* 1.12–15). Knowledge can seemingly transform anything into property, and thus appears to rise to an importance akin to that of wisdom in passages like the above cited protreptic of the *Euthydemus*, where Plato's Socrates argues that wisdom is the only good. If Xenophon's *oikonomikos* knows how to turn even enemies into wealth, he seems to know the same secret his Platonic rival does: all we need is wisdom. Xenophon's economics, then, may be rather philosophical, and his focus on material goods is only part of the story. Xenophon's Socrates deigns to talk about practical problems facing

leaders, but such topics do not so much replace as complement the sorts of topics we are more likely to find in Plato; and if we look hard enough, we find traces of such Platonic points as the supremacy of wisdom in Xenophon as well.

Still another way to find Socrates in Xenophon would be to isolate the Xenophontic from the Socratic. Can we identify a significant distance between Xenophon's treatment of leadership in the *Memorabilia* and his treatment of that topic in his non-Socratic works? We can hardly consider the full range of the Xenophontic corpus here, but let us take one sounding by comparing the advice for a cavalry commander here with that in Xenophon's treatise on commanding the cavalry (*Hipparchikos*). The treatise contains far more detailed advice on training, maneuvers, and formations, but that would be expected in a larger and more specialized work. All the major points mentioned in *Mem.* 3.6 are also elements in the *Hipparchikos*. Many of the points in the *Memorabilia* passage are covered early on, and in the same order, in the *Hipparchikos*. Thus in both we find calls for the commander to train horses (*Mem.* 3.3.2–4 // *Eq. mag.* 1.3–4, 13–16, 8.4), practice riding on rough ground (*Mem.* 3.3.6 // *Eq. mag.* 1.5), and develop skill in throwing the javelin from horseback (*Mem.* 3.3.7 // *Eq. mag.* 1.21, 25). In both there is also emphasis on developing a thirst for honor in the cavalymen (*Mem.* 3.3.12–15; *Eq. mag.* 1.23, 26). Both note that leaders win obedience by demonstrating their skill (*Mem.* 3.3.8–9; *Eq. mag.* 6.4–6). The most emphatic point in the *Memorabilia* passage is that the cavalry commander must be a skilled speaker, in order to convince his men how much better off they will be if they follow his commands (3.3.8–12). The *Hipparchikos* also notes the importance of the commander's words (*Eq. mag.* 1.24, 8.22), but there the commander's words are always coupled with his deeds, and there is nothing as fulsome as the following praise of *logos* we find in *Memorabilia* 3 (cf. 4.3.12):

Have you never reflected that all the worthiest lessons we customarily learn, the lessons we live by, we learn through speech, and that whenever anyone learns some other worthy lesson, he learns it through speech? Or that those who teach the most valuable lessons make use of speech and those with the best understanding of the most important things are those who discuss them in the finest way (οἱ τὰ σπουδαιότατα μάλιστα ἐπιστάμενοι κάλλιστα διαλέγονται)?

Mem. 3.3.11

This bit, especially the final point about skill at discussion, seems characteristic of Socrates. Xenophon will also speak of Socratic discourse/conversa-

tion/dialectic (διαλέγεσθαι) at 4.5.12 and 4.6.1; at 4.3.12 he will note what a great gift speech is from the gods.

To make the comparison on a grander scale, we could consider the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon's most ambitious work, and a work that is all about leadership. There are certainly numerous parallels between the *Cyropaedia* and Xenophon's Socratic works; Cyrus employs a number of Socratic techniques and arguments (see Gera 1993, 26–131; Gray 2011, 5–30). Or perhaps Xenophon's Socrates learned an anachronistic lesson or two from Xenophon's experience in Persia, as he appears to do in the *Oeconomicus* (4.4–25), where he praises the Persian attention to agriculture. Where Xenophon's Socrates differs from his Cyrus, we would be on somewhat surer ground in identifying Socratic influence. The major difference between Xenophon's Cyrus and his Socrates is rather obvious, though its ramifications may be complex: Socrates is not a leader but a teacher of leaders (*Mem.* 1.6.15). Cyrus himself learns how to lead men in the first part of what is, after all, called the *Education of Cyrus* (*Cyropaedia*), but he does not himself train leaders, at least not ones of the highest sort. And wherever else he succeeded, Cyrus failed to produce a worthy successor, as Persia, according to Xenophon, went into a steep decline immediately upon his death (*Cyr.* 8.8). As we shall see in the case of the *hetaira* Theodote (3.11), part of what distinguishes Socrates is his interest in producing not merely followers but men capable of doing things for themselves, men who can indeed produce the best sorts of friendship, rather than the parody of friendship that Theodote provides for her johns. Xenophon does not give us a list of Socratic success stories here, but would presumably include himself among the successful leaders produced by Socrates. If one facet of leadership is the ability to produce leaders capable of replacing oneself, Cyrus is a flawed example of leadership. Certainly if we consider leadership of a more philosophical variety, Socrates would be considered a successful teacher, given his immense impact on later philosophy, an impact already becoming clear in Xenophon's day, given the breadth and depth of the Socratic movement. This is not to say that Socrates bests Cyrus in all respects. Alcibiades and Critias also had leadership lessons from Socrates. And, at least in Xenophon's telling, Cyrus, after having succeeded not only in saving Persia from conquest but founding an immense empire, died peacefully in his own bed, rather than after drinking the hemlock served to him by his own people.

We have searched for the Socratic in these chapters by looking for parallels with what is often taken to be Socratic material, and by attempting to draw distinctions between Xenophon and his Socrates. The results, as is so often the case, are mixed—or rather they illustrate the complexity of the issues at hand. Perhaps this is what we should suspect from Xenophon, a Socratic who was

more than a Socratic. The least that can be said is that Xenophon's Socrates is not simply a front for Xenophon, despite his tendency to share interests, like military matters and leadership, with his author.

These chapters also have something to tell us about Socrates' relationship with Athenian democracy (cf. Gray 2004). If we consider democracy as a political system that opens office to all and gives all a say in electing high officials, rather than as a system that allows for direct rule by the entire citizen body, or as an ideology that praises the wisdom of the masses over the knowledge of experts, Socrates is here rather democratic. High military offices at Athens were among the few that were filled by election rather than by the lot, so Socrates' attack on the lot (*Mem.* 1.2.9) is not relevant here. And in these chapters, while Socrates explicitly says that the true general is not the man elected general but the man capable of being a general (3.9.10–11), Socrates implies that the Athenians tend to elect the right people. In 3.4 Socrates defends their choice of a good manager over a veteran officer, and in 3.6 he shows that the Athenians were right to laugh Glaucon down when he attempted to give military advice in the Assembly. The men elected to military positions in 3.2 and 3.3 are still in need of Socratic instruction, but perhaps have adequate potential to serve. The nearly despondent younger Pericles (3.5) similarly needs help before he can successfully undertake his leadership role, but Socrates' praise of Athens' ancestral valor and ambition shows that Pericles, precisely because of his father's example, has the potential to lead. And while the young Pericles is scathing about the lack of discipline among contemporary Athenian hoplites and cavalymen, Socrates defends Athens by offering counterexamples, including the navy, whose rowers were drawn primarily from the lower class, and holds out much hope for progress under enlightened leadership. Socrates is sometimes harsh about the capabilities of the Athenian demos, as when he tells Charmides that he has nothing to fear from an audience made up of the unwashed masses (3.7.5–7); but Socrates is at least trying to get Charmides to enter democratic politics, and he argues that the same skill that allowed Charmides to shine among aristocrats will also allow him a successful role in Athenian public life. Had Charmides followed this advice he may have done more democratic politicking and less of the oligarchic plotting that resulted in his death fighting on the side of the Thirty Tyrants in 403. Xenophon's Socrates thus appears to believe that Athenian citizens are quite capable of recognizing good leaders, whose qualifications must, as we have seen, include the ability to convince people of their worthiness to lead. In these chapters, at any rate, Xenophon's Socrates finds a way to integrate his belief in vigorous, expert leadership with the practices of Athenian democracy.

2 Goodness, Beauty, and Knowledge (3.8 and 3.9)

Memorabilia 3.8 begins with an account of the beautiful (*to kalon*), which offers at least a verbal connection with the noble goals (*ta kala*) sought by the interlocutors of 3.1–7. There is a further structural connection all the way back to 2.1, where Socrates' interlocutor was, as here, Aristippus; but Aristippus' return is more of a new beginning than an example of ring composition, as the discontinuity here is more marked than the continuity. Thus 2.1–3.7 form a large block about friendship and leadership, Socrates' take on interpersonal relationships. In the remainder of Book 3 the focus is more on individuals.

Aristippus is here eager to get back at Socrates following his refutation by Socrates in 2.1, and tries to catch him out by making Socrates answer questions for a change. Aristippus believes that he can refute any answer Socrates gives if he asks Socrates to tell him what beauty is, or what the good is. Socrates escapes by saying that while he can readily say what is fine (or beautiful or noble: *kalon*) in one set of circumstances, or what is good in one set of circumstances, he does not know anything that is fine or good *tout court*. Rather, "everything is both good and fine for the things it is suited for, and bad and ugly for those it isn't suited for" (3.8.7). Socrates' teaching and even his examples are very close to those given by Plato's Protagoras when he found himself embarrassed by Socratic questioning (Pl. *Prt.* 334a–c). Has Xenophon mistaken Socrates for Protagoras?

Probably not. As at 3.1.1, the introduction to 3.1–7, Xenophon's introductory words here in chapter 8 ought to guide us:

Socrates, as he wanted to benefit his companions, answered not like someone who was on his guard to prevent his argument from being thrown into confusion, but like one convinced that he must do what ought to be done.

Mem. 3.8.1

Socrates is trying to escape from an *elenchus* and do so in a way that benefits his companions listening to the conversation. Just how he intends to do this is not entirely clear. I have argued elsewhere that Socrates shows himself responsible by not giving Aristippus the answer Aristippus wanted to hear: that pleasure was the one thing fine and good in all circumstances (Johnson 2009). This answer would have allowed Socrates to keep his argument consistent, but would have risked harm to his followers, who might thus have been tempted by Aristippean hedonism. Now Xenophon's Socrates may have himself been a "moderate hedonist" (Gosling and Taylor 1982, 38–40); he is certainly happy to

praise the virtuous life by saying it is, in the long run, the most pleasant life (*Mem.* 1.6.4–10, 2.1, 4.5.9). But if he was a hedonist, he was the sort of hedonist who thought that self-control (*enkrateia*) was of the utmost importance and believed that his followers needed to master themselves before they were told that pleasure was what they were after. Xenophon portrays Aristippus, on the other hand, as being intemperate regarding desire (*Mem.* 2.1.1), and Socrates had spent all of *Memorabilia* 2.1 trying to convince him of the importance of *enkrateia*. Aristippus may not be Xenophon's only target. We may see here a sort of Xenophontic riposte to Plato's Socrates who, in the *Protagoras*, appears to endorse hedonism in his conversation with the relativistic Protagoras. Or at least he appears that way to many readers; if my reading of Xenophon is correct, Xenophon was among those who thought that *Protagoras* saddled Socrates with hedonism. Xenophon's Socrates does not differ from Plato's so much in substance as in presentation: he will not as openly flaunt his hedonism. At any rate, in the last few sentences of this chapter, we suddenly find Socrates discussing the best floor plan for a house or site for a shrine; in both cases Socrates emphasizes how one and the same plan can deliver pleasure under different circumstances. I would suggest that this otherwise bizarre appendix is meant to suggest that pleasure is in some sense a good that escapes from the relativism of the rest of this chapter. If this is right—and it is certainly speculative—we see some common ground regarding hedonism across three rather different Socratic characters (Xenophon's Socrates, Xenophon's Aristippus, and Plato's Socrates) despite vast differences in approach.⁴

In the next chapter, on the other hand, Socrates gives plenty of answers, many of which are strikingly in keeping with the intellectualist Socrates who appears in Plato's early dialogues.

Asked if he considered that those who knew what ought to be done but did the opposite were both wise and lacking self-control, he said, "No more so than they are both foolish and lacking self-control. For I believe that all, choosing what they think is most advantageous to themselves from what is possible, do it."

Mem. 3.9.4

4 I speak of "Socratic characters" advisedly, so as to avoid committing to anything about the historical Aristippus, or Xenophon's relationship with him. But if my speculation above is on the right track, Xenophon's problem with Aristippus would be not so much with his hedonism as with his flaunting the role of pleasure in a way that would mislead young men who had not yet learned the importance of *enkrateia*.

So there is no case in which someone knows (or even believes) that it is advantageous to do x, but instead chooses to do y. No one lacks self-control in this sense, so it makes no difference whether we call them wise, foolish, self-controlled, or the Queen of Sheba—for no such person exists. Everyone does what seems best at the time. In fact, this passage provides clearer evidence for psychological egoism, the thesis that we always do what we think is best for ourselves, than any passage in Plato.⁵ In what follows, Xenophon's Socrates spells out the central importance of knowing what is best, given our unfailing pursuit of it.

For just deeds and all else done by means of virtue are noble and good. And those who know these things would not choose anything in place of them, nor are those who don't know them able to do them. Rather, even if they do attempt them, they fall short ... Since, then, just deeds and everything else noble and good is done by means of virtue, it is clear that justice and the rest of virtue is wisdom.

Mem. 3.9.5

Other passages also make it clear that knowledge suffices for right action (4.6.3–4, of piety; 4.6.6, of justice; 4.6.11, of courage).

But how in the world are we to square this with Xenophon's tremendous emphasis on self-control (*enkrateia*)? After all, if knowledge is all one needs, why not just look for it—as Plato's Socrates seems to do? Xenophon for his part clearly believes that *enkrateia* is necessary to help us acquire knowledge (*Mem.* 1.5.4–5, 4.5.10–11). Without self-control we will be too distracted to pursue knowledge. So while knowledge may suffice for right action, without *enkrateia*, we'll never acquire it. What's more, *enkrateia* may also be required to maintain and employ knowledge (though contrast Dorion 2003). At *Mem.* 4.6.5, at least on one reading, Xenophon's Socrates recognizes the possibility of diachronic *akrasia*, the possibility that a lack of *enkrateia* can cause knowledge to be pushed aside, thus allowing for an agent who had known the right thing to do to choose the wrong thing instead. And Socrates will note later in Book 3 that many people, when their bodies are in poor shape, lose the knowledge they had earlier (3.12.6; cf. 1.2.19–23). So long as one has the relevant knowledge, though, one acts aright; intellectualism is to this extent preserved. While this

5 Clearest evidence for psychological egoism: Morrison 2008, 13. It is only fair to add that the text and interpretation of this passage are disputed: it provides clear evidence only if one reads it as Morrison and I do. See Dorion 2001–2011 2 ad loc for commentary on the difficulties.

is a far less absolute form of intellectualism than that typically attributed to Plato's Socrates, it is close to Aristotle's understanding of Socrates' views on these points, and is compatible with at least one reading of Plato's Socrates, that which allows for non-rational desires (cf. Brickhouse and Smith 2010; Devereux 1995).

3 Artists and the *Hetaira*, Souls and Bodies (3.10–14)

The next chapter begins with a sentence introducing a break: "And whenever he conversed with those who possessed an art (*technê*) and made their living from it, he was helpful to them as well" (3.10.1). We have left behind the generals and would-be generals of the first seven chapters of Book 3, and the philosophical interlude of chapters 8 and 9. Socrates now speaks with the famous painter Parrhasius, and then with two figures otherwise unknown to us, the sculptor Kleiton (unknown unless that name is short for the great Polykleitos) and a maker of breastplates, Pistias. Despite their expertise, each has something to learn from Socrates. Parrhasius is surprised to hear Socrates say that painters imitate the character of the soul in the facial expressions and poses of their images. Kleiton (3.10.6–8) rather similarly is at a loss to say how he makes figures lifelike, until he is told that sculptors delight their audiences by allowing souls to appear through bodies. Pistias (3.10.9–14) learns that his breastplates are deservedly expensive because they fit well, where fitting well does not mean fitting precisely or tightly, but fitting loosely enough to avoid chafing while in use.

In the first two cases Socrates' interest is in the souls that paintings or sculptures can represent. Artists reveal the soul within by showing the body in action, through facial expressions, poses, tension, and relaxation. The armorer Pistias is also concerned with the body in action, in use, for the good breastplate does not fit precisely but functions as an appendage rather than as a burden. Socrates takes images and armor that seemed static and external and puts them into motion to show the relationship between inside and outside: souls inside bodies, bodies inside armor. Pleasure is again a theme: lifelike paintings and sculptures that reveal noble character are a pleasure to behold, and the best armor is that which does not cause pain in use.

We turn now to an artist of a different sort, the *hetaira* Theodote, whom we meet posing for a painter (3.11). Socrates' conversation with Theodote demonstrates how much of her success she owes not to her body, though that is surely no hindrance, but to her soul. Much of her appeal, he suggests, lies in her treating her male companions not as customers but as friends; she then cunningly

stokes their desires by withholding her charms. The only thing she needs is a good pimp to help drive prey her way. Theodote throughout presents herself as being utterly ignorant of such tricks of her trade: she does not know how to draw “friends” her way; how to persuade them how much she cares for them “not only in words but in deeds”; or how to increase their desire by playing hard to get. But her ignorance may be more feigned than real: a high-class *hetaira* differs from a common whore precisely because she obscures the transactional nature of her enterprise (Davidson 1997, 120–130). For all his comfortable banter with Theodote, the result of Socrates’ analysis is to dissolve her charm. Though Socrates implies that he is as titillated as the rest of his followers when first catching sight of Theodote (3.11.3), by the end of the conversation Theodote, far from luring Socrates’ followers away from him, first tries to enlist him as her pimp and then, failing that, would herself become a follower of Socrates, eager to learn how he attracts so many. Socrates is sorry to say that he may have no time to see her when she comes calling. He is, after all, always surrounded by his adoring young friends. He is not the pursuer but the pursued. Socrates wins, as usual.

In order to defeat Theodote, though, Socrates engages with her in her own terms. Socrates and Theodote both rely on the kindness of friends, though Socrates’ lifestyle is hardly as extravagant. Xenophon’s Socrates can claim in the *Apology* (16–17) that he does not need, does not ask for, and does not accept any gifts from anyone in return for his services; but he also repeatedly emphasizes the benefits of friendship (*Mem.* 2.4–6; 2.9–10), and notes that he has friends who would help him if he needed them to do so (*Oec.* 2.7). Both consort only with those they choose; Socrates says that the sophists prostitute themselves by taking pay (*Mem.* 1.6.3–5), and Theodote, of course, would stoop to nothing so crass as direct monetary compensation. Friendship itself is a central concern of Socrates, both in Plato (*Lysis*) and in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.6.14, 2.4–10). Both Socrates and Theodote are in the business of creating desire. Xenophon concludes the *Memorabilia* by saying that those who desire virtue still long for Socrates most of all, because he helped so much in the acquisition of virtue (*Mem.* 4.8.11). Socrates does sometimes withhold his charms, as he does in refuting Euthydemus before sharing with him his positive teaching (*Mem.* 4.2). Nor is Socratic desire limited to the tamer *philia*: his erotic expertise is a key theme in Plato (*Symp.* 177d, 201d, *Lysis* 211e, *Thg.* 123b), Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.6.28, 4.1.2; *Symp.* 8), and Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* (SSR VI A 50). Xenophon characteristically defines Socrates’ expertise in more concrete terms than Plato does: for Xenophon, Socrates’ erotic expertise consists of his mastery of pimping (*Symp.* 3.10, 4.56–64, 8.42. cf. *Mem.* 2.6.36). While he can pimp himself (*Symp.* 8.5), Socrates’ real calling is pimping for virtue (*Mem.* 1.2.2, 1.2.64). That he is a pimp

and not only a prostitute is of course central to his superiority to Theodote. It is related to another key difference. Socrates has his (male) girlfriends (though see Nancy 2004) as Theodote has her boyfriends, but he teaches his friends his tricks, whereas Theodote has been unwilling even to acknowledge hers. That is, Socrates produces not only students but Socratics; many of his companions become teachers, pimps of virtue, in their own right.

Visiting the lovely Theodote has perhaps prepared us for three chapters on the body (3.12–14), though the soul remains part of the discussion as well. The young Epigenes thinks he need take no special care of his body, but is taught that just as athletes must train for the games, so too a citizen needs to train himself if he is to avoid death or dishonor on the battlefield; the reference to warfare connects us to the first third of the book. Being in good shape will aid him in everything he does, including thinking, as poor bodily health leads often to forgetfulness, despondency, peevishness, and even madness, and hence to the loss of knowledge (3.12.6). In the long run it is much less work to take good care of one's body than to suffer the consequences of being in poor shape. We then turn (3.13) to a string of six short exchanges in the form of *chreiai*, in which Socrates points out the pettiness of a number of complaints, mostly centered on the body. Several contrast complaining masters with their tough slaves, who do not complain because their water is too hot or too cold, and easily make long journeys carrying burdens while their masters are worn out despite carrying nothing. In the last chapter of the book (3.14), Socrates suggests that his followers share equally in the delicacies they bring to dinner, criticizes one for eating all desert and no entrée, thus disregarding the chef's artful preparations, and claims that "fine dining" ought to mean the sort of dining that harms neither body nor soul, and requires only those ingredients that are easy to find.

We may note a sort of long-distance ring composition going all the way back to 1.3, the discussion of self-control that began the large middle chunk of the *Memorabilia*, all that lies between the forensic defense of 1.1–2 and the new start at the beginning of Book 4. Xenophon has rung numerous changes on his major themes, one's relationship with the gods, with friends, with followers, and with one's own body. Still, these last chapters, in their emphasis on the body and their brevity, are the sort of thing that leads devotees of Plato's Socrates to dismiss Xenophon as a lightweight. But of course Plato's Socrates shows himself extraordinarily fit when it comes to withstanding bodily challenges, including sleep, cold, wine, and sex, most notably in Alcibiades' famous speech in Plato's *Symposium* (212e–222c). The difference is that Xenophon has Socrates talk about such things, through biting remarks like these, or in longer speeches, like his retelling of Prodicus' *Heracles at the Crossroads* (*Mem.* 2.1.21–

33) or his lengthy sermon on the dangers of consummated *erôs* in Xenophon's *Symposium* 8. Xenophon's Socrates, that is, stoops to explain things that Plato's Socrates does not.

4 Conclusion

Memorabilia 3 is not an organic whole. Rather than attempting to identify some single central argument or theme, I've aimed to do two things in this running commentary on the book: to suggest ways we can understand its literary form, its structure and typical modes of discourse, and to start us on the task of figuring out how to compare it to other works on Socrates.

The *Memorabilia* as a whole makes a case for the innocence, beneficence, and excellence of Socrates. But Xenophon's characteristic way of presenting Socrates in much of the *Memorabilia*, including the third book, is to show him approached by an interlocutor with a specific problem or question. Xenophon's Socrates responds to the issue at hand. He answers his interlocutors' questions, or gives them advice they can use (cf. Morrison 1994). Plato's Socrates sometimes faces similar questions, but he tends to leave them behind for more general questions about the larger issues at stake, questions he cannot resolve. Hence a conversation about whether one's sons should go to a man who would give them specialized training in how to fight in hoplite armor becomes a fascinating but inconclusive attempt to define courage (*Laches*). Xenophon's Socrates would have told us whether the training is a good idea or not. The initial questions are, for Xenophon, more than a dramatic entrée into an abstract conversation. The specificity and variety of Socratic conversations in Xenophon complicate any effort to reconstruct the more general views of Xenophon's Socrates.

Xenophon provides us, then, with what we might call applied Socraticism, rather than the theoretical Socraticism Plato offers. Where Plato's Socrates challenges us because he refuses to answer the questions he asks, Xenophon's Socrates challenges us because his answers tend to be too specific, or are presented as advice or guidelines, rather than being introduced and defended by argument. To bring Plato and Xenophon into a comprehensive conversation, then, we need to do some hefty interpretative work on both sides. One vital step is to make a distinction between doctrinal differences and differences in presentation. Plato's Socrates spends much of his time seeking in vain to define the virtues; Xenophon's Socrates spends much of his time preparing men to be virtuous, especially by promoting self-control as the precondition to virtue, and helping men apply the virtue they possess to specific problems. He is not

so much saying different things about virtue, or defining its nature, as dealing with its acquisition and application. And when Xenophon's Socrates does turn to defining key terms, as he does on occasion, his definitions can sound quite similar to those we attribute to Plato's Socrates: for Xenophon's Socrates, too, virtue is knowledge (*Mem.* 3.9.5).

Perhaps, then, the two figures are less dueling portraits than more or less compatible accounts of the same character, which take on different presentational styles because they are aimed at different audiences. Where Plato's Socrates aims to turn young men to philosophy, Xenophon's Socrates aims to be helpful to all, and in doing so shows the practical value of his thinking about the soul and body, persuasion, pleasure, beauty, and the good. The range of interlocutors is meant to mirror the range of Xenophon's readers. Certainly Xenophon's own interests influenced his portrait of Socrates just as Plato's interests influenced his. But even if Xenophon's portrait generally came later, as most believe, his Socrates may be more of a supplement to Plato's account than a rival to it. Xenophon is a popularizer who writes as he does not because he fails to understand his topic but because he wishes to ensure that his audience does not fail to understand him.⁶ Popularizers are generally viewed with contempt by scholarly specialists. But, by definition, they also aim to introduce a wider public to something which that public does not already know, and thus a good popularizer must also understand something beyond the sort of conventionality that has too often taken to be Xenophon's stock and trade. Good popularizers also write in the knowledge that they will be read not only by a popular audience but by experts—and judged by them, too; Xenophon also speaks to readers of Plato. And we too can learn much by listening to what he has to say.

References

- Brickhouse, T.C. and N.D. Smith. *Socratic moral psychology*. Cambridge 2010.
 Davidson, J. *Courtesans and fishcakes: the consuming passions of classical Athens*. New York 1997.
 Delatte, L. *Le troisième livre des Souvenirs Socratiques de Xénophon: étude critique*. Paris 1933.

6 For Xenophon as a popularizer, see Waterfield 2004. Waterfield would, however, make Xenophon's Socrates a rather more conventional figure than I would. Compare Danzig's emphasis (in this volume) on the unconventionally utilitarian nature of Xenophon's Socrates.

- Devereux, D. 'Socrates' Kantian conception of virtue', *JSPH* 33 (1995), 381–408.
- Dorion, L.-A. *Xénophon: Mémorables*. Paris 2000–2011.
- Dorion, L.A. 'Akasia et *enkrateia* dans les *Mémorables* des Xénophon', *Dialogue* 42 (2003), 645–672.
- Gera, D. *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: style, genre, and literary technique*. Oxford 1993.
- Gosling, J.C.B. and C.C.W. Taylor. *The Greeks on pleasure*. Oxford 1982.
- Gray, V.J. *The framing of Socrates: the literary interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia*. Stuttgart 1998.
- Gray, V.J. 'Le Socrate de Xénophon et la démocratie', *Eph* 69 (2004), 141–176.
- Gray, V.J. *Xenophon's mirror of princes: reading the reflections*. Oxford 2011.
- Johnson, D.M. 'Aristippus at the crossroads: the politics of pleasure in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*', *Polis* 26 (2009), 204–222.
- Hobden, F. and C. Tuplin. *Xenophon: ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Leiden 2012.
- Morrison, D. 'Xenophon's Socrates as a teacher', in: P. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*. Cornell 1994, 181–208.
- Morrison, D. 'Remarques sur la psychologie morale de Xénophon', in: M. Narcy and A. Tordesillas, *Xénophon et Socrate*, Paris 2008, 11–28.
- Narcy, M. 'La meilleure amie de Socrate: Xénophon *Mémorables* III, 11', *Eph* 69 (2004), 213–234.
- Sandridge, N. *Loving humanity, learning, and being honored: the foundations of leadership in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus*. Washington 2012.
- Tamiolaki, M. 'Virtue and leadership in Xenophon: ideal leaders or ideal losers?', in: Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 563–589.
- Waterfield, R. 'Xenophon's Socratic mission', in: C.J. Tuplin, *Xenophon and his world*. Stuttgart 2004, 79–113.

Xenophon's Socratic Education in *Memorabilia*

Book 4

Christopher Moore

Pennsylvania State University

1 Introduction

Memorabilia 4 sets out the system of education that accounts for Socrates' pre-eminent usefulness in his companions' search for happiness (4.1.1 and 4.8.11). Chapter 1 shows how Socrates persuaded different kinds of youth to take up that education. Chapter 2 sets out one of these propaedeutic methods in great detail.¹ Chapters 3 through 7 treat of the five stages of the education. In chapter 8, the end of the book and of the *Memorabilia* itself, Xenophon explains Socrates' behavior at his trial and summarizes the previous seven chapters (but not the three earlier books).² This conclusion might show that Xenophon composed *Memorabilia* 4 for independent publication.³ At least it shows that Xenophon wrote it with a unified vision.⁴ He wanted to establish the sequence of stages constituting the Socratic education. In doing so, he illustrates the precise way he takes Socrates to have proved useful. He also silences the charge, formulated at the beginning of the *Memorabilia*, that Socrates was responsible for Alcibiades' and Critias' becoming nefarious, a charge that supposes he taught them political power (τὰ πολιτικά) before teaching them to how to wield it

1 See Morrison 1994, 183–192, on *Mem.* 4.1–2.

2 Much of this chapter (sections 1–10) reprises Xenophon's *Apology*, especially in its reliance on a report by Hermogenes; but it appears also to reprise *Mem.* 1.1.8–1.2.64, as part of a ring composition giving coherence to the entirety of the *Memorabilia*.

3 This is the view of Marchant 1923, xviii. Henderson's 2013 revision of the Loeb volume takes a more cautious position on composition, noting only that the *Memorabilia* was assembled over a long period of time. Dorion 2000 argues that Xenophon probably did publish diverse independent dialogues, but attained remarkable unity in the overall work. Gray 1998, 6–7, and *passim*, works to explain that remarkable unity.

4 Emphasized, among others, by Bruell 1994, xxi; Gray 1998, 156. Bruell also thinks that Book 4 is merely a caricature of philosophical protreptic, given that Euthydemus “is about as unfit for philosophy as a nature can be” (x), “a brainless beauty” (xxi). Gray defends Euthydemus to the extent that Aristippus is a less receptive interlocutor (20).

well—that is, with *sôphrosunê* (1.2.17).⁵ In fact, Xenophon argues, for Socrates as educator, *sôphrosunê* always came first (4.3.1, implied at 1.2.17–29).

In *Memorabilia* 4 Xenophon portrays Socrates differently from Plato as far as their respective character's usefulness, capacity to corrupt others, and educational curriculum are concerned. The last of these three qualities is relevant here. Plato never presents Socrates as providing for his friends an elaborated course-by-course educational curriculum. Plato's *Republic* (521d–533d), the only seeming exception, has Socrates articulating, for tendentious purposes, a multi-decade curriculum for the guardians—philosopher-kings—of an imagined and improbable city. Admittedly, elsewhere Plato's Socrates demonstrates ways to talk well about important topics and observes that people should discuss, for example, the nature of virtue before assessing who best teaches some branch of it (e.g., *Prt.* 361a1–3, *La.* 190c1–2). All the same, in none of Plato's dialogues does Socrates explicitly articulate an order in which his associates ought to acquire certain virtues and skills. In this respect Xenophon's interest in Socrates differs.

The meaning of this difference between Xenophon and Plato can become clear only once we have addressed another question. This question concerns the five-stage curriculum itself. What exactly are the stages, how do they differ from one another, and how do they work in a sequence? In other words, what precisely is Xenophon's Socratic education? I take up the five stages (in chapters 3–7) in turn. Then I assess the final chapter as, contrary to appearance, a continuation of the matters discussed in these five stages. This allows us to see more readily Xenophon's purposes in Book 4. We will then be able to conjecture some differences between Xenophon and Plato, and posit some considerations about Socrates and his legacy.

2 *Sôphrosunê*

At the beginning of his discussion of the Socratic education, Xenophon says that Socrates aimed to engender *sôphrosunê* in his companions before he taught them anything else (*πρότερον*, 4.3.1; *πρώτον*, 4.3.2). Only with that foundation might they safely become skilled in speech, practical ability, and cleverness (*λεκτικούς και πρακτικούς και μηχανικούς*, 4.3.1). Admitting the truth behind the criticisms of Socrates' dealings with Critias and Alcibiades (1.2.17), Xenophon observes that possessing these political powers in the absence of

5 Aeschin. *In Tim.* 173 asserted a link between Socrates and Critias.

sôphrosunê would indeed make people liable to becoming more unjust and more capable of doing evil (ἀδίκωτέρους ... κακουργεῖν, 4.3.1). Xenophon says that Socrates does care that his companions eventually become skilled in speech and practical ability (4.6.1, 5.1). So a lesson in *sôphrosunê* is obligatory.

For all the priority and significance set on *sôphrosunê*, Xenophon does not make it immediately obvious what he means by it, and why he thinks that a person lacking it would be prone to bad action. Before turning to Xenophon's claims about *sôphrosunê* elsewhere in his oeuvre, we should canvass three plausible definitions that drew his contemporaries' attention, and that would readily explain its importance. One might suppose *sôphrosunê* to be a kind of self-knowledge, familiarity with one's powers and inadequacies, such that its possession would inhibit a person from doing what he would not do well. The Platonic dialogues *Charmides* (164d3–165b4), *Alcibiades* (133c18), and *Rival Lovers* (138a5) all draw equivalences between self-knowledge and *sôphrosunê* (cf. Tuozzo 2011, 184–286; Moore 2015). But Socrates in the *Memorabilia* has just treated of self-knowledge in the previous chapter, in his first conversation with Euthydemus; and there he argues that self-ignorance leads less to injustice and doing evil than to harmful error (4.2.24–30).⁶ One might instead suppose *sôphrosunê* to be self-control, another familiar equivalence, where self-control means deciding which desires to satisfy rather than capitulating to the most immediate or intense desire. People surely have strong desires to do what would be rightly judged unjust or evil. But Xenophon calls self-control *enkrateia*, and treats it as a distinct element in the Socratic education (4.5). Nowhere in Book 4 does Socrates or Xenophon say that *sôphrosunê* and *enkrateia* are identical. Socrates later does get Euthydemus' agreement that they have the same opposite (4.5.7–8); but arguments from shared opposites are dubious (cf. Pl. *Prt.* 332a4–333b4), and Socrates here never says that he thinks each item has only one opposite. Most importantly, Socrates says that *enkrateia* is important for executing one's will in the presence of annoyingly needy desires, for example to eat, drink, have sex, sleep; doing evil may therefore sometimes *require* the presence of *enkrateia* and the absence of *sôphrosunê*. Thus they are not the same. Finally, one might suppose that *sôphrosunê* is not self-knowledge or self-control but the knowledge of what is good and bad, as the end of Plato's *Charmides* comes to hint (174a10). Without the moral compass that *sôphrosunê* as knowledge of what is good would thereby provide,

6 On self-knowledge in *Mem.* 4.2, see Wilkins 1917, 23; Courcelle 1974, 19–20; Annas 1985, 121; Phillips 1989, 368; Dorion 2004, 240–251, and 2006, 96; Johnson 2005, 62–65; Rossetti 2011, 76–80. Morrison 1994, 187, mentions it just in passing. I show that the interpretation of self-knowledge is indeed more complicated than it seems, in Moore 2015, ch. 6.

a person might very well become unjust and do evil. Yet Xenophon presents knowing what is best as a later and distinct part of the educational scheme, connected to study and largely disciplinary-relative. He once notes that Socrates did not distinguish between *sophia* and *sôphrosunê* (3.9.4), but it is clear from Xenophon's explanation that both he and Socrates took those terms to be conceptually distinct even if psychologically overlapping; we will discuss this passage in detail later. At any rate, equating *sôphrosunê* with knowing what to do (i.e., what is good) seems grandiose and inconsistent with its being simply the first of five stages of education.

In our chapter of concern, *Mem.* 4.3, Xenophon does not define *sôphrosunê*; indeed, he defines it nowhere in Book 4. Instead of defining it, he shows how Socrates endeavors to make his companions exercise it with respect to the gods (περὶ θεοῦς ... σώφρονας, 4.3.2). He provides as illustration another conversation between Socrates and Euthydemus. In that conversation, Socrates' chief aim is to convince Euthydemus of the extent to which the gods have concerned themselves (ἐπιμελῶς, 4.3.2, cf. 4.3.12) with providing humans what they need. Euthydemus has yet to have taken the magnanimous extent of their *philanthropia* to heart (ἐνθυμηθῆναι, 4.3.3). Socrates therefore brings Euthydemus to agree to a sequence of ways that the created world suits human needs so well (4.3.3–12). Socrates says that this sequence should provide adequate reason for revering and honoring (σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν) the gods (4.3.13). We should not despise (καταφρονεῖν) what does not appear palpably before us, he says; in many other departments of life we accept that effects prove the existence of a cause just as much as the sight of the cause itself does (4.3.14). Confidence in the gods' existence and their benevolence should lead Euthydemus to thank them; and he can thank them by participating in the city's customary sacrifices to the best of his ability (4.3.15–16). With these thanks he can expect (θαρρεῖν τε καὶ ἐλπίζειν) from the gods the "greatest goods" (4.3.17). Xenophon ends this section by quoting Socrates in a way that brings *sôphrosunê* back into focus. The *sôphrôn* person anticipates (ἐλπίζειν) the greatest benefits to come from those who can provide the greatest benefits, the gods; and this person accordingly aims to please the gods through strict obedience to the customs of civic religion. Xenophon concludes this section by returning to his theme of education: "Saying such things, and himself acting in such ways, he [Socrates] prepared his companions to become more reverent and *sôphrôn* (εὐσεβεστέρους τε καὶ σωφρονεστέρους)" (4.3.18).

For all the details of this conversation, it hardly makes explicit which part of Socrates' teaching is meant to be imparting *sôphrosunê*. Sections 3–14 present an argument for the existence and benevolence of the gods. Socrates emphasizes the extensive evidence for both, and reminds Euthydemus how often he

already infers abductively from effect to cause. The result should be belief in accordance with religious convention. Sections 15–17 present an argument in favor of sacrificing to the gods on the grounds that doing so will maintain their benevolence. This gives a prudential reason to act in accordance with pious norms of behavior. Unlike the previous fifteen sections, section 18 does make explicit reference to *sôphrosunê*. Being *sôphrôn* involves looking to the right place for benefit, namely at those who can best confer it, the gods. It also involves prudence or unbending focus, strictly obeying religious tenets in order to preserve those benefits. Nothing in this passage itself specifies whether *sôphrosunê* combines a correct understanding of the source of benefit with a persistence in doing whatever maintains those benefits, or whether it is one or the other. The final line of the chapter adds a complication. Xenophon links *sôphrosunê*—at least with respect to the gods—with reverence (becoming εὐσεβεστέρους). The compound connective τε καὶ in εὐσεβεστέρους τε καὶ σωφρονεστέρους does not indicate the degree of difference Xenophon sees between the two adjectives. Xenophon's summary of this chapter at the book's end suggests he sees very little distance. He says that Socrates showed that he was so reverent (εὐσεβής) that he did nothing without the imprimatur or judgment (γνώμης) of the gods (4.8.11). The implication is that *sôphrosunê peri theous* practically means—or is at least an essential part of—doing what the gods judge best.

If being *sôphrôn* with respect to the gods means doing what the gods judge best, and the reason for doing this is that it is personally enriching to do so, then being *sôphrôn* in general would seem to mean doing whatever anything that is authoritative judges best because doing so yields the most personal benefit. This would seem to involve identifying the source of authoritative judgment (per sections 3–14), delineating the content of that judgment (per sections 15–17), and obeying that judgment (per section 18). Should a person do these three things, and thereby embody *sôphrosunê*, he would seem unlikely to become unjust, given that almost any imaginable authoritative judgment, be it social, rational, or divine, might be thought to legislate against injustice. For the same reason, the *sôphrôn* person would seem unlikely to do evil, even if he had the right skills.

Until we study *enkrateia* in detail we cannot account for all its differences from *sôphrosunê*. Even in approximation, however, we can query Louis-André Dorion's claim that *sôphrosunê* "is almost always synonymous with *enkrateia*," where *enkrateia* for him means "moderation in pleasures and desires."⁷ It may

7 Dorion 2006, 101 (= 2013, xxvi); in his 2013, 105, Dorion also claims that it is "une vertu

be granted that the *sôphrôn* person will not act on all his desires, given that authoritative judgment may call for only limited satisfaction of some. To this extent he will act with moderation in pleasures and desires. But *sôphrosunê* does not in itself mean moderation or limitation. It seems instead to mean recognizing, understanding, and fitting oneself to the determinatively best ways to live, and to do so in the acknowledgement of the personal value in doing so.

We can corroborate the *Memorabilia* 4.3 view of *sôphrosunê* with Xenophon's remarks about *sôphrosunê* elsewhere in the *Memorabilia*. In the work's opening book and chapter, mirroring 4.3.2, Xenophon expresses his amazement that anybody would consider Socrates to lack *sôphrosunê* with respect to the gods (περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς μὴ σωφρονεῖν) given that he was never irreverent (ἄσεβής) with respect to the gods, and that he always said or did whatever was appropriate to the most reverent person (εὐσεβέστατος) (1.1.19–20). Xenophon gives a similar explanation for Socrates' *sôphrosunê*: Socrates believes, as is common, that the gods care for humans, but he also believes, as is less commonly appreciated, that the gods know all, and give signs to men. Thus, the reader may infer, the gods make public their definitive and informative authoritative judgments. Xenophon observes Socrates' *sôphrosunê* here to explain Socrates' disobedience during the oligarchy. We could hardly think that his disobedience was a matter of moderation or self-control, for he probably did not desire to obey the tyrants, but to follow the right rules.

In the *Memorabilia*'s second chapter, Xenophon diagnoses Critias' and Alcibiades' interest in studying with Socrates. They saw that he lived most self-sufficiently on very little (ἐλαχίστων μὲν χρημάτων αὐταρκέστατα), was most self-controlled about pleasures (τῶν ἡδονῶν δὲ πασῶν ἐγκρατέστατον), and mastered any conversation (1.2.14). What these two men were drawn by, however, was only his power of speech and thus action, not his *sôphrosunê* (1.2.15). From this we can infer that *sôphrosunê* must comprise Socrates' first two traits, his *autarkeia* and his *enkrateia*. Socrates' need and desire for very little might seem best reduced to "self-control." If so, this would vindicate Dorion's equation of

indissociable de la sophia." North 1966, 123–132, recognizes the various instances and ways across his *oeuvre* that Xenophon distinguishes *sôphrosunê* from *enkrateia*, but does not give a clear account of that difference in the case of *Mem.* 4.3 (127); a much better account of the difference, in the non-Socratic works at least, is in Humble 1999, 340. De Vries 1943, 92–93, presents a range of Xenophon's uses of *sôphrosunê*: as a general ethical quality contrasting with *πονηρός*, or contrasting with *hubris*; as ambiguous between an ethical and intellectual notion; as simply "[good] sense"; as often "master of one's passions"; as knowing one's limits; etc.; but does not focus on the use in 4.3.

sôphrosunê and self-control (*enkrateia*) and show that the five-stage educational scheme described in Book 4 is actually no more than four stages. But in fact Xenophon does not make *sôphrosunê* reduce to *enkrateia*. First, while the *autarkeia* that *sôphrosunê* includes amounts for Socrates to making do with very little, it also includes, as we will see when we study 4.7.1, knowing how to do various things well. Second, and more significantly, Xenophon's remarks about Critias and Alcibiades continue (1.2.17–23). He presents the hypothetical charge against Socrates that he should have taught *sôphrosunê* before he taught *ta politika*. Xenophon rebuts the charge, claiming that Socrates both led his erstwhile companions to *sôphrosunê* by argument and demonstrated *sôphrosunê* in his own person. The reader must wait until 4.3 to learn about the argument he is to have used, but Xenophon here goes on to say what he means in referring to Socrates' "demonstration" of *sôphrosunê*. He says that Socrates showed himself to be *kalos kagathos* and talked admirably about virtue and the other human matters. Xenophon is not describing a person's control over his desires but rather a person's embodiment of traditionally ideal character traits and ability to speak well about the authoritative human norms. At this point Xenophon says that the opposite of *sôphrosunê* is *hubris* (1.2.19), where *hubris* must imply taking one's own goals as sovereign, in total disregard of others' rights or privileges.⁸ Xenophon also offers as examples of those lacking *sôphrosunê* drunks and people embroiled in love affairs; he says that they lose the ability to care for duty and disdain what is contrary to duty (τῶν τε δεόντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν μὴ δεόντων ἀπέχεσθαι, 1.2.22). The emphasis continues to be on the recognition and pursuit of the best guidelines for living and foregoing endorsement of whatever one simply feels like doing.

I will mention just three other relevant uses of *sôphrosunê* in the *Memorabilia*.⁹ When Xenophon lists the definitional questions Socrates pursues as

8 This view is supported by MacDowell 1976, 14–24. It is worth noting that denial of the gods was considered *hubris*—and thus *sôphrosunê*, as its opposite, would involve recognizing their existence (20); but apparently this is really a matter of acknowledging the gods' decisive role in the world.

9 I leave several aside. Linked with *aidôs*, *sôphrosunê* also characterizes the bearing of the virtuous woman in Prodicus' speech (*Mem.* 2.1.22); when Euthydemus has become incited by Socrates' provoking conversation, he keeps silent so as to project *sôphrosunê* rather than impetuous defensiveness (4.2.6). In Xenophon's *Symposium*, Callias' beloved Autolucus is once said to combine *sôphrosunê* with *aidôs* (1.8.5), and once with strength, endurance, and bravery (8.8.4). In the *Oeconomicus*, only to those truly *sôphrôn* do gods give the gift of being willingly obeyed (21.12).

part of his characteristic activity, he gives them in opposing pairs, and sets *sôphrosunê* against *mania* (1.1.16). Since the person acting in *mania* acts irrationally, *sôphrosunê* seems to mean acting on the basis of good reasons.¹⁰ In Book 3, Xenophon says that Socrates did not distinguish between *sophia* and *sôphrosunê*. The one who, recognizing (γινώσκοντα) what is admirable and good, does them (χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς), and who, knowing (εἰδότα) what is disgraceful, hangs back (εὐλαβεῖσθαι), Socrates judged both *sophon* and *sôphron* (3.9.4). If Xenophon uses parallel word order, he seems to suggest that *sophia* is recognizing and knowing what is good and bad, whereas *sôphrosunê* is doing what one knows is best to do. This reasoning is corroborated by a later remark, where *sophia* involves attention (προσέχειν) to what is useful, understanding (καταμανθάνειν), and perceiving (αἰσθανομένους) what is good and bad; by contrast, choice (προαίρεσθαι) and concerned action (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) are typical of *sôphrosunê* (4.5.6–7). *Sôphrosunê* is endeavoring to do what one ought (ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὧν προσήκει).

From what we see, *sôphrosunê* makes a plausible starting point for the Socratic education. It amounts to a sensitivity to considerations that ought to motivate action and a commitment to acting on those considerations.¹¹ It does not have its own detailed moral content. A person who is *sôphrôn* does not know, on account of his *sôphrosunê*, precisely what to do. What he knows instead—and I take this to be consistent with the connection Socrates draws between *sôphrosunê* and *sophia* at 3.9.4—is to seek out authoritative judgments and to listen to them. On the assumption that such authoritative judgments do exist, and on the assumption that education or learning amounts to following authoritative judgments—be they in the conventions of reading, the ways of navigation, or moral precepts—*sôphrosunê* will be foundational for any education whatsoever.

10 At *Mem.* 3.9.6, *mania* becomes the opposite of *sophia* and signifies self-ignorance (τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι γινώσκειν) about matters of common knowledge.

11 Marchant 1923, xviii, translates *sôphrosunê* as “prudence” and says that it means “character”; if so, then Xenophon’s Socrates provides a helpful and plausible analysis of “character.” But his introductory essay sometimes confounds the difference between *sôphrosunê* and *enkrateia* (xx and n. 2). Gray 1998, 153, does not distinguish *sôphrosunê* from *sôphrosunê peri theous* and accordingly translates “respect for the gods.”

3 *Dikaiosunê*

Book 4's fourth chapter sets out some specific judgments about how to act. Granted, chapter 3 already provided a little content. As we learned there, exercising *sôphrosunê* with respect to the gods amounts to being reverent, and this requires following the civic sacrifices, rituals, and other instituted or customary religious proprieties. The content is whatever those institutions or customs—in other words, those laws—set out about our relations with the gods (cf. 4.6.4). As we see in chapter 4, just as exercising *sôphrosunê* with respect to the gods is called reverence, exercising *sôphrosunê* with respect to other humans is called justice. This is most evident from the case of Socrates, who exemplified *sôphrosunê*. He obeyed both the common authority and the laws' command (κοινῇ ἄρχουσί τε ἃ οἱ νόμοι προστάττοιεν πειθόμενος, 4.4.1), never being swayed by popular feeling or oligarchic fiat, both of which encourage actions that are contrary to law (4.4.2–4). Socrates embodies justice by following the public authority, formulated concretely in law.

What we may infer from Xenophon's remarks about Socrates' character we may corroborate with Socrates' words. Further into chapter 4, Hippias asks Socrates what he believes justice to be (4.4.9); Socrates responds that the lawful is just (τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, 4.4.12); indeed, they are the same thing (τὸ αὐτό, 4.4.13). The law is the set of specific agreements about what ought to be done and not done (συνθέμενοι ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ὧν ἀπέχεσθαι ἐγράψαντο). Socrates soon clarifies what “the same thing” means: justice is obedience to or being persuaded by (πειθόμενος) the law. In other words, acting lawfully is acting justly. Some of these laws in accordance with which we act justly have admittedly never been established by legislator or legislative body. These “unwritten laws” (4.4.19) are the customs that all humans follow about piety, filial duty, and incest; they count as laws, despite having never been expressly decided upon, because their infraction yields punishment (4.4.21). Socrates puts the gods at the source of these laws, and judges those laws just on the grounds that the gods must be better law-givers than men (4.4.25).

Memorabilia 4.4 has generated much scholarly concern, especially about the validity and scope of the argument for the identity of law and justice.¹² A particular issue is whether Socrates conceives of human law positively or

12 Marchant 1923, xx, thinks that the argument here contradicts Plato's *Gorgias* as well as other parts of the *Memorabilia*, and is in the end “unconvincing as an exposition of Socrates' views on Justice, and the concluding sentence of the chapter does not square with it.” At *Mem.* 3.9.5 Socrates talks about a feature of justice, namely that it is beautiful and wisdom.

ideally, as that which has actually been issued irrespective of its value, or as only those laws that are actually beneficial.¹³ Another issue is whether Xenophon presents Socrates as providing his complete and honest opinion about the relation between justice and law, some readers worrying that Socrates might be obscuring his actual views, namely that some laws are unjust, to preempt charges that he undermines Athenian law, which charges Xenophon records at *Apology*. 1.2.¹⁴ Nor is it especially clear what feature of the obedience to the law makes it just. One possibility is that the arrangements the laws compel are intrinsically just; in this case, the content of the *dictates* is substantively just, and by consequence so too the acceptance of those dictates. Another possibility is that obedience to whatever laws there are, as long as those laws meet certain formal constraints—being universally applicable and enforced, for example—is procedurally just, as it were, because this allows everybody to coordinate their actions with everybody else's. Of course, Xenophon's Socrates might think it is both, or sometimes one and sometimes the other. The gods' law would be substantively just, as would some human legislation; other laws might not be wholly substantively just but their obedience would be just for reasons related to success at effecting social coordination.

The difficulties brought up by Chapter 4 are of great philosophical, literary, and historical interest.¹⁵ But they may be bracketed for the sake of understanding the Socratic education adumbrated in Book 4. Xenophon writes this chapter as part of the educational sequence (cf. 4.8.11): without *sôphrosunê* there is no justice; with *sôphrosunê* justice must have some practical realization, and it does so in the obedience to the laws. Yet this chapter has an odd position in the five curricular chapters: it is the only one in which Xenophon presents Socrates talking with someone other than Euthydemus.¹⁶ Xenophon says that Socrates talked often about justice, in particular about its teachability (4.4.5). Hippias, a fellow intellectual rather than a student, overhears Socrates going through this argument one of the many times Xenophon says he did so. Coming up to Socrates, he teases him for being both repetitive (4.4.6) and opaque about his

13 Morrison 1995 presents both sides but opts for the positivist interpretation.

14 Johnson 2012, 125–126, is somewhat sympathetic to Leo Strauss' view of *Mem.* 4.4 in his critical reappraisal of Strauss' evidence for his view; Dorion 2010, in an equally careful critique of Strauss, is less inclined to any sympathy, and so prefers the straightforward positivist reading; see also Stavru 2008 and Danzig 2009, 251–257.

15 See Johnson 2012, 133–135, for the drama and structure of the chapter.

16 Marchant 1923, xix, assumes that this means that Xenophon had already written this exchange with Hippias and inserted it into the work constituting *Mem.* 4; cf. Johnson 2012, 141–142, on the question.

real views (4.4.9). Hippias states that he has a new and irrefutable view of justice, but refuses to share it until Socrates shares his own (4.4.7). Socrates claims that his actions provide a sufficient clue to his view of justice, but he is eventually cajoled into putting into words what he thinks justice is (4.4.12; Socrates gives the same view without being cajoled at 4.6.5–6). The remainder of the chapter recreates a conversation between Hippias and Socrates, and closes with the claim that “by saying and doing such things he [Socrates] made those near him more just (δικαιοτέρους ποίει)” (4.4.25).

This ending integrates Chapter 4 into those around it by claiming for Socrates educational success. In the previous chapter, about *sôphrosunê*, it was at least somewhat clear how that educational success was to have come about. Euthydemus came to recognize the most important source of benefit, having apparently been skeptical about the gods and their benevolence, and he came to realize that by putting aside his disdain for theistic belief and practicing certain familiar actions—ritual sacrifice, for example—he could retain the benefit he got from them (4.3.14–16). Thus being *sôphrôn* requires committing oneself both to certain attitudes and beliefs and to doing one’s duty to the furthest extent of one’s ability (τῆς ... δυνάμεως μηδὲν ὑφίεσθαι ... μηδὲν ἐλλείποντα κατὰ δύναμιν, 4.3.17). Both sorts of commitment presumably require continual effort, self-scrutiny, and practice. Euthydemus appears on the way to making these commitments; and thus Socrates has been shown to be a success. It remains to be seen, however, how the conversation depicted in Chapter 4, about justice, reveals Socrates’ educational success.

Xenophon seems to think that Socrates’ actions are the best teachers for knowing how to live justly. Socrates’ scrupulous and sometimes disobedient or counterintuitive civic service, the justice of which history has vindicated, always supported the more fundamental laws over opportunistic commands or lazy habit (4.4.1–5). Socrates never bore false witness or served as a prosecutor; never set friends or citizens against one another; and never did anything that Hippias, for one, would consider unjust (4.4.11). So Xenophon may think that Socrates provides Hippias a model for the just life that Hippias in fact went on to imitate—a life of a person who avoids injustice and also avoids unlawfulness. But he must also think that the *argument* about injustice teaches an important part of the lesson. Hippias asserts that he can speak irrefutably about justice. He does not explicitly maintain that he accepts his own view about justice, but we have two reasons to think that he does. First, he claims that nobody at all can speak against his view (4.4.7); and so if Hippias is rational, he ought to believe his own view: after all, it is irreproachable! Second, Socrates says that this discovery about the nature of justice, if it is so good, would dispel all controversy about what is just, and thus put an end to all litigation and war

(4.4.8); and so if Hippias is sympathetic to these consequences as great goods, he again should believe his view: it is a panacea! But the view that Hippias wants to present, and probably believes, whatever it may be, is obviously not that justice is lawfulness. After all, he is confused by that view (4.4.13). Yet by the end of the conversation he understands Socrates' view and accepts it. If Socrates' view is from Xenophon's perspective true, then Socrates has replaced Hippias' false view of justice with his own true view of justice. Given that the degree to which one acts justly determines the degree to which one is just (4.4.13), and one's beliefs about justice determine how one acts (if one wants to act justly), then Hippias' acquisition of Socrates' true view of justice makes him more just.

This explanation for Socrates' ability to make Hippias more just holds irrespective of the content of Socrates' (true) view of justice. Yet I think that the content too contributes to making Hippias more just. We have argued that justice is *sôphrosunê* with respect to other humans. We have also argued that *sôphrosunê* amounts to identifying and following authoritative judgments. What are the authoritative judgments in the human realm? Likely the laws. An alternative view of justice brings this into relief. "Benefit friends and harm enemies" is backed mostly by tradition, and it does not help in situations where it is unclear who counts as a friend or what counts as a benefit (cf. Blundell 1989; Moore 2012). The law, by contrast, comes either from legislative deliberation or from the gods, both of which have claims to authority. The law is also finely articulated, capable of giving useable guidance in a great diversity of cases. As we have seen above, much more would need to be said about the authority of law, or its legislators, including whether it is always authoritative or only ideally, before becoming satisfied with Socrates' equation of justice and lawfulness. But the incompleteness of this view, or even the possibility that it might have some unavoidable vagueness, does not tell against Socrates' main point. His main point seems to be that justice is not simply doing what you want to do, or what you are told by others you can do, but is instead doing what something much greater than you—a well-ordered society, or the mind of god—has decided you ought to do.

4 *Enkrateia*

In 4.3.1, Xenophon presented Socrates as helping his students become *sôphrônes* before they became *praktikoi*, to avoid "becoming more unjust and more able to act badly." The existence of this worry means that Socrates thought it possible to be *praktikos* while not being *sôphrôn*. *Sôphrosunê* is a moral but not practical precondition for good action. In 4.5, Xenophon addresses the

other precondition for good action, the practical one. Here he shows Socrates encouraging *enkrateia* as the way to become more capable (πρακτικωτέρους). Now, *enkrateia* is not necessary for doing absolutely anything at all. It is good (ἀγαθόν) if one wants to be able to do anything admirable (καλόν τι πράξειν, 4.5.1). Still, this is different from the case of *sôphrosunê*. Neither, of course, is a knowledge of what is good and what is bad, or in other terms, the *content* of doing well and evilly. Both prepare you to benefit appropriately from such knowledge in the event you acquire it, but they prepare you in different ways. *Sôphrosunê* makes you not want to act unjustly or do evil, on the assumption that you could act badly if you wanted to. *Enkrateia* makes you able to act justly or do well, on the assumption that you would not otherwise be able to, even if you wanted to. But that there really is a difference between *sôphrosunê* and *enkrateia* vis-à-vis becoming *praktikos* does not tell us the nature of the difference, or the nature of *enkrateia* by itself. That explanation comes in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus.

The argument's first part describes *akrasia*, which Socrates eventually identifies as *enkrateia*'s opposite (4.5.8, the etymology supporting this view). *Akrasia*, as Socrates puts it, is being ruled by bodily pleasures. This slavery to pleasure both prevents a person from doing what is best and forces him to do what is bad (4.5.3–5). It distracts him from study and grasping important things, and blinds him to what is good and bad, and consequently prevents his attainment of wisdom (4.5.6). Finally it hinders the exercise of *sôphrosunê*, deflecting the person from practicing what is appropriate, and causing him to choose and practice what is harmful and useless (4.5.7). We may note parenthetically that this last sub-argument proves again that *sôphrosunê* must differ from *enkrateia*: Socrates has to demonstrate that *sôphrosunê* excludes *akrasia*—apparently it is not self-evident—but he does not have to show what *is* self-evident, that *enkrateia* excludes its conceptual and etymological opposite.

The argument's second part focuses on the nature and benefits of *enkrateia*. Socrates starts with a seeming irrelevance, arguing that *enkrateia* is a precondition for full pleasure (4.5.9). This seems an irrelevance because full pleasure is not itself necessary for being *praktikos*. But the reason *enkrateia* is a precondition for full pleasure reveals something deep about *enkrateia*. Getting full pleasure, Socrates argues, requires delayed gratification. This means that *enkrateia* allows one to defer satisfying the most immediate, pressing, or intense desires in favor of satisfying longer-term or less-obvious desires. But not just desires for pleasure; *enkrateia* gives a person the patience or psychic space he needs to engage in learning. Among the subjects Socrates includes as topics of learning “something good and admirable” are health, social relations, household management, and politics, all of which are both beneficial and pleasurable (4.5.10).

It is in this respect that Socrates' image and modeling of *enkrateia* helps people to become *praktikos*: thanks to *enkrateia*, people can be in the position to come to know what is good and how, in the various arenas of life, to pursue it. Socrates caps this part by explaining how precisely *enkrateia* is a practical precondition for knowing what is good. He implies that *enkrateia* puts all pleasures, whether intense or remote, at an equal distance, making it possible to sort through them (διαλέγοντας) and consider (σκοπεῖν) and choose (προαίρεσθαι) the best (4.5.11), all of which cognitive activities promote the acquisition of knowledge.

Without these last few arguments we might have imagined that *enkrateia* works by weakening the force of inner desires or expectations. This restraint picture, however, is not the most apt. The picture suggested by this argument is instead of a person managing an onslaught of noisy or seductive claims on his attention. *Akrasia* mean submitting to the first or loudest of those claims, for no other reason than that it has come most readily to attention; it has mere temporal or phenomenological priority. *Enkrateia* means not submitting to the first or loudest of the claims; it is the ability to survey all the claims disinterestedly, and then to pursue the one that seems on reflection best to pursue. *Enkrateia* does not indicate *which* claim is best to pursue; it opens a space in which to assess the available claims. In *Memorabilia* 1 Xenophon put it as a matter of being a master, who decides at leisure about the desires he wishes to satisfy, rather than a slave, who must always do whatever his (pushiest) desires demand (1.4.1–6). In other words, *enkrateia* is not itself the knowledge of good; it is a precondition for it.

Both *enkrateia* and *sôphrosunê* are developed through practice. Acquiring *enkrateia* requires practicing abstention from acting on the first desires that beckon. Acquiring *sôphrosunê* takes practice identifying the authoritative judgments and sticking to them. *Enkrateia* and *sôphrosunê* are of course related. Without *sôphrosunê* a person would exercise his *enkrateia* without being able to decide which desire to satisfy. Without *enkrateia*, both the attention to reality and the determination of one's will constitutive of *sôphrosunê* would be preempted by a person's giving in to instant gratification. But they are conceptually and pedagogically distinct.

5 *Dialektikê*

At the end of chapter 5, we saw that *enkrateia* allows the evaluative sorting of possible actions. Relying on an etymological play (ὀνομασθήναι), Socrates argued that sorting (διαλέγοντας) allows conversation (διαλέγεσθαι,

4.5.12).¹⁷ So in this way *enkrateia* helps people become most competent in speech (διαλεκτικωτάτους). Chapter 6 focuses on another way to become more “dialectical.”

According to Xenophon, Socrates encouraged people to investigate what each thing is, especially by discerning its definition. Once they knew the definition, they could explain the concept to others and could avoid misleading themselves and others. This neutralizes opponents who argue without clarity or logical defense (4.6.13). It also increases an advocate’s persuasiveness, by showing him how to go methodically through a set of equivalences or entailments, gathering up agreement at each step (4.6.15).

This chapter is presented as a display of the competence in speech that Socrates brought to his interlocutors. But it is remarkable for being Xenophon’s most concentrated account of Socratic definition. At *Memorabilia* 1.1.6, Xenophon says that Socrates asked “What is *x*?” questions. But only here does Xenophon show Socrates going through those questions—with Euthydemus—and arriving at an answer, on at least eight topics: reverence, justice, wisdom, good, beauty, courage, kingship, and the better man (4.6.4–14).¹⁸ These are familiar from the Platonic dialogues. But Plato’s Socrates does not generally claim that he teaches definition so as to improve his interlocutors’ power of speech. He asks definitional questions instead to reveal to his interlocutors that they fail to know what they might have assumed to be the most basic topics to know. He does this not just to open their minds to hear the correct view. Plato’s Socrates is the Socrates that Hippias in *Memorabilia* 4.4.9 recognizes, coy about his definitional beliefs and given to confuting his conversation partners. Xenophon accepts Hippias’ assertion, as we see at the beginning and through the first segment of Socrates’ conversation with Euthydemus (4.2.10–39).

All the same, Xenophon does not otherwise emphasize this quality of Socrates’ discussions. In fact what we seem to see here in 4.6 is Xenophon’s reinterpretation of Socrates’ commitment to definition. Whereas in Plato definition proves diagnostic and protreptic to further conversation, helping a person know his ignorance and dig his way back out, in Xenophon definition proves rhetorically valuable, helping a person know the best oratorical routes to sup-

17 Marchant 1923, xx, treats this as passage as a “curious” appendage, and supposes Socrates actually said something like this. But it really does seem to advance the argument of the passage.

18 At *Mem.* 3.9.1–10, Xenophon goes through the views Socrates has about concepts like courage, wisdom, *sôphrosunê*, leisure, and the like, but he can hardly be said to be giving Socrates’ definitions there (contra Marchant 1923, xxi).

porting one's thesis or confuting another's.¹⁹ Xenophon's Socrates shows that people have mistaken or inadequate beliefs about core moral concepts, but does this only to interest them in learning what they should instead believe.²⁰ For Xenophon, Socrates' educational scheme only momentarily leaves people's heads spinning. Plato's Socrates, by contrast, leaves his friends baffled, with the bare commitment to talk to them again in the future.

At the close of Book 4, Xenophon clarifies his point about Socrates' education in conversational skill. He says that Socrates manifests, and thereby teaches, an ability to speak, define, test, and refute (4.8.11). So his Socrates still pushes his friends to say what they think, and does not hesitate to show them their errors. But the difference between Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates—and this definitional chapter makes the difference stark—is the purpose to which this testing is put. In the first case, it provides self-knowledge; in the second, a practical capacity.

6 *Autarkeia*

Xenophon treats the last stage of the Socratic education as distinct from the others. The first four stages, he notes here, involved Socrates' giving his judgment (γνώμην) to his friends (4.7.1). As we saw, this judgment concerned *sôphrosunê*, justice, *enkrateia*, and conversation or *episkepsis*. These stages pertain equally and generally to all people. The fifth stage points beyond these fundamental preconditions for acting well. Xenophon notes that a wholly good person (*kalos kagathos*) must know (how to do) a number of things if he should want to be self-sufficient (*autarchês*). Some of these matters, Xenophon says, Socrates could himself teach; for some others Socrates recommended an expert; and for yet others Socrates apparently thought his friends could learn them for themselves (4.7.1–2). In this last category Socrates includes geometry, astronomy, cosmology, arithmetic, health, and forecasting (*mantikê*). But while Socrates expected his companions to engage in self-education, he proposed limits to their pursuits. It is these limits that constitute the substance of the chapter.

19 It is often noted that Xenophon presents not just Socratic definition but also Socratic "hypothesis" at 4.6.13–15 (e.g., Marchant 1923, xxi–xxii); such variety of procedure is to be expected. See Natali 2006.

20 For an alternative view about the effect of the *ti esti* question in this passage, see Stavru 2005, 145–157.

Socrates imposed on his companions four limits to their study. They should study only so much of a topic as is useful (4.7.2); as does not interfere with the learning of other useful things (4.7.2); as does not intrude on the gods' secrets (4.7.6); and as does not make them crazy or eccentric (4.7.6). At the conclusion of Book 4, when Xenophon summarizes the five stages of the Socratic education, he implies that these lessons contribute to teaching people to be thoughtful and competent (*phronimos*).²¹ The contrast is with being theoretically astute, disciplinarily deep, or well-versed in book learning. I suspect that Xenophon's ulterior motive here is to differentiate the Socrates he knew, who was *phronimos*, from the head-in-the-clouds Socrates as popularly caricatured by those who remembered him from Aristophanes' *phrontisterion*.

7 The Final Section

The final chapter of the *Memorabilia* starts by mentioning Socrates' claim that his *daimonion* sign told him (προσημαίνειν) what he ought and ought not to do (4.8.1). Yet Xenophon notes that his trial and execution might seem to speak against the reality of any predictive *daimonion* sign. Much of the rest of the chapter shows that Socrates was right not to have acted any differently than he did in response to the indictment. Xenophon's prime observations are that Socrates died admirably, happily, and beloved by the gods (4.8.3), he had already lived the best and most pleasurable life (4.8.7), and posterity would remember him as free of wrongdoing and concerned only to improve those around him (4.8.10). This chapter thus seems not to abandon Xenophon's description of the Socratic education but to show that it continued even in Socrates' death. A life well lived is tested most severely at its extremes, and here Socrates models the very best life lived.

A reader might wonder whether Xenophon makes a misstep in mentioning the *daimonion* sign. If it were really responsible for Socrates' success in life, and if a person could not be taught to have his own *daimonion* sign, then something about his success cannot be taught. From this perspective, Socrates' success cannot be conveyed even through careful literary remembrance. But it seems that Xenophon has not in fact erred. Socrates never says that anything he

21 Being φρονίμοις is a precondition for people serving in the council (*Mem.* 1.2.35); Socrates encouraged people to be φρονιμώτατον and ώφελιμώτατον (*Mem.* 1.2.55; cf. 2.3.1); the most φρονιμώτατοι periods of life are the most god-respecting (*Mem.* 1.4.16); generals are φρονιμώτατοι about military matters, as are all experts in their respective fields (*Ap.* 20 bis); to some of the famers who are φρονίμοις and έπιμελεσι the gods bring success (*Oec.* 11.8).

teaches in the five sections of his curriculum could be replaced by a *daimonion* sign. Indeed, his education is for those matters for which his students do not have daemonic guidance. They are to look elsewhere than to a supernatural personal coach, barking out the plays as they come. They are to look instead to their faculties of choice, to the authoritative judgments available to them, and to the disciplinary skills they can pursue with teachers or on their own.

8 Educational Schemes

A reader of Plato's Socratic dialogues could come to think that Socrates' lesson, as magisterially orchestrated and prolonged as it may be, is little more than that we should know ourselves and do so by discovering what is good and true.²² Socratic refutation causes a recognition that one fails to know what one thought one knew; coupled with any strong desire, one's acknowledgement of ignorance propels one to the investigation and testing of ideas possibly worth adopting (cf. Moore 2012). The virtues all amount to approximately the same thing, knowing what's good; and while what "the same thing" is perhaps even Socrates or Plato could not say, and "knowing" and "what is good" are also hardly self-evident terms, Socrates seems to think that the "unity of virtue" means that there is really just one way to improve ourselves, whichever particular virtue it is that we think is lacking, and that is by making the effort to avoid wrongdoing.²³

Of course, Socrates' lesson, perhaps simple to articulate, is not easy to take up. We may see this in Socrates' efforts with Charmides in Plato's *Charmides*. In Socrates' absence, Charmides has learned the appropriate form in which to answer definitional questions (159b5, 160e4–5). But he must now learn how to bear public judgment (158c5–159a4); how to come up with plausible responses to difficult questions (160d5–e2); how to check his responses for accuracy (161c8–162a7); how to choose which authorities to trust when accepting possible solutions to his problems (162a8–e5); how conversation can serve him better than direct instruction (156a1–b1); and how his guardian Critias has come to be an unreliable guide of the truth. These are just several of the parts of the Socratic lesson depicted in the *Charmides*, rendered atomically. So when we articulate Socratic pedagogy this way, even Plato presents Socrates as teaching

²² This argument is considered in Moore 2015.

²³ For one view on ambiguities in Socrates' remarks about the unity of virtue in Plato, specifically the *Protagoras*, see O'Brien 2003.

a range of skills, attitudes, and topics. It would thus be misleading to say that for Plato, Socrates only refutes—even if one posits a “positive *elenchus*”—or even that refutation is the most important part of his teaching. It would be better to say that Socrates brings to bear a constellation of conversational practices onto his companions and seeks a constellation of educational outcomes.

It is possible that Plato’s Socrates judges the sharpness of self-contradiction to have a peculiar effect on people smug about their level of education. But so too does Xenophon’s Socrates. Xenophon introduces *Memorabilia* 4.2 by saying that he will show the Socratic education for those who thought they had already come upon the best education and thought highly of their wisdom (4.2.1). This education is one full of refutation. So we might say that Xenophon focuses his literary attention, in the *Memorabilia*, on those who differed from Euthydemus, who did not have this conceit of wisdom. Plato, by contrast, focuses his attention on those like Euthydemus, who happen to be at once extremely appealing to Socrates and most in need of chastening, lest their political strengths harm themselves and others.²⁴

Just as both Plato and Xenophon found Socratic refutation to be characteristic of Socrates but not exhaustive of his pedagogical tactics, both found his pedagogic tactics and goals many and diverse. Because Xenophon allows himself editorial intervention, and foregoes dramatic continuity, he can organize and comment on the stages of the Socratic education. His desire to elucidate Socrates’ usefulness encourages him to do this. Plato’s literary form, as dramatic and realist, prevents him from emphasizing the pedagogical stages so starkly. He also seems less interested in proving Socrates’ practical usefulness than in showing exactly how a conversation with Socrates might have gone. Despite Plato’s preference for vivid representation over schematic overview, however, we may still perceive the parts of a Socratic education even in his dialogues. It would certainly be worth looking. In any event, both Plato and Xenophon show a Socrates much more complex than a teacher of some subject or a giver of some advice. Both dedicate their literary or memorial efforts to drawing out that complexity, trying to make sense of its density, efficacy, and completeness.²⁵

24 Some commentators (e.g., Danzig 2005) wonder whether Xenophon believes or denies that “*elenchus*” teaches virtue; I do not think that this is the best way to put an important question, because I am not sure that Plato believes that “*elenchus*” “teaches” “virtue” either, though see Tuozzo 2011 on the question. Gray 1998, 13–14, argues that Xenophon does not care for *elenchus*; Lachance (forthcoming) develops that argument.

25 This develops the argument of Gray 1998 (e.g., 8), that just as Socrates made advances

Xenophon's analysis in *Memorabilia* 4 is a fascinating one. The philosophical assumptions and distinctions he makes about the dispositions and skills necessary to live well repay close scrutiny. He advances a plausible view of *sôphrosunê*, not unimportant given the baffling variety of views current in the fourth century, including those found in Plato (including the *Alcibiades* and *Rival Lovers*, whoever their authors may be) and Aristotle. He presents a powerful view of *enkrateia*, one with resonances in Platonic reflection on *promêtheia* and the so-called "art of measurement." His attempt to remain grounded by explaining Socratic conversation itself, and noting Socrates' advice on those topics that exceeds the capacity of that conversation, broadens the register of discussion about the Socratic legacy.²⁶

References

- Annas, J. 'Self-knowledge in early Plato', in: D.J. O'Meara, *Platonic Investigations*, Washington 1985, 121–138.
- Blondell, R. *Helping friends and harming enemies: a study in Sophocles and Greek ethics*. Cambridge 1989.
- Bruell, C. 'Introduction', in: A. Bonnette, *Xenophon: Memorabilia*. Ithaca 1994, vii–xxii.
- Courcelle, P.P. *Connais-toi toi-même de Socrate à Saint Bernard*, 1. Paris 1974.
- Danzig, G. 'Review of Dorion 2003', *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 5.30 (2005).
- Danzig, G. 'Big boys, little boys: justice and law in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and *Memorabilia*', *Polis* 26 (2009), 251–257.
- Dorion, L.-A. *Xénophon: Mémoires 1, Introduction générale. Livre 1*, Paris 2003.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Qu'est-ce que vivre en fonction de sa *dunamis*? Les deux réponses de Socrate dans les *Mémoires*', in: L. Brisson, *Les études philosophiques: les écrits Socratiques de Xénophon*. Paris 2004, 235–252.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Xenophon's Socrates', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*. Oxford 2006, 93–109.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The Straussian exegesis of Xenophon: the paradigmatic case of *Memorabilia* IV 4', in: V.J. Gray, *Xenophon*. Oxford 2010, 283–323.
- Gray, V.J. *The framing of Socrates: the literary interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia*. Stuttgart 1998.

in presenting wisdom to his students, so too did Xenophon in presenting Socrates to his readers.

26 This paper has benefited from careful scrutiny from Alessandro Stavru.

- Henderson, J. *Xenophon: Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology*. Cambridge, MA 2013.
- Humble, N. 'Sôphrosunê and the Spartans in Xenophon', in: S. Hodkinson and A. Powell, *Sparta: new perspectives*. London 1999, 339–352.
- Johnson, D.M. 'Xenophon at his most Socratic (*Memorabilia* 4.2)', *OSAPh* 29 (2005), 39–73.
- Johnson, D.M. 'Strauss on Xenophon', in: F. Hobden and C. Tuplin, *Xenophon: ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Leiden 2012, 123–159.
- Lachance, G. 'Xenophon and the *elenchus*: a formal and comparative analysis', in: G. Danzig, D. Johnson, and D. Morrison, *Xenophon and Plato: comparative studies*. Leiden (forthcoming).
- MacDowell, D.M. 'Hybris in Athens', *G&R* 23 (1976), 14–31.
- Marchant, E.C. *Xenophon: Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology*. Cambridge, MA 1923.
- Moore, C. 'Socrates and Clitophon in the Platonic *Clitophon*', *AncPhil* 32 (2012), 257–278.
- Moore, C. *Socrates and self-knowledge*. Cambridge 2015.
- Morrison, D. 'Xenophon's Socrates as teacher', in: P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994, 181–208.
- Morrison, D. 'Xenophon's Socrates on the just and the lawful', *AncPhil* 15 (1995), 329–347.
- Natali, C. 'Socrates' dialectic in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*', in: L. Judson and V. Karasmanēs, *Remembering Socrates: philosophical essays*. Oxford 2006, 3–19.
- North, H. *Sôphrosunê: self-knowledge and self-restraint in Greek literature*. Ithaca 1966.
- O'Brien, D. 'Socrates and Protagoras on virtue', *OSAPh* 24 (2003), 59–131.
- Phillips, J. 'Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 4.2', *Hermes* 117 (2003), 366–370.
- Rossetti, L. 'L'Euthydème de Xénophon', in: L. Rossetti, *Le dialogue Socratique*. Paris 2011, 55–99.
- Stavru, A. 'Aporia o definizione? Il *Ti Esti* negli scritti Socratici di Senofonte', in: L. Rossetti and A. Stavru, *Socratica* 2005. Bari 2005, 137–158.
- Stavru, A. 'Socrate et le confiance dans les *Agraphoi Nomoi* (Xénophon, *Mémorables* iv.4): réflexions sur les Socratica de Walter F. Otto', in: M. Narcy, A. Tordesillas, and L.-A. Dorion, *Xénophon et Socrate*. Paris 2008, 65–85.
- Tuozzo, T.M. *Plato's Charmides: positive elenchus in a "Socratic" dialogue*. Cambridge 2011.
- Wilkins, E.G. '"Know Thyself" in Greek and Latin literature', Diss. University of Chicago, 1917.

Fundamental Parallels between Socrates' and Ischomachus' Positions in the *Oeconomicus*

Louis-André Dorion
Université de Montréal

Understanding the similarities between Socrates and Ischomachus, the main characters in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, requires an adequate interpretation of the entire text.¹ But attempts to state Xenophon's overall intentions in his treatise on estate management have produced very conflicting readings. Before Leo Strauss published *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the Oeconomicus* in 1970, most commentators saw no doctrinal opposition between the characters of Socrates and Ischomachus, and many did not hesitate to maintain that Ischomachus was in reality a double for Xenophon.² Of course, there were some commentators who argued that the character of Ischomachus supplanted that of Socrates, and who even went so far as to deny that the *Oeconomicus* was in fact a *logos Sôkratikos*,³ although they claimed that this supposed replacement of Socrates by Ischomachus did not involve a doctrinal opposition between the two characters. In the eyes of these commentators, Xenophon had abandoned Socrates in order to express his views through the intermediary of another literary character. This was to be a bit like Plato, who progressively abandons Socrates for other characters in his later dialogues—Timaeus, the Stranger from Elea, and the Athenian Stranger—who on some readings become his philosophical playwrights and spokesmen.

1 In an earlier study (Dorion 2008) devoted to Socrates' economic competence in the *Oeconomicus*, I tried to show that the economic models exemplified by Socrates and Ischomachus are complementary and that it is a mistake, therefore, to treat them as being in opposition to one other. In a footnote to that study (269 n. 52), I informed the reader that I had identified some forty significant parallels between Socratic ethics and the model exemplified by Ischomachus, and that I intended to publish, in the near future, a list of these parallels accompanied by commentary on them. I finally have the opportunity to keep this promise by publishing the study that follows.

2 Among others, Croiset 1873, 178, 183; Marchant 1923, xxiv, xxvi; Caster 1937, 51; Field 1946, 138; Luccioni 1947, 81; 1953, 76 n. 3; Chantraine 1949, 9; Delebecque 1951, 29, 35, 38–39; 1957, 17, 237, 359, 365–367; 1978, 6, 12; Magalhães-Vilhena 1952, 227; Breitenbach 1967, col. 1848; Sandbach 1985, 480; Waterfield 1990, 273; Gera 1993, 47 n. 81; Pomeroy 1994, 259 to 6.17; Morrison 1996, 847.

3 For numerous references, see Dorion 2008, 253 n. 1.

The 1970 publication of Strauss' interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* brought about a veritable paradigm shift. Instead of seeing Ischomachus as the alter ego of Xenophon that supplants the character of Socrates, Strauss sees him as the representative of a way of life that is not only opposed to Socrates' way of life, but also disavowed by him. This reading of the *Oeconomicus* is in large part founded on the structure of the dialogue. At the time of Socrates' discussion with Critobulus in the opening chapters of the dialogue (chapters 1–4), he has already met Ischomachus, and yet, not only has Socrates not renounced his own way of life in order to imitate Ischomachus' (cf. Pangle 1994, 136; Stevens 1994, 237), he does not attempt to persuade Critobulus to imitate it either—even though he now has a great opportunity to do so. This gives the impression that the admiration for this way of life that he appears to express, in the second part of the dialogue (chapters 7 to 21), is in fact feigned. It would seem, therefore, that commentators have failed to perceive the *ironic* dimension of the *Oeconomicus*. Far from admiring Ischomachus' way of life, Socrates opposes and disavows it, which is precisely the reason for his seeking to convert Critobulus to his way of life instead of to Ischomachus'. Far from being the dialogue that effects the replacement of the character of Socrates by Ischomachus, the *Oeconomicus* turns out to be, in reality, the Socratic dialogue “par excellence” (cf. Strauss 1970, 86).

In my view, both of these interpretations of the connections between Socrates' and Ischomachus' positions are mistaken, but the second one seems more harmful than the first. This is because Strauss' reading involves a completely erroneous reading of the *Oeconomicus*; the first does not. Further, since this Straussian interpretation of the *Oeconomicus* enjoys fairly wide acceptance today and is even adopted, at least with respect to the question of the connections between Socrates' and Ischomachus' positions, by commentators who do not openly claim to follow Strauss, I believe that it is important to set the record straight and demonstrate that there is in fact no radical opposition between them.⁴

Since 2008, when I identified some forty significant parallels between Socrates' and Ischomachus' views on a wide range of themes, I have found twenty-two more, so that today I can offer a list of sixty-two points of convergence between them. Although it is not possible to discuss each of these points of convergence in detail within the confines of this chapter, I think that a brief discussion of several of the most important of them will suffice to show that the Straussian reading of the *Oeconomicus* has little to recommend it, given the more or less complete agreement between Socrates and Ischomachus.

4 The following studies subscribe to most of the main conclusions of the Straussian interpretation: Stevens 1994; Pangle 1994; Ambler 1996; Too 2001; Nee 2009; Danzig 2010.

TABLE 1 *Showing points of convergence between Ischomachus' and Socrates' positions*⁵

	Theme	Ischomachus	Socrates
1.	Embodies <i>kalokagathia</i>	6.17–7.3	<i>Mem.</i> 1.2.18; <i>Symp.</i> 1.1, 9.1
2.	Necessity of educating one's wife	7.4–10.13	<i>Oec.</i> 3.14; <i>Symp.</i> 2.9
3.	Importance of <i>sôphrosunê</i> and <i>enkrateia</i> (see also nos. 7, 27, 28, 50)	7.6, 7.14–15, 7.27	<i>Oec.</i> 1.22; <i>Mem.</i> 1.5, 2.1, 4.5
4.	Before doing anything, consult the gods	7.7, 11.8	<i>Oec.</i> 5.19–20, 6.1; <i>Mem.</i> 1.1.7–10, 2.6.8 ⁶
5.	Competence as a teacher	7.9, 9.1, 9.12, 9.14, 9.16, 9.18, 10.13, 11.23, 12.6, etc. ⁷	<i>Mem.</i> 1.2.17, 1.2.31, 1.6.3, 2.7.1, 4.2.40, 4.7.1; <i>Ap.</i> 20–21
6.	A wife must be a helper and a partner	7.11, 7.13, 7.42	<i>Oec.</i> 3.10, 3.15
7.	<i>Enkrateia</i> is the main requirement for wealth	7.15, 11.12	<i>Oec.</i> 1.16–2.8; <i>Mem.</i> 1.2.22, 1.3.11
8.	Advocates increasing personal and collective wealth	7.15–16, 9.12, 11.8, 11.12	<i>Oec.</i> 3.10, 3.15, 5.1, 6.4, 11.19–20; <i>Mem.</i> 2.1.28, 2.2.5, 3.2.3, 3.4.1–2, 3.6.2, 3.6.4–8, 3.7.2, 3.7.9, 4.1.2, 4.6.14 ⁸
9.	Divine teleology	7.16–32	<i>Mem.</i> 1.4, 4.3
10.	Agreement between divine and human laws	7.16, 7.30–31	<i>Mem.</i> 1.3.1, 4.3.16, 4.4.19–25
11.	Importance of <i>epimeleia</i> (see also nos. 31, 41)	7.22, 7.26, 9.19, 11.12, 12.9–14, 12.18, 20.4	<i>Oec.</i> 8.1; <i>Mem.</i> 1.6.15, 2.7.7, 3.3.14, 3.4.9, 3.9.3, 4.2.7 ⁹

5 For the sake of clarity, the points of convergence are classified according to the order of their occurrence in the *Oeconomicus*, not their relative importance.

6 Cf. *Vect.* 6.2–3. When the points of convergence between Ischomachus' and Socrates' positions are confirmed by texts that are not in the corpus of Xenophon's Socratic dialogues, I will give the references for them in a footnote; I make no claim, however, to exhaustiveness.

7 It is no doubt significant that 47 of the 51 occurrences of the verb διδάσκω are in the second part of the *Oeconomicus* (chapters 7–21). This seems a clear indication that Ischomachus is to be thought of as an expert capable of teaching others (his wife, his foremen, Socrates).

8 Cf. *Hier.* 11 and the entire *Vect.* For Socrates and Xenophon, the happiness (*eudaimonia*) of the city is synonymous with material prosperity and not (above all) with moral virtue. Cf. Dorion 2013, 154–161.

9 Cf. *Cyr.* 1.6.23, 7.5.76; *Hell.* 3.2.29–30; *Cyn.* 12.6, 12.10, 13.13; *Eq. mag.* 9.2. For the importance of

TABLE 1 *Showing points of convergence between Ischomachus' and Socrates' positions (cont.)*

	Theme	Ischomachus	Socrates
12.	Resistance and endurance (<i>karteria</i>)	7.23	<i>Oec.</i> 5.4; <i>Mem.</i> 1.2.1, 1.6.6–7, 2.1.1, 2.1.6 ¹⁰
13.	Importance of memory, which is a gift from the gods	7.26, 9.11	<i>Mem.</i> 1.4.13, 2.7.7, 4.1.2, 4.3.11
14.	Men's activities take place outdoors	7.30	<i>Oec.</i> 4.2, 6.7; <i>Mem.</i> 2.7
15.	Acting contrary to a natural disposition is automatically punished	7.31	<i>Mem.</i> 4.4.21–24
16.	Condemnation of idleness (<i>argia</i>)	7.33	<i>Oec.</i> 1.19; <i>Mem.</i> 1.2.57, 2.1.16, 2.6.1, 2.7.7–8 ¹¹
17.	Women are to look after the work of spinning wool	7.36, 7.41, 10.10	<i>Mem.</i> 2.7, 3.9.11
18.	A good leader obtains voluntary obedience	7.37, 21.12	<i>Oec.</i> 4.19, 5.15; <i>Mem.</i> 3.3.8–10, 3.4.8, 3.5.5–6, 3.9.10–11
19.	Women can be in command, even of men	7.39, 7.42, 11.25	<i>Mem.</i> 3.9.10–11
20.	A good leader knows how to punish and reward	7.41, 9.11, 9.15, 12.6, 12.19, 13.6, 13.9, 14.7–9, 21.10	<i>Oec.</i> 4.7, 4.15, 5.15; <i>Mem.</i> 3.4.8 ¹²
21.	An apologia for order (<i>taxis</i>) and discipline (<i>eutaxia</i>)	8.1–9.10	<i>Oec.</i> 3.3, 4.21; <i>Mem.</i> 3.1.7, 3.3.14, 3.5.5, 3.5.18–21, 4.4.1
22.	Poverty is the state of not being able to satisfy one's needs	8.2	<i>Oec.</i> 2.1–8; <i>Mem.</i> 4.2.37–39 ¹³
23.	The parallel between a choir and an army	8.3–8	<i>Mem.</i> 3.4.2–6, 3.5.6, 3.5.18, 3.5.21
24.	Disapproval of decorations in the home	9.2 ¹⁴	<i>Mem.</i> 3.8.10

epimeleia for Xenophon, cf. Luccioni 1947, 273; Delebecque 1970, 51 n. 2; Azoulay 2004, 107–108.

¹⁰ Cf. *Cyr.* 1.2.10, 8.1.36.

¹¹ Cf. *Cyr.* 1.6.17.

¹² Cf. *An.* 1.9.18–19; *Cyr.* 8.1.39, 8.6.11.

¹³ Cf. *Symp.* 4.34–36; *Hier.* 4.8–11.

¹⁴ Cf. Delatte 1933, 103: "Ischomachus has the same ideas as Socrates on the decoration of buildings. Thus, he too condemns the use of tapestries to decorate houses."

	Theme	Ischomachus	Socrates
25.	The rooms in a house are for storing possessions	9.3	<i>Mem.</i> 3.8.10
26.	Layout of a house	9.4	<i>Mem.</i> 3.1.7, 3.8.8–9
27.	<i>Enkrateia</i> (or <i>sôphrosunê</i>) is indispensable to those who command	9.11, 21.12	<i>Mem.</i> 1.5.1, 2.1, 4.3.1, 4.5.11–12 ¹⁵
28.	Slaves can have <i>enkrateia</i>	9.11	<i>Oec.</i> 1.23; <i>Mem.</i> 1.5.2
29.	A good leader inspires eagerness (<i>prothumos</i>)	9.12, 21.9, 21.10	<i>Oec.</i> 5.15
30.	Importance of abiding by the laws (<i>nomima</i>)	9.14–15	<i>Mem.</i> 4.4
31.	A woman is naturally inclined to take care (<i>epimeleisthai</i>) of her children	9.19	<i>Mem.</i> 2.2.5
32.	Condemnation of makeup and other adornments for the body	10.1–8	<i>Mem.</i> 2.1.22; <i>Symp.</i> 2.3–4
33.	Health and/or strength and/or physical beauty	10.5, 11.8, 11.12–13, 11.19–20	<i>Oec.</i> 4.2–3, 6.5, 6.9; <i>Mem.</i> 1.4.13, 2.1.19–20, 2.1.28, 2.7.7, 3.12, 4.7.9; <i>Symp.</i> 2.16–18
34.	Exercising before meals	10.11, 11.18	<i>Mem.</i> 1.2.4 ¹⁶
35.	Things one can ask of the gods in a prayer	11.8	<i>Mem.</i> 1.3.2, 2.2.10, 4.2.34–36
36.	Competence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the success of an undertaking	11.8	<i>Oec.</i> 5.19–20; <i>Mem.</i> 1.1.6–9
37.	Aspiration for honor, glory, and fame	11.8, 13.9, 14.10, 21.6, 21.10	<i>Oec.</i> 11.11; <i>Mem.</i> 1.7.1, 2.1.19, 2.1.31, 2.1.33, 2.3.14, 2.6.25, 3.3.13–14, 3.6.2–3, 3.6.16–18, 3.7.1, 3.12.4, 4.2.28, 4.4.17, 4.8.1, 4.8.10; <i>Symp.</i> 8.32, 8.37, 8.43; <i>Ap.</i> 18 ¹⁷
38.	Honoring the gods in accordance with one's means	11.9	<i>Oec.</i> 2.5; <i>Mem.</i> 1.3.3, 4.3.15–17 ¹⁸

¹⁵ Cf. *Cyr.* 8.1.30–32.

¹⁶ Cf. *Oec.* 4.24 (concerning Cyrus); *Cyr.* 8.6.12.

¹⁷ Cf. *Cyr.* 1.2.1, 1.5.12, 8.1.39; *Hier.* 1.14, 7.3–4, 7.9; *Ages.* 10, 11; *Eq. mag.* 1.1, 1.22–23.

¹⁸ Cf. *An.* 3.2.9.

TABLE 1 *Showing points of convergence between Ischomachus' and Socrates' positions (cont.)*

Theme	Ischomachus	Socrates
39. Being useful to the <i>oikos</i> , to <i>philoï</i> , and to the <i>polis</i>	11.9, 11.10, 11.13	<i>Oec.</i> 4.3, 6.9, 11.10; <i>Mem.</i> 1.2.48, 1.6.9, 2.1.19–20, 2.1.28, 2.1.33, 2.6.25–26, 3.6.2, 3.6.4, 3.7.9, 3.12.4, 4.5.10; <i>Symp.</i> 3.4, 4.64, 8.38; <i>Ap.</i> 31 ¹⁹
40. Helping friends in need	11.9	<i>Mem.</i> 2.7–10
41. Success in agriculture depends on care (<i>epimeleia</i>)	11.12, 20.4	<i>Oec.</i> 5.12; <i>Mem.</i> 2.1.28
42. Care and exercise for the body	11.12–13, 11.19–20	<i>Oec.</i> 5.1, 5.5, 6.9; <i>Mem.</i> 1.2.4, 1.2.19, 3.12
43. Military training (<i>askêsis</i>)	11.12–13	<i>Oec.</i> 11.19; <i>Mem.</i> 3.12.5
44. Rising from bed early	11.14	<i>Oec.</i> 5.4; <i>Mem.</i> 2.1.3 ²⁰
45. The best defense is to avoid all wrongdoing	11.22	<i>Mem.</i> 4.8.4; <i>Ap.</i> 3
46. Reconciling <i>philoï</i>	11.23	<i>Mem.</i> 2.3
47. A good leader must be a good speaker	11.23–25, 13.9	<i>Mem.</i> 3.3.11
48. Never attempting to make the weaker argument the stronger	11.25	<i>Mem.</i> 1.2.31
49. Teaching others what he knows	12.4	<i>Mem.</i> 4.7.1
50. <i>Enkrateia</i> is the main requirement for <i>epimeleia</i>	12.9–14, 20.6, 20.15	<i>Mem.</i> 1.2.22, 1.3.11, 1.6.9, 2.1.20, 2.1.28, 4.5.7, 4.5.10
51. Importance of examples in education and training in virtue	12.17–18	<i>Mem.</i> 1.2.3, 1.2.17–18, 1.3.1, 1.5.6, 4.4.10–11; <i>Symp.</i> 8.27 ²¹
52. Teaching others the art of commanding and the art of being a good king	13.4–5, 15.1, 15.5	<i>Mem.</i> 1.6.15, 2.1, 4.2
53. It is through speech that one makes men more obedient	13.9	<i>Mem.</i> 3.3.9–11
54. Importance of effort (<i>ponos</i>) (see also no. 60)	13.11, 14.10, 21.3–6	<i>Oec.</i> 11.13; <i>Mem.</i> 1.2.1–2, 1.5.1, 2.1.1, 2.1.3, 2.1.19
55. Love of honor (<i>philotimia</i>)	14.10, 21.6, 21.10	<i>Mem.</i> 3.3.13; <i>Symp.</i> 8.41 ²²

19 Cf. *Hier.* 11.13–14. The various parts of the *Memorabilia* are clearly organized around the theme of utility for the *oikos*, for *philoï*, and for the *polis* (cf. Dorion 2000, ccxvii–ccxviii).

20 Cf. *Cyr.* 1.2.10.

21 Cf. *An.* 1.9.3–4; *Cyr.* 1.2.8, 7.5.86, 8.1.39, 8.6.13; *Cyn.* 12.10.

22 Cf. *Hier.* 7.1–3.

Theme	Ischomachus	Socrates
56. Agriculture is easy to learn	15.4, 15.10, 18.10	<i>Oec.</i> 6.9
57. Asking questions is teaching	19.15	<i>Mem.</i> 4.2–3, 4.5–6 ²³
58. Teaching and discussion	19.15	<i>Mem.</i> 4.6.13–15
59. The justice of the earth	20.14	<i>Oec.</i> 5.12
60. Love of hard work (<i>philoponia</i>)	20.25, 21.6	<i>Mem.</i> 3.4.9; <i>Ap.</i> 19 ²⁴
61. The art of commanding is the same in all spheres of activity	21.2	<i>Oec.</i> 13.5; <i>Mem.</i> 3.4.6–12, 4.2.11
62. The art of commanding (the “royal art”)	21.10	<i>Oec.</i> 13.5; <i>Mem.</i> 2.1.17, 4.2.11

Before discussing the parallels that I view as the most significant, I would like to emphasize that the first twenty parallels, that is, about a third of those listed in the table, are from chapter 7 of the *Oeconomicus*, the chapter in which the character of Ischomachus first appears. In other words, as soon as Xenophon introduces Ischomachus and has him speak, it is to offer a broad overview of an ethical doctrine that, at the very least, highly resembles that of Socrates—if it is not in fact identical with it. Indeed, the points of convergence identified in chapter 7 do not concern themes of minor or negligible importance, but key points of doctrine in Socratic ethics. Let me now present my brief list of the agreements in position that appear to be the most important.

Self-Control (cf. nos. 3, 7, 27, 28 and 50)

The distinctive trait of the ethical doctrine embodied and defended by Xenophon's Socrates is unquestionably the absolutely central role that falls to self-control (*enkrateia*).²⁵ Self-control is the main requirement, not only for the acquisition of virtue, but also for its practice. The veritable “foundation of moral goodness” (*Mem.* 1.5.4), *enkrateia* is in the ethics of Xenophon's Socrates the equivalent of *sophia* in the ethics of Plato's Socrates.²⁶ Moreover, Ischo-

23 In these four chapters in Book 4 of the *Memorabilia*, where he teaches Euthydemus, Socrates continually asks his young disciple questions.

24 Cf. *Cyr.* 1.6.8, 6.2.4; *Ag.* 9.3; *Hell.* 6.1.6.

25 Cf. Dorion 2006, 96–105.

26 Cf. Dorion 2012, 474–475.

machus does not attribute any less importance than Socrates does to *enkrateia* and *sôphrosunê*, that is, to the necessity of controlling physical desires (in particular, for food, drink, sexual relations, and sleep).

Endurance (cf. no. 12)

Endurance (*karteria*), the capacity to support cold, heat, and effort (*ponos*), is another distinctive trait of the ethical doctrine defended by Xenophon's Socrates.²⁷ To the extent that it makes the body harder and limits its need for clothing and shoes, endurance contributes, in conjunction with *enkrateia*, to the realization of the ideal of self-sufficiency. Socrates insists on the importance of *karteria* in numerous passages in the *Memorabilia*, and also in the first part of the *Oeconomicus*: "The land provides the greatest abundance of good things, but doesn't allow them to be taken without effort. It trains people to endure (καρτερεῖν) the cold of winter and the heat of summer" (*Oec.* 5.4).²⁸ Ischomachus is no less committed than Socrates is to the capacity to endure extreme temperatures: "For [god] made the masculine body and mind more capable of enduring (καρτερεῖν) cold and heat and travel and military expeditions, which implies that he ordained the outdoor work for man" (7.23).

Applying Oneself with Care (cf. nos. 11, 31, 41)

Like Socrates, Ischomachus also maintains that self-control (*enkrateia*) underlies the attitude of careful diligence (*epimeleia*) that makes possible the successful accomplishment of tasks and the achievement of goals in any sphere of human activity.

The position that Ischomachus develops in *Oec.* 12.9–14 is completely identical to the one that Socrates exposes in several passages of the *Memorabilia* (1.2.22, 4.5.7, 4.5.10). Self-control over bodily pleasures is indeed the *sine qua non* for being able to apply oneself with care to the activities that must not be practiced with nonchalance or negligence.

²⁷ Cf. Dorion 2013, xix.

²⁸ I use the translations of Waterfield 1990 with a few modifications.

The Teleotheology of Ischomachus and Socrates (cf. no. 9)

In the very first chapter in which Socrates introduces him (chapter 7), Ischomachus tells of a conversation he once had with his wife about the respective tasks of a husband and a wife. According to Ischomachus, the division of labor between men and women has a natural or—perhaps better—a divine foundation, to the extent that it is the gods who originally divided the different abilities of human beings between the two sexes with an eye to complementarity. A husband and a wife work together to realize a common undertaking, and the complementarity of their respective abilities and talents optimizes the results of their collaboration. Ischomachus sets forth a position that can be qualified as “teleotheological,” since it involves the notion that it is the gods who originally allotted, with a view to the best interests of married couples, different abilities to men and women. This doctrine may seem naive to us, but Xenophon’s decision to have it expounded by a wealthy landowner, who is a stranger to philosophy, reveals an important parallelism. For although the teleotheological doctrine that Socrates explains in detail in two important chapters of the *Memorabilia* (1.4, 4.3) does not explicitly mention the divine origin of the allotment of different tasks and talents to men and women, the underlying ideas in these two chapters are identical to those that motivate Ischomachus’ treatment of the same theme.²⁹ Moreover, the idea that there is a form of natural collaboration between men and women, which the gods have willingly created, echoes very closely what Socrates says about the necessary collaboration of brothers.³⁰

29 Contra: cf. Strauss 1970, 149: “In the *Oeconomicus*, Ischomachus indicates some doubts regarding the teleotheology. In particular, in the section devoted to ‘order’ there is almost complete silence about the god or the gods, and we find there even less support for the teleotheology than before.” It is always dangerous to interpret silence, and this passage from *Xenophon’s Socratic Discourse* is a very good example of the type of unfounded readings that Strauss frequently develops on the basis of an arbitrary interpretation of silence.

30 *Mem.* 2.3.19: “And yet, so far as I can see, brothers were intended by God to be more helpful to each other than hands or feet or eyes or any other natural pairs with which he has supplied mankind.”

Voluntary Obedience (cf. no. 18)

At the very end of the *Oeconomicus*, in a passage that highlights the main qualities by which a good leader can be recognized, Ischomachus does not hesitate to qualify as “divine” the voluntary obedience of those who submit to authority: “For I’m not quite convinced that this gift of wielding authority over willing subjects (τὸ ἐθέλόντων ἄρχειν) is entirely human rather than divine (θεῖον): it is clearly granted to those who are true initiates in self-control” (21.12). Just like Ischomachus, Socrates, who is particularly interested in the question of governing men and in the question of the criteria for a good governor,³¹ emphasizes with great insistence, both in the *Memorabilia* and in the *Oeconomicus*, the importance of obtaining voluntary obedience.³²

As is clear from *Mem.* 3.4.7–12, Socrates has the highest regard for good administrators. As his interlocutor is amazed that we can take, as Socrates does, good administrators to be excellent strategists as well, Socrates offers to compare their respective tasks, to verify that they are indeed the same. After his demonstration, Socrates warns his interlocutor: “Nichomachides, he said, do not despise good administrators (Μὴ καταφρόνει ... τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν)” (3.4.12). Those who would despise Ischomachus would thereby be reproached by Socrates for despising a good administrator.

For my demonstration to be completely convincing, I must not only bring to light the numerous points of convergence between Ischomachus’ and Socrates’ positions; I must also address the issue of the supposed points of opposition or divergence between them. I shall limit myself to some cases that are regularly mentioned by Straussian commentators.

The Supposed Difference between Ischomachus’ *Kalokagathia* and Socrates’

According to Strauss, the main opposition between Ischomachus and Socrates has to do with the status of the *kalokagathia* attributed to Ischomachus. Not

³¹ Cf. *Mem.* 1.1.16.

³² *Oec.* 4.19: “I count it as highly indicative of good leadership when people obey someone without coercion and are prepared to remain by him during times of danger”; *Oec.* 5.15: “Someone who wants to become a good farmer, then, must ensure that his laborers are both keen and obedient.”

knowing what *kalokagathia* is or, more precisely, feigning not to know what it is, Socrates begins to search for a man who has the reputation of being *kalos kagathos*, and this is how he meets Ischomachus (*Oec.* 6.12–7.1). Ischomachus' having the *reputation* of being a *kalos kagathos* is a sufficient reason, in Strauss' view, for us to doubt that he in fact is one.³³ In his view, Ischomachus embodies the values, the talents, and the aspirations that the city holds in esteem, but it does not follow from this that his *kalokagathia* corresponds to the Socratic conception of *kalokagathia*. Strauss repeatedly stresses that, in the eyes of Socrates, Ischomachus is not a true *kalos kagathos* and that the philosopher's admiration for him is feigned or, if preferred, *ironic*.³⁴ Thus it is claimed that the *Oeconomicus* portrays the opposition between two types of life: the political life (Ischomachus) that embodies the values of the city, and the philosophical life (Socrates) that involves a critical, perhaps even destructive, stance vis-à-vis these same values.³⁵ And here is what constitutes, according to Strauss, the main opposition between Ischomachus' *kalokagathia* and Socrates' *kalo-kagathia*: "a perfect gentleman in the Ischomachean sense differs profoundly from the perfect gentleman in the Socratic sense. A perfect gentleman in the Socratic sense is a man who knows through thinking what is pious, what is impious, what is noble, what is base, and so on, or who considers thoroughly the just and unjust things" (Strauss 1970, 175–176). To support this interpretation, Strauss refers in a footnote to four texts, only one of which is actually relevant to understanding the Socratic conception of *kalokagathia* (*Mem.* 1.1.16, 4.8.4; *Ap.* 3; *Oec.* 11.22). In *Mem.* 1.1.16, Xenophon explains that Socrates considered those who know the questions that pertain to human matters to be good men (καλοὶ καγαθοί) and that he saw those who are ignorant of them as slaves (see also *Mem.* 1.2.18). Strauss clearly wants to insinuate that Ischomachus completely ignores these questions and that he deserves, therefore, to be considered a slave. Apart from the fact that Ischomachus' ignorance of these questions is

33 Strauss 1948, 22: "In common parlance, 'gentleman' designates a just and brave man, a good citizen, who as such is not necessarily a wise man. Ischomachus, that perfectly respectable man whom Xenophon confronts with Socrates, is called a gentleman by everyone, by men and women, by strangers and citizens. In the Socratic meaning of the term, the gentleman is identical with the wise man." See also 22 n. 27; Stevens 1994, 212, 214; Danzig 2010, 251–252.

34 Cf. Strauss 1970, 132, 159, 161, 165, 175, 176, 185.

35 See also Danzig 2010, 247: "Rather than an appropriate symbol of the upstanding gentleman, Socrates, in a sense, was the anti-gentleman of Athens ... The most serious theme of the *Oeconomicus* is ... the investigation of the mutual antagonism between Socrates the philosopher and Ischomachus the respectable citizen of Athens." See also Pangle 1994, 130.

never demonstrated in the *Oeconomicus*, the sheer number of points of convergence between his ethical positions and those of Socrates, not to mention their importance as essential points of doctrine, leads me to think that, on the contrary, he knows much more than Strauss insinuates he does. Furthermore, Strauss completely ignores a text that seems to demonstrate that there is no opposition between Ischomachus' *kalokagathia* and the *kalokagathia* that Socrates transmitted to his disciples:

But Crito was Socrates' companion, and so were Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Hermogenes, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas and others, who associated with him not because they wanted to become politicians or barristers, but because they wanted to become truly good men (καλοὶ τε κάγαθοί) and to be able to perform honorably their duties (καλῶς χρῆσθαι) towards their estate, towards their servants, relatives and friends, and towards their city and their fellow citizens. Not one of these men at any period of his life did anything wrong, or was accused of doing so.

Mem. 1.2.48 (see also 4.1.2, 4.5.10)

The knowledge of how to “make proper use” (καλῶς χρῆσθαι) of his household, his servants, his friends, and the city, is exactly the type of knowledge that Xenophon attributes to Ischomachus and that he has him explain in the *Oeconomicus*. In other words, there is no difference worth mentioning between the *kalokagathia*³⁶ that Socrates transmitted to his disciples and that embodied by Ischomachus in the *Oeconomicus*. Another passage in the *Memorabilia*—which Strauss appears not to take into consideration—clearly demonstrates that a *kalos kagathos* does not necessarily possess all the knowledge that in principle he should: “Of all the people that I have known, he was ... the most enthusiastic to teach, so far as he was competent, the subjects which a truly good man should know (προσῆκει ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κάγαθῷ εἰδέναι); and where he himself was not well qualified, he put them in touch with experts” (*Mem.* 4.7.1). If, among all the types of knowledge that a good man must possess (προσῆκει ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κάγαθῷ εἰδέναι), Socrates willingly teaches those that he possesses and, for those that he does not possess, points out competent teachers, it follows that he himself does not possess all the knowledge that a good man ought to possess—even though he himself is a good man (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.18, 1.2.48; *Symp.* 1.1). Now Socrates recognizes that a good man ought to possess competent knowledge about agriculture (cf. *Oec.* 6.8), but he admits that he himself does

36 For the Socratic conception of *kalokagathia*, see also *Mem.* 1.2.2, 1.5.1, 4.7.1, 4.8.11; *Oec.* 6.8.

not possess such knowledge. Therefore, given what Xenophon tells us in *Mem.* 4.7.1, it is no surprise that he relates to Critobulus, who urgently needs to acquire such knowledge, his conversation with Ischomachus, who has the reputation of being both a good man (*Oec.* 6.12–17) and a successful farmer.

Forensic Rhetoric³⁷

When they interpret the *Oeconomicus*, Straussian commentators like to oppose Socrates, who supposedly knows nothing about forensic rhetoric—and who, even if he did have the required competence, would refuse to use it—to Ischomachus, who constantly practices his ability to make accusations and to defend himself in speech.³⁸ Since, in my view, this is a pseudo-opposition founded on a misreading of text of great interest to anyone seeking to understand the diverse functions of rhetoric, I shall quote the text in question in its entirety before providing detailed commentary:

[22] [Socrates] “Actually, Ischomachus, I said, I was going to ask you whether you also do anything about ensuring that you can hold your own in an argument, should the occasion arise.”

[Ischomachus] “Socrates,” he replied, “don’t you think that I have constantly been preparing for precisely (διατελεῖν μελετῶν) that—to argue in my own defense that I do wrong to no one (ἀπολογεῖσθαι μὲν ὅτι οὐδένᾳ ἀδικῶ), but in fact often benefit people to the best of my ability? And don’t you think that I prepare for arguing as a prosecutor too, by observing those individuals who often wrong not only private citizens but also the State, and never do good to anyone?”

[23] “Yes, Ischomachus,” I said, “but I’d still like to hear whether you practice actually expressing all this verbally (ἐρμηνεύειν τοιαῦτα μελετᾷς).”

“I never stop practicing (οὐδὲν ... παύομαι ... λέγειν μελετῶν) that, Socrates,” he replied. “Sometimes I get one of my servants to play the role of prosecutor or defendant, and I listen to his speech and then try to refute it; sometimes I criticize (μέμφομαι) or praise (ἐπαινῶ) someone before a jury of his friends; sometimes I reconcile some of my acquaintances with one another by trying to explain that it is in their interests to be on good terms, not bad (πειρώμενος διδάσκειν ὡς συμφέρει αὐτοῖς φίλους εἶναι μᾶλλον

37 This section on forensic rhetoric is based on an earlier study (cf. Dorion 2014, 36–39).

38 Cf. Strauss 1970, 166; Pangle 1994, 131–132; Ambler 1996, 123; Danzig 2010, 118 n. 10, 248, 254.

ἢ πολέμους); [24] sometimes we get together and pick holes in a general's conduct, or speak in defense of someone who has been accused despite being innocent, or in impeachment of someone wrongly appointed to political office. Moreover, we often act like members of the Council, and recommend a course of action we approve of, or criticize one we don't approve of. [25] And often, Socrates, I have even been singled out and sentenced to pay some appropriate penalty or fine!"

"By whom, Ischomachus?" I asked. "I didn't know that had happened."

"By my wife!" he said.

"And what are you like at arguing your case?" I asked.

"Not bad at all, when it is a matter of telling the truth; but when I'd be better off lying, Socrates, there's absolutely no way I can make the weaker argument into the stronger one (τὸν ἥττω λόγον ... οὐ δύναμαι κρείττω ποιεῖν)."

"That, Ischomachus," I said, "is probably because you are incapable of making lies true (τὸ ψεῦδος οὐ δύνασαι ἀληθές ποιεῖν)."

Oec. 11.22–25

This long passage calls for several observations:

i) It is remarkable that Ischomachus emphasizes, right from the start (*Oec.* 11.22), that the best defense is to show that one never commits any injustice and that this defense is precisely the one he continually practices. This defense is absolutely identical to the one that Socrates recommends, using the same terms, at the beginning of the *Apology*:

[Hermogenes] "Really, Socrates, ought you not to be considering your defense?" Socrates at first replied: "Don't you think that my whole life has been a preparation for my defense (ἀπολογεῖσθαι μελετῶν διαβεβιωκέναι)?"

"How?"

"Because I have consistently done no wrong (οὐδὲν ἄδικον διαγεγένημαι ποιῶν), and this, I think, is the finest preparation for a defense (νομίζω μελέτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀπολογίας)."

Ap. 3

Given that Ischomachus (*Oec.* 11.22) and Socrates (*Ap.* 3) have the same position on the best defense, it is a mistake to set up the following opposition: "Like Socrates (see *Ap.* 1.2–3), [Ischomachus] has spent his whole life in preparing his legal defense, *but unlike him, he has not relied on his righteous life as his defense*, but has actually had to waste his time preparing speeches for the court,

both defense speeches and speeches for the prosecution.”³⁹ On the contrary, a careful reading of the texts clearly demonstrates that, just like Socrates, Ischomachus counts on the exemplariness and the justice of his life to defend himself.

ii) In addition, Straussian commentators complacently emphasize that Socrates has never accused anyone, but that Ischomachus openly asserts that he practices making accusations (*Oec.* 11.22).⁴⁰ I must admit that I see no real opposition in this contrast. Is it necessary to point out that Ischomachus does not practice making accusations against just anyone, but only against those who harm the city or individual citizens and who do no good to anyone? That Socrates has not himself brought forward this type of accusation against such citizens does not imply that he disapproves of doing so. Consider the example of Archdemus: Xenophon describes him as “a person of considerable rhetorical and practical ability (πάνυ μὲν ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ πράξειν)” (*Mem.* 2.9.4), and tells how Socrates puts him in contact with his friend Crito. Using his rhetorical skills, Archdemus is able to rid Crito of the sycophants making accusations against him by instituting legal proceedings against them (*Mem.* 2.9.5). Now since Socrates undoubtedly approves of what Archdemus does to help Crito, why would he disapprove of the legal proceedings that Ischomachus institutes against those who, just like the sycophants harassing Crito, harm the city and individual citizens without doing any good to anyone?

iii) The fact that Ischomachus never stops practicing his speaking skills (οὐδὲν ... παύομαι ... λέγειν μελετῶν, *Oec.* 11.23) is also in conformity with what Socrates advises his friends to do and, in particular, with his advice in *Mem.* 3.3.11: ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν καὶ τοῦ λέγειν δύνασθαι. In addition, the occasions on which Ischomachus uses his speaking skills correspond to those on which Socrates uses his. For example, Ischomachus blames and praises people (*Oec.* 11.23) in the same way as Socrates, who has no hesitation about blaming someone in

39 Danzig 2010, 254 (my italics). See also 248: “Ischomachus says that he spends a great deal of time preparing for his own self-defense (11.21–25). The words he uses both recall those used by Socrates (*Ap.* 2–3) and indicate the vast difference between the two: while both men claim to have spent their entire lives preparing their defenses, Socrates meant this in a figurative sense—that his whole life was an act of justice—and did not mean that he wasted even one moment actually writing a speech. Ischomachus, on the other hand, says quite clearly that he spends a large amount of time practicing speeches for his inevitable day in court.”

40 Cf. Strauss 1970, 166; Ambler 1996, 123; Danzig 2010, 254.

front of his friends (cf. *Mem.* 2.5), and who praises those whose virtues he wants to draw attention to.⁴¹ The reply that Socrates gives to Charmides, when the latter asks him to explain how he had become aware of the political competence that he attributes to him, also confirms that the good leader—whether he be an estate manager or a politician—has to have the ability to provide sound criticism.⁴² And just as Ischomachus seeks to reconcile acquaintances who are on bad terms by showing them “that it is in their interests to be on good terms, not bad” (*Oec.* 11.23), Socrates tries to reconcile, for the same reason, close relatives who have fallen out with one another, in particular, his son Lamprocles and his mother (*Mem.* 2.2), and Chaerephon and his brother Chaerecrates (*Mem.* 2.3).⁴³

iv) At the end of *Oec.* 11.25, there is a clear allusion to the accusation against Socrates of his making the weaker argument appear to be the stronger (*Mem.* 1.2.31), when Ischomachus says that he is incapable of doing so: τὸν ἥττω λόγον ... οὐ δύναμαι κρείττω ποιεῖν. Ischomachus’ admission that he is unable to make the weaker argument appear to be the stronger, even if it might be to his advantage to do so (*Oec.* 11.25), can perhaps be read as a way of exonerating Socrates and of defending him against the accusation that he stoops to using such dishonest rhetoric. For although Ischomachus continually practices speaking, and although he uses his rhetorical skills in numerous situations to achieve many different goals, he is still unable to make the weaker argument appear to be the stronger, which means that it is impossible for him to use his rhetorical skills for immoral purposes. On this point also, Ischomachus’ position accords with Socrates’ position: immediately after Xenophon informs his readers that Charicles had attempted to slander Socrates by accusing him of making the weaker argument appear to be the stronger, he hastens to add that he himself never heard Socrates argue in this way and knew of no one else who had ever witnessed him do so either (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.31).

41 Cf. *Mem.* 2.1.19, 2.3.14, 3.3.14, 3.6.16; *Ap.* 18; *Oec.* 11.1, 13.5; *Symp.* 8.32, etc.

42 Cf. *Mem.* 3.7.3: “[Charmides] In what kind of activity have you studied my ability?”— “[Socrates] In your relations with politicians. When they consult you, I notice that you give them good advice (καλῶς συμβουλευόντα), and when they make mistakes, your criticism is fair and right (ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶντα).”

43 In the final paragraphs of *Mem.* 2.3, Socrates presents a detailed argument for a position that is identical to Ischomachus’ position, trying to convince Chaerecrates and his brother that it would be in the best interests of both of them to reconcile their differences and be friends (*Mem.* 2.3.18–19).

v) An attentive reading of *Oec.* 11.22–25 reveals that interpretations based on the supposed opposition between Socrates and Ischomachus are artificial and tendentious. For is it actually true, as some commentators claim (e.g., Danzig 2010, 118 n. 10), that Socrates “is unwilling to prepare a speech for his own trial (*Ap.* 1–4),” whereas Ischomachus “spends a great deal of time on such things (11.22–25)”?

It is in fact incorrect to claim that Socrates is unwilling to prepare a speech to defend himself (cf. *Ap.* 4–5, 8; Dorion 2014, 35). Moreover, the suggestion that the preparation of forensic speeches is the main, or even the only, activity described in *Oec.* 11.22–25 is also tendentious, because several other discursive practices common to both Ischomachus and Socrates are described in this passage. Finally, the commentators in question forget—or perhaps they simply do not want to see—that Socrates and Ischomachus share one very fundamental position: they both believe, independently of any discussion of the use of speaking skills to mount a legal defense, that the best way to defend oneself is to never treat anyone unjustly.

The Destiny of Ischomachus' Wife

The last divergence between Socrates and Ischomachus that I shall examine has become the pet theme of Straussian interpretations of the *Oeconomicus*. All of Strauss's followers take pleasure in discussing it knowingly, as if it were a question of an “irrefutable fact” that delivered the coup de grâce to poor Ischomachus. Strauss (1970, 157–158) was the first to raise doubts about Ischomachus' aptitude for undertaking and completing his wife's education. At the request of Socrates (*Oec.* 7.4), Ischomachus explains in detail how he took over his wife's education (*Oec.* 7–10) to ensure that she became the “best partner” (*Oec.* 7.11, 7.13) in the management of their household, with the result that most readers come away with the impression that Xenophon wants them to believe that he succeeded in giving his wife an excellent education. But Ischomachus' talent for teaching is precisely what Strauss contests, his aim obviously being to discredit Ischomachus and justify his own *ironic* reading of the *Oeconomicus*. To contest Ischomachus' expertise as a teacher of marital success, Strauss brings up a shocking episode in the life of a woman who was said to be the wife of Ischomachus. Chronologically speaking, this episode would have occurred after the conversation with Ischomachus that Socrates recounts in the *Oeconomicus*. The episode in question is the one related in Andocides' *Mysteries* (124–127): shortly after marrying the daughter of Ischomachus, the rich Callias took his wife's mother as his mistress and started living with both women under the same roof. The daughter soon felt ashamed of the situation

and attempted to hang herself, but she was saved from committing suicide at the last minute. However, her mother felt no pity and drove her daughter out of the house shortly afterwards. Now, in light of this episode, Strauss and his followers⁴⁴ do not hesitate to interpret the character of Ischomachus in the *Oeconomicus* retrospectively. In other words, if his wife turned out so badly that she would stoop to stealing her daughter's husband, it is necessary to conclude not only that Ischomachus failed miserably in his attempt to educate his wife, but also that we must not take literally Xenophon's apparently positive portrayal of his numerous talents.

This very questionable interpretation that Strauss and his followers give to the incident recounted by Andocides can be contested on the basis of the two following objections:

- a) It is not at all certain that the character named Ischomachus in Andocides' *Mysteries* is the same Ischomachus with whom Socrates converses in the *Oeconomicus*. The name Ἰσχόμαχος is widely attested at the end of the fifth century. Moreover, given that in the *Oeconomicus* Ischomachus never mentions his wife's name, it is risky—at the least—to identify her with Chrysilla (Χρυσίλλης).⁴⁵ One year after the publication of Strauss's interpretation in 1970, Davies (1971, 264–268) tried also to link the *Oeconomicus*' Ischomachus with the one in Andocides' *Mysteries* (though he does not reference Strauss). Despite the patience and the rigor that Davies shows in his efforts to disentangle and clarify the thirteen known mentions of persons with the name Ischomachus, it is impossible not to conclude that his “demonstration” remains very hypothetical.
- b) Even were it possible to prove with certainty that the morally depraved Chrysilla in the *Mysteries* and the anonymous wife of Ischomachus in the *Oeconomicus* are the same, this would in no way imply that Ischomachus is blameworthy *from Xenophon's perspective*. The failure to see this constitutes, I think, a grave error in the Straussian interpretation, since it betrays a profound misunderstanding of an essential position in Xenophon's ethical thought. For just as a virtuous father cannot be held responsible for the immoral behavior of his son if the latter keeps company with immoral persons,⁴⁶ just as Socrates cannot be held responsible for the political errors made by Critias and Alcibiades after they had stopped associating

44 Cf. Stevens 1994, 212, 217–223, 229; Ambler 1996, 118 n. 9; Nee 2009, 266; Danzig 2010, 258–259.

45 Cf. Andoc. 127.

46 Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.27.

with him,⁴⁷ and just as Cyrus cannot be held responsible for his son's corruption and the decline of his empire after his death,⁴⁸ it would be unacceptable to make Ischomachus responsible for the depravation of his wife after their separation. For Xenophon, human beings can never acquire virtue definitely, and preserving their virtue requires constant practice as well as an ever-present model of virtue for inspiration.⁴⁹ If men or women stop being virtuous, it is not the fault of their virtuous teachers or husbands; it is their own fault, having decided to keep company with immoral persons after having turned their backs on their models of virtue. If Ischomachus' wife threw herself into the arms of her daughter's husband, it was necessarily after having separated from Ischomachus, who cannot therefore be held responsible for the moral depravity of his wife. In other words, the Straussian interpretation of the story told by Andocides is not only very implausible in that it brings into play a retrospective reading entirely founded on an unverifiable hypothesis, it is also—and perhaps more importantly—completely contrary to the spirit and the letter of the ethical position of Xenophon on the question of the causes of moral corruption.⁵⁰

In their interpretation of the *Oeconomicus*, the Straussian commentators attempt to force us into a false alternative by setting up a radical opposition between Socrates, who exudes the extraordinary benefits of the philosophical life, and the miserable Ischomachus, who supposedly has the unfortunate role of representing the values and the kind of life respected by the city. They are completely convinced that Socrates rejects and disavows the kind of life that Ischomachus leads. They even go so far as to speak of Ischomachus' "indictment"⁵¹ as if, in writing the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon's main objective had been

47 Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.12–28.

48 Cf. *Cyr.* 8.8; Dorion 2013, 393–412.

49 Cf. *Mem.* 1.2.19–28.

50 Although he seems less opposed than I am to the idea that Chrysilla is the wife of the Ischomachus in the *Oeconomicus*, Azoulay 2004, 441, presents an interpretation that agrees with mine: "In [Xenophon's] view, Ischomachus has incurred absolutely no blame. He competently educated his wife, but once he was gone, the memory of his lessons faded away. There is nothing in this that would distinguish him from Socrates, who is no more responsible than he is when it comes to the deplorable development of Critias or Alcibiades."

51 In addition to the title of Nee 2009 ("The City on Trial: Socrates' Indictment of the Gentleman in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*"), see Stevens 1994, 212; Nee 2009, 263, 265, 270; Danzig 2010, 250, 257.

to blame Ischomachus and irrevocably condemn his life and everything that it represents. However, instead of over-interpreting the text of the *Oeconomicus* in search of clues that supposedly confirm the indictment of Ischomachus, the Straussian commentators would have spent their time much more wisely if they had patiently searched out the numerous points of agreement between Socrates' and Ischomachus' respective positions. By doing so, they might very well have arrived, just as I have, at the conclusion that it is not a fundamental opposition between Socrates and Ischomachus that the *Oeconomicus* reveals, but instead, a profound complementarity.

It is not to Socrates whom Ischomachus stands in contrast, but to Critobulus. Critobulus and Ischomachus differ in a number of ways: the first cannot control his desires (2.7), while the second is a model of temperance and moderation (7.6, 7.14–15, 7.27); since Critobulus is *akratês*, his business fails and he is in constant need of money (2.2, 2.4, 2.7, 2.9), while Ischomachus prospers and can take on a range of expenses (7.3, 11.9); Critobulus realizes that he is not *kalos kagathos* (6.12), while Ischomachus is well known for his *kalo-kagathia* (6.12, 6.17, 7.2, 12.2); Critobulus needs advice on better training his wife (3.10–15), while Ischomachus discourses at length (7.4) on how he has trained his wife in a way that has made her an “associate” in managing the *oikos* (7.11, 7.13, 7.42); Critobulus squandered time and money in his love for *paidika* (2.7), while Ischomachus seems a stranger to this type of ruinous passion.

Before Strauss's interpretation had begun to influence readers of the *Oeconomicus*, it was quite common for commentators to identify Ischomachus with Xenophon.⁵² There are in fact many reasons to do so. Xenophon led the life of a wealthy landowner on his estate at Scillus and was quite competent in the various types of technical knowledge indispensable to success on a farming estate, that is, in agriculture, in hunting, in horsemanship, and so forth. But if we are to accept the Straussian interpretation of the *Oeconomicus*, we are confronted by a formidable paradox, not to say an implausible contradiction. For although Xenophon must surely be seen as Ischomachus' alter ego, it would seem that he wrote a treatise to indict himself and radically oppose himself to Socrates. If I am not mistaken, Strauss never addresses directly the question of the similarity of Xenophon to his character Ischomachus.⁵³ This question is

52 Cf. n. 2 above.

53 Stevens 1994, 211 n. 8, completely rejects the idea that Xenophon and Ischomachus are similar, claiming that Strauss 1970, 90, has already “sufficiently dispelled” this supposed misconception. But Strauss never actually examined this idea for itself. At the most, he

raised, however, by Danzig in the conclusion of his study (2010, 260–263). Without going so far as to maintain that the character of Ischomachus corresponds exactly to Xenophon, Danzig nevertheless admits that they have so many interests in common that it is “hard to imagine that Xenophon wrote *Oeconomicus* as a parody of his own way of life” (2010, 261). According to Danzig, while recognizing the superiority of the philosophical life of Socrates, Xenophon uses the character of Ischomachus to valorize his own life as a wealthy landowner. Now I gladly admit that this type of interpretation of Xenophon's connection to Ischomachus is convincing, but I still have to say that it puts Danzig at odds with his own position, for it appears to be completely incompatible with the analyses of Xenophon's text that he presents in the rest of his article. Indeed, he spends most of his article arguing that Socrates is an “anti-Ischomachus,” who irrevocably rejects the life of a man honored as a *kalos kagathos* by the city, and attempting to convince us that the *Oeconomicus* is nothing less than Ischomachus' indictment. Then, rather unexpectedly, Danzig seems to change his mind at the last minute, and he admits, albeit rather reluctantly, that Ischomachus and Xenophon do in fact have a lot in common, so that it would be quite strange for Xenophon to have parodied his own life in the *Oeconomicus*. This conclusion hardly seems compatible with the main arguments in Danzig's study. That being said, it does give voice to an idea that appears to be valid, and one that should govern all interpretations of the *Oeconomicus*, namely, that Xenophon's treatise on estate management is an attempt to valorize the kind of life led by Ischomachus-Xenophon himself and to show that, contrary to appearances, no fundamental opposition exists between this kind of life and the one that Socrates leads.⁵⁴

contented himself, as even Stevens admits, with suggesting that Xenophon was more similar to Critobulus than to Ischomachus. Strauss and Stevens both refer to *Mem.* 1.3.8–13, where Xenophon is sharply criticized by Socrates after confessing that he feels the same attraction as Critobulus does for the son of Alcibiades. Now if Xenophon portrays himself in a conversation with Socrates, near the beginning of the *Memorabilia*, it is certainly not to suggest that he is as irredeemable as Critobulus and as impervious to the beneficial criticism offered by Socrates in his conversations with his companions.

54 Cf. Dorion 2008, 267–279. Danzig responds to this paragraph's argument against his interpretation in his contribution (in this volume, p. 461 n. 11). I wish to express my gratitude to William Milnes for translating my text into English.

References

- Ambler, W.H. 'On the *Oeconomicus*', in: R.C. Bartlett, *Xenophon: The shorter Socratic writings*. Ithaca 1996, 102–131.
- Azoulay, V. *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir: de la charis au charisme*. Paris 2004.
- Breitenbach, H.R. 'Xenophon von Athen', in: *RE IX A2* (1967), 1569–2052.
- Caster, M. 'Sur l'Économique de Xénophon', in: A.-M. Desrousseaux, *Mélanges offerts à A.-M. Desrousseaux*. Paris 1937, 49–57.
- Chantraine, P. *Xénophon: Économique*. Paris 1949.
- Croiset, A. *Xénophon, son caractère et son talent*. Paris 1873.
- Danzig, G. 'Why Socrates was not a farmer: Xenophon's Apology for Socrates in *Oeconomicus*', in: G. Danzig, *Apologizing for Socrates: how Plato and Xenophon created our Socrates*. Lanham 2010, 239–263.
- Davies, J.K. *Athenian propertied families (600–300 B.C.)*. Oxford 1971.
- Delatte, A. *Le troisième livre des Souvenirs Socratiques de Xénophon: étude critique*. Paris 1933.
- Delebecque, E. 'Sur la date et l'objet de l'Économique', *REG* 64 (1951), 21–58.
- Delebecque, E. *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon*. Paris 1957.
- Delebecque, E. *Xénophon: L'art de la chasse*. Paris 1970.
- Delebecque, E. *Xénophon: De l'art équestre*. Paris 1978.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Introduction', in: L.-A. Dorion, *Xénophon: Mémoires*. Paris, 2000, vii–cccxxvii.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Xenophon's Socrates', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*. Oxford 2006, 93–109.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Socrate *oikonomikos*', in: M. Narcy and A. Tordesillas, *Xénophon et Socrate*. Paris 2008, 249–276.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The nature and status of *sophia* in the *Memorabilia*', in: C. Tuplin and F. Hobden, *Xenophon: ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Leiden 2012, 455–475.
- Dorion, L.-A. *L'autre Socrate: études sur les écrits socratiques de Xénophon*. Paris 2013.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Le statut et la fonction de la rhétorique dans les écrits socratiques de Xénophon', in: P. Pontier, *Xénophon et la rhétorique*. Paris 2014, 17–40.
- Field, G.C. *Plato and his contemporaries*. London 1946.
- Gera, D.L. *Xenophon's Cyropaedia: style, genre, and literary technique*. Oxford 1993.
- Luccioni, J. *Les idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon*. Paris 1947.
- Luccioni, J. *Xénophon et le socratisme*. Paris 1953.
- Magalhães-Vilhena, V. *Le problème de Socrate: le Socrate historique et le Socrate de Platon*. Paris 1952.
- Marchant, E.C. *Xenophon: Memorabilia and Oeconomicus*. London 1923.
- Morrison, D.R. 'Xenophon', in: J. Brunschwig and G.E.R. Lloyd, *Le savoir grec*. Paris 1996, 843–849.

- Nee, L.D. 'The city on trial: Socrates' indictment of the gentleman in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*', *Polis* 26 (2009), 246–270.
- Pangle, T. 'Socrates in the context of Xenophon's political writings', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 127–150.
- Pomeroy, S.B. *Xenophon, Oeconomicus: a social and historical commentary*. Oxford 1994.
- Sandbach, F.H. 'Plato and the Socratic work of Xenophon', in: P.E. Easterling and B.M.W. Knox, *The Cambridge history of classical literature*. Cambridge 1985, 478–480.
- Stevens, J.A. 'Friendship and profit in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*', in: Vander Waerdt 1994, 209–237.
- Strauss, L. *On tyranny: an interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero*. Glencoe 1948.
- Strauss, L. *Xenophon's Socratic discourse: an interpretation of the Oeconomicus*. Ithaca 1970.
- Too, Y.L. 'The economies of pedagogy: Xenophon's wifely didactics', *PCPhS* 47 (2001), 65–80.
- Vander Waerdt, P.A. *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994.
- Waterfield, R. *Xenophon: conversations of Socrates*. London 1990.

Aphroditê and *Philophrosynê*: Xenophon's *Symposium* between Athenian and Spartan Paradigms

Maria Consiglia Alvino

Università di Napoli Federico II – Université de Strasbourg

1 Xenophon's *Symposium* in the Context of Greek Sympotic Literature

The exegetical problems with Xenophon's *Symposium* exceed those due to prejudicial comparisons with Plato's dialogue of the same name.¹ In recent decades scholars have attempted to understand and recognize the work's literary and philosophical value.² Xenophon's Socrates search for *kalokagathia*,³ *sôphrosunê*,⁴ and *enkrateia*;⁵ his distinction between *philia* and *sôphron erôs*;⁶ in short, the display in the *Symposium* of an *anthrôpinê sophia*,⁷ conceived as a form of

- 1 Even before Wilamowitz's final condemnation (von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 1919, 355), the question of the relation between the two *Symposia* was an ancient *querelle*, especially for the priority in the origins of the *symposion* genre. For the priority of Xenophon's *Symposium* see Ast 1816, 314–318; Henrichsen 1840 and 1844; Hug 1852 and 1876, xxiii–xxvii; Böck 1866, 6. For Xenophon's posteriority see Cornarius 1546; Weiske 1799; Schneider 1805; Hermann 1834 and 1853; Bury 1909, lxvii–lxviii; Rapaport 1925 and 1925a; Dornseiff 1942; Dover 1965. For the theory of a missing relation between the two *symposia* see Henrichsen 1840. For the theory of a second writing of Xenophon's *Symposium* see Thesleff 1978 and 2002; Danzig 2002 and 2005. For a comparison between Xenophon's and Plato's *Symposium*, see also Romeri 2015.
- 2 For positive philosophical and literary judgments of Xenophon's *Symposium* see Körte 1927, 4; Flacelière 1961; Gray 1992; Hindley 1999; Thomsen 2001. For the pedagogical value of the work see Vela Tejada 2011.
- 3 For the analysis of *kalokagathia* in Xenophon's *Symposium* see Ollier 1961, 1–36; Gray 1992. For Socrates' conception of *kalokagathia* in Xenophon's Socratic writings, see Dorion (in this volume), 530–533.
- 4 For a comparison with Xenophon's concept of *sôphrosunê* in *Memorabilia*, see Moore (in this volume), 501–507.
- 5 For the conception of *enkrateia* in Xenophon's Socratic writings, see (in this volume) Danzig (467–472), Moore (511–513), Dorion (527).
- 6 About the concept of *philia* in Xenophon's Socratic literature, see Dorion 2013, 195–218. For the analysis of the erotic theme in Xenophon's *Symposium*, see Gemoll 1934; Flacelière 1961; Hindley 1999; Thomsen 2001; Pentassuglio 2012; Périllie 2015.
- 7 For Socrates' conception of *sophia* and *philosophia*, see Dorion 2013, 122–146, esp. 144–145.

research into autarchy and virtue, have been recognized for their truly philosophical quality. Still, Xenophon's reliance on earlier and contemporary literature poses particular challenges to interpretation. As Huss writes, Xenophon "generally does not just quote other authors, but rearranges the elements he borrows from them according to his own needs," creating "largely independent new works of art which are neither Platonic or Antisthenic but simply Xenophontic."⁸ The difficulty in untangling the sources of Xenophon's *Symposium* is complicated by its membership in the genre of *spoudaiogeloion logos* ("serious-humorous writing");⁹ it appears to be, according to Pangle's definition, "a Socratic self-satire."¹⁰ Even if it is relatively easy to identify the comic sources,¹¹ it is hard to identify the "serious" models. Further, even if *spoudaiogeloion* is an element proper to sympotic elegiac poetry,¹² there remains the problem of articulating Xenophon's relation to the genre. As Stephen Halliwell has brilliantly argued, "One of Xenophon's literary-philosophical objectives in the *Symposium* is to show how the traditional protocols of sympotic laughter and exhilaration can be given a new Socratic twist, a distinctive (and quizzical) variation on an old form" (2008, 150–151).

In this chapter I will therefore discuss the role played by this Xenophontic *spoudaiogeloion* work in the Socratic literature, in the context of the sympotic literary genre. The dialogical frame in which Socrates and his fellows act in the symposium like characters of a *spoudaiogeloion* drama offers new communicative possibilities to the ancient genre of the sympotic elegy. Xenophon's literary strategy gives a more explicit philosophical and ethical significance to the sympotic genre, thanks to the Socratic discussion of *kalokagathia* and *sôphrosunê*, as well as the pedagogical value of music and dance. Moreover, Xenophon's *Symposium* shows a socio-political significance, one that has not often been considered a matter of research.¹³ A political perspective of the work can be

8 Huss 1999, 382; see also Gray 2010, 258.

9 For the *spoudaiogeloion* element in Greek literature see Giangrande 1972; for the literary genre of the *spoudaiogeloion logos* and its connection with the *Sôkratikoï logoi* see Segoloni 1994, 198–207; for the *symposion* as a *spoudaiogeloion logos* see Gentili 1989, 143.

10 Pangle 2010, 140.

11 Eupolis' *Kolakes* (PCG 156–191 Kassel-Austin) and *Autolykos* (PCG 48–75 Kassel-Austin) for the choice of the main characters Kallias and Autolykos; Aristophanes' *Clouds* for the direct citations with which the Syracusan addresses Socrates in *Symp.* 6.6–8; the *satyrikon* drama in Socrates's silenic characterization in *Symp.* 5.7; the mime for the scene of love between Dionysos and Ariadne in chapter 9.

12 For this aspect see Segoloni 1994, 217; Huss 1999, 397–398.

13 About the political value of Xenophon's *Symposium* see Pangle 2010.

seen when we look into Xenophon's literary sources implied in the artistic construction of his *Symposium*.

Besides the connections to the Socratic literature and to some of Plato's dialogues, Xenophon's use of the sympotic elegy as a general paradigm can be proved by his direct quotations of Theognis' poetry.¹⁴ His choice of Theognis' model is not, of course, ideologically innocent: Theognis' ethical code was that of the aristocratic party to which Xenophon belonged. The connection to Theognis reveals, therefore, Xenophon's desire to give his symposium a certain (aristocratic) pedagogical and political connotation. A philological analysis of the second chapter of Xenophon's *Symposium* (2.24–3.1) reveals an intertextual link with another aristocratic and propagandistic text: Critias' sympotic elegy, *Spartan Constitution*. As I will attempt to show, the allusions to Critias' use of the terms *philophrosunê* and *aphroditê* have a specific political inflection. They allow us to see Xenophon's relation to the oligarch Critias and the Thirty Tyrants¹⁵ in the context of the Socratic debate on the pedagogical value of the common meal.¹⁶

2 *Symposia and hetaireiai: The Political Value of the Socratics' Common Meal*

To understand the relation between Xenophon's *Symposium* and Critias' elegy, it will be useful to remember the socio-political value of the Athenian *symposia* ("drinking together") and the Spartan *syssitia* ("eating together"), which are the respective subjects of the two texts under consideration.

Both *symposia* and *syssitia* had pedagogical and political value.¹⁷ But while the Spartan *syssitia* were public and ritual gatherings of the Spartan oligarchy, Athenian *symposia* were private expressions and means of propaganda used by the powerful political aristocratic groups, the *hetaireiai* (see Pecorella Longo 1971; Talamo 1998). *Hetaireiai* played an important role in the rise of the Thirty, as can be inferred from the fact that after the democratic restoration a law

14 Xen. *Symp.* 2.4 quotes Thgn. 35–36 West; for Theognis' sympotic poetry see Giangrande 1972, 95–104; for the problem of attribution of a *Peri Theognidos* to Xenophon or Antisthenes see Giannantoni 1990, 4. 260–263 n. 30; Huss 1999a, 129–130.

15 On the relation between Xenophon and Critias see Canfora 2013, 394–402.

16 On the pedagogical value of the common meal in the Socratic reflection, see Rossetti 1976.

17 About *symposia* and *syssitia* see Lombardo 1988. About the symposium as a social institution see Murray 1990; Musti 2005; about the Spartan *syssition* see Nafissi 1991, 189; Talamo 1998, 46–47.

forbade the formation of *hetaireiai*, on the grounds of their subversive aims.¹⁸ Some scholars have argued that the Socratic circle was seen as an *hetaireia*, and that Socrates' trial must therefore have had a strongly political content (Sartori 1957; Fischer 1969; Rossetti 1976). This hypothesis has been queried on the basis of the analysis of the occurrences of the term *hetairos* in Plato, Isocrates, Xenophon, and Aristotle. In Xenophon the term turns out not to have had a specifically political connotation, referring rather to the dimension of *philia* and philosophical teaching (see Pecorella Longo 1971; Talamo 1998). I think that the variety of meanings of the word, rather than excluding the possibility that the Socratic circle was an heteric organization, points to a mixed state of that institution, which provided at once political, philosophical, and affective relations. Socrates added a pedagogical framework. The role of the symposium in the ethical education of the civic body was an important topic of discussion both in the aristocratic party and among the Socratics, especially because of a democratization, perceived as a vulgarization, of the sympotic institution during the times of Pericles (cf. Mosconi 2000). The importance of the symposium as a pedagogical and civic institution has been shown by Livio Rossetti (1976) on the basis of literary testimony, and the role of the Socratics in the Greek intellectualization of the symposium has often been recognized (von der Mühl 1983, 12; Talamo 1998, 47; Musti 2005, n. 222). Moreover, the political connotation and reinterpretation of the symposium as an heteric and aristocratic institution was one of the tyrant Critias's most important propagandistic arguments.¹⁹

The fact that Xenophon never speaks openly of *hetaireia* could mean that he did not want to be recognized as belonging to such an institution—thereby acknowledging the fact that he indeed was part of it. It might be interesting to notice that in the *Symposium* he refers to the Socratics with the harmless expression “those around Socrates” (οἱ ἀμφὶ Σωκράτην, 1.4, 7) an expression he uses elsewhere to refer to political groups.²⁰ We should therefore expect that the *Symposium* provides a sympotic ethical code corresponding to Xenophon's specific political theory. A careful consideration of Xenophon's *Symposium* will

18 The text of Hyperides' *nomos eisangeltikos* is transmitted by Hyper. 3.7–8. Its chronologic attribution to 411/0 or 403/2 is matter of discussion. For this problem see also Hansen 1975 and 1980; Rhodes 1979.

19 About Critias and the symposium see in general Bultrighini 1999, 93–105, with further bibliography; Iannucci 2002.

20 For example, limiting our research to the Greek contexts, *Hell.* 2.3.46; 3.2.4. Xenophon in fact generally prefers the locution οἱ περὶ to indicate political groups. It is not clear if the expressions are synonymous. For further information, see Pecorella Longo 1971, 18–29.

show differences in structure between Xenophon's imagined symposium and the form standard to the Athenian *symposia*. In the following paragraph I will dwell on the political relevance of these differences.

3 Critias' *Spartan Constitution* and Xenophon's *Symposium*: Towards the Definition of Xenophon's Sympotic Code

In the sympotic code proposed by Socrates we can find a first element that makes Xenophon's symposium similar to the Spartan *syssition*: the mixed age of its participants. Athenian *symposia* were, by contrast, generally held by men of the same age (Xen. *Lac.* 5.5–6). In Xenophon's *Symposium*, however, set in 422 BCE, Socrates, Lycon,²¹ and Callias²² are adults; Antisthenes²³ and Hermogenes²⁴ are young; the newly-weds Critobulus²⁵ and Niceratus²⁶ are just past their teenage years; Charmides²⁷ and Autolycus²⁸ are teenagers. We should also consider that the different social background²⁹ of the symposiasts distinguishes Xenophon's symposium both from the Athenian and the Spartan common meal.

In Xenophon's *Symposium*, Socrates lists some features that the symposium should have: diverse ages and social levels, performance of a jester,³⁰ and music and dance.³¹ Socrates goes on to define the right way to drink:

Well, gentlemen, so far as drinking is concerned, you have my hearty approval; for wine does of a truth “moisten the soul” and lull our grief to

21 See Huss 1999a, 73–74.

22 See Swoboda 1919; Huss 1999a, 70–72.

23 See Natorp 1894; Huss 1999a, 76–77; Dorion 2001–2011, 188–190. For further details about Antisthenes in Xenophon's production, see Danzig (in this volume, 36) with further bibliography.

24 See Döring 1996, col. 442; Huss 1999a, 76.

25 See Huss 1999a, 75–76. For Critobulus' character in Xenophon's production, see Noël 2015, as well as (in this volume) Pontier and Danzig.

26 See Reinke 1936; Huss 1999a, 74–75.

27 See Judeich 1899; Huss 1999a, 77–78.

28 See Judeich 1896; Huss 1999a, 72–73.

29 In Xenophon's *Symposium* Callias, Ermogenes, Charmides, Niceratos, Lycon and Aytolikos are aristocrats, while the Socratics belong to the middle-class.

30 Xen. *Symp.* 1.11–16. For further details about the narrative structure of the first chapter of Xenophon's *Symposium*, see Pontier (in this volume).

31 Xen. *Symp.* 2.1.

sleep just as the mandragora does with men, at the same time awakening kindly feelings (τὰς δὲ φιλοφροσύνας) as oil quickens a flame.³²

Symp. 2.24

Socrates defines the arousing of *philophrosunê* as the effect of the correctly organized symposium. Shortly after, Charmides quotes Socrates' words. When he does so, however, he substitutes the term *philophrosunai*, "friendly feelings," with *aphroditên*, "love pleasure," thereby including sexual pleasure in the symposium:

It seems to me, gentlemen, that, as Socrates said of the wine, so this blending of the young people's beauty and of the notes of the music lulls one's grief to sleep and awakens love pleasure (ἀφροδίτην).

Symp. 3.1

Socrates in turn rejects Charmides' proposal by excluding the aphroditic pleasure from the banquet and contrasting with it the spiritual pleasure created by the speeches themselves.

These people, gentlemen—said he—show their competence to give us pleasure (τέρπειν); and yet we, I am sure, think ourselves considerably superior to them. Will it not be to our shame, therefore, if we do not make even an attempt, while here together, to be of some service or to give some pleasure (εὐφραίνειν) one to another?

Symp. 3.2

The allusive value of the opposition between *philophrosunê* and *philia* is stressed by the strong literary connotation of Socrates' words in the first passage and in Charmides' modified quotation. *Philophrosunê* is originally a poetic word.³³ In Homer it is a "mutual friendship" that binds the members of a political enclave, whose ritual expression is the symposium.³⁴ The word occurs with this very meaning in Critias' *Spartan Constitution*:

32 All English translations of the Greek texts come from the Loeb Classical Library editions.

33 Before this contest, *philophrosunê* occurs in Hom. *Il.* 9.254–258; Pind. *Ol.* 6.98; Ion fr. 26.11, 27.8; according to LSJ, *philophrosunê*'s meaning here as "cheerfulness" is a *hapax semanticum* and occurs just once later in prose in Plut. *Mor.* 128d–e.

34 In Hom. *Il.* 9.254–258, Odysseus' speech to Achilles, with the persuasive aim to reestablish the peace between Achilles and Agamemnon, is followed by the offer of a cup of wine. The political value of the symposium is already shown here in a nutshell.

But the warriors of Sparta drink only enough
to lead the spirits of all into joyous hope
the tongue to kindliness (εἰς τε φιλοφροσύνην) and moderate laughter.³⁵

CRITIAS fr. 6 DK

We see that moderate drinking yields in Critias' song the same consequence as it does in Socrates' speech, namely, *philophrosunê*. We should therefore infer that in Xenophon *philophrosunê* has a specific political connotation, referring to the mutual friendship proper to the Spartan political groups in the *syssitia*.

This assumption can be supported by another consideration. It is notable that Charmides replaces Socrates' poetic word φιλοφροσύνας with the substantive *aphroditê* derived from the Goddess' name, meaning "erotics." This expression can be compared to the Homeric expression ἔργ' Ἀφροδίτης (*Hom. Hymn* 5.21), "acts of love," which normally refers to heterosexual unions (cf. Foucault 1984, 47–62). The same expression also occurs in Critias' elegy, immediately after the passage about *philophrosunê* quoted above:

Such drinking is good for the body,
mind and estate; well is suited to acts of love (ἔργ' Ἀφροδίτης),
and to further sleep, that haven from toil;
to invite, too, Hygieia, most delightful of gods to mortals
and Sobriety (Σωφροσύνην), the neighbor of Reverence (Εὐσεβίης).

CRITIAS fr. 6 DK

It is likely that Critias' *Spartan Constitution* is the text both Socrates and Charmides are referring to in the *Symposium*. We should remember that Critias was Charmides' cousin and tutor (Pl. *Chrm.* 157e–158a), and that Charmides' sister Periktione was Plato's mother (154a–155a). Charmides was a leading figure during the rule of the Thirty and died in 403 during the battle of Munichia (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.19). In the *Memorabilia* (3.7; cf. DL 2.29) Socrates praises his political abilities. He is the model of the young aristocrat whose uneducated character can be explained on the basis of his young age: he needs the philosopher's guidance to reach wisdom. Charmides' character acts the same part in Plato's homonymous dialogue, where Critias is his tutor and master (cf. Dusanic 2000). In that dialogue the definition of *sôphrosunê* is the main topic,³⁶ meaning,

35 οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ κόροι πίνουσι τοσοῦτον | ὥστε φρέν' εἰς ἱλαρὰν ἐλπίδα πάντ' ἀπάγειν | εἰς τε φιλοφροσύνην γλῶσσαν μέτριόν τε γέλωτα.

36 About *sôphrosunê* in Plato's *Charmides* see Lesses 2000; Stalley 2000; Tulli 2000; see in general Robinson and Brisson 2000; Tuozzo 2011.

according to Critias, self-knowledge (164b, 165d) or one's ability to do his own things (161b). Critias' definition of *sôphrosunê*, seen from the political perspective, hides the aristocratic concept of politics as a technical art, exercised only by those who have an appropriately familiar and cultural background, in opposition to the democratic *polypragmosunê*, conceived not as versatility, but as lack of a specific education and knowledge.³⁷

Scholars have noted the importance of the concept of *sôphrosunê*, held as the antidemocratic and aristocratic power of self-governance, in Critias' propaganda and its influence on Plato's discussion of politics as a *technê*.³⁸ In Plato's dialogue, however, the conclusions about *sôphrosunê* are aporetic, and little space is given to a political connotation of the term, perhaps because of Plato's apologetic attempt to divide Socrates from Critias. Yet finding the link between Xenophon's and Critias' concept of *sôphrosunê* can be important to get a background for understanding *sôphrosunê* in Socratic literature and Xenophon's idea of it.

In both Xenophon's and Critias' works, two drinking models are contrasted, topic by topic. Linguistic scurrility,³⁹ physical and mental weakening,⁴⁰ social riots, and economic ruin are contrasted with good expectations, the inner inclination to mutual friendship (φιλοφροσύνην), and healthy advantages for the body, the mind, and sexual unions. This last aspect is expressed in Critias' work by "Aphrodite's deeds" (ἔργ' Ἀφροδίτης), the counterpart to Xenophon's *aphroditê*. In Critias the relation between *syssition* and sexual unions has an important political connotation. As we know from Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* (1.3), this aspect was related to the problem of *teknopoiia* (begetting children) and *eugeneia* (improving the genetic quality of the population of the *polis*), which was very important in Sparta, given its militarized social system and *oligandria* ("lack of men"; cf. Hornblower 1983, 219–221). It is therefore no wonder that Xenophon's *Symposium* also ends with the scene of the married symposiasts running back home to their wives with the strong desire to procreate (9.7). From this scene, we should infer that Xenophon is borrowing features of the Spartan *syssition*. Socrates' exclusion of the aphrodisiac from the banquet

37 About the negative connotation of the concept of *polypragmosunê* see Edmunds 1987, 17–20; Musti 1995, 352 n. 25. About Critias and *polypragmosunê* see Bultrighini 1999, 47.

38 See Bultrighini 1999, 47–62, with further bibliography.

39 For this theme in sympotic literature see Giangrande 1972, 99–100; 120–127.

40 This topic seems to have particularly influenced Xenophon. The expression νοῦς δὲ παρέσφαλται is echoed in Xen. *Lac.* 5.4; *Cyr.* 1.3.10; 8.8.10. For further bibliography, see Huss 1999a, 169.

does not mean a total banishment of it from his fellows' life. On the contrary, any symposium must be still be aphrodisiac in some way and play some role in procreation.

Critias' *Spartan Constitution* had a specific political and pedagogical aim: to introduce Spartan institutions, including its common meal, into Athens. In his view the Athenian symposium, instrument of the propaganda of the *het-airieiai*, should be phased out and replaced with the ethical attitudes of the *syssitia*. In connection with this pedagogical reform program, we can readily see that Critias' poetic experimentation leads to the fusion of the serious content of the law and the less serious literary form of elegiac sympotic poetry. In Critias we find for the first time consciously and explicitly expressed the link between *politeia* and symposium, the latter expressing, in a nutshell, the general dynamics of the former. Xenophon borrows Critias' philolaconian concept of the common meal and gives it a Socratic twist: the power of speeches and the relational collaborative process of searching for the truth provided by the informal sympotic occasion are Socrates' best means to guide the symposiasts to the knowledge and consciousness of *sôphrosunê* and *kalokagathia*.

The influence of Critias' programmatic sympotic ethic is apparent also in Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*⁴¹ and in the first two books of Plato's *Laws*.⁴² We could infer that the relation between symposium, *politeia*, and *nomoi* was matter of discussion in the Socratic circle, to which Critias too was linked before his tyrannical degeneration.⁴³

In Xenophon's *Symposium* the term *sôphrosunê* occurs two times (1.8; 8.8), indicating the general idea of moderation and wisdom that we find in Critias' concept of Spartan austerity. In both cases it defines the specific virtue of Autolycus, the other teenager to which Charmides is contrasted throughout the symposium. Autolycus' *sôphrosunê* inspires in the symposiasts a kind of *sôphron erôs* ("moderate desire," 1.10). Whereas Charmides seems far from being *kalokagathos*, Autolycus is presented as a model of wisdom. About this Autolycus we know that he would die in 404 against the Thirty (Plut. *Lys.* 15.5; Diod. Sic. 17.5.7; Paus. 9.32.8) and that his father Lycon was one of Socrates' accusers. At the time of Demosthenes and Lycurgus he would become a symbol of the democratic fight against tyranny; a statue by Leochares in the *Prytaneion* commemorated him (Plin. *HN* 34.79; Paus. 1.18.3; 9.32.8).

41 For Critias' influence on Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* see Köhler 1896, 368–369; Ollier 1934, xxxv.

42 Jaeger 1939, 3.436.

43 About the Xenophontic Socrates' attitude towards tyranny, see Zuolo (in this volume).

By depicting and contrasting Charmides and Autolycus many years after the failure of the Thirty and Socrates' death, Xenophon compared oligarchical and democratic social institutions, trying, through a reinterpretation of the Socratic experience, to find a solution to their excesses. This attempt is carried on with a substitution of a political connotation of *sôphrosunê*, like Critias', with an eminently moral and more Socratic conceptualization of it. The final effect of *sôphrosunê* pointed out by the philosopher is the political engagement of the *kalokagathoi*. For Xenophon's Socrates *sôphrosunê* is a constitutive part of *kalokagathia* (1.8), which comes out to be "the ability to serve his friends and to exalt his country" (8.38).

It is notable that at the end of his so-called "erotic speech" (8.39),⁴⁴ Socrates states a sort of didactic program for Callias, the perfect *kalokagathos*, pointing out how to be a good lover and, consequently, a good politician, reflecting both on the Athenian and the Spartan institutions, on the democratic and aristocratic constitutions:

If, then, you would be in his good graces, you must try to find out what sort of knowledge it was that made Themistocles able to give Greece liberty; you must try to find out what kind of knowledge it was that gave Pericles the name of being his country's wisest counselor; you must reflect, further, how it was that Solon by deep meditation established in his city laws of surpassing worth; you must search and find out what kind of practices it is that gives the Lacedaemonians the reputation of being pre-eminent military commanders.

Symp. 8.39

It is interesting that Xenophon's neologism *spoudaiologêsai*, "to speak seriously," underlines the importance given by Socrates to the discussion of political matters even in the *geloion* informal frame of the symposium, whose correspondence with the *makro-kosmos* of the *polis* is clearly evident:

If what I say appears to you gentlemen to be too grave (*σπουδαιολογήσαι*) and earnest for a drinking party, I beg you again not to be surprised. For during practically all my life I have been at one with the commonwealth in loving men who to a nature already good add a zealous desire for virtue.

Symp. 8.41

44 For Socrates' erotic speech and his characterisation as *mastropos*, see Dorion 2013, 347–368, and Johnson (in this volume, 62–63).

It is evident that Xenophon's *Symposium* echoes Socratic discussions about the social and pedagogical value of the symposium and its relation with the problem of the *kratistoi nomoi*, the best constitution, which was an especially important problem in Athens under Theramenes and after the democratic restoration. The symposial *nomoi* are, after all, part of both Xenophon's and Plato's political speculation. In the next section I will examine first how Xenophon's *nomoi* are related to the *syssitia* mentioned both in his *Spartan Constitution* and in Plato's *Laws*; then I will compare these conceptions with Xenophon's *Symposium*; finally I will draw some conclusions about the influence of these conceptions on the Socratic symposium as reflected in the works of both Plato and Xenophon.

4 Sympotic *nomoi* and the Socratic Banquet

I will now analyze the links between Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* and his *Symposium*.⁴⁵ These links show how Xenophon attempts to give to his Socratic banquet a philolaconic frame.

Xenophon starts his description of Lycurgus' Spartan constitution by dealing with the issue of "begetting children" (*teknopoiia*), which is related to the problem of women's education and equality with men and to the rules of marriage:

In other states the girls who are destined to become mothers and are brought up in the approved fashion, live on the very plainest fare, with a most meagre allowance of delicacies. Wine is either withheld altogether, or, if allowed them, is diluted with water ... He [Lycurgus] believed motherhood to be the most important function of freeborn woman. Therefore ... he insisted on physical training for the female no less than for the male sex: moreover, he instituted races and trials of strength for women competitors as for men, believing that if both parents are strong they produce more vigorous offspring. He noticed, too, that, during the time immediately succeeding marriage, it was usual elsewhere for the husband to have unlimited intercourse with his wife. The rule that he adopted was the opposite of this: for he laid it down that the husband should be ashamed to be seen entering his wife's room or leaving it. With this restriction

45 About the literary genre of Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution* and its Socratic elements, see Humble (in this volume).

on intercourse the desire of the one for the other must necessarily be increased, and their offspring was bound to be more vigorous than if they were surfeited with one another.

Lac. 1.3–5

Modern scholars agree in acknowledging women's socio-anthropological value in ancient Sparta, which was conservative, militarized, and poor of men. In that context women had to assure genetic and patrimonial continuity to their community (cf. Piccirilli 1978, 94; Gallo 1983, 726; Vidal Naquet 1988, 144–145). Woman's education and marriage were therefore object of specific institutional rules.

In the *Symposium*, the education of women, their equality with men, and the role of marriage are also very important, even if hidden under the *spoudaio-geloion* that characterizes the whole work. First, the young dancer, who is performing an acrobatic play with circles while she dances, gives Socrates the opportunity to assert the equality between men and women and the necessity of educating wives (2.9). Then, her somersaults in a circle of swords lead Socrates to affirm the possibility of teaching courage to women (2.12). Finally, in the concluding scene of Dionysus and Ariadne's love, the girl's shamefulness recalls that of Spartan newlywed couples (9.3–4).

This leads us again to Xenophon's *Spartan Constitution*. Here we learn that one of the most important features of Lycurgus' educational system is the total interdiction of intimate physical love, even between men and boys (*Lac.* 2.13). This prohibition is evidently echoed in Socrates' erotic speech in *Symposium* 8 and in his final remarks to Callias about the "laws of surpassing worth" (*nomoi kratistoi*, *Symp.* 8.39). Moreover, the characterization of the symposiasts seems to echo the relationship between age and behavior on which Lycurgus' education laws are based. There is a clear correspondence between the education to *aidôs* of the Spartan teenagers, which is pursued with the supervision of a warden (*Lac.* 2.2), and the education to *aidôs* in the *Symposium*, which is reached through the guidance of the philosopher (*Symp.* 1.8, 8.33, 36). Finally, in the *Spartan Constitution* (5.2–7) the institution of the *syssitia* is regarded as the socio-pedagogical means for uniting every biological division of the civil body. As in the *Symposium* (2.26), the way to pursuit *aretê* is the abolition of compulsory drinking. Another link is between the *Constitution's* nightly walk, which the young Spartans are compelled to take after the *syssition* in order to prove their sobriety (*Lac.* 5.7), and the *Symposium's* walk, which Socrates and the other symposiasts take for evening refreshment (*Symp.* 9.7).

As in Critias' *Spartan Constitution*, in Xenophon's no mention is made of the pedagogical role of art. Yet art constitutes an important feature not only

of the *Symposium* but also of Plato's *Laws* 1–2. Here, the Athenian Stranger praises the cathartic function of intoxication. He aims to contrast the Athenian paradigm, according to which the symposium should educate a person to endure pleasure, with the Spartan *krypteia*,⁴⁶ which educates one to endure sorrow. To awaken, manage, and finally win against the temptation of pleasure, Plato returns to the same idea of wine as a *pharmakon* that we find in Xenophon's *Symposium*, when Socrates compares the effects of wine to the narcotic and aphrodisiac power of the mandragora.⁴⁷ Likewise, it is just after having had wine that Xenophon's characters show their real natures, in particular the weaknesses the demonic action of the philosopher has to correct.⁴⁸ The idea that wine is a *pharmakon* is even more evident in the second book of the *Laws*.

In Plato's *Laws* a correct kind of education, an *orthê paideia*, clearly depends on the sympotic institution:

In the next place, we probably ought to enquire, regarding this subject, whether the discerning of men's natural dispositions is the only gain to be derived from the right use of wine-parties, or whether it entails benefits so great as to be worthy of serious consideration ... I want us to call to mind again our definition of right education. For the safekeeping of this depends, as I now conjecture, upon the correct establishment of the institution mentioned.

PL. *Leg.* 652a–653a

-
- 46 Pl. *Leg.* 630d, 633. See also Plut. *Lyc.* 28.3–7. *Krypteia* was a Spartan initiating institution and part of their education. At the end of their training, young Spartan men had to hide themselves in the countryside, without food and sufficient equipment, and try to kill as many helots, the enslaved Laconian population, as they could; see Vidal Naquet 1988; Link 2006.
- 47 Pl. *Leg.* 647e, 649a, 666b; Xen. *Symp.* 2.24. It should be noted that the reference to the wine that frees expectations of something good (εἰς ἱλαρὰν ἐλπίδα) is already present in Critias' elegy.
- 48 In Xen. *Symp.* 3–4, in the round of speeches in which the symposiasts are charged to expose what about themselves they are proud of, everyone reveals himself to be not at all a *kalokagathos*: Callias thinks that money can make the others better (cf. *Mem.* 1.2.5–6; for Socrates' relation with money in the *Memorabilia* and in the *Apology*, see Pontier [in this volume]); Niceratus believes uncritically in the universal hermeneutic value of the Homeric epic; Critobulus has a utilitarian conception of beauty; Charmides likes his poverty because of anti-political feelings; Antisthenes' autarchy lacks political perspective; Hermogenes' religiosity is contractual. Socrates is proud of being a procurer, as he teaches his fellows how to be attractive to others through the art of the speech.

In *Laws* 2, the Athenian adds another connotation to the claim formulated in the first book, that education is to develop a student's strength toward pleasure. Education is the acquisition, through the endurance against love and pleasure, of that inner harmony of pleasure and love, pain and hate, truth and opinion, and reality and appearance that is the true substance of virtue (653d). The religious festivals granted by the gods set humans aright again (653d). If music and dance provide the young with physical harmony (654a), wine offers them spiritual harmony. This is why according to Plato the right kind of *paideia* consists in the correction of sympotic practice (653a). Through the right mimetic education provided by the Muses and Apollo during the ritual and public symposia, future citizens may understand the model of *eudaimonia* established by the civic law.

So Plato's sympotic model, which establishes the relation between the constitution and institutional common meals, provides a link between the private dimension of the Attic symposium and the ritual publicity of the Spartan *syssitia*, adding to these the pedagogical value of art. Only the eugenic function of the *syssition*, assumed by Xenophon, is excluded, as consumption of wine is forbidden for procreative aims (674b).

In Xenophon's *Symposium* too, art is included in the symposium, thanks to the introduction of music and dance, which causes the symposiasts' formulations of aesthetic judgments (cf. Brancacci 2004, 198). Art is a mimesis of reality and can help the philosopher point out different grades of education, determining an informal learning process in his fellows. As we saw above, Charmides establishes a correspondence between the perception of beauty, pure sound, and hedonistic love. This reveals, however, an inability to transcend the sensual dimension of reality, an inability due to Charmides' lack of education. Next, Critobulus, in his speech on beauty, links the inner and indirect vision of the pleasing object and the unpleasant unsatisfied desire, elevating the conversation to the more spiritual, even if still sense-related, imaginative dimension (*Symp.* 4.10–18). Finally, all the symposiasts are impressed by the mimesis of the divine love between Dionysus and Ariadne, in which the representations of beauty—Dionysus is *kalos*, Ariadne is *oraia*—are connoted by the moral feature of *philia*, which has political implications.⁴⁹

In Plato and Xenophon the political value of artistic mimesis is clear regardless of the problem of their mutual influence.⁵⁰ Plato works to develop a correct

49 Xen. *Symp.* 9.3–6. For Xenophon's concept of friendship and its political value, see Danzig (in this volume).

50 The still unquestioned position of von Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff 1919, 517–559, according

sympotic model by sketching a series of strict age and social distinctions, a response to the same fear of political revolutions that caused the banishment of the *hetaireiai* after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants.⁵¹ In Xenophon's pedagogic interpretation of the Socratic symposium, however, this fear does not appear. In Xenophon's *Symposium* the artistic depiction of the informal Socratic *sunousia* and the silent purpose to compare and synthesize different kinds of symposial *nomoi* can be interpreted as an attempt to indicate to the Athenians a moderate form of democracy like Theramenes' one.⁵²

5 Conclusion

Xenophon's *Symposium* turns out to be an original piece, in which converge the serious content provided by philosophy and politics and the less serious form of comedy and mime. If, according to Plato's definition, the Constitution is the best drama (*Leg.* 817b), as it is mimesis of the happiest or most correct life, and if the symposium is the reproduction and the embodiment of the beauty of the laws, then sympotic literature and the constitutional genre are two faces, the first playful, the other serious, of the same *spoudaiogeloion* reality.

From a political and philosophical perspective, Xenophon's *Symposium* appears as a lively synthesis of different theoretical sympotic canons. One of its most representative features is, as we saw, *philophrosunê*. This feature should be interpreted not just in an ethical but also in a political perspective, since the symposium is characterized by mutual friendships between members of the same political group. As with Critias' symposium, Xenophon's moderate one aims at procreation and the genetic improvement of society, since its *aphrodisia* should be seen as a specific socio-political effect of the Spartan *syssition*

to which the *Laws* reflect Plato's resignation to the Athenian defeat after Mantinea, is very disputable, given the posthumous publication of the *Laws* and its extreme length, suggesting a long time of composition, parallel to that of the other Platonic dialogues. Moreover, even if the allusion to the Syracusans' victory over the Locresians in the first book has to be referred to the events of 356 BCE, this does not mean that Plato could not have used previous material, material that Xenophon could have known thanks to the practice of the oral public lectures. I think that the origin of the first two books of Plato's *Laws* has to be seen in that same political speculation about the best constitution proper of the first half of the fourth century, which is also the basis of Xenophon's *Symposium*.

51 For the theory of Plato's fear of the evolution of society, see Popper 1966, 71–73.

52 Xenophon's sympathy towards a moderate idea of democracy like that of Theramenes may be truly Socratic. This has been often pointed out, e.g., by Mazzarino 1965, 365–385; Bearzot 1978 and 1979; Gray 2011.

applied to the Athenian symposium. The Socratic value of Xenophon's reinterpretation must be seen in the importance it gives to the dialectical discussion around such high matters as love and politics, art and mimesis. This last aspect recalls the role that the Socratic circle and the *hetaireiai* had in Athens after the rise of the Thirty. The reinterpretation of the pedagogical institution of the *hetaireiai* or, better, of the Socratic *synousia*, is far from the tyrannical paradigm proposed by Critias and characterized as a mixture of Spartan and Athenian features. Such actualization of the Socratic experience may go back to the times immediately after Leuctra and the peace between Sparta and Athens. For this, the *Symposium's* Callias is in part to be thanked (*Hell.* 6.3.2), for it is to his circle that Eubulus belonged (Kirchner 1907, 876–877), who was responsible for the revocation of Xenophon's exile (DL 2.59). Considering the dramatic date of the *Symposium* (422 BCE), one year before the peace of Nicias (421), the ideological reconnection to the idea of a "common peace" (κοινή εἰρήνη) is possible (cf. Momigliano 1936). This, together with the possible dependence to Plato's *Laws*, which Xenophon could have known in the form of public lectures, could be another element for dating the composition of the *Symposium* to between 369 and 362. Moreover, the exaltation of the military power of Sparta seems to entail that the battle of Mantinea had not already taken place (*Symp.* 8.35, 39). The main purpose of the *Symposium* could therefore be a political one: to reorganize Athenian democracy through an educational reform against the Theban danger.

In the space that divides the literary ancient sympotic elegy from the Hellenistic thematic specialization in erotic sympotic epigrammatic poetry and the philosophical *symposion* genre, Xenophon's *Symposium* appears as a harmonic unity of political, social, and ethical material. It shows the Socratic method, according to Xenophon's reinterpretation, of delivering serious contents as those of the law, with the didactic of informality and mimesis of reality, and Xenophon's Socrates' political purpose of achieving a general improvement and emancipation of the civic body through an informal philosophical teaching. If the political aim will fade together with the autonomy of the *poleis*, the Socratic method of gathering *spoudê* and *paidia* for pedagogical purpose will become part of literary tradition thanks to Xenophon's commitment to the *spoudaiogeloion* genre.⁵³

53 I wish to thank Prof. Mario Lamagna (Università di Napoli Federico II) for his precious guidance in the preparation of this chapter.

References

- Ast, F. *Platons Leben und Schriften*. Leipzig 1816.
- Bandini, M. and L.-A. Dorion. *Xénophon: Mémoires*. Paris 2011.
- Battegazzore, A. 'Crizia', in: M. Unterteiner and A. Battegazzore, *Sofisti: testimonianze e frammenti*, IV. Florence 1967, 214–363.
- Bearzot, C. 'Callistrato e i moderati ateniesi', *Atti del Centro ricerche e documentazione sull'Antichità classica* 10 (1978), 7–27.
- Bearzot, C. 'Teramene tra storia e propaganda', *RIL* 113 (1979), 195–219.
- Bielohlawek, K. 'Gastmahls und Symposionslehren bei griechischen Dichtern (von Homer bis zur Theognissammlung und Kritias)', *WS* 58 (1940), 11–30.
- Böck, A. *Gesammelte Schriften*, IV. Leipzig 1866.
- Brancacci, A. 'Socrate, la musique et la danse: Aristophane, Xénophon, Platon', *EPh* 69.2 (2004), 193–211.
- Bultrighini, U. *Maledetta democrazia: Studi su Crizia*. Alessandria 1999.
- Bury, R.G. *The Symposium of Plato*. Cambridge 1909.
- Canfora, L. *Il mondo di Atene*. Bari 2013.
- Cornarius, I. *De conviviorum Graecorum ritibus, moribus ac sermonibus*. Basil 1546.
- Danzig, G. 'La prétendue rivalité entre Platon et Xénophon', *RFHIP* 16 (2002), 351–368.
- Danzig, G. 'Intra-Socratic polemics: the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon', *GRBS* 45 (2005), 331–357.
- Diehl, E. 'Kritias', in: *RE* IX/2 (1922), coll. 1901–1912.
- Döring, K. 'Hermogenes', *DNP* 5 (1996), 442.
- Dorion, L.-A. *L'autre Socrate: études sur les écrits socratiques de Xénophon*. Paris 2013.
- Dornseiff, F. 'Zeitbestimmung von Platons *Symposion* durch Xenophon', *Hermes* 77 (1942), 112.
- Dover, K.J. 'The date of Plato's *Symposium*', *Phronesis* 10 (1965), 2–20.
- Dušanić, S. 'Critias in the *Charmides*', *Aevum* 74 (2000), 53–63.
- Edmunds, L. *Cleon, Knights, and Aristophanes' Politics*. Lanham 1987.
- Fischer, J.L. *The case of Socrates*. Praha 1969.
- Flacelière, R. 'A propos du *Banquet* de Xénophon', *REG* 74 (1961), 93–118.
- Foucault, M. *L'usage des plaisirs*, in *Histoire de la Sexualité*. Paris 1984.
- Gallo, L. 'Colonizzazione, demografia e strutture di parentela', in: Ecole française de Rome, *Forme di contatto e processi di trasformazione nelle società antiche*. Roma 1983, 703–728.
- Garzya, A. 'Osservazioni sulla lingua di Crizia', *Emerita* 20 (1952), 402–412.
- Gemoll, W. 'Der Eros in *Symposien* Xenophons und Platons', *PhW* 54 (1934), 30–32.
- Gentili, B. *Poesia e pubblico nella Grecia antica*. Bari 1989.
- Giangrande, L. *The use of spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman literature*. The Hague 1972.

- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Gray, V.J. 'Xenophon's *Symposion*: the display of wisdom', *Hermes* 120 (1992), 58–75.
- Gray, V.J. *Oxford readings in classical studies: Xenophon*. Oxford 2010.
- Gray, V.J. 'Xenophon's Socrates and democracy', *Polis* 28 (2011), 1–32.
- Gunning, C.P. *De sophistis Graeciae praeceptoribus*, Amsterdam 1915.
- Halliwell, S. *Greek laughter: a study of cultural psychology from Homer to early Christianity*. Cambridge 2008.
- Hansen, M.H. *Eisangelia: the sovereignty of the people's court in Athens in the fourth century B.C. and the impeachment of generals and politicians*. Odense 1975.
- Hansen, M.H. 'Eisangelia in Athens: A Reply', *JHS* 100 (1980), 89–95.
- Henrichsen, A.J.F. *Dissertatio de consilio et arte convivii Xenophontei eiusque cum Platonico necessitudine*. Flensburg 1840.
- Henrichsen, A.J.F. *Epistola critica ad Car. Fr. Hermannum de consilio Convivii Xenophontei eiusque cum Platonico necessitudine*. Slesvici 1844.
- Hermann, K.F. *Prooem. Catal. Lectt. Univ. Marb. Hib.* Marburg 1834.
- Hermann, K.F. 'Zur Frage über das Zeitverhältniss der beiden Symposien', *Philologus* 8 (1853), 329–339.
- Hindley, C. 'Xenophon on male love', *CQ* 49 (1999), 74–99.
- Hug, A. 'Über das gegenseitige verhältniss der symposien des Xenophon und Plato', *Philologus* 7 (1852), 638–695.
- Hug, A. *Platons Symposion*. Leipzig 1876.
- Huss, B. 'The dancing Socrates and the laughing Xenophon, or the other *Symposium*', *AJPh* 120.3 (1999), 381–409.
- Huss, B. *Xenophons Symposion: ein Kommentar*. Leipzig 1999.
- Hornblower, S. *The Greek world, 479–323 B.C.* London 1983.
- Iannucci, A. *La parola e l'azione: i frammenti simposiali di Crizia*. Bologna 2002.
- Jaeger, W. *Paideia: the ideals of Greek culture*, I, tr. G. Highet. New York 1943.
- Judeich, W. 'Autolykos', in: *RE* 11/2 (1896), coll. 2601–2602.
- Judeich, W. 'Charmides', in: *RE* 111/2 (1899), coll. 2174–2175.
- Kirchner, J. 'Eubulos', in: *RE* VI/1 (1907), coll. 876–877.
- Köhler, P. *Über Die Politeia Lakedaimoniôn Xenophon's*. Berlin 1896.
- Körte, A. *Aufbau und Ziel von Xenophons Symposion*. Leipzig 1927.
- Lange, J.W. *Xenophontis Symposium*. Halle 1825.
- Lesses, G. 'Socratic friendship and Euthydemean goods', in Robinson and Brisson 2000, 349–357.
- Link, S. 'Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der spartanischen Krypteia', *Klio* 88 (2006), 34–43.
- Lombardo, M. 'Pratiche di commensalità e forme di organizzazione sociale nel mondo greco; symposia e syssitia', *ASNP* 18.2 (1988), 247–273.
- Mazzarino, S. *Il pensiero storico classico*, I. Bari 1965.

- Momigliano, A. 'Per la storia della pubblicistica sulla KOINE EIPENE nel IV secolo a.C.', *ASNP* ser. 2, 5 (1936), 97–123.
- Mosche, C.J.W. *Xenophon: Oekonomikus, Apologie des Socrates, Symposium und Hiero*. Frankfurt 1799.
- Mosconi, G. 'La democrazia ateniese e la "nuova" musica: l'Odeion di Pericle', in A.C. Cassio, D. Musti, and L.E. Rossi, *Synaulía. Musica greca e contatti mediterranei (Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli. Sez. filologico-letteraria. Quaderni, 5)*. Napoli 2000, 217–316.
- Mühlh, P. von der. 'Il Simposio greco', in: M. Vetta, *Poesia e simposio nella Grecia antica: Guida storica e critica*. Bari 1983.
- Murray, O. *Symptotica: A symposium on the Symposium*. Oxford 1990.
- Musti, D. *Demokratía: Origini di un'idea*. Bari 1995.
- Musti, D. *Il Simposio nel suo sviluppo storico*. Bari 2005.
- Nafissi, M. *La nascita del kosmos: Studi sulla storia e la società di Sparta*. Napoli 1991.
- Natorp, P. 'Antisthenes', in: *RE* II (1894), coll. 2538–2545.
- Noël, M.-P. 'Critobule dans les écrits socratiques de Xénophon: le portrait d'un mauvais élève', *Kentron* 31 (2015), 43–58.
- Ollier, F. *Xénophon: La République des Lacédémoniens*. Paris 1934.
- Ollier, F. *Xénophon: Banquet, Apologie de Socrate*. Paris 1961.
- Pangle, T.L. 'Socratic political philosophy in Xenophon's *Symposium*', *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (2010), 140–152.
- Pecorella Longo, C. *Eterie e gruppi politici nell'Atene del IV sec. a. C.* Firenze 1971.
- Pentassuglio, F. 'Duplice Afrodite, duplice Eros: un caso di intertestualità nei Simposi socratici', *Elenchos* 33.2 (2012), 335–356.
- Périllié, J.-L. 'Socrate, "homme érotique" (erôtikos anèr)?', *Kentron* 31 (2015), 91–126.
- Piccirilli, L. 'Due ricerche spartane. Alcuni luoghi comuni relativi agli spartani', *ASNP* 8.3 (1978), 936–947.
- Popper, K.R. *The open society and its enemies: the spell of Plato*, I. London 1945 (1966).
- Rapaport, A. 'Ad Xenophontis Conviv. I, 1', *Eos* 28 (1925), 134.
- Rapaport, A. 'Ad Xenophontis Convivium VIII 32', *Eos* 28 (1925), 49–50.
- Reinke, G. 'Nikeratos', in: *RE* VII/1 (1936), coll. 312–313.
- Rhodes, P.J. 'Eisangelia at Athens', *JHS* 99 (1979), 103–114.
- Robinson, T.M. and L. Brisson. *Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides: proceedings of the fifth Symposium Platonicum*. Sankt Augustin 2000.
- Romeri, L. 'Le Banquet de Xénophon et le Banquet de Platon: convergences et divergences', *Kentron* 31 (2015), 75–90.
- Rossetti, L. 'Il momento conviviale dell'eteria socratica e il suo significato pedagogico', *AncSoc* 7 (1976), 29–77.
- Sartori, F. *Le eterie nella vita politica ateniese del VI e V sec. a. C.* Roma 1957.
- Schneider, J.G. *Xenophontis Oeconomicvs, Convivium, Hiero, Agesilaos*. Leipzig 1805.

- Segoloni, L.M. *Socrate a banchetto: il Simposio di Platone e i Banchettanti di Aristofane*. Roma 1994.
- Stalley, R.F. 'Sôphrosunê in the *Charmides*', in Robinson and Brisson 2000, 265–277.
- Swoboda, H. 'Kallias', in: *RE* X/2 (1919), coll. 1618–1622.
- Talamo, C. 'Eterie e democrazia in Atene', in: A. d'Atena and E. Lanzillotta, *Dalla polis al dibattito costituzionale contemporaneo*. Roma 1998, 43–56.
- Thesleff, H. 'The interrelation and date of the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon', *BICS* 25 (1978), 157–170.
- Thesleff, H. 'Intertextual relations between Xenophon and Plato?', *Arctos* 36 (2002), 143–157.
- Thomsen, O. 'Socrates and love', *C&M* 52 (2001), 117–178.
- Tulli, M., 'Carmide fra poesia e ricerca', in Robinson and Brisson 2000, 259–264.
- Tuozzo, T.A. *Plato's Charmides: positive elenchus in a "Socratic" dialogue*. Cambridge 2011.
- Untertsteiner M. and A. Battagazzore. *I sofisti: testimonianze e frammenti*. Florence 1967.
- Vela Tejada, V. 'Why did Xenophon write a *Symposium*? *Erotica paideia* and *Logos Sokratikos*', *Historika* 1 (2011), 81–99.
- Vidal Naquet, P. *Il cacciatore nero*, tr. F. Sircana. Roma 1988.
- Weiske, B.G. *Xenophontis Atheniensis Scripta*, v. Leipzig 1799.
- Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, U. von. *Aristoteles und Athen*, 1–11. Berlin 1893.
- Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, U. von. *Platon: Sein Leben und seine Werke*. Berlin 1919.

Xenophon's *Hiero*: Hiding Socrates to Reform Tyranny

Federico Zuolo
University of Genova

1 Introduction

This chapter's title might raise some immediate objections: Why talk about Socrates in Xenophon's *Hiero* at all? Why should there be anything to say if in the *Hiero* there is no mention of Socrates in the dialogue? In this chapter I try to respond to these important questions, and to unravel some complicated issues concerning the dialogue's meaning, its possible goal, and its addressees. I hope that, in doing so, we may learn something about the relation between Socrates and Xenophon.

Leo Strauss has written that in this dialogue Simonides functions as Socrates, on the double grounds that he is called wise (*sophos*) from the dialogue's very start (*Hier.* 1.1) and that for Xenophon Socrates is the emblematic wise man.¹ Assuming provisionally the validity of this idea, we might formulate a new question: why does Xenophon employ Simonides instead of Socrates? More specifically, why does he employ Simonides to represent wisdom in a dialogue dealing with happiness, good life, and political rule?

I will deal with the possible presence of Socrates or Socratic themes in the *Hiero* without, like Strauss, simply assuming that Simonides serves as alter ego of Socrates rather than as an autonomous character. I shall contend that there are good grounds for hypothesizing that Xenophon is in fact somehow "hiding" Socrates. Yet the reason for this strategic move is not—as Strauss maintains—that Xenophon wants Simonides to substitute for Socrates. Rather, as I shall argue, Simonides and Hiero debate a set of issues and themes that Xenophon prefers not to link to the figure of Socrates, in order to propose a model of advising tyrants alternative to the Platonic one. My hypothesis is that Xenophon is trying to hide Socrates in a situation where a wise man advises a tyrant with remarkably realist—if not immoralistic—suggestions. Such political realism is at odds with the moralistic image of Socrates represented in the *Memorabilia* and other dialogues.

1 Translations from Marchant 1925; if not otherwise specified, I cite *Hiero* with chapter and paragraph.

To support this hypothesis, I deal first with the Socratic features of the *Hiero*; that is, with the dialogical structure of the argument. In the second section, I discuss Strauss' Socratic interpretation of the dialogue, and cast some doubts on his reasons for holding it. My response to Strauss ensues from an analysis of Simonides' teaching as presented in the *Hiero*, which is at odds with the issues usually discussed in Socratic dialogues. Then, I show how the critical discussion of the first part is resolved in the second part of the dialogue, where we find pieces of strategic advice about governing a city without renouncing tyranny. Finally, I offer up for reflection Xenophon's reasons for representing this situation with Simonides and Hiero rather than with Socrates. This analysis will shed light on the purpose of the dialogue. I suggest that the overall meaning of the dialogue consists in a model of tyrant-counseling that is meant to challenge the model of counseling represented by Plato.

2 A Socratic Critique of the Commonsensical View of Tyranny?

The *Hiero* is a dialogue in which the poet Simonides discusses with Hiero, the tyrant of Syracuse, the commonsensical opinion that the life of a tyrant is preferable to all other types of life. The main argument of the first part (chapters 1–6), put forward by Hiero himself, may be reconstructed in the following way.

p1 Main normative hypothesis: The most preferable life is the one in which a person is the happiest, in which he enjoys the most of what is good.

p2 Main sociological statement: People think that the tyrant is the happiest person because he can enjoy all that is good.

p3 General anthropological assessment: Human goods include goods deriving from pleasures of the body (sight, hearing, taste, and sex) and those deriving from the relation a person has with others (love and honor).

p4 Main question: Do tyrants have access to the enjoyment of these goods?

p5 Conclusion: No. As the tyrant cannot access the goods that make life good, he is not happy and his condition is the worst one.

In brief, the tyrant rebuts Simonides' commonsensical prejudices and claims that he cannot enjoy the goods of sight because he cannot visit other cities and theaters (1.11–13); he does not enjoy the goods of hearing because all the flattering words he hears are false and unreliable (1.14–17); he cannot take pleasure in food because he always fears poisoned meals (1.18–25); and the sexual intercourses he can have are not free (1.26–38). Even marriage and love with young men cannot be authentic (1.32–36).

In the context of the *Hiero*, nobody would deny the normative validity of the normative hypothesis (P₁), which is a sort of reformulation of the general Greek eudaimonistic perspective. Simonides and Hiero agree that P₂ is widely held by many people, but Hiero seeks to challenge such a belief. The purpose of the dialogue is precisely that of demonstrating the falsity of P₂. By showing the falsity of P₂ through the lens of P₁ and P₃, the answer to P₄ cannot but be in the negative P₅. The anthropological assumption P₃ is accepted by Hiero and Simonides, but its investigation is necessary to start the dialogic movement. Building on these considerations, let us give a closer look to the anthropological assumption P₃.

If the list of pleasures the tyrant cannot enjoy might easily be seen as a commonsensical one, it is not clear why it is precisely the order mentioned above that should be followed. The criterion of ordering is not, as Vivien Gray (2007, 108) holds, to be explained as one of increasing generality, namely starting from the pleasures concerning a part of the body, then passing over to the whole body, and finally to the pleasures of the soul and the body together. The meaning of this ordering should be seen instead as going from the most public and visible type of pleasures (sight) to the least public and more intimate of the bodily pleasures (sex), in a continuum of growing importance. But this concerns only the pleasures of the body, which are said to be “mere trifles” (2.1). According to Simonides, the tyrant fares much better than private citizens with respect to his belongings and what he can do and achieve. The criterion of ordering in this second set of alleged advantages of the tyrant with respect to the citizens may be that of a decreasing tangibility. Indeed, Simonides mentions possessions—such as houses, luxury ornaments, and horses—and deeds that the tyrant's command capacity lets him readily acquire (2.3). But, if these first types of goods are clearly visible and tangible, what is most important are the intangible ones, those deriving from others' consideration: recognition, honor, and love.

There are two reasons the tyrant can enjoy no kind of good, whether material or immaterial. First, any enjoyment is always threatened by the suspicion that citizens are trying to kill him. Second, all those pleasures dependent on other people—for example, sex or honors—can really please only when freely given,

and yet the tyrant has them only when he compels their provision. From these considerations it follows that, contrary to commonsensical expectations, the tyrant's life is the least preferable. He is impaired in his capacity to enjoy pleasures, as the most important of these goods (love and honor) cannot arise when his citizens lack freedom and equality.²

3 Rebutting Strauss' Interpretation

This argument may be called Socratic in that it puts into doubt a widely held belief—that tyrants are the happiest persons—by discussing its tenability through an analysis of its possible instances. This is not exactly, of course, a dialectical *elenchus*, because this refutation is not meant to unveil the error of a self-proclaimed possessor of knowledge (as it is the case in the Socratic *elenchus*). On the contrary, it is the possessor of knowledge himself, Hiero, who shows the falsity of the popular prejudice on tyranny.³ Moreover, neither Hiero nor Simonides play the role of Socrates.⁴ Accordingly, we must admit that the dialogue has only, so to say, a Socratic inspiration.⁵ However, the way in which we should understand such a Socratic feature is unclear and will be discussed in what follows.

Before analyzing the second part of the dialogue and discussing the proposals that Simonides puts forward to improve the condition of Hiero, we must address Leo Strauss's charge that we read the dialogue through the lens of Socratic discussion.⁶ Strauss thought that great thinkers, Plato and Xenophon included, should be read in an indirect, even oblique way, so that we might unveil the hidden assumptions and look behind the dialogue participants'

² See Hindley 1999, 95.

³ Dorion 2000, cxli–clxxix, has convincingly explained the almost total lack of Socratic refutations in the *Memorabilia* as Xenophon's commitment to portraying a more "positive" image of Socrates than Plato does.

⁴ It might be said, however, that it is Hiero who is more Socratic than Simonides, in virtue of his more forceful refusal of the commonsensical perspective and his uncompromising attitude towards his condition.

⁵ Gray 1986, 115, nicely summarizes this hunch and provides a further reason: "The identification of Simonides as a wise man who nevertheless seeks wisdom from others establishes his Socratic nature from the start." However, as it will become clearer in what follows, this does not imply that Simonides acts with Socratic irony. In a similar vein see also Morrison 2004, 187.

⁶ For a lucid reconstruction of Strauss's interpretation of Xenophon's Socratic reading, see Dorion 2010.

moments of reticence. That is particularly the case in discussions of power, and when one of the participants in the dialogue is a wise man. The wise man (be he a poet or a philosopher) poses, according to Strauss, a radical challenge to any person in charge. On the one hand, by being radically different, the philosopher, whose most important representative is Socrates, is feared by the person in power because he proposes a distinct alternative to those who hold the power that puts the legitimacy of his political order into question. On the other hand, the wise man knows that he cannot be accepted by power since the holders of power are suspicious of him. Therefore, Strauss concludes, both speakers must be insincere with one another.

This is the general framework that Strauss employs in his analysis of a range of dialogues. It is also the structure of his interpretation of the *Hiero*. Strauss thinks that Simonides and Hiero are insincere in several ways and for several reasons. First, Hiero exaggerates his unhappy condition. According to Strauss, he does this to make his power seem less appealing, so as to dissuade Simonides from seizing his power. Second, Simonides, for his own part, pretends to follow the ordinary people in thinking that the tyrant lives the most fortunate type of life, able to do what he wants and to satisfy all his desires. This dissimulation works as a sort of maieutic strategy to stimulate Hiero's self-examination and his eventual self-declared desperation. Hiero's admission of unhappiness is more convincing than the same assertion by anybody else, for example the poet. This conviction would make the tyrant readier to accept Simonides's advice to moderate his tyranny. Although I think that Strauss' specific thesis is wrong, I believe that his suggestion that we read the *Hiero* in an indirect way is fruitful and worthwhile.

Strauss believes that Simonides is, as representative of the wise man, the dialogic alter ego of Socrates.⁷ The fact that Simonides is defined as a wise man should not, however, be overestimated. There is only one passage in the entire dialogue in which Simonides is defined as *sophos* (1.1). In 2.5 it is said that Simonides holds *gnomê*, a traditional form of wisdom. These passages lend support to the idea that Simonides does know something. But what he knows is unclear. And even if we conceded that Simonides and Socrates were at the same epistemic level, Simonides would not stand out as particularly wise, for he still lacks Socrates' moral dimension, the beliefs about virtue and autonomy that characterize Xenophon's Socrates.

In a Straussian vein, one might argue that Simonides is hiding his wisdom. This seems the case when Simonides gives voice to the commonsense view and

7 See Strauss 1968, 68.

proclaims that Hiero's avowal of an infelicitous condition is "incredible" (1.9). From this passage onwards, Hiero endeavors to show that all commonsensical opinions err when judging the tyrant's condition. That Simonides voices the commonsensical point of view is also shown in his insistence in asking how it could be true that tyrants are so unhappy if all the persons envy tyrants (1.9).⁸

Let us now evaluate the reasons Strauss has for assuming the insincerity of both interlocutors. First, it is not clear why the tyrant should fear the poet as a possible competitor over the supreme power. Why should Hiero fear Simonides? This question is harder to answer when we remember that Simonides could not have been in any sense a possible political competitor. He used to move from place to place, lacked an army or guards capable of seizing power, and was very old. Finally, Simonides was already a trusted advisor at Hiero's court. Together these facts put Hiero's supposed fear at odds with what the readers should expect of the two speakers.⁹

If Simonides in fact represented Socrates and thereby the universal figure of the wise man, as Strauss thinks, Hiero would have had even fewer reasons to fear him. Indeed, as Xenophon tried to demonstrate, Socrates did not directly threaten any political system, for he was a loyal and law-abiding citizen. Even if we were to admit that Simonides hides at first his wisdom and reveals it in the second part of the dialogue, this is not necessarily meant to show to the tyrant his superiority and thus to win dialogically.

More generally, later Hiero says that the fact that

the multitude should be deceived by tyrannical power surprises me not at all, since the mob seems to guess wholly by appearances that one man is happy, another miserable. Tyranny flaunts its seeming precious treasures outspread before the gaze of the world: but its troubles it keeps concealed in the heart of the despot, in the place where human happiness

8 Envy for a tyrant's life is a typical theme of popular perception and representation of tyranny. As Periander's daughter maintains when talking to her brother Lycophron, tyranny "is a slippery thing; many want it" (Hdt. 3.53). Furthermore, envy for tyrant's life is not only common sense; it is to be found in sophistic strands, as we see in Polus' remarks in Plato's *Gorgias*: "Ha! I suppose you wouldn't choose to have the liberty to do what you think fit in the city, rather than to lack it, Socrates, and you aren't envious whenever you see that someone has killed or expropriated or imprisoned anyone he thought fit!" (Pl. *Grg.* 468e6–8). In Simonides' statement the traditional motive and the sophistic one are merged into a common voice.

9 Although such historical details are not completely certain, we must assume that Xenophon was committed to representing a dialogical situation that could have been credible for a contemporary reader familiar with many more first-hand details than us.

and unhappiness are stored away. That this escapes the observation of the multitude I say, I am not surprised. But what does seem surprising to me is that men like you, whose intelligence is supposed to give you a clearer view of most things than your eyes, should be equally blind to it.¹⁰

XEN. *Hiero* 2.3–5

In this passage Hiero's harsh remark against Simonides' naïveté would seem to support Strauss' thesis. But this is the case only if we take Simonides to be the alter ego of Socrates, who, in Strauss' view, is the full representation of wisdom; and yet Simonides does not seem epistemically superior to Hiero. Indeed, Hiero has experienced that of which he speaks, and can compare his life as a tyrant with his life as a private citizen. After all, in a number of passages experience is said by Hiero and Simonides to be the most important ingredient in judging the truth of the issue under consideration (1.2, 1.10, 2.5–6). It is Hiero and not Simonides, indeed, who refutes the commonsensical opinion about tyranny, appealing to his experience as both private man and tyrant. We might still suppose that Simonides' allegedly insincere naïveté has a sort of maieutic effect in leading Hiero to unveil his condition by himself. There is a Socratic procedure of unveiling the falsity of a prejudice, but the critique is carried out by the interested person himself, not by an alleged alter ego of Socrates.

To conclude this section, we can say that the first part of the dialogue provides us with elements that cast doubts on Strauss' interpretation. But it is in the second part of the dialogue that we can find more robust reasons to reject the idea that Simonides is the alter ego of Socrates.

4 The Content of the Poet's Teaching between Realism and Moralism

Let us now turn to the second part of the dialogue. I will show that the politically realist content of this second part provides the main reason for excluding Socrates from the dialogue.¹¹ Xenophon could not have his Socrates advise Hiero to pursue policies aiming away from the common good and meant to solve only the tyrant's existential troubles.¹²

10 I substitute "despotic" and "despotism" given by Marchant's translation with "tyrannical" and "tyranny."

11 Schorn 2008 casts similar doubts, noticing the absence of moral content in the second part of the dialogue.

12 Aalders 1953, 213: "It [the *Hiero*] is the only dialogue he [sc. Xenophon] wrote without

According to Simonides, a good tyrant should try to eliminate the reasons for which the people hate him, and increase the reasons for which they love him. In other words, the tyrant should endeavor to improve both his image and the quality of life of citizens. This double move can change the outward look of the tyrant, deploying both deception and real efforts at advancing the common good.

One of the first measures to improve the tyrant's image is to "delegate to others the task of punishing those who require to be coerced, and to reserve to himself the privilege of awarding the prizes" (9.3). These strategies belong properly to the realistic approach to politics.¹³ Another reason for people's distress and hatred of tyrants is that tyrants are always surrounded by bodyguards. The solution to this is not getting rid of the guards but using them for the maintenance of public order, and thereby improving both the tyrant's image and the condition of the *polis*. Even further, the tyrant should set up a system of prizes to reward all those persons who have most benefited the *polis*, starting with agricultural production. This policy would stimulate a competition productive of the common good, including trade gains and improved martial behavior (9.7–9). Finally, the private wealth of the tyrant should be used for public purposes (11.2–4).

The suggestion that the tyrant promote competition (*philonikia*) among citizens is thought by Simonides (and probably by Xenophon) to be capable of fostering good attitudes and contributing to the common good. However, it is also devised as a way to channel potentially dangerous appetites out of the competition for power. It is not clear what is more important: fostering the common good or pursuing the tyrant's interest. Whichever it is, it is remarkable that there is always this double perspective, showing no moral grounding for the transformation of tyranny, but only a set of well-devised interests. This is made especially clear when we contrast the *Hiero* with, for example, Isocrates' *To Nicocles* and *Evagoras*, which deploy moralistic admo-

introducing the person of Socrates. The reason seems obvious. Object and aim of the dialogue will have been felt by the author as un-Socratic: the conversion of a tyrant into a king would have been for Socrates a moral conversion, even if the result were loss of power or, eventually, of life—and the latter possibility is exactly what will not be taken into consideration in the *Hiero*; the conversion there is not so much an inner, moral conversion as a conversion in manners and behavior, in tactics, in order to preserve the absolute power of the ruler."

- 13 A proof of this is that Machiavelli follows Xenophon directly in suggesting the same strategy for his Prince. Machiavelli 1988, ch. xix, 63, 66.

nitions meant to convince the tyrant to pursue the common good and practice a virtuous life. The *Hiero* aims instead to show the tyrant how he should enjoy his goods, lead a better life, and not fear the suspicion the private citizens.

This is striking if seen through the lens of a Socratic perspective. None of these suggestions could remedy the situation of deep human despair in which the tyrant, from Socrates' perspective, finds himself. They should be seen as amounting to a set of palliative measures rather than real remedies. Even were Hiero to follow all Simonides' suggestions, he would still remain a tyrant, albeit an appreciated one, and Hiero would perhaps become more trustful of citizens, but he would still be an excessive and competitive character: in a word, a tyrant and not a virtuous person.¹⁴

It might be useful to compare the perspective on the ruler provided in the *Hiero* with what Xenophon says in the other two works treating the model of the ruler. In the *Cyropaedia* the perspective is rather idealized: as a model of leadership Cyrus is excellent in all his practical capacities as well as moral virtues. In the *Oeconomicus* the emphasis is placed on the technical capacities of the "estate manager" discussed in the dialogue. In the *Hiero*, by contrast, such an idealized standard is absent and the positive message lies in the mere transformation of a harsh tyranny into a moderate one, in which the tyrant is supported by the citizens' consent.¹⁵ This comparison emphasizes the fact that Simonides' advice is not meant to foster a change in Hiero's moral character. Even when Simonides employs a moralistic tone, his suggestions aim at putting into practice deeds and attitudes that benefit both the tyrant and the city. Indeed, Simonides seems to employ a very rhetorical tone:

Take heart then, Hiero; enrich your friends, for so you will enrich yourself.
Exalt the state, for so you will deck yourself with power. Get her allies

14 For this reason, Zimmermann 1992, 235, is at error in including Hiero in the list of Xenophon's idealized chiefs: Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Ischomachus. These latter, indeed, have the most important philosophical and Socratic virtues, such as *enkrateia*, *sôphrosunê*, and *dikaïosunê*.

15 Newell 1983, 890–891: "At the heart of Xenophon's political thought is what we may term an experimental project for reforming tyranny into a tacit extra category—rule over willing subjects *without* law. This project is outlined in the *Hiero* and the *Oeconomicus*." On the *Oeconomicus* and the possible parallels between Socrates and Ischomachus, see Dorion (in this volume).

[for so you will win supporters for yourself]. Account the fatherland your estate, the citizens your comrades, friends your own children, your sons possessions dear as life. And try to surpass all these in deeds of kindness. For if you out-do your friends in kindness, it is certain that your enemies will not be able to resist you.

XEN. *Hiero* 9.13–15

Even in this last passage the motivation is based on the tyrant's need for a real enjoyment of this goods (including authentic relations), not on an intrinsic motivation towards virtue.

The ambiguity in the moral standing of a tyrant is interestingly represented by Aristotle's discussion of tyranny, which includes considerations that are in many respects similar to the second part of the *Hiero*. Aristotle singles out three strategies with which a tyrant can defend his power. First, he should put in place a sort of ruthless *Realpolitik*. "For one might reduce all things characteristic of tyranny to these presuppositions—that they not trust one another, that they not be capable, that they have modest thoughts" (Arist. *Pol.* 5, 1314a27–29). Second, the tyrant should improve his image by trying to appear to the ruled not as a tyrant but as a king or a good manager (1315b), by being moderate and discrete (1314b35), and by taking care of the embellishment of the city (1315a). Third, the tyrant will have to pursue policies capable of getting tyranny closer to kingship, without changing, however, the nature of the political system (1314a33–37).

Although Xenophon and Aristotle adopt diverse perspectives (a first person standpoint by Xenophon, a scientific impersonal one by Aristotle), they share a final ambiguity about the way tyranny should be considered from a moral perspective. If a tyrant were to follow good advice, for Aristotle he would remain a tyrant because of the lack of legitimacy, whereas for Xenophon he would remain a tyrant because, irrespective of formal legitimacy, his moral personality would be the same.

5 Conclusion: The Anti-Platonic Activity of Advising Tyrants

We have seen the logical structure of the dialogue and the possible Socratic elements. We have yet to understand, however, Xenophon's actual purposes and the addressee(s) and critical targets he had in mind. We can at least indicate a plausible range of responses. First, the Sicilian setting should be taken seriously. The possible addressee is likely to be Sicilian, for the dialogue lacks almost any hints at an Athenian political context. Second, I follow the mainstream view

dating the dialogue to the end of Xenophon's life.¹⁶ Besides the references to slaughters in the families of tyrants between 370 and 358 (hinted at in 3.8), there are other content-based considerations. It is commonly held that *Hiero* should be read jointly with the *Cyropaedia* and the *Oeconomicus*, for it includes topics discussed in such a late work as *Poroi*. Third, the characters of the dialogue are famous but ambiguous, in that Hiero was remembered both as a tyrant funding the arts and as a very distrustful tyrant (*Pol.* 5, 1313b11–15), and Simonides was remembered as a wise man but also as a mercenary poet (*Ar. Rh.* 1391a8–11).¹⁷ Such famous but not completely positive figures could be used to give voice to difficult discourses, such as the criticism of tyranny made by the tyrant himself, and the politically realist counseling by the poet. Finally, it is worth making some remarks about the relation between Hiero and Simonides. Traditional accounts report the anecdote according to which Simonides acted as mediator in a conflict between Hiero and Theron of Acragas.¹⁸ Although this anecdotal tradition may not rely on historical truth, it seems plausible that Simonides counseled Hiero.

These considerations may suggest to us that the dialogue should be seen as an indirect reply to Plato's treatment of tyranny in the *Republic* 8–9.¹⁹ What would Xenophon's personal motivation have been for challenging Plato's view by writing this dialogue? It is likely that Xenophon could have found disturbing such a harsh and apparently irredeemable condition of the tyrant outlined in Book 9. As we know, Xenophon has always been fascinated by individual leadership (Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus), and the *Hiero* could be seen as a way to provide guidance to a potential tyrant (like Dion) or actual ones. The practical advantage of the dialogue is that of providing personal reasons for not following certain tyrannical policies and attitudes. If in *Cyropaedia* it is held that human beings enthusiastically accept a ruler only to the extent that their interest is to do so (*Cyr.* 1.6.21), we could easily suppose that Xenophon wants to convince rulers that it is in their interest to put in place at least certain policies pursuing the common good.

To complete this reconstruction, we may, finally, ask why Xenophon has chosen Simonides to play this role. Simonides is chosen because he is a plausible

16 There are two hypotheses on the date of composition of the dialogue. According to Hatzfeld 1946–1947 and Delebecque 1957 it was composed in 358 BCE; according to Aalders 1953, in 355 BCE.

17 A more complete account of these considerations can be found in Zuolo 2012, esp. 89–93.

18 See Drachmann 1997, 69, *Scholium ad Olimpica* 2.29c. On this anecdote see in general Molyneux 1992, 224–233.

19 This has been suggested by Gaile-Irbe 2013.

counterpart to Hiero, who is himself a tyrant suitable for his role. Indeed, in making his dialogue on tyranny plausible, Xenophon needs two well-known characters (such as Simonides and Hiero), of a sufficiently distant past (so as not to be so closely linked to contemporary persons as to make the attribution of certain discourses implausible), whose encounter is credible (Simonides actually was at Hiero's court, and seems to have also acted as advisor of Hiero in some situations), and who lived in a politically relevant region as Sicily.

If this reconstruction holds, we could conclude that Xenophon, although representing a partially Socratic structure of the dialogue (in the first critical part), could not include Socrates in the dialogue because the content of the counseling of the second part would have contradicted the usual Socratic principles. Xenophon hid Socrates to propose a way of advising tyrants that could compete with that of the most famous Socratic pupil.

References

- Aalders, G.J.D. 'Date and intention of Xenophon's *Hiero*', *Mnemosyne* 6 (1953), 208–215.
- Delebecque, E. *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon*. Paris 1957.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Introduction', in: L.-A. Dorion, *Xénophon: Mémorables*. Paris, 2000.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The Straussian exegesis of Xenophon', in: V.J. Gray, *Xenophon*. Oxford 2010, 283–323.
- Drachmann, A.B. *Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina*. Stuttgart 1997.
- Gaile-Irbe, A. 'Xénophon, lecteurs de Platon: le *Hiéron* ou sur la tyrannie comme une réponse au portrait du tyran dans la *République*', in: F. de Luise and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 93–105.
- Gray, V.J. 'Xenophon's *Hiero* and the meeting of the wise man and tyrant in Greek Literature', *CQ* 36 (1986), 115–123.
- Gray, V.J. *Xenophon: on government*. Cambridge 2007.
- Herodotus. *Herodotus* tr. A.D. Godley. London 1966.
- Hatzfeld, J. 'Note sur la date et l'objet du *Hiéron*', *REG* 59 (1947), 54–70.
- Hindley, C. 'Xenophon on male love', *CQ* 49 (1999), 74–99.
- Irwin, T. *Plato: Gorgias*. Oxford 1989.
- Lord, C. *Aristotle: Politics*. Chicago 1984.
- Machiavelli, N. *The Prince*. Cambridge 1988.
- Marchant, E.C. *Xenophon in seven volumes*. London 1925.
- Molinyneux, J.H. *Simonides: a historical study*. Wauconda, IL 1992.
- Morrison, D. 'Tyrannie et royauté selon le Socrate de Xénophon', *EPh* 2 (2004), 177–192.

- Newell, W.R., 'Tyranny and the science of ruling in Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*', *Journal of Politics* 45 (1983), 889–906.
- Schorn, S. 'Die Vorstellung des xenophontischen Sokrates von Herrschaft und das Erziehungsprogramm des *Hieron*', in: L. Rossetti and A. Stavru, *Socratica 2005: Studi sulla letteratura socratica antica presentati alle Giornate di studio di Senigallia*. Bari 2008, 177–203.
- Strauss, L. *On tyranny: an interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero*. Glencoe, IL 1968.
- Zimmermann, B. 'Macht und Charakter: Theorie und Praxis von Herrschaft bei Xenophon', *Prometheus* 18 (1992), 231–244.
- Zuolo, F. *Senofonte: Ierone o della tirannide*. Roma 2012.

Xenophon's Philosophical Approach to Writing: Socratic Elements in the Non-Socratic Works

Noreen Humble
University of Calgary

καὶ Σωκράτην ζηλώσας ἀκριβῶς
DL 2.56

and he emulated Socrates precisely¹

∴

1 Introduction

In the Renaissance, when both Plato's and Xenophon's writings were being rediscovered by the Western tradition, Xenophon's new readers almost invariably designated him *Socraticus*, no matter which of his works was under discussion. Henri Estienne ([Henricus Stephanus], 1531–1598), for example, who edited and printed a Greek edition of all of Xenophon's works in 1561, is no exception.

Estienne, however, unlike most of his contemporaries, did spend some time in his prefatory material contemplating how to label Xenophon. The issue arose naturally from his desire to justify his arrangement of Xenophon's works: historical works first, followed by philosophic works (dialogues featuring Socrates) and the other "little books." It also arose, however, from the fact that he himself had observed that the ancients had difficulty finding one label for Xenophon. Lucian, for example, in one place called him a philosopher, in another a historian.² Estienne's consideration of this problem leads only to reinforcement of the contemporary point of view:

¹ All translations are my own.

² Estienne is referring here to pseudo-Lucian *Macrobii* 21 and Lucian *Verae historiae* 39.

Should it be (to speak first about the first things) that we will number him among the historians because of his historical writings? Or rather because of his philosophical works shall we place him in the album of the philosophers? Indeed not even his history of the education of Cyrus is unphilosophical but in this he philosophizes in such a way that he, as it were, covers his philosophy in the wrappings of history. I am talking about moral philosophy, however. But how would he have been able to conceal it in such a way that it did not appear obvious to us, when not even he himself after that fine metamorphosis (by which he transformed himself from the clothes of a philosopher into the clothes of a commander and left the camp of philosophy for the camp of Cyrus) could not avoid the mask of the philosopher or certainly the nature of the philosopher being recognized in him?³

That Xenophon's philosophizing is obvious throughout his works whatever generic or rhetorical garb he clothes them in (to redirect Estienne's metaphor) was a common idea in an age that valued moral philosophizing and which frequently appropriated Socrates as a model of this.⁴

By contrast, the following view, in the introduction of a recent edition of the *Apologia Socratis* and *Memorabilia* (Book 1), typifies the way Xenophon has been regarded over the past 200 years:

Xenophon lacked the literary charm and acute philosophical mind of Plato ... [He was a] home-spun philosopher, prone to excessive hero-worshipping.⁵

Thus, even when Xenophon is accorded philosophical credentials in modern scholarship—and this is indeed not always the case⁶—he is usually not taken very seriously.

Whatever type of philosophy we are meant to understand Xenophon as practicing, what does it mean to call him a Socratic? Is the label applied simply because he wrote some Socratic dialogues, or is there more to it than this? Is he or is he not a thinker with a recognizable allegiance to an admittedly difficult-to-define Socratic school of thought?

3 For the Latin text see Kecskeméti et al. 2003, 70.

4 See Hankins 2006 for a brief survey of the reception of Socrates in the fifteenth century.

5 Macleod 2008, 1. See Dorion 2006, 93–94 for a brief assessment of the origins of this view.

6 Denying Xenophon philosophical status: see, e.g., Cooper 1999, 10; Patzer 1999; Brickhouse and Smith 2000, esp. 38.

Modern scholars have tended to approach this question in one of two ways. The more common has been to compare Xenophon's Socratic works with those of Plato. This method has almost invariably resulted in a negative assessment of Xenophon as a serious thinker who at best was only on the outer fringes of the circle around Socrates.⁷ The other has been to focus on Xenophon's Socratic works in their own right.⁸ While this latter is certainly more positive overall, it can tend, paradoxically, to skirt the issue of what is or is not Socratic about these works, or at least comes up with something which, if it is not Socratic-Socratic, might more aptly be described as Xenophontic-Socratic.⁹ In this short essay I want to try a third approach.

First, treating Xenophon's corpus as a whole rather than splitting it into Socratic (*Memorabilia*, *Apologia Socratis*, *Symposium*, *Oeconomicus*) and non-Socratic parts is crucial.¹⁰ Recent scholarship has, indeed, shown much greater receptivity towards such inclusiveness, particularly when examining important concepts such as grace, disorder, and freedom in Xenophon's thought.¹¹ More problematic but equally important is to ask questions about the broader, albeit shadowy, context in which these works were written. Who, for example, was Xenophon writing for? What was the purpose of his literary endeavors? Further, if we are looking for what is particularly Socratic about Xenophon's thought and writing, it seems counterproductive to ignore the works of other Socratics, and thus I am inclined here still to follow the view that the Socrates of all the different Socratic dialogues is anchored in an historical figure who had a distinctive way of thinking, however much literary embellishment is applied and however much each Socratic developed different elements of Socrates' character for his own purposes.¹² There are simply too many points of similarity

7 Kahn 1996 is a particularly good example of this approach.

8 Dorion's body of scholarship exemplifies this approach. See his survey (2003a, xcix–cxviii) on the rehabilitation of Xenophon's Socratic works over the past century.

9 Dorion (2006 and 2011) tends in this direction.

10 In general collections of articles on Xenophon still do not fully cross this divide: e.g., Narcy and Tordesillas 2008 focuses mainly on the *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus*, whereas non-Socratic works dominate in Tuplin 2004. Hobden and Tuplin 2012 moves further towards inclusiveness, and though non-Socratic works still dominate, the section on Socrates in their introduction (20–39) may help spur more cross-fertilization.

11 Azoulay 2004, Pontier 2006, and Tamiolaki 2010 respectively. See also Schorn 2012 who argues for a close integration of the *De vectigalibus* with some of Xenophon's Socratic and non-Socratic works.

12 See, among others, Morrison 1994, the work of Rossetti in general (the collection of essays in 2011 provides a good overview), and Johnson (in this volume).

on doctrinal matters and methodology between the Socrates of both Plato and Xenophon to overlook.¹³

What follows, therefore, will be an examination of Xenophon's non-Socratic works from six different angles. The first three of these are concerned with aspects of methodology: the rhetoric of philosophical inquiry, the use of dialectic, and the adaptation of the medium to the intended audience. The last three treat core educative themes and principles that are manifestly key elements of the Socrates depicted by both Plato and Xenophon: an interest in leadership and education, self-examination, and being useful. The principles and methodology are, to be sure, general in nature. The survey below, however, will show how Xenophon in his non-Socratic works tried to put into practice lessons and principles he learned from Socrates, not just about how to live his own life but also about how to persuade and teach others—a picture of Xenophon much closer to that of Renaissance humanists than to that sketched out by some modern scholars.

2 The Rhetoric of Philosophical Inquiry

[Socrates to Critobulus] For observing well (καταμαθών) once that from the same deeds some men were very poor, while others were very rich, I was full of wonder (ἀπεθαύμασα), and whatever this might be seemed to me to be worthy of consideration (ἔδοξε μοι ἄξιον εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως). And upon considering I discovered (καὶ εὗρον ἐπισκοπῶν) that these things came about very naturally.

Oec. 2.17–18

It is a commonplace about philosophic inquiry that it stems from a sense of wonder. In the *Theaetetus* Plato has Socrates say: “this feeling, wondering (τὸ θαυμάζειν), belongs to a philosopher; for there is no other beginning of philosophy than this” (155d),¹⁴ and throughout their dialogues both Plato and Xenophon have Socrates employing the term θαυμάζω in this way.¹⁵ The quotation above from the *Oeconomicus* has Socrates in fact describing succinctly

13 See, e.g., Seel 2006 who finds in the *Memorabilia* the ideas of the “true Socrates” (by which he means the Platonic Socrates) “under the layers of his [Xenophon’s] false portrait.” For a more positive approach see Waterfield 2004, 86–93. Consider also Danzig 2010 on Plato’s and Xenophon’s similar apologetic aim.

14 The principle is echoed in Arist. *Metaph.* A.2, 982b10–15.

15 It is used to introduce or redirect a line of thought or to present something paradoxical

the whole philosophic process: observation leading to wonder, followed by consideration leading to discovery.

Xenophon in his own voice employs this very rhetoric at the opening of his *Memorabilia*,¹⁶ as well as at the openings of several of his non-Socratic works. For example, the *Cyropaedia* quite clearly follows the pattern. Xenophon reports that he had a thought that constitutions were always being overthrown (1.1.1). After considering this from a number of angles he came to the conclusion that men were remarkably difficult to rule (1.1.2). This thought led him to reflect further that Cyrus seemed to have been remarkably successful at ruling men (1.1.3–5). This paradox, in turn, led him to wonder at Cyrus (1.1.6). The rest of the work presents his further consideration and discovery about how this came to be. In the *Spartan Constitution*, Xenophon reflects on and wonders at another paradox, how such a thinly-populated state gained such great renown. This leads him to a consideration of Spartan institutions, and what he discovers in this case actually causes him to cease to wonder (*Lac.* 1.1–2). The *De vectigalibus* too, though lacking the element of wonder, opens with examination and reflection upon a paradox (*Vect.* 1.1–2). The verbal similarities have not gone unnoticed, but what they signal—that what follows should be understood as philosophical inquiry—has not, I think, been fully appreciated.¹⁷ The radically different literary forms Xenophon uses in his non-Socratic works do not immediately suggest that they have some similarity of purpose. His deliberate use of this rhetoric signals, however, that he is approaching all this material from a philosophical angle, using a framework of inquiry that he acquired from Socrates.

for further exploration: e.g., Pl. *Phd.* 62a, *Chrm.* 164a, *Euthyd.* 273d, *Grg.* 456a, *Resp.* 348e, 584e–585a; Xen. *Ap.* 11, 21; *Mem.* 2.3.2, 3.7.8, 4.2.6. See further Humble 2014.

16 The first two words are *πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα* (“Often I wondered”) (*Mem.* 1.1.1).

17 It is true that the concept of wondering as “a stimulant of deeper reflection” has a much broader pedigree: e.g., Baragwanath 2012, 631–633 argues for a strong Herodotean influence on Xenophon in this regard. There can be no doubt that Xenophon was influenced by Herodotus on a number of fronts, but there are many different layers to and levels of wonderment. It is one thing to record and ponder upon wonders and another to engage in philosophical inquiry in order to explain and even dispel wonder. It is not just the fact that at significant points in Xenophon’s corpus observation, usually of something paradoxical, elicits wonder that is in turn followed by consideration and understanding, but also the fact that Xenophon (and Plato) has Socrates employ this sort of rhetoric, that distinguishes the Xenophontic from the Herodotean usage in these instances.

3 Dialectic

Can it be, Ischomachus, that asking questions is teaching?

Oec. 19.15

For the Socrates of the *Sôkratikoî Logoi* dialectic is the fundamental method of philosophical inquiry. That he engages in dialectic in Plato's works more often to break down his interlocutors' pretensions than to build up and transmit his own views (as he seems more often to do in Xenophon's) is an important distinction, but the basic fact remains that dialectic, elenctic or otherwise, is characteristic of Socrates' method.¹⁸

Xenophon, likewise, employs dialectic across his corpus in experimental ways. So, for example, whereas Socrates is always in the driver's seat in conversations in the *Memorabilia*, he is not so in the *Oeconomicus*. In the inner portion of that work Xenophon in fact gives the dominant role in the conversation to Ischomachus, and indeed has Ischomachus make use of common dialectical techniques that elsewhere he (and more particularly Plato) has Socrates use (e.g., hypothesis, analogies, maieusis) and that results in Socrates' playful and ironic comment quoted above. In the *Hiero*, as in Plato's *Laws*, Socrates makes no appearance, and the two interlocutors, Hiero and Simonides, are each given a turn at driving the questioning.¹⁹ The choice of an epinician poet, whose very livelihood depended on his ability to convince tyrants to employ him, to argue ways in which a tyrant might become more beloved, is not an accident,²⁰ and the aporetic ending highlights the applicability of the dialogic form for philosophical inquiry in the sense that it encourages the active engagement of the audience to continue the dialogue about the issues raised.²¹

18 Most discussions of Xenophon's use of dialectic focus on the *Memorabilia*: e.g., Johnson 2005b and Gourinat 2008. Gera 1993, 27–44, likewise starts from the *Memorabilia* but ranges further across Xenophon's other Socratic works and, of course, the *Cyropaedia*. For useful expositions of approaches to understanding Plato's use of dialectic that in turn provide helpful ways for analyzing Xenophon's use, see Gill 2002, esp. 150, and Rowe 2007, 7–15. Rossetti 2004, 89 tends towards viewing *elenchus* as closer to the approach of the real Socrates, and argues that there are more examples of *elenchus* in Xenophon than meet the eye. See also Rossetti 2008.

19 See Gera 1993, 44–47.

20 Thus I would argue, contra Gray 2007, 34, that Simonides is meant to be understood as a specific individual rather than as a generic wise man. See further n. 27 below.

21 Gill 2002, 148, argues for this in respect of Plato's dialogues. Rossetti 2004, 86, argues that a hermeneutical approach was characteristic of *Sôkratikoî Logoi* in general.

Xenophon, no less than Plato, understands the limitations of writing.²² And while he does not restrict himself to the use of dialectic in order to encourage active, thoughtful reading,²³ he does not abandon its didactic power completely in his narrative works, though its application is complex and often involves cross-fertilization with other generic forms. See, for example, the complex dialogue between Cyrus and Cambyses early in the *Cyropaedia* (1.6), in which Cambyses employs a number of Socrates' dialectic approaches, including *elenchus*.²⁴ While the dialogue has its natural place in the context of the early life of Cyrus, it also discusses many issues that Xenophon presents Socrates taking up with various figures in the *Memorabilia*. This rehashing of topics of importance (dealing with the gods, how to rule men, etc.) is a feature of Xenophon's work that has long been observed (usually to his detriment). The point, however, is that engaging in dialectic on the same issues in entirely different settings with different interlocutors allows for different angles to be examined. This approach is also found in Plato's dialogues, and thus potentially represents a key aspect of Socrates' method.²⁵

A dialectical approach is also employed in a novel (even if, some may judge, in a not entirely successful) way in the *Spartan Constitution*. Along with signaling at the start that he has subjected the nature of Spartan power and renown to philosophical analysis, Xenophon frequently interrupts the narrative by posing questions or by anticipating objections or questions from imaginary interlocutors. In this way he recreates his own dialectical process and at the same time more ably encourages his audience to engage actively with the subject under discussion.²⁶

22 Johnson 2005b, 50–54.

23 That he had plenty of other literary strategies to accomplish this goal is apparent. On competing synchronic narrative strands, see Bradley 2001; on structuring the narrative so that his choices of events “speak for themselves,” see Tuplin 1993, 77. Cf. Johnson 2005a, esp. 204: “Xenophon recognized, following Socrates, that his audience would best learn lessons by having to think them through for themselves.”

24 Gera 1993, 50–72, provides an insightful analysis. Even more complicated are the dialogues concerning the Armenian sophist (*Cyr.* 3.1.14–31, 38–40).

25 Again Gill's (2002, 156–161) analysis of Plato's use of the dialogic form is instructive, particularly his emphasis that each dialectical encounter be viewed on its own terms. Thus further exploration is needed not just of the similarities between the topics discussed by Cambyses with those Socrates discusses in the *Memorabilia*, but also of the differences, not least because none of Socrates' interlocutors goes on to lead a vast empire.

26 See on this Humble 2014.

4 Adaptation of Medium to Audience

Socrates did not approach everyone in the same way.

Mem. 4.1.3

Both Plato and Xenophon depict their literary Socrates adapting his message and dialectical approach for different interlocutors.²⁷ Xenophon opens the fourth book of the *Memorabilia* with a discussion of this topic.²⁸ Xenophon might not do this on such an elaborate scale as Plato but it is nonetheless still a feature of his Socratic works (and more prominent, naturally, in the longer dialogues such as the *Oeconomicus* and *Symposium*). Since one of the more striking things about Xenophon's non-Socratic works is the variety and novelty of their generic structures, it behooves us to ask whether Xenophon's experimentation with genre may not also be driven at least to some degree by the target audience in each case. If he intends his works to be useful, as I think he does, he needs to be persuasive and to win over his audience, and different audiences need different means of persuasion.

The difficulty with investigating this point is, of course, that recreating Xenophon's intended audiences is problematic. There is still significant scholarly dissension even when we have internal clues. Thus while it is clear that the *De vectigalibus* is an oratorical work addressed to Athenians (*Vect.* 6.2), there is disagreement over whether a specific body is to be understood, such as the *ekklësia* or *boulê*, or even an imaginary group of Athenians.²⁹ *Cynegeticus* is directed towards young men (*Cyn.* 1.18, 13.17), but are these young men in general, Athenian youths, or specifically Xenophon's sons? Difficulty in dating almost all his works does not help make this task any easier.³⁰ Yet we can easily see, even if precision in these areas is beyond our grasp, that in each of his non-Socratic works the approach taken is radically different and usually involves a mishmash of generic features. A partial explanation for such variety may be that the works are aimed at different audiences. Two examples follow.

27 Rowe 2007, 11–12, argues that Plato's interlocutors are not meant to be understood as specific individuals but rather as types. If Plato, however, simply meant Laches to represent a general he could have made the interlocutor A General, in the same way that he keeps his interlocutors in the *Leges* non-specific. Is it really sensible to claim, for example, that Plato is generalizing his own brothers in the *Republic*?

28 On this passage see Morrison 1994, 183–191.

29 For a summary of views see Schorn 2012, 691 n. 12.

30 Apart from the *Agésilas* (which must be post-360 BCE) and *De vectigalibus* (c. 354 BCE).

In the *De vectigalibus* Xenophon treads a fine line. Those he wishes to convince of his analysis of the best way for Athens to pursue a path to prosperity are the very ones pursuing destructive and unjust policies. In order to gain their goodwill he must temper his criticism; otherwise, he loses them from the start. Including himself, through the frequent use of the first person, as a member of the group responsible for the problems and for finding solutions (for example, *Vect.* 4.39) is one way he manages this. Jansen's analysis of the complex structure of the *De vectigalibus* is instructive. He argues that the move from a brief foray into epideictic in the opening chapter to a more deliberative approach is strikingly rhetorical, but that the work was meant to be read rather than delivered. Though Jansen does not consider the opening rhetoric of examination and reflection in terms of signaling philosophical inquiry, it is telling that from his own analysis he concludes that the work was meant to stimulate dialogue.³¹

In the *Cynegeticus*, too, Xenophon keeps the real aim of his exhortation of the benefits of hunting from taking center stage until he has won the goodwill of his audience of young men, whose attention, Xenophon notes elsewhere, is prone to wander.³² To attract their attention he does not start with the yawn-inducing, eye-rolling proposition that hunting will make them good estate managers and citizens,³³ but with a reminder that all the great heroes of the past had studied hunting under the guidance of Chiron (1.1–18). More particularly he notes the rewards these heroes received: women, great victory in battle, great fame, and immortality dominate the list. Not all, to be sure, are as a result of the heroes' hunting skills (nor does Xenophon actually suggest this) but mention of these heady rewards is meant to ensure that he gains the attention of his audience. Once he has their attention he can deal with the practical matters of hunting (2.1–11.4). Only at this point, and by focusing first on how hunting is good training for war (12.1–9), does he then get to the broader, more fundamental points that hunting is, in fact, good training for being a useful citizen, being an excellent manager of a household, being law-

31 Jansen 2007, 56–104.

32 E.g., *Mem.* 1.2.16, 4.1.3–4; *Lac.* 3.1–2. Compare Morrison's (1994, 185–191) analysis of how Xenophon, in *Mem.* 4.2, shows Socrates carefully leading Euthydemus to the point where he can actually start engaging him profitably in dialectic.

33 Though Xenophon does not ignore his overall aim in his opening salvo ("through the heed they [the heroes of old, Chiron's pupils] paid to hounds and hunting and *the rest of their education* they excelled greatly and were admired for their virtue" (*Cyn.* 1.5); and "therefore I urge the young not to despise hunting or *any other education*" (1.18)), he keeps the focus firmly on hunting until he has his audience well and truly hooked (my italics).

abiding, and, above all, being in possession of great virtue (12.10–22). In the final chapter Xenophon reiterates how skill in hunting benefits the *polis* (13), and is unusually explicit about his aims: to make men wise and good (13.7) and for his work to be useful for all time.

5 Leadership and Education

He [Socrates] himself was always conversing about human things, investigating what is pious and what is impious, what noble and what shameful, what just and what unjust, what moderation is, what madness is, what courage and cowardice are, what a city is, what a statesman is, what rule of men is, what makes one capable of ruling men, and about anything else which, once known, makes one noble and good and about which, if one is ignorant, leads one justly to be called slavish.

Mem. 1.1.16

In general all aspects of this statement can be shown to be true, with varying degrees of emphasis, in the dealings of the Socrates of both Plato and Xenophon.³⁴ It is notable, however, that exploration of “what a statesman is, what rule of men is, what makes one capable of ruling men,” that is of leadership in all its manifestations, is not only prominent in Xenophon’s Socratic works but also pervades his non-Socratic works.³⁵ *De equitandi ratione* and the *Cynegeticus* are addressed to future leaders and the latter in particular, as noted above, focuses on the applicability of skills learnt while hunting to good management of one’s household and to usefulness in the civic sphere; the *De equitum magistro* advises on all aspects of leading successfully and improving the Athenian cavalry; the *De vectigalibus*, still concerning Athens, advises on political and economic, rather than military, leadership; the *Spartan Constitution* examines the Spartan state’s gain (and loss) of hegemony, as indeed does

34 As observed by Dorion 2003a, 62–63 n. 45, though I would qualify his note in two ways. First, Dorion concentrates on the places Socrates is made specifically to define such topics as piety, beauty, justice, moderation, and courage in Plato and Xenophon, rather than more broadly to discuss these concepts; Dorion’s evidence in fact shows that in some ways this passage describes Plato’s Socrates better than Xenophon’s. Further, Dorion does not give any evidence of Socrates’ interest in leaders or leadership in either Xenophon’s or Plato’s Socratic works though there is in fact a great deal. See further below and n. 43.

35 Recent explorations include Gray 2011, numerous essays in Hobden and Tuplin 2012, and Sandridge 2013.

the *Hellenica*, though the sweep there is wider and takes in the unsuccessful hegemonic ventures of Athens and Thebes; the *Anabasis* is also about military leadership, but from different angles again, examining mercenary, state, and non-Greek leaders; the *Hiero* confronts tyranny; the encomium, *Agésilas*, presents a wholly positive model of a leader upon his death; and the *Cyropaedia* examines what made the Elder Cyrus such a successful leader of a vast empire. Across these works Xenophon deals with himself as a leader (*Anabasis*), contemporary leaders from various Greek and non-Greek states, appointed by the state or in command of mercenaries, whom he has cause to have observed and in some cases whom he knows personally (*Anabasis*, *Hellenica*, *Agésilas*), future or theoretical leaders (*Cynegeticus*, *De equitandi ratione*, *De equitum magistro*), famous leaders from the past (*Cyropaedia*, *Hiero*), and *poleis* as leaders (*Spartan Constitution*, *Hellenica*, *De vectigalibus*). Even famous mythological leaders are given brief coverage in the *Cynegeticus*.³⁶ It is hard, indeed, to find an angle that he has missed.³⁷

Equally important across his works is the theme of education (which, even if it is not directly stated in the formulation above, is quite clearly implied). Good education is fundamental for producing both good citizens and good leaders.³⁸ Socrates in both Plato's and Xenophon's works is deeply concerned with education, and more specifically, the education of those who are likely to end up politically active.

No more clear-cut presentation of this can be seen than in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, the first book of which is devoted to Cyrus' formative years: his traditional Persian education, the lessons he learns at the Median court, and his father's guidance. The remainder reveals how Cyrus' training manifested itself in his style of governance. Modern scholars disagree on the effect of these educational influences on Cyrus as a leader,³⁹ but none would deny that Xenophon thought Cyrus' educational experiences were fundamental to the way he ruled his empire. Xenophon conducts a similar exploration of the influence of education on leadership in his *Spartan Constitution*. It has been a point of frustration that he is so vague on specific details, but he does show how the Spartan

36 We might add to this list that household management and its connection with civic leadership are examined in the *Oeconomicus*, though this connection between domestic and civic leadership is also made in the *Cyropaedia* and in *Cynegeticus*.

37 Cf. *Memorabilia* 3.1–7 which almost reads as a summary of the issues Xenophon deals with in his non-Socratic works; see Johnson (in this volume).

38 Cf. Xen. *Ap.* 20–21; *Cyn.* 12.14, etc. See also Moore (in this volume) for a complementary discussion (focusing on *Mem.* 4) of Xenophon's presentation of Socrates as educator.

39 See n. 55 below.

state inculcated in its citizen-young, those who were going to make up the ruling class, the virtues and behavioral patterns that were deemed essential for upholding the system. His inquiry discovers the flaws in the system, among which is an over-emphasis on the practice of virtue in public and a lack of education in justice and moderation (σωφροσύνη), which results in a lack of any internalized moral compass.⁴⁰ The results of such an upbringing are depicted in the behavior of various Spartan leaders in the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*. The *Agésilas* too relates to Xenophon's analysis of Spartan education, as a survey of the positive qualities attributed to Agesilaus therein reveals. For example, Agesilaus is said to possess moderation (σωφροσύνη, 5.7), but the examples given are of his self-control (ἐγκράτεια) in the face of food, drink, temperature, sleep, and above all attractive young boys (5.1–6).⁴¹ Moderation is, in fact, never cited by Xenophon as an aim of the Spartan education system, but self-control in all the above respects is (cf. *Lac.* 2).⁴²

As noted above, Xenophon signals at the beginning of the *Spartan Constitution* and the *Cyropaedia* that his intention is to embark on a journey of philosophical inquiry, and perhaps had these been his only non-Socratic works, his Socratic credentials might have been more positively assessed. Somehow the fact that he also composed works setting forth specific technical advice—*De equitandi ratione*, *De equitum magistro*, *Cynegeticus*—has served to cast doubt on his worth as a thinker. Yet, as noted above, he could hardly be more explicit about his view that learning the practical skills of hunting is an essential part of becoming a good citizen for the transferable skills it instills. These works might more fruitfully be viewed in another way: just as he analyzes leadership from every angle he can think of, so too he attempts to educate in as many different yet complementary ways as possible in order to be as beneficial as possible.

Whatever one might say about the ways in which Xenophon explores these topics—and his own experiences obviously play a significant role in his choice of approaches—it is not difficult to imagine that his interest in issues of leadership and education, and indeed Plato's interest too,⁴³ was kindled and inspired

40 See Humble 1999.

41 We might also regard this as another example of Xenophon's tailoring his material for his audience, speculatively assuming that the *Agésilas* was written for Spartans.

42 The fact that Humble 1999 and Dorion 2003b can come to quite different conclusions about the role of ἐγκράτεια in Xenophon's thought highlights the need to engage with his whole corpus and not just non-Socratic works (as in the former) or Socratic works (as in the latter).

43 Plato's interest in education and leadership manifests itself throughout his corpus and can

by their mentor.⁴⁴ After all, one of the common scenarios in which the literary Socrates finds himself is conversing with (and, hence, educating, in his own inimitable way) young aristocratic men about their knowledge of what is required to play a leading, public role in the political life of Athens.⁴⁵ Why Xenophon concentrated so heavily on these issues more than any other topics can be explained further if we consider other ways in which he may have learned from the example of Socrates.

6 The Examined Life

The unexamined life is not livable for a human being.

PL. *Ap.* 38a5–6

[Euthydemus to Socrates] But from what point should the process of self-examining begin?

XEN. *Mem.* 4.2.30

Unlike Plato, Xenophon does not have Socrates remark explicitly on the importance of constant self-examination, though the idea is made manifest in other ways, as the quotation from the *Memorabilia* shows. But Xenophon has left us evidence that he did himself critically examine his own life: the *Anabasis* recounts a two-year period, the consequences of which changed his life radically.⁴⁶ In it he is quite explicit about, and indeed breaks the chronological

be seen perhaps most strikingly in the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws*. Consider also his trips to Syracuse (the salutary skepticism of Schofield 2000 notwithstanding).

44 Again, as with the notion of wonder, an interest in leadership and how one might become a good leader was not confined to Socrates and his circle. Sophists were certainly happy to take money from willing pupils who aimed at wielding power in Athens' democracy. Nonetheless these were, among the Socratics, central issues on which there was lively debate. See, e.g., Morrison 2004 for a discussion about how Xenophon's Socrates both converges and diverges from Plato's Socrates and Aristotle on the nature of tyranny and royalty, Gaile-Irbe 2013 on striking points of comparison between the discussion of tyranny in the *Hiero* and Plato's *Republic*, and Humble forthcoming, for points of contact between the *Spartan Constitution* and Plato's *Republic*. I am, however, more inclined that Gaile-Irbe to see rapport, rather than rivalry, between Plato and Xenophon on issues of governance.

45 E.g., Glaucon (*Mem.* 3.6; Pl. *Resp.*), Charmides (*Mem.* 3.7; Pl. *Chrm.*), etc.

46 See also Danzig 2010, 260–263, for the intriguing suggestion that Xenophon also uses the context of the *Oeconomicus* for self-examination.

flow of the narrative to report, the facts (a) that he consulted Socrates before he headed off to Persia with Proxenus and Cyrus the Younger, (b) that Socrates warned him that campaigning with Cyrus might not be looked upon favorably in Athens, (c) that he blithely ignored this advice and was chastised by Socrates for this (*An.* 3.1.4–7), and (d) that he was later exiled from Athens (*An.* 5.3.4, 7.7.57). In view of this, therefore, it is hard not to think that Xenophon is including himself when he says:

Those who obeyed him [Socrates] prospered, but those who did not regretted it.

Mem. 1.1.4

It is worth thinking a bit more deeply both about his own self-portrayal in conversation with Socrates and about the consequences of his rejection of Socrates' advice. In the *Memorabilia* Xenophon presents himself only once in conversation with Socrates, about sexual passion (1.3.8–13). Here too he characterizes himself as high-spirited and headstrong, not precisely contradicting Socrates, but also not appearing to take the conversation about the dangers of sexual desire very seriously. He certainly does not leave us with the impression that Socrates convinced him of the dangers of kissing a pretty face. In fact in both the *Memorabilia* and *Anabasis* Xenophon portrays his younger self as a rather Alcibiades-like figure: just about—but not quite—restrained by the presence of Socrates; and quite unlike the sober and thoughtful figure we glean from his authorial presence.⁴⁷

Did Xenophon, therefore, learn to follow Socrates' advice only after he had cause to regret rejecting it? To answer this question properly, it would obviously help to know a few more concrete details about Xenophon's life. In the absence of these, however, let me pose a potential scenario. Perhaps Xenophon counted himself among those bright, headstrong aristocratic youths aiming at political life in Athens, the type of young man Socrates is frequently portrayed conversing with to try to direct their talents towards useful civic or political service

47 This self-portrait of the young Xenophon is quite different from the self-portrait of the young Plato. As a literary figure in his own Socratic dialogues Plato is only ever said to be present or absent in a particular context (*Pl. Phd.* 59b, *Ap.* 34a, 38b; cf. *Xen. Mem.* 3.6.1). In the *Seventh Letter* (and here authenticity does not matter), however, we have a representation of him very much heeding Socrates' example (324b–325a): though desirous of entering politics and encouraged by his relatives to do, his observation of Socrates' refusal to follow the orders of the Thirty when he deemed them to be acting impiously led to Plato's withdrawal from political engagement.

(e.g., Charmides, Glaucon, Alcibiades, etc.). In the *Anabasis* he certainly portrays himself with many of the requisite skills for such a career: he is an adept rhetorician, has a better-than-average talent for solving logistical and tactical problems, and has already well- (if not fully-) developed political intelligence. For all his self-vaunted accessibility and collegiality, however, he does not disguise the occasions on which he misreads the mood of his fellow-soldiers, or when the army is no longer willing to accept his leadership and he is unable to prevent its splintering into factions, or his ill-conceived desire to found a *polis*, or his difficulty dealing with manipulative Spartan harmosts and with provisioning.⁴⁸ Far from being read as a *curriculum vitae* advertising his worth as a military general for hire, the work can be seen as a candid admission that as a young man Xenophon thought he knew more than he really did, and he was, no less than many other young men who associated with Socrates, unmindful of his master's teachings. Only upon later self-reflection did he realize the cost of his actions.⁴⁹

The cost in Xenophon's case was quite dramatic. If he had been aiming at political life in Athens (and frequent passages in the final books of the *Anabasis* show that returning to Athens was his aim), the sentence of exile abruptly terminated that aspiration. He found himself under the patronage of the Spartans, but he did not embrace Spartan social and political life, as the chameleon-like Alcibiades did. Rather he channeled his energies into literary projects, all of which, I would argue, are in one way or another a defense of Socrates, and an homage to his influence and way of life.⁵⁰ Above all, and particularly through his non-Socratic writings, which are so overwhelmingly concerned with investigations of leadership on multiple levels, Xenophon aspired to be as useful as he could to those aspiring to the kind of political life which he himself could no longer actively pursue.

48 As Higgins 1977, 91–92, notes, he “is the victim of his own delusion” and has not yet learned from the example of Socrates.

49 The trope of presenting himself in the third person as a character in the events he recounts allows him the ironic distance to examine critically his younger self from the later position. For two different but complementary approaches see Bradley 2001 and Humble 2011.

50 I realize that this suggestion commits me to the view that his literary production belongs to the period after he is exiled. Dating of his works, as already noted, is a vexatious issue. At worst this scenario cannot be ruled out.

7 Being Useful

It seemed to me that he [Socrates] benefited those around him both by revealing what sort of man he was through his deeds and also through his conversations.

Mem. 1.3.1

It is not unreasonable to assert that both Plato and Xenophon would have agreed that Socrates not only strove to be, but also was, beneficial to those around him. Xenophon takes pains to highlight this in his Socratic works, for this is part of his mode of defending Socrates.⁵¹ The rest of his oeuvre also shows that he himself took on board Socrates' example in this matter. Though he had made poor choices, blocking his own path to political engagement, upon reflection, with the example of Socrates in front of him, he realized that he could still be useful to others through literary composition. Though he only once explicitly expresses the idea that he aims for his work to be useful (*χρήσιμα*, *Cyn.* 13.7), such a scenario accounts in yet another way for the fact that all his non-Socratic works focus on different aspects of leadership and that all are didactic (notwithstanding their other aims and complex generic affiliations). Further, his didacticism may have a deeper purpose than just his own desire to be useful. At the beginning of the third book of the *Memorabilia* Xenophon notes,

I will now set out in detail how he [Socrates] benefitted those who yearned for noble ends by making them pay close attention to those ends.

Mem. 3.1.1

This statement introduces a series of conversations on a variety of leadership topics at the beginning of the third book of the *Memorabilia* (3.1–7).⁵² Xenophon here characterizes Socrates' usefulness as primarily aimed at enabling potential leaders to recognize their weaknesses themselves and to work towards correcting them. Socrates is, in a word, persuasive. Is this Xenophon's aim also?

51 See, e.g., Pontier and Danzig (both in this volume). It has, indeed, often been noted that in the *Memorabilia* Socrates' conversations often have audiences (unlike Plato's) and so have greater potential to benefit; see, e.g., Dorion 2003a, cxlvii–cxlviii, and Johnson 2005b, 43.

52 On which see Johnson (in this volume).

If we were to look solely at what are often termed his technical treatises—*Cynegeticus*, *De equitandi ratione*, *De equitum magistro*—the knee-jerk reaction would be to say no, given the very specific detailed technical advice they contain. We might consider first, however, the audience at which the first two are addressed: young men who would not yet have acquired the requisite knowledge to pursue active political life sensibly, and who are, in fact, encouraged at the end of the *Cynegeticus* to recognize that their training in hunting will have wider civic and political consequences. The *De equitum magistro* is similarly full of practical and technical advice, but there is also much in it about managing men. For example, in it Xenophon comments on the need to be persuasive to compel others to serve to the best of their ability. His advice that the cavalry commander should attract ambitious young men to service by dwelling on the “brilliancy of horsemanship” (*Eq. mag.* 1.11) recalls in short the method Xenophon employed in his *Cynegeticus* to secure the attention of his audience. The *De vectigalibus*, on the other hand, mixes the philosophical with the practical in a quite novel way and dispenses advice of a utilitarian nature to rival that which Xenophon depicts Socrates dispensing in *Memorabilia* 3. Indeed Danzig’s arguments (in this volume), that Xenophon presents Socrates’ utilitarianism as outside cultural norms and, therefore, as dangerous, fit very well indeed with Xenophon’s own suggestions in the *De vectigalibus*, particularly concerning his somewhat radical proposals for master/slave relationships based on utility and mutual benefit.⁵³

Xenophon also provides us with a number of writings that present much broader lessons about the limitations of past and present leaders as salutary paradigms for others. For example, Xenophon’s venture into historical writing, *Hellenica*, does just this. Certainly it includes occasional explicit judgments on the behavior of specific individuals, but the overall shape of the narrative encapsulates the larger lessons he wants to impart, and learning from the account again requires *active* reading. Xenophon’s opinion is there to be found, but he knows, having seen how Socrates worked, that lessons are more readily learned if those learning them can be made to see them for themselves (a maieutic approach).⁵⁴ The *Cyropaedia* too is a didactic text that explores leadership and the ethics of leadership. As is his custom, Xenophon asks his readers to think about Cyrus and the means whereby he gained success. And also as is our custom, we moderns disagree, as we do about many of Xenophon’s works,

53 See also Jansen 2012, 734–740.

54 As the careful analysis of the *Hellenica* in Tuplin 1993 shows; see also the broad discussion about active and informed reading in Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 33–39.

on what his overall message was: is Cyrus a model for emulation, or is this work, like the *Hellenica*, *Spartan Constitution*, and *De vectigalibus*, another warning about the vices of empire?⁵⁵ While I do think Xenophon intended to make his readership think, and for that reason did not always spell out his views in succinctly formulated conclusions, there is one conclusion that he is unequivocal about: the unmatched usefulness of Socrates as one who helped others on the path towards virtue.

8 Conclusion

His heart was obviously set not on those who were naturally physically beautiful, but on those whose souls naturally excelled in goodness. These fine natures he recognized from their quickness to learn whatever they turned their minds to, their ability to remember whatever they learned, and their desire for every kind of knowledge on which depend good management of a household and a city and how to deal with men and their affairs effectively. For if people like this were educated, he thought that not only would they themselves be happy and manage their own households well, but they would be able to make other men and their cities happy as well.

Mem. 4.1.2

Thus Xenophon describes the ideal type of person with whom Socrates liked to associate. He does not comment on whether or not he himself fit that particular mold, but his works, Socratic and non-Socratic alike, show that he certainly had the requisite desire.

Is Diogenes Laertius, then, in the opening quotation correct in his assessment that Xenophon emulated Socrates precisely? It is difficult, of course, to say whether or not the present analysis bears any resemblance to that in which Diogenes engaged, but I would venture to sum up by suggesting that within the constraints posed by his own character and his own personal situation,

55 E.g., compare the different assessments of Gera 1993 and Johnson 2005a. Some of our confusion and disagreement, to be sure, has to do with being so removed from the period that we cannot adequately reconstruct a contemporary response. The one thing that can be said for certain is that whatever our misunderstandings, the more actively we read Xenophon's texts (and active reading was surely his intention), the more rewarding they are.

Xenophon, once he had time and space to reflect on and examine the consequences of his youthful actions (the end result of which was eventually the *Anabasis*), consciously chose to pursue a way of life that involved ongoing self-examination and philosophical inquiry on how best to live a useful, active political life. The results of this inquiry he disseminated through his manifold literary experiments, by means of which he aimed to be useful to others and to encourage others to reflect on their own actions in the light of his analyses. In this way he did indeed emulate Socrates, and Estienne was correct in his assessment that, though he left Socrates' camp for that of Cyrus the Younger, he always remained at heart a Socratic.⁵⁶

References

- Ahbel-Rappe, S. and R. Kamtekar. *A companion to Socrates*. Oxford 2006.
- Azoulay, V. *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir: de la charis au charisme*. Paris 2004.
- Baragwanath, E. 'The wonders of freedom: Xenophon on slavery', in: Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 631–663.
- Bradley, P.J. 'Irony and the narrator in Xenophon's *Anabasis*', in: E. Tylawsky and C. Weiss, *Essays in honor of Gordon Williams: twenty-five years at Yale*. New Haven 2001, 56–84.
- Brickhouse, T.C. and N.D. Smith. *The philosophy of Socrates*. Boulder 2000.
- Cooper, J. 'Notes on Xenophon's Socrates', in: J. Cooper, *Reason and emotion: essays on ancient moral psychology and ethical theory*. Princeton 1999, 3–28.
- Danzig, G. *Apologizing for Socrates*. Lanham 2010.
- Dorion, L.-A. *Xénophon: Mémoires*, I. Paris 2003. (= 2003a)
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Akrasia et enkrateia dans les *Mémoires* de Xénophon', *Dialogue* 42 (2003), 645–672. (= 2003b)
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Xenophon's Socrates', in: Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar 2006, 93–109.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'The rise and fall of the Socratic problem', in: D.R. Morrison, *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011, 1–23.

56 Much of the work on this paper was carried out while I held a Fellowship at the Calgary Institute for the Humanities (2013–2014) and I am grateful to the Institute, its Director, James Ellis, and my colleagues that year for providing such a congenial working environment. I would also like to thank Gabriel Danzig and David M. Johnson for graciously allowing me to read drafts of their chapters for this volume. David M. Johnson also commented extensively on a draft of my own chapter; where I chose to accept his excellent advice, and that of the editors of this volume, the paper has been greatly improved. Infelicities that remain are to be laid at my doorstep alone.

- Gaile-Irbe, A. 'Xénophon, lecteur de Platon: le Hiéron ou sur la tyrannie comme une réponse au portrait du tyran dans la *République*', in: F. de Luise and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 93–105.
- Gera, D.L. *Xenophon's Cyropaedia*. Oxford 1993.
- Gill, C. 'Dialectic and the dialogue form', in: J. Annas and C. Rowe, *New perspectives on Plato, modern and ancient*. Cambridge, MA 2002, 145–171.
- Gourinat, J.-B. 'La dialectique de Socrate selon les *Mémoires* de Xénophon', in: Narcy and Tordesillas 2008, 129–159.
- Gray, V. *Xenophon on government*. Cambridge 2007.
- Gray, V. *Xenophon's mirror of princes: reading the reflections*. Oxford 2011.
- Hankins, J. 'Socrates in the Italian renaissance', in: Ahbel-Rappe and Kamtekar 2006, 337–352.
- Higgins, W.E. *Xenophon the Athenian*. Albany 1977.
- Hobden, F. and C. Tuplin. *Xenophon: ethical principles and historical enquiry*. Leiden 2012.
- Humble, N. 'Sôphrosynê and the Spartans in Xenophon', in: A. Powell and S. Hodkinson, *Sparta: new perspectives*. London 1999, 339–353.
- Humble, N. 'Xenophon's *Anabasis*: self and other in fourth-century Greece', in: P. Crowley, N. Humble and S. Ross, *Mediterranean travels: writing self and other from the ancient world to contemporary society*. Oxford 2011, 14–31.
- Humble, N. 'L'innovation generique dans la *Constitution des Lacedemoniens*', in: P. Pontier, *Xénophon et la rhétorique*. Paris 2014, 213–234.
- Humble, N. 'Sparta in Xenophon and Plato', in: G. Danzig, D.M. Johnson and D.R. Morrison, *Plato and Xenophon: comparative studies*. Leiden (forthcoming).
- Jansen, J. *After empire: Xenophon's Poroi and the reorientation of Athens' political economy*. Diss. University of Texas at Austin 2007.
- Jansen, J. 'Strangers incorporated: outsiders in Xenophon's *Poroi*', in: Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 725–760.
- Johnson, David M. 'Persians as centaurs in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*', *TAPhA* 135 (2005), 177–207. (= 2005a)
- Johnson, David M. 'Xenophon at his most Socratic (*Memorabilia* 4.2)', *OSAP* 29 (2005) 39–73. (= 2005b)
- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Kecskeméti, J., B. Boudou, and H. Cazes. *La France des humanistes: Henri II Estienne, éditeur et écrivain*. Turnhout 2003.
- Macleod, M.D. *Xenophon: Apology and Memorabilia I*. Oxford 2008.
- Morrison, D.R. 'Xenophon's Socrates as teacher', in: P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994, 181–208.

- Morrison, D.R. 'Tyrannie et royauté selon le Socrate de Xénophon', *EPh* 2 (2004), 177–192.
- Narcy, M. and A. Tordesillas. *Xénophon et Socrate*. Paris 2008.
- Patzer, A. 'Der Xenophontische Sokrates als Dialektiker', in: K. Pestalozzi, *Der fragende Sokrates*. Stuttgart 1999, 50–76.
- Pontier, P. *Trouble et ordre chez Platon et Xénophon*. Paris 2006.
- Rossetti, L. 'The Sokratikoi Logoi as a literary barrier', in: V. Karasmanēs, *Socrates, 2400 years since his death (399 B.C.–2001 A.D.)*. Athens 2004, 81–94.
- Rossetti, L. 'Savoir imiter c'est connaître: le cas de Mémoires, III, 8', in: Narcy and Tordesillas 2008, 111–127.
- Rossetti, L. *Le dialogue Socratique*. Paris 2011.
- Rowe, C. *Plato and the art of philosophical writing*. Cambridge 2007.
- Sandridge, N.B. *Loving humanity, learning, and being honoured: the foundations of leadership in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus*. Washington 2013.
- Schofield, M. 'Plato and practical politics', in: C. Rowe and M. Schofield, *The Cambridge history of Greek and Roman political thought*. Cambridge 2000, 293–302.
- Schorn, S. 'The philosophical background of Xenophon's *Poroï*', in: Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 689–723.
- Seel, G. 'If you know what is best, you do it: Socratic intellectualism in Xenophon and Plato', in: L. Judson and V. Karasmanēs, *Remembering Socrates*. Oxford 2006, 20–47.
- Tamiolaki, M. *Liberté et esclavage chez les historiens Grecs classiques*. Paris 2010.
- Tuplin, C. *The failings of empire*. Stuttgart 1993.
- Tuplin, C. *Xenophon and his world*. Stuttgart, 2004.
- Waterfield, R. 'Xenophon's Socratic mission', in: Tuplin 2004, 79–113.

PART 5

Later Reception



Aristotle on Socrates

Nicholas D. Smith
Lewis and Clark College

1 Aristotle's Sources

1.1 Introduction

Because Socrates had died before he was born, Aristotle's value as a historical source on Socrates is hotly debated among scholars. Some regard Aristotle's testimony as both important and highly reliable.¹ Others argue that Aristotle provides no valuable historical evidence on the Socratic Problem.²

1.2 Aristotle on the Socratic Logoi

Aristotle is one of our main sources on the genre of works that has come to be known as the "Socratic *Logoi*."

(T₁) The Socratic dialogues (*hoi Sôkratikoî*) do depict character.³

Rh. 3.16, 1417a18–21

(T₂) We have no common name for a mime of Sophron or Xenarchus and the Socratic Conversations (*tous Sôkratikus logous*)

Poet. 1, 1447b9–10

(T₃) The *Socrates* of Theodectes provides an example: "What temple has he profaned? What gods recognized by the state has he not honored?"

Rh. 2.23, 1399a7–9

In T₃, Aristotle actually names one such work, by an author named Theodectes, whose work is otherwise wholly lost to us.⁴ Aristotle makes no comment about

1 So, for example, Joël 1893; Gomperz 1902; Bokornew 1913; Robin 1916; Ross 1924, l.xxxix–xli; Vlastos 1991, esp. 97–98 and notes; Penner 1992, esp. 122–124, and 2003; Irwin 1995, 8–11, and 2008, 78. A qualified version of this view may also be found in Nehamas 1999, 93.

2 So, for example, Döring 1895; Taylor 1911; Maier 1913; Chroust 1952; Kahn 1996; Dorion 2011; Waterfield 2013.

3 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Aristotle are from Barnes 1984, some with slight modifications for consistency.

4 Compare to Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.2: "Let us consider the first charge [against Socrates], that he did

whether he takes these Socratic *Logoi* to be reliable sources, but if Aristotle was aware of fictionalization within the genre of Socratic *Logoi*, he does not tell us about it.⁵

A more interesting example of Aristotle's report of Socratic *Logoi* may be found in another passage.

(T4) The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument the Socratics used: e.g. "Public officials ought not to be selected by lot. That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship's crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it."

Rh. 2.20, 1393b3–8

Skeptics about "the Socrates problem" regard Plato as an unreliable source. Skeptics then dismiss the Aristotelian testimony as too dependent upon Plato.⁶ Those who count Aristotle more favorably as a source argue, on the contrary, that, as a member of the Academy and resident of Athens for twenty years, and not so long after Socrates' death, Aristotle had the opportunity to learn about Socrates from others who knew the man, and not just from Plato.

The argument in T4 is relevant to this debate because it cannot be found in Plato's dialogues. A criticism of using the lot to select public officials may be implied at *Republic* 557a5, but no actual argument is given there. In the *Laws*, Plato actually defends using lots for selecting some public servants (cf. 3.690c5–8, 6.757e3–758a2, 6.759b7–c1, 9.856d6–e1, 12.946b2–4). The closest text for the argument Aristotle gives here seems to be the position articulated by "the accuser" (probably referring to Polycrates⁷) in Xenophon:

He made his companions despise the established laws by saying that it was foolish for the archons of the state to be chosen by lot and that no one

not respect the gods whom the state respects. What proof could they possibly have used? He was seen sacrificing to them frequently at home and at the city's public altars as well." So such observations were commonly made by Socrates' later defenders.

- 5 Other ancient authors do express this concern, however. See Xenophon's complaint in the first lines of his *Apology*, and Diogenes Laertius's criticism of Polycrates at 2.39. Recent examinations of Aristotle's discussions of the Socratic *Logoi* include Halliwell 2006 and Ford 2010.
- 6 So Kahn 1996, 87, proclaims that Aristotle "arrived on the scene too late; he was separated by the dazzling screen of Plato's portrayal." See also Dorion 2011, 16; Peterson 2012, 224–229.
- 7 See Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 174, esp. n. 85.

would be willing to choose a pilot, builder, or flutist by lot—yet mistakes in such tasks cause much less harm than mistakes in ruling the state.⁸

XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.9

The parallel between the version in Xenophon and T4 is striking, but perhaps not quite close enough for us simply to assume that Xenophon was Aristotle's source here, since Aristotle's case of the athlete is not given in Xenophon. So it is not clear from where Aristotle got the quotation he gives in T4; however, we have no reason to think that he got it from Plato.

2 Aristotle's Debts to Plato

2.1 Aristotle Citing (or Clearly Relying On) Plato

In several cases, Aristotle makes it perfectly plain that he is talking about the Socrates who speaks in Plato's works.

(T5) For it is true, as Socrates says in the *Funeral Speech* [one of the ancient titles given to Plato's *Menexenus*] that "the difficulty is not to praise the Athenians at Athens, but at Sparta."

Rh. 3.14, 1415b30–32 (cp. *PL. Menex.* 235d3–6)

Aristotle also had this text in mind earlier in the *Rhetoric*, when he makes the same point:

(T6) We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience.

Rh. 1.9, 1367b7–9

Elsewhere in the *Rhetoric*, Plato's *Apology* seems to be the source for what Aristotle reports:

(T7) Thus, when Meletus denied that Socrates believed in the existence of gods, Socrates proceeded to ask whether supernatural beings were not either children of the gods or in some way divine. "Yes," said Meletus.

8 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Xenophon included in this chapter are those in Benjamin 1985.

“Then,” replied Socrates, “is there anyone who believes in the existence of children of the gods and yet not in the existence of the gods themselves?”⁹

Rh. 3.18, 1419a8–12

So either Plato is the source of what Aristotle tells us in T7, or else what Plato tells us duplicates whatever other source Aristotle used in this case.

(T8) But when the same event follows from indefinite and undetermined antecedents, it will be good or evil, but there will not be the science that comes by experience of it, since otherwise some would have learned to be lucky, or even—as Socrates said—all the sciences would have been kinds of good luck.

Eth. Eud. Θ.1 (H.14), 1247b11–15 (cp. PL. *Euthyd.* 279d6–280a8)

A good example of Aristotle talking about the Socrates who appears in a Platonic dialogue may be found in the critique of Plato’s *Republic* in *Politics* 2.1.3–2.3.1. Each mention of Socrates in this text is simply a reference to the character by that name who speaks in Plato’s dialogue. The same may be said for the reference to “the Socrates in the *Phaedo*” at *On Generation and Corruption* 2.8, 335b10.

Scholars are thus right to claim that Aristotle relies on Plato as a source. The question is whether or not Aristotle *always* relies only on Plato. It is to this question I now turn.

2.2 *Aristotle on Socratic Virtue Intellectualism*

Some descriptions of Socrates obviously fit very well with what we find in Plato.

(T9) Experience with regard to particular facts is also thought to be courage; this is indeed the reason why Socrates thought courage was knowledge (*epistêmê*).

Eth. Nic. 3.8, 1116b3–5

(T10) This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom (*phronêsis*), and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues

9 Compare to Pl. *Ap.* 27c10–e3; Xenophon also reports an exchange between Socrates and Meletus at the trial (*Ap.* 19–21), but nothing even close to the argument Aristotle recalls here can be found in Xenophon’s Socratic works.

were forms of practical wisdom (*phronêsis*) he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom (*phronêsis*) he was right ... Socrates, then, thought the virtues were forms of reason (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of knowledge (*epistêmê*)), while we think they *involve* reason.

Eth. Nic. 6.13, 1144b14–21, 28–30

(T11) There are five kinds of courage, so named for a certain analogy between them; for they all endure the same things but not for the same reasons. One is a civic courage, due to the sense of shame; another is military, due to experience and knowledge (*to eidenai*), not (as Socrates said) of what is fearful, but of the resources they have to meet what is fearful.

Eth. Eud. 3.1, 1229a12, 14–16

(T12) For the truth is the exact opposite of what Socrates thought: he held that courage was knowledge (*epistêmê*).

Eth. Eud. 3.1.1230a7–10

In these passages, Aristotle mentions what has come to be known as Socrates' "intellectualism" about virtue. Compare what Aristotle has to say here with, for example, the way Plato has Socrates argue in the *Protagoras*:

"And aren't cowards shown to be so through their ignorance of what is to be feared?" "Absolutely." ... "So wisdom (*sophia*) of what is and is not to be feared is courage and the opposite of this is ignorance."¹⁰

PL. *Prot.* 360c2–d5

Socrates' intellectualism about virtue is also made clear in Plato's *Meno*. Socrates and Meno both agree that virtue will be knowledge if (a) virtue is something good, and also if (b) nothing else but knowledge is good (*Meno* 87d2–8). They quickly agree that (a) virtue is something good (87d2–4), and then Socrates goes on to argue for (b). The conclusion of the argument is obvious: "Virtue, then, as a whole or in part, is [practical] wisdom (*phronêsis*)" (89a3–4).

It is tempting to assume that Aristotle used Plato as his only source for Socrates' virtue intellectualism. But there are some problems with such a sim-

10 Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Plato that appear in this chapter are those provided in Cooper 1997.

ple explanation. First, other testimony shows that Aristotle actually counts Socratic intellectualism *as a point of disagreement* between Socrates and Plato. Such a distinction is at least implicit in one passage in the *Eudemian Ethics*:

(T13) Socrates the elder¹¹ thought the knowledge of virtue to be the end, and used to inquire what is justice, what bravery and each of the parts of virtue; and his conduct was reasonable, for he thought all the virtues to be kinds of knowledge, so that to know justice and to be just came simultaneously; for the moment we have learned geometry or building we are builders and geometers. Therefore he inquired what excellence is, not how or from what it arises.

Eth. Eud. 1.5, 1216b2–10

Aristotle does not make an explicit contrast between Socrates and Plato in this passage, but it can hardly be thought that Aristotle was unaware of Plato's lengthy treatment of moral education in the *Republic*, where elements of the soul other than the rational part were to be habituated. Aristotle is clear that *Socrates* was a virtue intellectualist. So a distinction between the Socratic and Platonic views on this issue can at least be inferred from T13. Elsewhere this distinction between Socrates and Plato is explicit.

(T14) After him [sc. Pythagoras] came Socrates, who spoke better and further about this subject [sc. virtue], but even he was not successful. For he used to make the virtues sciences (*epistēmai*), and this is impossible. For the sciences all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that all the virtues, according to him, are to be found in the rational part of the soul. The result is that in making the virtues sciences he is doing away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also with both passion and character; so that he has not been successful in this respect in his treatment of the virtues. [Aristotle then continues his account of former thinkers by changing the subject to Plato's views.] After this Plato divided the soul into the rational and the irrational part—and in this he was right—assigning appropriate virtues to each ... But after this he went astray. For he mixed up virtue with

11 Aristotle uses "Socrates the elder" to distinguish the historical Socrates from the "young Socrates" who was a contemporary of Theaetetus (and mentioned in Pl. *Tht.* 147d2 and elsewhere in Plato's works) and who may have been a member of Plato's Academy.

the treatment of the good, which cannot be right, not being appropriate. For in speaking about the truth of things he ought not to have discoursed upon virtue; for there is nothing common to the two.

Mag. Mor. 1.1, 1182a15–23

Given this introduction to the topic, Aristotle's occasional return to the issue of Socratic virtue intellectualism in the same work should also be regarded as a direct attribution of this view to Socrates—and *not* to Plato.

(T15) Neither was Socrates right in making the virtues sciences. For he used to think that nothing ought to be in vain, but from the virtues being sciences he met with the result that the virtues were in vain. [Aristotle continues his critique ...] Why so? Because in the case of the sciences, as soon as one knows what the science is, it results that one is scientific (for anyone who knows what medicine is, is forthwith a physician, and so with the other sciences). But this result does not follow in the case of the virtues. For anyone who knows what justice is, is not forthwith just, and similarly in the case of the rest. It follows then that the excellences are actually in vain and that they are not sciences.

Mag. Mor. 1.1, 1183b8–11

(T16) Nor indeed was Socrates right in asserting that courage was knowledge (*epistémê*).

Mag. Mor. 1.20, 1190b27–29

(T17) Hence Socrates was not speaking correctly when he said that excellence was reason, thinking that it was no use doing brave and just acts, unless one did them from knowledge and rational choice. This was why he said that excellence was reason.

Mag. Mor. 1.34, 1198a10–13

In T14 Aristotle talks about how Plato divided the soul into rational and irrational parts—but this happens most clearly in *Republic* 4 (and is also repeated in *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*) with Socrates introducing and explaining the view. The options here for those skeptics who discount Aristotle as a source independent of Plato are awkward, because the way Aristotle distinguishes Socrates from Plato either shows that Aristotle understood the Platonic testimony in precisely the way contemporary “developmentalists” understand that testimony—in which case, skeptics owe us some account of where Aristotle got the idea to read Plato's dialogues in that way. Alternatively, Aristotle had some

other source(s) that independently support developmentalists' association of the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues with the historical Socrates.

But there are other problems for the claim that Aristotle's sole source on Socrates was Plato, for we find that Xenophon also explicitly identifies Socrates as a virtue intellectualist (see *Mem.* 3.9.4–5 and 4.6.11). Of course, it is possible that Xenophon simply plagiarized this point from Plato, and thus Plato might be the sole source for "Socratic intellectualism," on which both Xenophon and Aristotle (later) relied. Or, even if Xenophon supplies an independent source here, it may be that Aristotle either never read Xenophon or at least did not at all rely on his account. I leave it to readers to decide which of the available explanations makes the most sense.

2.3 *Aristotle on the Socratic Denial of Akrasia*

Aristotle also reports that Socrates denied the possibility of (synchronic) *akrasia*. I have already considered some of what Aristotle has to say about this (see T13 and T15, above). But there's more.

(T18) That he should behave so [sc. akratically] when he has knowledge, some say is impossible; for it would be strange—so Socrates thought—if when knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it about like a slave. For *Socrates* was entirely opposed to the view in question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one, he said, acts against what he believes best—people act so only by reason of ignorance ... But there are some who concede certain of Socrates' contentions but not others; that nothing is stronger than knowledge they admit, but not that no one acts contrary to what has seemed to him the better course, and therefore they say that the incontinent man has not knowledge when he is mastered by his pleasures, but opinion ... The position that Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result; for it is not what is thought to be knowledge proper that the passion overcomes (nor is it this that is dragged about as a result of the passion), but perceptual knowledge.

Eth. Nic. 7.2–3, 1145b21–27, 31–34, 1147b14–17

(T19) The Socratic saying (*to Sôkratikon*) that nothing is stronger than wisdom is right. But when he said this of knowledge he was wrong.

Eth. Eud. 9.1 (H.13) 1246b32–36

(T20) Now Socrates the elder used to reject and deny *akrasia* altogether, saying that no one would choose evil who knew it to be such. But the

akratic seems, while knowing things to be bad, to choose them all the same, letting himself be led by passion. Owing to such considerations he did not think that there was *akrasia*. But there he was wrong.

Mag. Mor. 2.6, 1200b25–29

Note Aristotle's use of the expression, "drag it about like a slave," in T18. Compare this with Plato's *Protagoras* 352c1–2, where Socrates says that "they [the 'many'] think of knowledge as being utterly dragged around by all these other things as if it were a slave." Not surprisingly, scholars have taken this as the clearest evidence that Plato was Aristotle's source on the topic of the Socratic denial of *akrasia*.

But if it is Plato's *Protagoras* that Aristotle is using as his source, it is clear that Aristotle presents what he has to say as an account of what the historical Socrates said. So either Aristotle had some reason to accept Plato's early dialogues as historically accurate depictions of Socratic philosophy, or else Aristotle had independent corroboration for the view he found attributed to Socrates in the *Protagoras*. He might have found such corroboration in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 3.9.5, where Socrates says that "the men who know what is good and what is beautiful will never choose anything else."

Those who accepted the possibility of *akrasia* always assigned a role to the appetites and passions in their explanations of such behavior. So Aristotle probably supposed that Socrates' denial of *akrasia* resulted from failing to provide an adequate role for appetites and passions within his conception of moral psychology. Recall Aristotle's complaint in T14: "The result is that in making the virtues sciences he is doing away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also with both passion and character." Aristotle goes on to credit Plato with recognizing an irrational part of the soul, and most scholars have taken the tale of Leontius in *Republic* 4 (439e–440a) to be an example of one whose irrational part overwhelms his rational part in such a way as to produce an akratic act. Here, too, then, we find Aristotle making a distinction between Socrates and Plato.

The Socratic denial of *akrasia* is sometimes explicated in terms of what is and is not voluntary. In both early and also middle Platonic dialogues, putatively akratic action is sometimes said to be "involuntary." Here is how Aristotle puts it:

(T21) We must next inquire whether it [sc. virtue] is possible of attainment or is not, but, as Socrates said, to be good or bad does not rest with us to come about. For if, he says, one were to ask any one whatever whether he would wish to be just or unjust, no one would choose injustice. Similarly

in the case of courage and cowardice, and so on always with the rest of the virtues. And it is evident that any who are bad will not be bad voluntarily; so that it is evident that neither will they be voluntarily good. [Aristotle goes on to say that he thinks this view is wrong.]

Mag. Mor. 1.9, 1187a5–13

The claim that no one ever willingly chooses injustice may be found in Plato's *Gorgias* at 474b2–5; see also *Meno* 78a6–b2.

2.4 *Further Contrasts Aristotle Makes between Socrates and Plato*

Aristotle also distinguishes between Socrates and Plato on metaphysics.

(T22) Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to any sensible thing but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were apart from these, and were all called after these; for the multitude of things which have the same name as the Form exist by participation in it.

Metaph. A.6, 987b1–6

(T23) Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions—for of the natural scientists, only Democritus touched on the matter and defined, after a fashion, the hot and the cold; while the Pythagoreans had before this treated of a few things, whose formulae they connected with numbers—e.g., opportunity, justice, or marriage. But it was natural that Socrates should seek the essence. For he was seeking to deduce, and the essence is the starting point of deductions. For there was as yet none of the dialectical power which enables people even without knowledge of the essence to speculate about contraries and inquire whether the same science deals with contraries. For two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive¹² arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science. But Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions

¹² The term should probably be “epagogic” rather than “inductive” here. See McPherran 2007.

exist apart; his successors, however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas.

Metaph. M.4, 1078b17–32

(T24) They [sc. those who believed in the Ideas—see 1086a32] thought that the sensible particulars were in a state of flux and none of them remained, but that the universal was apart from these and different. And Socrates gave impulse to this theory, as we said before, by means of his definitions, but he did not *separate* them from the particulars; and in this he thought rightly, in not separating them. [Aristotle continues with criticisms of those who separate the Forms.]

Metaph. M.9, 1086a37–b5

As with the other contrasts Aristotle makes between Socrates and Plato, the evidence for what Aristotle says about Socrates in these passages could possibly come from Plato's dialogues—but only if Aristotle followed a developmentalist interpretation of Plato's dialogues. But the “fairly” (*dikaiôs*—1078b28) in T23 seems to indicate that Aristotle was aware of many theories attributed to Socrates, and was making his own deliberate choice among these. In other words, this adverb makes clear that Aristotle is presenting *his own* view of Socrates, from among the various sources he had at his disposal.¹³

2.5 *Other Aristotelian Statements That May Have Plato as a Source*

On other topics, too, Aristotle might have had Plato as his main or only source.

(T25) This was why Socrates used to ask questions and not to answer them—for he used to confess that he did not know.

Soph. el. 34, 183b6–8

(T26) Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid parade; and here too it is qualities which bring about reputation that they disclaim, as Socrates used to do.

Eth. Nic. 4.7, 1127b22–26

The figure of Socrates as questioner is one we find in nearly every Platonic dialogue in which Socrates appears, and a Socrates who professes ignorance

13 I owe this point to Alessandro Stavru.

is also one we find in many Platonic dialogues, especially among those of the early period.¹⁴ But Socrates certainly plays the role of questioner in most of the discussions in Xenophon's works, and other sources attribute the profession of ignorance to Socrates (see Aeschines, *Alcibiades*, SSR VI A 53).

(T27) Clearly, then, excellence of character belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, the same.

Pol. 1.5, 1260a20–24 (cp. *PL. Meno* 73b3–c5)

We are not aware of any other source Aristotle might have had to make the claim about Socrates that he does in T27, and so it is reasonable to assume that Plato was his source here.

(T28) Lysander and Socrates are given as examples of ones who are indifferent to good and bad fortune.

Post. an. 2.13, 97b15–25

Quite obviously, there is little of historical significance that one can gain from considering Aristotle's claim here. Certainly the Socrates of Plato's *Apology* might have seemed to Aristotle as someone who showed such indifference. But the same could also be said of the Socrates of Xenophon's *Apology*, for that matter. Lysander is never mentioned by name in Plato's surviving dialogues. Even so, this is consistent with the skeptics' claim that Plato was Aristotle's only source about the historical Socrates.

One other bit of testimony also falls into this category, though it obviously carries little weight, as it comes from the so-called Aristotelian *Fragments*.

(T29) Of the inscriptions at Delphi that which was thought to be the most divine was "Know Thyself"; it was this, as Aristotle has said in his Platonic works, that started Socrates off puzzling and inquiring.

PLUT. *Adv. Col.* 1118c

Socrates' interest in this famous Delphic inscription is mentioned in both Plato (e.g. at *Chrm.* 164d4, *Phdr.* 229e6) and also Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.2.24), and so

14 *Ap.* 20c1–3, 21d2–7, 23b2–4; *Chrm.* 165b4–c2, 166c7–d6; *Euthphr.* 5a7–c5, 15c12, 15e5–16a4; *La.* 186b8–c5, 186d8–e3, 200e2–5; *Lysis* 212a4–7, 223b4–8; *Hp. mai.* 286c8–e2, 304d4–e5; *Grg.* 509a4–6; *Meno* 71a1–7, 80d1–4; *Resp.* 1.337e4–5.

Aristotle could presumably have gotten the connection from multiple sources available to him (cf. Moore 2015, 7–13).

3 Aristotelian Testimony That Does Not Depend on Plato

3.1 *Aristotle and Xenophon*

Several other bits of Aristotelian testimony seem quite plainly to have relied on sources other than Plato. One of these turns out to be extremely important, because we can be very confident in identifying Aristotle's actual source.

(T30) Some, again, think that we only regard the useful (*chrêsimon*) as a friend, their proof being that all pursue the useful, but the useless, even in themselves, they throw away (as old Socrates said, citing the case of our spittle, hairs, and nails), and that we cast off useless parts, and in the end at death our very body, the corpse being useless; but that those who have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt.

Eth. Eud. 7.1, 1235a35–b2

Those eager to associate Aristotelian testimony with Plato's dialogues might hope to find some success in this case by looking to Plato's *Lysis*, in which the association of friendship to benefit is explored. But that connection is wholly inadequate to explain the specifics of what Aristotle attributes to Socrates here—for the examples of “spittle, hairs, and nails” never appear in Plato's *Lysis* as examples, and yet it is these specific examples that Aristotle quite explicitly attributes to Socrates. As a matter of fact, however, we can almost certainly identify who Aristotle used as his source here. He used not Plato, but Xenophon.

He even used to say that when the soul, the only place where prudence resides, left the body, men carry out and get rid of the body as quickly as possible, even that of the closest relative. Socrates used to point out that every man alive, if he does not do so himself, allows others to remove useless parts of his body, even though the body is what a man loves most of all. Either they themselves cut and burn off nails, hair, and calluses, or they allow doctors to do so, despite the pain and suffering involved. Men think they should even give thanks and money for this! They spit saliva from their mouths as far away as possible, because it is of no use to them inside and could do much harm.

XEN. *Mem.* 1.2.53–54

This passage turns out to be quite important for what we should think about Aristotle's degree of dependence on Plato. For here, it is plain that Aristotle did rely on some other source than Plato, *and not just for some trivial biographical detail* about the historical Socrates.

3.2 *Testimonia with Unknown Other Sources*

There remain several items in Aristotle's testimonia about Socrates for which we can assign no specific sources, while nonetheless being fairly confident that Aristotle did not get the reported information from Plato or Xenophon. Many of these are in the so-called Aristotelian *Fragments*, and may thus be regarded with some suspicion as to their accuracy or authenticity. But before we list these, we will provide three from the *Rhetoric* and one from the (also doubtful) *Problems*.

(T31) A clever stock will degenerate towards the insane type of character, like the descendants of Alcibiades or of the elder Dionysius; a steady stock towards the fatuous and torpid type, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates.

Rh. 2.15, 1390b28–31

This rather fanciful bit of socio-biology obviously does not wholly exclude the possibility that Plato was Aristotle's only source for the claim that Socrates qualified as "steady stock." But we never learn from Plato anything to support the claim that Socrates' descendants were "fatuous and torpid."

(T32) A further example is to be found in the reason given by Socrates for not going to the court of Archelaus. He said that "one is insulted by being unable to requite benefits, as well as by being unable to requite injuries."

Rh. 2.23, 1398a24–26

This bit of testimony is particularly interesting, since we never get any indication from Plato that Socrates was ever invited to the court of Archelaus. Plato actually has Socrates claim that he never met Archelaus (*Grg.* 470d5–e3). The story Aristotle tells seems to have been preserved, and Diogenes Laertius may have had Aristotle's testimony in mind—or perhaps the source that Aristotle used—when he (2.25) includes the event in his biography of Socrates.¹⁵

15 Contrast the close association between Socrates and Archelaus alleged by Aristoxenus; see Stavru (in this volume), section 4.1.2.

(T33) Or again as Aristippus said in reply to Plato when he spoke somewhat too dogmatically, as Aristippus thought: “Well, anyhow, our *friend*,” speaking about Socrates (*legôn tôn Sôkratên*), “never spoke like that.”

Rh. 2.23, 1398b29–31

Here again, this is a story we cannot find in Plato, who only mentions himself in two of the dialogues, and never with the object of airing a criticism of himself.¹⁶ We might more reasonably suppose that Aristotle’s source for this tale was Aristippus himself.¹⁷

(T34) Many others of the heroes seem to have been similarly afflicted, and among men of recent times Empedocles, Plato, and Socrates, and numerous other well-known men, and also most of the poets. For many such persons have bodily afflictions as the result of this kind of temperament, while some of them obviously possess a natural inclination to affections of this kind; in a word, they all, as has been said, are naturally *atrabilius*.

Pr. 1, 953a26–32

The Socrates who appears in Plato’s dialogues is far too playful and charming to qualify as “*atrabilius*.”

Let us now turn to the testimony provided in the *Fragments*.

(T35) Aristotle says that he [sc. Socrates] had two wives, first Xanthippe from whom he had Lamprocles, and secondly Myrto, the daughter of Aristides the Just, whom he took without a dowry and from whom he had Sophroniscus and Menexenus.

DL 2.26

The only wife ever mentioned by Plato—and the one who Plato has visiting Socrates on the day of his death (*Phd.* 60a2–6)—is Xanthippe.¹⁸

16 Plato is named at *Ap.* 38b7, as being present in the courtroom and as attempting to assist Socrates in the offer of a fine for the counter-penalty, and at *Phd.* 59b10, as actually being absent on the day Socrates died.

17 I note that this is how Brisson (in this volume), section 4, seems to understand Aristotle’s remark here.

18 I do not regard the *Halcyon* as authentic. Scholarly consensus contends that the work was written much later. But the *Halcyon* mentions both Xanthippe and Myrto: “I shall sing frequently to my wives, Xanthippe and Myrto, of your piety and loving devotion to your husband.” Those more familiar with earlier depictions of the relationship between

(T36) Just as it is disputed what height is good, so it is disputed those who ought to be called well-born. Some think it is those born of good ancestors, which was the view of Socrates: he said that because Aristides was good his daughter was nobly born.

STOB. *Anth.* 4.29.a.25

This story sounds like it belongs in the same category as the stories that have Socrates married to Aristides' daughter, Myrto. Again, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that Plato was the source for this testimony.

(T37) He [sc. Socrates] had as rivals, according to Aristotle in the third book of his *On Poetry*, a certain Antilochus of Lemnos and Antiphon the soothsayer.

DL 2.46

Although several people attempt to menace Socrates in Plato's dialogues, the only Antilochus ever mentioned in them is Nestor's son in the *Iliad* (*Ion* 537a5). Several references are made to Antiphon (and these do not all appear to refer to the same man¹⁹), but none appear to be references to a soothsayer. We do not know what Aristotle (or Diogenes) had as a source for this claim.

(T38) Aristotle says that he [sc. Socrates] went to Delphi.

DL 2.23

In Plato, we hear about Socrates' friend, Chaerephon, going to Delphi and receiving the famous oracle about Socrates' wisdom (*Ap.* 20e7–21a7). Not once does Plato ever depict Socrates himself as having actually gone to Delphi.

Socrates and Xanthippe—particularly those provided by Xenophon—would find the *Halcyon's* characterization of her as one of “loving devotion” surprising. In the very brief moment in which she appears in Plato (cited above), the shrewishness that became her legend is not, however, evident. For other discussion of the two wives, see Woodbury 1973. See also Stavru (in this volume), section 4.4.1.

19 See Nails 2002, s.v. Antiphon.

4 Assessing the Aristotelian Contribution to “The Socrates Problem”

4.1 *Skepticism about the Aristotelian Evidence Revisited*

In this chapter, I have gone through the Aristotelian testimony carefully, so that we could try to see for ourselves whether the evidence supported skeptics’ claims that Aristotle relied entirely on Plato for what he says about Socrates. Here is what I have found, in going through thirty-eight items of testimony from Aristotle.

1. Several of the testimonia that are sometimes counted as belonging to the Aristotelian evidence come from sources that are unreliable and of dubious authenticity. In his *Complete Works of Aristotle*, Jonathan Barnes notes that authenticity of the *Problems* and the *Magna Moralia* have been “seriously doubted” (see xii) and though he does not make any comment there about the *Fragments*, it is obvious that caution is required in the case of these. If we accept the arguments against these works, the thirty-eight testimonia are reduced to twenty six. I leave it to readers to decide what to make of these sources, but confess that I regard the most important of these—the *Magna Moralia*—as authentic.²⁰

But skepticism with respect to this evidence is always expressed in terms of its alleged dependence upon what Plato provides. If we elect to overlook the evidence on the ground that Aristotle may not have been its actual author, the skeptical suspicion also has to shift—for now there is no further reason to suspect that Plato’s influence on Aristotle is grounds for doubting the evidence in these texts. Perhaps the skeptics could now apply the same arguments for why the putatively non-Aristotelian evidence should be similarly rejected, but precisely how or why the same skepticism applies to non-Aristotelian evidence is anything but obvious, and I believe distinct arguments would be required.

2. Skeptics are quite right to note the obvious connections between the Aristotelian testimony and what we get in Plato. In my review of the thirty eight items, I have concluded that four certainly had Plato as their source (T5–T8), and twenty-two others could well have had Plato as their source (T1, T9–T29). But that still leaves us with twelve passages in which Aristotle talks about Socrates and says things that we have concluded could not have come entirely from Plato (T2–T4, T30–T38). So even if we concede to skeptics the claim that

²⁰ For a defense of this position see Cooper 1973.

Plato was Aristotle's most important source about Socrates, I regard twelve bits of undeniably independent evidence as too weighty to draw the skeptical conclusion.

Now five of the twelve passages that I count as clear evidence of Aristotle's independence from Plato come from dubious sources. But the problem for skeptics would still remain, since it still turns out that seven of twenty six of the testimonia that are counted as authentic cannot have Plato as their source—more than a quarter of the total evidence under consideration. I conclude that Aristotle both had and used sources other than Plato for at least some of what he tells us about Socrates. And that would seem to imply that even when Aristotle used Plato as a source, he did so with a background of independence from Plato. And once we have established with near certainty that Aristotle did at least sometimes use sources other than Plato, there remains no reason to accept the skeptics' claims that the evidence about Socrates' philosophical views depended entirely on Plato's influence over Aristotle.

3. It cannot be doubted that Aristotle presents his testimony about Socrates *as if* it is about the historical philosopher himself—except in those cases in which Aristotle plainly cites the works of Plato in which the Socrates Aristotle is talking about appears (about which, see section 2.1, above). It is with this sort of evidence in view that some non-skeptics (such as Vlastos 1991, 97 n. 67) have called upon what has come to be known as “Fitzgerald's canon”: the claim that Aristotle distinguishes between the historical Socrates and Plato's Socrates by indicating the latter with the definite article—“the Socrates” (of whatever dialogue applies)—and the former when he simply used the name “Socrates” without the article (see Ross 1924, 1.xxxix–xli). My own review of the Aristotelian evidence, however, does not sustain this criterion. It is true that Aristotle usually uses the definite article when he is talking explicitly about the Socrates who appears in some specific Platonic dialogue. But there are also exceptions to Fitzgerald's canon that show it is not a reliable indicator of the distinction it is supposed to sustain. For example, in T9, T15, T32, and T33,²¹ Aristotle uses the article, but appears to be talking about the historical Socrates while not making any obvious citation of a Platonic dialogue, and when he recalls in the *Rhetoric* Socrates' claims in Plato's *Menexenus* (T5 and

21 Taylor 1911, 44–45, and Nehamas 1999, 93, count T33 as a counterexample to “Fitzgerald's canon,” and so I list it here as one. This particular case, however, is less clearly a counterexample than the others mentioned, as the specific grammatical construction in T33 may explain the Aristotle's use of the article here.

T6) Aristotle plainly refers to the Socrates of the dialogue, but does not use the article. The same omission of the article may be found when Aristotle seems to be recalling a scene from Plato's *Apology* (in T7). In T18 Aristotle uses only the name without the article, but (as I said in our commentary on this passage) it is difficult to miss what appears to be a direct allusion to lines given to Socrates in Plato's *Protagoras* in what Aristotle says.²² Moreover in T30 Aristotle appears to be relating something he took from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* without the use of the article. A more plausible indication than "Fitzgerald's canon" of when Aristotle means to refer to the historical Socrates is Stenzel's observation that when Aristotle wishes to talk about the character in Plato's dialogues, he uses the present tense—"Socrates says ..."—whereas when he means to talk about the historical Socrates, Aristotle always uses the past ("Socrates said") or imperfect ("Socrates used to say") (Stenzel 1927, A.1, col. 882; repeated in Vlastos 1991, 97 n. 67). Of course, by either criterion, it would follow that Aristotle supposed, when he wrote T30, that the character who spoke in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* should be identified with the historical Socrates.

But whether or not either of these criteria provide the sort of "litmus test" we might like, it remains true that in all of the testimonia that skeptical scholars have contended derive entirely from Plato, Aristotle talks as if he is referring to the historical Socrates. He also uses the past tense when he intends to attribute views to the historical Plato—and he freely attributes views to the historical Plato that are mainly or *only* ever expressed by the character, Socrates, who speaks in Plato's middle or later period dialogues. As I noted in my earlier discussion, this presents an awkward problem for skeptics, because it means that Aristotle seems to have read Plato's dialogues in precisely the way that historicist developmentalists (like Vlastos) have proposed.²³ So unless Aristotle actually does represent a truly independent source of evidence—the very thing skeptics most of all want to deny—then Aristotle must have supposed that he had *some warrant* for thinking that Plato had accurately represented the historical Socrates—including most importantly his *philosophical views*—in

22 Similar reservations about the use of 'Fitzgerald's canon' may be found in Nehamas 1999, 93, and especially Taylor 1911, 42, who also notes that "the text of Aristotle exhibits the same kind of fluctuation in the presence or absence of the article with other proper names". Not all scholars have found these objections decisive—see, e.g. Irwin 1995, 355 n. 12.

23 Some developmentalists simply think that the indications of development between the earlier and later dialogues are merely phases in Plato's own thinking, with Socrates used always (and only) as a "mouthpiece." I am thus calling those scholars who combine developmentalism with the further claim that associates the Socrates of the earlier dialogues with the historical Socrates "historicist developmentalists."

the early dialogues, and then had gone on to represent Plato's own views, put into the mouth of the character named Socrates, in the middle and later dialogues. This, of course, is what historicist developmentalists claim that Plato did. This result, however, defeats treating *Plato's* evidence with skepticism.

4.2 *Summary and Conclusion*

These observations plainly fall far short of determining exactly how we should respond to the evidence about Socrates given in Aristotle's works. But the evidence does seem to me to provide some grounds for interpreting Plato's dialogues in the way developmentalists have done (and continue to do). Aristotle most certainly did *not* have *only* Plato as a source *about* Socrates, and even if he did rely mostly on Plato for what he had to say about Socratic philosophy, the very way in which Aristotle derived his views about Socratic philosophy needs to be taken seriously. Aristotle was both a historicist about Socrates, and also supports the developmentalist understanding of the appearance of Socrates in Plato's dialogues. Perhaps either or both of these positions are mistakes. But if they are mistakes, at least contemporary historicist developmentalists can count themselves as being in very good company—and as taking an approach to “Socratic philosophy” that has very deep roots in the history of thought that go all the way back to the time of Plato.

References

- Barnes, J. *The complete works of Aristotle*, 1–11. Princeton 1984.
- Benjamin, A.S. *Xenophon: recollections of Socrates and Socrates' defense before the jury*. New York 1985.
- Bokwone, P. 'Sokrates' Philosophie in der Darstellung des Aristoteles', *AGPh* 27 (1913), 295–304.
- Brickhouse, T.C. and Smith, N.D. *Plato's Socrates*. New York 1994.
- Brickhouse, T.C. and Smith, N.D. *The trial and execution of Socrates: sources and controversies*. New York 2002.
- Brickhouse, T.C. and Smith, N.D. *Socratic moral psychology*. Cambridge 2010.
- Chroust, A.-H. 'Socrates in the light of Aristotle's testimony', *The New Scholasticism* 26 (1952), 327–366.
- Cooper, J.M. 'The *Magna Moralia* and Aristotle's moral philosophy', *AJPh* 94 (1973), 327–349.
- Cooper, J.M. *Plato: complete works*. Indianapolis 1997.
- Döring, A. *Die Lehre des Sokrates als soziales Reformsystem: neuer Versuch zur Lösung des Problems der sokratischen Philosophie*. München 1895.

- Dorion, L.-A. 'The rise and fall of the Socratic problem', in: D.R. Morrison, *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011.
- Ford, A.L. 'ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ in Aristotle and fourth-century theories of genre', *CPh* 105 (2010), 221–235.
- Halliwell, S. 2006. 'An Aristotelian perspective on Plato's dialogues', in: F.-G. Herrmann, *New essays on Plato: language and thought in fourth-century Greek philosophy*. Swansea 2006, 189–211.
- Gomperz, T. *Griechische Denker: eine Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*. Leipzig 1902.
- Hicks, R.D. *Diogenes Laertius* 1. Cambridge, MA 1925.
- Irwin, T.H. 'Socrates the Epicurean?' *ICS* 11 (1986), 85–112.
- Irwin, T.H. *Plato's ethics*. Oxford 1995.
- Irwin, T.H. 'The Platonic corpus', in: G. Fine, *The Oxford handbook of Plato*. New York 2008, 63–87.
- Joël, K. *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates*. Berlin 1983.
- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Maier, H. *Sokrates: sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung*. Tübingen 1913.
- Mansfeld, J. 'Aristotle on Socrates' Contributions to Philosophy', in: F. Alesse et al., *Anthropine Sophia: studi di filologia e storiografia filosofica in memoria di Gabriele Giannantoni*. Napoli 2008, 337–349.
- McPherran, M.L. '"What even a child would know": Socrates, luck, and providence at *Euthydemus* 277d–282e', *AncPhil* 25 (2005), 1–15.
- McPherran, M.L. 'Socratic *epagôgê* and Socratic induction', *JHPH* 45 (2007), 347–364.
- Moore, C. *Socrates and self-knowledge*. Cambridge 2015.
- Nails D. *The people of Plato*. Indianapolis 2002.
- Nehamas A. *Virtues of authenticity*. Princeton 1999.
- Penner, T. 1992. 'Socrates and the early dialogues', in: R. Kraut, *The Cambridge companion to Plato*. Cambridge 1992, 121–169.
- Penner, T. 'The historical Socrates and Plato's early dialogues: some philosophical questions', in: J. Annas and C.J. Rowe, *New Perspectives on Plato, modern and ancient*. Cambridge 2013, 189–212.
- Peterson, S. *Socrates and philosophy in the dialogues of Plato*. Cambridge 2012.
- Reshotko, Naomi. *Socratic virtue: making the best of the neither-good-nor-bad*. Cambridge 2006.
- Robin, L. 'Sur une hypothèse récente relative a Socrate', *REG* 29 (1916), 129–165.
- Ross, W.D. *Aristotle's Metaphysics: a revised text with introduction and commentary*, 1–11. Oxford 1924.
- Russell, Daniel. *Plato on pleasure and the good life*. Oxford 2005.
- Smith, N.D. 'Plato and Aristotle on the nature of women', *JHPH* 21 (1983), 467–478.
- Stenzel, J. 'Sokrates (Philosoph)', in: *RE* 11 (1927), coll. 811–890.

- Taylor, A.E. 'On the alleged distinction in Aristotle between *Sokrates* and *ho Sokrates*', in: A.E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*. Oxford 1911, 40–90.
- Vlastos, G. *Socrates: ironist and moral philosopher*. Ithaca 1991.
- Waterfield, R. 'The quest for the historical Socrates', in: J. Bussanich and N.D. Smith, *The Bloomsbury companion to Socrates*. London 2013, 1–19.
- Woodbury, L. 'Socrates and the daughter of Aristides', *Phoenix* 27 (1973), 7–25.

Aristoxenus on Socrates

Alessandro Stavru
Università Bocconi Milano

1 Introduction

With very few exceptions in modern scholarship, Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* has been thought untrustworthy as a source of information about Socrates.¹ This is not surprising, since the Socrates described by Aristoxenus appears at odds with the one generally reconstructed from the first-generation Socratics, our main sources for his thought. Most scholars have claimed that Aristoxenus' portrait is hostile toward Socrates, and thus incompatible with the "idealized" accounts of earlier sources, especially Plato and Xenophon. Recent studies have assessed Aristoxenus' report more positively, pointing out that it relied on oral accounts, and was therefore likely to reflect features of the historical Socrates.²

This chapter will follow this newer trend of studies. I will first dwell on the peculiar features of Aristoxenus's report on Socrates, which is closely linked to the development of the biographical genre in antiquity. It is important to see that Aristoxenus' cultural background is not that of the *Sôkratikoî logoi*, but that of the Pythagorean and Peripatetic milieux. His way of dealing with Socratic literature is altogether different from that of the first-generation Socratics, or even of Aristotle. Nevertheless, most of what he writes seems to be related, explicitly or implicitly, to that literature. The accounts of the Socratics do in fact feature, at once, an "idealized" Socrates, whose intellectual abilities make him a model of virtue and philosophical inquiry, and a highly realistic Socrates, whose most peculiar and "positive" qualities turn out to be closely connected to the "negative" and critical aspects of his character.³ Aristoxenus' character-

1 For different reasons these scholars reject Aristoxenus as a trustworthy source of information about Socrates: Leo 1901; Dittmar 1912; Heiberg 1913; Maier 1913; Burnet 1914; Schmid 1920; Zeller 1963 (⁵1922); Stuart 1928; Geffcken 1928; Wehrli 1967; Dihle 1970; Fitton 1970 (who, however, accepts Aristoxenus' account of Socrates' two wives); Guthrie 1971; Woodbury 1971; Momigliano 1993; Mansfeld 1994; Son nabend 2002; Patzer 2006; Barker 2007. Exceptions: von Mess 1916; Joël 1921; Minar 1979 (¹1942); Fortenbaugh 2007; Zimmermann 2014. I am thankful to Christopher Moore and Livio Rossetti for their precious remarks. They have substantially improved this chapter.

2 Döring 2007; Schorn 2012; Huffman 2012.

3 On the realistic features of a "Socrates in action" see Rossetti 2011. Rossetti reconstructs these

ization of Socrates as an ignorant, irascible, sex-driven man who dominates his licentiousness through education while remaining constantly exposed to violent emotions is not at odds with the depictions of the first-generation Socratics. I will deal with Aristoxenus' connections with the *Sôkratikoî logoi* (in particular with Antisthenes, Plato, Xenophon, and Phaedo) as well as with other biographical material that circulated within the Peripatus, and conclude that Aristoxenus' understanding of Socrates as a "living contradiction," far from being "polemical" or "unkind" toward Socrates, is not even an idiosyncratic position: in most cases it is explicit or implicit in earlier literature.

2 Sources

Aristoxenus was an erudite and prolific writer: 453 books were attributed to him, dealing with a complex range of subjects.⁴ A substantial part of his work takes on Pythagorean issues, such as harmony and music, while a smaller portion, mostly of an historical character, seems to be influenced by topics studied in the Peripatus.⁵ This fact is important for understanding what in antiquity has been praised as one of Aristoxenus' greatest achievements, namely the artful description of the "lives" (*bioi*) of famous personalities.⁶ We know about his lives of Pythagoras, Archytas, Socrates, Plato, and the poet Telestes, and hear tell of books in which, probably, whole series of personalities were depicted.⁷ Such accounts were complete portraits of the life and the character of important persons of the past. Of these works only the portions excerpted by later authors remain, the transmission of these texts being often indirect, through late antique sources.

features through an intertextual study of parallel passages in the Comics, the Sophists, and the first-generation Socratics, and relates them to Socrates' way of living, behaving, and dealing with others. Rossetti shows that a number of parallel texts refers to a clearly recognizable "Socratic character" whose communication strategies aim not at imparting wisdom but at changing the interlocutor's mind through psychagogic, protreptic, and maieutic means. This chapter endeavors to show how these traits belong to the complex personality into which Aristoxenus gives insight, albeit from a different angle than the Socratics.

4 "Omnium longe doctissimus" (fr. 10b Wehrli = Hieronymus, *De viris illustribus*, praefatio); "Vir litterarum veterum diligentissimus" (fr. 25 Wehrli = Gell. *NA* 4.11). On Aristoxenus' oeuvre see the reconstructions by von Jan 1895; Centrone 1989; Kaiser 2010, vii–xxxvii; Zimmermann 2014.

5 See Wehrli 1967, and the overviews in Centrone 1989 and Kaiser 2010, x–xii.

6 Fr. 10a–b Wehrli.

7 *On Pythagoras and His Pupils*, *On Aulos Players* and *On Tragedians* (see Kaiser 2010, xi).

In the case of the *Life of Socrates*, the great majority of the extant fragments are quotations from Porphyry's lost *History of Philosophy* (third century CE), which in turn are quoted by the Christian authors Cyril of Alexandria and Theodoret of Cyrrus (both born in the last quarter of the fourth century CE). An important point to make is that although these authors are critical toward "ancient pagans," they seem to be largely reliable for Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates*. This follows from the fact that both of them identify the source they quote it from, namely the third book of Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*. This text was probably still extant when they wrote; readers could verify the exactness of their quotations. So even if their general attitude toward Socrates was polemical, they likely quoted Porphyry with accuracy.

Cyril and Theodoret quote two blocks of texts nearly *verbatim* and without referring to each other. These two blocks, the introductions to them, and their place in Porphyry's text are either very similar or in fact identical. This makes it probable that Cyril and Theodoret do not draw them directly from Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*, but from an intermediary source that featured a selection of passages from it.⁸ A close look at these texts lets us draw some interesting conclusions. In one case, Cyril (*Adv. Iul.* 6.186) and Theodoret (*Graecarum affectionum curatio* 12.63–65) quote a nearly identical passage from Porphyry, but while the former attributes it to Porphyry, the latter attributes it to Aristoxenus. In another passage the situation is the other way round: here Cyril states that he owes his information to Aristoxenus (*Adv. Iul.* 6.208), while Theodoret does not mention him (*Graec. aff. cur.* 1.26–29). These two cases make it likely that each time Cyril and Theodoret quote passages about Socrates from Porphyry's *History of Philosophy* they are ultimately relying on Aristoxenus—even when they do not explicitly mention his name. This means that all the quotations from Porphyry that deal with Socrates in Cyril and Theodoret should count as sources for Aristoxenus.⁹ This conclusion is of some importance, as it yields an expansion of the corpus of texts commonly attributed to the *Life of*

8 This has been rightly pointed out by Schorn 2012, 202.

9 This point has been made by Patzer 2006, 37–38, followed by Schorn 2012, 201. Patzer is certainly right when he claims that "in his biography of Socrates, Porphyry focused largely on Aristoxenus's biography of Socrates" (37), but he goes too far when he concludes that everything Porphyry reports on Socrates should be attributed to Aristoxenus (38). Even if the fragments 210 Smith (Socrates historicus, *Historia ecclesiastica* 3.23) and 215a (*Suda* s.v. Σωκράτης) seem to have an Aristoxenean flavor and can be easily related to the extant fragments of Aristoxenus, there is simply no evidence for claiming that Porphyry drew them from his *Life* and not from another biographical work on Socrates (such as of Demetrius of Phalerum's *Apology of Socrates*).

Socrates.¹⁰ This chapter will benefit from such an expansion—it will include four passages not featured in other collections: one from Cyril and three from Theodoret.¹¹

2.1 *Pythagorean and Peripatetic Connections*

When Aristoxenus came to Athens and joined the Peripatus, probably around 335 BCE,¹² he could draw on rich biographical and doxographical information that had been collected and (at least partly) published by Aristotle on the Pythagoreans, the Socratics, and other philosophers.¹³ It is very likely that other members of the early Peripatus, such as Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, also worked with this material.¹⁴ But unlike other Peripatetics, Aristoxenus made a peculiar use of such material, privileging empirical and ethical aspects over doctrinal and more abstract ones. It has been rightly observed that Aristoxenus

-
- 10 Wehrli's collection has twelve fragments (51, 52a and 52b, 53, 54a and 54b, 55–60), and is heretofore the most complete. The older collection by Müller 1848 had eight fragments (25–31 and 31a); the more recent ones rely on Wehrli: Giannantoni 1971 (twelve fragments: 1–12) and *SSR* I B (eleven fragments: 41–51), and Kaiser 2010, who opts for a chronological order (the same fragments as in Wehrli split up into fourteen: Plutarch: 2.4.15 and 2.4.40; Diogenes Laertius: 3.2.40 and 3.2.45; Athenaeus: 3.2.125; Eusebius: 4.1.05; Synesius: 4.2.05; Cyril: 5.2.50; 5.2.55; 5.2.65; Theodoret: 5.2.65, 15.1.40; *Suda* (10).2.05; *Σ. Pl. Ap.*: INC.2.05).
 - 11 New text from Cyril *Adv. Iul.*: 6.208 = fr. 212 Smith (portion of T2); new texts from Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.*: 1.26–28, not in Smith (T3); 12.65–67 = fr. 215 Smith (T6) and 12.68 = fr. 217 Smith (beginning of T12); 4.2 = fr. 216 Smith (T7).
 - 12 Huffman 2014, 285, claims that Aristoxenus came to Athens around 350. Reconstructions of chronological dates relating to Aristoxenus' life are difficult, as the only available source is a very late one, the Byzantine *Suda* (completed in the tenth century CE). Even Aristoxenus' date of birth is debated: taking the information about his *floruit* to be correct (336–332 BCE, according to *Suda* α 3927), scholars claim that he was born in 379 (Pearson 1990, xxv), in 370–365 (Momigliano 1993, 74; Visconti 1999, 19–20), or in 356–352 (Bélis 1986, 18 n. 10).
 - 13 There is evidence for an early date (c. 350 BCE) of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* A, a work that presupposes a repository of facts about previous philosophers. It is probable that Aristotle's books on the Pythagoreans also go back to that period (Berti 1999, 14–19).
 - 14 A use of doxographical material can be acknowledged with certainty for a contemporary of Aristoxenus, Theophrastus of Eresos (c. 371–287 BCE), who drew on Aristotle's books on the Pythagoreans in his *Physical Opinions* (see Philip 1963, 197, who relates *Dox. Gr.* 360A, 1–8, and 360B, 1–11 [Theophrastus] to fr. 16 Ross [Aristotle]). The relationship between Aristoxenus and Theophrastus must not have been good: according to the *Suda*, when Aristotle appointed Theophrastus to the succession of the Peripatus, Aristoxenus' disappointment was so great that he “took revenge” (ὑβρίσεν) on Aristotle after his death (fr. 1 Wehrli).

was probably the first Peripatetic to pick up the erudite research promoted by Aristotle and to blend it into his biographies, enriching them with gossip and anecdotes.¹⁵

This peculiarity might depend on Aristoxenus' Pythagorean background, which made him a non-conventional Peripatetic. But Aristoxenus was also a non-conventional Pythagorean, as he had distanced himself from the older tradition of Pythagoreanism.¹⁶ Following upon recent developments that denied the existence of an immortal soul and of metempsychosis, he claimed that the soul was intimately related to a harmony of corporeal elements.¹⁷ This focus on the relation between the body and the soul is of utmost importance, as it provides useful hints for understanding Aristoxenus' approach to biography, and in particular to his *Life of Socrates*, which in this respect was radically different from the *Lives* of other Peripatetics.¹⁸

2.2 *Socrates, or the Birth of Biography*

From Cicero we learn that Aristoxenus "maintained that a certain straining (*intentionem*) of the body—like what is called harmony in singing and playing an instrument—was the soul, and believed that from the nature and the figure of the whole body various motions are excited, as sounds are from singing."¹⁹ This means that for Aristoxenus the soul was not "separated" from the body, as it was in traditional Pythagoreanism. It consisted instead in a kind of emotion-producing vibration that permeated both the inside and the outside of the body.

This conception of a "corporeal soul" might have had a profound influence on Aristoxenus's descriptions of individual personalities. He seems to have dealt first with Pythagoras, then with Archytas and other Pythagoreans, and only in a second stage with the non-Pythagoreans Socrates and Plato.²⁰ His

15 Momigliano 1993, 76.

16 See Zhmud 2012, 227 ("Determined to keep his distance from all authorities, he allied himself with Aristotle against the Pythagoreans and with the Pythagoreans against Aristotle") and Huffman 2014, 286 (for whom Aristoxenus "rejected the Pythagorean approach"). See also Kaiser 2010, xiii.

17 Frr. 118–121 Wehrli. In the *Phaedo* Plato attributes a similar doctrine to Philolaus's disciples Simmias of Thebes (86b–c and 92b–93c) and Echecrates of Phlius (88d).

18 Such as Dicaearchus of Messana (c. 350–285 BC), Chamaeleon of Heraclea (c. 350–281), Clearchus of Soli (c. 340 BCE–?), who most probably also wrote *Lives*: see White 2001, 197–198; Fortenbaugh 2007, 72; Schorn 2012, 206; Huffman 2014, 281–285.

19 Fr. 120a Wehrli = Cic. *Tusc.* 1.10.

20 This order has been suggested by Momigliano 1993, 75; Huffman 2014, 286.

account of Pythagoras linked the man to ideal types, mostly religious, mythic, and rational ones, as was common within the Peripatus; the same applies to his description of Archytas, which focused on his nearly superhuman self-control and restraint. Here we learn, for instance, that when angry the Pythagoreans waited in silence until they were able to think rationally.²¹

With Socrates we get a completely different picture. His anger is described as an emotion accompanied by a physiological disfigurement.²² The same applies to Socrates' ability to persuade, which is related to the sound of his voice, the shape of his mouth, and the outward manifestation of his character. Aristoxenus' account of Socrates is thus sharply contrasted with that of Archytas. Socrates' interior is driven by emotions that manifest themselves in his external appearance, whereas Archytas' emotions are not visible: they are controlled by rationality, and his body does not seem to be influenced by them.²³

It is evident that Socrates' personality, with his extraordinary outward appearance, his intense emotions, and his incredible capacity to restrain them rewarded psychological inquiry much more than the detached characters of Pythagoreanism.²⁴ Socrates' passionate character readily illustrated Aristoxenus' conception of a "corporeal soul," since it featured the dynamic interweave of psychological and physiological aspects. The Socratic literature (both the *Sôkratikoî logoi* and the biographical information about Socrates circulating in the Peripatus) provided a rich empirical basis to build an all-round figure upon these premises, and it is not surprising that Aristoxenus made extensive use of it. It seems, therefore, that it was the character of Socrates depicted in these texts, so unique and so different from the other personalities portrayed by Aristoxenus, that prompted the beginning of "modern biography."²⁵

21 Fr. 30 Wehrli. See also fr. 47–50. On other accounts of Archytas' personality see Huffman 2005, 283–341.

22 Frr. 54a–b and 56 Wehrli.

23 It is significant that we do not get such information even about the voluptuary Polyarchus, who in Athenaeus is juxtaposed to the virtuous Archytas (fr. 50 Wehrli). Polyarchus' pursuit of bodily pleasures does not seem to reflect on his physiognomy, as it does in Socrates. On this fragment see the discussion in Huffman 2005, 310–322, and 2012, 267–268.

24 This was pointed out by von Mess 1916, 83–84.

25 Aristoxenus is well aware of "the singularity of Socrates' appearance" (τὴν τοῦ εἰδούς ἰδιότητά): see fr. 54a–b Wehrli. Plato had labeled it ἀτοπία: *Symp.* 221c–d; *Gorg.* 494d. On Aristoxenus as the father of modern biography see Leo 1901, 79; von Mess 1916, 84; Momigliano 1993, 74–76; Patzer 2006, 35; Fortenbaugh 2007, 76; Huffman 2012, 279.

2.3 *Did Aristoxenus Rely on First-Hand Information about Socrates?*

Scholars who have reevaluated Aristoxenus as a reliable source for Socrates claim that he relied not on the fictional *Sôkratikoî logoi* but on independent first-hand information. A fragment of the *Life of Socrates* seems to confirm this. In this fragment (54a Wehrli), Aristoxenus names his father and teacher Spintharus as the source for his knowledge of Socrates. He says that Spintharus had “met” Socrates,²⁶ and that he will report what he “has heard” from him.²⁷ According to Spintharus, Socrates had an extraordinary power of persuasion, which reflected itself in his voice (φωνήν), his mouth (στόμα), his manifest character (ῥήθος), and his unique outward appearance (τὴν τοῦ εἶδους ιδιότητα). But sometimes, when Socrates was inflamed by anger, his disfigurement was terrible (δεινὴν ... ἀσχημοσύνην), and he was not able to restrain himself, either in his words or his deeds. The report based on Spintharus ends here, and the rest of the fragment is attributed to Porphyry, who probably relies on Aristoxenus.²⁸

Some scholars think that this part of Aristoxenus’ account should be taken as reliable, or even as reflecting the historical Socrates.²⁹ They claim that the historiographical principle of autopsy applies here: Aristoxenus reports not his own thoughts but facts transmitted though an eyewitness.³⁰ Aristoxenus’ *Life of Socrates* would therefore belong, though indirectly, to the Socratic literature

-
- 26 The participle ἐντυχόντων (fr. 54a Wehrli = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 6.185) does not suggest that Spintharus was an associate or even a pupil of Socrates, as some scholars have claimed (von Jan 1895, 1057; von Mess 1914, 90; Huffman 2012, 254). For thorough discussions of Spintharus and the sources reporting about him, see Müller 1878, 269; Woodbury 1971, 304 n. 18.
- 27 Schorn 2012, 207, is right in pointing out that the phrase λέγει δὲ ὁ Ἀριστόξενος ἀφηγούμενος τὸν βίον τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀκηκοέναι Σπινθάρου τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ (“in recounting the life of Socrates Aristoxenus says what he heard from Spintharus about him”) could mean that everything he reports on Socrates is derived from Spintharus. This reading is possible but highly unlikely for reasons I deal with in this paragraph.
- 28 Here I do not follow Schorn 2012, 207, who thinks that the whole passage of Cyril—and even the parallel one in Theodoret, in which Spintharus is not mentioned—is based on Spintharus’ oral autopsy.
- 29 On the reliability of Spintharus’ report see Heiberg 1913, 356–358; von Mess 1916, 90; Schorn 2012, 207–208; Huffman 2012, 254.
- 30 The principle of autopsy obviously does not apply to other passages of Aristoxenus’ *Life* in which episodes of Socrates’ youth are narrated (fr. 51–52). If we admit that Spintharus was Aristoxenus’ father and teacher (the son born no earlier than 375 BCE), he could not have witnessed Socrates’ youth. Other eyewitnesses Aristoxenus cites as sources (for Pythagoras) are Xenophilus of Chalcidice (fr. 25 Wehrli), who was another of his teachers, and the tyrant Dionysius II of Syracuse (fr. 31 Wehrli).

of the first generation. But with a significant difference: while the *Sôkratikoî logoi* are a literary fiction, aimed at providing the idea of a highly typified—if not altogether “idealized”—Socrates, Aristoxenus provides a balanced depiction of him, in which the positive and the negative aspects are both present.

I think this goes too far. The first difficulty relates to the historicity of Spintharus, which is problematic: chronology makes it hard to believe that he was the eyewitness of events that must have happened at least fifty years earlier.³¹ Moreover, the fact that Aristoxenus cites him as a source for the life of Archytas as well³² casts further doubts on his use of Spintharus as a character. In both cases, the reference to him looks like a device Aristoxenus uses to convey a realistic touch to his descriptions.

It is one thing, however, to admit that Spintharus may have existed and met Socrates, and even that he may have told his son about this encounter; it is quite another to claim that because Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* relies on Spintharus' eye-witness report (or some other form of hearsay), it is to count as the sole non-fictional document in the whole of the Socratic literature. This seems to me a groundless exaggeration. There is no need to assume that Aristoxenus relied on information not available to earlier authors. Indeed, nothing of what he reports about Socrates is incompatible with the accounts already circulating in the Peripatus, the *Sôkratikoî logoi* extant at his time, or the tradition dependent on them. That he made use of a wealth of sources seems assured by a passage in which Porphyry is likely quoting directly from Aristoxenus.³³ Here Porphyry—but very probably Aristoxenus himself—stresses (τούτων δὲ οὕτω σαφηνισθέντων λέγωμεν) that he is making a brief selection (ἐπ' ὀλίγον φυλοκρινούντες) of “the tales that have been related many times” (πολλαχῶς ... μεμυθευμένα) about Socrates “by erudite men” (ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων ἀνδρῶν). As we are going to see in the next paragraph, he organized this material into two main categories: information concerning the praise (ἔπαινον) of Socrates, and information concerning the reproach (ψόγον) of him.

31 See above, n. 12, for the three possible dates of Aristoxenus' birth. Even assuming the earliest of the three, 375 BCE, Spintharus would have been fifty when Aristoxenus was born and seventy when he told him the stories about Socrates (Huffman 2012, 254). Though possible, this hypothesis seems unrealistic, as Aristoxenus' account bears a series of details which seem difficult to be remembered fifty years later and at the age of seventy.

32 See fr. 30 Wehrli.

33 Fr. 212 Smith = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 6.208 (= T2).

3 Aristoxenus' Alleged Enmity toward Socrates

A major reason for the rejection of Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* depends on the enmity most scholars have attributed to his testimony.³⁴ It has been claimed that Aristoxenus is gossipy, unkind, even malicious, and that his slander should therefore not be taken seriously. This attitude relies on sources that make explicit reference to his "reproaches" (ψόγοι) and "criticisms" (ἐπιτιμωμένα), as well as on the "malignity" (κακότηες) and "enmity" (δυσμένεια) of his account.³⁵ The most important text to be considered is from Plutarch:

(Τ1) [fr. 55 Wehrli = Plut. *De Herod. malign.* 9.856c] Akin to these [sc. writers] are those who put praises (ἐπαίνους) alongside their reproaches (ψόγοις), as Aristoxenus did in the case of Socrates, who, having said that he was uneducated (ἀπαίδευτον), ignorant (ἀμαθῆ), and incontinent (ἀκόλαστον), added: "but there was no injustice (ἀδικία) involved." [Plut. *De Herod. malign.* 9.856d] For just as those who flatter (κολακεύοντες) with art and skill mix a few mild reproaches (ψόγους) with great and extended praises (ἐπαίνοις), adding frankness (παρρησίαν) to their flattery (κολακεία) as a spice, so malignity (τὸ κακότηες) lays down some praise (ἔπαινον) in the belief of whom it reproaches (ψέγει).³⁶

34 Most of the studies quoted above, n. 1, rely on this argument for considering Aristoxenus' account of Socrates altogether untrustworthy.

35 Sources on Aristoxenus' alleged enmity toward Socrates are: fr. 55 Wehrli and Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 1.26–28 (ψόγοι); fr. 217 Smith (ἐπιτιμωμένα); and fr. 51 Wehrli (δυσμένεια). Porphyry (c. 234–305 CE), who is a major source for Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* and was certainly influenced by it in his own account of Socrates, is accused of slander by the Church historian Socrates (c. 380–440 CE): "Porphyry, in the *History of Philosophy* he wrote, disparaged the life (τὸν βίον διέσυρεν) of the most important of all philosophers, Socrates. And the writings he left behind on him are such that not even the accusers of Socrates, Meletus and Anytus, dared to say such things: on Socrates, I mean, who was wonderful among the Greeks for his temperance (σωφροσύνη), justice (δικαιοσύνη), and the other virtues" (SSR I B 41 = fr. 210 Smith = Socrates historicus, *Historia ecclesiastica* 3.23. The passage has been reprised some thousand years later by another Church historian, Nicephorus Callistus, in his *Historia ecclesiastica* 10.36). It should be noted that this is the only source that attributes to Aristoxenus a one-sided enmity toward Socrates.

36 The second part of this passage (856d, starting with "For ...") is not featured in Wehrli. I agree with Schorn 2012, 189–199, who rightly emphasizes its importance for understanding the sense of the first part (856c). All translations from Aristoxenus are my own.

This passage gives us a valuable insight into Aristoxenus' attitude toward Socrates. According to Plutarch, Aristoxenus is among those who give detailed accounts of the positive and negative aspects of personalities. These two aspects are intertwined, as artful flattering cannot be one-sided; to arouse interest it needs the right amount of reproach and frankness. Similarly, the opposite of flattery, namely malignity, is not one-sided either, since its reproaches always follow praise. This means that in the case of Socrates, the negative aspects (his being uneducated, ignorant, and without self-control), the mention of which can count as malignity, are accompanied by positive ones (that he did not commit injustice while being uneducated, ignorant, and without self-control). Plutarch is suggesting that Aristoxenus' account of Socrates is therefore balanced, as all artful descriptions of personalities are and ought to be balanced.³⁷ We even find this mix of positive and negative judgements in other texts dealing with Aristoxenus' alleged enmity (fr. 51 Wehrli; fr. 217 Smith; Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 1.26–28).³⁸

It is striking that we find in T1 a word, *παρρησία*, that plays a pivotal role in Plato's depiction of Socrates. The etymology of the noun, a compound of *πᾶς* and *ῥῆσις*, points at the speaker's intention to "say everything"—and thus, when speaking of a person, to deal with both his or her positive and negative aspects.³⁹ Such duality is characteristic of the parrhesiastic Socrates depicted in various dialogues of the Platonic corpus and in one passage from Xenophon's *Symposium*.⁴⁰ These passages feature Socrates' harshness toward his pupils,

37 This fits with Plutarch's positive attitude toward Aristoxenus' *Lives* in *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 1093c (fr. 10 Wehrli), where he considers them as "neither harmful nor painful." See the thorough discussion of the passage in Schorn 2012, 184–188. The other passage of Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* reported by Plutarch is fr. 58 Wehrli = Plut. *Arist.* 27 (= T14), where the tone is not at all polemical.

38 It is striking that when Theodoret deals with Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* he reports both negative and positive aspects of Socrates; by contrast, when he recounts Plato's account of Socrates (in Alcibiades' speech of the *Symposium*), he explicitly accuses Plato of slandering his master: "Plato wrote this, but my consideration of Socrates hinders me to say that the speeches in this dialogue feature the strangeness and the drunken behavior of Socrates, as well as his dishonor" (Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 12.59). From Theodoret's perspective it was therefore Plato and not Aristoxenus who disparaged Socrates. This becomes even more clear a few lines later (12.61 = T10), where he declares that he will rely on Porphyry's account of Aristoxenus, and not (δέ) on Plato's (καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος δέ, τὴν Φιλόσοφον ἱστορίαν ξυγγράψας ... Ἀριστοξένῳ μάρτυρι κεχρημένος τὸν Σωκράτους βίον ξυγγεγραφότι).

39 See Palumbo 2013, 256.

40 See Xen. *Symp.* 8.25, a picture of Socrates that is radically juxtaposed to that in Plato's

who deem themselves fortunate to receive his criticism.⁴¹ It is important to note that Socrates does not criticize his pupils from the position of a teacher. On the contrary, in most cases his *parrhêsia* implies a position inferior to that of his interlocutor.⁴² In fact, Plato has Socrates disavowing knowledge in a variety of contexts, and when in the *Symposium* Diotima is about to impart to him the knowledge of the *erôtika*, she is doubtful about Socrates' ability to follow her.⁴³ Aeschines and Aristotle confirm this feature of Socrates, but do not give us further details about the extent and ambit of this lack of knowledge.⁴⁴ Aristoxenus articulates the idea more fully. In T1 he says that Socrates was uneducated (ἀπαίδευτον), ignorant (ἀμαθῆ), and incontinent (ἀκόλαστον);⁴⁵ in T3 he explains how this lack of *paideia* should be understood. Socrates, though not at all untalented (πρὸς οὐδέν ... ἀφυῆ), is uneducated in every respect (ἀπαίδευτον δὲ περὶ πάντα): he is not even able to write or read properly.⁴⁶ This particular inability may seem strange at first glance. In Phaedo, Socrates is stupid and dull;⁴⁷ in Plato he disavows traditional education and knowledge, in one case even admitting his difficulties in expressing himself.⁴⁸ But neither

Symposium. Here Socrates admits that he is gluttonous, and that he is urged by wine and love to speak frankly (παρρησιάζεσθαι) against *Erôs*.

41 See in particular Pl. *La.* 188a; *Resp.* 7.533a, on which Erler 2010, 291–292.

42 See Foucault 1983, 5: “an ancient Greek would not say that a teacher or father who criticizes a child uses *parrhêsia*. But when a philosopher criticizes a tyrant, when a citizen criticizes the majority, when a pupil criticizes his or her teacher, then such speakers may be using *parrhêsia*.”

43 See Pl. *Ap.* 21b, d, 22e, 33a; *Meno* 71d; *Hp. mai.* 304b; *Euthphr.* 16a; *Symp.* 216d and 209e (Diotima). For discussion of these and other passages in which Socrates disavows knowledge see the still classic Vlastos 1983.

44 Aeschines: *SSR* VI A 53 (ἐγὼ οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος); Aristotle: *Soph. el.* 34.183b (Σωκράτης ... ὡμολόγει γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι).

45 For discussion of this adjective see below, 4.1.2. Huffman 2012, 272, is convinced that the adjective was not in Aristoxenus, who in another passage has εὐκολον (T14). But ἀκόλαστος fits well with T8–10, so there is no reason to suspect it.

46 Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 1.28–29 (= end of T3).

47 Fr. 6 Rossetti = Cic. *Fat.* 5.10 (*stupidum ... et bardum*).

48 See Pl. *Ap.* 17b–18a, a passage Theodoret quotes right after having reported Aristoxenus' statement about Socrates' illiteracy (*Graec. aff. cur.* 1.30–31). Here Socrates marks the difference between the *logoi* of his accusers, which are “finely tricked out with words and phrases,” and his own, which aim at saying what is “true” and “just.” Socrates' admission of minimal rhetorical ability might strike the modern ear as an ironic dissimulation, or a *captatio benevolentiae*. Theodoret interprets the passage of the *Apology* in the literal sense, thus providing an explanation of Aristoxenus' claim about Socrates' illiteracy: “But although the language [of Socrates] was ignorant (ἀμαθῆ) and uneducated (ἀπαίδευτον),

Phaedo nor Plato go so far as to attribute a quasi-illiteracy to Socrates.⁴⁹ For this we have to look at Antisthenes, who reportedly claimed that the wise man could do without reading, writing, or rhetorical training.⁵⁰

4 Socrates' Life and Personality

It is very likely that Aristoxenus wrote his *bios* of Socrates while he was in Athens (c. 335–322 BCE), where he could draw on a wealth of Socratic literature and on biographical material collected within the Peripatus. The structure of the *bios* can only be guessed at: probably Aristoxenus went through various aspects and episodes of Socrates' life. It is also likely that his narrative followed a chronological order, since some parts of what he reports are evidently related to a young, others to an aged Socrates.

4.1 Youth

The information about Socrates' youth provided by Aristoxenus is of great interest given the scarcity of sources about this period of Socrates' life. For chronological reasons it probably could not have been conveyed by Spintharus. This means that Aristoxenus must have relied on written sources or, at best, on hearsay. A clearly identifiable source is Ion of Chios, who seems to be the source for the report about Socrates' connection with Archelaus.

4.1.1 From Stonecutting to *Paideia*

Aristoxenus' account of Socrates' first profession is largely hypothetical. He gives important pieces of information, but does not seem to be sure about all of them. Socrates might have worked with his father when he was very young, probably in his adolescence:

(T2) [Fr. 86 Giannantoni 1986, 512⁵¹ = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 6.207] We turn now to Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, whose mother was a midwife and whose father was a stonecutter. It is reported that he reached the apogee of his art without feeling blameworthy. [fr. 51 Wehrli = Cyril *Adv. Iul.*

he deserved more respect than anyone else, even more than Plato, who in his eloquence triumphed over all Greeks."

49 Nor do later authors who dwell on Socrates' ignorance refer to his illiteracy (see, e.g., SSR I C 440, 447–448, 450–452).

50 SSR V A 161 and 173. I owe this point to Schorn 2012, 213.

51 *Deest* in Giannantoni 1971 and in SSR.

6.208] Porphyry writes thus about Socrates in the third book of his *History of Philosophy*: [fr. 212 Smith = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 6.208] “let us make clear that what we say about Socrates has been deemed worthy of memory by others, and that we make a brief selection (ἐπ’ ὀλίγον φυλοκρινούντες) of the tales that have been related many times (πολλαχῶς ... μεμυθευμένα) by erudite men about the praise (ἔπαινον) and the reproach (ψόγον) of Socrates, but we leave aside without inquiry the question whether he worked with his father as a stonecutter (τὴν λιθοτομικήν) or whether his father worked alone. In fact, nothing of this left a mark on him (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνέκοπτεν) in his search for wisdom (πρὸς σοφίαν), since he worked for a short period of time. And even were he a carver of herms (έρμο-γλύφος), no more [would this have left a mark on him]: for this craft is pure and without blame (καθάρειος ... καὶ οὐ πρὸς ὀνειδούς).” [fr. 51 Wehrli = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 6.208] For Socrates became a craftsman, employing his father’s art, that of stonecutting (λιθοτομικήν). Timaeus also, in his ninth book, says that Socrates learned to work stone (λιθουργεῖν). If we cannot trust <Aristoxenus> because of his enmity (δυσμένειαν) and Timaeus because of his age, for Timaeus is younger, we must use Menedemus of Pyrrha, who became a pupil of Plato and was older than Aristoxenus, when he says, in the *Philocrates*, that Socrates never stopped talking either about his father as a stoneworker (λιθουργοῦ) or his mother as a midwife.⁵²

(T3) [Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 1.26–28] You certainly agree on the fact that Socrates the son of Sophroniscus is the greatest of all Greek philosophers. But he was born from a father who was a stonecutter (λιθοκόπου), and Porphyry, in the third book of his *History of Philosophy*, has written down the story this way: “what we say about Socrates ... pure and without blame [text nearly identical to T2].” What follows in the text has the same line of thought: it introduces authors who say that Socrates practiced the craft of stoneworking. [fr. 214 Smith = Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 1.28–29] But perhaps he practiced stoneworking in his youth, and then (ὕστερον δέ), having fell in love with poetic and rhetorical speeches (λόγων ποιητικῶν καὶ ῥητορικῶν ἐρασθεῖς), took part in education (παιδείας μετέλαχεν). But this cannot be said, since Porphyry claims the following: “he is not at all untalented (ἄφυῆ), but uneducated in every respect (ἀπαίδευτον δέ

52 The last portion of this passage, fr. 51 Wehrli, draws upon the translation by Huffman 2012, 259, which relies on the new Greek text of Cyril’s *Against Julian* by Wolfram Kinzig 2016.

περὶ πάντα), to put it simply. Probably he does not quite know the letters: he is ridiculous every time he must write or read, and he stammers like children do.”⁵³

These passages do not specify the work Socrates’ father Sophroniscus engaged in.⁵⁴ Was he a stone-cutter (λιθοτομική/λιθοκόπος), or, more generally a stone-worker (λιθοουργός)? Aristoxenus seems none too sure. Stonecutting seems to refer to the extraction of stone, possibly in a quarry; and stoneworking could mean a profession both in stonemasonry or in statuary in stone. In ancient Greece both jobs were thought particularly strenuous and physically demanding, and therefore “banausic,” unable to guarantee the leisure necessary for being good citizens and developing intellectual activities. In any case, it is should be noted that when speaking of Sophroniscus, Aristoxenus does not use terms which typically denote the *art* of sculpture (e.g., ἀγαλματοποιός). This seems to entail that even were Sophroniscus a sculptor, Aristoxenus saw in him someone who worked “stone,” and not “images in stone.”

Aristoxenus is sure that Socrates worked with stone for a short period of time, a fact Porphyry confirms by referring to reports by two earlier authors, Timaeus of Tauromenium and Menedemus of Pyrrha (τ2 seems to imply that this issue was highly debated among the authors on whom Porphyry relied); the latter adds that Socrates was proud of his father’s profession throughout his life. About everything else Aristoxenus is not sure. Possibly Socrates joined his father in stonecutting, and then moved on to a more refined kind of stoneworking. This seems to follow from the fact that Socrates “reached the apogee of his art without feeling blameworthy.” Such blame may be that of *banausos*, which applied to the profession he performed when working with his father. Aristoxenus suggests that Socrates might have detached himself from the banausic profession of his father by becoming at some point a “pure and blameless” carver of herms (έρμογλύφος). He could have performed such a profession in one or more statuary workshops, as a much discussed passage of Plato’s *Symposium* could imply.⁵⁵ In fact, a tradition linked Socrates to the art of sculp-

53 On the attribution of this passage to Aristoxenus’ *Life of Socrates* see above, n. 11. Such attribution is also maintained by Hansen 1994, 265; Patzer 2006, 38; Schorn 2012, 213. For discussion see above, n. 9.

54 As Livio Rossetti points out to me, the tradition reporting that Sophroniscus was a sculptor is a late one (unlike that of Phaenarete as a midwife, which began as early as Plato). The earliest extant references are Val. Max. III 4 ext. 1 (first century CE), followed by DL 2.18, Lib. *Apol. Socr.* 27, Epiph. *Adv. haeres.* 3.6, and (after Cyril and Theodoret) *Suda* s.v. Σωκράτης.

55 In Pl. *Symp.* 215b Socrates is compared to statues of Silenus that contain images of gods

ture: a Hermes Propylaion and a group of Graces which were placed on the Acropolis were (maybe erroneously) attributed to him, and just as the Platonic Socrates claims a lineage from the mythical initiator of sculpture Daedalus, the Xenophontic Socrates confers primacy to sculpture over painting and cuirass-making.⁵⁶ It is interesting to note that Socrates' profession as a "stonecutter" (λιθοκόπος) did not "leave a mark" (ἐνέκοπτεν) on him: Aristoxenus' pun clarifies that Socrates' banausic activity did not impede him in his search for *sophia*.

T3 narrates the last phase of Socrates' adolescence. While he was still working with stone, he fell in love (ἐρασθείς) with poetry and rhetoric. This event marked a new phase of his life (ὑστερον δέ), prompting him to look for traditional education (παιδεία). But even on this point Porphyry—and perhaps Aristoxenus—is uncertain, as it does not fit with the claim discussed before, that Socrates was uneducated and even illiterate.⁵⁷ A possible explanation to this difficulty may be that Porphyry (and/or Aristoxenus) is referring to different reports about single periods of Socrates' youth, and is having difficulties in assembling them in a coherent way.

4.1.2 Disciple of Archelaus

At some point toward the end of his adolescence, Socrates made an encounter that changed his life, orienting him toward philosophy.

(T4) [fr. 52a Wehrli = DL 2.19] He became a pupil of Archelaus, the writer on nature, of whom Aristoxenus says he also became the beloved (παιδικά).

when their two halves are pulled open. According to Plato, such statues were preserved in ἐρμολυφεία. Unfortunately, there is neither archaeological nor textual evidence of such statues except in passages dependent on this one, per Dover 1980, 166.

56 The evidence for Socrates as sculptor is shaky: see DL 2.18–19; Val. Max. 3.4.1; Lucian *Somn.* 12; Schol. Ar. *Nub.* 773; Paus. 1.22.8 and 9.35.3; *Suda* s.v. Σωκράτης; Plin. *HN* 36.32. On his relationship with Daedalus see Pl. *Euthphr.* 11b–d, *Meno* 97d–e, and *Alc.* 121a. On the primacy of sculpture over painting and cuirass-making see Xen. *Mem.* 3.10 (although Burnet 1924, 130–131, claims that were Socrates a former sculptor this would have been a perfect occasion to mention it). Vogel 1918 thinks that Socrates was never a sculptor because of his contemptuous statements about *demiourgoi* in Pl. *Ap.* 22d and *Symp.* 215b. This is not convincing if we think of the positive role played by the *demiourgos* in the *Timaeus*. Note the judgment of Busse 1919, 86–88, who deems it probable that Socrates worked as a sculptor because his help would have been needed at his father's workshop, given the poor economic condition of his family.

57 See above, n. 50.

(T5) [fr. 52b Wehrli = *Suda* s.v. Σωκράτης] Socrates: ... Aristoxenus says that he was first the pupil of Archelaus and that he also became his beloved (παιδικά) and had a very strong sex drive (σφοδρότατόν ... περί τὰ ἀφοροδίσια), but this did not lead him to act unjustly (ἀδικήματος χωρίς), as Porphyry says in his *History of Philosophy*.

(T6) [fr. 215 Smith = Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 12.65–67] Porphyry said the following about Socrates: “it was reported about him that when he was a boy (παῖς) he did not lead a good life (οὐκ εὖ βιώσειεν) and was not disciplined (οὐδὲ εὐτάκτως). At first, it is said, he always disobeyed (τῷ πατρὶ διατελέσαι ἀπειθοῦντα) his father, and every time his father ordered to him to bring their working tools somewhere, he gave no heed to his order and ran about wherever he liked. When he was about seventeen, Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, came to visit him, and said that he was his lover (ἐραστήν). Socrates did not refuse the intercourse (οὐκ ἀπόσασθαι τὴν ἔντευξιν) and the company (ὁμιλίαν) with Archelaus, remaining with him many years (ἔτη συχνά), and so he was led (προτραπήναι) by Archelaus to philosophical matters (ἐπὶ τὰ φιλόσοφα).”

(T7) [fr. 216 Smith = Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 4.2] Porphyry says that Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, was at times prone to intemperance (εἰς ἀκολασίαν ἤνικα ... ἀποκλίναντα) when he was young (νέος ἦν), but with endeavor and learning (σπουδῇ καὶ διδαχῇ) he removed (ἀφανίσαι) these imprintings (τοὺς τύπους) [from himself], and he impressed upon them the imprintings of philosophy (τοὺς δὲ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐκμάξασθαι).

Socrates' connection to Archelaus is well documented. It goes back to Ion of Chios, one of the most trustworthy sources of the fifth century, and is to be found also in Theophrastus.⁵⁸ Ion adds that Socrates went to Samos with Archelaus “while young” (νέον ὄντα).⁵⁹ Aristoxenus gives further details. He

58 Ion: 392 fr. 9 *FGH* III B p. 280 (= *DL* 2.23); Theophrastus: fr. 4 Diels (= *Simpl. in Phys.* 27.23–24), and the doxographic tradition going back to Cic. *Tusc.* 5.4.10, *DL* 2.16, Hippol. *Haer.* 10, ps-Galen *Hist. philos.* 3, August. *De civ. D.* 8.2.

59 Because this report contradicts the commonplace that Socrates never travelled except on military expeditions (Pl. *Cri.* 52b), scholars used to be skeptical about Ion's testimony (Zeller 1922, 49; Jacoby 1947, 10; Pohlenz 1953, 432 n. 2; Woodbury 1971, 301; Brickhouse and Smith 2000, 49 n. 9). More recent studies have reevaluated it in consideration of the fact that Ion usually reports from his personal experience (Tilman 2000, 69–72; Patzer 2006, 15; Fletcher 2007, 319–322; but see already Gomperz 1935, 35–36; Chroust 1952, 132; Cappelletti

reports that Socrates and Archelaus were in a pederastic relationship, and is clear about their respective roles: Socrates was the “beloved” (παιδικά) of Archelaus, who was his “lover” (ἐραστής). The relationship was, according to Greek standards, also a didactic one, with Socrates as Archelaus’ pupil. Porphyry tells us that Socrates started this relationship just before becoming adult, and that he refused Archelaus neither sexual intercourse nor his company. Socrates stayed with Archelaus for many years, and was brought by him to philosophy. Aristoxenus is clear about the positive effect this association had on Socrates, who before meeting Archelaus used to have a vehement sex drive, was prone to intemperance, and lacked discipline and obedience toward his father. It seems, therefore, that this account was not meant to slander Socrates for an illicit relationship, as some scholars maintain.⁶⁰

From τ6 we get the impression that this relationship followed the traditional dichotomy between *erastês* and *erômenos*, where Archelaus had an active role in converting Socrates to philosophy, who had a merely passive role. But τ7 tells a different story, that Socrates did play a positive part in his own educational process. It was not just the protreptic of Archelaus that brought him to philosophy, but also his personal endeavor and learning (σπουδῇ καὶ διδασκίῃ). The metaphor of a Socrates who removes the imprintings (τύπους) left on him by intemperance by impressing upon them (ἐκμάξασθαι) the imprintings of philosophy could refer to the stoneworking period of his life; as intemperance molded Socrates when he worked with his father, now philosophy did the molding. But at the same time the metaphor shows that Socrates is like a waxboard. Philosophy does not transform him into something new or different; he remains substantially the same. What changes are the imprintings: philosophy will help him substitute the right for the wrong ones.

Socrates’ association with Archelaus did not manage to eradicate his vehement nature, but only to tame it. The word used to define the intemperance of Socrates, *akolasia*, is the same occurring in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (1348) to describe Pheidippides’ outrageous behavior toward his father, after he has received Socratic education in the *phrontistêrion*. In a section of the *Clouds* surely composed after 423, the competition between the Just and the Unjust

1960, 81). Graham 2008, 311, has rightly pointed out that Archelaus and Socrates were both alive when Ion wrote his *Memories*, and therefore were able to deny any false claim about them.

60 See, e.g., Patzer 2006, 38–50, who thinks that the report about Socrates’ (socially acceptable) relationship with Archelaus as a boy goes back to Ion of Chios, whereas the (socially unacceptable) continuation of this relationship after his seventeenth birthday should count as a slander invented by Aristoxenus.

argument, this model of education is enriched by a critical account of *sôphronein*, the ability to restrain oneself (1070–1082).

In Plato we have an abundant use of *akolasia*, which is usually juxtaposed with the cardinal virtue *sôphrosunê*.⁶¹ These notions define two aspects of one and the same process: that of controlling violent emotions and passions. It seems that throughout Plato's work, whenever *sôphrosunê* is practised, at every critical moment there is a risk that *akolasia* may take control.⁶²

In Aristotle, *akolasia* is juxtaposed to *sôphrosunê* but differentiated from *akrasia*. The acolastic person is persuaded that he should follow bad principles, whereas the acratice person knows that such principles should not be followed but he ends up following them anyway, overcome by passion. This distinction is important for understanding how *akolasia* relates to Socrates' self-restraint (*karteria* vs. *enkrateia*). A passage from the *Eudemian Ethics* seems to suggest that Socrates is not an acratice but an *akolastos* who is able to restrain himself. The intelligence that inhabits his rational part (ἡ φρόνησις ἡ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ) enables him to make the *akolasia* that inhabits his non-rational part (τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀκολασίαν) more tempered (σωφρόνως πράττειν); and this very ability is precisely his *enkrateia*.⁶³

4.1.3 Socrates as a Living Contradiction: Emotion and Temperance
Socrates is the living paradigm of the fight between emotions and their restraint. Aristoxenus shows the effects of such a fight on his physiognomy:

(T8) [fr. 56 Wehrli = Synesius *Encomium calvitatis* 81a] Aristoxenus says that Socrates was by nature (φύσει) quick to fury (τραχὺς εἰς ὀργήν), and

61 Plato has about seventy occurrences of ἀκολασία/ἀκόλαστος, mostly defining the incontinence of men or souls in contrast to temperance. Xenophon's Socratic works feature this concept only one time, as applied to Aristippus (in *Mem.* 2.1.1: ἀκολαστοτέρως ἔχων).

62 This follows from the most important accounts of *sôphrosunê* in Plato's corpus: in *Charmides*, *sôphrosunê* is a form of knowledge that enables Socrates to direct his *erôs* toward the spiritual, and not the physical, beauty of Charmides; in *Gorgias*, it is "the control of pleasures and appetites" (491d); in *Phaedo*, it is essential for detaching the soul from the affections of the body (82c); in *Symposium*, it is the virtue of Socrates' interior that enables him to be both *phronimos* and *karteros* (216c–221b); in *Republic*, it concerns the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts of both the soul and the State; in *Phaedrus*, it is juxtaposed, or combined, with *epithumia* and *mania*; and in *Laws* it is directed toward the *epithumetikon* which, if not restrained, takes control over reason. See North 1966, 150–196, for a more detailed overview.

63 Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 1246b23–24.

that every time he was dominated (κρατηθείη) by this emotion (τῷ πάθει), he went through every kind of disfigurement (διὰ πάσης ἀσχημοσύνης ἐβάδιζεν).

(T9) [fr. 54a Wehrli = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 6.185] For, come, let us see, even before the others, what sort of man Socrates was, who was famous (διαβόητος) among them ... [fr. 211 Smith] Perhaps, even if someone disbelieves the stories about Socrates [fr. 54a Wehrli] he will not also speak against the writings of Porphyry who set out the life of the ancients He spoke, then, as follows about him: "Aristoxenus says, while recounting the life of Socrates (τὸν βίον τοῦ Σωκράτους), that he heard things about him from Spintharus (ἀκηκοέναι Σπινθάρου τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ) who was one of those who had met (ἐντυχόντων) Socrates. Spintharus said that he at least had not met (ἐντετυχηκέναι) anyone more persuasive (πιθανωτέρῳ) than him. Such was both his voice (φωνήν) and his mouth (στόμα), and the character manifest in him (τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος), and, in addition to all the things said, the singularity of his appearance (τὴν τοῦ εἵδους ιδιότητα). He was like this, but not when he was angry (ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζοιτο). When he was seized by emotion (ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους) his disfigurement was terrible (δεινὴν ... ἀσχημοσύνην). For he did not refrain from any word or action."

(T10) [fr. 54b Wehrli = Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 12.61–63] "And Porphyry, in composing his History of Philosophy, at first (πρῶτον) said that Socrates was both irascible (ἀκρόχολον) and good-tempered (εὐόργητον), providing as a witness Aristoxenus, who had written a Life of Socrates. Aristoxenus said that he had never come across (ἐντετυχηκέναι) anyone more persuasive (πιθανωτέρῳ) than him. Such was both his voice (φωνήν) and his mouth (στόμα) ... For he did not refrain from any word or action" [= text nearly identical to T9].

Here we learn that Socrates was the most persuasive of men, that he had a good temper, but also that he was by nature so irascible that from time to time he was seized by fury. His passions were so violent as to change his facial features, making him appear ugly. The three fragments describe this ugliness as the immediate consequence of his *pathos*. In T8 Socrates is "dominated" (κρατηθείη) by this emotion and therefore goes through a sort of "metamorphic" ugliness (διὰ πάσης ἀσχημοσύνης ἐβάδιζεν): apparently, Aristoxenus is saying that a variety of expressions deform Socrates' face subsequently. This seems to follow from T9 and T10 as well, where the ugliness is the result of an emotion that takes control over him. Another consequence of Socrates' anger is his

inability to control his words and deeds. This recalls a passage in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, where Socrates cannot restrain his resentment toward Critias.⁶⁴

It is interesting to note that T9 and T10 describe Socrates' appearance in normal conditions. Aristoxenus is explicit in saying that Socrates owes his persuasiveness to his physical features, specifically his voice and mouth, and to the way they are related to each other; to the manifest aspect of his character, that is, to a sort of "outward interiority" he has; and to the singularity of his appearance.

It is easy to find references to these features in the Socratic literature. As to the *phonê*, it is likely that this noun defines not only the voice, but also the peculiar way Socrates spoke. It is certainly not by chance that both Plato and Xenophon define Socrates' unique personal divinity, the *daimonion*, as a voice.⁶⁵ The relationship Aristoxenus establishes between the persuasiveness, the voice, and the mouth of Socrates is found in both Plato and Xenophon, where the mouth is the "instrument" through which thoughts can be expressed, communicated, and made persuasive.⁶⁶ Socrates' *stoma* is as peculiar as his voice is. Xenophon gives a detailed account of it in the *Symposium*.⁶⁷ Here the

64 Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.29–30. Proneness to anger could be implied in Socrates' frequent swears by the dog reported by Plato (e.g. *Ap.* 22a; *Grg.* 461b, 466c, 482b; *Lysis* 211e; *Hp. mai.* 287e, 298b; *Chrm.* 172e; *Cra.* 411b; *Phd.* 98e; *Resp.* 399e, 567d, 592a; *Phdr.* 228b), as suggested by von Mess 1916, 91. For different account of these swears see Patzer 2003; Baer 2007; Murphy 2013. On Socrates' anger in the later tradition see Antipater (fr. 65 SVF III p. 257) and Seneca (*De ira* 1.5.13, 2.7.1, 3.13.3).

65 "A kind of voice" in *Ap.* 31d (φωνή τις) and *Phdr.* 242c (τινα φωνήν); "the voice" (ἡ φωνή) in *Thg.* 128d–e, 129b–c. For other references of Plato's Socrates to his own voice see *Ap.* 17d and *Euthd.* 293a. Xenophon deals with the acoustic feature of Socrates' *daimonion* at *Symp.* 12–13: "As for introducing 'new divinities,' how could I be guilty of that merely in asserting that a voice of God is made manifest to me (θεοῦ μοι φωνή φαίνεται) indicating what I should do? Surely those who take their omens from the cries of birds (φθόγγοις οἰωνῶν) and the utterances of men (φήμαις ἀνθρώπων) form their judgments on voices. Will any one dispute either that thunder utters its voice (φωνεῖν), or that it is an omen of the greatest moment? Does not the very priestess who sits on the tripod at Delphi divulge the god's will through a voice (φωνή)?"

66 See, for example, Pl. *Phlb.* 17b: "From our viewpoint the voice that passes through the mouth of all and each of us is one; yet it is infinite in number"; and *Def.* 414d: "The voice is a stream that flows through the mouth and from thought." For Xenophon, see *Mem.* 1.4.12: "though all living beings have a tongue, the tongue of man alone has been formed by the gods to be capable of contact with different parts of the mouth, so as to enable us to articulate the voice and to express all our wants to one another".

67 Xen. *Symp.* 5.7: "As for the mouth," said Critobulus, "I concede that point. For if it is created for the purpose of biting off food, you could bite off a far bigger mouthful than I could. And

kalokagathos Critoboulos says that Socrates' mouth is more beautiful than his own because of the functionality of its fleshy lips: Socrates can bite off more food and kiss more tenderly than he can. In the remaining part of the passage we learn that other features of Socrates' appearance also have such a functionality, which makes his body more useful—at least for practical purposes—than Critobulus'.⁶⁸

But Socrates' peculiarity is not limited to his physiognomy. His character is also related to his rhetorical ability.⁶⁹ Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is "immediately manifest" (ἐπιφανόμενον). This seems related to the story attributed to Phaedo of Elis, in which Zopyrus, a physiognomist coming from Persia, infers the nature of Socrates' character (*mores naturasque*) by observing his outward appearance.⁷⁰ Zopyrus claims that Socrates is "stupid and dull," a "womanizer," or a "pederast," but Socrates' pupils laugh at him, or, according to another version, try to attack Zopyrus. Socrates intervenes, and tells them to be quiet: "this is how I am," he says, "but I control my vices through reason."

This anecdote helps explain Aristoxenus' expression ἐπιφανόμενον ἦθος: Socrates' ability to persuade depends on the fact that his character *is* the way it looks. This entails that there is correspondence, not contradiction, between Socrates' interior and his exterior.⁷¹ Hence his absolute uniqueness (τὴν τοῦ εἶδους ἰδιότητα), for which Aristoxenus might have relied on Plato's famous account of Socratic *atopia* in the Alcibiades speech of the *Symposium*.⁷² This

don't you think that your kiss is also the more tender because you have thick lips?' Socrates: 'According to your argument, it would seem that I have a mouth more ugly (αἷσχιον) even than asses'. But do you not reckon it a proof of my superior beauty that the river Nymphs, goddesses as they are, bear as their offspring the Sileni, who resemble me more closely than they do you?"

68 Good overviews of Socrates' physiognomy are Dupréel 1922, 312–334; Guthrie 1971, 65–70.

69 For the link between ἦθος and persuasivity Aristoxenus could rely on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1356a4–12): "we believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided ... his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses."

70 Fr. 6 Rossetti (= Cic. *Fat.* 5.10) and 7 Rossetti (= *Tusc.* 4.37). See Rossetti 1980; Henkelman 1999; Boys-Stones 2004; Boys-Stones 2007; McLean 2007; Rossetti 2015.

71 Here I stick to Friedrich Nietzsche's famous *dictum* about Socrates: "monstrum in fronte, monstrum in animo" (Nietzsche 1889). See also Stavru 2011, 99–129.

72 Plato seems to be the only Socratic who attributed this particular feature to Socrates: see *Symp.* 221c–d; *Grg.* 494d. The other Socratics do not use this term for describing their master's originality. Xenophon uses it only once, to define the uniqueness not of Socrates himself, but of his *legein*: *Mem.* 2.3.15. On this issue see Barabas 1986; Eide 1996.

text does not contrast the interior and the exterior of Socrates. The statues that are located in the interior of Socrates are in fact full of temperance (216d), a virtue that frustrates all attempts at seduction by Alcibiades: Socrates is able to restrain himself *although* he is constantly “enraptured” by beautiful persons. This means that his strong emotions are not pacified: his temperance is always facing a potentially wild or even morbid character.⁷³ As for Aristoxenus, the uniqueness of Socrates consists of his ability to bear both aspects, and to cope with them through day-to-day discipline.

4.2 Money-Making

What happened in the two decades after Socrates quit his job as a stoneworker is not clear. According to Aristoxenus, he remained a pupil of Archelaus for quite a while. The first secure fact we know from the Socratic tradition is his participation in the siege of Potidaea in the summer of 432 BCE. He served as a footsoldier, a “hoplite,” which means that he could afford the armor, the “panoply,” and the weapons.⁷⁴ As these were too expensive for poor people and Socrates could not rely on family wealth, it seems likely that he had other sources of income.⁷⁵

-
- 73 See above, n. 61. Aristoxenus' account of a choleric Socrates has spawned interpretations of his supposed psychological disorders. Socrates might have been a melancholic, as claimed by Heiberg 1913, 359, and Döring 2007, 262–266, followed by Schorn 2012, 210–211. Döring's reconstruction is based on a pseudo-Aristotelic passage (*Probl. Phys.* 953a–955a) which might imply that Socrates had an excess of black bile in his body and was therefore prone to become dull and stupid in cold days, frenzied, clever, passionate and choleric in warm days. Other scholars maintain that Socrates had temporal lobe epilepsy (Muramoto and Englert 2006, diagnosed on the basis of the *daemonion*); or Graves' disease (hyperthyroidism) (Papapetreou 2015, on the basis of his *exophthalmos*).
- 74 Pl. *Ap.* 28e; *Symp.* 220c–d. Socrates' participation in the campaigns of Potidaea (432), Delium (424) and Amphipolis (422) is considered as a historical fact: see Patzer 1999 and Anderson 2005 for a complete survey of the sources.
- 75 Reports about Socrates' economic status are contradictory. See Pl. *Apol.* 23b on Socrates' poverty, an issue the Socratics relate to the claim that Socrates was not paid for his teaching. For Socrates' father's poverty see *La.* 186c. Xen. *Oec.* 2.3 reports that Socrates' overall wealth was five minae, a sum that was not enough to live on; see Heiberg 1913, 355–356. Plato and Xenophon agree in maintaining that Socrates did not charge his pupils for his teaching (Pl. *Ap.* 19d, 31b–c, 33a–b; *Euthphr.* 3d; *Hp. mai.* 300c–d; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.60 (where Socrates is even depicted as a *philanthrôpos* who donates his belongings to others), 1.5.6, 1.6.3–5, 1.6.11–13, and *Ap.* 16), and the later reports on his poverty seem to confirm this (Ael. *VH.* 2.43, 4.11; Sen. *Ben.* 7.24.1–2; Philo *De prov.* 2.21). This does not fit with Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where Socrates does indeed receive money from his pupils (98, 245–246, 876, 1146–1147). The issue is not unimportant, given the importance the Socratics

(T11) [fr. 59 Wehrli = DL 2.20] Aristoxenus son of Spintharus says that he [sc. Socrates] also engaged in money-making (χρηματίσασθαι). At least, by making deposits (τιθέντα) he accrued the small change invested (τὸ βαλλόμενον κέρμα), and then, when he had spent this (ἀναλώσαντα),⁷⁶ he again made a deposit (πάλιν τιθέναι).

(T12) [fr. 217 Smith = Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 12.68] And a bit further on Porphyry says: “among the criticisms (τῶν ἐπιτιμωμένων) made of Socrates there was also that he thrust himself into the crowds, and that he wasted his time (τὰς διατριβὰς ἐποιεῖτο) at the money-changers’ counters and before the herms.” This is what Porphyry said about Socrates, and I deliberately left out other details.

The verb used in T11, χρηματίσασθαι, has been interpreted in various ways. The most likely translation is the neutral “money-making.”⁷⁷ Diogenes’ text is awkward, but it seems clear that the activity attributed to Socrates refers to a cyclical investment practice.⁷⁸ Apparently, Socrates did not deposit money until he had spent the little cash he had accrued, which suggests that the sums he invested were small. He lived for a while with the scarce interest he had gained, and then made new deposits. And since he did not have a regular income, it seems likely that these deposits came from occasional donations made to

attribute to it for differentiating Socrates’ unpaid teaching from that of the Sophists: see Blank 1985.

76 All the manuscripts feature the participle ἀναλώσαντα (so in Dorandi 2013, 163, who refers to Wilamowitz 1919, 101). Crönert 1906, 173, followed by Wehrli 1945, 26, changed it into διπλώσαντα (“having doubled the value”), thus maintaining that Socrates practiced usury (see Wehrli 1945, 67).

77 See von Mess 1916, 96–98; Fischer 1969, 74; Rossetti 1976, 42; Narcy 1999, 230; Schorn 2012, 214; Huffman 2012, 262.

78 The text is awkward because it is not clear why Socrates should re-deposit (τιθέντα ... πάλιν τιθέναι) money every time he consumes the little interest that it accrues (τὸ κέρμα ... ἀναλώσαντα). Why does he accumulate the amount of money deposited, and why does he do it when he uses up the small interest he withdraws? Wouldn’t it be sufficient to make periodic withdrawals of the interest, leaving the same amount of money invested? An alternative reading to overcome these difficulties is to take τὸ βαλλόμενον κέρμα to refer not to interest but to small offerings Socrates receives and periodically deposits: “by making deposits of small change that had been thrust [into his hands] he accrued [it], and when he had spent [it], he made again a deposit [sc. of small change].” Socrates would be poor even according to this reading, since in this case too the χρηματίσασθαι would not stand for big earnings (e.g., for teaching fees he might have charged his pupils).

him. His investment activity was very likely part of his daily routine. According to T12, he spent much time in hanging out with his fellow citizens, going to places where he was sure to meet people: the money-changers' counters and the herms referred to in the fragment were located in crowded places such as squares, roads, and crossings.

There is evidence that Socrates received donations from his pupils as well as from "the most important citizens of Athens."⁷⁹ Aristippus and Alcibiades were among his donors, and Crito administered the wealth he had accumulated in the course of the years.⁸⁰ We also have evidence for Socrates' "time-wasting" in Plato, where he is described twice as spending his days "at the tables in the *agora*."⁸¹

4.3 *Encounter with an Indian*

Socrates' readiness to engage discussions with anyone and on any possible subject is exemplified by the following anecdote:

(T13) [fr. 53 Wehrli = Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 11.3.8] Aristoxenus the musician says that this tale (λόγον) comes from the Indians. For one of these men met Socrates in Athens and inquired from him what kind of activity he was doing as a philosopher (τί ποιῶν φιλοσοφοίῃ). Socrates answered that it consists in investigations (ζητῶν) about human life (περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου). The Indian laughed at him, and said that it is not possible for anyone to understand (κατιδεῖν) human matters (τὰ ἀνθρώπινα) without knowing (ἀγνοοῦντά) the divine ones (τὰ θεῖα). [Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 11.3.9] Whether it is true or not that this is possible, no one can say for sure.

The meeting between Socrates and the Indian traveler has been considered suspect in antiquity, and fictitious by almost all modern scholars.⁸² The anecdote

79 DL 2.70; see also Xen. *Ap.* 17.

80 On Aristippus see SSR IV A 1 (= DL 2.65); on Alcibiades, Ael. *VH* 9.12, 9.29, and Stob. 3.17.16; On Crito, Pl. *Ap.* 38b, *Cri.* 45b; DL 2.121 and Plut. *Arist.* 1.9. According to Demetrius of Phalerum, the wealth of Socrates administered by Crito amounted to 70 minae (Plut. *Arist.* 1.9; on the issue see Heiberg 1913, 355, and O'Sullivan 2008, 402).

81 Pl. *Ap.* 17c. and *Hp. mi.* 368b. See also the detailed account of Dio Chrys. *Or.* 54.3–4.

82 The final sentence of the anecdote suggests that Aristocles was not fully convinced by the story. In fact, the somewhat clumsy image of Socrates it conveys is at odds with what Aristocles says about him in an earlier passage quoted by Eusebius (11.3.2): "And not least did Socrates, exactly according to the proverb, add fire to fire, as Plato himself said. For being a man of great genius, and clever in raising questions upon any and every

is reported via a quotation from Aristocles of Messene's treatise *Of Philosophy* by Eusebius of Caesarea, an author whose work was characterized by violent polemic against the pagan world.⁸³ It seems that Eusebius did not quote the anecdote in its entirety, likely omitting a final *pointe* by Socrates.⁸⁴ This way he could present Socrates, "the most wise of the Greeks," as an agnostic.⁸⁵ In fact, there are at least two reasons for the strangeness in Socrates' not replying to the Indian's observation.

The first is that the Indian does not seem to be acquainted with Socrates' teaching activity: he asks him not what Socrates philosophizes about (as one would expect), but what kind of activity he is doing as a philosopher (τί ποιῶν φιλοσοφῶν).⁸⁶ This sounds awkward, and even more odd is that Socrates is unable, or unwilling, to counter the Indian's argument. Throughout the *Sôkratikoî logoi* Socrates refutes much more prepared interlocutors, some of them famous for their rhetorical or philosophical abilities.

The second reason for which Socrates' silence is strange is that he could have countered the Indian's observation in many ways. In various places of the *Sôkratikoî logoi* the knowledge of ethical and "human" matters appears to be related to Socrates' unique relationship to the divine. Plato's Socrates could

matter, he brought moral and political speculations into philosophy, and moreover was the first who attempted to define the theory of the Ideas: but while still stirring up every kind of discussion, and inquiring about all subjects, he died too early a death." Modern scholars who judge the anecdote inauthentic: Hirzel 1890; Bréhier 1928; Jaeger 1934; Bidez 1945; Festugière 1971; Sedlar 1981; Halbfass 1988; Karttunen 1989; Chenet 1998; Chiesara 2001; Lacrosse 2007. Scholars attributing historical value to the meeting are Conger 1952; Filliozat 1981; Tola and Dragonetti 1982.

83 See Kofsky 2000.

84 Eusebius of Caesarea's enmity toward paganism is not the only reason to think that he is less reliable in quoting Aristoxenus' testimony on Socrates than the other two early Christian authors Cyril (375–444) and Theodoret (393–457): while the latter quote Aristoxenus via Porphyry's third-century *History of Philosophy* (or even via a later epitome of it: see above, n. 8), Eusebius (263–339) quotes Aristoxenus via the seventh book of the Peripatetic Aristocles of Messene's first-century (BCE or CE) treatise *Of Philosophy*. This means that unlike Cyril and Theodoret, who both quote from a text (or from an epitome of it) that was then still extant and therefore verifiable by others, Eusebius' quotation, going back to a text written three centuries earlier, was more difficult to check, and therefore easier to abbreviate or manipulate. For another reconstruction see Chiesara 2001, who is more positive about Aristocles' reliability for Aristoxenus.

85 See Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 15.61.12; an agnostic Socrates is featured also at 14.11.7–12, 14.16.7, 15.62.10.

86 This point has been made by Hirzel 1890, 427.

have referred to the *daimonion*, an entity he explicitly defines as “something divine” (θεῖόν τι: Pl. *Ap.* 31d), or to his service and deep devotion to Apollo (*Ap.* 23b; *Phd.* 84e–85b, 60d), or to his belief in a divine *demiourgos* (*Tim.* 29a [Timaeus’ account] and 29d [Socrates’ agreement with it]; *Phlb.* 27b; see also Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.2–7 and 3.1–18), a divine soul (*Phd.* 80a; *Phdr.* 245c–246a; *Alc.* 133c), or in benevolent, caring, and wise gods (*Ap.* 21b, 23a–c, 41c–d, 42a; *Euthphr.* 14e–15a; *Grg.* 508a; *Resp.* 377e–383c; see also Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.25).⁸⁷ Xenophon’s Socrates could have also hinted at his *daimonion* (various places),⁸⁸ at his devotion toward the gods of the city (*Mem.* 1.3.1; 4.3.16; 4.6.2), at his idea of a teleologic divine cosmos (*Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3; see also Pl. *Phd.* 97b–98b; *Cra.* 400a; *Phlb.* 29a–30e), or at his belief in divination (*Mem.* 1.4.15; 1.4.18; 4.3.12; *Symp.* 4.47–49), divinity of the soul (*Mem.* 1.4.13–14; 4.3.14), and *agraphoi nomoi* (*Mem.* 4.4.19–25). Last but not least, Euclides’ Socrates might have invoked his double *daimôn* (SSR II A 11), and Aeschines’ Socrates the *theia Moira* (SSR VI A 53, 4–15).⁸⁹ All this supports the hypothesis that Eusebius deliberately left out the final part of the anecdote.

4.4 Advanced Age

The fragments relating to the last period of Socrates’ life deal with two subjects: the erotic life of Socrates and his relations with two women, Myrto and Xanthippe; and the reasons for his accusation in 399 BCE.

4.4.1 Erotics, Xanthippe, and Myrto

The tradition attributing two wives to Socrates goes back to Aristotle. In his lost *On Nobility*, Aristotle reports that Socrates was first married to Xanthippe, from

87 It should be kept in mind that before quoting the anecdote of Socrates and the Indian, Eusebius writes that, according to Aristocles, Plato claims that human things (ἀνθρώπεια) cannot be understood without divine things (θεῖα). For Aristocles the anecdote of Socrates and the Indian serves to introduce a disagreement between Plato and Socrates so as to show the superiority of the former to the latter. Eusebius, who quotes Aristocles, seems to have a different aim. In order to demonstrate the fallacy of the Socratic *anthropinê sophia*, he summarizes the portion of the text that precedes the anecdote (which is not essential but still useful to his argument), and omits the final pun (which might have dealt with aspects of Socrates’ religiosity he wants to hide). For discussion of the broader context of the fragment see Chiesara, 2001, 61–67.

88 See Dorion 2000, 52, who claims that in Xenophon τὸ δαίμόνιον means in most cases “the god.”

89 A succinct overview of the relevant passages in Plato and Xenophon is McPherran 1996; on Euclides’ double *daimôn* see Brancacci 2005 and in this volume; on Aeschines’ *theia Moira* see Mallet 2013.

whom he had his first son Lamprocles, and second to Myrto, from whom he had Sophroniscus and Menexenus.⁹⁰ The story of the double marriage of Socrates is not thematized in the *Sôkratikoî logoi*, but was much discussed within the Peripatus, which might be the reason why Aristoxenus dwells on it.⁹¹

(T14) [fr. 54a Wehrli = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 6.186] For Porphyry has again written as follows about him: “In matters having to do with his life and with every other issue he was easily satisfied (εὐκόλον) and required few material goods in his daily life. He had a very strong sex drive (τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν σφοδρότερον), but there was no injustice (ἀδικίαν) attached to it. For he had sex (χρηθεῖν) only with his wives (ταῖς γαμεταῖς) or with women who were commonly available (κοιναῖς). He came to have (σχεῖν) two women at the same time (δύο γυναῖκας ἅμα): Xanthippe, who was a citizen and anyhow (πῶς) more commonly available (κοινοτέραν), and Myrto, the granddaughter of Aristides, son of Lysimachus. He took (λαβεῖν)⁹²

90 Arist. fr. 93 Rose (= DL 2.26). Aristotle is not clear whether Socrates' marriages overlapped, since “first” (πρωτέρων) and “second” (δευτέρων) refers only to the order in which he married them. But there is no reason to think that Socrates married Myrto after Xanthippe was dead or had been repudiated, since both in the *Sôkratikoî logoi* and in later literature Xanthippe is bound to Socrates in his advanced age. In fact, the absence of any reference to Socrates' wife (or wives) in Aristophanes' *Clouds* seems to mean that he got married after 423 BCE, i.e., after the age of 45. It should be noted that Plato's *Phaedo* (116b) does not exclude the possibility that in 399 BCE Socrates had more than one wife (Nails 2002, 209), nor that Xanthippe was his concubine (Fitton 1973) or mistress (Bicknell 1974). But besides the late pseudo-Platonic *Halcyon*, where both wives of Socrates are mentioned, the *Sôkratikoî logoi* do not mention Myrto. On the other hand, the Socratic and the later tradition devote great attention to Xanthippe, whose bad temper plays an important role for highlighting Socrates' paradigmatic endurance (see Xen. *Mem.* 2.2, *Symp.* 2.10; and Pl. *Resp.* 8.549c–e, a passage that might portray Xanthippe; DL 2.36; Ath. 5.219a; Gell. *NA* 1.17.1–3; *Suda* s.v. τροχίλεα; Plut. *De cohib. ira* 161d and *Cat.* 20; Ael. *VH* 9.29; *Gnom. Vat.* 743.491. For a good overview see Labarbe 1998, 37–43). In the Socratic tradition Xanthippe is even responsible for transmitting Socrates' legacy to posterity. She brings up his physical progeny—her own child Lamprocles and two children who were very likely Myrto's—and she donates his spiritual progeny, namely his seven dialogues, to the most faithful of his pupils, Aeschines of Sphettus (it is noteworthy that this astonishing anecdote goes back to an early heir of Socratism such as Menedemus of Eretria [350–265 BCE], per DL 2.60).

91 After Aristotle (385–322 BCE), Aristoxenus himself (375?–300 BCE), Callisthenes of Olynthus (370–327 BCE), Demetrius of Phalerum (350–280 BCE), Hieronymus of Rhodes (290–230 BCE), and Satyrus of Callatis (250–200 BCE) all dealt with Myrto's relationship with Socrates and her noble origin: see below, n. 104.

92 Wehrli's text has λαβεῖν, which is a correction of the extant λαθεῖν. I agree with Fitton 1970,

Xanthippe after she got involved with him (περιπλακεῖσαν),⁹³ and from her Lamprocles was born to him (ἐαυτῷ Λαμπροκλῆς ἐγένετο). But Myrto [he took] in marriage (γάμφ), and from her [were born] Sophroniscus and Menexenus.⁹⁴

(T15) [fr. 54b Wehrli = Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 12.63–65] After having gone through these issues in detail,⁹⁵ Aristoxenus shows that Socrates had also been enslaved to pleasures (ἡδυπαθείαις δεδουλωμένον). He says the following: “He had a very strong sex drive ... the son of Lysimachus” [text nearly identical to T14]. “He took Xanthippe after she had sexual intercourse with him (προσπλακεῖσαν), and from her Lamprocles was born (ὁ Λαμπροκλῆς ἐγένετο). But Myrto [he took] having married her (γαμηθείσαν), and from her [were born] Sophroniscus and Menexenus. These women engaged in battle (ξυνάπτουσαι μάχην) with one another, and whenever they paused, they attacked Socrates, because he never prevented them from fighting but laughed when he saw them fighting with one another and with him. It is said (φησιν) that in his relationships Socrates was sometimes quarrelsome (φιλαπεχθήμονα), harsh (λοιδορον), and outrageous (ύβριστικόν).”

61 n. 1; Woodbury 1973, 21; and Huffman 2012, 280–281, that this correction makes sense, since the idea of a “hidden” relationship between Socrates and Xanthippe is awkward.

93 Fitton's emendment (πρὸς παλλακείαν instead of περιπλακεῖσαν; 1970, 61) is awkward because παλλακεία, i.e., “concubinage,” is a rare word not used earlier than the first century BCE (three occurrences in TLG, of which only one features the locution πρὸς παλλακείαν but with the meaning “for the harem” and in the non-Greek context of the Indian city of Ozene). More convincing is Woodbury 1973, 21–24.

94 Translation by Huffman 2012, 270–271, relying on the new Greek text by Wolfram Kinzig. The general attitude of Cyrus toward Socrates can be observed from another passage, which is useful for understanding the polemical purpose of his quotations from Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates*: “Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who was brought up (σύντροφος) with philosophy, and was poor, devoted himself to handcraft (χειρουργικὴν ἐπιστήμην) at the beginning; he was used to meager rations; he was oppressed by necessity and by his needs of wealth, crawling on the earth, as Homer would say; and he came together (συνεφύρετο) with his wives—Myrto, I mean, and Xanthippe. He also had sexual intercourse (συνεπλέκετο) with prostitutes with the allure of heterae (ἐταιριζομένας), since he had no control of his wicked and most disgusting yearnings (εἰς ὁρέξεις αἰσχροῦς μυσαρωτάτας). Should we therefore say of Socrates: ‘what great virtue!? What richness of wisdom!? If he has not even been able to deal with pleasure (οὐ περιγέγονεν ἡδονῆς)!?’” (SSR I G 56 = Cyril *Adv. Iul.* 7.226).

95 See above, text T10.

These passages deal again with Socrates' strong passions, this time relating them to his sexual behavior.⁹⁶ And in this case too we have a contrast: on the one hand Socrates is easily satisfied and needs little to live on; on the other hand, he is "vehement in having sex" (τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν σφοδρότερον) or even "enslaved to pleasures" (ἡδυπαθείαις δεδουλωμένον). Of Socrates' double nature in amorous matters, the *Sôkratikoî logoi* bear abundant evidence.⁹⁷

Socrates' vehemence is not, however, boundless. Aristoxenus specifies that his sexual addiction does not lead him to commit injustice (ἀδικίαν), since he

96 The emotions Aristoxenus focuses on when dealing with Socrates, anger and sexual desire, recall those Aristotle deals with in the *Nicomachean Ethics* associating them with *akrasia* (1149a–b). Here Aristotle distinguishes between an *akrasia* relating to anger (ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ) and an *akrasia* relating to desires (ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν). The fact that Socrates has both of these acratice emotions and is even *akolastos*, but at the same time restrains himself and is *enkratês* (see 4.1.2), makes him a living demonstration of the way ethical attitudes that Aristotle thinks to be contradictory can coexist in one individual. This prompts a provocative thought: is Aristoxenus using Socrates' living example to refute basic tenets of Aristotle's ethics?

97 For an overview of the ambivalence of the amorous Socrates see Maier 1913, 399–403; Stavru 2013. This double nature of Socrates, which involves a reciprocity between his vehement character and his ability to restrain it, surfaces in Phaedo's anecdote of Zopyrus discussed above. It is interesting to note that Socrates' excessive sexuality leads him to be, according to one version of this anecdote (fr. 11 Rossetti = Cassian. *Conlat.* 13.5.3), a pederast, and, according to another version (fr. 6 Rossetti = Cic. *Fat.* 5.10), a womanizer. The first case seems to describe Socrates' irresistible attraction toward his pupils (which might duplicate aspects of his own intercourse with Archelaus), the second his intercourse with his two wives and the multiple relationships with hetaerae like Aspasia, Theodote, and Callisto (on Socrates and his pupils see Antisthenes: *SSR V A* 14; Aeschines: *SSR VI A* 53; Plato: *Lys.* 211d–e, *Chrm.* 154b, *Prt.* 309a–b, *Grg.* 481d, *Symp.* 177d, 193e, 198d, 212b, 216d–217a, *Phdr.* 257a, *Alc.* 103a; Xenophon: *Mem.* 2.6.28–29, *Symp.* 4.27–28, 8.2. On Socrates and the hetaerae see, for Aspasia: Plato's *Menexenus*, Aeschines' *Aspasia*, Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.36 and *Oec.* 3.14, Plut. *Per.* 24, Hermesianax in Ath. 5.219c–e, 220e–f and 13.599a, Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 1.17, and Syriani, *Sopatri et Marcellini Scholia ad Hermogenis Status* 4.159; for Theodote: Xen. *Mem.* 3.11 and Ael. *VH* 13.32; for Callisto: Ael. *VH* 13.23. For an overview see Lupo 2013). On the other hand, the Zopyrus anecdote is very clear about the fact that Socrates is able to control such a vehement passion. This issue is of core importance among the first-generation Socratics, who deal with it from different angles (Antisthenes: *SSR V A* 53, 90, 126; Aristippus: *SSR IV A* 36, 96, 124; Simon: *SSR IV A* 224; Xenophon: *Mem.* 1.2.1–5, 1.6.6–8, 2.1.18–20, 2.6.22, 4.5.8–9, *Symp.* 8.8, *Ap.* 25, *Oec.* 5.4; Plato: *Prt.* 358a–c, *Grg.* 491c–e and 505a–c, *Symp.* 219c, *Resp.* 4.430e–431b, *Leg.* 4.709e–710a. See Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013, 66, 72–75, 105–110, and for discussion Stavru 2016): Socrates is famous for his strength (*ischus*), endurance (*karteria*), self-control (*enkrateia*), and temperance (*sôphrosunê*).

has intercourse only (μόναις) with his wives or with prostitutes. Aristoxenus' text is explicit about the fact that at a certain moment Socrates came to have two wives at the same time (ἄμα), namely Xanthippe and Myrto.⁹⁸ The adjective Aristoxenus uses to define Xanthippe (κοινωτέραν) is the same he employs to distinguish the wives of Socrates from the other women (κοιναῖς). And since Socrates does not commit *adikia* having sex with these *koinai* while being married, it is difficult to think that they can be anything other than prostitutes.⁹⁹ But this means that Xanthippe, who is not even *koine* but *koinoteran*, must also be a prostitute (the comparative perhaps even suggesting that she was "more prostitute than the others"). Such a status fits well with the rest of the story, which reports that after Xanthippe Socrates married a completely different kind of woman, the aristocratic Myrto.

Aristoxenus next explains why Socrates married Xanthippe: he took her because she got involved with him (περιπλαχεῖσαν, according to Cyril), or she had sexual intercourse with him (προσπλαχεῖσαν, according to Theodoret).¹⁰⁰ From this involvement or intercourse Lamprocles was born. The other two children of Socrates, Sophroniscus and Menexenus, were born from Socrates' second wife (γάμῳ in Cyril; γαμηθεῖσαν in Theodoret), Myrto.

It should be noted that Aristoxenus is by no means juxtaposing the condition of Myrto to that of Xanthippe in terms of their relation to Socrates, as has been claimed.¹⁰¹ If Myrto is married to Socrates, Xanthippe is too: we saw before that Socrates "made use of" his wives (ταῖς γαμεταῖς, in plural), which can only mean of Xanthippe and Myrto. The difference between the two that

98 The simultaneous presence of two wives at a certain point of Socrates' life is reported by a eight sources: see Labarbe 1998, 18, for a complete overview.

99 On κοιναῖς / κοινωτέραν see LSJ s.v. κοινός, IV.3c, where κοινή = prostitute. The order of the phrase ἢ γὰρ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἢ ταῖς κοιναῖς χρῆσθαι μόναις makes it unlikely that Socrates had sexual intercourse *first* with prostitutes *and then*, once married, with his wives (Fitton 1970, 60). The opposite order (first with his wives and then with prostitutes) would stick more to the text, but would not fit with the numerous testimonies about Socrates being married in his late years. Given the previous sentence, where his vehement sex drive is mentioned, Socrates must have had intercourse *at times* with his wives and *at times* with prostitutes, as both kinds of intercourse were no *adikia*.

100 See the discussion in Woodbury 1973, 21–24, who claims that Porphyry's text had προσπλαχεῖσαν (as in Theodoret) and Smith's fr. 215, which relies on Woodbury. But there is no reason for preferring προσπλαχεῖσαν over γαμηθεῖσαν. It seems more prudent to think that either Cyril or Theodoret made an error when transcribing the text (possibly Theodoret made this error, and then adjusted the subsequent γάμῳ [in Cyril] into γαμηθεῖσαν so as to make it parallel to the προσπλαχεῖσαν he had introduced: see Fitton 1970, 61 n. 1).

101 For a clear account of the status of Xanthippe and Myrto see Labarbe 1998, 17–21.

Aristoxenus points at refers to the peculiar way the marriage with Xanthippe came about. Apparently, Socrates' decision to marry Xanthippe came, so to say, unexpectedly, because she happened to be in a certain condition, or because she behaved in a certain way. When Socrates married Myrto, by contrast, he made his decision well in advance.¹⁰²

We then get a glimpse into this *ménage à trois*. Which was a difficult one: Xanthippe and Myrto quarrelled with each other, and Socrates, instead of calming them down, used to laugh at their fights. This made the two wives even more furious, and every time they stopped fighting they attacked him (αὐτῷ μαχομένας). Socrates' family life is thus described as a devastating—albeit hilarious—*bellum omnium contra omnes*, from which even Socrates does not remain unscathed.¹⁰³

(T16) [fr. 58 Wehrli = Plut. *Arist.* 27] Demetrius of Phalerum, Hieronymus of Rhodes, Aristoxenus the musician, and Aristotle—if the book *On Nobility* has to be put among his authentic ones—report that Myrto, the granddaughter of Aristides, lived together (συνοικῆσαι) with Socrates the wise (τῷ σοφῷ), who had another wife (γυναῖκα), and took up Myrto who was widow because (διὰ) she was poor and in need of the necessary things. Against this account responded Panaetius in his writings on Socrates.

(T17) [fr. 57 Wehrli = Ath. 13.555d–556a] And beginning in this manner, one might criticize the authorities who assign Socrates two legitimate wives (δύο γαμετάς γυναῖκας), Xanthippe and Myrto the daughter of Aristides—not the Aristides known as “the Just,” who was not Socrates' contemporary, but that man's grandson. The authors in question are Callisthenes, Demetrius of Phalerum, Satyrus the Peripatetic, and Aristoxenus; Aristotle set the tone for them by reporting this in his *On Nobility*. [Ath. 13.556a–b] The alternative explanation, of course, is that this had been agreed to in that period by means of a decree (ψήφισμα) in response to a population shortage (διὰ σπάνιν ἀνθρώπων), making it possible for anyone who wished to have two wives (δύο ἔχειν γυναῖκας); that would explain why the comic poets are completely silent about this fact, even though they frequently recall Socrates. Hieronymus of Rhodes cited a decree about wives (περὶ τῶν γυναικῶν ψήφισμα); I will send it to you after I acquire the book.

102 See below, n. 104.

103 See Nardi 1958, 17–27, for a thorough reconstruction of other extant versions of this *ménage à trois*. The tradition reaches until early modernity.

Panaetius of Rhodes, on the other hand, argued against those who talk about Socrates' wives (Σωκράτους γυναικῶν).

The *Sôkratikoî logoi* do not deal with Myrto.¹⁰⁴ The circumstances of her marriage with Socrates were highly debated within the Peripatus, but apparently not within other philosophical schools: the Stoic scholarch Panaetius of Rhodes (185–110 BCE), for instance, rejected the story. It is interesting that Plutarch (45–125 CE), although he has doubts about the authenticity of the work that had “set the tone” for the story about Xanthippe and Myrto, Aristotle's *On Nobility*, is nevertheless certain that Socrates had two wives. On the other hand, Athenaeus (180–250 BCE) is skeptical, and highlights the difficulty of a Socrates

104 Socrates might have married Myrto for reasons linked to her noble origin. Myrto was the daughter (or granddaughter, according to some testimonies) of Aristides the Just (530–468 BCE), who had become famous for having been an Athenian general, statesman, and the founder of the Delian League. Aristides and his family come from Alopec, the same deme of Socrates. In Plato's *Laches*, the dramatic date of which is between 424 and 418 BCE, Socrates is on close terms with Lysimachus, the son of Aristides. No mention is made of a linkage with Lysimachus' family in the *Laches*, so Socrates' marriage with (Lysimachus' sister or daughter) Myrto must have happened after 418. According to T16, Socrates married Myrto because (διὰ) she was widowed and impoverished, that is, out of an act of generosity (von Mess 1916, 95–96; Fitton 1970, 63). Two passages from Aristotle, one from *On Nobility*, the other from *Rhetoric*, are likely to provide another reason for Socrates' decision to marry Myrto. According to fr. 92 Rose, Socrates claimed that “because of Aristides' virtue (ἀρετή) his daughter was nobly born (γενναία).” This and the general context of Aristotle's treatise might suggest that Socrates married Myrto for eugenic purposes (Döring 2007, 259–260), maybe because he wanted to have other children after Lamprocles and was afraid that they were going to be genetically affected by his (and possibly Xanthippe's) advanced age (this idea is featured at Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.23, *Oec.* 7.19, and *Resp. Lac.* 1.6, on which see Stavru 2008, 70–71 n. 24); this plan failed when it turned out (presumably only after Socrates' death) that one or more of Socrates' children were “senseless” (one according to Epict. *Diss.* 4.5.33: *υἱοῦ ἀγνώμονος*; more than one according to Plut. *Cat.* 20.3: *παισὶν ἀποπλήκτοις*). The story fits with what Aristotle had claimed at *Rh.* 1390b30, namely that Socrates' descendants had degenerated from Socrates' “firm kind” (στάσιμον γένος) into “silliness and indolence” (ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα). If we follow this train of thought, Socrates' senseless children must be those he had from Myrto, namely Sophroniscus and/or Menexenus, and not Xanthippe's son Lamprocles, who at Xen. *Mem.* 2.2 talks with his mother without showing any sign of stupidity. Be that as it may, Plutarch's explanation parallels that given by Porphyry (i.e. Cyril/Theodoret) about Socrates' decision to marry Xanthippe: in both cases the choice of Aristoxenus' Socrates seems to relate to the behavior or condition of Xanthippe viz. Myrto, and only in the second instance to his personal interest (the begetting of healthy children).

having “two married wives” (δύο γαμετάς γυναῖκας).¹⁰⁵ He then goes on to refer to a decree, according to which due to a population shortage during the Peloponnesian War it was possible for Athenian men “to have two wives” (δύο ἔχειν γυναῖκας).¹⁰⁶ Other sources for the decree refer it to the Peripatetics Satyrus of Callatis and Hieronymus of Rhodes, which we have seen playing a role in the transmission of the story of Socrates’ two wives.¹⁰⁷ This suggests that the story of the bigamy decree was discussed within the Peripatus, probably in the same context of Socrates’ marriages with Xanthippe and Myrto, and of the noble origin of the latter. We have seen that one possible reason for which Socrates married the noble Myrto might have been his wish to have other children after Lamprocles.¹⁰⁸ If this hypothesis holds, Socrates would have aimed at doing exactly what the decree was promoting: supplying healthy children for his city at war.

It seems that the three cores of the Peripatetic research concerning Socrates’ biography (the two wives of Socrates, the eugenic preoccupation of Socrates, and the bigamy decree) form a coherent whole. This makes it unlikely that the decree was invented by Hieronymus only to explain the position of Socrates, although a forgery cannot be excluded.¹⁰⁹

4.4.2 An Apology of Socrates

Socrates’ conviction in 399BCE spawned many apologetic texts, in which his friends and associates tried to exculpate him from the charges made against him. The *Sôkratikoî logoi*, composed by Socrates’ immediate pupils within about fifty years, followed the strategy of showing that Socrates’ teaching had been highly beneficial for them and his fellow citizens. But before these *logoi* were written another associate of Socrates who was not his pupil, the orator Lysias, defended his memory by following a much more immediate strategy:

105 As also pointed out by Fitton 1970, 57–58; Bicknell 1974, 4.

106 Ath. 13.555d. The historicity of the bigamy decree has been widely disputed: see Buermann 1878; von Mess 1916, 93–94; Zeller 1922, 54–57; Wolff 1944, 85–95; Lacey 1968, 112–113; Fitton 1970, 62–63; Davies 1971, 51–52; Woodbury 1973, 24–25; MacDowell 1978, 90; Cromeý 1980; Sealey 1984, 129–131; Just 1989, 53–54; Ogden 1996, 72–75 and 189–191; Harrison 1998, 17; Labarbe 1998, 24–27; Nails 2002, 210; Schorn 2004, 392–398; O’Sullivan 2008, 403 n. 27; Lape 2010, 262–264; Huffman 2012, 276; Haake 2013, 100–107.

107 DL 2.26 and Gell. NA 15.20. For Satyrus and Hieronymus see above, T16–17 and n. 91.

108 See above, n. 104.

109 In fact, it seems strange that there is no archaeological evidence for such a decree, given the amount of extant epigraphic material going back to the period of the Peloponnesian War. Moreover, forged decrees existed throughout the Greek world (Haake 2013).

(Τ18) [fr. 60 Wehrli = *Scholia in Platonis Apologiam* 18b] This Anytus was the son of Anthemion. He was Athenian, lover (ἐραστής) of Alcibiades, and rich due to his business as a leather tanner. As he was mocked (σκαμπτόμενος) by Socrates for this ... he persuaded Meletus with a payment (μισθῶ) to present an accusation against Socrates. This is recalled by Lysias in his *Apology of Socrates*, Xenophon, and Aristoxenus in his *Life of Socrates*.

Aristoxenus, to whom the scholiast Areta co-attributes this text, very probably drew on Lysias' *Apology of Socrates*.¹¹⁰ In this speech, most likely written in the immediate years after Socrates' death, Lysias aimed not only at defending Socrates, but also at attacking those who had formulated the charges against him. Anytus, who was very wealthy and by far the most influential of Socrates' three accusers, had a liaison with his most prominent pupil, the rich and beautiful Alcibiades. From the *Sôkratikoî logoi* we know that Socrates also had a relation with Alcibiades: excepting Aristippus and Xenophon, all the major pupils of Socrates write about it. According to these accounts, this relation turned out a failure once Alcibiades abandoned his master's teaching to devote himself to politics. There was an apologetic purpose for describing the relation this way: by showing that Alcibiades had turned away from Socrates, the Socratics countered the charge of corruption of the youth launched against their master.

This background is important for understanding the apologetic strategy adopted by Lysias. By claiming that Anytus had entertained a stable erotic relationship with Alcibiades (ἐραστής),¹¹¹ he turned the accusation of corrupting the youth against the accuser. It was Anytus, and not Socrates, who had made Alcibiades an impious lawbreaker and the traitor of Athens. This meant going much further than the Socratics, whose aim was to show that Alcibiades remained uneducated and unlawful (*apaideutos* and *paranomos*) despite his master's love and educational efforts. It is therefore likely that Lysias negated altogether a liaison between Socrates and Alcibiades, thus exonerating Socrates from any responsibility at all for Alcibiades' deeds.¹¹²

110 See Lysias' frs. 281–286 Carey. On Aristoxenus' use of Lysias' *Apology* see Hirzel 1889, 246; Dover 1968, 62; Rossetti 1975, 5.

111 On the erotic relationship between Anytus and Alcibiades see Plut. *Alc.* 4 and Ath. 534e–f, who draws on the peripatetic Satyrus of Callatis. This fact is of some importance, as it might entail that material from Lysias' *Apology* circulated within the Peripatus until the second century BCE. Aristoxenus may have had access to the same material quoted by Satyrus, and might have used it for lost sections of his *Life of Socrates*.

112 See Rossetti 1975, 10.

But this was only one facet of Lysias' aggressive defence strategy. The other one concerned the hidden reasons for the accusations formulated against Socrates. These consisted in the different models of education put into practice by him and Anytus. Lysias tells us that Anytus' enmity was provoked by Socrates, who had mocked him for his business as leather tanner.¹¹³ It is very likely that such mocking concerned not only the financial aspect of Anytus' activity, but also its paideutic background.

Two passages from the *Sôkratikoî logoi* clarify the reasons for Socrates' criticism and Anytus' reaction to it. In Plato's *Meno*, Socrates talks with Anytus about the teachability of technical excellence.¹¹⁴ After a thorough analysis of different kinds of technical excellence, Socrates concludes that such excellence is never teachable. Anytus' enraged and menacing reaction, followed by his departure (94e), makes it clear that Anytus is exactly the kind of aspiring teacher Socrates meant during his inquiry. Anytus' idea of education is wrong, which shows that he is not a teacher. The second passage is from Xenophon's *Apology*, and is probably the one mentioned by the scholiast in T18.¹¹⁵ Here too the problem is that of the legitimacy of Anytus' teaching. Socrates denies it, and urges him not to educate (παιδεύειν) his son Anthemion into the tanning trade. Socrates foresees that Anthemion, despite being "not weak of spirit," will eventually fall into shameful desires that will impede him from following his father's profession. He will waste all his talent and become a drunkard, thus demonstrating the complete failure of his father's education.

These passages suggest that Lysias' *Apology* dealt with different educational models. By attacking Anytus, Socrates defended his own. We have seen that according to Spintharus' account no man was more persuasive than Socrates, but not when he was seized by the emotions that made him ugly and aggressive (T9 and T10). This fits well with Lysias' picture that Aristoxenus relies on. Socrates was indeed an extraordinary teacher, but his strong temper led him occasionally to be rude, as he was with Anytus. But he stuck to his idea of teaching, probably knowing that this would eventually cost him his life.¹¹⁶

113 It should be noted that the verb used here for Socrates' mocking (σκώπτειν) seems to refer to an attitude that was not common for him. The verb is related to Socrates' own behavior only four times in Plato (*Euthyd.* 294d, *Phdr.* 264e3, *Thg.* 125e, *Alc.* 109d) and three times in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.3.7, 3.6.9, 3.11.16).

114 Pl. *Meno* 90b–95a.

115 Xen. *Ap.* 29–31. On Xenophon's Socrates as a teacher see Morrison 1994.

116 See Pl. *Meno* 94e–95a. A major difference between Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates lies in the fact that the first denies being a teacher, the second affirms it: see Dorion 2013, xiv–xv

5 Conclusion

We have seen that Aristoxenus' account of Socrates relies on evidence that can be traced back to the *Sôkratikoî logoi* and to biographical material that had been collected within the Peripatus since the time of Aristotle. Aristoxenus deals with the most contradictory aspects of Socrates' character, providing a comprehensive picture of his life, his way of behaving, and his unique character. Such contradictions depend mostly on the fact that despite his extraordinary qualities Socrates is never in full control of his intense emotions. Both his outward appearance and boundless behavior bear the trace of these emotions, which are, however, fully consistent with his persuasiveness, his good temper, and his ability to restrain himself. Aristoxenus' account gives us insight into a contradictory and complicated character, whose life could only be contradictory and complicated: from stonemason to philosopher, from vice to virtue, from absolute poverty to money-making, from his liaison with Archelaus to that with his quarrelsome wives. Such a lively set of contrasts provides a rich and impressive picture. One might even say that Socrates' charismatic features consist precisely in the sum of all the character features and the biographical facts, positive and negative, outlined by Aristoxenus. The remarkable coherence of his portrait seems to confirm this.

References

- Anderson, M. 'Socrates as Hoplite', *AncPhil* 25 (2005), 273–289.
- Baer, R. 'Das Schwören des Sokrates "beim Hunde!"', in: R. Baer, *Xenophons Apologie des Sokrates vor dem Gericht*. Niederuzwil 2007.
- Barabas, M. 'The strangeness of Socrates', *Philosophical Investigations* 9 (1986), 89–110.
- Barker, A. *The science of harmonics in classical Greece*, Cambridge 2007.
- Bélis, A. *Aristoxène de Tarente et Aristote: le traité d'harmonique*, Paris 1986.
- Berti, E. 'Introduzione', in: E. Berti and C. Rossitto, *Il libro primo della "Metafisica"*, Roma 1999, 3–33.
- Bicknell, P.J. 'Sokrates' Mistress Xanthippe', *Apeiron* 8 (1974), 1–5.
- Bidez, J. *Eos, ou: Platon et l'Orient*. Bruxelles 1945.
- Blank, D.L. 'Socratic versus Sophists on payment for teaching', *ClAnt* 4 (1985), 1–49.
- Boys-Stones, G. 'Phaedo of Elis and Plato on the soul', *Phronesis* 49 (2004), 1–23.

for further references. See also Morrison 1994, 194–198, who claims that both Plato's and Xenophon's Socrateses are "moral experts."

- Boys-Stones, G. 'Physiognomy and ancient psychological theory', in: S. Swain, *Seeing the face, seeing the soul: Polemon's physiognomy from classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam*. Oxford 2007, 19–124.
- Boys-Stones, G. and C. Rowe. *The circle of Socrates: readings in the first-generation Socratics*, Indianapolis 2013.
- Brancacci, A. 'The double *daimon* in Euclides the Socratic', *Apeiron* 38 (2005), 143–154.
- Bréhier, E. 'L'orientalisme de Plotin', in: E. Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin*. Paris 1928, 107–133.
- Brickhouse, T.C. and N.D. Smith. *The philosophy of Socrates*. Boulder 2000.
- Buermann, H. 'Das legitime Konkubinat der Athener und die vermeintliche Bigamie des Sokrates', *Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie* 9 (1878), 569–597.
- Burnet, J. *Greek philosophy, 1: Thales to Plato*. London 1914.
- Burnet, J. *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito*. Oxford 1924.
- Busse, A. 'Aus den Lehrjahren des Sokrates', *Sokrates. Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* 7 (1919), 86–90.
- Carey, C. *Lysiae Orationes cum Fragmentis*, Oxford 2007.
- Centrone, B. 'Aristoxène de Tarente', in: R. Goulet, *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* 1 (1989), 590–593.
- Cappelletti, A.S. 'Arquelao, maestro de Sócrates', *RF* 9 (1960), 79–96.
- Carawan, E. 'Pericles the Younger and the Citizenship Law', *CJ* 103 (2008), 383–406.
- Chenet, F. 'L'Indie et la Grèce', in: J.-F. Mattéi, *Le discours philosophique: encyclopédie philosophique universelle*, IV. Paris (1998), 1288–1327.
- Chiesara, M.L. *Aristocles of Messene: testimonia and fragments*. Oxford 2001.
- Chroust, A.-H. 'Socrates and pre-Socratic philosophy', *ModSch* 29 (1952), 119–135.
- Conger, G.P. 'Did India influence early Greek philosophies?', *Philosophy East and West* 2 (1952), 102–128.
- Cooper, C. 'Aristoxenus, Περὶ βίῳν and Peripatetic biography', *Mouseion* 46 (2002), 307–339.
- Crönert, W. *Kolotes und Menedemos*. Leipzig 1906.
- Cromey, R.D. 'Socrates' Myrto', *GB* 9 (1980), 57–67.
- Davies, J.K. *Athenian propertied families: 600–300 B.C.* Oxford 1971.
- De Luise, F. and A. Stavru. *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013.
- Dihle, A. *Studien zur griechischen Biographie*. Göttingen 1970.
- Dihle, A. *Die Entstehung der historischen Biographie*. Heidelberg 1987.
- Doerrie, H. 'Xanthippe, die Gattin des Sokrates', *RE* IX A2 (1967), coll. 1335–1342.
- Dorandi, T. *Diogenes Laertius: lives of eminent philosophers*. Cambridge 2013.
- Döring, K. 'Myrto', *DNP* (2006). (= 2006a)
- Döring, K. 'Xanthippe', *DNP* (2006). (= 2006b)

- Döring, K. 'Biographisches zur Person des Sokrates', in: Erler and Schorn 2007, 257–267.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Commentaire', in: M. Bandini and L.-A. Dorion, *Xénophon: Mémoires*, 1. Paris 2000.
- Dover, K.J. *Lysias and the corpus Lysiacum*. Berkeley 1968.
- Dover, K.J. *Plato, Symposium*. Cambridge 1980.
- Dupréel, E. *La légende socratique et les sources de Platon*. Bruxelles 1922.
- Eide, T. 'On Socrates' *atopia*', *Symbolae Osloenses* 71 (1996), 59–67.
- Erler, M. 'La *parrhēsia* da Socrate a Epicuro', in: L. Rossetti and A. Stavru, *Socratica* 2008: *studies in Ancient Socratic literature*. Bari 2010, 279–320.
- Erler, M. and S. Schorn. *Die griechische Biographie in hellenistischer Zeit: Akten des internationalen Kongresses vom 26.–29. Juli 2006 in Würzburg*. Berlin 2007.
- Festugière, A.J. 'Grecs et Sages orientaux', in: A.J. Festugière, *Etudes de philosophie grecque*. Paris 1971, 183–195.
- Filliozat, J. 'La valeur des connaissances gréco-romaines sur l'Inde', *Journal des Savants, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres* 2 (1981), 97–135.
- Fischer, J.L. *The Case of Socrates*. Praha 1969.
- Fitton, J.W. 'That was no lady, that was ...', *CQ* 20 (1970), 56–66.
- Fletcher, R. 'Legwork: Ion's Socrates', in: V. Jennings and A. Katsaros, *The world of Ion of Chios*. Leiden 2007, 317–330.
- Fortenbaugh, W.W. 'Biography and the Aristotelian Peripatos', in: Erler and Schorn 2007, 45–78.
- Foucault, M. *Discourse and truth: the problematization of parrhesia*, 6 lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley, Oct–Nov, 1983.
- Geffcken, J. 'Antiplatonika', *Hermes* 64 (1928), 87–109.
- Giannantoni, G. (1986). *Socrate: tutte le testimonianze: da Aristofane e Senofonte ai Padri cristiani*. Bari 1986.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*. Napoli 1990. (= SSR).
- Gomperz, T. *Griechische Denker: eine Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, II. Berlin 1925.
- Graham, D. 'Socrates on Samos', *CQ* 58 (2008), 308–313.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. *Socrates*. Cambridge 1971.
- Haake, M. 'Illustrating, documenting, making-believe: the use of *psephismata* in Hellenistic biographies of philosophers', in: P. Liddell and P. Low, *Inscriptions and their uses in Greek and Latin literature*. Oxford 2013, 79–124.
- Halbfass, W. *India and Europe*. Albany 1988.
- Hansen, G.C. 'Porphyrion über Sokrates', *Philologus* 138 (1994), 264–266.
- Harrison, A.R.W. *The law of Athens 1: the family and property*. Indianapolis 1998.
- Heiberg, J.L. 'Sokrates' Entwicklung', *Sokrates: Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* 1 (1913), 353–373.
- Henkelman, W.F.M. 'Zopyrus en Sokrates: Een fysiognomische ontmoeting', *Lamprax* 32 (1999), 128–148.

- Hirzel, R. 'Polykrates' Anklage und Lysias' Verteidigung des Sokrates', *RhM* 44 (1889), 239–250.
- Hirzel, R. 'Aristoxenos und Platons erster Alkibiades', *RhM* 45 (1890), 419–435.
- Huffman, C.A. *Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, philosopher and mathematician king*. Cambridge 2005.
- Huffman, C.A. *Aristoxenus of Tarentum: discussion*. London 2012. (= 2012a)
- Huffman, C.A. 'Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates*', in: Huffman 2012, 251–281. (= 2012b)
- Huffman, C.A. 'The Peripatetics on the Pythagoreans', in: C.A. Huffman, *A history of Pythagoreanism*. Cambridge 2014, 274–295.
- Jacoby, F. 'Some remarks on Ion of Chios', *CQ* 41 (1947), 1–17.
- Jaeger, W. *Aristotle: fundamentals of the history of his development*. Oxford 1934.
- Jan, K. von. 'Aristoxenos', in: *RE* 11/1 (1895), coll. 1057–1065.
- Joël, K. *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*. Tübingen 1921.
- Just, R. *Women in Athenian law and life*. London 1989.
- Karttunen, K. *India in early Greek literature*. Helsinki 1989.
- Kayser, S.I. *Die Fragmente des Aristoxenos aus Tarent*. New York 2010.
- Kinzig, W. *Kyrrill von Alexandrien: gegen Julian*. Berlin 2016.
- Kofsky, A. *Eusebius of Caesarea against Paganism*. Leiden 2000.
- Labarbe, J. 'Les compagnes de Socrate', *AC* 67 (1998), 5–43.
- Lacey, W.K. *The family in classical Athens*. London 1968.
- Lacrosse, J. 'Some remarks about a meeting between Socrates and an Indian (Aristoxenus' Fragment 53)', *AGPh* 89 (2007), 247–263.
- Lape, S. *Race and citizen identity in the classical Athenian democracy*. Cambridge 2010.
- Laurenti, R. *Aristotele. I frammenti dei dialoghi*, 1–11. Napoli 1987.
- Leo, F. *Die griechisch-römische Biographie nach ihrer litterarischen Form*. Leipzig 1901.
- Littman, R.J. 'The loves of Alcibiades', *TAPhA* 101 (1970), 263–276.
- Long, A.A. 'Socrates in Hellenistic philosophy', *CQ* 38 (1988), 150–171.
- Lupo, C. 'I dialoghi di Socrate con le etere', in: de Luise and Stavru 2013, 298–306.
- Luzac, J. *Lectiones Atticae: de δῶρα Socratis dissertatio*. Leiden 1809.
- MacDowell, D.M. *The law in classical Athens*, London 1978.
- Maier, H. *Sokrates: sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung*. Tübingen 1913.
- Mallet, A. 'The notion of *Theia Moira* in Aeschines of Sphettus' Fragments', in: de Luise and Stavru 2013, 225–232.
- Mansfeld, J. *Prolegomena: questions to be settled before the study of an author or a text*. Leiden 1994.
- McLean, D. 'The Socratic corpus: Socrates and physiognomy', in: M. Trapp, *Socrates: from antiquity to the enlightenment*. Aldershot 2007, 65–88.
- McPherran, M.L. 'Recognizing the Gods of Socrates', in: M.L. McPherran, *Wisdom, ignorance, and virtue: new essays in Socratic studies*. Edmonton 1996, 125–139.
- Mess, A. von. 'Die Anfänge der Biographie und der psychologischen Geschichtsschrei-

- bung in der griechischen Literatur', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 71 (1916), 79–101.
- Minar, E.L. *Early Pythagorean politics in practice and theory*. Baltimore 1942.
- Momigliano, A. *The development of Greek biography: four lectures*. Cambridge 1993.
- Morrison, D.R. 'Xenophon's Socrates as a teacher', in: P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*. London 1994, 181–208.
- Müller, K. 'Aristoxenus Tarentinus', in: K. Müller (ed.), *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*, 11. Paris 1878.
- Muramoto, O. and W.G. Englert. 'Socrates and temporal lobe epilepsy: a pathographic diagnosis 2,400 years later', *Epilepsia* 47 (2006), 652–654.
- Murphy, D. "'By the goose, by the ram': Socrates' other unusual oaths', *SCO* 62 (2016), 15–51.
- Nails, D. 'Myrto', in: *The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics*. Indianapolis 2002, 208–210.
- Narcy, M. 'Socrate', in: M.O. Goulet-Cazé, *Diogène Laërce: vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres*. Paris 1999, 226–250.
- Nardi, T. *Sulle orme di Santippe: da Platone a Panzini*. Roma 1958.
- Nietzsche, F. 'Das Problem des Sokrates 3', in: *Götzen-Dämmerung oder wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert*, in: G. Colli and M. Montinari, *Kritische Studienausgabe*, VI. Berlin 1889.
- North, H. *Sophrosyne: self-knowledge and self-restraint in Greek literature*. Ithaca 1966.
- O'Sullivan, L. 'Athens, intellectuals, and Demetrius of Phalerum's Socrates', *TAPhA* 138 (2008), 393–410.
- Ogden, D. *Greek bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods*. Oxford 1996.
- Palumbo, L. 'Socrate, i Socratici e la *parrhēsia*', in: de Luise and Stavru 2013, 252–260.
- Papapetrou, P.D. 'The philosopher Socrates had *exophthalmos* (a term coined by Plato) and probably Graves' disease', *Hormones* 14 (2015), 167–171.
- Patterson, C. *Pericles' citizenship law of 451–450 B.C.* New York (1981).
- Patzer, A. 'Sokrates als Soldat', *A&A* 45 (1999), 1–35.
- Patzer, A. 'Beim Hunde! Sokrates und der Eid des Rhadamanthys', in: M. Schauer and G. Thome, *Altera Ratio: Klassische Philologie zwischen Subjektivität und Wissenschaft. Festschrift für Werner Suerbaum zum 70.* Stuttgart 2003, 93–107.
- Patzer, A. 'Sokrates und Archelaos: historische und fiktionale Texte über den jungen Sokrates', in: W. von der Weppen and B. Zimmermann, *Sokrates im Gang der Zeiten*. Tübingen 2006, 9–56.
- Pearson, L. *Aristoxenus: Elementa Rhythmica*. Oxford 1990.
- Philip, J.A. 'Aristotle's monograph on the Pythagoreans', *TAPhA* 94 (1963), 185–198.
- Pohlenz, M. 'Nomos und Physis', *Hermes* 81 (1953), 418–438.
- Prandi, L. *Callistene: uno storico tra Aristotele e i re macedoni*. Milano 1985.

- Rossetti, L. 'Alla ricerca dei *logoi Sokratikoi* perduti (11). 3—L'Apologia Sokratous di Lisia', *Rivista di Studi Classici* 23 (1975), 87–99.
- Rossetti, L. 'Il momento conviviale dell'eteria socratica e il suo significato pedagogico', *AncSoc* 7 (1976), 29–77.
- Rossetti, L. 'Ricerche sui dialoghi socratici di Fedone e di Euclide', *Hermes* 108 (1980), 183–200.
- Rossetti, L. *Le dialogue socratique*. Paris 2011.
- Rossetti, L. 'Phaedo's *Zopyrus* (and Socrates' Confidences)', in: U. Zilioli, *From the Socratics to the Socratic schools: classical ethics, metaphysics and epistemology*. London 2015, 82–98.
- Schmid, W. *Wilhelm von Christs Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur, 11: die nachklassische Periode der griechischen Litteratur 1: Von 320 vor Christus bis 100 nach Christus*. München 1920.
- Schorn, S. *Satyros aus Kallatis: Sammlung der Fragmente mit Kommentar*. Basel 2004.
- Schorn, S. "Periegetische Biographie", "Historische Biographie": Neanthes von Kyzikos (*FgrHist* 84) als Biograph', in: Erler and Schorn 2007, 115–156.
- Schorn, S. 'Aristoxenus' Biographical Method', in: Huffman 2012, 177–221.
- Schwarzenberg, E. 'The portrait of Socrates by Aristoxenus and Demetrius of Phaleron', in: K.J. Boudouris, *The philosophy of Socrates*. Athens 1991, 309–323.
- Sealey, R. 'On lawful concubinage in Athens', *ClAnt* 3 (1984), 111–133.
- Sedlar, J.W. *India and the Greek world*. Totowa 1981.
- Smith, A. *Porphyrii philosophi fragmenta*. Stuttgart 1993.
- Sonnabend, H. *Geschichte der antiken Biographie*. München 2002.
- Stavru, A. 'Socrate et la confiance dans les *agraphoi nomoi* (Xénophon, *Mémorables* IV.4): réflexions sur les *Socratica* de Walter F. Otto', in: M. Narcy and A. Tordesillas, *Xénophon et Socrate: actes du colloque d'Aix-en-Provence (6–9 novembre 2003)*. Paris 2008, 65–85.
- Stavru, A. *Il potere dell'apparenza: percorso storico-critico nell'estetica antica*. Napoli 2011.
- Stavru, A. 'Sokrates und der zweifache Eros in den Überlieferungen von Antisthenes, Aischines und Platon', *Bochumer Jahrbuch zur Philosophie der Antike und Mittelalter* 16 (2013), 1–22.
- Stavru, A. 'Socrate *karterikos* (Plat. *Symp.* 216c–221b)', in: M. Erler and M. Tulli, *Dialogues on Plato's Symposium: selected papers from the tenth Symposium Platonicum*. Sankt Augustin 2016.
- Stuart, D.R. *Epochs of Greek and Roman biography*. Berkeley 1928.
- Tilman, V. 'Archélaos d'Athènes', *RPhA* 2 (2000), 65–107.
- Tola, F. and C. Dragonetti. 'Augusto y la India', *AHAM* 22 (1982), 148–241.
- Visconti, A. *Aristosseno di Taranto: biografia e formazione spirituale*. Napoli 1999.
- Vlastos, G. 'Socrates' disavowal of knowledge', *PhilosQ* 35 (1985), 1–31.

- Vogel, F. 'Aus den Lehrjahren des Sokrates', *Sokrates: Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* 6 (1918), 10–12.
- Vogt, S. *Aristoteles: Physiognomonika*. Darmstadt 1999.
- Wehrli, F. *Die Schule des Aristoteles Texte und Kommentar: Aristoxenos*. Basel 1945.
- Wehrli, F. 'Der Peripatos bis zum Beginn der römischen Kaiserzeit', in: H. Flashar, *Die Philosophie der Antike, III: Ältere Akademie, Aristoteles, Peripatos*. Basel 1983, 459–599.
- White, S. 'Principes Sapientiae: Dicaearchus Biography of Philosophy', in: W.W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schütrumpf, *Dicaearchus of Messana: text, translation, and discussion*. New Brunswick 2001, 195–236.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. von. *Platon 1: Leben und Werke*. Berlin 1919.
- Winspear, A.D. and T. Silverberg. *Who was Socrates?* New York 1939.
- Wolff, A. 'Marriage law and family organization in ancient Athens: a study on the interrelation of public and private law in the Greek city', *Traditio* 2 (1944), 43–95.
- Woodbury, L. 'Socrates and Archelaus', *Phoenix* 25 (1971), 299–309.
- Woodbury, L. 'Socrates and the Daughter of Aristides', *Phoenix* 27 (1973), 7–25.
- Zeller, E. *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, II 1: Sokrates und die Sokratiker. Platon und die alte Akademie*. Darmstadt 1963, 54–57.
- Zhmud, L. 'Aristoxenus and the Pythagoreans', in: Huffman 2012, 223–249.
- Zimmermann, B. 'Aristoxenos von Tarent', in: B. Zimmermann and A. Rengakos, *Die Literatur der klassischen und hellenistischen Zeit*. München 2014, 705–707.

Socratic Protreptic and Epicurus: Healing through Philosophy

Jan Erik Heßler

Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg

Socrates, as we learn from Colotes' critique of him,¹ was held in much lower esteem by the greater part of the Epicureans than by other schools.² But Epicurus himself, especially in his *Letter to Menoeceus*, shows the influence of an essential element of the Socratic educational method: the protreptic familiar from the writings of Plato and other Socratics. In order to demonstrate how I have arrived at this conclusion, I will take the following steps:

1. A short history of *protreptikoi logoi*; 2. General features of protreptic literature; 3. Protreptic in Socratic writings: Philosophy as therapy; 4. Protreptic in Epicurus: *philosophia medicans*. 5. In some concluding remarks, I will compare the observations made about Plato and other Socratics with those about Epicurus in order to show which elements the founder of the *kêpos* most likely adopted from Socrates.

1 An Overview

Before discussing in detail certain characteristics of Epicurean and Socratic protreptic, some general remarks on *protreptikoi logoi* seem in order. This kind of speech was developed during the fifth century BCE, when *sophistai* began giving lessons independently of the traditional system of education. Their lectures were meant to prepare the young citizens of the Athenian *polis* for becoming politicians,³ consisted mainly in teaching rhetoric, and were rather expensive. But before starting with their teaching program, the sophists first had to convince the youth of Athens—and, if necessary, also the paying

1 Kechagia 2011, 53–80. 109–115.

2 On the Epicureans' negative attitude towards Socrates, see Kechagia 2011, esp. 74–75. On their positive estimation of him, see Erler 1994, 129–130, and the Epicureans' statements on Socrates in SSR I C.

3 Kerferd 1981, esp. 15–23; Kerferd and Flashar 1998.

parents—of the usefulness of these lessons.⁴ For this purpose they used a sort of advertising lecture.⁵

This advertising lecture, after a reassessment of its underlying intention, was adopted by the Socratics.⁶ Among the Socratics of the first generation, the title *protreptikos* (and consequently the literary form) is first documented for Antisthenes and Aristippus,⁷ whose exhortative speeches, however, have been lost.⁸ Plato himself did not write a *protrepticus* in the narrow sense of an exhortative text, but several passages of protreptic character can be found within his works,⁹ and the aporetic dialogue *Euthydemus* is generally considered the earliest preserved protreptic text.¹⁰ By the early-fourth century BCE, writing protreptic texts already was considered a conventional, if not mandatory, practice of philosophers. Consequently, Epicurus too uses the protreptic strategies developed in the Socratic literature, as we will see below. Before considering which features connect or separate Socratic and Epicurean protreptic, however, let us look into the ancient sources that tell us about the functions of protreptic literature in general.

2 General Features

Several scholars (starting with Paul Hartlich and Konrad Gaiser) each in their own way account for the characteristics of protreptic and paraenetic literature. These complex theories sometimes seem partly speculative or too rigid in their genre distinctions.¹¹ In this chapter I will concentrate instead on the ancient theories, as these seem to provide a more precise definition of protreptic

4 Gaiser 1959, 25–26, 59; Collins 2015, 1–7.

5 See the passages in Gaiser 1959, 37–40, 40–42, 45–47. For the differentiation between Plato's protreptic and sophistic exhortation speech, see 130–147.

6 Michelini 2000, 512. See also the Socratic *protreptikoi* in Xen. *Mem.* 1.4–2.1, 4.2, and 4.6; Michelini 2000, 510 n. 7; Slings 1999, 77–82. For the development of the Socratic dialogue from sophistic exhortation speeches see Gaiser 1959, 95–106; Van der Meer 2002, 606–609.

7 Antisthenes: DL 6.16; Aristippus: DL 2.85.

8 For examples of protreptic writings up to late antiquity see Hartlich 1889, 273–333; Görgemanns 2001.

9 E.g. Pl. *Euthyd.* 278e–282d, 288d–292e; Gaiser 1959, 47–51; for an analysis of further passages see 106–130; see also Slings 1999, 75–76.

10 Chance 1992, 14.

11 On different approaches of genre and terminology see Swancutt 2005, esp. 117–121; Alieva 2013; Collins 2015, 16–34; Alieva (forthcoming).

writings than “discourses with a hortatory function.”¹² I will focus not only on the proper representatives of the genre but also on the ancient texts that offer definitions of it.

Epictetus in his *Dissertations* (Arr. *Epict. diss.* 3.23.34) says that a *protrepticus* can confront the audience with the fact that they are constantly engaged in a battle with themselves, that is, that they want what leads to a happy life but are looking for it in the wrong places. Epictetus here refers to the rhetorical practice of philosophers: since in ancient times all kinds of texts were read out loud and often in front of an audience,¹³ the task of *protreptikoi logoi* (whether written or performed) were to address a person and point out to him the usefulness of philosophy¹⁴ for discovering the conditions for *eudaimonia*.¹⁵ Therefore, if they want to achieve a state of constant happiness, they must first be convinced to philosophize.¹⁶ That is why, first of all, *protreptikoi logoi* direct the members of their audience toward their inner conflicts which they must face because they are pursuing the wrong way of life.¹⁷ These *logoi* work towards a change of mind (*metanoia*) in their listeners, a change allowing them to choose the right path. Similar guidelines for *protreptikoi* can be found in Clement of Alexandria.¹⁸ At the beginning of his *Paedagogus* (1.1.1.3–4), Clement states that the *logos*, understood as a heavenly leader, is called *protreptikos* when it leads to salvation. It provides good advice to the exhorted and promises a cure from passions.¹⁹ This aspect of healing is important and can be found in connection with *protreptikoi logoi* even before Clement. The most important source for this therapeutic function is Philo of Larissa. We will take a closer look at his characterisation of protreptic in the next part of this chapter.

12 Hartlich 1889, 221–222; Canto-Sperber 1989, 61.

13 Usener 1994, esp. 6–7.

14 Philo fr. 2 Mette (*Mette* 1986/87) = Stob. 2.7.2 pp. 39–41 Wachsmuth; Pl. *Euthyd.* 288d–e.

15 Dio Chrys. *Or.* 13.28.

16 Pl. *Euthyd.* 282d, 288d; Isoc. *Antid.* 285; *Ep.* 7.3; see also Heßler 2014, 155–156, on Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.

17 Slings 1999, 59–63; Swancutt 2005, 124–125.

18 Swancutt 2005, 125–126.

19 See the phrasing in Ps.-Plut. *De liberis educandis* 7d.

3 Protreptic in Socratic Writings

3.1 *Plato's Euthydemus: An Early Representative of Protreptic Literature*

As mentioned above, the Socratics developed a form of protreptic *logos* out of the sophists' advertising speeches.²⁰ The cultural processes of this era are reflected in Plato's *Euthydemus*,²¹ where (in contrast to the other dialogues) Socrates repeatedly uses the terms *protrepein*/*protreptikos*. This dialogue will serve as an example of Socratic protreptic in Plato.

As the course of the dialogue shows,²² Socrates' conversation provides a counterweight to the sophistic art that the practitioners of eristic identify with protreptic.²³ The effectiveness of Socrates' form of philosophical discourse becomes obvious from the progress that Clinias makes during his second conversation with Socrates: the young man no longer limits himself to short answers but suggests his own solutions to problems.²⁴ His improvement is a result of dialectical argumentation;²⁵ and this is exactly the reason Clinias also realizes the necessity of dialectics (290c–d).²⁶ The young man is led from his own views to new insight, a desire to philosophize. Thus, a rethinking has taken place, and it is Socrates—not the practitioners of eristic—who has fulfilled his own request, that Clinias comes to care for philosophy and the care for *aretê*. This change of mind, as the passage in Epictetus shows (Arr. *Epict. diss.* 3.23.34), is an important element of *protreptikoi*.

3.2 *Socratic Protreptic as Therapy: The Euthydemus and Other Passages of Plato*

The most important ancient source for the evaluation of protreptic texts—and therefore also Plato's *Euthydemus* along with other Socratic writings—is an account by Philo of Larissa. In a long fragment transmitted by Stobaeus,²⁷ Philo talks about philosophical *logoi* and compares the philosopher to a physician, for both have to convince an ill person to start therapy, and both have to counter or pre-empt any opposing pieces of advice. This task the philosopher

20 See n. 6.

21 Swancutt 2005, 131–135; Van der Meeren 2011, xxvii; Collins 2015, 44–145.

22 For the course of argumentation see Hawtrey 1981.

23 In detail Chance 1992, 54–77, 110–129; Kahn 1996, 322.

24 Pl. *Euthyd.* 289c–290d; Canto-Sperber 1989, 62.

25 For dialectical technique see Chance 1992, 71–72, 75–76.

26 For this reason Szlezák 1985, 61, identifies dialectics with the *epistêmê* the participants of the dialogue are looking for.

27 Philo fr. 2 Mette = Stob. 21.7.2 pp. 39–41 Wachsm.

accomplishes by writing a *protrepticus*, the characteristics of which are listed by Philo in the following paragraphs.²⁸

His text offers an extensive description of the *protreptikos logos*, which is important for us because (1) it is the earliest source about how to write these kinds of text and (2) the elements listed by Philo can be found within protreptic literature written by Plato and other first-generation Socratics, as well as in Aristotle, Isocrates, Epicurus, and later authors. In fact, Philo's definition of *protreptikoi logoi* seems to apply to all ancient texts dealing with protreptics. This is why, even if modern scholarship has addressed it only briefly,²⁹ the passage should be taken into consideration for understanding the protreptic of both the Socratics and Epicurus.

Let us see how the *Euthydemus* and other Socratic writings match the characteristics listed by Philo:

1. The imagery of physician and healing that frames Philo's account is not found in the *Euthydemus*, but is familiar from several passages in other dialogues of Plato.³⁰ The requirement that a *protrepticus* has to convince the addressee to start engaging in philosophy just like a physician has to convince his patient to start a therapy is met right at the beginning of the *Euthydemus*, when Socrates tells the brothers: "You are to persuade this young fellow here that he ought to pursue wisdom and practise virtue, and so you will oblige both me and all these present."³¹
2. Refuting those who give bad advice and try to turn their listeners against philosophy is another criterion of a protreptic writing which we encounter at the end of the *Euthydemus*. Socrates here asks Crito to judge philosophers based on the subject of their studies and to dissuade everyone from what he thinks is bad (*phaulon*): "let those who practise philosophy have their way, whether they are helpful or mischievous; and when

28 Brittain (2001, 277–295) divides Philo's passage into three sections: protreptic, therapeutic, and prophylactic. Jordan (1986, 316–317) and Swancutt (2005, 123–124), by contrast, read all of Philo's remarks as addressing the *protrepticus*—which seems plausible in the light of the statement in 2.7.2 p. 40, 20–22 Wachsmuth. My interpretation follows Jordan's and Swancutt's reading. For a recent synoptic interpretation see Alieva (forthcoming).

29 See the short remarks in Jordan 1986, 316–317; Slings 1995, 179–180; Swancutt 2005, 127–128.

30 E.g. Pl. *Grg.* 464b–466a. 500a–501c; Wehrli 1951.

31 Pl. *Euthyd.* 275a (tr. Lamb). That it is necessary to take up studies in philosophy is stated several times within the dialogue, see 282d, 288d–e; Pl. *Clit.* 408c (which, however, does not use the word "philosophy").

you have tested the matter itself, well and truly, if you find it to be a poor affair, turn everyone you can away from it.”³² In fact, the whole depiction of the practitioners of eristics serves this purpose (and the end is probably directed against Isocrates).³³

3. According to Philo, maintaining *eudaimonia* requires advice on how to live. This *logos* is either *idios* (communicating statements concerning the individual) or *koinos/politikos* (providing general rules for the community). The question “How should one live?” is fundamental to Plato’s Socrates and can be found in his dialogues in many variations. In the *Euthydemus*, it is phrased as “how can we prosper?”³⁴ All these questions in a way represent versions of Philo’s *logos* on the way of living of an individual or of a whole society. One further example of this approach would be the discussions in the *Republic* on how to be just.
4. A protreptic writing, Philo tells us, operates by replacing wrong opinions with healthy views. But while the first step of this procedure, the removal of wrong notions, is demonstrated not only in the *Euthydemus*, where Clinias departs from his previous views, but in most of Plato’s dialogues, the second part of Philo’s claim is not met in the *Euthydemus* nor in the other aporetic dialogues: that one should provide “healthy views,” correct and especially concrete knowledge. *Protrepsis* is performed in *aporia*;³⁵ no *epistêmê* is found that can provide happiness (292d–293a). One may well start to wonder whether the passage explicitly called “protreptic” in the *Euthydemus* differs only slightly from non-protreptic passages. This impression is confirmed by ancient authors, such as a statement by Dicaearchus, who says that Plato had exhorted (*proetrepsato*) countless people to philosophy but in doing so made them philosophize in a superficial manner (*epipolaiôs*).³⁶ And in the (ps.-) Platonic *Clitophon*, the eponymous disciple criticizes Socrates for urging people on to *aretê* without providing knowledge.³⁷

32 Pl. *Euthyd.* 307b–c (tr. Lamb); see Chance 1992, 14; for passages in Xenophon see Gray 1998, 82. Diogenes Laertius considers persuading and dissuading as characteristics of Socrates’ instruction (2.29 = SSR I D 1).

33 Michelini 2000, 529–530; see Isoc. 2.39.

34 Pl. *Euthyd.* 279a (tr. Lamb); *Grg.* 500c; *Resp.* 352d.

35 See Demetr. *Eloc.* 296–298.

36 Phld. *Historia Academicorum* 1.11–17 Dorandi (Dorandi 1991); see Erler 1987, 293; Gonzalez 2002, 168.

37 Pl. *Clit.* 408d–409b; see Isoc. 15.271; Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.1–1.5.6 with Gray 1998, 75–91.

In Plato's dialogues, however, Socrates continuously shows how important and useful philosophy is, and it is through his method of *elenchus* that he causes the change of mind mentioned above: during the conversation, the views of one's dialogue partner are questioned and/or refuted with the help of arguments based on his own beliefs. Consequently, the *elenchus* is the instrument for testing the wisdom claimed by one's dialogue partners.³⁸ In the *Euthydemus*, Clinias does not claim the status of an expert, but the results of 288e–289a are summarized with the expression *exêlenxamen*.³⁹ The *Euthydemus* demonstrates both the importance of dialectics and their appropriateness for, or identification with, *protrep-sis*⁴⁰—Socrates himself calls the conversation with Clinias a protreptic demonstration.⁴¹ In Plato's dialogues, many instances of this dialectic-protreptic method can be found. The fact, though, that in the early dialogues the “What-is-x?” questions and other issues remain unanswered, can be explained easily: the reply is just not presented in the dialogue itself, but can be found when studying concepts expounded in the later dialogues.⁴²

5. According to Philo, a protreptic discourse shows the great usefulness of the sort of philosophy that, as it argues, leads to *aretê*. In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates does so several times, and explicitly tells Clinias that one has to philosophize to acquire useful knowledge (*hemâs onêsei*).⁴³
6. As we have seen above, an important feature of protreptic is to effect a change of mind. The whole account of Philo and other authors commenting on protreptic is based on this premise. Just as the physician has to persuade his patient to start therapy, the philosopher has to convince his disciple to get rid of his noxious opinions and to come to a healthy state of mind. As we have seen, in the *Euthydemus* Clinias, with the help

38 For *elenchus* in general, see the articles of Schmid, Vlastos, Kahn, Benson, Brickhouse, and Smith, in Prior 1996; Benson 2010. For *elenchus* and protreptics in Plato see Slings 1999, 127–164.

39 Morrison 1994, 197. What Slings (1999, 3–4, 53–63, 209–215) calls “implicit protreptic” is for Gaiser protreptic by means of the *elenchus*; Slings’ “explicit protreptic” is Gaiser’s *paraenesis*, an instrument for reflecting the protreptic that is implicit in the *elenchus*. See also Stemmer 1992, 250–270; Kahn 1996, 322; Long 2002, 54–57.

40 Gaiser 1959, 47–51, 137–140; see also Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.1–15.

41 Pl. *Euthyd.* 282d; see Gill 2000, 137–138.

42 Szlezák 1985, 49–65; Erler 1987, 233–256, 283–289; Kahn 1996, 206–209, 323–325; critiquing Kahn’s “proleptic” interpretation, see Gonzalez 2002, 170–171 n. 20; see also Erler 2007, 126.

43 Pl. *Euthyd.* 288d–e; see also 275a, 282d.

of Socrates and the elenctic method (4.), changes his mind; he comes to realize the importance of philosophy and wants to start philosophizing himself. This turning around reminds us of the *periagôgê* in the allegory of the cave (Pl. *Resp.* 7.514a–521c), where we can find several protreptic aspects, like the healing of *aphrosunê*.⁴⁴

7. One last criterion of protreptic found in Philo is that it points out the things that lead to *eudaimonia*. In the *Euthydemus*, the way to a blissful life through the right use of goods (*agatha*, 282c) forms an important part of the argumentation as well: one *has* to philosophize, Socrates argues, because that is the only way to become *eudaimôn* (282d).

These then are the core elements of protreptic literature as listed by Philo, all of which are present in Plato and other Socratics. Thus one gets the impression that it was Plato who, in the *Euthydemus* (as well as in protreptic passages in other dialogues), determined the elements that became characteristic of all protreptic writings, including the features of therapeutic protreptic.⁴⁵ Having made these remarks, I would now like to take a look at the writings of other Socratics.

3.3 Other Socratics

Besides Plato, the only Socratic author of whom we have a substantial amount of text is Xenophon. Of Aeschines, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, by contrast, only a few fragments have come down to us. Regarding protreptic, even fewer conclusions can be drawn, and the handful of studies on protreptic in “the other Socratics” partly overplay their interpretation given the poor status of the textual tradition.⁴⁶ Therefore I will concentrate on the extant remains of the Socratics that allow us to speak about their protreptic elements.

44 Pl. *Resp.* 515c; see Michelini 2000, 511; Long 2002, 54; Van der Meeren 2011, xvii–xviii.

45 The main difference between Socratic and later protreptic remains the fact that for Socrates, and thus all authors of Socratic writings, it was impossible to provide fixed doctrines (cf. Gonzalez 2002, 176–179, 226). This is why the dialogues take the form of dialectical conversations with the Socratic arguments brought forward in a way matching the respective partner and displayed in intermediate stages until the dialogue partner shows his consent and a final point is reached—or an *aporia*; on this see Erler 1987, 293; Canto-Sperber 1989, 64; Kahn 1996, 99; Gill 2000, 142; Gonzalez 2002, 168 n. 18 with bibliography; Rossetti 2008, 60–67.

46 On the different approaches, see Alieva 2013 with literature. She concludes: “Before these tasks are accomplished, we have no solid ground to speak of the Socratic protreptic as a separate genre” (39).

Both for Aristippus and Antisthenes writings have been listed under the name *Protrepticus*, but having little or nothing more than the title, we cannot reconstruct their respective concepts of protreptic.⁴⁷

Xenophon makes two important remarks about protreptic in his *Memorabilia*. The first reads as follows: "If any hold the opinion ... of Socrates ... that though he was consummate in exhorting men to virtue, he was an incompetent guide to it, let them consider not only the searching cross-examination with which he chastised those who thought themselves omniscient, but his daily talks with his familiar friends, and then judge whether he was capable of improving his companions" (1.4.1, tr. Marchant). Here we come across the same kind of criticism as found in the *Clitophon* (see 4.), namely that Socrates, after having exhorted his interlocutors to virtue (*protrepsasthai*), does not offer concrete guidelines but instead continues the examination (*êlenchen*).⁴⁸ In the second passage, we have an exhortation through *aporia*. In Book 4, Socrates examines Euthydemus, a young man who takes himself already to be wise. At the end of the conversation, the young man concludes: "I will know nothing at all presently" (4.2.39, tr. Marchant). Afterwards, he wants to learn from Socrates, who "began to expound very plainly and clearly the knowledge he thought most needful and the practices that he held to be most excellent" (4.2.40, tr. Marchant).⁴⁹ As we have seen above, showing what is useful (5.) and the refutation of wrong opinions (4.) that lead to a conversion (6.) are important elements of Socratic protreptic.⁵⁰

Aeschines' dialogue *Alcibiades* is commonly regarded as containing protreptic elements,⁵¹ and some of the fragments point in this direction. Alcibiades is shown bragging about being superior to everyone, even Themistocles. By asking questions, Socrates lets Alcibiades recognize his vain thoughts and his wrong behavior, whereupon he starts to cry.⁵² At this point we see Alcibiades' significant change of thought. Socrates shows his beloved companion the inadequacy of merely possessing a lot of knowledge; to be secure, you also have to take care of yourself.⁵³ This method reminds us of point 4. above, the removal of wrong opinions, and its protreptic nature is actually attested in the next frag-

47 For Aristippus' *Protrepticus*, see SSR IV A 144; for Antisthenes see Giannantoni 21990–1991, 4.243–245, 285–286, 289–294, and Alieva 2013, 129–131.

48 Gray 1998, 75–91.

49 On this passage see the detailed discussion in Rossetti 2011.

50 See also Xen. *Mem.* 3.3.15; 4.8.11.

51 Döring 1984, 25–27; Slings 1999, 71; Michelini 2000, 512.

52 SSR VI A 47 = August. *De civ. D.* 14.8.

53 SSR VI A 50 = Aristid. *Or.* 348–349.

ment (*chrêsimon eis to protrepsai*).⁵⁴ In another extant passage, Socrates talks about sick people who are healed by doctors and about what is conducive to human well-being,⁵⁵ both aspects that have been mentioned as characteristic of Socratic protreptic above.⁵⁶ Having collected all this reference material, we are now in a position to decide whether Epicurus follows the conditions for Socratic protreptic.

4 Protreptic in Epicurus

In an influential article from 1975, Marcello Gigante applied the term *philosophia medicans* to the philosophy of Epicurus.⁵⁷ One of the key texts in this context is a statement cited by Porphyry: “Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul.”⁵⁸ With this statement in mind, we may turn to Epicurus’ *Letter to Menoeceus*, which⁵⁹ offers an epitome of his ethics and briefly informs the reader in such subjects as how to correct wrong views about the gods; how to form a correct opinion about death; how to handle desires; and how and why the Epicurean *sophos* will be able to live like a god on earth. In this letter, all of the above-mentioned elements of Socratic protreptic can be found, with the aspect of philosophical protreptic as healing therapy certainly being the most important. That is why we should read the *Letter* in comparison with Philo’s fragment as well.

1. At the beginning of the *Letter to Menoeceus*, we read of the healing effect of philosophy that provides, and preserves, human health and well-being. Epicurus writes that the young as well as the aged should philosophize because no one is too old for what is healthy for the soul (122.2).⁶⁰ The expression Epicurus uses for this concept is *hygiainon*, a term that comes up right at the beginning and is—explicitly or implicitly—referred to

54 SSR VI A 51 = Aristid. *Or.* 576–577.

55 SSR VI A 53 = Aristid. *Or.* 576–577.

56 On other aspects of this dialogue Alieva 2013, 131–135 with literature.

57 Gigante 1975.

58 Porph. *ad Marcellam* 31 = Epicurus fr. 221 Us. = fr. 247 ²Arr. (tr. Long/Sedley 1987, 1.155).

59 For general information on this letter, see Heßler 2014.

60 The paragraphs of the *Letter to Menoeceus* are cited after Heßler 2014.

several times in the letter.⁶¹ The idea of philosophy being a healer exactly corresponds to criterion (1.) of Socratic protreptic; the therapy, which one should be invited to take up, is Epicurus' *therapeia tês psuchês*. In the *Letter*, Epicurus calls his teachings elements of a good life (*stoicheia tou kalôs zên*) that have to be internalized by way of continuous training. Everyone who does so will know how to cope with desires and emotions, will no longer be afraid of gods or fear death, and finally will be able to reach a state of inner tranquillity (*ataraxia*).⁶²

2. A *protrepticus* performs the task of refuting those who deride philosophy. Right at the beginning of the *Letter*, Epicurus, too, turns against those who say that philosophy should be practiced only at a certain age. He does so by referring to the positive effects of engaging in philosophy (122.1–5) in a way that is very similar to Plato.
3. As we have seen above, according to Philo, a *logos peri biôn*, either *idios* or *koinos*, is needed in order to preserve *eudaimonia*. In the case of Epicurus, the *idios* type is chosen. Especially in the last section of the letter, he provides guidelines for reaching the status of *sophos*. Formally, the advice is directed at the individual addressee only, but in fact a far broader audience is addressed: by using terms like “you/we/the wise man,” Epicurus makes clear that his instructions on living are meant to reach everyone.
4. According to Philo, the act of *therapeutika prosagein* is a necessary ingredient in protreptic. The idea of administering medication is present in the *Letter to Menoeceus* as well simply because its structure follows the so-called *tetrapharmakos*. This “fourfold remedy” comprises the four most important principles of Epicurean philosophy, which are treated in the first four *Kuriai doxai* and, successively, also in the letter.⁶³ 1) The blessed, immortal gods do not intervene in the human sphere, because that would disturb their blessedness. 2) Death does not concern the human being, because death is the end of perception. 3) The limit of all sensual pleasures is the removal of all pain. 4) Pain is either acute and short or long-lasting and so weak that it is exceeded by pleasure. Within the argumentation outlined in these passages of the letter, several aspects are mentioned that have a healing effect, for example the *epilogismos*, an empirical method that can be helpful for the therapy of affects,⁶⁴ and the

61 See Heßler 2014, 63–64.

62 For the importance of the *therapeia tês psuchês* see Nussbaum 1994, 115–139; Tsouna 2009.

63 See Phld. *Ad [Contubernales]* col. 4.9–14 Angeli.

64 See Heßler 2014, 295–296.

administering of remedies (*therapeutika*) in order to remove false opinions and instill healthy ones. From the beginning, Epicurus explicitly or implicitly contradicts the views of other schools concerning the common people and contrasts them with his own opinions. From the first sentence starting with the phrase “No one should ...” and the first request for avoidance of false beliefs onwards, Epicurus already obeys or abides by the rules that were to be laid down later by Philo;⁶⁵ he also seems to have influenced a passage in Philodemus, according to which upbringing and education have as their shared goal the removal of wrong opinions.⁶⁶ Many further examples of this kind of argumentation are contained in the *Letter*.⁶⁷

5. As we have seen for the Socratics, protreptic literature underlines the usefulness of philosophy. This feature is—predominantly implicitly—brought up in the *Letter to Menoeceus* again and again: if one follows the doctrines of Epicurus, one will no longer be afraid of the future, nor even of death. One will instead lead a life free from bodily or psychological disturbances and enjoy the state of Epicurean *hedonê*.⁶⁸
6. The *Letter to Menoeceus* even urges a conversion; we need only note the many requests toward the readers that they should follow such-and-such to experience the positive effects of a change of behavior.⁶⁹ The most striking example is found at the end of the letter, where it says: “Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself, and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men” (tr. Bailey).⁷⁰
7. The goal of philosophical protreptic is *eudaimonia*, as we have seen above; Epicurus underlines this fact several times in the *Letter to Menoeceus*, for

65 Epicurus in his letter frequently uses negative phrasing like “no one should / neither ... nor”; see Heßler 2014, 66 n. 182.

66 Phld. *Rhet.* PHerc 832 col. 44.5–20. The statement is attributed to first-generation Epicureans by Tepedino Guerra and Longo Auricchio (1980, 476–477), but the authors do not decide between Metrodorus and Epicurus.

67 Several times in his letter—and partially where it is not evident at all—Epicurus not only deals with atomistic predecessors but also with other Presocratics, Academics, and Peripatetics (Heßler 2014, 67–69).

68 See Heßler 2014, 65.

69 Heßler 2014, 70 n. 190.

70 On the Epicurean concept of *homoiôsis sophôi* and *homoiôsis theôi* in Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, see Heßler 2014, 327–333.

example right at the beginning in the request to “practice what provides happiness” (*meletân ta poiounta tēn eudaimonian*, 122.5). At the end of the letter, he summarizes this goal in the formula “you shall live like a god among men. For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like to a mortal being.”⁷¹

5 Conclusion

In Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus*, we recognize many elements that are constitutive also for the healing protreptic of the Socratic writings. Even though certain differences between Epicurean and Socratic protreptic arise due to the dialogue form and the aporetic character of some of the latter texts (see above 3.2), the similarities predominate, and 1.–7. match:

1. Both Socratics and Epicurus see the need to begin therapy, that is, to start engaging in philosophy; 2. Just as Plato and others made Socrates and some of his dialogue partners speak out against the opponents of (his notion of) philosophy, Epicurus criticizes those who oppose his way of life; 3. To maintain this state one needs a *logos peri biōn*, either *idios* or *koinos*. As we have seen, both Epicurus and Plato give such *logoi*;⁷² 4. As just stated and due to the literary form, only Epicurus provides concrete instructions for specific situations, while the Socratic writings, at least the aporetic ones, do not. But, just like Socrates, Epicurus shows us what is certainly not the path to a happy life; 5. Both underline how useful philosophy is; 6. A change of thinking takes place—or is at least intended; 7. The goal of life is the same for the founder of the Kepos as it is for the Socratics: *eudaimonia*.

One is thus led to conclude that the literary form of the *protreptikos logos* is to a high degree influenced by the Socrates of Plato and other authors; the *Letter to Menoeceus*, in particular, contains many elements of the protreptic method exhibited in the *Euthydemus* and other Platonic dialogues, even though this might not be recognizable at first sight. Epicurus' many references in his letter to Platonic passages⁷³ already show his interest in the dialogues, and thus, by writing his protreptic letter, he becomes part of the tradition founded by the

71 The idea that Epicurean philosophy leads to a happy life is also highlighted in the opening and closing passages of the *Letter to Herodotus* and the *Letter to Pythocles*, see De Sanctis 2011, 2012, and 2015.

72 See also the description of the wise man in Epicurus *Ep. Men.* 133.1–135.3 and of the true philosopher in Plato's *Phaedo*.

73 Summary in Heßler 2014, 15 with n. 19.

Socratics. While doing so, he uses the protreptic method in a different literary genre, a letter, and thus integrates an existing concept into his writings, just as he does elsewhere with concepts or statements of other authors. This might be surprising when considering Epicurus' notorious refusal of any education and thereby also literature.⁷⁴ But, as he states himself, precisely this integration constitutes the *autodidaktos* according to his definition.⁷⁵ In this respect, Epicurus remains true to his principles while writing a protreptic text and integrating into the *Letter to Menoeceus* elements of Socratic protreptic.⁷⁶

References

- Alieva, O. 'Protreptic in the Socratics: in search of a genre', in: F. de Luise, and A. Stavru, *Socratica III: studies on Socrates, the Socratics, and the ancient Socratic literature*. Sankt Augustin 2013, 128–139.
- Alieva, O. 'Protreptic: a protean genre', in: O. Alieva, A. Kotzé and S. van der Meer, *When wisdom calls: philosophical protreptic in antiquity*. Turnhout (forthcoming).
- Arrighetti, G. *Epicuro, Opere*. Torino 1973.
- Bailey, C. *Epicurus, the extant remains*. Oxford 1926.
- Benson, H.H. 'Socratic Method', in: D.R. Morrison, *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2010, 179–200.
- Brittain, C. *Philo of Larissa: the last of the Academic Sceptics*. Oxford 2001.
- Canto-Sperber, M. *Platon: Euthydème*. Paris 1989.
- Chance T.H. *Plato's Euthydemus: analysis of what is and is not philosophy*. Berkeley 1992.
- Collins, J.H. *Exhortations to philosophy: the protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle*. Oxford 2015.
- Döring, K. 'Der Sokrates des Aischines von Sphettos und die Frage nach dem historischen Sokrates', *Hermes* 112 (1984), 16–30.
- Dorandi, T. *Filodemo, storia dei filosofi: Platone e l'Accademia*. Napoli 1991.
- Erler, M. *Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons*. Berlin 1987.
- Erler, M. 'Epikur', in: H. Flashar, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: die Philosophie der Antike*, IV. Basel 1994, 29–202.

74 Heßler 2014, 13–17.

75 Heßler 2014, 16 with n. 21 on Epicurus *de rerum natura* 14.

76 I would like to thank the editors Alessandro Stavru and Christopher Moore for many helpful suggestions, as well as Olga Alieva. I would also like to thank the whole team of the Fondation Hardt, where I finished this article during a funded stay in March 2015. Finally, I am grateful to Jeremy Wink-Yagmur and Marion Schneider for correcting versions of my text.

- Erler, M. 'Platon', in: H. Flashar, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Die Philosophie der Antike*, 11.2. Basel 2007.
- Erler, M. "'Denn mit Menschen sprechen wir und nicht mit Göttern': Platonische und epikureische epimeleia tês psychês', in: D. Frede and B. Reis, *Body and soul in ancient philosophy*. Berlin 2009, 163–178.
- Eucken, C. *Isokrates: seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen*. Berlin 1983.
- Gaiser, K. *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon: Untersuchungen zur Form des platonischen Dialogs*. Stuttgart 1959.
- Gerson, L.P. 'Elenchos, protreptic, and Platonic philosophizing', in: Scott 2002, 217–231.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, 1–IV. Napoli 1990.
- Gigante, M. 'Philosophia Medicans', *BCPE* 5 (1975), 53–61.
- Gill, C. 'Protreptic and Dialectic in Plato's *Euthydemus*', in: T.M. Robinson and L. Brisson, *Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides. Proceedings of the fifth Symposium Platonicum. Selected Papers*. Sankt Augustin 2000, 133–143.
- Görgemanns, H. 'Protreptik', in: *DNP* (2001), 468–471.
- Goldschmidt, V. *Les dialogues de Platon. Structure et méthode dialectique*. Paris 1947.
- Gonzalez, F.J. 'The Socratic Elenchus as Constructive Protreptic', in: Scott 2002, 161–182.
- Gray, V.J. *The framing of Socrates: the literary interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia*. Stuttgart 1998.
- Hartlich, P. 'De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole', *Leipziger Studien zur classischen Philologie* 11 (1889), 207–336.
- Hawtrey, R.S.W. *Commentary on Plato's Euthydemus*. Philadelphia 1981.
- Heßler, J.E. *Epikur, Brief An Menoikeus*. Basel 2014.
- Hoek, A van den. 'Apologetic and protreptic discourse in Clement of Alexandria', in: A. Wlosok and F. Paschoud, *L'apologétique chrétienne gréco-latine à l'époque prénicénienne*. Genève 2005, 69–93.
- Jordan, M.D. 'Ancient philosophic protreptic', *Rhetorica* 4 (1986), 309–333.
- Kahn, C.H. *Plato and the Socratic dialogue: the philosophical use of a literary form*. Cambridge 1996.
- Kechagia, E. *Plutarch against Colotes: a lesson in history of philosophy*. Oxford 2011.
- Kerferd, G.B. *The Sophistic movement*. Cambridge 1981.
- Kerferd, G.B. and H. Flashar. 'Die Sophistik', in: H. Flashar, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie der Antike*, 11.1. Basel 1998, 1–137.
- Long, A.A. *Epictetus: a Stoic and Socratic guide to life*. Oxford 2002.
- Long, A.A. and D. Sedley, *The Hellenistic philosophers*. Cambridge 1987.
- Marchant, E.C., O.J. Todd and J. Henderson, *Xenophon: Memorabilia, Oeconomicus, Symposium, Apology*. Cambridge 2013.
- Meeren, S van der. 'Le protreptique en philosophie: essai de définition d'un genre', *REG* 115 (2002), 591–621.

- Meeren, S van der. *Exhortation à la philosophie*. Paris 2011.
- Mette, H.J. 'Philon von Larisa und Antiochos von Askalon', *Lustrum* 29 (1987), 9–63.
- Michellini, A.N. 'Socrates plays the buffoon: cautionary protreptic in *Euthydemus*', *AJPh* 121 (2000), 509–535.
- Morrison, D.R. 'Xenophon's Socrates as teacher', in: P.A. Vander Waerdt, *The Socratic movement*. Ithaca 1994, 181–208.
- Nussbaum, M.C. *The therapy of desire: theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics*. Princeton 1994.
- Prior, W.J. *Socrates: critical assessments 3: Socratic Method*. London 1996.
- Rossetti, L. 'I Socratici della prima generazione: fare filosofia con i dialoghi anziché con trattati o testi paradossali', in: L. Rossetti and A. Stavru, *Socratica* 2005. Bari 2008, 39–75.
- Rossetti, L. 'L'*Euthydème* de Xénophon', in: L. Rossetti, *Le dialogue socratique*. Paris 2011, 55–99.
- Sanctis, D. de. 'ὦ φίλτατε: il destinatario nelle opere del Giardino', *BCPE* 41 (2011), 217–230.
- Sanctis, D. de. 'Utile al singolo, utile a molti: il proemio dell'Epistola a Pitocle', *BCPE* 42 (2012), 95–109.
- Sanctis, D. de. 'Strategie della comunicazione di Epicuro nell'epilogo delle sue opera', in: F.G. Masi and S. Maso, *Peri Physeos Book 11: update, proposals, and discussions*. Amsterdam 2015, 171–190.
- Schmidt, E.G. 'Die drei Arten des Philosophierens', *Philologus* 106 (1962), 14–28.
- Scott, G.A. *Does Socrates have a method? Rethinking the elenchus in Plato's dialogues and beyond*. University Park 2002.
- Slings, S.R. 'Protreptic in ancient theories of philosophical literature', in: J.G.J. Abbenes, S.R. Slings and I. Sluiter, *Greek literary theory after Aristotle: a collection of papers in honour of D.M. Schenkeveld*, Amsterdam 1995, 173–192.
- Slings, S.R. *Plato: Clitophon*. Cambridge 1999.
- Stemmer, J. *Platons Dialektik: die frühen und mittleren Dialoge*. Berlin 1992.
- Swancutt, D.M. 'Parainesis in the light of protrepsis: troubling the typical dichotomy', in: J. Starr and T. Engberg-Pedersen, *Early Christian paraenesis in context*. Berlin 2005, 113–153.
- Szlezák, T.A. *Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie*. Berlin 1985.
- Tepedino Guerra, A. and F. Longo Auricchio, 'Per un riesame della polemica epicurea contro Nausifane', in: F. Romano, *Democrito e l'atomismo antico: atti del convegno internazionale, Catania 18–21 aprile 1979*. Catania 1980, 467–478.
- Tsouana, V. 'Epicurean therapeutic strategies', in: J. Warren, *The Cambridge companion to epicureanism*. Cambridge 2009, 249–265.
- Untersteiner, M. *I sofisti*. Milano 1996.
- Usener, H., *Epicurea*. Stuttgart 1966.

Usener, S. *Isokrates, Platon und ihr Publikum: Hörer und Leser von Literatur im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Tübingen 1994.

Wehrli, F. 'Der Arztvergleich bei Platon', *MH* 8 (1951), 177–184.

From Competitor to Hero: The Stoics on Socrates

Robert Bees

Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen

It is commonly held that Zeno of Citium founded the Stoa in the wake of Socrates, and that from that point on the Stoics took themselves to be Socratics. This view gained added credence¹ thanks to A.A. Long, who claimed that “from Zeno to Epictetus, that is to say throughout the history of the Stoa, Socrates is the philosopher with whom the Stoics most closely aligned themselves.”² This was not, of course, a new idea; forty years earlier M. Pohlenz claimed that “the Stoics, who drew their image of Socrates from Xenophon’s writings, always saw in him their spiritual ancestor.”³

In this chapter I will criticize this view. Zeno did not regard himself as a Socratic, I will argue, and he conceived his philosophy as an explicit alternative to Socratism. The first leaders of the Stoa followed the founder of the school. Only in the so-called Middle and Imperial Stoa did the position on Socrates change, Socrates becoming an *exemplum*. But this was the result of a process that cannot be projected back upon Zeno without anachronism.

1 Zeno of Citium

1.1 The Construction of a Succession

In the introduction to his work, Diogenes Laertius draws the major lines of succession of philosophy, including the following: Socrates-Antisthenes-Diogenes-Crates-Zeno-Cleanthes-Chrysippus (1.15). According to this model of succession, the first three scholarchs of the ancient Stoa—the so-called founding generation—were linked ultimately to Socrates. In Cicero’s *De oratore* (3.60–62), Socrates is the philosopher whose importance ranks above all others. A

1 Cf. e.g. Alesse 2000, 13: “It is a renowned fact that the Stoa referred to Socrates’ teaching in every period of its history”; Inwood 2003, 1: “Stoicism has its roots in the philosophical activity of Socrates.”

2 Long 1988, 160; similarly, Long 2011, 362, adding Marcus Aurelius and referring to Socrates as “their primary inspiration and model.”

3 Pohlenz 1948–1949, 159. Döring 1979, 5, holds a similar view: “The Stoics put it differently. They felt themselves as ‘Socratics’ from the very beginning, and held therefore the memory of Socrates in high esteem.”

variety of schools “developed” from him, and although they quarreled among themselves, all these philosophers “wanted to be called and also thought they were Socratics” (*cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrentur*, 61). A few lines later we learn that “from Antisthenes, who praised the endurance and strength of Socrates’ teaching, developed first the Cynics, then the Stoics” (62).

At a certain point the image of the Stoa as a Socratic school must have been widely spread.⁴ The question is: does this image match with historical reality? Two testimonies back up this image: a notice in Philodemus’ *De Stoicis* and Zeno’s biography reported by Diogenes Laertius.

1.1.1 Philodemus’ *De Stoicis*

A.A. Long (1988, 151) noted that “according to Philodemus, the Stoics actually wanted to be called ‘Socratics.’” Accordingly, the early Stoics attempted “to fulfil that wish.”⁵ Ever since, many scholars have followed Long’s view.

Long’s claim is founded on *De Stoicis*, col. XIII 3–4: Σωκρατικοὶ καλεῖσθαι θέλουσιν (“They want to be called Socratics”). If we give a closer look at the text, however, we notice that Long’s reading is wrong. It depends on inadequate consideration of its context. Philodemus is discussing a series of arguments that have been brought against Zeno’s *Politeia* (col. IX 1 ff. = T 12 Bees), among which is the following: “Some claim boldly also this, that the Stoics must not be seen as responsible for Zeno’s flaws, since the school began ... with Antisthenes and Diogenes, and therefore they want to be called Socratics” (c. 3, col. XII 20 ff.).⁶ In the lacuna following “began” almost certainly stood, among other words, “Socrates.”

The argument is attributed to “some Stoics” who were very probably contemporaries of Philodemus (second or first century BCE).⁷ It is no honor for Socrates if they see in him the founder of the Stoa, since they attribute to him the alleged flaws of the *Politeia*—especially the call for promiscuity, incest, and cannibalism, the call for which was misunderstood and therefore sharply criticized. In the light of this criticism it looks strange that these Stoics want to be called Socratics. One thing is clear: the group of Stoics to which Philode-

4 This theme can be found also in Late Antiquity, e.g. in Julian, *ep. ad Them.* 264c–d (the Stoa is presented as the ἀποικία, i.e., the colony of Socratic wisdom). According to Boethius, *cons. phil.* 1.3 Epicureans and Stoics “took over the legacy of Socrates.”

5 See also Long 1998, 367.

6 The text has been edited by Dorandi 1982. For a German translation see Bees 2011; extensive discussion of the passage at 31 ff.

7 Cf. Dorandi 1982, 117.

mus refers does not represent the opinion of the overall school, since the first successors of Zeno fully approved of the *Politeia*. In fact, Philodemus objects rightly that almost all Stoics see in Zeno the ancestor of the school. He and no one else is the founder of the school, as a number of testimonies testify.⁸

The text of the papyrus features the names of Diogenes and, almost certainly, Antisthenes. Behind this is obviously the line of succession claimed by Diogenes Laertius (1.15). Secure about it is only the master-disciple relationship between the Cynic Crates and Zeno. Doubtful, however, is Diogenes' being a pupil of Antisthenes, as the latter died about 365 BCE, whereas Diogenes came to Athens only around 350. It is also unclear whether Crates was a pupil of Diogenes.⁹ The whole reconstruction looks like an invention aimed at connecting Zeno with Socrates.¹⁰

1.1.2 Diogenes Laertius

According to Diogenes Laertius, the Cynic Crates was the first teacher of Zeno (6.105, 7.1ff.). This must not be doubted, although the circumstances of the encounter are suspect. Diogenes Laertius (7.2–3) reports that Zeno was heading to Athens with a load of purple. Having had a shipwreck, he went to the city anyway, entered a bookstore, and heard the bookseller reading aloud (as was customary in antiquity) the second book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Zeno asked him where he could find such men as Socrates. Coincidentally, Crates was then walking along the street. The bookseller pointed at him and said: "follow him!" From then on Zeno was his pupil.

It is evident that the story has been designed with the aim of connecting Zeno with Socrates. It is not by chance that the bookseller reads a book on Socrates. The suspicion becomes stronger if one considers another story reported by Diogenes Laertius. Zeno's father Mnaseas, a salesman who came often to Athens, brought Socratic books to the young Zeno (7.31–32). Zeno was hence educated in his home town Citium, and when he came to Athens he joined Crates. Here the discipleship looks like a conscious choice, while in the story of the bookshop it is an accidental encounter that makes Zeno a Socratic. There is also a variant concerning the book that was decisive for Zeno's conver-

8 See, e.g., Cic. *Fin.* 3.5 = SVF I 34 (*Stoici ... Zenoque, eorum princeps*), *Acad.* 2.131 = SVF I 181 (*Zeno ..., qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit*). For Diogenes Laertius, Zeno is the founder of the school: for this reason, he treats the common tenets of Stoicism when discussing Zeno's biography (7.38).

9 Cf. Döring 1998, 298.

10 Cf. Sayre 1948a, 90 ff.; 1948b.

sion: according to Themistius (*or.* 23 = SVF I 9), it was Plato's *Apology* that led Zeno from Phoenicia to the *Stoa Poikile*. Such variants always hint at invention.

I do not think one can share the confidence of those who claim that the Socratic writings led Zeno to philosophy.¹¹ On the contrary, it is probable that with his stories Diogenes Laertius meant only to confirm the succession line from the Cynics to Zeno he draws in the introduction (1.15).¹² This is also the reason that he so carefully blends Book 6 on the Cynics with Book 7 on the Stoics. The account of the Cynics ends with the hint that Zeno was a disciple of Crates (6.105), a hint we also find in the account of Zeno (7.2). There are undoubtedly connections between Cynicism and Stoicism,¹³ but this is no evidence that the Stoa was a Socratic school.

1.2 Zeno's Philosophy

It is commonly held that multiple links connect Zeno with Socrates and Socratic philosophy. It is sufficient, however, to examine but a few points to see that Zeno did not take up Socrates' teaching, and on the contrary that he dismissed it.

1.2.1 Socrates' Name

A survey of the fragments of and testimonies about Zeno shows that Socrates is for him no paradigm, no example of a Stoic way of life one should admire or imitate (as he becomes in later Stoicism). The name Socrates crops up only a few times, and only in trivial contexts. For example, Socrates and his accusers are cited as an example that history repeats itself after every cosmic conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις) (SVF I 109; see SVF II 625, 626). No value judgment is attached to this example; other events of Greek history would serve just as well. Similarly, in logic, Socrates is mentioned as an illustrative example (DL 7.52 = SVF II 87; DL 7.63 = SVF II 181).¹⁴ Zeno's disciple Herillus illustrates the claim of the mutability of τέλος with the fact that one can become a statue either of Alexander or of Socrates (SVF I 411).¹⁵

11 Uncritical is Ioppolo 1986, 41; Alesse 2000, 106 ff.

12 See Bees 2011, 16 ff.

13 DL 6.104 speaks of a "community" (κοινωνία) among the schools.

14 On this see SVF II 164, 184.

15 A similar use of the name Socrates is made by Aristotle, who is certainly not a Socratic. The fact that in *De Oratore* 3.61–62 Cicero ranks him among the philosophers who considered themselves Socratics only confirms the untenability of the whole construction: see, e.g., Arist. *Metaph.* 1033b24, 1079a29, etc.

1.2.2 The So-Called “Socratic Turn”

It is common to speak of a “turn” brought about by Socrates’ philosophy, which unlike the naturalist speculations of the Presocratics is limited to ethics. Cicero famously has it that “Socrates was the first to call back philosophy from the heavens” (*Tusc.* 5.10). As this so-called Socratic turn is attested in other authors as well, the credibility of individual versions of it cannot be doubted.¹⁶

By contrast, Diogenes Laertius (7.39) states that “Zeno was the first” to divide philosophy into three areas: logic, physics and ethics. After him a series of later Stoics did the same. “Zeno was the first” means here the first of the Stoics.¹⁷ But this means that Zeno stood up against the Socratic turn. In fact, Zeno developed a whole system in which logic, physics, and ethics form a homogeneous and coherent whole. The Stoics described through a variety of images this organic unity in which the whole and its parts can neither be separated nor exist independently: as a living being, an egg, or a fruit garden (D.L. 7.40). We can say that the doctrinal system of the Stoa corresponds to the cosmos, which is an integrated unit. It is even possible to go so far to claim that this system is intended to be an image of nature—and in this case the imitation of nature would emerge as the determining principle of Stoic philosophy.

Ariston, one of Zeno’s heretic disciples, expressed his own opinion: he attributed importance only to ethics and deemed physics and logic unnecessary. As to physics he thought that things of nature were not accessible to knowledge, and even if they were, they were useless (SVF I 353). Ariston is presented here as a successor of Socrates—a clear sign that Zeno followed another tradition.

As a consequence of Stoic dogmatism, the Old Academy became a Skeptical school that appropriated Socrates. This change came about thanks to Arcesilaus, who was about twenty years older than Zeno. In *De oratore* (3.67) Cicero assesses this change: Arcesilaus drew from Plato’s books and the Socratic dialogues the claim that “nothing certain exists that can be grasped with the senses or with the intellect” (*nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit*). Accordingly, he “dismissed every judgment of the intellect and the senses. He was the first who did not express his own opinion, but discussed those of others.” Cicero stresses that this attitude is genuinely Socratic (*Socraticum maxime*). The target of Arcesilaus’ skepticism is Zeno’s epistemology, which relies on representations deriving from objects.¹⁸

16 Already Aristotle (*Metaph.* A, 987b1ff.) says that Socrates dealt with ethics, but not with the study of nature. This view is purported also by Plato (e.g., *Ap.* 19b3ff., *Thet.* 173c6ff.). On this see Döring 2010.

17 See Steinmetz 1994, 528.

18 See Görler 1994, 798ff.

According to Zeno, the Stoic sage possesses a “secure, solid, and unshakeable knowledge” (Sext. Emp., *adv. math.* 7.151–152 = 41C LS). Arcesilaus repudiates this claim, and criticizes especially the “cognitive representation” (καταληπτική φαντασία)—a concept that had been developed by Zeno and had great standing in Athens (Numenius, SVF I 12; 68G LS). Therefore, Arcesilaus considered Zeno a “dignified opponent.” In his polemic against Zeno, Arcesilaus invoked Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge (Cic. *ac.* 1.43 ff. = 68A LS), which is a clear hint to the fact that Zeno did not put himself in the succession of Socrates. Later testimonies yield the same picture.¹⁹ This prompted A.A. Long to conclude that “Zeno and Arcesilaus were competing for the title of Socrates’ philosophical legacy, a know-nothing but morally irreproachable Socrates, in the case of Arcesilaus, and a Socrates who was the nearest thing to a wise man (someone with infallable moral knowledge) in the case of Zeno.”²⁰ But there is no evidence for this. There is no grounds for claiming that Zeno or other Stoics connected the Stoic sage, who has secure knowledge and knows everything (“there is nothing he does not know,” SVF III 548), to Socrates.²¹

1.2.3 *Oikeiosis*

Zeno founded the Stoa and formulated the central tenet of the school, that of *oikeiosis*. This had been noted by Cicero: “Zeno, however, who was the originator and first head of the Stoics, set it up that the end of goods is the morally honourable life, and that this is derived from nature’s recommendation” (*Honeste autem vivere, quod ducatur a conciliatione naturae, Zeno statuit finem esse bonorum, qui inventor et princeps Stoicorum fuit*).²² According to my reconstruction, *oikeiosis* (literally: “appropriation”; Cicero translates it *conciliatio*) means an act in which nature induces man to behave according to the objects he deems “his own”: his own nature, his own descendants, and his own fellow

19 Cicero’s *Academici libri* (2.66) show that the skeptical Academy detached itself from Zeno’s dogmatism (on this see Bees 2011, 13–14). Lactantius (SVF III 553) rightly contrasts Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge with the ideal of the Stoic sage, who should not have opinions but only secure knowledge (see SVF III 548 ff.).

20 Long 1998, 366.

21 On this issue even early scholars were mistaken: “the founder of the Stoa himself, its second founder Cleanthes, and their successors among the people of the Quirites struggled to build up their inner man according to the archetype of the virtuous sage, whose traits they took over from the blissful figure of Socrates” (see Noack 1862, 13, with whom Ueberweg 1865, 162, agrees, in his influential *Grundriß*). The error consists simply in drawing conclusions from later appreciations of Zeno.

22 Cic. *Acad.* 2.131 = SVF I 181 (tr. Rackham).

human beings. The divine nature of cosmos guides man (and animals) to love themselves and their fellow creatures, and therefore to preserve them. For if what nature created out of itself at the beginning of a cosmic period perished, nature itself would perish. This doctrine is grounded in cosmology and biology. Single elements of it can be traced back to earlier thinkers, but the whole of it is certainly new and original.²³

Modern scholars are wrong in interpreting the so-called doctrine of *oikeiosis* as a process of self-knowledge. According to this interpretation, the original impulse of self-conservation transforms itself in a shift towards rationality; man rises above the impulse of nature and therefore over the animals. This mistaken interpretation leads to a misinterpretation of Stoic ethics as a whole, if not of the Stoic system altogether. In fact, ethics aims not at the self-development of man, a claim for which there is no evidence, but at conforming oneself to the will of a cosmic and divine nature.²⁴ The source of this misinterpretation comes from the belief that the Stoa is a Socratic school. On the *oikeiosis* doctrine, Erler, for example, writes that “apparently ancient writers were looking for evidence that this important piece of doctrine was not genuinely, that is to say, originally Stoic, but belonged to the ultimate ethicist Socrates.”²⁵ The evidence does not support this argument, as we will see.

In *Mem.* 1.2.51 Xenophon quotes the following accusation against Socrates: he brought discredit on the fathers and relatives of his friends by saying that they could not help him in case of illness or at court. This would be instead a matter for physicians and lawyers, as Xenophon says at the end of the passage (1.2.53). But for the Stoics “honoring the parents and brothers comes second after the gods” (DL 7.120). It is therefore a sin to offend the parents (Cic. *fin.* 3.32 = SVF III 504). According to the Stoics, any human community is based upon the love between parents and children (Cic. *fin.* 3.62). Nature cares to maintain the cosmos. To do so it instills a social instinct in humankind; the Stoa interprets this instinct as an *oikeiosis* towards both one’s descendants and one’s fellow human beings. Grown-ups develop moral action by following this instinct: “Appropriate acts are those that reason prevails on us to do; and this is the case with honoring one’s parents, brothers, and country, and having conversation with friends” (DL 7.108).

According to Erler, Xenophon’s passage (1.2.51) “is about a natural sense of belonging—about οἰκεῖν, that is, about a topic that plays an important role in

23 For evidence on this, see Bees 2004, 2011, 2011b.

24 Cf. Bees 2013.

25 Erler 2001, 211.

the Stoic discussion of *oikeiosis*.²⁶ But the noun *οἰκεῖος* does not appear here, and Socrates' view is contrary to Stoic ethics. This follows from Xenophon's explanation: the benevolence of friends has no utility if friends cannot help each other. This is what the accusers say (1.2.52), who add: "he says that only those deserve honor who know what is necessary and are able to explain it." Later, Xenophon confirms this (1.2.55): "Socrates urged the necessity of cultivating sound sense and usefulness (*παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον*), in order that he who would fain be valued by father or by brother or by anyone else may not rely on the bond of familiarity and neglect him." In his commentary, Gigon clearly states what Socrates' argument is about: "Even in the man who is closest to us everything depends on *phronesis* and on its bearer, the soul ... the Socratics take part in a process that dissolves all irrational and traditional bondages between mankind ... for the benefit of rationally justifiable, smoothly developing relationships."²⁷

"The instinctive behavior of man ... aimed at usefulness" that Erler sees here does not apply to Socrates.²⁸ It is instead the basis of the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis*, which is in marked contrast with Xenophon's Socrates. A reference to *Eudemian Ethics* 1235a31 ff. may be useful here. Here friendship is accounted for in two different ways. According to the first one, only good men can be each other's friends (a position held in the Academy),²⁹ while "others think it strange that mothers should not love their own children (and maternal affection we see existing even among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their young)" (tr. Rackham).

We do not know who Aristotle is thinking of. For certain we know that shortly after Aristotle wrote the *Eudemian Ethics*, Zeno of Citium will use the same argument to define the instinctive love of offspring as an *oikeiosis* that consists in a turn towards "one own" that is determined by nature. In Cicero's outline of Stoic ethics we read that "bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions" (*Fin.* 3.66, tr. Rackham). From this Cicero concludes that in humankind the strong must therefore commit themselves to helping the community. Musonius Rufus says that women must love their children more than themselves (11.9–10 Hense). He also stresses that "women must defend themselves if they do not want to be worse than hens and other female birds, as these fight for their babies against much stronger animals than they are" (15.11 ff. Hense). The same argument

26 Erler 2001.

27 Gigon 1953, 78 and 80.

28 Erler 2001, 212.

29 According to Dirlmeier 1984, 372 (note on 63.34).

occurs in authors who adopted the Stoic doctrine³⁰ (and, as it turns out, even in modern sociobiology).³¹ I have no doubts that Aristotle would count this argument as an opinion that “is closer to the facts of observation,” as he says when introducing his discussion of friendship (*Eth. Eud.* 1235a31).

Socrates is instead a prime example of the idea that in friendship only utility counts. Aristotle refers to Socrates’ idea that all men pursue the useful, since we throw away what is useless (spittle, hair and nails), and also the corpses of the dead, since they are of no use. This argument features in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (1.2.53–54). Therefore, it certainly originates in Socratic doctrines of social relations. It is noteworthy that Stoicism disagreed even with this argument found at *Mem.* 1.2.53–54. According to Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 11.192 ff. = SVF III 748, 752), Chrysippus recommended eating the dead and pieces of one’s own flesh. Corpses should be buried only if the flesh is indigestible, as in the case of nails and hair. This refers undoubtedly to Socrates’ argument, to which Chrysippus gives, however, a completely different meaning. Cannibalism and autocannibalism are in fact integral parts of the cosmic-biological form of life Zeno expounds in his *Politeia*. Here the issue at stake is that of nature’s self-preservation, which one has to strive for with his deeds.³²

The issue of self-preservation has nothing to do with Socrates’ care of the self, as a fragment of Zeno shows (SVF I 236).³³ Here the peasant who takes most care of the plants with the highest yield serves as an example for humankind in general. Human beings look after those who are useful for them. According to Zeno this is no surprise, since we also take care of the parts of the body that are most useful for us. The issue is the same as the one tackled by Socrates, but Zeno handles it in a completely different way. He traces the help for his fellow human beings to a natural predisposition, *πεφύκασιν*—“men are by nature such.” From Socrates’ purely rational calculus he draws the evidence that social behavior is directed by nature.³⁴

30 Plut. *am. prol.* 494–495; Galen *de usu part.* 14.4 [vol. IV, p. 152 κ].

31 On this see Bees 2004, 245.

32 On this see extensively Bees 2011; on the quoted passages from Chrysippus cf. 199 ff.

33 On this fragment see Erler 2001, 213 ff. I agree when Erler says that the criterion of the Socratic care of the self “is not instinct, but reason,” but not when he concludes: “obviously the Stoics referred to this argument in order to link their concept of an instinctive relationship with the own and the other, i.e. *oikeiosis*, to Socrates.” I claim there is no evidence that the Stoics, and in particular Zeno, thought that the doctrine of *oikeiosis* was a prosecution of Socratic philosophy.

34 On this Bees 2004, 247 ff.; 2011, 118–119.

I do not agree with Erler's conclusion that "with their doctrine of *oikeiosis* the Stoics wanted to justify their claim to be not original, but to be instead faithful Socratics."³⁵ Zeno did not recycle old ideas; he was an original thinker. I do not think the contrary can be claimed just because he uses the word ἐπιμέλεια. In SVF I 236 Zeno uses often the verb ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, but not in the sense Socrates does. This verb does not mean "care for one's own soul" (ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια), that is, "care for virtue" (ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια).³⁶ It means, on the contrary, care for one's fellow man, which Zeno illustrates by dwelling on the relationship between the peasant and the plants he takes care of.

This misunderstanding has occurred already before. Pembroke rightly defines Socratic *epimeleia* as "a concern for oneself, for *aretê* and for the perfecting of the *psuchê*."³⁷ He then says that at SVF I 236 "the word *epimeleia* is used by Zeno—and referred to a classic province of *oikeiosis*, the parts of one's body."³⁸ In Stoic doctrine, the care for the body's parts is care for the physical preservation of life. As Hierocles expounds in his *Foundations of Ethics* (1.50 ff.), the first thing a living being perceives is its body parts and their natural function.³⁹ And this is instinct, as a testimony of Chrysippus makes clear: οἰκειούμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς γινόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη—"right after birth we are assigned to ourselves and to the parts of our bodies" (SVF III 179). When Zeno dwells on the "care of the parts" he wants to demonstrate that help towards fellow human beings is innate (πεφύκασι). Socrates asserts, however, that care of one's body-parts should not be pursued with the same commitment as that of the soul (Pl. *Ap.* 30a7 ff.). Although Zeno disagreed with this view, he might have referred to this passage when he related the care of the self and of others to an impulse of nature.

I already argued that interpretations like those of Kerferd⁴⁰ are a rear-projection of the modern philosophy of self.⁴¹ But behind this misinterpre-

35 Erler 2001, 215.

36 Socrates deals with this topic in Plato's *Apology* (29d–31b), but also in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.2.2–4, 1.2.8, 1.7.1, *Symp.* 8.26, 43). Cf. Pl. *Euthyd.* 275a, *Crito* 45d, *Tht.* 167e, *Resp.* 556a, *Leg.* 897c.

37 Pembroke 1971, 137.

38 Forschner 1995, 145 Anm. 19 took over this reference ("on a genuine field of οἰκείωσις: the parts of our own body") and all passages mentioned by Pembroke 1971 (see 137 n. 116), but without quoting Pembroke.

39 See Seneca, *ep.* 121.5 ff., on which Bees 2004, 27 ff.

40 Kerferd 1972 (186: "The process of *oikeiosis* is a process of self-recognition, and it is by self-recognition that a sense of personal identity is achieved").

41 Bees 2004, 200 ff.

tations is the Socratic anthropology for which indeed self-knowledge (as formulated in the care for the soul or virtue), and hence self-determination, are decisive. Hardy has recently shown the importance of this concept for Socrates' philosophy.⁴² Therefore, Zeno's doctrine of *oikeiosis* can only be seen as alternative to the Socratic approach: determination through nature versus self-development through knowledge.

2 Zeno's Disciples and Successors

2.1 *Cleanthes*

Among the passages often appealed to for the Stoic commitment to Socrates is a testimony of Cleanthes (SVF I 558).⁴³ According to it, Socrates always taught that the just man is happy, and he cursed he who first separated the just from the useful, as responsible for something impious. Cleanthes agreed, since he also considered this separation "impious."

In Cicero's *De officiis* we learn that the Stoics were so much in agreement with Socrates that "they maintained that if anything is morally right, it is useful, and if anything is not morally right, it is not useful" (3.11 = SVF I 558).⁴⁴ Cicero attributes this claim to Panaetius (3.34). Cicero adduces several examples from practical life to illustrate this principle, to which he agrees.⁴⁵ We should here also refer to what Chrysippus says about the usefulness of evil for maintaining cosmic balance: "Meletus' wickedness conforms to Socrates' justice" (Plut. *comm. not* 1065b–c = SVF II 1181).

We can therefore conclude that not only were Socrates' ideas about justice received by the Stoics, but that Socrates himself served as an exemplar in their arguments about justice. It would be wrong, however, to think that the Stoics held the same views as Socrates. An extant quotation from Chrysippus applies to the Stoics: "There is not to be found any other beginning or any other generation of Justice but what is from Zeus and common Nature. From thence must every such thing have its beginning, if we will say anything concerning good and evil" (Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1035c = SVF III 326). Immediately after, Plutarch quotes a similar statement: "One cannot otherwise or more properly come to the discourse of good and evil, to the virtues, or to happiness, than from common Nature and the administration of the cosmos" (SVF III 68). On

42 Hardy 2011.

43 See Long 1988, 160.

44 See SVF III 86 ff.

45 See Bees 2013.

this conception are based Chrysippus' claims about *telos*: it is undoubtedly a common Stoic tenet (it occurs also in Marcus Aurelius: 11.10.3–4).

2.2 *Chrysippus*

Scholars claim that “Chrysippus admired Socrates as an excellent ‘dialectician,’”⁴⁶ referring to Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 1045f–1046a (= SVF II 126) and 1046a–b (= SVF II 31). Let's look at the context of this quotation: “In his Third Book of *Dialectics* Chrysippus said that Plato, Aristotle, and those who came after them, even to Polemon and Straton, but especially Socrates, diligently studied dialectics, and then he cried out that one would even choose to err with such and so great men as these (συνεξαμαρτάνειν).” This testimony does not imply that Chrysippus admired his predecessors, including Socrates: on the contrary, he was critical of them. If his predecessors praised dialectics, he concludes, one cannot avoid dealing with it. It is unlikely that they would have been so mistaken (διαμαρτάνειν) about the value of dialectics, if they were in every respect as we esteem them. Chrysippus links his criticism of dialectics with a general reckoning of his predecessors. Plutarch asks why Chrysippus never ceases to fight and to refute these men if he thought them “to err in the principal and greatest matters” (ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις καὶ μεγίστοις διαμαρτάνοντας). Chrysippus calls their whole doctrine “blind and contradictory to itself, and affected by thousands of other faults.”⁴⁷

There is every reason to believe that Plutarch's assessment of Chrysippus is correct. For instance, we know that in his *Πρὸς Πλάτωνα περὶ Δικαιοσύνης* (*On Justice against Plato*) Chrysippus criticized Plato's *Republic* (SVF III 288, 313), and that in doing so he stood in a tradition that begins with Zeno. In fact, Zeno had already attacked the notion of dialectics of the *Republic* (SVF I 78, 260), and his pupil Persaeus had written a work with the title *Πρὸς τοὺς Πλάτωνος νόμους* (*Against Plato's Laws*).

2.3 *Sphaerus*

Another disciple of Zeno's was Sphaerus of Borysthenes. A.A. Long calls his work *Περὶ Λυκούργου καὶ Σωκράτους τρία* (*On Lycurgus and Socrates in Three Books*, DL 7.178), and draws the conclusion that “the association of these two names must indicate an interest in Socrates' attitude to law and society.”⁴⁸ On the other hand, Brown is skeptical. He refers to other known works of Stoics

46 Döring 1979, 6; see also Döring 1998, 168; Hershbell 1989, 2154.

47 Long 1988, 160 is telling only half the story: “Chrysippus commented on Socrates' devotion to dialectic in a list of philosophers.”

48 Long 1988, 160.

who dealt with Socrates: “Still, it is not clear how much of this evidence shows that Socrates was taken to be an example worth imitating.”⁴⁹

We know of two works entitled *Apology of Socrates* that have been attributed both to Zeno of Sidon and Theon of Antiochia, but we do not know their contents.⁵⁰ In Sphaerus’ case we can make some hypotheses. In addition to the work just mentioned, there is another attested, *On the Spartan Constitution* (DL 7.178). From this book a testimony is extant and another one can be attributed to it (SVF I 629–630). Sphaerus was in contact with the Spartan reformers Agis and Cleomenes (SVF I 622–623). Thus he was certainly an admirer of Sparta. And since we know that Socrates admired the Spartan legislator Lycurgus, whose laws had given a special role to Sparta (Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.15), it is quite possible that Sphaerus wanted to put himself into this tradition.⁵¹

3 Middle Stoicism

Since Schmekel (1892), scholars have spoken of Middle Stoicism, and rightly so. In fact, the modifications of Zeno’s doctrine undertaken in this phase of Stoicism are evident. Important for our purposes is the Stoic relationship to Socrates and Plato.

3.1 *First Steps, in Antipater*

Antipater of Tarsos became the head of the Stoa around 150 BCE. Even if he does not count as a member of the Middle Stoa, a different attitude towards Zeno’s Stoicism is clearly recognizable.

In *De divinatione* Cicero states that “much of what has been collected by Antipater had been miraculously foreseen by Socrates” (*per multa conlecta sunt ab Antipatro, quae mirabiliter a Socrate divinata sunt*, 1.123 = SVF III, fr. 37 [p. 249]). This reveals Antipater’s appreciation of Socrates, since divination had an important place in Stoicism.⁵² From a report in Athenaeus (14.643f. = SVF III, fr. 65 [p. 257]) we learn that in Antipater’s *On Anger* Socrates and Xanthippe were cited as examples.

More important, however, is the information we get from Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 5.14 = SVF III, fr. 56 [p. 252]): “In his work *According to Plato*

49 Brown 2009, 275–276.

50 As Alesse 2000, 155, also admits.

51 See Bees 2011, 302–303.

52 The conclusion is: “if there is providence, divination also exists” (DL 7.149, where various Stoics are mentioned; Cic. *Div.* 1.82ff.).

Only Moral Goodness is Good ("Ὅτι κατὰ Πλάτωνα μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν), Antipater showed that for Plato virtue is sufficient for happiness." Clement adds that many other Platonic doctrines are in line with Stoicism. Antipater's account is very noteworthy, as the principle of the autarchy of virtue is central in Zeno's ethics and in this rigid form cannot be traced back to Plato. With this tenet Old Stoicism sought therefore to differentiate itself from the Socratics. According to a testimony reported by Plutarch (*Stoic. repugn.* 1040d = SVF III 157), in his *Against Plato* Chrysippus attacked Plato because he took health for a good. In fact, Chrysippus claims, if we take for goods pleasure and other things which are not morally good, we give up not only justice, but also high-mindedness, temperance, and all other virtues.⁵³

We see that in the *Tusculan Disputations* (5.33ff.) Cicero belittles Zeno's authority when it comes to the question whether the concept of the autarchy of virtue should be attributed to him. Following Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero declares that Zeno "crept in old philosophy, but the dignity of his thesis is maintained thanks to the authority of Plato."⁵⁴ In fact, Plato often claims that virtue is the only good, for instance at *Gorgias* 470d7 ff. and *Menexenus* 247e6 ff. These passages do not, however, deal with autarchy.⁵⁵

Plato distances himself from the common opinion on moral goods: for him the spiritual goods are divine, and therefore superior to the corporeal and external goods (*Leg.* 631bff.); furthermore, he declares that health, beauty, and wealth are the best properties for the just and pious men, but the worst for the unjust (*Leg.* 661a–d).⁵⁶ But he does not take the step Zeno takes, that is to consider virtue as a good opposed to wickedness and everything else as indifferent.⁵⁷ This view represents a conscious reaction against the Socratic-Platonic doctrine.⁵⁸

53 In the Platonic dialogues health is indeed a good, e.g., *Lysis* 218e, *Grg.* 452a–b, *Resp.* 357c.

54 In *De finibus* 5.74 the Stoics are called "thieves that changed only the definitions."

55 Lefèvre 2008, 155 is right in calling the argument "not pertinent." This applies also to Stob. *Ecl.* 2.55.22 ff. w, where the Stoic tenet "Only the moral good is a good" is attributed to Plato. Shortly before, however, Stobaeus enumerates the usual three classes of goods (2.55.11 ff.).

56 At *Grg.* 451dff. Plato discusses the hierarchy of the gods, but he doesn't question that they are all goods.

57 See Stob. *Ecl.* 2.57.18 ff. Modern scholarship is convinced that Zeno's doctrine is "new" (see Philemon at DL 7.27; Antipater of Sidon and Athenaeus in DL 7.30–31); see Bees 2012.

58 According to Long 1988, 164 ff., *Euthyd.* 278e3 ff. marks the starting point of Zeno's theory of goods. But health, richness, etc. are also considered "goods."

3.2 *Panaetius*

A disciple and successor of Antipater was Panaetius of Rhodes. We know that he turned to Plato for inspiration; Philodemus writes that “he was strongly influenced by Plato and Aristotle, and in some points he deviated from Zeno’s doctrine because of the Academy and the Peripatos.”⁵⁹ Cicero shares this view: “Panaetius strove to avoid this uncouth and repellent development [of old Stoicism], censuring alike the harshness of its doctrines and the crabbedness of its logic. In doctrine he was mellowed, and in style more lucid. Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and Dicaearchus were constantly on his lips, as his writings show.”⁶⁰

This fits with the report that Panaetius dealt with the life of Socrates in a work (Περὶ Σωκράτους) where he defends him against the accusation of having been rich and bigamous.⁶¹ Probably Cic. *off.* 1.148 (= Test. 73 Alesse = C 12 Vimercati) should be traced back to Panaetius. Here we learn that Socrates (and Aristippus), “thanks to their great and superhuman virtues (*magnis et divinis bonis*),” acquired the freedom to act against the established customs. The doctrine of the Cynics should instead be rejected, for it is “inimical to moral sensibility (*inimica verecundiae*).” I think that this evaluation speaks against Pohlenz’s supposition that Panaetius presented the Stoa as deriving from Socrates and the Cynics.⁶² It seems likely that in *On Philosophical Schools* (Περὶ αἰρέσεων) Panaetius claimed the proximity of the Socratic doctrines propounded by Plato to Stoicism.⁶³ There is evidence that he dealt with the issue of the authenticity of the *Sôkratikoî logoi*.⁶⁴

3.3 *Posidonius*

The most important disciple of Panaetius, and one of the most important Stoics altogether, was Posidonius of Apameia (born ca. 135 BCE).

He went further than his teacher in modifying Zeno’s system, as he renounced its strict monism. Posidonius rejected the idea that the soul was entirely rational, and assumed that it had three faculties (δυνάμεις): a rational, a spirited, and an appetitive one (fr. 142–146 EK). He did not explain emotion as

59 Phld. *Stoic. hist.* (PHerc. 1018), col. 61.2 ff. Dorandi (= fr. 57 van Straaten = test. 1 Alesse = A 19 Vimercati).

60 Cic. *Fin.* 4.79 (= fr. 55 van Straaten = Test. 79 Alesse = A 95 Vimercati, tr. Rackham).

61 Fr. 132 ff. van Straaten = Test. 142 ff. Alesse = A 112 ff. Vimercati.

62 Pohlenz 1949, 427–428.

63 Steinmetz 1994, 651, sees here “a new interpretation of the Stoic philosophy from the spirit of Socrates.”

64 Fr. 123 ff. van Straaten = Test. 145 ff. Alesse = A 104 ff. Vimercati.

Zeno and his followers did, that is, as the consequence of a wrong decision of reason, as an “irrational and unnatural movement of the soul,” or as “an instinct exceeding the goal stated by reason” (SVF I 205, 206). Posidonius assumed instead an irrational part of the soul, which enabled him to acknowledge—on the basis of experience—the emotions of children and animals. On this issue he openly criticized Chrysippus (fr. 31 ff.). Posidonius was too ashamed to agree with the wrong doctrine of Chrysippus and of other Stoics (fr. 159 EK). On the other hand he admired Plato, whom he called “divine” (fr. 31, 150a, 152 EK).⁶⁵

This fits well with Posidonius’ admiration for Socrates. “The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on *Ethics*, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress” (Τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ Ἠθικοῦ λόγου τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην, DL 7.91 = fr. 29 EK, tr. Hicks). It is certainly not by chance that Posidonius mentions these three philosophers as examples for the Stoic concept of progress:⁶⁶ in fact, we find these three philosophers in Philodemus’ line of succession (Philodemus *De Stoicis*, c. 3, col. XII 20 ff.; DL 1.15).

4 The Imperial Stoa

The Imperial Stoa generally followed the doctrines of the founder of the school. This does not, however, apply to its relation to Socrates, where the tendencies of the Middle Stoa continued: Socrates became a model for the ethical life.

4.1 Seneca

According to Seneca, Stoicism is different from Epicureanism in that the quotations and pithy sayings of its previous representatives (beginning with Zeno) need not be followed faithfully: “we do not live under a king; everyone is responsible for himself” (*Ep.* 33.4). This freer attitude can also be recognized in the numerous passages in which Seneca speaks of Socrates.⁶⁷

In his quest for the wise man Seneca thinks of “men like Plato and Xenophon, and the spiritual progeny of Socrates” (*tranqu. an.* 7.3). Ethical life should be pursued not through mere teaching, but through personal intercourse and the living example of a teacher (*ep.* 6.5). Seneca finds evidence for this not

65 On this Bees 2004, 46 ff.

66 On this Roskam 2005.

67 For a detailed discussion see Döring 1979, 18 ff.; von Albrecht 2004, 53 ff.

only in Zeno and Cleanthes, but also in Plato and Aristotle: “the multitude of the philosophers that branched out in many directions benefited more from the character than from the words of Socrates.” It is noteworthy that Seneca’s quest for the *exemplum* is not limited to his own school, but extends to what surrounds it, leading him eventually to see in Socrates an equally important paradigm. He admires him highly, and ranks him with Romans like Cato and Laelius and the founders of the Stoic school, Zeno and Cleanthes (*ep.* 64.10), or Chrysippus and Zeno, “and other great men” (*ben.* 7.8.2).

Socrates’ way of life substantiates Stoic tenets, as the one that death is “unimportant” (*ἀδιάφορον/indifferens*).⁶⁸ Here he stands on the same ground as Zeno: “one will teach you how to die when it will be necessary, the other one before it will be necessary” (*ep.* 104.21). Seneca admires Socrates’ death by hemlock as Cato’s self-determined end of life (*ep.* 13.14). By the way he died, Socrates showed that there is no reason to fear death (*ep.* 24.4). In another passage, Seneca says that the ethical life consists in a variety of actions. Dying is among them, and again Socrates serves as an example as do the Romans Regulus and Cato (*ep.* 67.7; cf. *prov.* 3.4). Cato serves as a model, since he followed Socrates’ death and put “Plato’s book” (i.e., the book dealing with Socrates’ death, the *Phaedo*) beneath his sword (*ep.* 24.6; cf. *ep.* 104.29).

We already saw that Socrates did not teach the autarchy of virtue. Seneca gives the mistaken impression that he did. According to *ep.* 71.7 Socrates traced philosophy to ethics, that is, to the separation of what is good from what is evil. One should bear injustice if he possesses virtue. Indeed Socrates taught that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it, but he never explained this as Seneca does. Seneca “does not shy away from interpreting and adjusting the extant tradition according to his purposes.”⁶⁹

As Döring goes on to show,⁷⁰ this trend, the free use of tradition, concerns other topics too. In *De vita beata* (24.4 ff.) Socrates is characterized as a Stoic sage, and “has next to nothing in common with the historical Socrates.” In *De tranquillitate animi* (5.1–3) Seneca’s own situation under Nero is mirrored: Socrates appears here engaging himself for the state even during the tyranny of the Thirty. The most important issue at stake in *De beneficiis* (5.4.1–5.6.7) is whether one should outdo others in doing deeds. This applies to both Socrates and Diogenes, whose frugality makes it impossible to return what one receives from others. When Socrates and the Cynic Diogenes are placed on the same

68 DL 7.103, on which Bees 2012, 101 ff.

69 Döring 1979, 23–24.

70 Hereinafter I follow Döring’s reconstruction at 28 ff.

footing (see also 5.6.1), they are so placed because of the succession line according to which the Cynics derived from Socrates, and the Stoics from the Cynics. Seneca reports (5.6.2–7) on Socrates' invitation at the court of the Macedonian king Archelaus. Socrates refuses, as "he was unwilling to enter voluntary servitude, this man whose freedom a free city could not bear" (*noluit ire ad voluntariam servitutem is, cuius libertatem civitas libera ferre non potuit* 5.6.7). According to Döring, here Seneca is justifying his retreat from Nero's court (Döring speaks of a "camouflaged justification of his own actions"). In a fictitious talk Seneca thinks how he could have benefited Archelaus, namely, by giving a scientific explanation of the solar eclipse (5.6.4–5). Socrates' name is, however, otherwise related to the exclusion of physics. With this invented story Seneca wanted to show the utility of philosophy. As Döring puts it, "the fact that Seneca came into conflict not only with the traditional image of Socrates, but also with his own tradition-oriented one, was apparently not an obstacle to him." I shall add that in *Naturales quaestiones* Seneca sets himself the task of explaining the natural appearances not only by means of physics, but also according to Stoic physics and theology. He deals with the formation of solar eclipses (1.12.1), and deplores the superstition of the people who fear death when the sun becomes obscure (7.1.2). Such lack of knowledge applies to Archelaus (*ben.* 5.6.3). It is evident that also in this passage Seneca is depicting himself.

The image of Socrates expounded by the Greek-writing Stoics of the Imperial Age shows clearly that in this case too we are dealing with stylization. Socrates appears as a character on whom Stoic concepts and doctrines were projected—in order to derive them according to the succession theory.

4.2 *Musonius*

Musonius has been associated with Socrates as both providing "evidence for the best life" (Orig. *c. Cels.* 3.66), and for how he dealt with the injustice he had to suffer from political power (Iul. *ep.* 16). His attitude towards Nero has been compared to Socrates' fearlessness toward death (Philostr. *vita Apoll.* 4.46). It is no wonder that his lectures also feature admiration for Socrates.

The fourteenth *Diatribē* addresses whether marriage is cumbersome for the philosopher. The question is answered negatively with reference to Pythagoras, Socrates, and Crates. It is certainly not by chance that the latter belong to the "succession." We know that Socrates led a marriage that we would nowadays define as bourgeois. In fact, when talking with his son he holds entirely traditional views, concerned to provide a material basis for marriage (Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.1–2): a man chooses a woman in view of the generation of children.⁷¹ About

71 The quarrelsome Xanthippe (reported by Gell. *NA* 1.17.1ff.) is certainly an exaggeration,

Crates, however, Musonius reports that he had no property, no home, and that he slept with his wife in public buildings. This fits with Diogenes Laertius' report (6.85–93) of his partner Hipparchia: "The girl made her choice [sc. for Crates] and, adopting the same dress, went about with her husband and had sex with him in public" (6.97). Apparently Musonius gives here two entirely different examples to explain the Stoic tenet: "as Zeno said in the *Politeia*, he (sc. the Stoic sage) will get married for begetting children" (Καὶ γαμήσειν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι DL 7.121 = *Politeia* T 10 Bees). This attitude holds not only for the way of life Zeno propounded in his *Politeia* (where promiscuity dominates). It must refer also to the attitude of the sage in the existing state. But this way of life is different from the Cynic one.⁷² The reason why Musonius juxtaposes Socrates and Crates and claims that there is no philosopher better than them lies indeed in the succession. The Cynic Crates was insignificant from an historical viewpoint, but he plays a key role in the alleged transmission of Socratic-Cynic philosophy to Stoicism.

The Stoic idea according to which even women should philosophize (*diatr.* 3) is backed by the Socratic definition of philosophy as a science of life (p. 10.4 ff. Hense). But Socrates did not have such "advanced" thoughts about the equality between man and woman (like those formulated by Zeno, particularly in the *Politeia*).⁷³ It seems that this was only a Cynic idea.⁷⁴ *Diatribes* 8 is devoted to the Platonic theme of the philosophers kings (*Politeia* 473bff.). Here Socrates is cited for being responsible for understanding philosophy as a "political and kingly science" (p. 40.7 ff. Hense). This is certainly correct, but the ideal Zeno has in mind is not the rule of the philosophers, that is of sages, over common people. The goal is rather that all men should become sages (as described in the *Politeia*). In such a cosmos only one way of life should exist and only one law; no borders anymore, and men should live like a flock pasturing together (Plut. *de Alex. fort.* 329a–b = T 1 Bees). Musonius stands in an old tradition when he refers to Socrates to demonstrate that exile is not an evil (which is the topic of

based very probably on Xen. *Symp.* 2.10. Here Socrates chooses to live with her in order to learn how to withstand other men; on this see Huss 1999, 138–139.

72 Marriage is of no importance for the Cynic. The union between Crates and Hipparchia is an exception (according to Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.76).

73 According to the Stoa, virtue is identical in men and women (SVF III 253–254).

74 See Phld. *De Stoicis* col. XVIII 26 ff. = T 3 Bees (on Antisthenes as a Cynic see DL 6.12). To illustrate his definition of philosophy Musonius quotes *Odyssey* 4.392. This verse also occurs in Socrates' biography at DL 2.21, in connection with the observation that Socrates did not attach importance to physics. Musonius seems to ignore the fundamental difference between this position and that of old Stoicism.

diatr. 9): “the fatherland common to all men is the cosmos” (p. 42.1–2 Hense). Already in Cicero (*Tusc.* 5.108) Socrates defines himself as a *mundanus*, that is, as a citizen of the cosmos. This cosmopolitanism is then attributed to the Cynic Diogenes. At DL 6.63 Diogenes answers the question of his provenance: I am a κοσμοπολίτης (“a citizen of the cosmos”).⁷⁵ This shows that here we are not dealing with an authentic tradition, but with a retrojection of a Stoic conception on a Cynic Socrates that never existed.⁷⁶

4.3 *Epictetus*

There is no doubt that Socrates had a special meaning for Epictetus.⁷⁷ In *Encheiridion* (c. 51) he recommends to all those who are “not Socrates” to strive to become like him. Socrates’ example, that is, the “memory of his deeds and words” (*Diss.* 4.1.169), is useful for mankind. However, in his lectures he draws a picture of Socrates—and, similarly, of Diogenes—that is highly stylized. Indeed, he goes even further than his teacher Musonius, as can be inferred also from the fact that Socrates is cited less frequently than the Stoic scholars.

On this we owe important insights to Klaus Döring. When dealing with the criteria upon which Epictetus quotes passages about Socrates he notes that “Epictetus is so heavily influenced by his own way of conceiving Stoicism that the result is not a Platonic, but a typical Epicteteian Socrates ... It is not the quotations from Plato upon which Epictetus’ image of Socrates depends, but on the contrary it is Epictetus’ image of Socrates which determines the choice of the quotations and the way they are presented.”⁷⁸ Moreover, it is to be assumed that the quotations do not come from direct readings, but from a traditional repertoire.

Some examples: the *Encheiridion* ends with a “central tenet” that one should always have at hand: “Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me” (c. 52). Epictetus recalls this quotation in other passages as well (*Diss.* 1.29.18, 2.2.15; 3.23.21). In his commentary to the *Encheiridion*, Simplicius clearly recognized that Epictetus employed this quotation in order to clarify the distinction he makes in the first chapter between the “things that are and the things that are not in our control.” To the latter belong the body, and therefore life, that according to the Stoic doctrine of the goods is only an *indifferens*. Epictetus fits

75 On this Epict. *Diss.* 3.24.66, 4.1.154.

76 See Bees 2011, 291 ff.

77 This has been noticed by a number of scholars: see Schweingruber 1943; Döring 1974 and 1979, 42 ff.; Gourinat 2001; Long 2002.

78 Döring 1974, 197.

the example of Socrates into a doctrine that did not belong to the historical figure. Zeno, who uses Socrates and his accusers as an example for the recurrence of events (SVF I 109),⁷⁹ could have cited any other historical event or any other group of people. Epictetus, by contrast, embeds Socrates as if he were integral part of the Stoic system.⁸⁰

In *Diss.* 1.9 Socrates appears as a “cosmopolitan” (as Musonius and others had already depicted him). However, Epictetus’ doctrine, according to which everything arising or growing on earth comes from god’s seed, is genuinely Stoic and not Socratic.⁸¹ The trend becomes evident if we look at a similar statement about the Cynic Diogenes. He is also presented as a “citizen of the cosmos,” whose “motherland is the whole earth” (*Diss.* 3.24.66). Then we learn that Diogenes loved all men, he took great efforts for them, and he acted as a servant of Zeus. This is all mere Stoic doctrine Epictetus has presented in the introduction to this section (3.24.10–11): the cosmos is *one* state consisting of *one* substance. All men are by nature linked to each other by means of *oikeiosis*. This central doctrine is retrojected onto Diogenes, the alleged “friend of man” (φιλόανθρωπος, 3.24.64), whose children are all men (3.22.81).⁸² The same applies to Socrates, who at 3.24.60 appears as the man who loved his children, but first of all god.

Epictetus puts himself into a line of succession. It is evident that he construes a Socratic-Cynic doctrine joined by Stoicism. Epictetus differentiates among the ways Socrates, Diogenes, and Zeno practiced philosophy (3.22.19), but he interprets each of their contributions to Greek thought as god’s mission—as if they only had different tasks. On this Schofield rightly observes that “in talking of Socrates, Diogenes and Zeno in this way, Epictetus is not doing history of philosophy.”⁸³

As other passages in Epictetus lead to the same conclusion, I believe that A.A. Long’s claim according to which Epictetus stands in a succession line beginning with the school’s founder Zeno is untenable.⁸⁴ Epictetus stand in

79 This is presented as a common Stoic view in SVF II 625, 626.

80 Evidence in Döring 1974, 200 ff., and 1979, 47 ff.

81 At the beginning of a cosmic period stands divine nature as σπερματικός λόγος—a “seminal cosmic reason” that yields and determines everything (SVF I 98, 102). The cosmos is therefore a “system of gods and humans,” as Epictetus says (§ 4; see SVF II 527–528).

82 The same applies to the characterization of Diogenes in *Diss.* 4.1.154–155.

83 Schofield 2007, 73.

84 Long noticed that “Epictetus’ Socrates is the Stoics’ patron saint ... Four hundred years of Stoicism had contributed to the preservation and interpretation of that memory” (Long 1988, 150–151); “Now there is nothing surprising about a Stoic aligning himself *doctrinally*

completely different tradition: the construction of a succession line with the aim of attenuating the extreme position of the founder of the school and his immediate successors.

4.4 *Marcus Aurelius*

For Marcus Aurelius, too, Socrates is a sage, a model for the present. Together with Chrysippus and Epictetus he functions as an example of those men who have “assimilated divinity in themselves” (7.19.2): the “noble philosophers” (σεμνοὶ φιλόσοφοι) such as Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates (6.47.3). Alexander, Gaius, and Pompeius, who are characterized by “ignorance and dependency,” stand opposite to Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates, who “had insight into the things and their causes” (8.3). That Socrates wanted to overcome natural philosophy is no longer important.

In the introductory section of his work, Marcus Aurelius grants his adoptive father with what is reported about Socrates, that is, the ability to resist and to delve into pleasure in the same way (1.16.30). Socrates has freed himself from the “temptations of the senses” (3.6.2: αἰσθητικῶν πείσεων). He embodies the ideal that Marcus Aurelius presents to his readers as Stoic doctrine: “to be pious towards men and gods, not to be affected by wickedness, and to be content with the part of the universe one has been assigned” (7.66). Socrates calls the “rational souls” to unity (11.39), but this is an entirely Stoic concept.

5 Conclusions

In *De finibus* Cicero calls Socrates the “father of philosophy” (*parens philosophiae* 2.1). In *De oratore* he speaks of the “flock of philosophers, beginning from their founder and originator Socrates” (*philosophorum greges ... ab illo fonte et capite Socrate* 1.42). He then draws a line of succession according to which all later philosophers except Epicurus not only departed from Socrates, but also wanted to be called Socratics (3.61ff.). From a historical viewpoint this is incorrect.

Zeno did not see himself as a Socratic, nor did he conceive of his system as a prosecution of Socratic philosophy. On the contrary, he consciously contradicts Socrates, as is particularly evident in his systematic approach to materialism. The same applies to Zeno’s successors Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Although

with Socrates. That had been the practice of the school ever since Zeno” (Long 2000–2001, 85).

positive claims are made here and there about Socrates, there is no evidence that they conceived of him as a sage.

A change in the general attitude can be recognized only in Middle Stoicism. This depends most likely on the construction of a succession line that runs from Socrates to Cynicism up to Stoicism. Accordingly, genuine conceptions of Stoicism were derived from Socrates and Plato, or the original Stoic system was modified by taking over concepts of other philosophical schools.

This change becomes particularly evident in Imperial Stoicism. Here Socrates appears as bearing Stoic thoughts and ideas, often in conjunction with representatives of Cynicism such as Diogenes. Here the history of philosophy has apparently been retouched in order to provide grounds for claiming the derivation of the Stoa from Socrates. Socrates appears now as the epitome of the good man, the Stoic sage, whose words and deeds become paradigmatic. Such an idealization is evident already in Xenophon,⁸⁵ but not in the Stoa of Zeno and his first successors.⁸⁶

References

- Albrecht, M. von. *Wort und Wandlung: Senecas Lebenskunst*. Leiden 2004.
- Allesse, F. *La Stoa e la tradizione socratica*. Napoli 2000.
- Bees, R. *Die Oikeiosislehre der Stoa, 1: Rekonstruktion Ihres Inhalts*. Würzburg 2004.
- Bees, R. *Zenons Politeia*. Leiden 2011.
- Bees, R. 'Ökonomie der Natur: zum kosmo-biologischen Konzept der Stoa', in: I. de Gennaro, S. Kazmierski, R. Lüfter, *Wirtliche Ökonomie: philosophische und dichterische Quellen*. Nordhausen 2013. 'Autarkie der Tugend: zum Wertbegriff der Stoa', in: I. de Gennaro, *Value: sources and readings on a key concept of the globalized world*. Leiden 2012, 83–105.
- Brown, E. 'Socrates in the Stoa', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar, *A companion to Socrates*, Malden 2006, 275–284.
- Dirlmeier, F. *Aristoteles: Eudemische Ethik*. Berlin 1984.
- Dorandi, T. 'Filodemo, gli Stoici (PHerc. 155 e 339)', *BCPE* 12 (1982), 91–133.
- Döring, K. 'Sokrates bei Epiktet', in: K. Döring and W. Kullmann, *Studia Platonica*. Amsterdam 1974, 195–226.
- Döring, K. *Exemplum Socratis*. Wiesbaden 1979.
- Döring, K. 'Sokrates, die Sokratiker und die von ihnen begründeten Traditionen', in: H. Flashar, K. Döring, M. Erler, G.B. Kerferd, F. Ueberweg, *Sokrates, Sokratik, Mathematik, Medizin. Die Philosophie der Antike* 2/1. Basel 1998, 139–364.

85 For a survey see Hogenmüller 2013.

86 This chapter was translated from German to English by Alessandro Stavru.

- Döring, K. 'Sokrates und die Naturphilosophie', *AKAN 20* (2010), 9–23.
- Erler, M. 'Sokrates' Rolle im Hellenismus', in: H. Kessler, *Sokrates: Nachfolge und Eigenwege*. Zug 2001, 202–232.
- Flashar, H., M. Erler, F. Ueberweg et al. *Die Philosophie der Antike: die hellenistische Philosophie*. Basel 1994.
- Forschner, M. *Die stoische Ethik*. Darmstadt 1995.
- Gigon, O. *Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien*. Basel 1953.
- Görler, W. 'Älterer Pyrrhonismus—Jüngere Akademie—Antiochos aus Askalon', in: Flashar, Erler, Ueberweg et al. 1994, 717–989.
- Gourinat, J.-B. 'Le Socrate d'Épictète', *PhilosAnt* 1 (2001), 137–165.
- Hardy, J. *Jenseits der Täuschungen: Selbsterkenntnis und Selbstbestimmung mit Sokrates*. Göttingen 2011.
- Hershbell, J. 'The stoicism of Epictetus: twentieth-century perspectives', *ANRW* II 36 (1989), 2148–2163.
- Hogenmüller, B. 'Das Sokratesbild in Xenophons Apologie des Sokrates', *Forum Classicum* 56 (2013), 30–38.
- Huss, B. *Xenophons Symposium*. Stuttgart 1999.
- Inwood, B. *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*. Cambridge 2003.
- Ioppolo, A.M. *Opinione e scienza: il dibattito tra Stoici e Accademici nel III e nel II secolo a.C.* Napoli 1986.
- Kerferd, G.B. 'The search for personal identity in Stoic thought', *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library* 55 (1972), 177–196.
- Lefèvre, E. *Philosophie unter der Tyrannis: Ciceros Tusculanae Disputationes*. Heidelberg 2008.
- Long, A.A. 'Epictetus as Socratic mentor', *PCPS* 46 (2001), 79–98.
- Long, A.A. 'Socrates in Hellenistic philosophy', *CQ* 38 (1988), 150–171.
- Long, A.A. 'Socrates in later Greek philosophy', in: D.R. Morrison: *The Cambridge companion to Socrates*. Cambridge 2011, 355–379.
- Long, A.A. 'Theophrastus and the Stoa', in: J.M. van Ophuijsen and M. van Raalte, *Theophrastus: reappraising the sources*. London 1998.
- Long, A.A. *Epictetus: a Stoic and Socratic guide to life*. Oxford 2002.
- Noack, L. *Psyche*, v. Leipzig 1862.
- Pembroke, S.G. 'Oikeiosis', in: A.A. Long, *Problems in Stoicism*. London 1971, 114–149.
- Pohlenz, M. 'Panaitios (5)', *RE* XVIII/2 (1949), coll. 418–440.
- Pohlenz, M. *Die Stoa*. Göttingen 1949.
- Roskam, G. *On the path to virtue: the Stoic doctrine of moral progress and its reception in (middle-)Platonism*. Leuven 2005.
- Sayre, F. *The Greek Cynics*. Baltimore 1948. (= 1948a)
- Sayre, F. 'Antisthenes the Socratic', *CJ* 43 (1948), 237–244. (= 1948b)
- Schmekel, A. *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*. Berlin 1892.

- Schofield, M. 'Epictetus on Cynicism', in: T. Scaltsas and A.S. Mason, *The philosophy of Epictetus*. Oxford 2007, 71–86.
- Schweingruber, F. 'Sokrates und Epiktet', *Hermes* 78 (1943), 52–79.
- Steinmetz, P. 'Die Stoa', in: Flashar, Erler, Ueberweg et al. 1994, 491–716.
- Ueberweg, F. *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: erster Theil*. Berlin 1865.

Cicero and the Socratic Dialogue: Between Frankness and Friendship (*Off.* 1. 132–137)

François Renaud*
Université de Moncton

Introduction

At the end of his life Cicero sketched a theory of conversation (*sermo*). I propose an analysis of it as expounded in the first book of the *De officiis* (1.132–137), his last philosophical work (44 BCE). The oft-cited passage has seldom been commented upon by scholars.¹ Despite its relative brevity (two pages in Winterbottom's edition), it offers, as Carlos Lévy (1993, 399) suggests, “a very advanced reflection on the ethics of conversation.” While the Latin term *sermo* covers a variety of types of conversations, Cicero appears to have in mind philosophical dialogue broadly understood in the light of the practical ethics of the Stoic Panaetius. There are good reasons to believe that Cicero more particularly had the Socratic dialogue in view.

Cicero begins his analysis by referring to the Socratics (*Socratici*) as supreme masters in the art of conversation.² While he does not name them, he seems to have Xenophon and especially Plato in mind. *Sermo* is the term Cicero uses for both the conversations of Socrates (*Off.* 1.108) and the Platonic dialogue as literary genre (*De or.* 3.60: *sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato*). One might object that Plato cannot be properly be considered a “Socratic.” In Antiquity, however, in contrast to conventional modern classifications, Plato was ranked, according to Diogenes Laertius, among the principal “Socratics” (τῶν λεγομέ-

* This is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at the joint seminar on “Philosophie hellénistique et romaine,” directed by Professors Bernard Besnier, Alain Gigandet, and Carlos Lévy, at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. I wish to thank them warmly, as well as the other participants, for their insightful questions and remarks, which proved extremely helpful in the revision of the text. Special thanks go to Jeremy Hayhoe for kindly proofreading the English text.

- 1 There are, however, Andrew R. Dyck's commentary (1996, 309–315), and the studies by Gary Remer (1999, 43–49), and Carlos Lévy (1993, esp. 401–411).
- 2 *Off.* 1.134; *maxime excellunt*. In *De or.* 11.270 Socrates is recommended as the best model for witty and refined conversation (*longe lepore et humanitate omnibus praestitisse*); cf. Griffin and Atkins 1991, n. 1; 52 n. 2.

νων Σωκρατικῶν οἱ κορυφαῖότατοι, 2.47). The author of the *Thirteenth Letter*,³ which might date from as late as the first century BCE, refers to the *Phaedo* under the title *On the Soul* (περὶ ψυχῆς) as one of the Socratic dialogues (Σωκρατεῖοι λόγοι).⁴ Moreover, the context of the passage, namely Panaetius' doctrine on duties (καθήκοντα), does not rule out the possibility of a reference to Plato. To Panaetius himself, again according to Diogenes Laertius,⁵ Plato was one of the authors of the "true" (ἀληθεῖς) Socratic dialogues (Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων) together with Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschinus. Finally, Cicero himself speaks in the *Tusculanes* of "Plato and the other Socratics" (*ut Platonem reliquosque Socraticos*, 2.8).⁶

I defend in this paper the following thesis. A comparison of the rules of conversation (*sermo*) in the *De officiis* with those of the Socratic διαλέγεσθαι in Plato, in particular in the *Gorgias*,⁷ reveals, beyond the obvious differences, one decisive agreement: the requirement of frankness for both truth and friendship. The role of reproof and correction (*obiurgatio*, *castigatio*) in Ciceronian conversation goes back, directly or indirectly, to the Socratic dialogue, more specifically to refutation conceived as correction (κολάζειν) and the counterpart of medical treatment. Cicero's position on this crucial issue is, however, in tension with the kindness or civility demanded by the *humanitas* but also more specifically by a "middle" ethics, the prime object in the *De officiis*.

3 Letter XIII, 363a6–7. The references to Plato's texts are to the Burnet edition (1900–1907). The English translations of Plato, which I have sometimes modified, are those of the *Complete Works* edited by Cooper (1997). With regard to Cicero's and Plutarch's texts, I refer to the Loeb Classical Library for the translation. The name of the translator is in all cases given.

4 I owe this observation to my colleague Harold Tarrant.

5 DL 2.64 (= fr. 126 ed. Van Straaten = test. 145 ed. Alesse). See Alesse's commentary on the term ἀληθεῖς (1997, 280–287), which refers according to her to the reliability or credibility of those dialogues as testimonies on Socrates.

6 Sedley 2014 quotes this passage but remains nevertheless hesitant about regarding Plato as being called a "Socratic" at Cicero's time; his detailed analysis of Horace's verses in the *Ars poetica* referring to "Socratic writings" (*Socraticae chartae*, 295–322) explores parallels with Xenophon, a largely justified move with regard to the relevant verses (in particular 312–316; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2).

7 In the *De oratore*, for example, Crassus, in many respects Cicero's spokesman, says he read that dialogue under Charmadas the Academician: "I read [the *Gorgias*] with close attention (*diligentius*)" (*De or.* 1.47; tr. Sutton). In the preface to Book 2 of *De finibus*, Cicero writes in his own name: Socrates makes fun of Gorgias "as we can learn from Plato" (*ut e Platone intelligi potest*) (*Fin.* 2.2; tr. Rackham). In the *Tusculanes* (5.36) he freely translates into Latin a whole passage from the *Gorgias* (470d).

1 Ethics of Conversation (*Off.* 1.132–137)

1.1 Stoic Context

In the preface of his treatise on “duties” (more exactly “appropriate actions,” καθήκοντα), Cicero informs the reader that he will chiefly (*potissimum*, *Off.* 1.6) follow the ethics of the Stoics, in particular Panaetius. The complex question about the degree of Panaetian influence on *De officiis* exceeds the limits of this short study.⁸ It must be emphasized, however, that Cicero claims to follow the Stoics “not as translator” (*non ut interpretes*) but as drawing on their teachings at his own discretion (*iudicio arbitrioque nostro*) as it suits his purpose.⁹ In the case of the art of conversation, he points out that no one has yet formulated rules for it (*praecepta ... nulla sermonis*, *Off.* 1.132), and to that extent he appears to expound his own conception of it.¹⁰ Panaetius’ teaching about middle (*medium*) duty, by comparison with the complete duty (*perfectum*) of the wise, constitutes the context and scope of his treatise (of Book I and II at least)¹¹ and of the passage on conversation. This ethics is that of the appropriate (*decorum*, πρέπον, *Off.* 1.94), that is, of what is fitting given the circumstances and the persons involved, according to the values specific to the Roman social élite as well as the natural bounds uniting all humans.¹²

8 On the problem of the sources, see Testard 1965, 25–49, who concludes by insisting on Cicero’s relatively free use of his sources, including Panaetius.

9 Ibid. The translation of Miller 1913 has been here partially followed.

10 The examples referred to in this passage (1.132–137) are all Romans, and the passages on conversation in others writings by Cicero confirm the *De officiis*, including that on diction (*De or.* 3.41–42, cf. Dyck 1996, 311), which clearly indicate according to Lefèvre 2001, 68, n. 378, “dass es sich um eine durch und durch ciceronische Materie handelt.”

11 *Off.* 1.8; 1.46: “we do not live with men who are perfect and clearly wise (*non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus*), but with those who are doing splendidly if they have in them mere images of virtue” (*simulacra virtutis*) (tr. Griffin and Atkins). For the translation of the *De officiis* I follow Griffin and Atkins 1991, with occasional modifications as indicated; I have also consulted those of Miller 1913 and Walsh 2000 and refer to them when necessary.

12 *Off.* 1.50: reason (*ratio*) and speech (*oratio*) associate human being and “unite them in a kind of fellowship” (*conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate*)’ (trans. Griffin and Atkins). More generally on the limits of the early Stoa’s (esp. Zeno’s) reception of Socrates, see Bees (in this volume).

1.2 *Preliminary Remarks (1.132–133)*

Cicero divides speech (*oratio*) into two categories, *contentio*, “oratory,”¹³ and *sermo*, “conversation.” While *contentio* has been given rules (*praecepta*) by rhetoricians, including Cicero himself (in the *De oratore*, *Brutus*, and *Orator*), there still exists, he says, none (*nulla*) for *sermo*. Cicero thus decides at the end of his life, in a treatise on moral and political philosophy, to fill out, at least in part, this important lacuna. Evidently it is not easy to “codify” this private and informal activity. It is nevertheless possible to propose some rules, claims Cicero, insofar as words and ideas (*verborum sententiarumque*), which are constitutive of oratory, are also constitutive of conversation.

Contentio and *sermo* are first to be distinguished with regard to place. *Contentio* is appropriate for speeches in law courts, assemblies, and other public places; *sermo* should be employed in the private sphere, in social groups, discussions (*disputationibus*), and gatherings of friends (*familiarium*, *Off.* 1.132). Cicero refers to the voice, which should be clear and attractive, but he does not mention clarity of thought (*cogitationis*). The latter is implied, however, as the rules common to both *contentio* and *sermo* concern words and ideas (*Off.* 1.133). His analysis deals with ideas (*sententiae*), rather than with words (*verba*).¹⁴

1.3 *Rules of Conversation (1.134–137)*

I will number the rules in the same order as they appear in the text. (1) Conversation should be gentle, undogmatic (*lenis minimeque pertinax*), and witty (*lepos*), characteristics Cicero attributes elsewhere to Plato’s Socratic dialogues.¹⁵ (2) No one should monopolize the conversation and all should allow others to have their turns. (3) We should especially give thought to the subject of discussion; if it is serious we should treat it with gravity; if humorous, with wit. (4) We should be particularly careful that our conversation does not reveal some fault in our behaviour (*vitium*), especially by speaking in a malicious or abusive manner about people who are absent. (5) Conversations are for the most part about private or public business, or about some literary or scholarly subject (*de artium studiis atque doctrina*); we must therefore always try when the discussion begins to drift off to bring it back to those subjects, but with consideration of the company present; for we do not at all time enjoy discussing the same subjects in the same way. (6) Since conversation is something to be

13 Translation by Miller as well Griffin and Atkins, to which I will return. Walsh translates *contentio* by “argument,” a translation more problematic than “oratory” as we will see.

14 Cicero has already dealt with the *verba* in Book 3 of *De oratore*.

15 Cf., e.g., *De rep.* 1.16: *leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis*.

enjoyed, we must know when it is best to end it. (7) As in the rest of life, we must control excessive passions (*perturbationes*) that are opposed to reason, including anger (*ira*). (8) We must take particular care to be seen to respect and have affection (*veriri et diligere videatur*) for those with whom we converse.¹⁶ (9) Cicero finally comes to a delicate subject: the reproofs (*obiurgationes*) that sometimes need to be addressed to the interlocutor. On those occasions we must use a more rhetorical tone of voice (*vocis contentio maiore*) and harsher language, even appearing (*videamur*) to be angry (*irati*).¹⁷ Cicero elaborates on this a little. Like medical treatment by surgery and cauterization (*ut ad urendum et secandum*), we must have recourse to this kind of rebuke (*genus castigandi*) rarely and reluctantly and when no other remedy (*medecina*) can be found. In most cases we ought to resort only to mild criticism (*clemente castigatione*) reinforced with earnestness (*gravitas*) so as to show severity (*severitas*). Insults must be avoided. We must show that even the very harshness of the rebuke (*obiurgatio*) has been adopted for the good of the person rebuked, and this is why anger (*iracundiam*) is to be shunned. (10) Boasting is unattractive, especially when the claims are false.

These rules call at once for a correction about the relation between *sermo* and *contentio*. In the light of the rule about rebuke and criticism (*obiurgatio, castigatio*), the initial translation of *contentio* as “oratory” has to be qualified. Even if conversation ought to be free of intransigence and anger, it is not necessarily free from *contentio*.¹⁸ Therefore *contentio* is not the exact equivalent of *eloquentia*. The difference between *contentio* and *sermo* lies above all in the voice: in the *contentio* there is “tension” in the voice, while in the case of *sermo* it is, at least in principle, devoid of “tension.”¹⁹ As Carlos Lévy points out, “there

16 *Videamur* indicates the ambiguity involved in this rule as in others (there are three occurrences of *videamur* in our passage: in 131 and 136 *bis*); the subject is a propriety located often halfway between image and reality, as is the middle ethics of the *Officiis* as a whole (cf. 1.50: *simulacra virtutis*, quoted above).

17 According to Cicero (*Tusc.* 4.55) the orator too sometimes had better pretend (*simulare*) to be angry.

18 *Tusc.* 2.5: “We, however, whose guide is probability (*probabilia*) and who are unable to advance further than the point at which the likelihood of truth (*quod veri simili*) has presented itself, are prepared both to refute without obstinacy and be refuted without anger” (*refellere sine pertinacia et refelli sine iracundia parati sumus*) (tr. King). Cf. *Pl. Grg.* 458a2–4.

19 See the first two definitions of *contentio* given in the *Latin Oxford Dictionary* (Glare 1982): “1. A stretching, tension; 2. The strenuous exercise of any of the physical or mental faculties, exertion, effort.” Lévy 1993, 400. Cf. *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.23: “The Tone of Conversation (*sermo*) is relaxed (*remissa*), and is closest to daily speech (*cotidianae*)

can be *sermo* in oratory and *contentio* in conversation" (1993, 402). Cicero refers in the passage to Caesar, the brother of the elder Catulus, as someone who so greatly surpassed everyone else in witticism and humor that even in forensic speeches (*forensi genere dicendi*) he defeated the oratory (*contentiones*) of others with his conversational style (*sermone*, *Off.* 1.133). Plato's Socratic dialogues, which Cicero calls *sermones*, are not free from "tension," as is obviously the case of the *Gorgias*. Socrates' speech is full of "tension" insofar as he is always striving for refutation or demonstration, and his tone of voice sometimes becomes more emphatic toward his adversaries, here Polus and Callicles.²⁰ It is true that the rebuke (*obiurgatio*) to which Cicero refers does not correspond in every respect with the Socratic *elenchus*, but the practice of dialogue (*διαλέγεσθαι*) is not reducible to (logical) refutation either. I will return to this question toward the end of this study.

2 Dialectical Rules and Ethical Implications

2.1 *Dialectical Rules in Plato's Socratic Dialogues*

Plato presents Socratic dialogue as *practiced* without ever giving a systematic account of its *theory*; that is the reasons for holding those conversations in the particular way that he has Socrates hold them. He does, however, make scattered remarks, through his Socrates, about the rules that should regulate the dialogue, especially in the *Gorgias* (though to some extent also the *Protagoras*), which has sometimes been called a dialogue on dialogue. In the course of his successive exchanges with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, Socrates points to the principal rules of dialogue as he practices it or, more accurately, as he would like to practice it. As will quickly become apparent, several of the rules of the following (non-exhaustive) list are absent from Cicero's brief sketch.

Let us begin with the main *general* rules. (1) We must be prepared to give an account of our own claims and convictions (*Prt.* 336c1: λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι; cf. *Plt.* 286a5); (2) dialogue is a common search for truth rather than a fight for victory; (3) its principal aim is the liberation from false beliefs (and possibly the discovery of truth);²¹ (4) the interlocutor must possess three qual-

locutioni). The Tone of Debate (*contentio*) is energetic (*acris*), and is suited to both proof and refutation" (*et ad confirmandum et ad confutandum*) (tr. Caplan).

20 On the struggle (*ἀγωνίζεσθαι*) in dialogue (*διαλέγεσθαι*) as well as the gap between theory and practice in Plato's dialogues, see Renaud 2009, col. 181–182.

21 I need not take a position on the very controversial question whether the Socratic *elenchus*' aim is exclusively refuting or also defending theses.

ities without which authentic dialogue is impossible: friendship or goodwill (εὐνοία), knowledge or competence (ἐπιστήμη), and frankness or freedom of speech (παρρησία) (*Grg.* 487a–d); (5) we ought to remain calm and not get angry if our opinion is refuted (*Grg.* 457d–e); (6) we must seek logical coherence, that is, agreement (ὁμολογία) with the reason in us (*Grg.* 481d–482c). As for the main *particular* rules: (7) there must be two interlocutors and no more, the questioner and the respondent, since the interlocutor's agreement is the only one that counts (*Grg.* 474a–b); (8) the questioner must obtain the interlocutor's agreement at each step of the discussion, which rules out long speeches; (9) the roles of questioner and respondent are interchangeable; each one may in turn question and respond (*Grg.* 462a3–5); (10) logical *elenchus* (ἐλεγχος), or refutation, typically proceeds in two steps: (a) the questioner, usually Socrates, asks a question (often of definition: "What is x?"; also "Is x y"), to which the respondent must answer, thus becoming the defender of a thesis; (b) a series of questions follows leading to reformulations of the initial thesis on the part of the respondent and usually to the refutation; (11) the questioner tests the consistency between the various claims of the respondent (logical consistency), but he can also test the consistency between his claims and his way of life (moral consistency).²² Hence the necessity of frankness or sincerity: the respondent must stand behind what he says, which implies both παρρησία and ἐπιστήμη, as he must know what he himself thinks and express it according to the rules.²³

2.2 *Plato and Cicero: Disagreements and Agreements*

The present study is not concerned so much with Plato's and Cicero's *practice* of dialogue as with their respective *conceptions* of it.²⁴ It is nevertheless important to point out at the outset two differences pertaining to their practice of the written dialogue, which will then be qualified. First, Plato often opposes the Socratic dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι), proceeding by questions and answers, to long speech, which he identifies negatively with rhetoric (ῥητορικὴ) (*Grg.* 471d–

22 Cf. *Grg.* 482b4–6: "or else, if you leave this unrefuted, then by the Dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be dissonant with you all your life" (ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ) (tr. Zeyl); *La.* 188d3–6: the most beautiful harmony (ἁρμονία καλλίστη) is not the one on the lyre or some other pleasurable instrument, but actually on his own life "rendering [it] harmonious by fitting his deeds to his words" (αὐτοῦ βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα) (tr. Sprague).

23 See Narcy's pioneering study (1996) as well as, on the moral dimension of the dialectical virtues, Geiger 2006.

24 On Cicero's practice of dialogue see Schofield 2008.

472c; cf. Quint. *Inst.* 5.14.27–29). Cicero does often praise the Socratic method, including as we have seen in the passage on the art of conversation, but in his philosophical dialogues (*sermones*) he most often opts for the antilogic debate, the *disputatio in utramque partem*, opposing uninterrupted speeches (*oratio perpetua*). Such is the case, for example, in the *Academica*, *De finibus*, and *De natura deorum*.²⁵ This difference in practice is no doubt due to Cicero's bent for oratory, but also to his conviction that *disputatio* allows for a more complete presentation of a doctrine.²⁶ Second, despite the rule of reciprocity, the Socratic dialogue in Plato is most often a dialogue between unequal interlocutors, as the questioner-protagonist (Socrates) is the leader of the discussion. Cicero's dialogues present conversations between equal interlocutors who belong to the Roman elite and show mutual esteem. These two fundamental differences must at once be qualified. In Plato's early dialogues Socrates sometimes uses uninterrupted speech. Such is the case in his fictive questions, which introduce a monologue within a brief dialogue, and above all in speeches such as the personification of the Laws in the *Crito* (50a–54c), the commentary on Simonides' poem in the *Protagoras* (342–347a), the stories about the leaking jars in the *Gorgias* (492d–494a), and the same dialogue's final myth (523a–527e). In addition, the equality prevailing in the Ciceronian dialogues implies the exclusion of interlocutors not belonging to the Roman elite or expected to accede to it.

Let us now consider the principal agreements. *Disputatio* as well as *sermo* are characterized by freedom, as opposed to the intransigence (*pertinacia*) of a dogmatic attitude (cf. *Tusc.* 2.5). This freedom in Cicero's dialogues is manifested in various ways: witticism, irony (*De or.* 2.269–270), and the seemingly improvised character of the dramatic action (*De or.* 1.207). This freedom of scepticism does not, however, exclude the defence of some beliefs like the existence of the divine in and around us (cf. *Tusc.* 1.30). With regard to the passions, anger is banished as it is in Plato. Finally, there is the decisive importance of goodwill, since conversation flourishes best among friends (*in amicitia*).²⁷

25 Cicero calls the conversations in his own dialogues *sermones*, and the written dialogues themselves he (often) calls *disputationes*, which are by nature mimetic and include a significant rhetorical dimension: *Fin.* 2.17; *Tusc.* 1.112. For an analysis and defense of the rhetorical strategy in *Fin.* 2, see Inwood 1990.

26 Cf. *Fin.* 2.3: *Nos commodius agimus. Non enim solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret sed etiam cur.* See however, in the same passage, Cicero's stated preference in principle for the Socratic method (*cum in rebus singulis insistas et intelligas quid quisque concedat*), which Cicero at first adopts but quickly gives up in favour of uninterrupted speeches.

27 *Off.* 1.58. Cf. *Fam.* 9.24.3; Lévy 1993, 404–405; Remer 1999, 48.

In short, the moral virtues of conversation in Cicero are essentially those of the *humanitas* ideal: courtesy, self-restraint, mildness (*comitas, clementia*), and goodwill (*benevolentia*).²⁸ Cicero's conception agrees with Plato's, with the difference that the practice of dialogue that the Roman thinker privileges above all is the peaceful dialogue among friends characterized by a conciliatory spirit. Still, in Cicero too, goodwill and the care for truth-telling occasionally require reproof and correction (*obiurgationes*), as will be discussed in § 3.

2.3 *Other Ethical Assumptions and Implications*

Let us now explore the more general implications of the art of conversation (1.132–137). According to Cicero the power of speech (*oratio*), and especially that of dialogue (*sermo, colloquium*, etc.), being that which distinguishes us from animals (*De or.* 1.32–33; cf. *Inv.* 1.5; Quint. *Inst.* 2.16.16), allows us to seek the truth by relying on commonly shared values. An important question arises: does conversation as Cicero understands it ultimately rest on common values or does it rather constitute the condition of knowledge and ethics?

Claude Roubinet puts forth the general thesis (with no direct link to Cicero) that sociability exists before the exchange (1981, 205). From this point of view, goodwill constitutes one of the preconditions of dialogue, since the willingness to listen and respond implies the recognition of the human community, including local traditions such as the *mos maiorum*. This would explain why in his dialogues Cicero features the great Roman political orators; in addition to suiting the subject of discussion, the characters chosen also embody the *humanitas* ideal, which thus contributes to the legitimation of philosophy at Rome (*Cato M.* 3; *Amic.* 4. Cf. Ruch 1958, 403–404). According to Lévy, however, this foundational sociability in Cicero is largely idealized or dreamed, and it is not applicable to Cicero's purely theoretical works such as the *Academica*. In the second version of the *Academica*, in which the main speaker is the scholar Varro, the question of truth predominates and therewith the ideal of the contemplative life in comparison to the active life. This predominance is well illustrated in the correspondence at the time between Cicero and Varro, who in Cicero's eyes admirably embodies the contemplative life (βίος θεωρητικός).²⁹ In the *De officiis*, however, Cicero claims the primacy of moral action over the search for truth: “all the praise that belongs to virtue lies in action” (*virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit*; *Off.* 1.19, tr. Griffin and Atkins). This is all the

28 *De or.* 1.35, 106. Cf. Becker 1938, 19–20; Leeman and Pinkster 1981, 82; Renaud 1998, col. 81–84; Zoll 1962, 105–133, in particular 129–133.

29 *Fam.* 9.1–8. See Lévy's (1992, 132–137) analysis of that correspondence.

more true in the context of an intermediary ethics, which explains why frankness is nowhere cited explicitly as one of the virtues of conversation. Lévy goes further, however. According to him, the old political concept of frankness or freedom of speech (παρρησία) seems to play “no important role in philosophical texts prior to Philodemus” (1993, 411). He refers to the fact that the philosophical conversation in the Academy, as Cicero writes in the *Academia*, consists in seeking truth without any contention (*sine ulla contentione*), intransigence or stubbornness—in other words, without dogmatism (*Acad. 2 (Luc.) .7*). With regard to Plato, Lévy claims that “Callicles, a character full of violence and intolerance, represents an intrusion of *contentio* into the Platonic *sermo* that bears the title *Gorgias*” (403). In what follows I will try to show in what sense frankness (παρρησία) does in fact constitute an important dialectical virtue in the *Gorgias* as well as a significant component of the art of conversation in the *De officiis*, albeit in a more limited sense than in Plato.

3 Friendship and Truth

3.1 Criticism and Frankness

In the *Gorgias* Socrates claims that his interlocutor Callicles possesses the three dialectical virtues: goodwill (εὐνοία), knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), and frankness (παρρησία, 487a–e). Whether this praise is ironic or not, it implies a general hypothetical statement: the dialogue between them, as any dialogue worthy of the name, is not possible unless the interlocutor truly possesses these three virtues. As the discussion and the dramatic action quickly show, this is not all the case. Callicles *embodies* both his thesis that might is right and the unrestrained hedonism he defends (482c–486d, 488b–499b). He identifies with his impulses (491e–492c), reason being for him merely an instrument for their satisfaction. Socrates seeks to demonstrate that Callicles has a false conception of himself and that in rejecting justice and self-control he makes himself unfit for partnership and therefore for dialogue (*Grg.* 507e5: κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος). More than once, Callicles gives up the principle of frankness (παρρησία) in order to avoid self-contradiction and refutation (*Grg.* 495a5–9, 499b4–c2; cf. 505d4–7). Refutation thus reveals the contradiction in his words (λόγοι) and more fundamentally between his words and his actions (ἔργα).

There are good reasons to believe that (a) Cicero's final remarks on the art of conversation regarding the necessity of rebuke and criticism (*Off.* 1.136–137) refer directly or indirectly to the *Gorgias* and (b) that this reference sheds light on the relation between *contentio* and *sermo*. Let us cite this time at length the relevant section paraphrased earlier:

A further point: sometimes it happens that it is necessary (*necessariae*) to reprove (*obiurgationes*) someone. In that case we may perhaps need to use a more emphatic tone of voice (*vocis contentione maiore*), or sharper and more serious language, and even to behave so that we seem to be acting in anger. However, we should have recourse to this sort of criticism (*hoc genus castigandi*) in the way that we do to surgery and cauterization (*ad urendum et secandum*), rarely and unwillingly; never unless it is necessary, if no other medicine (*medicina*) can be found.³⁰ However, anger itself should be far from us ... [137]. One ought for the most part to resort only to mild criticism (*clementi castigatione*), though combined with a certain seriousness (*gravitate*) so as to show severity (*severitas*) while avoiding abusiveness. We must furthermore make it clear that any sharpness there may be in the reproof (*obiurgatio*) has been adopted for the sake of the person who is being reproofed.

CIC. *Off.* 1.136–137 (tr. GRIFFIN and ATKINS, modified)

The expression “surgery and cauterization” (*ad urendum et secandum*)³¹ as well as the language of rebuke and criticism (*obiurgatio, castigatio*)³² clearly recall the *Gorgias*. At the end of his exchange with Polus, Socrates defends a good use of rhetoric, which consists in chastising and revealing false pretence to knowledge:

[He] must compel himself and the others not to play the coward, but to grit his teeth and present himself with grace and courage as to a doctor for cauterization and surgery (ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῶ).

PL. *Grg.* 480c5–7 (tr. ZEYL)

30 The medical analogy is employed earlier in the treatise (*Off.* 1.83): “When confronting danger, therefore, we should copy the doctor (*imitanda medicorum*), whose custom it is to treat mild illnesses mildly, though he is forced (*coguntur*) to apply riskier, double-edged, remedies to more serious illnesses” (tr. Griffin and Atkins).

31 Cicero uses the same expression, at the time of the *De officiis*, towards his enemy Mark Anthony (*Philippics* 8.15), this time as an analogy of the “body of the State”: “If there be in the body anything such as to injure the rest of the body we suffer it to be cauterized and cut out (*uri secarique*), that some member, rather than the whole body, should perish; so in the body of the State (*sic in rei publicae corpore*)” (tr. Ker). Cf. Dyck 1996, 314.

32 Other than those in the *De off.* already referred to, here follow the occurrences of these two terms and their cognates in Cicero’s philosophical writings; for *obiurgatio*: *Off.* 3.83; *Nat. D.* 1.5; *Tusc.* 2.50; *Amic.* 88; 89; 90; for *castigatio*: *De leg.* 2.62; *Tusc.* 2.50; 3.64; 4.66; 5.4.

With regard to “true politics” (ἀληθῶς πολιτικὴ τέχνη, *Grg.* 521d7; cf. 464b), towards the end of his exchange with Callicles Socrates prophesizes his trial by comparing himself to a doctor accused by a pastry chef and judged by a jury of children. The pastry chef will accuse him as follows:

Children, this man has worked many great evils on you, yes on you. He destroyed (διαφθείρει) the youngest among you by cutting and burning them (τέμνων τε καὶ κάων).

PL. *Grg.* 521e6–8 (tr. ZEYL)

The expression employed in 480c and 521e, τέμνειν καὶ κάειν, is nearly identical to that in Cicero (*ad urendum et secandum*), the order of words being simply reversed. Moreover, in the *Gorgias* the medical and juridical analogies are combined to underscore the parallel between argument and dramatic action. As Callicles refuses to recognize the refutation or even to respond, Socrates exhorts him, comparing refutation to correction or punishment (κόλασις, κολάζειν) as the theme of the discussion being enacted by them:

This fellow won’t put up with being benefited and with his undergoing the very thing the discussion’s about, with being disciplined (περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ, κολαζόμενος).

PL. *Grg.* 505c3–4 (tr. ZEYL)

Socrates thus compares dialectic to medical treatment and judicial discipline, and this in the heat of the action, when examining and refuting his interlocutor. These three passages from the *Gorgias* reveal a double parallelism: on the one hand, between punishment (and medicine) and dialectic; on the other, between argument and dramatic action.³³ Frankness (παρρησία) is thus required for both the questioner (Socrates) and the respondent.

Plato seems to achieve a double transfer in the *Gorgias*: that of the political παρρησία of the democratic debate to παρρησία of a philosophical conversation; and that of a conventional rhetoric that hides and flatters to one that accuses and chastises (κατηγορεῖν, κολάζειν).³⁴ This double transfer, taking place for the

33 Likewise when Socrates exhorts Polus to recognize the refutation: “Don’t shrink back from answering, Polus. You won’t get hurt in any way. Submit yourself nobly to the argument as you would to a doctor” (ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ) (475d4–6; tr. Zeyl).

34 *Grg.* 480b–d. In the *Gorgias* a dozen of each of those two terms and their cognates are found. In the *Lysis* the verb κολάζειν is also used by the young Lysis when referring to Socrates’ way of arguing (211c3); Socrates himself is of the opinion that “this is how

most part tacitly through the dramatic action (ἔργῳ), is embodied in Socratic “true politics,” the function of which is the care of the soul, namely the liberation from the greatest evil, ignorance, and hence from injustice (Grg. 457d, 525b cf. Erler 2010, 286–287). Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* also uses the language of chastisement or discipline (κολαστηρίου ἔνεκα) to characterize the refutation Socrates inflicted on those who think they know everything.³⁵

The understanding of refutation as a disciplinary measure is well illustrated in Socrates’ treatment of Alcibiades in Plato as well as in Aeschines of Sphettus. In Plato’s *Symposium* Socrates is said to have destroyed the pride of prince-like Alcibiades. The latter confesses that when Socrates begins to speak, “the tears come streaming down my face” (δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τοῦτου, 215e2–3). According to Plutarch’s testimony, in his treatise *How to tell a flatterer from a friend*, Plato once praised Aeschines for understanding Socrates’ capacity to correct and amend (ἐπανορθοῦν)³⁶ by his speech those with whom he associated (67c–e). A little later, Plutarch reports the episode of the *Symposium* cited above and underscores the importance of frankness in what is an indirect reference to Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* (68f–69a). I reproduce in what follows the second passage in Plutarch, a passage considered a fragment of Aeschines by Dittmar and Giannantoni:

In what circumstances, then, should a friend be severe (σφοδρόν), and when should he be emphatic (τῷ τόνῳ) in using frank speech (παρρησίας)? It is when occasions demand of him that he check (κολοῦσαι) the headlong course of pleasure or of anger or of arrogance, or that he abate avarice or curb inconsiderate heedlessness ... In such manner Socrates tried to keep Alcibiades in check (ἐκόλουε), and drew an honest tear from his eyes (δάκρυον ἐξῆγεν ἀληθινόν) by exposing his faults (ἐξελεγχόμενου), and so turned his heart (τὴν καρδίαν ἔστρεψε).

AECHINES *Alcibiades* 69e–f = SSR VI A 51 = fr. 10 ed. Dittmar (tr. COLE BABBIT)

you should talk with your boyfriends (τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι), Hippothales, cutting them down to size and putting them in their place (κατιδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀγωνιώντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων), instead of swelling them up and spoiling them, as you do” (210e3–6; tr. Lombardo). See Renaud 2002, 188–194.

35 *Mem.* 1.4.1. On παρρησία in Xenophon and other Socratics see Palumbo 2013.

36 In the Platonic corpus we find 33 occurrences of the verb ἐπανορθοῦν and its cognates, two of which are in the *Gorgias*: 461c6–8: πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθώτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις, and 462a2.

It is possible that Aeschines' *Alcibiades* is the source of Cynic-Stoic maxims (ἀποφθέγματα) on the harshness of reproof as a salutary means of correction.³⁷ As is well known, παρρησία will be an important element of the Epicurean conception of philosophy as medicine of the soul, notably in Philodemus (c. 110–140 BCE).³⁸ The medical analogy is part of the ideas that were being discussed in the intellectual circles to which Cicero belonged. He refers in the *De oratore* (3.117) to the opposition between friend and flatterer as a rhetorical *topos*. Cicero's criticism of the Cynics (cf. *Off.* 1.128, 148) might conceivably be part of a polemical strategy against Philodemus or some other contemporary. Cicero does not, however, reject all forms of frankness: rebuke and criticism (*obiurgatio, castigatio*), which are sometimes necessary as we have seen, depend on its use. Furthermore, the *De amicitia* (esp. 91–92) constitutes nothing less than a praise of frankness, as will be briefly discussed in § 3.3.

3.2 *Two Kinds of Criticism in Plato: Moral and Dialectical*

An objection might be raised at this point. Since the reproof or correction referred to in *De officiis* appears to be moral or psychological in nature, in what sense can it possibly correspond to Socratic refutation, which is primarily logical in character? Cicero remains admittedly vague and says nothing explicit in this passage about the argumentative dimension of rebuke and criticism.

It might be helpful to recall here Plato's general distinction between two kinds of chastising or reproof: (a) juridical or conventional punishment (e.g., flogging, imprisonment, exile, execution; *Grg.* 480c8–d3); (b) dialectical or philosophical punishment, namely refutation (ἐλεγχος). In the *Gorgias* Socrates often uses the same term for *both* kinds, namely κολάζειν (as well as κατηγορεῖν, “to accuse”). In the *Apology* (25e6–26a7) Socrates rejects conventional punishment (κολάζειν) as ineffective in the case of unwilling wrongdoings (which all wrongdoings are, according to Socrates), as opposed to the private instruction (νοθετεῖν) that teaches (διδάσκειν). In the *Sophist*, the same distinction is drawn, albeit in different and even contrary terms. The Stranger distinguishes between two kinds of ignorance corresponding to two types of

37 Cf. *SVF* I.384, 387, both of which concern Aristo of Chios. See Alesse 2000, 162–164, according to whom these anecdotes concerning Alcibiades go back to Aeschines of Sphettus. On reception of the Platonic *Alcibiades* in Cicero see Renaud and Tarrant 2015, 110–125.

38 On Philodemus see Erler 2010, 284–285. On his treatise on frankness (περὶ παρρησίας), cf. Gigante 1972 and its English translation in Konstan 1998; more generally on the possible relations between Cicero and Philodemus, cf. Auvray and Delattre 2001. On the reception of the Socrates figure in Epicurus and in Plutarch see Hessler and Roskam (in this volume).

teaching (διδασκαλία), the first being old fashioned and rough, the second newer and softer: (1) admonition (νουθετητική), again considered ineffective (insofar as virtue is knowledge), and (2) refutation (ἔλεγχος), superior by far, as it purges the individual from the learning-impeding false pretence to know.³⁹ As we see, the vocabulary changes and is sometimes contradictory, but the basic distinction between conventional punishment (dealing above all with the non-rational in us) and Socratic punishment (primarily if not exclusively logical or argumentative in nature) is maintained. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates frequently uses the term *κολάζειν* and other cognates (as well as *κατηγορεῖν*) as though he accepted the conventional conception of punishment or correction. This can be explained (although I cannot argue for this interpretation in detail here) by the fact that he adapts to his interlocutors' prejudices in order to lead them gradually to the dialectic conception, and this at the conceptual level as well as in deed, in the very action of the dialogue.⁴⁰

In the case of Cicero, determining exactly the kind or kinds of correction he has in mind is not an easy task. Cicero might have had both sorts of correction in mind, or some intermediary definition somewhere between the conventional and the dialectical. It would be unduly restrictive to suppose that Cicero is referring purely and simply to the moral *elenchus* (reproof) as opposed to the logical *elenchus* (refutation), and this for at least two reasons: Cicero's characterization of it is deliberately vague or generic;⁴¹ and the Socratic logical *elenchus* itself often includes a moral or existential dimension, as visible already in its (etymological) connection with the notion of shame.⁴² At any

39 *Soph.* 229b7–230e3. The same basic distinction is found in the *Eudemian Ethics* 1 (1214b–1215a) where Aristotle assimilates conventional political correction (κόλασις), such as whipping (πληγῶν; cf. *Grg.* 480c8, 485c2, 485d2, 524c5), to medical treatment, both of which he calls correction (κολάσεως ἰατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς) as forms of compulsion, which suits the child (παιδαρίοις) or the insane (παραφρονοῦσι), for such are unable to profit from the other, superior, treatment by refutative argument (ἔλεγχος).

40 Cf. the enlightening analysis of Rowe 2007, 144–152.

41 The Greek terms for reproof (μέμφεσθαι, ψέγειν) used in the *Gorgias* have in general a conventional, not a dialectical meaning. On the use and defense of the strict distinction between moral *elenchus* as reproof blame and logical *elenchus* as refutation, see Dorion 2000, cxlvii.

42 As Vlastos 1994, 9, point this out, despite his primary interest in the logical dimension of the *elenchus*. (See above, section 2.1, dialectical rule 11.) Let us recall that the Greek term ἔλεγχος and its cognates originally meant “reproach,” then later also the “examination” or “test” of opinions and of the persons holding them, and later still “refutation” (or “proof”). Cf. LSJ s.v. The older meanings of ἔλεγχος and their connotations (reproach and especially examination, as synonymous with ἐξέτασις) are still present in Plato's dialogues,

rate, in both kinds of *elenchus*, for Cicero as well as Plato, punishment depends on frankness (παρρησία).

3.3 *Contentio and sermo as Complementary*

What is the relation between *sermo* and *contentio* in Cicero, and more generally between Socratic dialogue and Ciceronian conversation? The *Gorgias* admittedly constitutes an extreme case insofar as it is a dialogue that transforms into a polemic. However, the practice of polemic and the language of punishment are not unique to this dialogue.⁴³ At the very end the *Apology*, for instance, Socrates makes the following request to those of the audience who accused (κατηγόροις) and convicted him (καταψηφισαμένοις):

When my sons grow up, punish them (τιμωρήσασθε)⁴⁴ by causing them the same kind of grief (λυπούντες) that I caused you (ἐλύπουν), if you think they care for money or anything else more than they care for virtue ... If you do this, I shall have been justly treated (δίκαια) by you, and my sons also.

PL. *Ap.* 41e2–42a2 (tr. GRUBE, modified)

From the lexical point of view the *Apology* is at variance with the *Gorgias*, but from the semantic point of view the idea is essentially the same: the care of the other, just like the care of oneself, must be friendly but rough, since what counts is the soul's good and truth rather than the pleasure derived from flattery (κολακεία).⁴⁵ In Cicero, the intimate link uniting friendship and *sermo* (transformed in part into *contentio*) is confirmed earlier in Book 1 of *De officiis*:

as indicated in the *Sophist* passage referred to above, which clearly brings out the link between the *elenchus* as refutation and *elenchus* as shaming: “The people who cleanse the soul, my young friend, likewise think the soul, too, won't get any advantage from any learning that's offered to it until someone shames it by refuting it (πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας)” (230d1–2; tr. White). Cf. *Symp.* 216b2–3: ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι. On the humbling effect of the Socratic *elenchus*, especially in the *Lysis*, see Renaud 2002.

43 In his study of the *Gorgias* that corroborates my interpretation in many ways, Sedley 2009, 60 n. 12, raises doubts on precisely this question.

44 This formulation is perhaps not without a tint of irony, despite the solemn context, as τιμωρήσασθε can also mean “avenge yourself” (as Grube translates).

45 464c7–d1: conventional, shameful rhetoric “takes no thought at all of whatever is best” and only of “what's most pleasant at the moment” (ὅπερ ὑπέδω, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει) (tr. Zeyl); 503a7–9: noble rhetoric on the contrary consists of “getting the souls of the citizens to be as good as possible and of striving valiantly to say what is best,

A shared life and a shared living, counsel and conversation (*sermones*), encouragement, comfort, and sometime even reproofs (*etiam obiurgationes*), flourish most of all in friendships (*in amicitiiis*); and friendship is most pleasing when it is cemented by similarity of conduct.

CIC. *Off.* 1.58 (tr. GRIFFIN and ATKINS)

But it is above all in the *De amicitia* that Cicero deals fully with the connection between truth and friendship. There we read: “whatever there is [in it] is genuine and comes from its own accord” (*id est verum et voluntarium*; *Amic.* 26; tr. Armistead Falconer). A significant part of this treatise is devoted to the relation between frankness and friendship (89–100). Hence the reiterated denunciation of spurious friendships and of false friends. A friendship without frankness, without the willingness to say and hear the truth, is undeserving of the name;⁴⁶ as Cicero writes,

They are annoyed, not at the fault, but at the reproof (*obiurgari moleste*); whereas, on the contrary, they ought to grieve for the offense and rejoice at its correction (*correctione gaudere*).⁴⁷

Amic. 90 (tr. ARMISTEAD FALCONER)

Contentio in *sermo*, when judiciously used, is like a friendly and kindly battle against error (in judgment or behaviour). The harshness of the reproof (*obiurgatio*), just as that of punishment (κολάζειν) in Plato, implies frankness or freedom of speech (παρρησία) conceived as a salutary means of correction and education.⁴⁸

whether the audience will find it more pleasant or more unpleasant” (διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν).

46 *Amic.* 88–98. There one also reads the following passages: “it deserves to be branded as a vice peculiar to fickle and false-hearted mean who say everything with a view to pleasure and nothing with a view to truth” (*ad voluptatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem*)” (91); “hypocrisy (*simulatio*) ... is especially inimical to friendship (*repugnat maxime*), since it utterly destroys sincerity (*veritatem*), without which the word friendship can have no meaning” (92); “friendship which is wholly weighed in the scales of truth (*quae tota veritate perpenditur*)” (97) (tr. Armistead Falconer).

47 This remark recalls Socrates’ declaration in the *Gorgias*: “And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted (εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθές λέγω) if I say anything untrue” (458a3–4; tr. Zeyl). See also *Ap.* 23a1–2, c8.

48 On the diverging, Straussian reading of the *Gorgias*, as defended by Stauffer 2006, downplaying the importance of frankness as a dialectic virtue in the dialogue see Renaud 2008, 70–73.

Conclusion

Carlos Lévy recognizes that, according to Cicero, genuine conversation cannot be dissociated from genuine friendship, and he aptly underscores a tension in his thinking between theory and practice:

In absolute terms, there is no difference in Cicero between the conversation that produces pleasure and the conversation that produces truth. In practice, there is in his work at least a certain tension between these two models.

LÉVY 1993, 415

This tension is inseparable from the distinction between two kinds of friendship (corresponding to the two ethics, the intermediary and superior): the friendship discussed in the *De officiis* is not the perfect friendship of the wise but is instead the so-called common friendship (*de communibus amicitiiis*, 3.45). In the *De amicitia*, the subject of which is true friendship, Cicero quotes a saying of Cato the elder:

Some men are better served by their bitter-tongued enemies than by their sweet-smiling friends because the former often tell the truth (*verum saepe dicere*), the latter, never.

Amic. 90 (tr. ARMISTEAD FALCONER)

The cause of the tension between friendship and frankness seems to lie ultimately in the insurmountable human imperfection—the imperfection that is unwilling to show itself and especially to be shown by others. It is this imperfection that Panaetius' middle ethics seeks to accommodate as expounded by Cicero in the Book I and II of the *De officiis*. Between the antagonistic *contentio* of the lawyer or politician and the free and gentle *sermo* of true—that is, wise—friends, there exists an intermediary kind of conversation in which frankness has to negotiate its rights with those of indulgence.⁴⁹

49 Cicero admits in the *De legibus* (111.1), through the mouth of Marcus, how difficult (*difficillam*) it is to combine seriousness (*gravitas*) with gentleness (*humanitas*).

References

- Alesse, F. *Panezio di Rodi: Testimonianze*. Naples 1997.
- Alesse, F. *La stoa et la tradizione socratica*. Naples 2000.
- Appuhn, C. Cicéron, *De la vieillesse, de l'amitié, des devoirs*. Paris 1967.
- Arnim, H. von. *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*. Leipzig 1923. (= SVF)
- Auvray, C. and D. Delattre. *Cicéron et Philodème: la polémique en philosophie*. Paris 2001.
- Brisson, L. *Platon, Œuvres complètes*. Paris 2008.
- Becker, E. *Technik und Szenerie des ciceronischen Dialogs*. Osnabrück 1938.
- Burnet, J. *Platonis opera*, I–V. Oxford 1902–07.
- Cooper, J.M. *Plato: complete works*. Indianapolis 1997.
- Dittmar, H. *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker*. Berlin 1912.
- Dodds, E.R. *Plato: Gorgias*. Oxford 1959.
- Dorion, L.-A. 'Introduction générale', in: M. Bandini and L.-A. Dorion, *Xénophon: Mémoires*, I. Paris 2000, vii–cclii.
- Dyck, A.R. *A commentary on Cicero, De officiis*. Ann Arbor 1996.
- Erler, M. 'La parrhêsia da Socrate a Epicuro,' in: Rossetti and Stavru 2010, 279–320.
- Geiger, R. *Dialektische Tugenden: Untersuchungen zur Gesprächsform in den Platonischen Dialogen*. Paderborn 2006.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990. (= SSR)
- Gigante, M. 'Per l'interpretazione dell'opera filodema *Sulla libertà di parola*', *Cronache ercolanesi* 2 (1972), 59–65.
- Glare, P.G.W. *The Oxford Latin dictionary*. Oxford 1982.
- Griffin, M.T. and E.M. Atkins. *Cicero: On Duties*. Cambridge 1991.
- Inwood, B. *Rhetorica disputatio: the strategy of the Finibus 11*, in: M.C. Nussbaum, *The poetics of therapy: Hellenistic ethics in its rhetorical and literary context*. Edmonton 1990, 143–164.
- Konstan, D. *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism*. Atlanta, GA 1998.
- Leeman, A.D. and H. Pinkster. *M. Tullius Cicero: de oratore libri 1, Kommentar 1 Buch 1, 1–165*. Heidelberg 1981.
- Lefèvre, E. *Panaios' und Ciceros Pflichtenlehre: vom philosophischen Traktat zum politischen Lehrbuch*. Stuttgart 2001.
- Lévy, C. *Cicero Academicus: recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne*. Rome 1992.
- Lévy, C. 'La conversation à Rome à la fin de la République: des pratiques sans théorie?', *Rhetorica* 11 (1993), 399–414.
- Lévy, C. et al. 'Discussion', *Rhetorica* 11 (1993), 415–420.
- Liddell, H.G. and R.A. Scott. *Greek-English lexicon*. Oxford 1968.
- Miller, W. *Cicero: De Officiis*. Cambridge, MA 1913.

- Narcy, M. 'Les règles de la dialectique chez Platon', *Études de philosophie* (1996), 83–96.
- Palumbo, L. 'Socrate, i Socratici e la *parrhêsia*', in: Rossetti and Stavru 2010, 252–260.
- Remer, G. 'Political oratory and conversation: Cicero versus deliberative democracy', *Political Theory* 27 (1999), 39–64.
- Renaud, F. 'Humanitas', in: G. Ueding, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, IV (Hu-K). Tübingen 1998, col. 80–86.
- Renaud, F. 'Humbling as upbringing: the ethical dimension of the Socratic elenchus in Plato's *Lysis*', in: G. Scott, *Does Socrates have a Method? The Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond*. University Park, PA 2002, 183–198.
- Renaud, F. 'Zwischen Dialektik und Rhetorik: neuere Forschungen zu Platons *Gorgias*', *Philosophische Rundschau* 55 (2008), 66–79.
- Renaud, F. 'Streitgespräch', in: G. Ueding, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, IX (St-Z). Tübingen 2009, col. 178–189.
- Renaud, F. and H. Tarrant. *The Platonic Alcibiades 1: the dialogue and its ancient reception*. Cambridge 2015.
- Rossetti, L. and A. Stavru. *Socratica 2008: studies in ancient Socratic literature*. Bari 2010.
- Roubinet, C. 'En marge de deux textes sur le dialogue', in: E. Weil, G. Kirscher, and J. Quillien, *Cahiers Eric Weil*. Villeneuve d'Ascq 1987, 198–218.
- Rowe, C. *Plato and the art of philosophical writing*. Cambridge 2007.
- Ruch, M. *Le préambule dans les œuvres philosophiques de Cicéron: essai sur la genèse et l'art du dialogue*. Paris 1958.
- Schofield, M. 'Ciceronian dialogue', in: S. Goldhill, *The end of dialogue in antiquity*. Cambridge 2008, 63–84.
- Sedley, D. 'Horace's *Socraticae chartae* (AP 295–322)', *Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 72 (2014), 97–120.
- Sedley, D. 'Myth, punishment and politics in the *Gorgias*', in: C. Partenie, *Plato's myths*. Cambridge 2009, 51–76.
- Stauffer, D. *The unity of the Gorgias: rhetoric, justice and the philosophic life*. Cambridge 2006.
- Straaten, M van. *Panaetii Rhodii fragmenta, collegit tertioque*. Leiden 1962.
- Testard, M. *Cicéron, Les devoirs, tome 1, livre 1*. Paris 1965.
- Vlastos, G. 'The Socratic elenchus: method is all', in: M. Burnyeat, *Socratic studies*. Cambridge 1994, 1–37.
- Walsh, P.G. *Cicero: on obligations*. Oxford 2000.
- Winterbottom, M. *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Officiis*. Oxford 1994.
- Zoll, G. *Cicero Platonis Aemulus: Untersuchungen über die Form von Ciceros Dialogen besonders von de oratore*. Zürich 1962.

Socrates and Alcibiades as “Satiric Heroes”: The Socrates of Persius

Diego De Brasi
Philipps-Universität Marburg

The relationship between Socrates, the “troublemaker” of fifth-century BCE Athens, and Alcibiades, member of the Alcmaeonid family and pupil of Pericles, has been a matter of historical and philosophical dispute and a source of literary imagination ever since classical antiquity.¹ An excellent example of this interest is the Stoic reception of the “Socrates-Alcibiades topic,”² which stressed the educational aspect of their relationship, and brought the topic to Rome.³ The aim of my contribution is to analyze a specific Stoic representation of Socrates and Alcibiades in early imperial Rome: that provided by Persius in his *Fourth Satire*.⁴ I will argue, first, that Persius’ depiction of Socrates is rooted in his own satirical poetics, and second, that the *Fourth Satire* is a genuine example of Socratic “behavior”: Persius, like Socrates, emphatically urges his interlocutor (his reader) to live “philosophically,” that is, always to acknowledge his own shortcomings.⁵

-
- 1 To mention one well-known example: in his *Memorabilia* (1.2.12–47) Xenophon answers to Polycrates’ accusation that “among the associates of Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades” (tr. Marchant, cf. Isoc. *Bus.* 5). We also know that almost every disciple of Socrates wrote a dialogue under the title *Alcibiades*, and two dialogues in the Platonic corpus bear this name. On ancient Socratic literature about Alcibiades see Giannantoni 1997 and Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013, chs. 6 and 7. On the nature of the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades see Littman 1970.
 - 2 On Stoicism as Socratic philosophy see Long 1988, 160–171, and Alesse 2000. For a criticism of this view see Bees (in this volume). On Socrates as the Stoic sage *par excellence* in imperial Rome and in late antiquity, see Döring 1979.
 - 3 Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 3.32.77; Arr. *Epict. diss.* 3.1.42. See Dessen ²1996, 100–105.
 - 4 While Persius has long been read as a dogmatic Stoic (cf. the overview in Colish 1985, esp. 194 and nn. 142–143), recent studies stress his satirical reshaping of Stoic philosophy and highlight his significance as a poet. Groundbreaking are the monographs of Dessen ²1996 and Bellandi 1988. See also Cucchiarelli 2007 and Bartsch 2012, esp. 218–235.
 - 5 The aim of this contribution being preeminently an inquiry into Persius’ depiction of Socrates, I will not explore Persius’ relationship to other authors of satires and especially to his “predecessor” Horace.

1 Persius' *Fourth Satire*: A Brief Introduction

Persius' *Fourth Satire* is not only a rather neglected poem, but nineteenth-century scholarship has even branded it immature, indecent, and coarse.⁶ This circumstance can be explained by its apparently simple structure, its repetitively and transparently stated philosophical topic ("Know thyself"), and the obscene language of its second part. It begins, indeed, as a poetic adaptation of Plato's *Alcibiades*⁷ (1–22), goes on to declare that everyone is unable to see his own faults but is inclined to blame others for theirs (23–24), and presents two vivid and salacious examples in support of this statement (25–41). Finally, it expresses some general considerations about human behavior: since everyone attacks others and is attacked in turn, and since everyone tries to conceal their own faults, and likes flattery, one should look inside oneself and experience how imperfect one is (42–52). However, despite apparently simple and unremarkable structure, this satire has been read in several ways, and we can detect at least three main interpretative tendencies:

- 1) An "historical" interpretation, according to which Alcibiades and Socrates represent Nero and his teacher Seneca.⁸ Although this reading is highly conjectural,⁹ many scholars—even in recent times—have supported it.¹⁰
- 2) A "dramatic" reading, according to which the whole poem is a dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades.¹¹
- 3) A "negative" interpretation, according to which the objects of Persius' satirical attack are not only human imperfections and failures but also

6 See, e.g., Gildersleeve 1875, 141–142. Reckford 1962, esp. 484–487, was one of the first scholars to try to overcome this attitude.

7 The Platonic authorship of the dialogue is controversial. See De Brasi 2008, 57 n. 1, for an overview of the positions and 57–67 for arguments supporting Plato's paternity. Cf. also Benitez 2012. Kurihara 2012 and Heitsch 2012 have recently argued against Plato's authorship. A different approach can be found in Renaud and Tarrant 2015, esp. 3–24; cf. also Tarrant (in this volume).

8 See esp. Kukula 1923.

9 Cf. Döring 1979, 41–42 n. 97; Scholz 1966.

10 Cf. Marmorale 1956, 274; Freudenburg 2001, 191; Reckford 2009, 105 and 202 n. 6.

11 Kießel 1990, 495–498, offers a critical overview of the different opinions up to 1990. Hooley 1997, 126–129, also discusses "dramatic" readings of this satire; Littlewood 2002 proposes his own dialogical repartition.

philosophy—especially in its Platonic connotation¹²—and satire itself.¹³

Each interpretive tendency surely offers interesting insights, but a close reading of the poem shows, in my opinion, that Persius' aim in the *Fourth Satire* is genuinely Socratic insofar as the satire represents a warning to everyone to be aware of their own faults. Hence, let us turn to Persius' text.

2 Persius' *Fourth Satire*: Text and Translation¹⁴

- “*Rem populi tractas?*” (*barbatum haec crede magistrum
dicere, sorbitio tollit quem dira cicutae*)
“*quo fretus? dic hoc, magni pupille Pericli.
scilicet ingenium et rerum prudentia uelox*
5 *ante pilos uenit, dicenda tacendaue calles.*
ergo ubi commota feruet plebecula bile,
fert animus calidae fecisse silentia turbae
maiestate manus. quid deinde loquere? ‘Quirites,
hoc’ puta ‘non iustum est, illud male, rectius illud.’
10 *scis etenim iustum gemina suspendere lance*
ancipitis librae, rectum discernis, ubi inter
curua subit uel cum fallit pede regula uaro,
*et potis es nigrum uitio praefigere theta.*¹⁵
quin tu igitur, summa nequiquam pelle decorus,
15 *ante diem blando caudam iactare popello*
desinis, Anticyras melior sorbere meracas?
quae tibi summa boni est? uncta uixisse patella
semper et assiduo curata cuticula sole?
expecta: haut aliud respondeat haec anus. i nunc,

12 This reading argues that Plato's philosophy, being a particular instance of *erôs*, is intrinsically tied to the homosexuality criticized by Persius in the second half of the poem. See, e.g., Littlewood 2002, 57; d'Alessandro Behr 2009, 242–244; Bartsch 2014; Bartsch 2015, 96–132.

13 See, e.g., Hooley 1997, 134–153; Littlewood 2002, 68–82.

14 Unless otherwise stated, I follow the Latin text of Kißel 2007; the translations, modified slightly, are from Braund 2004.

15 On the possible meanings of *theta*, see Lee and Barr 1987, 121 ad loc., and Kißel 1990, 515–516.

- 20 *'Dinomaches ego sum,' suffla, 'sum candidus.' esto,*
dum ne deterius sapiat pannucea Baucis,
cum bene discincto cantauerit ocima uernae."
Vt nemo in sese temptat descendere, nemo,
sed praecedenti spectatur mantica tergo!
- 25 *"quaesieris 'nostin Vettidi praedia?' 'cuius?'*
'diues arat Curibus, quantum non miluus errat.'
'hunc ais—'¹⁶ 'hunc dis iratis genioque sinistro
qui, quandoque iugum pertusa ad compita figit,
seriolae ueterem metuens deradere limum
- 30 *ingemit—hoc bene sit—tunicatum cum sale mordens*
cepe, et farratam pueris plaudentibus ollam
pannosam faecem morientis sorbet aceti!
at si unctus cesses et figas in cute solem,
est prope te ignotus, cubito qui tangat et acre
- 35 *despuat: 'hi mores! penemque arcanaque lumbi*
runcantem populo marcentes pandere bulbos!¹⁷
tunc, cum maxillis balanatum gausape pectas,
inquinibus quare detonsus gurgulio extat?
quinque palaestritae licet haec plantaria uellant
- 40 *elixasque nates labefactent forcipe adunca,*
non tamen ista filix ullo mansuescit aratro.'"
Caedimus inque uicem praebemus crura sagittis.
uiuatur hoc pacto, sic nouimus. ilia subter
caecum uulnus habes, sed lato balteus auro
- 45 *praetegit. ut mauis, da uerba et decipe neruos,*
si potes. "egregium cum me uicinia dicat,
non credam?" uiso si palles, improbe, nummo,
si facis, in penem quidquid tibi uenit, amarum
si puteal multa cautus uibice flagellas,
- 50 *nequiquam populo bibulas donaueris aures.*
respue, quod non es, tollat sua munera cerdo.
tecum habita: noris, quam sit tibi curta supellex.

16 It is difficult to determine the speaker here. I accept the solution advanced by Kißel 1990, 533. He relies on the scholiast and argues that the change of speaker between *ais* and the second *hunc* contributes to the characterization of the main speaker, who does not even hear his interlocutor out and assails him with his tattle.

17 The text of this line is problematic; see Kißel 1990, 548–549.

“Handling the public affairs?” (Imagine the bearded teacher saying this, the one removed by that fatal gulp of hemlock.) “Relying on what? Tell me that, ward of the great Pericles. Wisdom, I suppose, and knowledge of the world have arrived early, before your whiskers. You are an expert in what must and must not be said. So, when the mob seethes with its anger roused, you feel moved to silence the fevered crowd with an authoritative gesture. What will you say then? ‘Citizens of Rome,’ imagine ‘this is unjust, that is ill-advised, that one is more correct.’ For you know how to weigh justice in the twin dishes of the wavering scales, you can spot a straight line when it passes between curves, even when the rule is deceptive with its bandy feet, and you are competent to stick the black mark onto wrongdoing. So why then, since your pretty looks on the skin’s surface are useless, why don’t you stop wagging your tail for the flattering mob before your time, when you’d be better off gulping down undiluted Anticyras? What’s your idea of the highest good? To live off rich dishes all the time and pamper your skin with assiduous sun? Hang on, you’ll get exactly the same reply from this old woman. Go on now, puff yourself up, ‘I’m Dinomache’s son, I’m a dazzler.’ Granted; only wrinkled Baucis has as much sense as you when she expertly touts her basil to some slob of a slave.”

That no one attempts the descent into himself, no one! Instead he stares at the knapsack on the back in front of him! “Suppose you ask, ‘Do you know Vettidius’ estates?’ ‘Whose?’ ‘That rich man at Cures who ploughs more land than a hawk can fly over.’ ‘Oh, you mean him ...’ ‘Yes, that man hated by the gods, with the hostile Guardian Spirit! When he hangs up his yoke at the perforated crossroads shrine reluctant to scrape the ancient dirt from his little jar, he groans—Let it be all right—while munching an onion in its jacket with salt. As his slave-boys cheer their pot of porridge, he gulps down the threadbare dregs of expiring vinegar!’ But if you relax after a massage and focus the sun on your skin, there will be a stranger right beside you who nudges you and spits savagely: ‘What morals! Weeding your prick and the recesses of your backside and exposing your withered nuts to the public! And another thing, while you comb and perfume the rug on your jaws, why does your windpipe stick out clean-shaven from your groin? Even if five wrestling trainers were to pull out these seedlings and make your boiled buttocks shake with their curving clippers, still that bracken of yours won’t be tamed by any plough.’”

In turn we shoot and expose our legs to the shots. We live on that basis, that’s the way we know. Down in your groin you have a secret wound,

but your belt with its wide gold band conceals it. As you like: cheat and fool your sinews, if you can. “When the whole neighbourhood tells me I’m wonderful, shouldn’t I believe them?” You shameless man, if you go pale at the sight of a coin, if you do whatever comes to prick, if with your securities in place you whip up the horrid Well-head with many weals, it’s pointless to offer your thirsty ears to the public. Spit out what isn’t you, and let the laborer keep his gifts. Live with yourself, and you’ll find out how incomplete your furniture is.

3 Socrates, Alcibiades, and Persius’ Poetics: A Tentative Analysis of the *Fourth Satire*

One must start by remarking on Persius’ ability to involve his readers from the poem’s beginning, reducing the gap between fiction and the “real” world. For, by immediately addressing somebody with an imperative in the second person singular (*crede*), Persius creates not only an imaginary interlocutor for the satiric *persona*, but he also gives the impression that the reader’s mind will be responsive to what will be depicted (as if Persius says to us: “You! Yes, you reader, imagine ...”).

The situation Persius describes is well known: Socrates, introduced with the periphrasis *barbatum ... magistrum ... sorbitio tollit quem dira cicutae* (“the bearded teacher ... the one removed by that fatal gulp of hemlock”), tackles Pericles’ pupil Alcibiades, exposing the latter’s vain confidence in his own political ability. Persius then presents his reader with a condensed adaptation of the first half of Plato’s *Alcibiades*,¹⁸ although his depiction of Socrates and Alcibiades is

18 The several textual references have been noticed by every commentator since Casaubon (cf., e.g., Dessen 21996, 58–62; Lee and Barr 1987, 118–123; Kißel 1990, 499–530). Here I offer only a short list: a) v. 1 (*rem populi tractas?*)—Pl. *Alc.* 105a–b and esp. 118b7sq. (διὸ καὶ ἄττεις ἄρα πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πρὶν παιδευθῆναι, but see Kißel 1990, 501–502). b) v. 3 (*quo fretus?*) and v. 5 (*ante pilos*)—Pl. *Alc.* 123c8 (θαυμάσαι ἂν ὅτῳ ποτὲ πιστεύων) and 123e3sq. (τί οὖν ποτ’ ἔστιν ὅτῳ πιστεύει τὸ μεῖράκιον;). c) v. 8–9 (*quid deinde loquere? ... hoc, puta, non iustum est, illud male, rectius illud*)—Pl. *Alc.* 109b, 110c, 112d and esp. 113b8–11 (οὐκοῦν ἐλέχθη περὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ καλὸς ὁ Κλεινίου οὐκ ἐπίστατο, οἶοιτο δέ, καὶ μέλλοι εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐλθὼν συμβουλευσεῖν Ἀθηναίοις περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν οἶδεν;). d) v. 14 (*summa nequiquam pelle decorus*)—Pl. *Alc.* 119c2sq. (βαβαί, οἶον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοῦτ’ εἴρηκας· ὥς ἀνάξιον τῆς ιδέας ...) and 135c. e) v. 20 (“*Dinomaches ego sum*” *suffla* “*sum candidus*”)—Pl. *Alc.* 104a–b, 113b, and esp. 123c–e. Kißel 1990, 499 n. 1, rightly argues (against Dessen 21996, 61) that Plato’s *Alcibiades* is the only textual basis used by Persius for his portrayal of Socrates and

inconsistent with Plato's dialogue.¹⁹ In Persius' *Fourth Satire* Alcibiades is first and foremost depicted as a vulgar debauchee (17–18), while Plato describes his main characteristic as arrogance (φρόνημα, Pl. *Alc.* 103b and *passim*).²⁰ Persius' Socrates is harsh, ironic, and almost sarcastic (cf. esp. 4–8, 10–13, 16, 19–22), whereas Plato's Socrates is described as a fostering teacher (Pl. *Alc.* 104e–106a).

Is Socrates' sarcasm—as Cynthia Dessen and others argue—a literary device used by Persius to “relieve the didactic tone of the satire” as well as his “more caustic weapon” against “Alcibiades' vices” within the dramatic situation?²¹

Explaining Socrates' sarcasm both as a literary device and a persuasive tool is partially right. Nevertheless, we do not have to follow Dessen's assumption that Persius uses Socrates as his poetic *persona* within the whole satire. And we do not have to suppose—as several modern, mostly Anglophone, scholars do²²—that the poem has a dialogical structure. A different, simpler explication is probable. By the narrator's frequent appeals to a fictitious interlocutor (1: *crede*; 25: *quaesieris*; 33: *at si unctus cesses et figas in cute solem*; 51–52: *respue ... tecum habita*)²³ and the poem's switch to the first person plural from line 42 on (*caedimus*), Persius seems to make clear that the dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades represents just one of three different scenes (1–22; 25–32; 33–41). Their purpose consists in the plastic and caustic illustration of the poem's main topic as expressed in the central lines 23–24: no one tries to climb down into himself; rather, everyone prefers to criticize others. Thus the whole satire is indeed a kind of dialogue, but not between Socrates and Alcibiades. It is instead a one-sided dialogue between the satiric *persona* and his interlocutor, and—more or less figuratively—between Persius and his reader. In this “dialogue” each scene has its own specific function, as shown by their mirrored distribu-

Alcibiades in the *Fourth Satire* and explains the dissimilarities between the two works in terms of their different literary and philosophical aims.

19 Cf. Marmorale ²1956, 272; Dessen ²1996, 62–66.

20 On Alcibiades' φρόνημα in the *Alcibiades* see De Brasi 2008, 68–76. Cf. also Alcibiades' description and his speech in Pl. *Symp.* 212d–222b.

21 Dessen ²1996, 63 and n. 14.

22 See above n. 11.

23 Cf. the scholiast's interpretation on 25: *ab aliquo quaerit an norit Vectidi praedia ... hoc ergo aut poeta loquitur aut ille quem aliena uitia culpantem inducit* (“someone asks whether he knows Vettidius' estates ... thus either it is the poet who speaks or the person he introduced to blame the faults of others”). See also Kißel 1990, 533, ad 25 (*quaesieris*). Surely advocates of a “dialogical” interpretation can interpret these expressions as respectively pronounced by Socrates or Alcibiades.

tion around the central lines 23–24.²⁴ Socrates' speech to Alcibiades serves as a rhetorical opening that should intuitively lead to line 23, which is both a sort of *captatio benevolentiae* and a kind of disclosure of the poem's theme to the audience. By beginning the satire with Socrates' well-known reproach of Alcibiades (cf. Pl. *Alc.* 118b, *Symp.* 216a), Persius seems to imply two things: 1) I am following a popular philosophical and literary tradition; and, thus, 2) the point of this satire is (as in Plato) the Delphic motto "Know thyself." But since Persius turns the Delphic motto from an exhortation into an acknowledgment of man's shortcomings and stresses "the other side of the coin," that is, that man's attitude is to blame others for his flaws without recognizing his own, he needs to develop the rest of the poem by stressing this aspect too. Thus the scenes that follow on from line 24 typify the dictum that everyone criticizes others while they at the same time introduce the general remarks of lines 42–43 that everyone is at once accuser and accused. If this is a correct analysis of the intended structure of the poem, the resulting interpretation has a twofold advantage. It allows us to ignore a minor problem arising from lines 33–38, and it offers an explanation for Socrates' sarcasm as consistent with Persius' depiction of himself as a satirist.

Let us begin our discussion with a brief examination of the lines 33–38. Here, the criticism hits a bearded figure (*cum maxillis balanatum gausape pectas*) taking a sunbath while displaying a shaved genital region, which appears to be a clear reference to Alcibiades' opinion of the highest good in the first half of the poem (17–18: *quae tibi summa boni est? [...] semper et assiduo curata cuticula sole?*).²⁵ However, as has been recently noted, this equivalence ignores three important points: first, that the person doing the criticizing is an *ignotus* who is talking to a bearded man; second, that the only person described as "bearded" at the beginning of the poem is Socrates; and, third, that the beard was, in Persius' time, the conventional mark of a philosopher.²⁶

Although these remarks point to an actual misunderstanding of the passage in question, unlike the scholars who have pointed out these incongruences I do not think that Socrates is necessarily the target of Persius' satirical attack. For, if we—rightly—think that the one speaking here is an *ignotus*, why should

24 If we consider scene 2 (Vettidius) and scene 3 (the sunbather) as a dramatic unity, since the person addressed in both scenes seems to be the interlocutor of the satiric *persona* (cf. Nikitinski 2002, 190 ad 33–41), the whole poem until line 42 presents an almost perfect symmetrical structure around the lines 23–24: scene 1 (Socrates-Alcibiades): 22 lines; central topic: 2 lines; scenes 2–3: 17 lines.

25 See, for example, Kißel 1990, 546; Miller 2009, 338–341.

26 D'Alessandro Behr 2009, 243; cf. also Bartsch 2014, 256–257; Bartsch 2015, 107–108.

we assume that he is speaking to either Alcibiades or Socrates? Rather, the *ignotus* addresses another *ignotus*, namely the interlocutor to the satirical *persona* who had previously criticized Vettidius (25–32) and who is now attacked himself according to the principle briefly enunciated in line 24 (which will be developed *in extenso* in lines 42–45). Furthermore, why should Persius—who explicitly compares his teacher Cornutus with Socrates in his *Fifth Satire* (36–37)—use Socrates as an example of the faux philosopher and object of criticism in the *Fourth Satire*? Is there such a difference between Socrates' philosophical *erôs* and Cornutus' pedagogical relationship to Persius to support the identification of Socrates with the faux philosopher, as has recently been claimed?²⁷

In response to these questions we should first consider the way in which Cornutus is compared to Socrates:

*secreti loquimur. tibi nunc hortante Camena
excutienda damus praecordia, quantaque nostrae
pars tua sit, Cornute, animae, tibi, dulcis amice,
ostendisse iuuat. pulsa dinoscere cautus
quid solidum crepet et pictae tectoria linguae.*

...

*Cum primum puido custos mihi purpura cessit
bullaque succinctis Laribus donata pependit,
cum blandi comites totaque impune Subura
permisit sparsisse oculos iam candidus umbo,
cumque iter ambiguum est et uitae nescius error
deducit trepidas ramosa in compita mentes,
me tibi supposui. teneros tu suscipis annos
Socratico, Cornute, sinu. tum fallere sollers
apposita intortos extendit regula mores,
et premitur ratione animus uincique laborat
artificemque tuo ducit sub pollice uultum.
tecum etenim longos memini consumere soles
et tecum primas epulis decerpere noctes.
unum opus et requiem pariter disponimus ambo,
atque uerecunda laxamus seria mensa.*

5. 21–25; 30–44

27 Bartsch 2014, 257–260; cf. Bartsch 2015, 107–114.

In privacy we speak. With the encouragement of Camena, I offer you my heart for unfolding, and it is my pleasure to demonstrate to you how much of my soul is yours, Cornutus, dear friend. Tap it: you have the skill to discriminate between what rings solid and the stucco of a painted tongue.

...

When first as a timid youth I lost the protective purple and my amulet hung as an offering to the girdled Hearth gods; when my indulgent companions and fresh white folds permitted me to cast my eyes over the whole Subura without risk; at the age when the route is unclear and perplexity ignorant of life leads the agitated mind on the branching crossroads, I put myself in your hands. You adopted my tender years in your Socratic embrace, Cornutus. Then your skilful rule was applied unawares and it straightened out my twisted ways, and my mind was overcome by reason and strove to surrender and took on its features, molded by your thumb. Yes, I remember spending long days with you and plucking the early evenings for feasting with you. Together we arrange our work and rest as one and relax our seriousness at a restrained table.

Cornutus is similar to Socrates insofar as he serves as a role model for the young Persius, showing him that the practice of philosophy consists in living and searching together, rather than in the mere learning of abstract theories. Persius' description of Cornutus is thus based on a distinctive feature of Socratic teaching (*sunousia*)—stressed by many first-generation Socratics²⁸—that would later become idiosyncratic of philosophical teaching in general.²⁹ But, this being the terms of the comparison, it is impossible to think of the

28 Cf. e.g. Pl. *Tht.* 150d–e; *Symp.* 172c; 211d; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2; 1.6; 4.2; 4.5.1; Aeschin. *Socr.* SSR VI A 53; Antisth. esp. SSR V A 92 and 187. On Antisthenes' fragments and Socratic *sunousia*, see Brancacci 1990, 158–171.

29 Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 6.5–6: “I shall therefore send to you the actual books; and in order that you may not waste time in searching here and there for profitable topics, I shall mark certain passages, so that you can turn at once to those which I approve and admire. Of course, however, the living voice and the intimacy of a common life will help you more than the written word (*Plus tamen tibi et uiua uox et conuictus quam oratio proderit*). You must go to the scene of action, first, because men put more faith in their eyes than in their ears, and second, because the way is long if one follows precepts, but short and helpful, if one follows patterns (*deinde, quia longum iter est per praecepta, breue et efficax per exempla*) ... Plato, Aristotle, and the whole throng of sages who were destined to go each his different way, derived more benefit from the character than from the words of Socrates (*Platon et Aristoteles et omnis in diuersum itura sapientium turba plus ex moribus quam ex uerbis Socratis traxit*, tr. Gummere 1917).” See Döring 1979, 19–24.

Socrates depicted in the *Fourth Satire* as a representation of the faux philosopher, since his words—as sarcastic as they are—fulfill a function similar to that of Cornutus in the *Fifth Satire*, namely, to “straighten out” Alcibiades’ “twisted ways.”

The real difference between the two poems lies in Persius’ and Alcibiades’ respective attitudes toward their masters. Indeed, Alcibiades seems unaffected by Socrates’ words,³⁰ whereas Persius’ encounter with Cornutus has life-changing power. Further, Persius describes his admiration for Cornutus in the same tone used by genuine disciples and other friends of Socrates in their expressions of affection for him.³¹ Alcibiades, by contrast, cannot be counted among these genuine disciples, since he deeply misunderstands Socrates’ erotic engagement with philosophy, believing that it would conform to traditional pederastic practice (*Symp.* 215a–217c).³² The Alcibiades of Persius’ poem is, in this regard, a faithful adaptation of the Alcibiades of the Socratic tradition.³³ Alcibiades is the perfect counter-example to how someone should respond to philosophy, and so is the best example that Persius could have chosen for the opening scene of his poem. Alcibiades represents the vast majority of people who—despite repeated and heartfelt exhortations to give up their way of life and begin to search for themselves—are satisfied with what they have, thinking themselves better than their fellow human beings.³⁴

If we see in Alcibiades a paradigm of hopeless insensibility toward philosophy and if we, meanwhile, maintain the poem’s division into three thematically connected but scenically independent parts, we can explain Socrates’ sarcasm in a more multifaceted manner than has previously been done. According to this interpretation, Socrates is an alternative satiric *persona* skillfully introduced by Persius to deepen the poem’s meaning. Therefore, his sarcasm corresponds to Persius’ own satiric mordancy.

30 The poem emphasizes this aspect insofar as Alcibiades is portrayed as someone already involved in politics and not—like in the *Alcibiades*—as someone who is about to get involved in it.

31 Cf., e.g., Pl. *Cri.* 43b–46a; *La.* 180c–181c.

32 See Erler 2010.

33 The relevant texts are collected in Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013, chs. 6 and 7.

34 In this respect Reckford 1962, 487, rightly observes that “*Satire* 4, then, is held together chiefly by the metaphorical contrast between shadow and substance. The contrast is of course Platonic ... But Persius deepens the familiar contrast with forcible new metaphors ... Abandoning the mime of Socrates-Alcibiades, Persius generalizes (*ut nemo*) to bring the lesson home to his audience, but the lesson is that we are all Alcibiades, just as we all have asses’ ears.”

As a matter of fact, Persius repeatedly stresses this aspect in his poems, for instance in three passages of his programmatic *First* and *Fifth Satires*.³⁵ In the first, Persius speaks to his fictitious interlocutor (1.44), who tries to present himself as a truth-lover. The poet, however, has only harsh, reproachful words for him.³⁶ The second excerpt is a sort of mirror image of the first, since the very same fictitious interlocutor asks Persius

*sed quid opus teneras mordaci radere uero
auriculas?*

1.107–108

But what need is there to scrape delicate ears with biting truth?

Whereupon Persius answers that he will dig a hole for his little book and that everyone has donkey's ears.³⁷ The third passage allows us, finally, to harmonize Persius' poetics with his presentation of Socrates. In the *Fifth Satire* Cornutus praises his pupil's poetry:

*uerba togae sequeris iunctura callidus acri,
ore teres modico, pallentes radere mores
doctus et ingenuo culpam defigere ludo.*

5.14–16

35 Clearly, a similar demeanor is to be found in all of Persius' poems, although it is not enunciated in the form of a programmatic announcement, but applied as an overall tone.

36 Pers. 1.56–62: *Qui pote? uis dicam? nugaris, cum tibi, calue, / pinguis aqualiculus propenso sesquipede exstet. / o lane, a tergo quem nulla ciconia pinsit / nec manus auriculas imitari mobilis albas / nec linguae, quantum sitiatis canis Apula, tentae! / uos, o patricius sanguis, quos uiuere fas est / occipiti caeco, posticae occurrere sannae* ("How actually? Do you really want me to? You're a fool, baldy, your fat paunch sticking out with an overhang of a foot and a half. Lucky Janus, never pummelled from behind by a stork or by wagging hands imitating a donkey's white ears or by a tongue as long as a thirsty Apulian dog's. You, of patrician blood, who have to live without eyes in the back of yours heads, turn around and face the backdoor sneer!").

37 1.119–121: *me muttire nefas? nec clam? nec cum scrobe? nusquam? / hic tamen infodiam: uidi, uidi ipse, libelle: / auriculas asini quis non habet?* ("Am I forbidden to mutter? Not even in secret? Not even in a hole? Nowhere? Never mind: I'll dig a hole for it here. I have seen it, yes, have seen it for myself, little book: is there anyone who does not have donkey's ears?").

You pursue the language of the toga, skilled at the pointed combination,
rounded with moderate utterance, clever at scraping sick morals and at
nailing fault with well-bred wit.

Cornutus, who, as we have seen, serves as the Stoic *alter ego* of Socrates, thus recognizes as the most distinctive character of his pupil's style his ability to "scrape" (*radere*, cf. 3.113–114 too)—to display with caustic language—the faults in his fellow human beings. This allows for an additional conjecture. Since according to the just-cited passages the satirist considers it his duty to put the finger on the weak spots, he is not very different from the Socrates of Plato's *Apology*,³⁸ who compares himself to a gadfly arousing a horse (ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ ... δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος) and describes his activity in the following terms:

I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you (ὅμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον), constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long.

PL. *Ap.* 30e7–31a2 (tr. FOWLER 1914)

We can find several remarkable examples of this attitude in ancient Greek comedy,³⁹ in the Platonic dialogues,⁴⁰ and in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, in particular Socrates' dialogues with Aristippus (3.8) and Euthydemus (4.2).⁴¹

If this juxtaposition is plausible, Persius is not merely transforming Socrates into a satiric *persona* according to his own style. Rather, he appropriates Socrates precisely because he is an icon of free speech able to expose human shortcomings. Such an interpretation is supported by the central position assumed by the *Fourth Satire* in Persius' "little book."⁴² Indeed, some scholars have already pointed out possible links among the poems,⁴³ so I will be brief in

38 Kibel 1990, 591.

39 Cf., e.g., the parodic depiction of Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds* (esp. 223–790).

40 Cf., e.g., the discussion in the *Euthyphro* (on this, see Rossetti 2011, 121–194); *Meno* 70a–80b; *Prt.* 333d–e and 360e; *Grg.* 505c–e and 515a–b.

41 On the two passages in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, see Rossetti 2011, 55–119.

42 Of course, we cannot know whether the actual ordering of the poems was carried out by Persius or by the editor of his "little book" (cf. *Vita Persii*, 8, 36). However, we have to deal with the fact that someone did put the poems in the order in which we are reading them.

43 See, e.g. Henderson 2009, 89–96. Cf. also Hooley 1997, 122: "The blunt critique and conspicuous obscenity of 4 stand in startling contrast to the facile ... graciousness of the opening of 6, as if the building urgency of 4 had reached some major and comprehensive resolu-

my consideration of this aspect. The *Fourth Satire* represents a sort of inflection point within a thematic unity that consists of *Satire* 3, 4, and 5, clearly bearing a protreptic function. In the *Third Satire*, a dialogue between a young student (woken up with a hangover) and his friend culminates in a general exhortation to philosophize, loosely characterized as the activity of investigating oneself.⁴⁴ The “Stoic sermon” on freedom in the second part of the *Fifth Satire* (5.73–188) is, conversely, framed by a plea for a life spent practicing philosophy (5.52–72), and by a brief scene stressing that such arguments cannot be appreciated among people uneducated in philosophy (5.189–191). Further, at least two implicit cross-references can be discovered between the first section of this poem—in which Persius praises his teacher Cornutus—and the second.⁴⁵ On the one hand, the exhortation to practice philosophy in lines 52–72 serves as a transition between the first and the second part, since, for Persius, Cornutus represents the best example of Stoic efforts toward freedom. On the other hand, the freedom described in the second part of the poem is exactly the inner freedom that Persius learned from his “spiritual father” Cornutus, as contrasted with the apparent freedom he was going to enjoy after he had come of age. But, for Persius, Cornutus is a second Socrates and his freedom arises from his continuous engagement with philosophy, with his continuous attempt to examine himself. The *Fourth Satire* thus represents the moment at which Persius switches from a discussion between friends (*Third Satire*) to a discussion with Socrates, the most authoritative example of constant *exhortatio ad philosophiam*—an example that he takes up again through Cornutus, thus bringing it into his own contemporary time (*Fifth Satire*). Socrates is a cen-

tion in 5, to be followed, in turn, by a Horatian *lisis* or denouement in the book’s closure. Yet the contrasting manners of these framing poems embody linkages as well. The theme of self-knowledge is present in all three poems.” Reckford 2009, 108: “*Satire* 4 ends, then, where *Satire* 3 began, with a call to wakefulness.”

44 Pers. 3.66–72: *discite et, o miseri, causas cognoscite rerum: / quid sumus et quidnam uicturi gignimur, ordo / quis datus, aut metae qua mollis flexus et unde, / quis modus argento, quid fas optare, quid asper / utile nummus habet, patriae carisque propinquis / quantum elargiri deceat, quem te deus esse / iussit et humana qua parte locatus es in re* (“Learn, you idiotic creatures, discover the rationale of existence: What are we and what sort of life are we born for? What rank is given us at the start? Where and when should we make a smooth turn around the post? What should be the limit to money? What is it right to pray for? What are the uses of new-minted coin? How much should be lavished on your country and your nearest and dearest? What role is assigned you by god and where in the human world have you been stationed?”).

45 For a detailed account, see Kißel 1990, 569.

tral figure in Persius' *Satires* in two respects. First, he is perhaps the greatest example of a life spent practicing—and exhorting other people to practice—philosophy. Second—and, I would say, more importantly—his constant arousing and reproaching his fellow human beings is an image of Persius' own poetics, if we understand his poetics as the uncovering and chastising of human faults and sick morals.

But the *Fourth Satire* also displays Persius' own pessimism regarding the degree of success philosophy could enjoy in real life, as emphasized aptly at the beginning of the *Third* and the end of the *Fifth Satire*. Thus, while the beginning of the *Third Satire* focuses on the “dissolute” behavior of a student who is “not inexperienced at detecting deviant conduct or at the teachings of the philosophic portico” (3.52–54), and the end of the *Fifth Satire* describes uncultivated soldiers' mocking attitudes towards philosophy (5.189–191), the *Fourth Satire* shows, in its entirety, the ineffectiveness of philosophy. The example of Alcibiades, everyone's daily conduct, and Persius' generalizing and pessimistic adaptation of the Delphic motto (*ut nemo in sese temptat descendere, nemo*, 4.23) are symbols of the deafness of human beings to any exhortation to correct and improve their way of life.

So it is still Socrates who, through Persius, tells us: “Live with yourself, and you'll find out how incomplete you are.” But he knows that we will all act like Alcibiades and remain insensible to the fascination of a philosophical life.⁴⁶

References

- Alesse, F. *La Stoa e la tradizione socratica*. Napoli 2000.
- Bartsch, S. 'Persius, Juvenal and Stoicism', in: S. Braund and J. Osgood, *A companion to Persius and Juvenal*. Malden 2012, 217–238.
- Bartsch, S. 'Persius' *Fourth Satire*: Socrates and the failure of pedagogy', in: D. Konstan and M. Garani, *The philosophizing muse: the influence of Greek philosophy on Roman poetry*. Newcastle upon Tyne 2014, 245–268.
- Bartsch, S. *Persius: a study in food, philosophy, and the figural*. Chicago 2015.
- Bellandi, F. *Persio: dai "uerba togae" al solipsismo stilistico*. Bologna 1988.
- Benitez, E. 'Authenticity, experiment or development: the *Alcibiades 1* on virtue and courage', in: Johnson and Tarrant 2012, 119–133.

46 I am deeply thankful to Professor Shadi Bartsch for sending me a draft of her then still unpublished paper, to the editors of this volume for their precious comments on the first draft of this paper, and to Elin Simonson for her accurate proofreading.

- Boys-Stones, G. and Rowe, C. *The circle of Socrates: readings in the first-generation Socratics*. Indianapolis 2013.
- Brancacci, A. *Oikeios logos: la filosofia del linguaggio di Antistene*. Napoli 1990.
- Braund, S. *Juvenal and Persius*. Cambridge, MA 2004.
- Clausen, W.V. and Zetzel, J.E.G. *Commentum Cornuti in Persium*. München 2004.
- Colish, M.L. *The Stoic tradition from Antiquity to the early Middle Ages, 1: Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature*. Leiden 1985.
- Cucchiarelli, A. 'Persio. Il satirico oscuro', in: K. Freudenburg, A. Cucchiarelli and A. Barchiesi, *Musa Pedestre: storia e interpretazione della satira in Roma antica*. Roma 2007, 77–97.
- d'Alessandro Behr, F. 'Open bodies and closed minds? Persius' *Saturae* in the light of Bakhtin and Voloshinov', in: *Plaza* 2009, 222–254.
- De Brasi, D. 'Un esempio di educazione politica: una proposta di analisi dell'*Alcibiade primo*', *WJA* 32 (2008), 57–110.
- Dessen, C.S. *The satires of Persius: Iunctura callidus acri*. London 21996.
- Döring, K. *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum*. Wiesbaden 1979.
- Erler, M. 'Charis und Charisma: zwei Bilder vom Weisen und ihre Diskussion in Platons Dialogen', in: D. Koch, I. Männlein-Robert and N. Weidtmann, *Platon und das Göttliche*. Tübingen 2010, 42–61.
- Fowler, H.N. *Plato with an English translation, 1: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*. Cambridge, MA 1914.
- Freudenburg, K. *Satires of Rome. Threatening Poses from Lucilius to Juvenal*. Cambridge 2001.
- Giannantoni, G. 'L'*Alcibiade* di Eschine e la letteratura socratica su Alcibiade', in: G. Giannantoni and M. Narcy, *Lezioni Socratiche*. Napoli 1997, 343–379.
- Gummere, R.M. *Lucius Annaeus Seneca: Moral Epistles, 1*. Cambridge, MA 1917.
- Heitsch, E. 'Zum *Alkibiades 1*', *RhM* 155 (2012), 234–244.
- Henderson, J. 'Persius' didactic satire: the pupil as a teacher', in: *Plaza* 2009, 72–106.
- Hooley, D.M. *The knotted thong: structures of mimesis in Persius*. Ann Arbor 1997.
- Johnson, M. and Tarrant, H. *Alcibiades and the Socratic lover-educator*. London 2012.
- Kißel, W. *Aules Persius Flaccus, Saturarum liber*. Berlin 2007.
- Kißel, W. *Aules Persius Flaccus: Satiren*. Heidelberg 1990.
- Kukula, R.C. *Persius and Nero*. Graz 1923.
- Kurihara, Y. 'Socratic ignorance, or the place of the *Alcibiades 1* in Plato's early works', in: Johnson and Tarrant 2012, 77–89.
- Lee, G. and Barr, W. *The satires of Persius*. Liverpool 1987.
- Littlewood, C. 'Integer ipse? self-knowledge and self-representation in Persius *Satires 4*', *Phoenix* 56 (2002), 56–83.

- Littman, R.J. 'The loves of Alcibiades', *TAPhA* 101 (1970), 263–276.
- Long, A.A. 'Socrates in Hellenistic philosophy', *CQ* 38 (1988), 150–171.
- Marmorale, E.V. *Persio*. Firenze ²1956.
- Miller, P.A. 'The bodily grotesque in Roman satire: images of sterility', in: Plaza 2009, 327–348.
- Nikitinski, H. *A. Persius Flaccus, Saturae*. München 2002.
- Plaza, M. *Persius and Juvenal*. Oxford 2009.
- Reckford, K.J. *Recognizing Persius*. Princeton 2009.
- Reckford, K.J. 'Studies in Persius', *Hermes* 90 (1962), 476–504.
- Renaud, F. and Tarrant, H. *The Platonic Alcibiades 1: the dialogue and its ancient reception*. Cambridge 2015.
- Rossetti, L. *Le dialogue socratique*. Paris 2011.
- Scholz, U.W. 'Rem populi tractas? Zu Persius' 4. Satire', *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe* 15 (1966), 525–531.

Plutarch's Reception of Socrates

Geert Roskam

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

1 Plutarch, an Important Source about Socrates?

Plutarch lived nearly half a millennium after Socrates. To a certain extent, this obviously reduces his importance as a source for the historical Socrates. Anthony Long argues that Plutarch was in no better position than we are to understand and evaluate difficult interpretative or philosophical problems, such as Socrates' divine sign.¹ This is partly correct, in that Plutarch had to turn to the age-old sources we do, significantly the works of Plato and Xenophon. Yet Long's view is also in need of some qualification, and for at least three reasons Plutarch is still important for our understanding of Socrates.

First, in spite of the great chronological distance between Socrates and Plutarch, the latter obviously remains much closer to Socrates than we do. No doubt much changed in the centuries between Plutarch and Socrates, but many aspects of everyday life and of what it meant to live stayed fundamentally the same. There can be no doubt that Plutarch looked at Socrates from his own perspective (just as we, again, approach him from our own), but he may sometimes be sensitive to aspects of Socrates' position that we tend now to ignore. Therefore, a careful study of the Socrates reception of later authors such as Plutarch can help us in discovering blind spots in our own interpretation of Socrates.

Second, Plutarch sometimes provides us with relevant information for which he is the sole source. Even though not all this information is important, there are several useful and interesting complements to the rich Socratic tradition. These passages sometimes have the added benefit of helping lay bare the ideological bias of Plato's and Xenophon's interpretation. We may well argue that it is precisely because the information that Plutarch offers in such passages has no parallel in any of the usual authoritative sources (including Aristotle and Aristophanes) that it deserves close attention.

Finally, Plutarch was widely read and it is in fact astonishing how thoroughly he was acquainted with the previous tradition on Socrates. Next to Plato and Xenophon, he mentions as sources on Socrates:

1 Long 2006, 64 (dealing with Socrates' divine sign).

- Demetrius of Phaleron: Plutarch repeatedly refers to his work *Socrates*, where it was argued that Socrates was not poor (*Arist.* 1.9) and that Myrto, Aristides' granddaughter, lived in Socrates' house (*Arist.* 27.3).
- For information about Myrto, Plutarch also read Hieronymus, Aristoxenus, and Aristotle's *On nobility of birth* (though this work may not actually be by Aristotle) (*Arist.* 27.3).
- For good arguments against this Peripatetic tradition about Myrto, Plutarch refers to Panaetius' *On Socrates* (*Arist.* 27.4).
- The Megarian School and Terpsion: the explanation of Socrates' divine sign as a sneeze is traced back to "one of the Megarian school, who had it from Terpsion" (*De genio Socr.* 581A). The literary format of this dialogue makes it impossible to determine with certainty whether Plutarch here refers to some precise source that he had consulted.

Next to these sources, Plutarch also recalls different later evaluations of Socrates:

- Aristoxenus' general evaluation of Socrates as "an uneducated ignorant sensualist, but without any injustice" is mentioned as an example of malice (*De Her. mal.* 856CD).
- The Epicurean attack on Socrates is discussed at length in *Adversus Colotem*. I shall come back to this in due course.
- The paradoxical Stoic position that "men like Socrates and Plato are involved in vice no less vicious than that of any slave you please" and "that they are just as foolish and intemperate and unjust" is alluded to in *De soll. an.* 962B,² and Plutarch is also offended by the implications which the Stoic view of providence has for the death of Socrates (*De Stoic. rep.* 1051CD and *De comm. not.* 1065BC).
- Cato the Elder thought, so Plutarch tells us, that "there was nothing else to admire in Socrates of old except that he was always kind and gentle in his intercourse with a shrewish wife and stupid sons" (*Ca. Ma.* 20.3), and that "Socrates was a mighty prattler, who attempted, as best he could, to be his

2 Plutarch was not wrong in attributing this striking view to the Stoics, although he presents their position in a biased way by omitting the great esteem which the Stoics in fact had for Socrates and Plato and by ignoring the subtle distinctions which they made between people who have made some progress (προκόπτοντες) such as Socrates and Plato, on the one hand, and utterly wicked persons, on the other hand. I discuss both the Stoic position and Plutarch's attack on it in detail in Roskam 2005. Translations of Plutarch's works in the present chapter come from the Loeb Classical Library.

country's tyrant, by abolishing its customs, and by enticing his fellow citizens into opinions contrary to the laws" (*Ca. Ma.* 23.1).

- Finally, Plutarch recalls Dandamis' judgement on Socrates, Pythagoras, and Diogenes as men "of good natural parts, who had, however, passed their lives in too much awe of the laws" (*Alex.* 65.3).

This wealth of quotations demonstrates that Plutarch was in a better position than we are for assessing the tradition about Socrates. He was familiar with many sources that are no longer extant and it is not unreasonable to presume that this erudition may have enabled him to come closer to the historical Socrates than we are still able to do now. In all likelihood, Plutarch's general image of Socrates was partly influenced by these lost sources, and to the extent that this image differs from ours, we should refrain from too hasty conclusions and criticisms, since there is a good chance that such criticisms would no less illustrate our own bias than that of Plutarch.

In what follows, I present a brief survey of the information about Socrates that can be found in Plutarch's works. Within the constraints of this paper, it is impossible to provide a thorough and exhaustive discussion, for there is simply so much relevant material that a detailed and in-depth analysis would take on the dimensions of a book.³ I here confine myself to the broad outlines, distinguishing between biographical material and ideas, and adding some comments here and there.

2 Plutarch on Socrates' Life

Nearly all the data about Socrates' life and person that we still know, are also known by Plutarch. He recalls that Socrates was the son of a midwife and a stone-mason (fr. 140 = Stobaeus, 4.29.22), and repeatedly refers to his poverty.⁴ He tells us that he celebrated with some of his friends Socrates' birthday on the sixth of Thargelion (*Quaest. conv.* 717B). He knows about Socrates' marriage problems with Xanthippe (*De cap. ex inim.* 90E; *De coh. ira* 461D; *Ca. Ma.* 20.3) and about his supposed relation with Myrto (*Arist.* 27.3–4). He praises him for his virtuous political (*Adv. Colot.* 117E) and military conduct (*De genio Socr.* 581DE; *Adv. Colot.* 117E; *Alc.* 7.3–6), recalls his trial and the part played by his

3 Excellent introductions to Plutarch's Socrates reception are Hershbell 1988 and Pelling 2005.

4 See, e.g., *De prof. in virt.* 84F; *De genio Socr.* 581C; *Arist.* 1.9; cf. *De cup. div.* 527B and E; fr. 171.

accusers,⁵ and admires his consistent, high-minded behavior in prison (*De aud. poet.* 16C; *De tranq. an.* 466E; *De genio Socr.* 581CD; *Adv. Colot.* 1126B) and his brave and serene death (*An vitiositas* 499B; *De exilio* 607F; *An seni* 796DE; *Nic.* 23.4).

It is striking that nearly all of these biographical elements have a moral significance. This is not just factual knowledge: in the background, the presence of the rich *exemplum Socratis* tradition can often be felt.⁶ Briefly, Socrates' whole life is one continuous illustration of his excellent virtue. This overall moral perspective is typical of ancient biography (especially as presented in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*) and particularly of the ancient lives of philosophers, whose consistency between words and deeds was usually seen as the ultimate test of their credibility as a thinker.⁷ In line with this perspective, Socrates' value as a philosopher rests not only on his theoretical insights but also (even primarily) on the virtues displayed in his actions.

Socrates' moral excellence is also illustrated by his conduct and his association with other people. The philosopher avoided humbug and preferred a simple style (*De aud.* 45F; *De genio Socr.* 580B), did not disdain associating with ordinary people (*Maxime cum principibus* 776BC), and thereby showed virtues such as self-control, friendliness, and especially mildness.⁸ Furthermore, he exerted a positive influence on his interlocutors—including Alcibiades.

The latter's relation with Socrates was a much discussed issue in the later Platonic tradition. Plato himself suggested in several dialogues (*Alcibiades* and *Symposium*) that Alcibiades was fascinated by Socrates, but every *pepaideumenos* also knew how his later career was anything but virtuous and in fact severely damaged Athens. Plutarch several times points to Socrates' association with the gifted young man (*De Al. Magn. fort.* 328BC and 333A; cf. *De prof. in virt.* 84D) but the key text is the *Life of Alcibiades*, especially chapters 4–7. These chapters have been the subject of several detailed studies and

5 See *De Al. Magn. fort.* 328D; *De tranq. an.* 475DE [with reference to the Platonic *locus classicus*, from *Ap.* 30C9–d6; cf. Baumeister 1983]; *De inv. et od.* 537F–538A; *De genio Socr.* 580BC; *Amatorius* 762D; *De Stoic. rep.* 1051C; *De comm. not.* 1065C. It may be added that Plutarch also wrote a work *On the Condemnation of Socrates* (Lamprias catalogue 190) and an *Apology of Socrates* (Lamprias catalogue 189).

6 See on this esp. Döring 1979 and de Luise and Farinetti 1997.

7 For Plutarch's emphasis on the demand of consistency between theory and practice, see esp. *De prof. in virt.* 84B–85B and *De Stoic. rep.* 1033AB; Roskam 2005, 320–335.

8 For mildness (πρᾶσις), which is one of Plutarch's favorite virtues, see *De coh. ira* 455AB and 458C; *Adv. Colot.* 1108B. Other relevant passages are *De gar.* 512B and 512F; *Adv. Colot.* 1124DE; *Alc.* 1.3. On Socrates as an ideal teacher in Plutarch's works, see Roskam 2004, 104–105 and 108.

there is no need to enter at length upon them here.⁹ I limit myself to a few general remarks.

The general focus of the *Life* is, of course, on Alcibiades. Socrates comes into play only when he is important for the principal hero's career, that is, for the latter's instruction in his youth. In the later chapters of the *Life*, Socrates is almost completely ignored, which obviously suggests that the philosopher is not involved in, and bears no responsibility for, Alcibiades' problematic political course. In chapters 4–7, Socrates mainly plays a protective part. He indeed protects Alcibiades against the pernicious influence of his wicked lovers, while focusing on the young man's soul, exposing its weakness and rebuking his vain and foolish pride (*Alc.* 4.3). And Alcibiades himself came to think “that the work of Socrates was really a kind of provision of the gods for the care and salvation of youth” (*Alc.* 4.4).¹⁰ Plutarch clarifies in this section of the *Life* not only the precise nature of the association between Alcibiades and Socrates, but he also touches upon an essential aspect of the latter's personality, that is, his art of love (ἔρωτικὴ τέχνη). It is well known that erotic matters were the only thing Socrates claimed to know,¹¹ but of course, this *ars amatoria* should be understood correctly. It had nothing to do with corporeal pleasure; it is an art of love for the divine and the intelligible (*Quaest. Plat.* 1000E) that is characteristic of the “choir of Socrates and Plato” (*De Pyth. or.* 406A). Plutarch develops his own interpretation of this art of love in his *Amatorius*, but this falls outside the scope of this chapter.

Throughout the *Corpus Plutarcheum*, Socrates thus appears as a virtuous philosopher and teacher.¹² As we have presented it, it does not yet present Socrates' uninterrupted search for definitions and knowledge, inspired by Apollo's oracle (described in so lively a fashion in *Pl. Ap.* 20e6–23c1). But in fact Plutarch captures even this element. He refers to the oracle “that we all know” (ὃν ὅσμεν ἅπαντες) in *Adv. Colot.* 1116E and recalls its role as a catalyst for Socrates' philosophical inquiry (cf. 118D). He also considers philosophical con-

9 See esp. Pelling 2005, 116–125; Duff 2009; Verdegem 2010, 131–151. I deal with the topic more fully in Roskam 2012.

10 See on this important sentence Roskam 2012, 91–92.

11 *Pl. Symp.* 177d7–8; cf. also 212b6–7; *Lysis* 204b8–c2; *Thg.* 128b1–4. In later Platonism, the topic received much attention. Maximus of Tyre discussed it in several of his discourses (*orat.* 18–21), Favorinus wrote a work *On Socrates and his erotic art*, and Proclus and Hermias dealt with it throughout their commentaries on the *Alcibiades* and the *Phaedrus*. See also Dillon 1994.

12 Still, Plutarch refrains from explicitly calling Socrates a teacher, taking into account the latter's refusal of the title; cf. *Quaest. Plat.* 1000E (οὐδὲν ἐδίδασκε Σωκράτης).

versation (διαλέγεσθαι) to be the characteristic activity of Socrates (*De lat. viv.* 1128F) and sometimes alludes to Socrates' eagerness to trouble reputed fellow citizens with his questions. In *De genio Socr.* 580D, for instance, Theocritus tells how Socrates once asked Euthyphro a question (διερωτῶν) and playfully threw him into confusion (διασείων ... μετὰ παιδιᾶς). The well-balanced combination of the elements of questioning (διερωτῶν), confusion (διασείων) and play (μετὰ παιδιᾶς) in this passage is an accurate crystallization of several basic characteristics of the Socratic conversation. Somewhat further in the same dialogue, Simmias relates how Timarchus, in his desire to learn the nature of Socrates' divine sign, descended into the crypt of Trophonius and there had a marvelous vision. Socrates himself only heard about his attempt after Timarchus had died, and blamed his companions for not having told him earlier, "as he would have been glad to hear it from Timarchus himself and question him about it more closely" (592F)—a reaction typical of Socrates indeed: wherever any claim of knowledge occurs, Socrates is present to question and learn. Passages such like these may escape the notice of even the most careful readers, yet they often tell more about Plutarch's thorough familiarity with Socrates' philosophy than lengthy explicit theoretical statements.

A last important biographical issue about Socrates is his notorious divine sign. Plutarch dedicated a dialogue to this topic, and his discussion of it is the most detailed and penetrating treatment that has come down to us from Antiquity.¹³ Later Platonists often returned to the problem, but none came up to Plutarch's level.¹⁴ In *De genio Socratis*, Plutarch distinguishes between five possible interpretations of the divine sign:

- (1) The first one, usually ignored in scholarly research, is that of the seer Theocritus, who understands the sign as a kind of vision (ὄψιν) that guides Socrates in dark matters (580CF).¹⁵
- (2) Galaxidorus then suggests that Socrates' δαιμόνιον was only a trivial external matter such as a sneeze or a random utterance (580F–581A and 581F–582C).
- (3) Probably the most interesting explanation, which has also received the most attention in the scholarly literature, is that of Simmias, who explores

13 Recent good discussions are Corlu 1970, 45–81; Döring 1984; Babut 1988; Alt 1995; Long 2006; Setaioli 2012.

14 See Apul. *De deo Soc.*; Maximus of Tyre, *Orations* 8 and 9; Procl. *in Alc.* 60.1–92.3 Segonds (esp. 78.7–83.20); Hermias, *In Phdr.* 65.26–69.31 Couvreur = 70.3–74.16 Lucarini-Moreschini; Olympiodorus, *in Alc.* 21.1–14 Westerink.

15 See now Roskam 2013.

- possible analogies with human language and communication and suggests that Socrates was able to perceive the wordless voice of a demon that touched his pure mind (588C–589F).
- (4) Simmias then goes on to tell what he heard from Timarchus. This mythical account says that the demon should be identified with the purest part of the human soul (589F–592F).
 - (5) Finally, the Pythagorean Theanor argues that demons are disembodied souls who help other souls that are about to reach their final destination (593A–594A).

Each of these five alternative interpretations are carefully considered attempts to throw light on the challenging phenomenon of Socrates' δαιμόνιον. Plutarch makes use of different traditions and perspectives: Plato and the later philosophical tradition, but also Homer and literary sources. Some interpretations are characterized by a sober-minded rational approach; others are presented in the form of a myth. In this variety, Plutarch's masterly literary talents fully come to the fore.

But the whole discussion is also particularly interesting from a philosophical perspective, as a salient example of Plutarch's "zetetic" approach. None of the alternatives is decisive and convincing on all points, but neither is one of them utterly wrong (a view I develop in Roskam 2011). Every interpretation throws its own light on important aspects of the phenomenon, and perhaps it is only through an—impossible—combination of all perspectives that the light of truth may shine on all the details of the matter.

One last comment on this biographical section. Plutarch does not always carefully distinguish between the historical Socrates and the *persona* of Socrates in the works of Plato and Xenophon. Typical examples are his references to Socrates' claim of having heard himself how Pericles introduced a measure for the long wall (*Per.* 13.7; cf. *Pl. Grg.* 455e5–6) and to Socrates' famous night with Alcibiades (*De Al. Magn. fort.* 333A; cf. *Pl. Symp.* 217d3–219d2). History and literature here intermingle, and in a sense, the notorious "Socratic problem" was not Plutarch's problem. For him, the careful imitation of Socrates' virtue, and even the efforts to act now and then as a kind of *Socrates redivivus* (see Roskam 2010, 60, 64, 67, 70), was more important than an attempt to recover all the details about the historical Socrates, even if he ends up being useful to us in recovering some of those details. It is not impossible that Plutarch took Xenophon's work "as a more straightforward depiction of the historical Socrates" (Pelling 2005, 108 n. 9), although it is difficult to believe that he would also have preferred Xenophon to Plato as a philosophical authority about Socrates. Yet it is true that Plato is more complicated in this respect. This is not the place to explore fully

Plutarch's reading and understanding of Plato, but I would like to point briefly to one interesting passage from the *Table Talks*, where we find the argument that Plato combined with the spirit of Socrates that of Lycurgus and Pythagoras (719A). This is at first sight a quite remarkable evaluation of Plato's thinking, and I do not think that it occurs in many contemporary handbooks of Plato, yet on closer inspection, it is an interesting reading of Plato by a learned Platonist who is thoroughly familiar with the Greek tradition. Presumably, Socrates is connected with the dialectical and epistemological aspect of Plato's thinking, Pythagoras with the metaphysical one, and Lycurgus with the political one (cf. *Lyc.* 31.2), whereas thinkers like Parmenides (cf. *Adv. Colot.* 1114C) and Heraclitus are strikingly absent: they presumably have to yield to older and more venerable figures. Contemporary specialists may or may not feel sympathy with such a general view of Plato, but there can be no doubt to my mind that this interpretative framework at least throws some light on the dynamics of Plato's philosophy and that it has the additional advantage of relating the philosopher's position to that of important models in the Greek tradition. We may even wonder whether this Plutarchan view of Plato is therefore not "more Greek" and thus in a way "more Platonic" than our own—a provocative question that I prefer to leave open here.

3 Plutarch on Socrates' Thinking

The above discussion has shown that Plutarch was well informed about Socrates' life and that he attached great importance to the latter's virtuous conduct. But what about his philosophy? According to Christopher Pelling (2005, 106–116), this topic receives much less attention from Plutarch: the full emphasis in his works is on how Socrates lived and died, not on his thinking. Many passages scattered over the *Corpus Plutarcheum* confirm Pelling's view, and in the previous section, we connected this general emphasis with the importance that Plutarch attaches to consistency between words and deeds. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Plutarch completely ignores Socrates' thinking. He in fact touches upon many different aspects of it.

We may begin by listing a few sayings that Plutarch ascribes to Socrates:

- "Base men live to eat and drink, and good men eat and drink to live" (*De aud. poet.* 21E).
- When Euthydemus was offended by Xanthippe's scolding: "At your house the other day did not a hen fly in and do precisely the same thing, yet we were not put out about it?" (*De coh. ira* 461D).

- Socrates remarked that “he would rather have Darius than a daric as a friend” (*De frat. am.* 486E).
- “To precipitate ourselves upon troubled water and from lack of self-control to drink it, is less of an evil,” as Socrates said, “than while we are turbid and clouded in our judgement with rage and fury, before becoming settled and clear, to glut ourselves with vengeance on a being of our own kindred and race” (*De sera num.* 550F–551A).
- The saying of Socrates is still better, that he was no Athenian or Greek, but a “Cosmian,” because he did not shut himself up within Sunium and Tanaerus and the Ceraunian mountains (*De exilio* 600F–601A).
- “The pupil should pray that he might acquire the art of music and the bridegroom that he might beget children” (fr. 67).

Other sayings that are attributed to Socrates by Plutarch are elsewhere ascribed to others:

- Replying to a friend’s complaint about how expensive the city was, Socrates took him to the meal-market: “Half a peck for an obol! The city is cheap”; then to the olive-market: “A quart for two coppers!”; then to the clothes-market: “A sleeveless vest for ten drachmas! The city is cheap!” (*De tranq. an.* 470F; cf. Teles, fr. 2, 12.8–13.9 H.; DL 6.35; *Gnomol. Paris.* 333 [all three attributed to Diogenes]).
- “If we were all to bring our misfortunes into a common store, so that each person should receive an equal share in the distribution, the majority would be glad to take up their own and depart” (*Cons. ad Apoll.* 106B; cf. also Hdt. 7.152 and Val. Max. 7.2 ext. 2 [attributed to Solon]).
- “Socrates used to urge the ill-favored among the mirror-gazing youth to make good their defect by virtue, and the handsome not to disgrace their face and figure by vice” (*Con. praec.* 141D; cf. DL 2.33 [Socrates]; Stob. *Flor.* 2.31.98 [Socrates]; but 3.1.172ζ [Bias]).

This uncertainty about the precise origin is a recurrent feature of such sayings, which began to receive a value on their own, isolated from the original context in which they were uttered. In many such cases, it is simply impossible to gain certainty about the source. Socrates is as good a candidate as other distinguished philosophers, but the general, moralizing content of the sayings does not contain anything that is peculiar to Socrates alone. A few other sayings, finally, can with some plausibility be traced back to their precise origin:

- Socrates warned against those foods which induce us to eat when we are not hungry, and against those liquids which induce us to drink when we are not thirsty (*De tuenda* 124DE; *De gar.* 513C; *De cur.* 521E; *Quaest. conv.* 661F ~ Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.6).
- “How much better to do good to our friends, and to make friends of our enemies” (*Lac. Apophth.* 218A ~ Pl. *Resp.* 1.335b2–336a10; *Cri.* 49a4–c11).

In these two cases, Socrates' saying can be discovered (in a different form, though) in extant texts of Xenophon and Plato. Such passages illustrate the same blurred intermingling of the historical Socrates and the literary *persona* that we encountered in biographical discussions.

We may ask at this point what the value of these sayings can be for our own understanding and appreciation of Socrates' philosophy. Probably, the majority of contemporary specialists of Socrates will find them uninteresting, disappointing, or irrelevant. They will either ignore them altogether or connect them with the more pedestrian Socrates of Xenophon. For Plutarch, on the other hand, these sayings are part and parcel of his view of Socrates and no doubt condition his appreciation of the philosopher. We may here recall the opening dedication letter of the *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*, where he briefly deals with the importance and function of such sayings. In his view, they “afford an opportunity to observe, as in so many mirrors, the workings of the mind of each man” (172D) and thus gain insight into the heroes' virtues.¹⁶ Consequently, Socrates' sayings likewise help the reader in assessing his virtue. They evoke the image of a morally excellent man who practiced what he preached, and this, in turn, contributes no little to the effects of his words. We may recall in this context the famous tears of Alcibiades (*De prof. in virt.* 84D) or the reaction of Aristippus. When the latter “had gleaned a few odd seeds and samples of Socrates' talk, he was so moved that he suffered a physical collapse and became quite pale and thin” (*De cur.* 516C). This is the talk that reveals the true philosopher: not otherworldly meditations or abstract speculations, but pointed words that directly affect the hearer's character and succeed in bringing about a fundamental change towards the better. If this is indeed what the λόγος of philosophy should be like (cf. *Maxime cum principibus* 776CD), such sayings are directly relevant for a correct evaluation of Socrates'

16 The authenticity of this letter is not beyond doubt (the case for authenticity has recently been made by Beck 2002) but even if the letter is spurious, this does not affect my argument, for Plutarch's use of anecdotes and sayings in his works perfectly illustrates that his position indeed basically corresponds to what is said in the letter.

philosophical achievements. Plutarch would definitely not share our lack of interest into these sayings, and I see little reason to assume that Socrates himself would disagree with Plutarch on this.

Yet Plutarch does not limit himself to these pithy sayings. Allusions here and there show that he had a good knowledge of Socrates' principal philosophical convictions. He refers, for instance, to Socrates' opposition to the sophists (*Quaest. Plat.* 999C), to his sincere belief that every bad man is unwillingly bad (fr. 40), and to his fundamental ignorance (*De ad. et am.* 72A and *Adv. Colot.* 1117D). He does not, however, discuss Socrates' attitude towards natural philosophy and his criticism of Anaxagoras. He knows the *locus classicus* from the *Phaedo* (97b8–98c2) but, interestingly enough, regards the whole section as evidence for Plato's position (*De def. or.* 435F).¹⁷

Other topics that we now consider as typical of Socrates' philosophy, Plutarch elaborates without reference to Socrates. He devotes a whole work to the teachability of virtue (*An virtus doceri possit*), a "Socratic issue" that had long become a topic for discussion across the philosophical schools. Plutarch had no reason to regard this as an exclusively Socratic concern. The same is true for Plutarch's "zetetic" approach in philosophy (see, e.g., Opsomer 1998, 189; Bonazzi 2008; Kechagia 2011), which clearly has Socratic roots (cf. *Adv. Colot.* 1117D: *μανθάνειν αἰεὶ καὶ ζητεῖν τὸ ἀληθές*) but which can also be linked to the skeptical Academy. The Socratic paradox that the man who is put to death unjustly is less pitiable and wretched than he who puts him to death (*Pl. Grg.* 469b3–5) is echoed in King Agis' comforting words to one of his officers: "even though I am put to death in this lawless and unjust manner, I have the better of my murderers" (*Agis* 20.1). A similar principled attitude was shown by Phocion (*Phoc.* 36.1 and 3), and in the very last sentence of his *Life*, Plutarch explicitly connects his fate with Socrates' (38.5). These passages illustrate yet another characteristic of Plutarch's reception of Socrates, that is, his creative use of "Socratic" elements in other contexts without explicit reference to the philosopher. We may add that Plutarch's readers were cultivated enough not to need pedant and over-detailed elucidations in such cases.

In two works, Plutarch deals more extensively with Socrates' philosophical convictions. Although both have received excellent discussions, they will repay further study. Again, I cannot but confine myself to some brief introductory remarks. In *Adversus Colotem*, Plutarch replies to Colotes' attack on

17 Cf. Pelling 2005, 108: "When it is the philosophical argument that matters, it is 'Plato' rather than 'Socrates' that Plutarch quotes."

Socrates.¹⁸ The Epicurean blamed Socrates for three things. He claimed that the oracle of Apollo is nothing but a cheap and sophistic tale (1116E–1117C); Socrates' arguments were charlatans (ἀλαζόνες), for while he claimed not to rely on his senses, he in everyday life of course trusted them, and thus proved inconsistent (1117D–1118B); and Socrates' quest for self-knowledge was absurd (1118B–1119C). Colotes' attack was particularly rhetorical and sharp, interlarded with funny examples, and appealing to common sense. Plutarch reacts in two ways: he defends Socrates against Colotes' unjustified criticism and launches a counterattack on the Epicurean: in all of the three cases, it is not Socrates who is guilty of the charges, but Colotes himself.¹⁹ The whole section is interesting because it contains vital information about ongoing controversies between different philosophical schools. It can be used as a source for the Epicurean view of Socrates but also clarifies the role played by Arcesilaus and the skeptical Academy in these polemical debates. Several scholars have indeed pointed out correctly that Socrates' philosophical position as presented by Colotes and Plutarch shows close resemblance to that of Arcesilaus (Hershbell 1988, 369; Warren 2002, 343–355; Opsomer 2012, § 3). In short, the whole discussion once again shows a multilayered image of Socrates, where elements taken from Plato's dialogues (cf. Hershbell 1988, 370–371) are combined with later interpretations (both Epicurean and Academic) and with Plutarch's own view.

A similar case is the first *Quaestio Platonica*, where the question is raised about the god's bidding Socrates to act as midwife to others but preventing him from himself begetting (cf. *Tht.* 150C7–8).²⁰ Plutarch puts forward four possible answers:

- Socrates' *elenchus* is a kind of purgative medicine that cured his interlocutors from humbug and error and that contributed to his credibility because he seemed to be seeking the truth along with them (999DF).
- By not defending his own view, Socrates became a better, impartial judge of the convictions of other people (1000AC).
- If knowledge is beyond the reach of human beings, the god correctly prevented Socrates from begetting false beliefs; if it can be reached, Socrates will be able to acquire the best knowledge (1000CD).

18 For the *Adversus Colotem* as a whole, see Westman 1955; Kechagia 2011. For the section on Socrates, see Warren 2002; Opsomer 2012.

19 This eristic strategy pervades the whole of the work; cf. Kechagia 2011, 172–178, who distinguishes between “vindication arguments” and “overturning arguments.”

20 The *Quaestio* is discussed at length by Opsomer 1998, 127–212 and by Mura 2007.

- The knowledge of divine things is a matter of reminiscence and Socrates' *elenchus* is a means to serve his maieutic skill (1000DE).

This is, for more than one reason, a particularly rich and interesting text. Much of what we today regard as essential features of Socrates' philosophy are here indeed discussed: Socratic *elenchus*, ignorance, and maieutics, Socrates' attitude towards the sophists, and his refusal to accept the title of teacher. In a nutshell, it is all there, although in this case too, we encounter a multilayered picture of Socrates (based on Platonic, Epicurean, Stoic, and Academic elements). Moreover, this first *Quaestio Platonica* is to a certain extent also a programmatic text, and Plutarch's reflection on Socrates is directly relevant for his own self-understanding as a Platonist (cf. Opsomer 1997; Roskam 2011, 423).

The above survey has shown that Plutarch had a good knowledge of the core of Socrates' philosophical convictions and approach. This may be further illustrated by his use of several concepts that bear a clear Socratic stamp. We already mentioned *μαιωτική* (*Quaest. Plat.* 1000E), *ἐλεγχος* (*Quaest. Plat.* 999EF; *Alc.* 4.3; cf. also *Dec. or. vit.* 832C), and *διαλέγεσθαι* (*De lat. viv.* 1128F; cf. also *De Stoic. rep.* 1045F–1046A), and can now add crucial concepts such as *ἐξέτασις* (*Quaest. Plat.* 999E; cf. *Aem.* 38.7 and *Ca. Ma.* 16.1) and *πρᾶγμα* (*Alc.* 4.4).²¹ Even Socrates' celebrated comparison with the gadfly is probably alluded to in *Alc.* 21.8 (cf. Verdegem 2010, 257, n. 121).

4 Conclusion

We may conclude, then, that Plutarch was particularly well informed about Socrates. He still had access to many sources that have meanwhile been lost, and dealt with (or at least knew) the most important aspects of Socrates' life and thinking. In general, he regarded him as an eminent philosopher (*De Al. Magn. fort.* 328A; *Non posse* 1086EF) and even repeatedly called him a sage (*Arist.* 27.3 and *Nic.* 13.9). Socrates was a "champion of the truth" (*De aud. poet.* 16C), divinely inspired towards virtue (*Adv. Colot.* 1117A), free from humbug and reliant on sober reason (*De genio Socr.* 580BC) and a steadfast judgement (581C). Plutarch's appreciation of Socrates, then, rests on both moral and intellectual standards. He no less praised him as a powerful thinker than as a virtuous man. One of the most famous ancient characterizations of Socrates as the

21 On the importance of *ἐξέτασις*, see, e.g., Kraut 2006; Tarrant 2000. On *πρᾶγμα*, see, e.g., Noussan-Letry 1974, 43–119.

man who called philosophy down from heaven in order to place it in the cities and houses of men came from Cicero (*Tusc.* 5.10; cf. *Acad.* 1.15). Yet Plutarch's eulogy is hardly less eloquent and perfectly qualifies as a conclusion of this chapter:

Socrates at any rate was a philosopher, although he did not set out benches or seat himself in an armchair or observe a fixed hour for conversing or promenading with his pupils, but jested with them, when it so happened, and drank with them, served in the army or lounged in the market-place with some of them, and finally was imprisoned and drank the poison. He was the first to show that life at all times and in all parts, in all experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy.

An seni 796DE

References

- Ahbel-Rappe, S. and R. Kamtekar. *A companion to Socrates*. Malden 2006.
- Alt, K. 'Das sokratische Daimonion in der Darstellung Plutarchs', in: H. Kessler, *Sokrates: Geschichte, Legende, Spiegelungen. Sokrates-Studien 11*. Kusterdingen 1995, 71–96.
- Babut, D. 'La part du rationalisme dans la religion de Plutarque: l'exemple du *De genio Socratis*', *ICS* 13 (1988), 393–407.
- Baumeister, T. "Anytos und Meletos können mich zwar töten, schaden jedoch können sie mir nicht": Platon, *Apologie des Sokrates* 30c/d bei Plutarch, Epiktet, Justin Martyr und Clemens Alexandrinus', in: H.-D. Blume and F. Mann, *Platonismus und Christentum: Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie*. Münster 1983, 58–63.
- Beck, M. 'Plutarch to Trajan: the dedicatory letter and the Apophthegmata collection', in: P.A. Stadter and L. Van der Stockt, *Sage and emperor: Plutarch, Greek intellectuals, and Roman power in the time of Trajan (98–117 A.D.)*. Leuven 2002, 163–173.
- Bonazzi, M. 'L'offerta di Plutarco: teologia e filosofia nel *De E apud Delphos* (capitoli 1–2)', *Philologus* 152 (2008), 205–211.
- Corlu, A. *Plutarque: le démon de Socrate. Texte et traduction avec une introduction et des notes*. Paris 1970.
- Dillon, J. 'A Platonist *Ars amatoria*', *CQ* 44 (1994), 387–392.
- Döring, K. 'Plutarch und das Daimonion des Sokrates (Plut. *de genio Socratis* Kap. 20–24)', *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984), 376–392.
- Döring, K. *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum*. Wiesbaden 1979.
- Duff, T. 'Plato's *Symposium* and Plutarch's *Alcibiades*', in: J. Ribeiro Ferreira, D. Leão,

- M. Tröster and P. Barata Dias, *Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch*. Coimbra 2009, 37–51.
- Hershbell, J.P. 'Plutarch's portrait of Socrates', *JCS* 13 (1988), 365–381.
- Kechagia, E. 'Philosophy in Plutarch's *Table Talk*: in jest or in earnest?', in: F. Klotz and K. Oikonomopoulou, *The philosopher's banquet: Plutarch's Table Talk in the intellectual culture of the Roman empire*. Oxford 2011, 93–104.
- Kechagia, E. *Plutarch against Colotes: a lesson in history of philosophy*. Oxford 2011.
- Kraut, R. 'The examined life', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar 2006, 228–242.
- Long, A.A. 'How does Socrates' divine sign communicate with him?', in: S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar 2006, 63–74.
- Luise, F. de and G. Farinetti. *Felicità socratica: Immagini di Socrate e modelli antropologici ideali nella filosofia antica*. New York 1997.
- Mura, G. 'La "I Platonica Quaestio" di Plutarco: un tentativo di interpretazione', *Acme* 60 (2007), 367–383.
- Noussan-Letry, L. *Spekulatives Denken in Platons Frühschriften: Apologie und Kriton*. Munich 1974.
- Opsomer, J. *In search of the truth: academic tendencies in middle Platonism*. Brussels 1998.
- Opsomer, J. 'Plutarch's defence of the *Theages*, in defence of Socratic Philosophy?', *Philologus* 141 (1997), 131–134.
- Opsomer, J. 'The lives and opinions of Socrates and Stilpo as defended by Plutarch against the insidious yet ignorant attacks of Colotes', *Aitia* 3 (2012).
- Pelling, C. 'Plutarch's Socrates', *Hermathena* 179 (2005), 105–139.
- Roskam, G. 'From stick to reasoning: Plutarch on the communication between teacher and pupil', *WS* 117 (2004), 93–114.
- Roskam, G. 'Plutarch's "Socratic Symposia": the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon as literary models in the *Quaestiones convivales*', *Athenaeum* 98 (2010), 45–70.
- Roskam, G. 'Socrates and Alcibiades: a notorious *σκάνδαλον* in the later Platonist tradition', in: I. Muñoz Gallarte and L. Roig Lanzillotta, *Plutarch in the religious and philosophical discourse of late antiquity*. Leiden 2012, 85–100.
- Roskam, G. 'Theocritus' view in *De genio Socratis* 580CF', in: A. Casanova, *Figure d'Atene nelle opere di Plutarco*. Firenze 2013, 233–248.
- Roskam, G. 'Two *Quaestiones Socraticae* in Plutarch', in: J.M. Candau Morón, F.J. González Ponce and A.L. Chávez Reino, *Plutarco Transmisor: actas del x Simposio Internacional S.E.P., 12–14 de noviembre de 2009*. Sevilla 2011, 419–431.
- Roskam, G. *On the path to virtue: the Stoic doctrine of moral progress and its reception in (middle-)Platonism*. Leuven 2005.
- Setaioli, A. 'The *Daimon* in Timarchus' cosmic vision (Plu. *De gen. Socr.* 22, 590B–592E)', in: J. Ribeiro Ferreira, D.F. Leão and C.A. Martins de Jesus, *Nomos, Kosmos and Dike in Plutarch*. Coimbra 2012, 109–119.

- Tarrant, H. 'Naming Socratic interrogation in the *Charmides*', in: T.M. Robinson and L. Brisson, *Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis, Charmides: proceedings of the fifth Symposium Platonicum. Selected Papers*. Sankt Augustin 2000, 256–258.
- Verdegem, S. *Plutarch's Life of Alcibiades: story, text and moralism*. Leuven 2010.
- Warren, J. 'Socratic scepticism in Plutarch's *Adversus Colotem*', *Elenchos* 23 (2002), 333–356.
- Westman, R. *Plutarch gegen Kolotes: seine Schrift 'Adversus Colotem' als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle*. Helsingfors 1955.

“A Man of Outstanding Perfection”: Apuleius’ Admiration for Socrates

Friedemann Drews

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster

1 Introduction

Should Apuleius be regarded as a “serious philosopher”¹ or as only a sophist,² merely showing off his philosophical education³ while being “blinded to the logical development of his theme by the glitter of his own rhetoric”?⁴ This general issue, highly debated in Apuleian scholarship, also affects the way one interprets Apuleius’ attitude towards Socrates. Is Apuleius a true admirer of Plato’s teacher, or are his texts, most notably the first book of his novel, the *Metamorphoses* (*Met.*), also known as the *Golden Ass*, meant to cue derision and laughter in Socrates’ face?

In what follows I shall argue that Apuleius’ admiration for Socrates should be taken seriously—in spite of the fact that the person called Socrates in the first book of the novel is indeed a somewhat comic and unsettling figure. According to my reading, there is no clash between Apuleius’ sincere philosophical interests and his obvious sense of humour. He labels himself a “Platonic philosopher”—and Plato himself shows in his dialogues how true philosophy can go hand in hand with comedy, particularly in the *Symposium* (185c–e, 212c).⁵ Might considering Apuleius a genuine Middle-Platonist perhaps be the easiest way to come to grips with his sense of humour?

2 The Anti-Socrates (*Met.* 1)

Apuleius’ novel is about the curious protagonist Lucius, eager for magical and erotic adventures, who, by accident, is transformed into an ass and as such

1 Cf. Penwill 2009; Bernard 1994; Krafft 1979; O’Brien 2002; Hijmans 1987, 418, 424, 396; Baltes, Lakmann et al. 2004.

2 Cf. Harrison 2000, 224; Murgatroyd 2004, 319.

3 Cf. Beaujeu 1973, 274; Schlam 1992, 8–9, 47; van Mal-Maeder 2001, 410–411.

4 Sandy 1997, 105.

5 See also Xen. *Symp.* (esp. the beauty contest between Socrates and Critobulos at 5).

experiences many hardships, for which he blames "blind fortune/fate" (books 1–x). At the end of the novel (*Met.* xi), he recalls his still human capacity of free will (*liberum arbitrium*) and turns in prayer to the "queen of heaven" (*regina caeli*); in return, the goddess Isis reveals herself to Lucius-the-ass and eventually releases him from his asinine existence; Lucius becomes one of her disciples.⁶

In *Met.* 1.6, Lucius hears Aristomenes tell the story of his encounter with "his friend Socrates."⁷ Socrates, lying on the floor in ragged clothes,⁸ appears to be a beggar, "deformed" and pale, almost a ghost.⁹ Asked about his deplorable situation, he explains that he has become a victim of cruel Fortune¹⁰—a major motif of the novel since Lucius, when transformed into an ass, will himself be suffering under the sway of cruel Fortune until he will finally succumb to the goddess of heaven in *Met.* xi.¹¹

The main reason for the present calamities affecting Socrates is his love-affair with and subsequent bondage to the witch Meroe. Intending to escape with Socrates in the morning, Aristomenes himself unwillingly witnesses Meroe and a fellow-witch enter their locked sleeping room the night before, murder Socrates with a sword, and fill the wound in Socrates' throat with a sponge.¹² The next morning, the porter suspects Aristomenes might have murdered Socrates, whereupon Aristomenes returns to their room and tries to commit suicide, but "without success." Suddenly Socrates awakes. Aristomenes surmises everything was just a nightmare. Going for a walk, the two arrive at a river. As Socrates, thirsty, drinks some water, his throat-wound opens up and the sponge appears.¹³ Aristomenes buries the dead Socrates.¹⁴

Scobie rightly said that the Socrates of *Met.* 1 is depicted as a figure antithetical to the famous philosopher (*kat' antiphrasin*) (1975, 92).¹⁵ Keulen observes

6 For this line of interpretation see my works on Apuleius in Drews 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015. For a summary of the novel see Harrison 2000, 211–215.

7 *Ecce Socraten contubernalem meum conspicio* (*Met.* 1.6.1.).

8 As for the literary motif, cf. the appearance of Lady Philosophy in Boethius, *cons.* 1.1p.

9 *Humi sedebat scissili palliastro semiamictus, paene alius lurore, ad miseram maciem deformatus* (*Met.* 1.6.1.). Cf. *Ar. Av.* 1553–1564.

10 *Met.* 1.6.4–7.1.

11 The novel's theme of blind Fortune vs. Isis' seeing providence, in connection with the issue of free will, is discussed at greater length in Drews 2009; for a brief survey see also Drews 2012 and 2015. See now also Englert 2015, 85–86.

12 *Met.* 1.11–13.

13 Cf. Frangoulidis 2001, 33.

14 *Met.* 1.15–19.

15 See also Münstermann 1995, 21–22, for the distorted image ("Zerrbild") of the Platonic Socrates.

that “whereas the philosopher Socrates was renowned for his physical endurance and temperance ..., this Socrates is an outspoken hypochondriac, who cannot control his lust for sex ..., food, drink, and spectacles” (2007, 161). Frangoulidis points out that Socrates “is a victim both of passion and witchcraft, just like Lucius after him” (2001, 20).

However, van der Paardt has drawn attention to the allusions to Plato’s dialogues in Aristomenes’ tale (*Phd.* 118a; *Phdr.* 237a): “The significance of [Socrates’] covering his head [in *Met.* 1.7.1.] is twofold. In the first place we realise that we are concerned with an almost genuine Socrates or rather with a *larvale simulacrum* of the great philosopher (6, 3); secondly it announces the irrevocable approach of his death, bearing in mind the parallel situation in the *Phaedo*” (1978, 82). Besides, the Platonic Socrates is warned about crossing a river by his *daimonion* (*Phdr.* 242c); the anti-Socrates of *Met.* 1 takes only a mouthful of the river-water and dies. These allusions¹⁶ unambiguously connect the figure of Socrates in *Met.* 1 with Socrates the philosopher and at the same time set them apart. This must be part of Apuleius’ intention.

O’Brien has pointed out that, in the *Crito* (53d–54a), Socrates is warned by the Laws “about going to Thessaly” (2002, 27–28). Should he leave Athens, he will become a “laughing-stock”; “by sending Lucius to Thessaly, Apuleius puts him where the wise Socrates would not be led.” So Lucius himself, the protagonist of the novel, seems to become part of Apuleius’ image of the anti-Socrates in *Met.* 1.

However, what is the purpose of all this? How is the reader meant to make sense of these observations? Why does Apuleius, a Platonic philosopher as he calls himself, draw this caricature of the most prominent figure in Plato’s dialogues? One could argue that he behaves just like a sophist who wants to ridicule any “serious” kind of philosophy. However, there are other passages in Apuleius’ works where he is speaking in highest favor and with greatest respect for “his Socrates.” Does he therefore contradict himself?

I think this is not the case.¹⁷ The reader of the *Metamorphoses* has to bear in mind that this is a novel about “changing figures.”¹⁸ As becomes clear against

16 For the obvious similarity of the *locus amoenus*-motif in *Met.* 1.18.8.cont. with Pl. *Phdr.* 229; cf. Frangoulidis 2001, 31, and Keulen 2007, 338.

17 Englert 2015, 86–87 now also argues that Aristomenes’ story does not undermine Apuleius’ Platonism and his sympathy for Socrates, but that Apuleius wants “to make us notice the great differences between the two figures [of Socrates in *Met.* 1 and *Met.* x].”

18 *figuras fortunasque hominum in alias imagines conversas et in se rursum mutuo nexu refectas ut mireris* (*Met.* 1.1.2).

the background of the whole of the *Metamorphoses*, Apuleius enjoys playing with the reader; however, in doing so, he remains a philosopher throughout and entangles his audience with philosophical questions. Is the Thessalian world of "superstitious frenzy" to be seen on the same level with the Isiac religion of *Met.* XI?¹⁹ Or is the world of witchcraft and blind Fortune (philosophically speaking, the world of becoming and vanishing appearances) rather set apart against the realm of the true gods Isis and Osiris (the world of the true and divine Ideas)? I have argued elsewhere for the latter interpretation by highlighting the fact that Lucius' transition from the world of witches and blind Fortune takes place when he, although still an ass, rediscovers his free will (*liberum arbitrium*) at the very end of book x before turning in prayer to the goddess of heaven and regaining his human form.²⁰

If this is the direction of development under the surface of an otherwise amusing novel, then the reader is meant to ask: What becomes of the *figura deformata* of the anti-Socrates in *Met.* I when he will be restored to his true form—in *se rursus refect[us]*, as announced in the prologue, the "program of the novel"?

3 Asinus Philosophans: A Turn to Philosophy and the Return of the True Socrates (*Met.* x)²¹

Towards the end of *Met.* x, Lucius-the-ass comments with indignation²² on Paris' famous judgement: even then, *exordio rerum*, at the beginning of world history, injustice had taken its course when Venus bribed Paris to give the apple to her as the most beautiful of the goddesses.²³ With increasing annoyance, Lucius mentions Socrates, who was unjustly compelled to drink the hemlock.

The impression of the moralizing ass is rather grotesque if the reader takes into account that, only recently, the very same ass had functioned as a *matrona's* sex-partner.²⁴ Lucius-the-ass seems to be aware that the reader might

19 Keulen 2007, 40: "Being a satirical figure with superstitious inclinations, the Apuleian Socrates seems to reflect the comic ambiguity of the main narrator and protagonist Lucius. ... Moreover, Socrates strikingly resembles the type of superstitious 'confessor.'"

20 Drews 2009, 519.

21 My interpretation of the *asinus philosophans*-motif is set out at greater length in Drews 2012.

22 ... *indignationis meae ... impetum* (*Met.* x.33.4).

23 *Met.* x.33.

24 *Met.* x.19.3.

not be willing to endure a “philosophizing ass.”²⁵ If, however, the “philosophizing ass” is conceived of as an *imago* in the sense of the prologue,²⁶ then its re-metamorphosis should also be expected to take place—and this is exactly what happens step by step towards the end of the novel, starting with the transition from the end of *Met.* x to book xi.

The *asinus philosophans*, being perhaps an *imago* of Lucius’ “philosophy” (his former beliefs in an all-determining fate and blind fortune) within the first ten books, undergoes a metamorphosis into a human philosopher in *Met.* xi: guided by divine aid, he becomes one of Isis’ initiates. With the metamorphosis of Lucius-the-philosophizing-ass into Isis’ disciple, the novel reaches its conclusion.²⁷

It is against this background that the mentioning of Socrates at the end of *Met.* x should be interpreted. When Lucius-the-ass hints at the *divinae prudentiae senex* (*Met.* x.33.3) and his undeserved death without spelling out his name, the reader is asked to recognize that the true Socrates is made to appear in the novel by the narrator Lucius. For the first reader, this might add to the novel’s entertaining fun at this point of the narrative. Seen with hindsight, however, from the perspective of the novel’s ending, the reader might identify the mentioning of Socrates as the *first step* in Lucius’ inner metamorphosis, from a stupid ass to a disciple of Isis and her “enlightening philosophy”;²⁸ it is

25 *sed ne quis indignationis meae reprehendat impetum secum sic reputans: “ecce, nunc patiemur philosophantem nobis asinum” ... (Met. x.33.4).*

26 See above note 18. For my interpretation of the prologue see Drews 2006.

27 Englert 2015 now introduces a slightly different reading of the novel’s closure since he stresses that Lucius is not shown to have fully become a philosopher, but has just made an important first step towards this direction: “Lucius is never shown understanding the Isis cult on anything other than what Plutarch, and, I would argue, Apuleius, would describe as a superficial level” (89); “Even if Lucius seems unable to make this final transition to philosophy, Apuleius may have hoped that the final humorous yet disconcerting twist would spur at least some of his readers to look beyond Lucius’ literal interpretation of Isis, Osiris, and Seth/Typhon and interpret them as Platonic allegory, and to search for the true realities that they symbolize” (90). Englert’s reading is, of course, possible. I agree with Englert that Apuleius wants us to recognize the *direction* of Lucius’ change when he succumbs to the queen of heaven, is instructed by the priest about the different realms of providence and blind fortune/fate respectively, and becomes a disciple of Isis; however, this *direction* does involve both philosophical and religious “progress”: Lucius’ development might not appear to be completed, but it is a change towards becoming human again as well as a philosopher and a devout follower of Isis.

28 For a more detailed interpretation of “the light of Isis” see Drews 2015 (cf.: *in tutelam iam*

one of the signals that Lucius' inner self begins to change. The next step will be his sudden remembrance that, although still an ass, he remains capable of free will; the philosophical term *liberum arbitrium* occurs only once in the whole novel.²⁹ The third step will be his prayer to the *regina caeli* at the beginning of *Met.* XI, and the fourth his re-metamorphosis until he will finally have become Isis' initiate and will have undergone several initiations.

There are at least two more aspects related to the appearance of Socrates in *Met.* x. The first one is connected with the strange figure of the same name the reader has already encountered in book I. The fact that the novel involves "two Socrates" cannot be without a purpose. Given the bizarre character of the first Socrates in *Met.* I that the reader is bound to recognize as precisely an "incarnation of an anti-Socrates," the implicit mentioning of the philosopher in *Met.* x, even though it takes place only in passing, makes the appearance of the true Socrates not only a return, but a re-metamorphosis. The reader can only apprehend this by bearing in mind the "program" of the novel's prologue and by interpreting the story-line of the *Metamorphoses* as a development from the world of witchcraft and deception towards one of true religion and philosophy.

Once the reader understands the novel this way, second, a connection arises between (a) Lucius-the-ass' taking sides with Socrates the philosopher and (b) Apuleius' own philosophical stance and his love for the teacher of Plato.³⁰

4 "My Socrates": A Man of Outstanding Perfection (*De Deo Socratis and Florida*)

When Lucius-the-ass hints at Socrates the philosopher, he describes him as an "old man of divine wisdom whom the god of Delphi (i.e. Apollo) loved more than all other mortals because of his outstanding wisdom."³¹ In case the reader is *not* inclined to interpret the novel in the way suggested above, this representation might be taken as part of the funny picture of the philosophizing ass, perhaps even as an ironic remark about the famous Athenian.

receptus es Fortunae, sed videntis, quae suae lucis splendore ceteros etiam deos illuminat, Met. XI.15.3; *iam tibi providentia mea inlucescit dies salutaris, Met.* XI.5.4).

29 ... *meis cogitationibus liberum tribuebatur arbitrium (Met.* x.35.2–3).

30 This would be in line with the interpretation that Lucius "becomes" so to speak Apuleius towards the end of the novel when he is addressed as a "man from Madauros" (*Madaurensem, Met.* XI.27.9). See Smith 2012; van der Paardt 1981.

31 ... *divinae prudentiae senex, quem sapientia praetulit cunctis mortalibus deus Delphicus (Met.* x.33.3).

There are, however, sufficient reasons *not* to read this as if Apuleius were making fun of Socrates, both in and outside the novel. Looking at his philosophical works, particularly at *De Deo Socratis*, it becomes clear that Apuleius himself does indeed endorse the words he puts in Lucius-the-ass' mouth. After setting out a detailed theory of Platonic *daemones* and explaining why Plato understood them as mediators between gods and humans in the *Symposion*,³² Apuleius praises Socrates' divine wisdom by means of a rhetorical question:³³

Is it any wonder that Socrates, a man of outstanding perfection and wisdom according to even Apollo's testimony, knew and worshipped this, his very own, god, and that, therefore, his guardian angel—I'd almost like to call him his intimately befriended Lar—prevented all that was to be prevented, averted all that was to be averted, warned him of all he was to be warned of, and that, whenever human wisdom was defeated, he would still not be in need of counsel but of a divine sign, so that where he failed out of doubt he would find his feet by the aid of divination?³⁴

APUL. *De deo Soc.* 17.157–158

Apuleius holds Socrates in the highest regard because no less a person than Apollo testified to Socrates' wisdom. Socrates was able to see and intercommunicate with his "god," his *daemon* and guardian angel. Apuleius the philosopher gives the same reason for his praise of Socrates as does Lucius, the protagonist of Apuleius' novel, who said that Apollo, the god of Delphi himself, preferred Socrates to all other men because of his outstanding perfection and wisdom. The parallel argument of *Met.* x and *De deo Soc.* 17 proves that (1) the words of "Lucius-the-philosophizing-ass" reveal the author's own opinion and that (2) Lucius-the-ass is indeed making his first step towards his inner (and outer) re-metamorphosis at the end of *Met.* x.

According to Apuleius' own conviction, Socrates' wisdom consists not only in philosophical knowledge, but in religious insight as well. Philosophy and religion are essentially interconnected as is the case in Apuleius' novel: Lucius needs to overcome his superstition and his "belief" in all-determining fate and

32 I try to give a brief outline of the importance of Apuleius' daemonology to the interpretation of his novel in Drews 2009, 544–551.

33 The translations given are my own.

34 *Igitur mirum si Socrates, vir adprime perfectus et Apollinis quoque testimonio sapiens, hunc deum suum cognovit et coluit, ac propterea eius custos—prope dicam Lar contubernio familiaris—cuncta et arcenda arcuit, praecavenda praecavit et praemonenda praemonuit, sicubi tamen interfectis sapientiae officiis non consilio sed praesagio indigebat, ut ubi dubitatione clauderet, ibi divinatione consisteret?*

blindfortune;³⁵ he does so by turning in prayer to the *regina caeli* and by acknowledging his own responsibility. Lucius is even considering the possibility that he might have offended a deity and that therefore, to appease this deity, he might have deserved to die.³⁶ One could argue that Socrates is the ideal of a religious philosopher from whom Lucius has departed at first, but is gradually getting closer to by the end of the *Met*.

For Apuleius, the proof of Socrates' excellence as a philosopher rests on Socrates' familiarity with his *daimonion*, his "guardian angel." Apuleius thinks that Socrates was able not only to hear the voice of this spirit mediating between the human and the divine, but also to see it:

However, Socrates said that not 'a voice', but 'a certain voice' occurred to him, which specification should indeed make you understand that no common nor a human voice is meant here. ... In my opinion he grasped the signs sent by his daemon not only with his ears, but also with his eyes. For he revealed quite openly that, rather often, not a voice but a divine sign occurred to him. This sign could have been the very form of the daemon himself, which only Socrates should be able to see³⁷ just as it is Achilles who sees Athena in Homer [sc. *Iliad* 1.194–198].³⁸

APUL. *De deo Soc.* 20.165–166

The interrelation of seeing and hearing is transformed and raised to the level of intellectual insight when Apuleius tells his audience about Socrates:

Of course, Socrates could not see a silent man; for he was convinced that human beings are to be judged not by the keenness of the eyes, but of the mind (*mens*) and by intellectual insight (*animi obtutus*). Besides, if the

35 See Drews 2009.

36 *ac si quod offensum numen inexorabili me saevitia premit, mori saltem liceat, si non licet vivere* (*Met.* XI.2.4).

37 Apuleius explicitly alludes to Plato's *Phaedrus* (242b8–c3): *quippe etiam semotis arbitris uno cum Phaedro extra pomerium sub quodam arboris opaco umbraculo signum illud adnuntium sensit* (*De deo Soc.* 19.164).

38 *At enim Socrates non vocem sibi sed 'vocem quampiam' dixit oblatam, quo additamento profecto intellegas non usitatam vocem nec humanam significari. [...] quod equidem arbitrator non modo auribus eum verum etiam oculis signa daemonis sui usurpasse. nam frequentius non vocem, sed signum divinum sibi oblatum prae se ferebat. id signum potest et ipsius daemonis species fuisse, quam solus Socrates cerneret, ita ut Homericus Achilles Minervam.*

judgement of the eyes surpassed that of the intellect, as far as wisdom is concerned, we should indeed give way to the eagle!³⁹

APUL. *Flor.* 2.2, 5

Apuleius elucidates here that Socrates' outwitting cleverness relies not on supernatural abilities of his senses (i.e., hearing and seeing) or magic, but on the grasp of his intellect. He says: "In order that I can see you, say something!",⁴⁰ for only the *mens/animus* is ultimately able to "see" what is the case or what kind of person and character someone really is. That is why also the epiphany of Socrates' daemon, which Apuleius describes in bodily and sensible terms (see above), becomes manifest to Socrates and to no one else.

As can be clearly seen, the veneration of Socrates is based on Apuleius' genuine love for philosophy and religion. This implies issues such as epistemological distinctions (*senses—intellect*) and religious devotion (Socrates worshipped "his god"/daemon and was therefore loved by Apollo). The following passage from *De deo Socratis* indicates how philosophy and religious practice can interrelate. Again, Socrates serves as the perfect example:

In the same way, also when you look at human beings, don't hold such foreign things in high esteem, but consider the inner self of the man, see himself as my Socrates, as a poor one.⁴¹ 'Foreign', however, I call what parents have gained and what fortune has bestowed. Of these things I do not add anything to the praises of my Socrates, no nobility of birth, no ancestry, no long lineage, no enviable riches.⁴²

APUL. *De deo Soc.* 23.174

The value of a person's inner self, of the soul, is what counts. As simple as this may sound, for Apuleius it is the direct consequence of his Platonic epistemology. Since only the intellect is able to apprehend what something is by nature, the real self of a human being cannot consist in material wealth or noble birth,

39 *Scilicet Socrates tacentem hominem non videbat; etenim arbitrabatur homines non oculorum, sed mentis acie et animi obtutu considerandos ... Ceterum si magis pollerent oculorum quam animi iudicia, profecto de sapientia foret aquilae concedendum.*

40 'ut te videam', inquit, 'aliquid et loquere' (*Flor.* 2.1).

41 Cf. *Apol.* 18.7.

42 *Similiter igitur et in hominibus contemplandis noli illa aliena aestimare, sed ipsum hominem penitus considera, ipsum ut meum Socratem pauperem specta. aliena autem voco, quae parentes pepererunt et quae fortuna largita est. quorum nihil laudibus Socratis mei admisceo, nullam generositatem, nullam prosapiam, nullos longos natales, nullas invidiosas divitias.*

etc. Therefore Apuleius applies a different mode of assessment: one should try to see a person in his or her "poor state," stripped of all the "blending disguise" that meets the senses. If someone's overwhelming outward appearance was the criterion for judging him as a person, an eagle would indeed outdo the rather poor eyes of man, as Apuleius puts it.

The perspective on the "poor man" (understood in these Apuleian terms), on the one hand, is based on Platonic epistemology; on the other hand, it has a religious dimension: Looking at the soul as the person's core leads to valuing the immaterial over the material. Ultimately, this may coincide with the true veneration of the divine and lead to the familiarity with one's guardian angel as is exemplified by Socrates—according to Apuleius, the Platonic philosopher.

5 Conclusion

In his philosophical works, Apuleius reveals beyond doubt his own true admiration of Socrates. For Apuleius, the teacher of Plato is the epitome of the perfect philosopher, combining philosophical insight with religious worship. The god Apollo himself, as Apuleius writes, testifies to Socrates' "outstanding wisdom" and his intimacy with his daemon, his guardian angel as it were. In the context of his elaborated theory of Platonic daemonology, Apuleius explains that Socrates was able not only to hear the very voice of his guardian angel, but to see signs that, however, appeared to him only without being noticed by other people present, just like Athene revealed herself solely to Achilles in the *Iliad*. Whatever one makes of these visible and/or audible signs, Apuleius shows that, ultimately, the apprehending capacity of the *mens*, the intellectual grasp, is the crucial point involved here: Socrates could only "see" a person's true self if that person uttered something. In order to know what kind of person someone really is, one needs foremost to find out what he thinks, not what his outward appearance is like. This might illuminate the meaning of the "daemoniac apparitions" Apuleius speaks of: he does not want to endorse any superstitious frenzy or magical sensation; he does, however, hold the view that the spiritual and noetic sphere of Platonic ideas, gods, and daemons is a reality of its own right.⁴³ For him, the realm of the *mens/nous* does not consist in mere abstractions and metaphors.⁴⁴

43 For Apuleius' own description of Platonic ontology and epistemology see *De Platone* 1,6 (Moreschini 93–94) and 1,9 (97–98) and Drews 2015, 521. For Platonic epistemology as set out in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Republic* see Radke 2003, 441–456.

44 See Schmitz 2002, 461, 465 for the ontological difference between externally existing

By close examination, these observations do not interfere with Apuleius' famous novel: the figure of Socrates in *Met.* 1 is precisely the figure antithetical to the famous philosopher. No contradiction arises when the reader of the novel pays attention to the program of the prologue: There we are told that this novel is about changing figures that will be transformed into different shapes before regaining their real ones. As the narrator explicitly says, the Socrates of *Met.* 1. is *deformatus* (*Met.* 1.6.1), a deformed figure. So the reader is meant to recognize that this Socrates is not the "real one," the well-known teacher of Plato. The prologue also gives a clue as to what the reader should expect to take place within the novel: Socrates' regaining his true form. This, however, takes place only implicitly, almost in passing in *Met.* x when Lucius-the-ass hints at Socrates the philosopher and describes him as an "old man of divine wisdom whom the god of Delphi (i.e. Apollo) loved more than all other mortals because of his excelling sapience."⁴⁵ The wording reveals that Lucius is talking of the "real Socrates," the famous philosopher. Here, although implicitly, the deformed Socrates of *Met.* 1 is being restored to his original form—in *se rursus refect[us]*. Since Lucius gives the same argument for the veneration of Socrates as does Apuleius in *De deo Socratis*—because of his wisdom Socrates is the beloved one of Apollo—this should be taken literally and seriously: Apuleius is a true admirer of Socrates' excellence as a philosopher and does indeed consider him "a man of outstanding perfection."⁴⁶

References

- Baltes, M. and M.L. Lakmann. *Apuleius: über den Gott des Sokrates*. Darmstadt 2004.
 Beaujeu, J. *Apulée: opusculs philosophiques et fragments*. Paris 1973.
 Bernard, W. 'Zur Dämonologie des Apuleius von Madaura', *RhM* 137 (1994), 358–373.
 Drews, F. 'Review of O'Brien 2002', *Plekos* 6 (2003), 11–19.
 Drews, F. 'Der Sprecherwechsel zwischen Apuleius und Lucius im Prolog der Metamorphosen', *Mnemosyne* 59 (2006), 403–420.
 Drews, F. *Menschliche Willensfreiheit und göttliche Vorsehung bei Augustinus, Proklos, Apuleius und John Milton*. Frankfurt 2009.

things ("Dinge") and inner content-unities that consist purely in their comprehensibility, in their potential to be comprehended ("*innere erfasste Inhalte*") in Platonic and Aristotelian thought.

45 ... *divinae prudentiae senex, quem sapientia praetulit cunctis mortalibus deus Delphicus* (*Met.* x.33.3).

46 I am deeply indebted to Niels Grewe and the editors of this volume for their helpful advice.

- Drews, F. 'Asinus philosophans: allegory's fate and Isis' providence in the *Metamorphoses*', in: Keulen and Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012, 107–131.
- Drews, F. 'A Platonic reading of the Isis-book', in: W. Keulen and U. Egelhaaf-Gaiser, *Apuleius' Metamorphoses, Book XI: The Isis Book*. Leiden 2015, 517–528.
- Englert, W. 'Only halfway to happiness: a Platonic reading of Apuleius' *Golden Ass*', in: M.P. Futre Pinheiro, S. Montiglio and F.C. Gulbenkian, *Philosophy and the ancient novel*. Groningen 2015, 81–92.
- Frangoulidis, S. *Roles and performances in Apuleius' Metamorphoses*. Stuttgart 2001.
- Harrison, S.J. *Apuleius. A Latin sophist*. Oxford 2001.
- Hijmans, B.L. 'Apuleius, philosophus Platonicus', in: *ANRW* II 36 (1987), 395–475.
- Hijmans, B.L. and R.T. van der Paardt. *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass*. Groningen 1978.
- Keulen, W.H. *Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius: Book I*. Groningen 2007.
- Keulen, W.H. and U. Egelhaaf-Gaiser. *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass*, 111. Leiden 2012.
- Krafft, P. 'Apuleius' Darstellung der providentia tripartita', in: *MH* 36 (1979), 153–163.
- Mal-Maeder, D. van. *Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius: Book II*. Groningen 2001.
- Münstermann, H. *Apuleius: Metamorphosen literarischer Vorlagen. Untersuchung dreier Episoden des Romans unter Berücksichtigung der Philosophie und Theologie des Apuleius*. Stuttgart 1995.
- Murgatroyd, P. 'The ending of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*', in: *CQ* 54 (2004), 319–321.
- O'Brien, M.C. *Apuleius' debt to Plato in the Metamorphoses*. Lewiston 2002.
- Radke, G. *Die Theorie der Zahl im Platonismus: ein systematisches Lehrbuch*. Tübingen 2003.
- Sandy, G. *The Greek world of Apuleius: Apuleius and the Second Sophistic*. Leiden 1997.
- Schlam, C.C. *The Metamorphoses of Apuleius: on making an ass of oneself*. London 1992.
- Schmitz, M. 'Zur Logik der henologischen Metaphysik: zu Proklos' *Elementatio Theologica*, prop. 1', in: M. Barbanti, G.R. Giardina, and P. Manganaro, *Henosis kai philia: unione e amicizia. Ommaggio a F. Romano*. Catania 2002, 455–467.
- Scobie, A. *Apuleius: Metamorphoses I*. Meisenheim 1975.
- Smith, W.S. 2012. *An author intrudes into his narrative: Lucius 'becomes' Apuleius*, in: Keulen and Egelhaaf-Gaiser 2012, 202–219.
- Tatum, J. *Apuleius and The Golden Ass*. London 1979.
- Paardt, R.T. van der. 'Various aspects of narrative technique in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*', in: Hijmans and van der Paardt 1978, 75–94.
- Paardt, R.T. van der. 'The unmasked "I": Apuleius Met. xi 27', in: *Mnemosyne* 34 (1981), 96–106.
- Zimmerman, M. *Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius: Book x*. Groningen 2000.

Socrates in Maximus of Tyre

Michael B. Trapp

King's College London

The forty-one *Dialexeis* of Maximus of Tyre, apparently composed at some point in the second half of the second century CE,¹ are a precious document, not for any great profundity of thought, ingenuity of structure, or elegance of style, but for the view they give of the way philosophical material could be packaged for an educated audience of the period, keen for contact with this treasure of the Greek cultural tradition, but not for too deep or too prolonged immersion.² Their subject-matter ranges over theology, religious observance, psychology and epistemology, and ethics, with attention also to the history of philosophy, and to the question of the value (or otherwise) of other forms of discourse and performance besides philosophy (i.e., poetry, history, epideictic oratory). They constantly stress the practical, ethical ends of all true philosophy, without ever descending to the kind of detailed advice on conduct and self-discipline dispensed by a Plutarch or an Epictetus. Sectarian polemic, and indeed any sustained reference to the existence of different schools of philosophical thought, is almost entirely avoided, with the exception of some vehement denunciations of the godless hedonism of Epicurus; otherwise, Maximus assumes a largely unitary body of philosophical truths, shared by all who truly deserve the name philosopher. In practice, however, such positive doctrines as he does advance all fit very comfortably within the ambit of what we now call Middle Platonism.³ In such a context as this, one might well expect Socrates to be a considerable presence in the *Dialexeis*. The expectation is indeed realized, but with some surprises and individual quirks along the way.

Socrates is most obviously present in the *Dialexeis* in those lectures in which he is either the principal subject throughout or provides the starting-point from which the chosen topic develops (and to which it may or may not return). These are *Dialexis* 3, in which the subject is Socrates' refusal to defend himself (properly) when on trial for his life; *Dialexeis* 8–9, where the subject is the

1 For discussion of the evidence for Maximus's date, see Trapp 1997a, xi–xii; López Cruces and Campos Daroca 2005, 7–13.

2 For a fuller presentation of this analysis of the *Dialexeis*, see Trapp 1997a, xvi–xxii, and 1997b, 1971–1975. For a view of the social and cultural context in which I think this kind of philosophical writing belonged, see Trapp 2007, chs. 1 and 9.

3 Trapp 1997a, xxii–xxx; 1997b, 1946–1950.

nature and function of *daimones*; and *Dialexeis* 18–21, where the subject is Socratic (or Platonic) *erôs*. In each instance, consistently with the general tenor of the *Dialexeis*, the case of Socrates is used as a particularly vivid means of communicating a general philosophical truth, about values, conduct, soul, or cosmos, rather than an object of analysis in its own right.

1 The Trial

Dialexis 3 is premised on the familiar perception of the trial of Socrates as one of the great miscarriages of justice, in which history and the eye of reason alike show Socrates to have been in the right (and so the real winner), while the Athenians were in the wrong, with catastrophic consequences for their reputation and for democracy as a political system.⁴ It ends with an impassioned rhetorical turning of the tables, in which Socrates is imagined accusing the Athenians with far more justice of the same crimes as he was charged with: corruption of the young (in the persons of Alcibiades, Critias, Hipponicus, and their kind), and impiety (in bestowing Zeus's epithet "Olympian" on the mere mortal Pericles). It was for this, the very final words of the oration declare, that the heavens punished Athens with the Plague and defeat in the Peloponnesian War.⁵

The discussion leading up to this conclusion, although clearly based primarily on the Platonic version of the trial, seems to depart from it in one central and startling respect. Maximus begins by suggesting that Socrates' dealings with his persecutors, from the moment of his indictment by Meletus up until his death, were marked by a contemptuous but calm detachment, a refusal to take them at their own serious evaluation of themselves. This is said to include "deriding Lycon as he made his speech, voting against the Athenians as they voted, and proposing an alternative penalty to theirs" (§ 2), which are words that at first hearing might seem to suggest that Maximus is crediting Socrates with a degree of active participation in the trial process. But he then goes on to argue that a conventional speech of defense, with all its rhetorical tricks and

4 Cf., e.g., Apul. *Met.* 10.33; for the long afterlife of this view, and use, of the condemnation of Socrates, see Macgregor Morris 2007.

5 This part of the logic of Maximus's lecture needs to be underlined, since lazy summaries have sometimes saddled him with the chronological absurdity of asserting that the punishment was inflicted on Athens for executing Socrates, rather than for earlier misdemeanors: thus the brief section on Maximus in H.J. Rose's influential *Handbook of Greek Literature*, 407 n. 36 (presumably inherited from earlier handbook accounts, rather than freshly mis-observed by Rose himself).

appeals to the emotions, would have been unworthy of a true philosopher, and a true philosophical defense would neither have convinced an Athenian jury, nor even have been comprehensible to them; it would instead simply have kindled their anger still further. What good, then, would words have been, in a community that had no respect for virtue and gentility (§ 6)? No: Socrates “kept safely silent (*esiôpêsen*) where virtuous speech was impossible” (§ 7). Making a conventional defense speech (or maybe any sort of defense speech) would have been a betrayal, like Leonidas’ voluntarily giving way before Xerxes at Thermopylae (§ 8). Maximus thus seems by the end of the oration to have put himself in the position of denying by implication that Socrates made any such speech as the Platonic *Apology* at his trial—or indeed as the alternative performance sketched by Xenophon; and the initial impression that in § 2 he was accepting and summarizing something like the Platonic account turns out to have been mistaken. If this is a deliberate rejection, then it is a striking and unusual view of the trial, not directly paralleled in any other surviving ancient source.⁶ It may however just be possible to see here instead a temporary rhetorical intensification of the (certainly Platonic) thought that Socrates inhabited an altogether higher level of sensibility, thought, and speech to a democratic Athenian jury, rather than a direct attempt to challenge the authenticity of the Socrates of the *Apology*.

2 The *Daimonion*

In *Dialexeis* 8 and 9, a linked pair, the case of Socrates is used as a particularly well-known and colorful point of entry to a more wide-ranging discussion of *daimones* in general as divine agents and necessary constituents of the physical cosmos, very much as is done also in Apuleius’ *De deo Socratis* and Plutarch’s *De genio*. Like Plutarch and Apuleius, Maximus works with an essentially Middle Platonic conceptual framework, which treats *daimones* as intermediates both in their nature (subject to emotion like human beings, but immortal like the gods) and in their function of operating as a channel of communication between gods and humans.⁷ Socrates here works as little more than a conve-

6 Libanius’s declamation *On the Silence of Socrates* (*Decl.* 2) is not a parallel, since it refers not to the trial but to the year 404 and the story that Critias and the Thirty Tyrants forbade Socrates to discuss philosophy (cf. *Lib. Decl.* 1.59). For analyses and discussions of the lecture, see Oldfather 1938; Calder 2002; Nesselrath (in this volume).

7 For discussions of *daimones* in Middle Platonism, see Dillon 1996, 31–33, 46–47, 90–91, 171–174, 216–224, 287–288, 317–320; Brenk 1986.

nient peg on which to hang the discussion. Maximus has no interest in explaining, or even mentioning more than fleetingly, specific episodes of daemonic intervention from the Platonic dialogues, and by the end of *Dialexis* 8.6 he has explicitly turned away from Socrates in favor of the wider picture, returning to him only briefly in § 8 to comment that, as exceptionally virtuous individuals, Plato, Pythagoras, Zeno, and Diogenes each had a *daimonion* too, and that the sheer number of *daimones* in existence means that their contact with individual human beings is by no means limited to just that small set of thinkers. The individuality of the Socratic *daimonion* is thus lost in the larger proposition about the hierarchy of living beings in the Platonist cosmos, and the evidence that *daimones* provide of the reality of divine providence.⁸

3 *Erôs*

Dialexeis 18–21, the four-lecture sequence on *erôs*, fall between the first two cases in terms of the degree of interest they show in Socrates, and the consistency of their focus on him. Although like *Dialexeis* 8–9 they range widely, over much more material than can be directly connected to him, and have a general message to convey about right and wrong ways of dealing with any and every instance of erotic attraction, they are explicitly cast as an investigation and defense of Socrates' well-known and apparently scandalous profile in this area, and they both begin and end with him.

Dialexis 18.4–5 proposes the erotic Socrates as a problem, by means of a composite picture put together from Xenophon and Aeschines as well as the Platonic material, and invoking such famous moments as Socrates' encounters with Phaedrus, Alcibiades, Phaedo, Agathon, and Autolycus, and his confessions of his own helplessness in the face of young male beauty.⁹ All this Socratic enthusiasm for the good-looking young, Maximus observes, is apt to seem morally suspect in itself, and inconsistent with the portrayal of Socrates as a paragon of virtue and self-restraint given elsewhere by the Socratic authors;

8 These two lectures in their turn combine with others in the sequence to produce a more comprehensive account of life forms and kinds of intelligence in the Platonist cosmos: most obviously with *Dial.* 11, which in its opening words explicitly refers back to *Dial.* 8 and 9, but also the conclusion to *Dial.* 7 (picturing the release of soul from body at death), and *Dial.* 10 (describing the functions of soul in recollection [*anamnêsis*]).

9 The principal texts drawn on are: Pl. *Symp.* 198b–212c, 201d, 203c–e, 215a–222b, 215e; *Chrm.* 154b, 155d; *Phdr.* 230b, 234d; *Lysis* 203ab; *Menex.* 235e; *Resp.* 327a, 468b; *Thg.* 128b; Xen. *Symp.* 1.3, 1.9, and 3.7; Aeschines, *SSR* VI A 53, 60, 66.

and even if there is a hidden meaning, concealed beneath the scandalous surface, the dangers of this being misunderstood are obvious (18.5). But the “problem” is of course a manufactured one, set up only so that it can be instructively solved by the series of progressively profounder considerations unfolded over the remainder of *Dialexis* 18 and the three following orations.

Maximus begins his defense in 18.6 with the observation that it is strange, to say the least, that lack of erotic restraint was not among the charges brought against Socrates in his own day, either by the prosecutors of 399 BCE or by Aristophanes on the comic stage. He continues in 18.7–9 with a demonstration that, whatever else may be said, Socrates was at least not alone in the history of Greek culture in parading erotic enthusiasm: the same may be said about Homer, Hesiod, Sappho, and Anacreon. Sappho, in particular, is shown to offer close parallels to Socrates both in her personal life (with both pupils and professional rivals) and in the wording of her poetry.¹⁰ In this first, provisional move, the implicit argument is that Socrates’ erotic talk and behavior cannot after all be so scandalous, if shared with so many others, and if those others were themselves so distinguished and so widely admired.

Dialexis 19.1–2 offers a more direct and substantial but still not definitive defense, in terms of the historical context and immediate purpose of Socrates’ actions. Socrates in his own day was in fact a wholly virtuous lover, on a mission to keep the youth of Athens safe from the many predatory, hedonistic lovers by whom they were threatened. Whereas these latter aimed only at selfish physical gratification, what he saw in the beauty of the young was the potential for moral virtue, calling for expert guidance to develop it. Thus, though to the careless eye he may seem to have pursued the beautiful young just like a hedonistic lover, his real aims could not have been more different.¹¹ The remainder of *Dialexis* 19, the whole of 20, and the beginning of 21 are devoted to further clarification and exemplification of the distinction between virtuous and vicious *erôs*, with the latter eventually (21.1–7) being declared not to deserve the name *erôs* at

10 *Dial.* 18.9 is a famous set piece, with long-lasting consequences for both ideas about the career and character of Sappho and knowledge of her poetry. Its reception history in the modern era runs through Poliziano’s lectures on the Ovidian *Epistle of Sappho to Phaon*, via the second edition of Henri Estienne’s *Pindari Olympia ... et Caeterorum octo lyricorum carmina* (1560) and F. Welcker’s “Sappho von einem herrschenden Vorurtheil befreit” (1816) to twentieth-century editions of the fragments and ongoing debates about her social and sexual relations: see Trapp 1997a, 158–159; Parker 1993.

11 This part of Maximus’s exposition particularly appealed to Marsilio Ficino, who used it in his commentary on Plato’s *Symposium* (*Comm. in Symp.* 7.16), in the section explaining the utility of Socratic (Platonic) love, *Quam utilis amor Socraticus*.

all, but to be mere desire (*epithumia*).¹² The very end of the sequence, 21.7–8, returns to Socrates for his final and decisive exoneration, in terms of the Platonic understanding of physical attractiveness as the earthly instantiation of transcendent, ideal Beauty. What Socrates was so enthusiastically and to first appearances so scandalously “hunting” was not physical beauty at all, but recollection of its transcendent immaterial source.

4 Revenge and Harm

Besides *Dialexeis* 3, 8–9, and 18–21, there is one other that, although not directly centered on a question about Socrates, is nonetheless shot through with his presence and his example. This is *Dialexis* 12, devoted to the question of the morality of revenge. Maximus’ central insistence in this lecture (which incidentally struck one humanist commentator as having a peculiarly Christian slant to it)¹³ is that paying back a wrong done to you with another wrong is incompatible with a truly virtuous character. In the first place, if you are yourself a morally virtuous person, it is impossible for real harm to be done to you by another’s wrongdoing (12.3–5); and secondly, the taking of revenge, far from healing a situation, will merely increase the damage done, and threaten to initiate a potentially endless cycle of reprisals (12.6–8). The case of Socrates is explicitly invoked only towards the end of the lecture, in 12.8–10, as a shining example of the right, virtuous reaction to the misdeeds of others: first, in a quotation of his declaration in *Apology* 30c that Anytus and Meletus cannot harm him, because no good man can be harmed by a bad man (12.8), and then in the concluding picture of the good man rising above his unjust persecutors by treating them with the scorn that they deserve, like an adult on trial before a jury of children (12.10, invoking the imagery of *Grg.* 521e–522a). The Socrates of the *Apology*, and still more insistently the *Gorgias*, have, however, been hovering over the discussion from a much earlier stage. In 12.2 Maximus formulated the question at issue in terms of the antithesis between inflicting

12 The overall shape of the argument, moving through preliminary and only partially adequate answers, via a recantation (palinode) to final insight, is self-consciously modeled on that of the *Phaedrus*.

13 Beatus Rhenanus, *Maximi Tyrri Philosophi Platonici Sermones*, Basel, Froben, 1519, 4: Habet sermonem de hac re Tyrius tam sanctum, tam pium, tam Christianum, ... (“The Tyrian has a discourse on this subject which is so holy, so pious and so Christian ...”). The visibility of this particular lecture was helped by the fact that, in the version of the collection known to Beatus, it stood in second and not in twelfth position. See Trapp 2000.

wrong and being wronged (*adikein*—*adikeisthai*), following the lead of *Gorgias* 469b and 473a–476a, and compared the difference between them to that between proving someone wrong in argument and being oneself proved wrong (*elenchein*—*elenchesthai*: another key preoccupation of the *Gorgias*, e.g., 458a, 462a, 467a). The oration as a whole thus both uses Socrates as a key, clinching example (proving that the virtuous course leads to triumph not disaster), and retraces the argumentation of the Platonic Socrates of the *Gorgias* and *Apology*.

5 Biographical Details and Sources

The eight lectures discussed so far are the only ones in the collection where Socrates supplies the main topic or its principal example, but he is a pervasive presence in the remainder as well. In all, he is mentioned and used as authority or illustration in a further seventeen lectures,¹⁴ meaning that he is there in well over half the items, failing to appear in only sixteen of the forty-one. This is a total number of appearances exceeded in the *Dialexeis* only by Homer (of whom more shortly).

The biographical details that it suits Maximus' purposes at different points to mention, besides the outline of the trial, imprisonment, and death,¹⁵ are Socrates' humble origins as the son of a stonemason, his poverty, his ugly, shabby appearance (the snub-nose, pot-belly, and ragged cloak), his unhappy marriage to Xanthippe, his military exploits (as recalled in the *Symposium*), his defiance of the Thirty Tyrants, and the celebrated verdict on his wisdom delivered by the Delphic oracle.¹⁶ Besides his erotic proclivities (alluded to in 29.7 and 22.8 in addition to the full treatment in *Dialexeis* 18–21), the other regular Socratic habits to be mentioned are his strange oaths, his distinctively philosophical style of prayer, his penchant for *elenchus*, and his technique of intellectual midwifery (*maieutikê*).¹⁷ None of these (all entirely familiar) facets of the philosopher is expounded at any length; they are all alluded to in knowing tones in illustration of some larger truth, about him or about life

14 *Dial.* 1.9, 5.8, 6.5–6, 10.8, 12.8 and 10, 14.9, 15.9–10, 22.6, 25.7, 26.3 and 5, 27.6, 28.4, 29.7, 32.8, 34.9, 36.6, 37.1, 38.4 and 7, 39.5, and 40.6.

15 Referred to at *Dial.* 6.5–6, 12.8, 12.10, 15.10, 25.7, 27.5, 34.9, 36.6, and 39.5, as well as providing the main topic of 3.

16 Humble origins: 39.5; poverty and appearance: 1.9 and 39.5; Xanthippe: 1.9, 18.9, 32.9; military exploits: 18.5; Tyrants: 18.5; Delphic Oracle: 14.9.

17 Oaths: 18.7; philosophical prayer: 5.8; *elenchus* (with just the single imperfect tense *élenchen*): 1.9; *maieutikê*: 10.8.

and values more generally. It is simply assumed, as part of the implicit pact between the highly cultivated orator and his well educated audience, that the audience will of course be familiar with all this material; and this in turn tells us something important about the level of knowledge of Socrates expected of the cultivated (*pepaideumenos*) listener of this period.

Mention of Socrates necessarily often brings with it mention of his most prominent associates, whether pupils or adversaries, remembered from both the Platonic and the Xenophontic texts.¹⁸ The names of Meletus, Anytus, Lycon, and Aristophanes naturally come up in allusions to the trial, though it is also noticeable that mentions of the imprisonment and death concentrate on the event and the hemlock cup (e.g.m 25.7), to the exclusion of the surrounding cast (no Phaedo, Crito, Apollodorus, Simmias, or Cebes). The discussion of *erôs* in *Dialexeis* 18–21 brings in Aspasia and Diotima as Socrates' supposed instructors in erotics,¹⁹ Phaedrus, Lysis, Charmides, Agathon, Alcibiades, Critobulus, and Autolycus as the objects of his passion,²⁰ Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines as his commemorators,²¹ and Thrasymachus, Callias, Polus, Prodicus, Gorgias, and Protagoras as his professional rivals and potential critics.²² In the process, there are allusions to famous details and moments from not just the Platonic *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, but also the *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Protagoras*, *Ion*, and *Republic*, plus the Xenophontic *Symposium* and the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines. Other lists of pupils and associates can be found elsewhere in the collection: at *Dialexis* 1.9 Aeschines and Antisthenes are contrasted with Alcibiades, Critias, Critobulus, and Callias on the grounds that it was the latter who had (but failed to real-

18 As the following discussion explains, Maximus does also exploit the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines, besides Plato and Xenophon. No references to episodes or characters in Socrates's life, however, have to be accounted for as deriving from any other Socratic author besides these three.

19 18.4. Diotima of course comes directly from the Platonic *Symposium*. Aspasia is a more complicated case. Although the *Menexenus* (236a–d, 249d–e) gives some qualified warrant for regarding Socrates as her pupil, Maximus' confident declaration must depend also in part on Aeschines' *Aspasia*, where Socrates recommends her to Callias as tutor for his son, on the grounds that he himself had been taught by her (fr. 29–33 Dittmar = *SSR* VI A 68–72). What is not clear is whether Aeschines' dialogue either said or implied that the instruction Socrates received from her was in the arts of love: that connection seems to depend as much on Aspasia's general reputation, in Aeschines and elsewhere, as on any direct assertion in an early Socratic text. On the *Aspasia*, see Dittmar 1912, 1–59; Ehlers 1966; Henry 1995, 29–56.

20 *Dial.* 18.4 and 9.

21 *Dial.* 18.5.

22 *Dial.* 18.4 and 9; "Callias" is perhaps a slip, or a manuscript error, for "Callicles."

ize) a real potential to affect contemporary Athenian politics for the better; at 22.6 (cf. 18.5) Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines are grouped together as beneficial philosophical writers; at 26.5, Maximus contrasts Socrates' respectful treatment of Parmenides and Timaeus with the rough handling that Thrasymachus, Polus, and Callicles experienced from him; at 32.8, the contrast is between the physically ill-favored pupils whom Socrates did not fall in love with (Theaetetus, Chaerephon, Aristodemus), and the handsome ones for whom he did feel passion (Alcibiades, Phaedrus, Charmides); and at 38.4, Aspasia, Diotima, Connus, Evenus, Ischomachus, and Theodorus are cited as authorities that Socrates respected and learned from.

It is clear from this concatenation of references that, like almost all ancient authors, Maximus finds no difficulty at all in combining information from different Socratic authors and treating them all on the same footing, as equally reliable sources whose testimony is usefully complimentary. Details from Xenophon's *Symposium* fit comfortably into the composite picture of Socrates the lover, just as material from the *Oeconomicus* helps paint the picture of his constant efforts to find suitable advisers for himself and his friends (itself a Xenophontic rather than a Platonic emphasis). Similarly, material from Aeschines' *Alcibiades* combines smoothly with elements from the Platonic *Symposium*, *Alcibiades*, and *Protagoras* to depict relations with the most charismatic and dangerous of the pupils, just as (though somewhat more tendentiously) Aeschines' *Aspasia* meets Plato's *Menexenus* in references to Aspasia as a Socratically endorsed instructress.

Moreover, this compound Socrates is in turn fitted smoothly into the larger context of the history of Athens over the last quarter of the fifth century, so as to draw appropriately improving lessons. We have already noted how in *Dialexis* 3.8 Socratic innocence in his dealings with the young and the gods is contrasted with Athenian guilt, and its punishment by plague and military defeat. In the same way, in *Dialexis* 12, Socrates' virtuous refusal to return wrong for wrong is contrasted with the fatal consequences for both Athens and Sparta, again in the Peloponnesian War, of failing to behave similarly towards their enemies (12.7). And in *Dialexis* 6, Socrates' observance of the "laws" of philosophy is contrasted with the transgressions of Alcibiades (6.6). All this once more follows the precedent set by Plato in the *Apology* and the *Gorgias*, where Socrates is insistently contrasted with the conventional values and leaders of democratic Athens,²³ but pulls in extra detail from other classic sources, above all the principal historian of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides.

23 *Ap.* 29d–30c, *Grg.* 502d–504a, 515b–519d, etc.

There is evidently no “Socratic problem” for Maximus, and no sense that there might be such a thing as a distinctively Xenophontic or Aeschinean Socrates, to be contrasted with other rival versions. In the same way, he shows no tendency to worry about where within his principal source, Plato, a line ought to be drawn between the genuinely Socratic and the Platonic. What the character “Socrates” says in a Platonic dialogue can according to the need of the moment be equally well credited to either one of the two. At *Dialexis* 21.7 what scholarship since antiquity has normally treated as Platonic metaphysics (the cosmic role of ideal Beauty) is cheerfully described as “divined” by Socrates (*kata tēn Sôkratous manteian*), while at 27.5 the theory of the soul expounded by the Socrates of *Phaedrus*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus* described as “a native of Plato’s ... hearth” (*epichôrion tēs Platônos ... hestias*). The construction of the ideal city of *Republic* is credited to Socrates at 37.1, as is its erotic reward for war heroes at 18.4, but in *Dialexis* 17 it is Plato not Socrates who expels Homer from it.

6 Socratic and Other Authority

What then is the standing of this unproblematically composite Socrates compared to the other intellectual heroes of the *Dialexeis*? While clearly both a major authority and biographically the most colorful of all the figures from the honored past that Maximus brings into play, Socrates does not officially occupy a rank higher than the mass of his fellow philosophers. What counts in the *Dialexeis* is philosophical truth, not (with one exception) the standing of any one of its individual exponents. Thus in the programmatic *Dialexis* 1, although Socrates is the one philosopher to have the details of his appearance and social habits picked out, this is done in order to contest the mistaken belief that uncouth appearance and a taste for the company of the poor are obligatory for the true philosopher (1.9); and a moment later, at the end of the oration, he reappears as just one of a quartet of representative philosophers, differing in appearance and teaching style, but all equally deserving of a hearing (1.10). Within this framework of understanding, other figures can perfectly well be declared superior to Socrates in particular respects, or as the rhetorical needs of the situation require. In *Dialexis* 36, where the hero of the moment is Diogenes, Socrates’ obligation to obey the commands of the Athenian court can be used as evidence that he did not enjoy as unconstrained a life as the Cynic (36.6), just as in 32.9 Socrates’ troubles with Xanthippe can be held up as the reason that Diogenes refused to tie himself down to matrimony.

There is, however, one figure of authority in the *Dialexeis* to whom all philosophers, Socrates included, must bow: the first and greatest of all the cultural icons of Hellenism, Homer, who is presented in *Dialexeis* 4 and 26 as not only the first and greatest of poets, but also the first and greatest of philosophers.²⁴ According to the picture constructed in those two lectures, and invoked also, though much more briefly, in 27.5 and 29.7, the grand history of philosophy through recorded time begins with a paradisaical stage in which philosophical truth was in the hands of a class of poet sages, among whom Homer was pre-eminent.²⁵ At this period there was no division into divergent and reciprocally hostile sects, and a unitary truth was expressed in the ideal—i.e., mythological, allegorical, poetic—form for the simple ears and minds of early man (4.2–3, 4.6; 26.4). It was only later, in a process of degeneration brought on by the increasing sophistication (and meddlesomeness) of human intellect, that philosophy both transferred from verse to prose format, and began to divide into a multiplicity of sects (4.2–3; 26.2).²⁶ As a consequence, scandalously, it came about that the old poets, Homer above all, ceased to look to the eye of the general public like the philosophers they nevertheless still were, and are (26.2). Among the degenerate modern prose philosophers, those are best who, like Plato, keep some kind of contact in their own writing with the old, poetic, mythological (allegorical) modes of exposition (4.4; 26.3).

From a modern point of view, this is a reading of the history of philosophy that depends on a wholly illegitimate reversal: starting with the truths of modern philosophy, it reads them back into early poetry by acts of allegoresis, then claims priority for the texts into which they have been read back. In the context of Maximus' project in the *Dialexeis*, however, it is probably best read as a reassurance to his nervous audience of philosophical debutants and dilettanti

24 On the details of the two lectures, see Trapp 1997a, 31–33 and 213–214; Heath 2013, 132–137 and 150–162. For the larger background in ancient theorizing: Heath 2013, 104–137; Buffière 1956; Lamberton 1986, 1–82; Keaney and Lamberton 1996, 1–29; Russell and Konstan 2005, xi–xxix.

25 There is some inconsistency between *Dialexeis* 4 and 26: whereas in the latter, Maximus sees Homer alone as the great philosophical genius of distant times, in the former he envisages a larger class of sages, some of them, Orpheus and Musaeus, earlier than Homer in time. Consistency over such details is less important to Maximus than conveying the central truth that early poetry was the work of sages fully equal to the philosophers of more recent times.

26 This is a version of a widespread Greek view of the historical development of forms of discourse: some of the classics texts are Ar. *Rh.* 3.1.9; Plut. *De Pyth. or.* 24; Strabo 1.2.6, p. 18; Varro in Isidore, *Etym.* 1.38.1–2.

that, on the one hand, philosophy is continuous with the poetry they already know and love, rather than a strange new alternative to it, and on the other, that provided they know their poets, above all Homer and Hesiod, they already have the essence of philosophical truth in their hands, in outline even if not in niggling doctrinal detail. At all events, what is clear for present purposes is that it is a picture of the history of philosophy that, unlike others available in antiquity, offers no privileged position to Socrates. He is neither the heroic figure who established the true identity and purpose of *philosophia* by turning its attention away from the heavens and towards ethics and the world of men, nor the common ancestor claimed by almost all modern sects as their point of departure.²⁷ For in the perspective of the *Dialexeis* it is either the early poets collectively who serve as the point of departure, from which subsequent philosophy diversifies, or Homer on his own; and ethics is already the true heart of the system at this primal stage, so that no subsequent discoverer is needed. This removal of Socrates from a key position in the main line of philosophical development is perhaps most strikingly expressed at *Dialexis* 26.3, where discussion of Homer and his heritage leads Maximus to declare that it was with Homer rather than Socrates that Plato's real affinities lay, however loudly he may on the surface have proclaimed otherwise.

Nor indeed is there much real sign of an inquiring Socrates. It is true that his technique of maieutics, using careful questioning to extract knowledge from an interlocutor that the interlocutor did not realize he had, is briefly described in *Dialexis* 10, in the course of an exposition of the Platonic doctrine of recollection; and his distinctive philosophical activity is once described, in *Dialexis* 1.10, as *elenchein*. But in neither case is the reference more than a very brief one, and in neither case is it suggested that this is a side to Socrates that has a more general importance to philosophy. This too makes good sense in terms of the overall perspective of the *Dialexeis*, in which philosophy is much more a question of a body of truths, of doctrines that the cultivated, well-educated individual should know or at any rate know about, than of any process of exploration or inquiry.

27 Both the idea of the epoch-making turn to ethics and the sense of Socrates as shared point of origin for diverse later developments are most famously expressed by Cicero: *Tusc.* 4.4.10 (both ideas), *Acad.* 1.15–16 (diffusion). There is excellent discussion of the historical processes leading up to the conferring of this role on Socrates in Steven 2007.

7 A Safe and Circumscribed Socrates

Maximus' portrayal of Socrates is thus in various ways a circumscribed one, made safe and comfortable for the kind of rhetorical product and the kind of target audience he was working with.²⁸ Just as he is not allowed to intrude too far on territory that for Maximus's purposes is better given to Plato and to Homer, so too nothing is said about him that might threaten the essential respectability of philosophy. Another notable but entirely understandable absence from the *Dialexeis* is any of the more critical and discreditable material that had accumulated in Socrates' disfavor by the second century CE. Trouble with Xanthippe is given a bare mention, but without any of the colorful anecdotal material that was available to flesh it out.²⁹ His enthusiastic avowals of erotic passion are catalogued, and then explained virtuously away, in *Dialexeis* 18–21, but without leaving the kind of underlying assertion of a flawed nature requiring careful molding and control that is embodied in the story of the encounter with the physiognomer Zopyrus,³⁰ or the account in Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates* that passed on to Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*, and to Christian controversialists.³¹

A carefully circumscribed presence can still, however, be a considerable one, and the texture of the *Dialexeis* would clearly have been very different had Socrates not appeared in them, as authority, example, problem, and (occasionally) quoted voice.³² One final respect in which this generalization applies is at the level of verbal style. Maximus in the *Dialexeis* aims for a style that will be both lively and inspiring, and at the same time convincingly philosophical: as he puts it in his discussion of acceptable modes of discourse in *Dialexis* 25,

28 It is an open question whether in presenting this kind of a Socrates, Maximus was consciously selecting from what he knew to be a wider range of possible Socrateses to suit the needs of the particular audience and kind of communication in question in the *Dialexeis*, or whether the absence here of a more elenctic and openly investigative Socrates comes down to simple ignorance or lack of concern on his part.

29 E.g., the episodes of the cake (Ael. *VH* 11.12, Ath. 14.643–644) and the drenching (DL 2.36, Sen. *Constant.* 18.6, Arr. *Epict. diss.* 4.5.33), and the story of the two wives (Jer. *Adv. Iovinian.* 1.48, Theodoret. *Graec. aff. cur.* 12.65). Further material in DL 2.34 and 36–37; cf. Trapp 2007b, 51–61 (esp. 58–61).

30 Cic. *Fat.* 5.10, TD 4.37.80; Arrian, *Epict. diss.* 4.5.33; Alex. Aphr. *De fato* 6; see McLean 2007, 65–85.

31 See Trapp 2007b, 54–55; Huffman 2012, 251–281.

32 Socrates “speaks,” through quotations from Plato and Aeschines, at *Dial.* 12.8, 16.10, 18.4 and 9, and 38.4.

a morally responsible style can legitimately be pleasure-giving, but the pleasure must be of a particularly compelling and uplifting kind, like a trumpet call (25.7).³³ To realize this aim, he depends heavily on a deliberately unperiodic sentence structure, with short constituent clauses, frequently linked by parallelism and assonance, and frequently in apposition—a kind of modified “Asianism,” for all the careful Atticism of his diction. But a substantial contribution is made also by the language of the Platonic Socrates, in particular the characteristic formulae of apostrophe, interrogation, and exhortation in which Plato’s *mimesis* of Socratic conversation is so rich: *ô aristè, ô tân, ar’ oun apodechêi, epanagômen epi ton logon, eche dê autothi* (“my dear fellow,” “sir,” “will you then accept ... ?,” “let us return to the argument,” “hold it right there”), and so on.³⁴ A good many of these had indeed by this time been taken into the standard repertoire of the well-educated sophistic orator: the speeches of an Aelius Aristides are full of them too. But the philosophical content of the *Dialexeis*, and the pose of the inspiring but also accessible philosophical instructor that Maximus adopts in them,³⁵ reclaims their Socratic pedigree and ensures that on this level too the *Dialexeis* are shot through with Socrates’ presence.

References

- Brenk, F. ‘In the light of the moon: demonology in the Early Imperial Period’, *ANRW* II 16.3 (1986), 2068–2145.
- Buffière, F. *Les mythes d’Homère et la pensée grecque*. Paris 1956.
- Calder, W.M., B. Huss, M. Mastrangelo, R.S. Smith, and S.M. Trzaskoma. *The unknown Socrates: translations, with introductions and notes, of four important documents in the late antique reception of Socrates the Athenian*. Wauconda, IL 2002.
- Dillon, J. *The Middle Platonists*. London 1996.
- Dittmar, H. *Aischines von Sphettos*. Berlin 1912.

33 The text is uncertain here. I wonder if acceptable sense can be gained by (i) accepting Hobein’s conjecture *harmonîai* for the manuscript’s *harmonian*, and (ii) a few words before that replacing the suspect *kai turannou* with the adjective *turannikên*, so as to give *ei de kai hêdonês pros tèn agôgên tauten deêsometha, turannikên dotô moi tis hêdonên, hoian kai epi salpiggos harmonîai ...* (“But if we are going to need pleasure also to assist in this process of leading, let someone give me a tyrannical pleasure, such as is experienced at a trumpet-call”).

34 e.g. *Dial.* 2.4, 5.3., 7.5, 7.7, 8.4, 8.6, etc.: see further Trapp 1997b, 1965–1966 with n. 68.

35 Trapp 1997b, 1950–1954.

- Ehlers, B. *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: der Dialog Aspasia des Sokratikers Aischines*. Munich 1966.
- Giannantoni, G. *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, I–IV, Napoli 1990.
- Heath, M. *Ancient philosophical poetics*. Cambridge 2013.
- Henry, M. *Prisoner of history: Aspasia of Miletus and her biographical tradition*. New York 1995.
- Huffman, C.A. 'Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates*', in: C.A. Huffman, *Aristoxenus of Tarentum: discussion*. New Brunswick 2012, 251–281.
- Keaney, J. and R. Lamberton. *Plutarch: Essay on the life and poetry of Homer*. Atlanta 1996.
- Lamberton, R. *Homer the theologian*. Berkeley 1986.
- López Cruces, J.L. and J. Campos Daroca. *Máximo de Tiro, disertaciones filosóficas*. Madrid 2005.
- Macgregor Morris, I. 'The refutation of democracy? Socrates in the enlightenment', in: Trapp 2007, 209–227.
- McLean, D. 'The Socratic corpus: Socrates and physiognomy', in: Trapp 2007, 65–85.
- Oldfather, W. 'Socrates in court', *Classical Weekly* 31.21 (1938), 203–211.
- Parker, H. 'Sappho schoolmistress', *TAPhA* 123 (1993), 309–351.
- Rose, H.J. *Handbook of Greek literature*. London 1934.
- Russell, D.A. and D. Konstan. *Heraclitus: Homeric problems*. Atlanta 2005.
- Steven, K. *Constructing Socrates: the creation of a philosophical icon*. Diss. Cambridge 2007.
- Trapp, M. *Maximus of Tyre: the philosophical orations*. Oxford 1997. (= 1997a)
- Trapp, M. 'Philosophical sermons: the *Dialexeis* of Maximus of Tyre', *ANRW* II 34.3 (1997), 1945–1976. (= 1997b)
- Trapp, M. 'Beatus Rhenanus and Maximus of Tyre (Basel, 1519)', in: J. Hirstein, *Beatus Rhenanus, lecteur et éditeur des textes anciens*. Turnhout 2000, 151–171.
- Trapp, M. *Socrates from antiquity to the enlightenment*. Aldershot 2007.
- Trapp, M. *Philosophy in the Roman empire*. Aldershot 2007. (= 2007a)
- Trapp, M. 'Beyond Plato and Xenophon: some other ancient Socrateses', in: Trapp 2007, 51–61. (= 2007b)

Socrates in the Ancient Biographical Tradition: From the Anonymous *PHib.* 182 to Diogenes Laertius

Tiziano Dorandi

CNRS

1 Socrates in the Ancient Biographical Tradition

The life of Socrates, understood as the continuous narrative of the primary events in his life, from birth until death, received only modest attention from ancient authors. A few of the incidents of his life—his difficult marriage with Xanthippe; the actual or presumed bigamy with Myrto, daughter of the Aristides nicknamed “The Just”; the meeting with the young Plato; the association with Alcibiades; and his independent and honest spirit during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens—were indeed in broad and continuous circulation. Socratic literature, however, was dominated by the incidents linked to his trial for impiety and his capital punishment, even if the scope of these works was more philosophical than biographical (see *SSR* I B–D).

Except for Diogenes Laertius (third-century CE) we have no traces of proper “biographies” of Socrates comparable in structure and content to the many “Lives” of Plato and Aristotle. Compiled up until late Antiquity, these biographies of Plato and Aristotle owed their fortune to the fact that from a certain era they served as introductions for readers of the works of the two philosophers in the Neoplatonic curriculum of higher education. The fact that Socrates wrote nothing, or that he led the “normal” life of an average Athenian citizen, may be among the reasons explaining or perhaps justifying the lack of interest in his biography throughout Antiquity. But we have no evidence that allows us to go beyond the level of hypothesis.

I am well aware that Plato’s *Apology* and *Phaedo*, and likewise Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, constitute important stages in the story of Greek biography, as they offer “a description that could be adapted and incorporated into full biographical accounts,” especially because they “encapsulate in an exemplary manner the main characteristics of the person’s life” (Hägg 2012, 23). This is not, however, the biographical genre I wish to consider. Nor do I want to insist on Albrecht Dihle’s disputed hypothesis according to which Plato’s *Apology* represents “the earliest and most accomplished literary work to embody in its entirety the ‘biographical element’” (Dihle 1970, 13; cf. Hägg 2012, 12).

An interest in the “biography” of Socrates began or more likely was intensified in the first Hellenistic period. Unfortunately these works are mostly lost. From this great shipwreck we have recovered a few pieces of flotsam. Chief among them are those found in the *Life of Socrates* of Diogenes Laertius. Also of note is another book, this one in a very poor state of preservation. It is found in a papyrus of the third-century BC, from el-Hibeh. Both Diogenes Laertius and the el-Hibeh papyrus are essential to reconstructing the ancient biographical tradition of Socrates.

It would be useful to add yet another text, the biography that the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara (first-century BCE) wrote of Socrates. I have recently worked on his meager and disconnected fragments, which have been shorn of context. They constituted one book, not otherwise identified, of his *Collection of the Philosophers*. As with Diogenes, it is likely that Philodemus’ account of Socrates was accompanied by his accounts of the Socratics. Because I have already dealt with this (Dorandi 2015, 168–170), I will not repeat myself. Nor will I take into consideration the short biographical sketch in the *Suda* (σ 829 = SSR I D 2) derived from the *Onomatologos* (*A Biographical Dictionary of Learned Men*) of Hesychius of Miletus (sixth-century CE). Diogenes Laertius and Hesychius shared an unidentified source, probably a lost work from the Hellenistic period. What we read from Hesychius on Socrates in the *Suda* does not differ from Diogenes’ account.

2 Socrates’ Portrait in *PHib*. 182

Let me to begin with a few pages on the papyrus of el-Hibeh, although there are doubts about its “biographical” character. This text is important to discuss here for several reasons. The first is the antiquity of the document, which dates back to a time close to the composition of the book *On Socrates* of the Peripetetic Aristoxenus of Tarentum (fourth-century BCE). Some ancient authors call Aristoxenus’ book a *bios*; we also know that it was founded on the testimony of his father, Spintharus (born c. 425 BCE), who apparently knew Socrates. A few fragments of it remain (fr. 51–60 Wehrli), mostly transmitted by later authors who cite it second hand, through Porphyry’s *Philosophos Historia*. Their reliability has been suitably re-evaluated in recent years.¹ The second reason is that the el-Hibeh papyrus is inexplicably omitted from Giannantoni’s collection (as have the few remains of Philodemus) and has enjoyed little

¹ See Stavru (in this volume).

success in the secondary literature on Socrates. Calling attention to it seems a timely and necessary action.

PHib. 182, dated on palaeographic grounds to the mid-third-century BCE, preserves twenty-eight fragments, recovered from a mummy cartonnage, whose correct sequence is uncertain.² The text, written on the front of a roll, was written with a quick hand by a skilled scribe. The calligraphy has no pretense of elegance, but it does not seem an autograph. The fragments that yield a readable text are few and their reconstruction is often conjectural. In one we read anecdotes; in others the subject seems to bring up moral issues.

Fr. A (col. 2) features one complete *chreia* (lines 1–14) and the beginning of a second one (15–17). The first has as protagonists Socrates and Xanthippe. The philosopher says to his wife, who rushes about borrowing cushions and cups, hoping to give a worthy reception for some foreigners visiting Athens, “No need to worry about anything, Xanthippe; don’t concern yourself about these things. If they are good people (he said), they will have no problems sharing what there is; but if they are not good people, I do not care anything about them.” This *chreia* finds strong parallels in Diogenes Laertius (2.34) and the gnomological tradition.³ At the beginning of the second *chreia* Xanthippe is ready to go out to participate at the Dionysia.

In fr. B (col. 3), the discussion focuses on issues relating to money and the means through which a free man can procure it: “(since) Socrates, thanks to the money he obtained from it (this activity), could live as a free man (ἐλεύθερος) and not lead a stunted existence” (1–4). The passage goes on to dwell on the adversities of fate, diseases, and the infirmities of old age (6–13). Ancient sources, in particular Plato and Xenophon, say that according to Socrates wealth (πλοῦτος) was not essential to happiness and that this external good can be useful or harmful depending on the use we make of it. The interpretation of this papyrus fragment, mutilated at both beginning and end, is made particularly uncertain because of the difficulty in determining who utters the phrase just translated. It is possible that we are witnessing a dialogue between Socrates and an unknown character. Socrates’ interlocutor would then be arguing that wealth is useful and that Socrates should therefore accept payments, because only then could he provide for himself against misfortune, disease, and the infirmities of old age. If we accept this idea, then we can

2 Gallo 1999, 720–753. This edition reprises the text provided by Gallo 1980, 169–218, albeit with substantial revisions by the editorial staff of the *Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini*.

3 SSR I C 352. Ihm 2001, 339 (*ad* pseudo-Maximus Confessor 13, 32/27) lists a number of other occurrences. See Gallo 1999, 744–745.

assume that col. 3 takes up a conversation begun earlier and that continues until line 10. Socrates would respond (from 3.11) not with a justification of wealth—inappropriate from his mouth and especially in this seemingly Cynically-influenced context—but rather by pointing out that the true meaning of freedom (ἐλευθερία) is to receive compensation in order not to become a slave (which is the theme of ἐλευθέρως ζῆν).⁴

The next readable passage is fr. F (col. 9). Here the discussion focuses on the retention of evil desires (κατοχή τῶν μοχθηρῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν): “(Since) the evil desires are rejected by means of reason (διὰ τοῦ λόγου), why Socrates [...] evil desires of sages (?) [...]: a brake (to evil desires) does [not] come through reason but through good habits (ἐθισμός) [...]”.⁵ The meaning seems to be this: we must not allow ourselves to be dominated by evil desires; reason does not help us recognize and eliminate them, but good habits do. For Socrates, it would thus be habits (ἐθισμοί) and not reason (λόγος) that constitute the moral restraint against evil desires (μοχθηραὶ ἐπιθυμίαι). This thought is in contrast to the testimonies of Plato and Aristotle and recalls the Cynical attitude “in devaluing the λόγος and in stressing what most joins humans to other animals” (Gallo 1999, 729–730, 750–752). The discussion about evil desires, which desires sensible people should avoid, continues in cols. 10–11, but is too poorly preserved to be translated.

In fr. H (col. 12.1–10) we read: “believing that they cannot reach satiety [this word, πλεσμοσυνή, has been almost completely reconstructed, but it seems secure], they fill themselves excessively, and in so doing they do violence to nature, contrary to what is appropriate. (In fact, if) they put an excessive load on themselves forcing their nature ...” What appears here is obviously a critique of insatiable people who unnaturally pursue unnecessary desires. This is another Cynical-sounding element.

Are these data enough to say that the text of el-Hibeh presents the remnants of a “biographical” work on Socrates? I share the judgment of the most recent editors concerning the serious difficulties in determining the genre and the overall structure of the work, and I believe that their proposal to name it *Treatise on Socrates* instead of *Life and Sayings of Socrates* (Turner 1955 and Gallo 1980) is correct. We should therefore ask ourselves: to what genre does this treatise belong to?

4 See Gallo 1999, 745–747 with a reference to Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.5–7.

5 The translation of *logos* as “reason” follows Gallo 1999, and relies on the late fourth-century controversy between λόγοι and ἐθισμοί, which the editors see reprised in the text.

In the few readable fragments we may identify two elements that do not always appear clearly fused: the *chreia* in its best-known form, and a series of discussions in the form of a dialogue between Socrates and at least one unknown interlocutor. The themes of these conversations are the value and function of wealth, the condemnation of evil desires, and the superiority of habits over reason in restraining them. This mixture of motifs and themes rules out this work from being a simple collection of *chreiai* or a diatribe about ethics. Such mixture might better be explained by the “biographical” hypothesis, assuming a *bios* that—as in Diogenes’ *bioi*—combines anecdotes and doxography, although at least in the extant parts we lack specific biographical elements, such as chronology or prosopographical and genealogical cues.

The presence of *chreiai* is an argument against its being a Socratic dialogue like those of Plato, Xenophon, or Aeschines of Sphettus. The most reliable hypothesis is that the papyrus transmits a fairly late biography of Socrates written once “biography” had become its own genre.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to say who wrote this book. Turner (1955, 28) considered the hypothesis of an attribution to Antisthenes, but he rejected it with convincing arguments: the use of λέγεται to introduce the anecdote about Xanthippe (fr. A col. 2.2); the quite elaborate presentation of Xanthippe in that anecdote; the vocabulary and the arguments in the controversy among λόγοι and ἔθισμοί, which seem to belong to the late-fourth and early-third centuries BCE rather than to the fifth; and, finally, the anecdotes contained in the narrative. *PHib.* might therefore rely on a work belonging to the later Socratic literature influenced by Cynicism, such as that which attracted the attention of Panaetius of Rhodes (DL 2.64). But we cannot go beyond a mere supposition. The author, even if not a Cynic, could have been influenced by earlier or contemporary Cynical works (Gallo et al. 1999, 742–743).

3 Diogenes Laertius’ Portrait of Socrates

The only complete “biography” of Socrates is that of Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* (2.18–47).⁶ The Laertian *bios* of Socrates is shorter than, for example, that of Plato, which occupies the entire third book of the *Lives*, but is about the same length as that of Aristotle (5.1–35). Giannantoni has

6 SSRI D 1. I rely on the edition by Dorandi 2013 and on the results by Giannantoni 1986, 183–208 (summarized in Giannantoni 1992, 3608–3615), to which I add the notes of Narcy 1999, 226–250, and other bibliography provided in Dorandi 2013, 834–836.

proposed a plausible division of the *bios* into four sections. The first (2.18–26) is biographical (parents, home, teachers, education, character traits, military exploits, and anecdotes). The second (2.27–37) corresponds to what is in other lives the doxography. In it, through a series of anecdotes, Diogenes describes the character and behavior of Socrates and provides material useful for giving a sense of his thought. The third (2.38–44) is devoted to the trial and death sentence and subsequent reaction. In the fourth and last (2.45–47), Diogenes gets back to the chronology of Socrates, cites the epigram he composed for his death, introduces the discussion related to his disciples (Xenophon, Aristippus, Phaedo, Euclides, Stilpo, Crito, Simon, Glaucon, Simmias, Cebes and Menedemus of Eretria: 2.48–144), and finally adds the list of homonyms.

What in particular do we learn of the life of Socrates by reading Diogenes Laertius? I shall go through the sections as Giannantoni distinguished them.⁷ The first section comprises a series of scattered reports retrieved from several disparate sources, not always presented in a coherent succession. Socrates, a citizen of Athens, belonging to the deme Alopece, was the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus and the midwife Phaenarete. Diogenes then takes an abrupt turn, relating the malicious rumors of some comic poets (Teleclides, Callias, Aristophanes) who accused Socrates of having helped Euripides compose his dramas.⁸ Then he lists Socrates' teachers: Anaxagoras and the musician Damon of Athens (according to Alexander Polyhistor in his *Successions of Philosophers*) and, after the death of Anaxagoras, Archelaus of Athens, of whom he would also become the beloved (according to Aristoxenus). Duris of Samos says that in his youth Socrates was a slave and a sculptor, and that some attributed to him the Graces on the Acropolis.⁹ To this craft Timon of Phlius alludes scornfully in the *Silloi*. The Epicurean Idomeneus of Lampsacus attests that Socrates was formidable in public speaking to the point that the Thirty Tyrants—as reported by Xenophon—prevented him from “teaching verbal skill” during their rule. The force of his reasoning was also highlighted by Aristophanes (*Nub.* 112–118), who “attacks him in his plays for making the worse appear the best argument” (2.20). Socrates was the first to teach rhetoric together with his student Aeschines of Sphettus (according to Favorinus and Idomeneus). Moreover, he was the first “who discoursed on the conduct of life, and the first philosopher who was tried and put to death.” The testimony of Aristoxenus

7 I quote only the name of Diogenes' sources. For more details see the critical apparatus of Dorandi 2013, 161–179. The translations of passages or paraphrases of the *Lives* are taken over from Hicks 1931, 148–177, except when the text of my edition is different.

8 The passage is probably corrupt. See the critical apparatus of Dorandi 2013, 161–162.

9 Pliny *HN* 36.32 attributes them to the homonymous Socrates of Thebes.

follows: “Aristoxenus, son of Spintharus, says of him that he made money; he would at all events invest sums, collect the interest accruing, and then, when this was expended, he invested the principal again” (fr. 59 Wehrli; see Schorn 2012, 214; Huffman 2012, 260–264). I wonder whether this testimony ought to be read keeping in mind the passage of *PHib.* 182 (fr. B col. 3) that records the exchange between Socrates and an unknown interlocutor on issues relating to money and the means through which a free man can procure it. Demetrius of Byzantium is cited for the relationship between Socrates and Crito, who removed Socrates from the workshop and educated him. Socrates then began to teach philosophy and “discussed moral questions in the workshops and the marketplace, being convinced that the study of nature is no concern of ours; he claimed that his inquiries embraced ‘Whatso’er is good or evil in an house’ (Hom. *Od.* 4.392); that frequently, owing to his vehemence in argument, men set upon him with their fists or tore his hair out; and that for the most part he was despised and laughed at, yet bore all this ill-usage patiently” (2.21).

The episode of Crito’s removing Socrates from the workshop and educating him obviously recalls the episode where Socrates, a few years later, urged Alcibiades and the same Crito to pay the ransom to release the young Phaedo from the brothel where he served, thus enabling him to devote himself to philosophy (2.105). At the same time, the “doxographical” digression that follows up shows a Socrates *adiaphoron* (as Giannantoni defines him), “indifferent” and superior to all the passions, which reveals the obvious Cynical origins of this account (Giannantoni 1986, 194 and 197).

Diogenes continues (2.22–26) with a description of the character traits and habits of Socrates through a series of anecdotes. Socrates never left Athens except to fulfill his military service obligations (on the expedition to Amphipolis and in the battle of Delium and at Potidaea), always keeping in good physical shape. Other authors (Ion of Chios, Aristotle, and Favorinus) are aware of travels during his youth (to Samos, Delphi, and the Isthmus). A supporter of the democracy, Socrates defended it even under the rule of the Thirty, refusing to obey Critias who had ordered him to arrest the rich Leon of Salamis. In the end he refused to escape from prison and faced death with dignity. He had always been a man of great dignity and independence of character, even when confronting Alcibiades (according to the testimony of Pamphila), and contented himself with the strictly necessary. However, he showed his contempt for Archelaus of Macedonia, Scopas of Cranon, and Eurylochus of Larissa, always refusing to go to their court. His regime of austere living prevented him from getting sick when pestilence broke out in Athens. At the end of this section, Diogenes tackles the thorny debate about Socrates’ bigamy (Aristotle, followed by Satyrus and Hieronymus of Rhodes, admitted and justified the belief that he

did it), and gives the names of the two wives, Xanthippe and Myrto, and their children: Lamprocles, from the first; Sophroniscus and Menexenus, from the second (see Narcy 1999, 234–235 n. 3).

Giannantoni suggests that the second section should begin at 2.27. In my opinion, it is better to keep 2.27–30 in the first section. In these paragraphs Diogenes continues to describe the specific qualities of Socrates' character: "He could afford to despise those who scoffed at him. He prided himself on his plain living, and never asked a fee from anyone" (27). The malicious evidence of the comic poets (Aristophanes and Ameipsias) has an effect opposite to what they had intended, because "in the act of ridiculing him they give him high praise" (27–28). Diogenes then concludes with a nod to the persuasiveness of Socrates: "He showed equal ability in both directions, in persuading and dissuading men" (29).

The second section (2.30–37) consists of a long series of *chreiai* that feature Socrates and a number of other characters. They offer items that go well beyond the boundaries of anecdote, and transmit an echo, albeit a pale one, of some philosophical doctrines. This echo is important, however, if we consider the utter scarcity and vagueness of similar information about Socrates in the *bios* of Diogenes Laertius. Here we can spot traces of a tradition according to which Socrates seems to reject, along with physics, logic and geometry as well (2.30, in an exchange of lines with Euclides; see also 2.32). At another passage Socrates identifies the good with knowledge and evil with ignorance, and treats wealth and nobility of birth as sources of evil (2.31); speaks of the δαίμῳνιον that predicts the future; and argues that "to make a good start was no trifling advantage, but a trifle turned the scale; and that he knew nothing except the fact of his ignorance" (2.32). At 2.37 Diogenes reports the famous response of the oracle at Delphi to Chaerephon: "Of all men living Socrates is the most wise." More interesting, if also problematic, is what we read a little later, at 2.45: "In my opinion Socrates discoursed on physics as well as on ethics, since he holds some conversations about providence, even according to Xenophon, who, however, declares that he only discussed ethics. But Plato, after mentioning Anaxagoras and certain other physicists in the *Apology*, treats for his own part themes that Socrates disowned, although he puts everything into the mouth of Socrates."¹⁰ Giannantoni sees here one of Diogenes' rare personal stances about the philosophy of Socrates. Giannantoni cannot tell whether Diogenes actually read Plato and Xenophon directly. He is certain,

10 Diogenes refers to Pl. *Ap.* 26d–e and Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.6 and 1.1.16. Other passages where Diogenes expresses his personal opinion can be found in Giannantoni 1986, 200 n. 30.

however, that Plato and especially Xenophon were for Diogenes two “real sources” and “safe points of reference.” That would explain why he is able “to criticize them from the inside without juxtaposing them with other sources and traditions.”¹¹ The interpretation of this passage is controversial because it presents two contrasting views on the thought of Socrates. Diogenes says that Socrates occupied himself with physics, calling Xenophon into question; then he cites Plato to prove the contrary. We are therefore allowed to ask, with Gigon (1965, 105), whether the text is corrupt or if instead Diogenes himself is responsible for this apparent nonsense.

Finally we come to the last two sections. The first of these, the third overall, is devoted to the trial and execution of Socrates (2.38–44). The facts are too well known to need recounting. These pages, along with the narrative of the military campaigns of Socrates (2.22–23), are the most valid parts of the *Life* from the historical point of view.¹² The information is taken from Plato and Favorinus, who seems a reliable author, used repeatedly by Diogenes Laertius. It is generally accurate and sometimes of considerable importance. I recall only the testimony of Favorinus (2.39), according to which the speech of Polycrates against Socrates is not authentic, “for he mentions the rebuilding of the walls by Conon, which did not take place till six years after the death of Socrates.”

After describing the last moments of the life of Socrates, inspired by Plato’s *Apology* and *Phaedo*, Diogenes opens a parenthesis on Socrates’s poetic interests and then goes on to describe the reactions that his death sparked in Athens: closure of palaestrae and gymnasia; exile or death sentences for his accusers; Lysippus’ commission to sculpt a statue of Socrates.

The fourth section of the *Life* ought also be delineated differently than Giannantoni has. To my mind, the initial reference to the dates of Socrates’ life rather fits the third section. Diogenes cites here the *Chronology* of Apollodorus of Athens (with Demetrius of Phalerum in agreement)—Socrates was born “under the archonship of Apsephion, in the fourth year of the 77th Olympiad [469–468 BCE], on the 6th day of the month of Thargelion [May/June], when the Athenians purify their city, which according to the Delians is the birthday of Artemis. He died in the first year of the 95th Olympiad [400–399 BCE] at the age of seventy” (2.44)—and the alternative view that Socrates “was sixty when

11 Giannantoni 1986, 199–200. Giannantoni 1992, 3612 n. 25, seems to underplay the importance of this issue. Narcy 1999, 248 n. 8 underscores the difficulties of the passage and does not seem to be convinced by Giannantoni.

12 See Giannantoni 1986, 197–206, who explains as well how this image of a Socrates who “introduced ethics or moral philosophy” (DL 1.14) came about.

he died.” Even Diogenes’ funeral epigram (2.46) for Socrates should be moved to the third section of the *bios*.

It is more difficult to find a place for the passage cited above (p. 774–775) where Diogenes, reporting the accounts of Plato and Xenophon, seems to express his own opinion about the significance of Socrates’ philosophy (2.45). This is most likely an out-of-place note that Diogenes had not yet revised, which confirms that the *Lives* was incomplete at the time of its author’s death. Even more obvious traces of jumbled notes are found in the final paragraph (2.47) of the *Life of Socrates*, which still poses considerable textual and interpretative difficulties.¹³ The “biography” ends (2.47) with a short list of homonymous men derived from Demetrius of Magnesia.

Diogenes cites a considerable number of sources to confirm the information that makes up the *Life of Socrates*. In particular, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle and the peripatetic philosophers, and comic poets; but also a myriad of other authors. Most of the sources used by Diogenes Laertius are lost. This fact makes it difficult if not impossible to know why Diogenes mentions one or another author, or omits some other author, as well as to judge the reliability of the sources he chose and those that were actually available to him. What is more interesting to note is that the second section of the *Life* is distinguished from the others in the paucity of sources mentioned: apart from a few verses of Aristophanes, we have only Plato (four times) and Xenophon (five times). In the other sections, the richest in biographical references, quotes from Plato and Xenophon thin out considerably (see Giannantoni 1986, 190). A couple of possibilities might explain this imbalance. Perhaps Diogenes was less interested in the philosophy of Socrates than in the biographical material. Perhaps he was convinced that Plato and Xenophon had provided enough about his thought and that he did not need to go further. Perhaps the sources he used already had this structure and Diogenes thought that Plato and Xenophon were less reliable on biographical matters than authors from the first Hellenistic period or somewhat later. The loss of the greater part of these sources prevents us from being able to make a more confident claim.

13 See Dorandi 2013, 178. Bibliography on the evidence that Diogenes was not able to finish the *Lives* is cited by Dorandi 2009, 196 n. 3. For the interpretation of the passage in relation to Socrates in particular, see Giannantoni 1986, 201–208.

4 Conclusion

Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Socrates* is the only ancient biography to come down to us, and for this reason it is of extreme importance for modern readers engaged in the difficult task of reconstructing the "historical" Socrates. The portrait of the man and the character of Socrates that emerges here is in fact quite rich and often different than the one presented in Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle. Diogenes also provides important evidence about the "biography" of Socrates in the Hellenistic period (Giannantoni 1986, 201–202). At the same time, the contribution to the presentation of the thought of Socrates is less impressive and does not bring much to what we already know, not only from Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, but also from Aristophanes, despite the polemical tone that characterizes the picture we see in the *Clouds*. The Socrates we get in Diogenes has lost its brilliance, density, and clarity.

As to its structure, the use of the sources, and the information it conveys, the *Life* of Diogenes is not so different from most of the other Laertian biographies. Diogenes has reconstructed certain aspects of Socrates' personality and doctrine on the basis of sources available to him and has fit them into the well-defined pattern that he created while drafting his indispensable history of philosophy.

If we consider the *Life of Socrates* of Diogenes with an objective eye we can value it as a document worthy of total respect. His contribution is not negligible, since it provides "precious evidence to reconstruct the lively discussions that ... kindled the circle around Socrates after his death," and because it preserves "some cues to the fact that Socrates and the Socratics came to be a true problem" for ancient philosophical historiography (Giannantoni 1986, 202).¹⁴

References

- Dihle, A. *Studien zur griechischen Biographie*. Göttingen 1970.
- Dorandi, T. *Laertiana: capitoli sulla tradizione manoscritta e sulla storia del testo delle Vite dei filosofi di Diogene Laerzio*. Berlin 2009.
- Dorandi, T. *Diogenes Laertius: Lives of eminent philosophers*. Cambridge 2013.
- Dorandi, T. 'Epicureanism and Socraticism: the evidence on the minor Socratics from the Herculaneum Papyri', in: U. Zilioli, *From the Socratics to the Socratic schools: classical ethics, metaphysics, epistemology*. London 2015, 168–191.

14 This chapter was translated from Italian to English by Christopher Moore.

- Gallo, I. *Frammenti biografici da papiri, II: la biografia dei filosofi*. Roma 1980.
- Gallo, I. 'Socrates 3T', *CPF* I.1***. Firenze 1999
- Giannantoni, G. 'Socrate e i Socratici in Diogene Laerzio', *Elenchos* 7 (1986), 183–216.
- Giannantoni, G. 'Il secondo libro delle *Vite* di Diogene Laerzio', *ANRW* II 36.5 (1992), 3603–3618.
- Gigon, O. 'Review: *Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum* ed. H.S. Long', *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 86 (1965), 101–105.
- Hägg, T. *The art of biography in antiquity*. Cambridge 2012.
- Huffman, C.A. *Aristoxenus of Tarentum: discussion*. London 2012.
- Huffman, C.A. 'Aristoxenus' *Life of Socrates*', in: Huffman 2012, 251–281.
- Ihm, S. *Ps.-Maximus Confessor: erste kritische Edition einer Redaktion des sacro-profanen Florilegiums Loci Communes*. Stuttgart 2001.
- Narcy, M. 'Diogène Laërce livre II', in: Goulet-Cazé, *Diogène Laërce: Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres*. Paris 1999, 169–367.
- Schorn, S. 'Aristoxenus' biographical method', in: Huffman 2012, 177–221.
- Turner, E.G. 'Life and apophthegms of Socrates', *The Hibeh Papyri*, II. London 1955, 26–40.

An Embodiment of Intellectual Freedom?

Socrates in Libanius

Heinz-Günther Nesselrath
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

Socrates, as Plato depicted him in his dialogue *Gorgias*, may have been no friend of conventional rhetoric; but once his death had become an integral part of Classical Greek heritage, rhetoric included Socrates in its frequent evocations of the classical past. This continued well into Late Antiquity, as this survey of Socrates' presence in Libanius, one of the most important Greek orators and teachers of rhetoric in Late Antiquity, will show. Libanius was a very prolific author in a number of prose genres, and in all of them Socrates can be found. This chapter will first look into Socrates' presence in Libanius' letters, then move on to Libanius' speeches. In these two genres we get a largely conventional but positive picture of Socrates, as a virtuous philosopher, who even in his old age did not despise learning something new. After that, Libanius' declamations will be considered, with the lion's share going to *Declamation 1*, which may in fact contain more reflections of Libanius' contemporary situation than might be expected at first sight and thus present us with a picture of Socrates that goes well beyond everything Libanius has to say about him elsewhere.

1 Socrates in Libanius' Letters

In the vast corpus of Libanius' preserved letters, Socrates is invoked fourteen times, most often to pay someone a compliment. In *Ep.* 233.4 Foerster¹ Libanius describes the bearer as being soldier-like in appearance, but as a real philosopher in his deeds, who "imitates Socrates with regard to profit" (τὸν Σωκράτην ἐν μέσοις μιμησάμενος κέρδεσιν, tr. Cribiore). In *Ep.* 301.1² Libanius compares his addressee, the famous orator and philosopher addressee Themistius, to

1 Written to his pupils Apolinarius and Gemellus, perhaps in 360 CE. The letter is no. 20 in the "Dossiers of Students" presented in Cribiore 2007, 241–242.

2 Written perhaps in 361.

Socrates;³ in *Ep.* 1493.4⁴ he does the same with his acquaintance Victorinus. In *Ep.* 1488.3⁵ Socrates figures in an even more flattering comparison: while the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus and Socrates were honored by oracles of Delphic Apollo, the young Paeonius was honored by the addressee's favorable judgment. In a letter of recommendation (*Ep.* 652.1⁶) Libanius praises Hilarinus, who prudently imitated Socrates by devoting himself to learning.⁷ A similar case is *Ep.* 1171.2,⁸ in which Libanius compares the willingness of Apringius to learn something new in advanced age to that of Socrates. In *Ep.* 872.5⁹ he extols Macedonius and compares his honorable poverty to Socrates'. In *Ep.* 1158.1¹⁰ Libanius remarks that the letter he is responding to shows him that its author modeled his writing after the way Socrates used to talk. In *Ep.* 1487.1¹¹ he seems to compare his addressee's teaching with the conversational style of Socrates.

The example of Socrates is also used to encourage people to devote themselves to further study. In *Ep.* 379.7¹² Libanius exhorts his addressee (who has just married) to resume his interrupted rhetorical studies, pointing out once more that even in his old age Socrates was not averse to learning something new.

Libanius can even identify himself with Socrates. In *Ep.* 435.2–3¹³ he compares his (very friendly) relationship to the addressee (who, he says, loves him) to that of young Athenians who were in love with the older Socrates. Or he can use Socrates' example to ingratiate himself to other people: in *Ep.* 694.1¹⁴

-
- 3 Beginning with an allusion to Pl. *Symp.* 176c, "Socrates I do not count in the matter" (Σωκράτη δὲ ἐξαίρω τοῦ λόγου, tr. Fowler), Libanius continues: "for you are powerful, while the things of the others are but a shadow" (σὺ μὲν γὰρ ισχύεις, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε τῶν ἄλλων σκιά). The *Symposium* quote is rather a nice joke, for Socrates is characterized here as being a much better drinker than others!
 - 4 To Rufinus, in 365. In this and the preceding letter, he again quotes *Symp.* 176c (Σωκράτη δὲ ἐξαίρω τοῦ λόγου) to introduce his comparison.
 - 5 To the influential imperial courtier Datianus, in 365.
 - 6 Written to Anatolius (governor of Galatia and father of Libanius' pupils Apolinarius and Gemellus; see n. 1), in 361.
 - 7 *Ep.* 652.1: "he imitates Socrates in the belief that it is fitting for every age to learn something good" (τὸ Σωκράτους μιμούμενος νομίζων ἀπάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ πρέπειν τῶν καλῶν τι μαρθάνειν).
 - 8 To Domninus (who was a teacher of Roman Law at Berytus), in 364.
 - 9 To Tatianus (Praefectus praetorio Orientis 388–392 and Consul 391), in 388.
 - 10 To Priscianus (one of Libanius' oldest friends and governor of Cilicia), in 364.
 - 11 To Nicocles (teacher of grammar in Constantinople), in 365.
 - 12 To Calycius (a pupil of Libanius' in 357 and 358), in 358.
 - 13 To Iovianus (a young notarius at the imperial court of Constantinople), in 355.
 - 14 To Maximus of Ephesus (the famous philosophical mentor of the Emperor Julian), in

Libanius praises Socrates as the very model of a philosopher, who deserves every kind of support.

Socrates makes two further brief appearances: In *Ep.* 286.3¹⁵ Libanius uses the well-known blamelessness of Socrates as an example of something self-evident (and obviously universally accepted at Libanius' time), and in *Ep.* 559.1¹⁶ Socrates is connected with Libanius' own student days in Athens.

All in all, Socrates is one of the most frequently cited figures from Classical Athens in Libanius' letters.¹⁷ When he turns up, he serves mostly to introduce a compliment or to bolster a pedagogic exhortation. The few features of Socrates evoked in these letters—Socrates' willingness to learn something new even in advanced age; his quasi-erotic relationship with younger men—are familiar from the writings of Plato and Xenophon.

2 Socrates in Libanius' Speeches

Not many of the speeches Libanius gave outside his classroom contain references to Socrates. In his *A Reply to Aristides on Behalf of the Dancers* (perhaps written in 361), Libanius summons Socrates "who is worthier than whole cities with regard to his testimony [and] who is by the vote of the god the wisest of all men" as witness for the respectability of pantomimic dance (*or.* 64.18). The next reference appears in his address (written in the Spring of 363) to the Emperor Julian on behalf of the citizens of Antioch, who had fallen out with the Emperor during his stay in their city. Here, Libanius asks for Julian's forgiveness and appeals to his being thoroughly imbued by Greek *paideia*, as this should induce him to be merciful towards his fellow Hellenes. One important part of this *paideia* is philosophy, which is represented here by three names: Socrates, Pythagoras, and Plato (*or.* 15.28). Two years later, in his *Epitaphios* on Julian, Libanius reminisces how the late Emperor had felt the same admiration for his philosophic mentor Maximus of Ephesus as Chaerephon did for Socrates (*or.* 18.155), and Libanius even compares the dying Julian to Socrates himself,

362. By comparing his addressee, the philosopher Maximus, with Socrates, he wants, of course, to win Maximus' goodwill towards himself. This letter may also be an important testimonial regarding *Declamation* 1 (see below).

15 To a certain Palladius, perhaps in 361.

16 To Eugnomonius (a companion of Libanius' study times in Athens), in 357.

17 Socrates is mentioned in 14 letters, Plato in 20, Euripides in 7, Sophocles in 4, Aeschylus in 7, Thucydides in 6, Pericles in 5, Alcibiades in 2. The front-runner, of course, is Demosthenes, appearing in 27 letters.

with regard to the manner in which both courageously and calmly awaited their death (*or.* 18.272). The last preserved reference is found in Libanius' *First Speech against Icarius* (written in 385), in which the absurd notions held by this governor are illustrated by the remark that Icarius might even argue that Socrates had been hated by the gods because he had been executed by drinking hemlock (*or.* 27.7). Altogether, Socrates plays no important role in Libanius' speeches. One reason for this may have been that the historical situation in which Libanius wrote his speeches had (in many respects) very little in common with the Classical Athens that brought forth Socrates. The background in Libanius' declamations, however, is markedly different, as many of them try to take their audiences back to those very times of which Socrates was perceived as a well-nigh indispensable ingredient.

3 Socrates in Libanius' Classroom: The Declamations

Libanius' declamations—the speeches he wrote for his rhetorical teaching and not for public appearances—are the part of his oeuvre in which Socrates figures most prominently. Even here he is present in only a few pieces, but among them is the longest text regarding Socrates' famous trial that Antiquity has bequeathed to us. Before we evaluate Socrates' role in these texts, however, we must face a difficulty: perhaps not all of the declamations in which Socrates appears are genuine. Let us have a look at some doubtful cases.

In declamations fifteen and sixteen, two Athenians vie for a prize by which the city wants to honor its most virtuous citizen.¹⁸ Cephalus, the speaker of the fifteenth declamation, compares his opponent Aristophon—who, as he claims, was as often acquitted as accused of various crimes—*ex negativo* with the most virtuous Socrates, who angered the judges of his trial by demanding to be fed in the Prytaneum; but Socrates nevertheless deserved this honor, while the opponent in the current trial deserves it not at all (*decl.* 15.13). In his response, Aristophon turns the argument onto its head: if even Socrates and other excellent Athenians were convicted, the fact that the speaker (Aristophon) was so often absolved can only mean that he has been truly and always innocent (*decl.*

18 The heading for both of them is: "A law prescribes that there is to be a prize of honor for an excellent life, and for this Cephalus and Aristophon compete against each other." The setup owes its origin to a remark by the orator Aeschines (*Or.* 3.194), which compared these two Athenians citizens: while Aristophon claimed to have successfully escaped seventy-five *graphai paranomôn*, Cephalus had sponsored many legislative initiatives without even once incurring the *paranomôn* charge.

16.45–46). Both of these declamations are under grave suspicion of not being genuine,¹⁹ and both only briefly try to use the virtuousness of Socrates as an argument.

Another brief mention of Socrates can be found in declamation 23, in which Demosthenes, having been captured by Philip and then released on condition that he retire into private life, has to defend himself in court for his staying out of politics. At one point he argues that nobody can be ordered to speak, and nobody has ever been, while many have been ordered to stay silent, among them Socrates by the tyrant Critias (*decl.* 23.24). Again, however, it is rather doubtful whether this declamation is genuine.²⁰

There is no doubt, however, about the authenticity of the twelfth declamation (*Timon, Who Is in Love with Alcibiades, Gives Himself up to Justice*), which is based on a situation that can be found in several other Libanian declamations: a scurrilous character (a misanthrope or a miser) finds himself in a predicament (here, in the pain of love) that brings him into a heart-rending contradiction with his misanthropic or miserly convictions and thus induces him to seek death by judicial decree.²¹ In this declamation, Socrates is evoked several times, for Timon denounces him repeatedly as a lover of Alcibiades (*decl.* 12.21, 22, 41, 46, 47, allusively also at 49); in ch. 28 Socrates (as a devotee of Alcibiades) is compared to the old Silenus as an attendant of the god Dionysus (cf. *Pl. Symp.* 215a–b); in ch. 38 he is briefly evoked as a companion of Aspasia.²² These negative pronouncements are, of course, explained by the character of the imagined speaker: Timon, the famous misanthrope, hates all human beings and makes no exception for Socrates. The impieties of Alcibiades are the topic of another declamation, of which one longish passage remains (fr. 50 Foerster),

19 See Foerster 1909, 110–111 n. 3: “ut de eo similiter atque in declamatione 11 (t. v p. 123) dubitem me movent cum error de Cephalo p. 146,9 [= ch. 1] commissus ... gravior quam quem a Libanio committi potuisse facile credam, tum elocutionis quaedam proprietates imprimisque delectus verborum ... Neque testes vetustissimi Libanium declamationum auctorem noverunt.” Foerster and Münscher 1925, 2512 give a similar judgment.

20 See Foerster 1911, 370–371: “revera declamatio cum universa compositionis forma imprimisque nimia, paene dixerim, putida rerum abundantia a genuinus differt tum tot res et locutiones imprimisque voces a Libanio alienas exhibet, ut nisi eam aetati iuvenili tribuere vis, satis causae sit cur de authentia dubites.” A similar judgment is given by Foerster and Münscher 1925, 2514.

21 Other examples for this set-up are provided by *decl.* 26, 28, 30 and 32.

22 It is difficult to say whether Libanius is relying here solely on the “evidence” of Plato’s *Menexenus* or also on other Socratic literature on Aspasia (see now ch. 8, “Aspasia and the Role of Women,” in Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013, 233–252).

which contains a catalogue of Alcibiades' sins,²³ among which once again his erotic relationship with Socrates is mentioned.

Before we turn to Libanius' most substantial piece of writing about Socrates, we have to consider the peculiar case of *Declamation 2*, the heading of which is *They Want to Prevent Socrates from Having Conversations in Prison, and Someone Objects to This*. Since the times of Foerster, who first included it in an edition of Libanius' declamations,²⁴ serious doubts have persisted regarding its authenticity. Foerster himself acknowledged un-Libanian elements in content and language, but was willing to consider it as a work of Libanius' early years.²⁵ One year later, Foerster's pupil Markowski came to more or less the same conclusion.²⁶ The question was taken up again in 1960 by W.M. Calder, and his treatment of this declamation deserves detailed attention.²⁷

In the first part of his "Interpretation," Calder very well points out the oddities of the text: "Not satisfied with what they have already gained [i.e. the death sentence against Socrates], the prosecutors have petitioned the state to forbid Socrates ... to speak with anyone, even with his wife, his children, or the jailer (§ 17). Libanius' piece is the imagined rebuttal. A nameless student of Socrates (§ 3) pleads in his favor. The speech pretends to be delivered to the *ekklesia* assembled at the Pnyx" (197). Calder rightly remarks that "there is no parallel for such procedure, legislative or judicial, in the known constitutional history of classical Athens," and several times the piece itself even draws attention to this (§§ 1, 14, 15, 19, 22). Moreover, "there existed no reasonable motive" for such a harsh prohibition, which indeed could easily have elicited a *graphê paranomôn* (a suit against bills that are contrary to the laws). In addition to the "inherent absurdity of the fundamental situation," Calder draws attention to "a number

23 For such a catalogue, Libanius could rely not only on the respective dialogues in the *Corpus Platonicum* (most of all the *Symposium*), but also on evidence from Athenian Old Comedy and perhaps again on the presentation of Alcibiades in other Socratics (see now ch. 7, "Alcibiades and Politics" in Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013, 191–232).

24 See Foerster 1909, 122: "in editionibus Morelliana et Reiskiana desideratur."

25 Foerster 1909, 123 n. 1: "Talem fictionem non prorsus a Libanio alieno alienam censeo ... Et quamquam in dictione imprimisque verborum collocatione nonnulla sunt insolita quae dubitationes de authentia declamationis moveant, tamen eam a Libanio praesertim adulescente scribi potuisse negare nolo." A similar judgment can be found in Foerster and Münscher 1925, 2510.

26 Markowski 1910, 172–178. See especially his conclusion on 177–178, where Markowski acknowledges "repugnantiae ... ac discrepantiae" between this declamation and *decl. 1*, but nevertheless believes that they can be explained by the fact that *decl. 2* was written by a "juvenile" (or even "puerile") Libanius, while *decl. 1* is the work of the mature author.

27 Crosby and Calder 111 1960, 197–202.

of ... puzzling details" (198): the speaker remains nameless (while an identified individual like Crito might have used his personal merits to bolster his plea); of the three well-known accusers of Socrates, Lycon is never mentioned; the claim that Socrates "sends his words in every direction" (§ 4) is odd for a man who only ventured abroad on military expeditions and never wrote anything; the mention of the possibility "of an actual cutting out of Socrates' tongue" (§§ 13, 21; Calder 198) is quite unthinkable for Classical Athens; to present someone like Phaedo (who visited Socrates in prison) as a fully grown or even old man (§ 23) is downright wrong; § 25 implies that Socrates frequently speaks in courts, which is an outright contradiction to Plato's *Apology* 17d; and the example of Xenophon's behavior evoked in § 26 is unsuitable in the context and thus rather inept. From all this Calder draws the conclusion that this odd piece of text is a work not of the young but the old Libanius, "intended as a protest against Christian encroachment upon the old pagan education. Socrates is not meant to be the historical figure, but a symbol of pagan intellectual *paideia*" (199–200). Calder goes on to call the piece a "dramatic allegory" (200), in which everything means something else: Socrates is a "figure exemplifying the highest pagan intellectual achievement," Meletus "is the Church," Anytus "is the State," "to cut out Socrates' tongue refers to banning the teaching of the classics," and "sophists ... represent other teachers, probably incompetent Christian ones." Calder adds other examples of what he perceives as intended double entendre, and his cleverness is remarkable.

Calder's reading is nevertheless fundamentally misguided, for two reasons. One of them was already pointed out by the most recent translator of this piece, Donald Russell: we have no clues whatsoever about the historical situation in which Libanius would or should have written such an allegory.²⁸ The other reason may be even more lethal for Calder's supposition: during the whole of Libanius' lifetime, there is no evidence for a "Christian encroachment upon the old pagan education." Libanius himself ran his school until the very end of his life, and though interest in it and his rhetoric seems to have declined in his later years,²⁹ he never even once complained that there were Christian attempts to curtail his efforts.³⁰

In my view, the oddities of this piece which Calder so ably summarized point to different conclusion, namely that this declamation was indeed not written by Libanius but by someone else at a later time which we have no

28 Russell 1996, 58, who, by the way, acknowledges the arguments against the authenticity of this declamation, but gives no decisive vote in favor of or against it.

29 See *ep.* 1075 Foerster and Nesselrath 2012, 32–33.

30 See also the objection raised against Calder's thesis by Cribiore 2007, 230 n. 9.

way of determining more precisely. This unknown author probably wanted to imitate Libanius' famous first declamation.³¹ In some respects, the situation and contents of both texts are remarkably similar. In a very conscious effort to vie with famous predecessors, Libanius refers to the famous trial of Socrates, while his imitator selects an adjacent but rather peculiar situation; Libanius chooses an unnamed speaker, his imitator does the same; Libanius structures his text by a series of *antitheseis*, imagined charges by the accusers, which he then rebuts, and his imitator again does the same. All in all, declamation 1 handles its material much more effectively (see below) and without the considerable number of oddities pointed out above. The best explanation, then, of declamation 2 is that it is not a part of Libanius' dossier on Socrates, but a witness to the influence of his declamation 1, to which we now turn. As already stated, it is Libanius' most substantial piece of writing about Socrates, and therefore it deserves detailed treatment.

4 Socrates in Libanius' First Declamation

The famous trial of Socrates was probably one of the major embarrassments of the legal history of Classical Athens. It caused a publicity stir already in its own time: the sophist Polycrates actually produced a speech of accusation some years after the trial, and this in turn prompted defense speeches by Lysias, Plato, and Xenophon. But things did not stop with that. More than 750 years later, the trial still prompted the writing of a major rhetorical text of Late Antiquity, the *Defense of Socrates* by the "real" Libanius.

This text is actually the longest defense of Socrates still extant; Plato's *Apology* is about 34 OCT pages, Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.1–2 is seventeen, and the relevant chapters of his *Defense of Socrates* (10–26), based on Hermogenes' account,³² are together about eight. Compared to these texts, Libanius' speech is huge, covering 108 pages in Foerster's Teubner edition.

31 It is well known that not all the declamations ascribed to Libanius were really written by him, though the exact number of spuria is disputed (see Nesselrath 2012, 42). In some cases it seems pretty obvious that a declamation is an imitation of another one: thus *decl.* 20 imitates 19 (see Foerster and Münscher 1925, 2513), 29 imitates 28 (see Foerster and Münscher 1925, 2515), and 43 seems to make use of *decl.* 14 (see Foerster and Münscher 1925, 2517).

32 On this Hermogenes, a son of the rich Athenian Hipponicus, see Davies 1971, 269–270 (Nr. 5119/23).

Another peculiar feature of this text is that it purports to be an actual defense speech given during the trial (unlike in Xenophon's two texts), but it is not delivered by Socrates himself (as in Plato's *Apology*), but by somebody else. This speaker is a *synêgoros* (or supporting advocate), who delivers a second plea of defense after Socrates' own. This is, in fact, a well-established procedure in the legal system of Classical Athens.³³ Libanius took his cue from a remark in Xenophon's *Defense of Socrates*: "Clearly, more things were said than these by himself [i.e. Socrates] and by the friends who supported him (ὑπό ... τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, 22)." From this remark, we might even conclude that there was more than one supporting speech during the trial. The speaker of Libanius' speech identifies himself only as a longtime friend and follower of Socrates. At the beginning of his plea he states that he feels compelled to do his share in preventing the Athenian judges from condemning Socrates to death and thus pronouncing a horribly unjust verdict.

There is also a difference in the addressee of the speech. In Plato's *Apology* the main addressee is Meletus, who according to *Apology* 23e5 represented the Athenian poets and may be identified as a tragic poet himself.³⁴ Meletus was also the author of the formal indictment, as we will see below. Meletus is the only explicitly named opponent in the description of the trial in Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates*. In Libanius' speech, however, not Meletus but the politician Anytus is the main target of the speaker's counter-invective; he is directly addressed no fewer than thirteen times (in 35, 39, 48, 53, 63, 96, 107, 114, 129, 140, 154, 155, 184), while Meletus is mentioned several times but addressed not even once. Even less present is Lycon, the third accuser, mentioned just two times. This arrangement of things may suggest that Libanius in fact imagines his speaker giving an answer to a second speech of accusation, which was delivered by Anytus.³⁵ Additionally, Libanius is conscious that the most important accuser actually was Anytus, as is already apparent from several passages in Plato's *Apology*.³⁶ By giving the politician Anytus the greatest prominence,

33 See, e.g., ch. 2 (δεῖ ... καὶ λόγῳ βοηθοῦντα φαίνεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν, ἀφ' ᾧ ἂν δόξαιμι τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, παρελθεῖν ... ὥστε οὐ τῷ φεύγοντι συνηγορήσων μάλλον ἀνέβην ἢ τῶν ὑμῖν συμφερόντων ποιησόμενος πρόνοιαν).

34 See Zimmermann 1999, 1183.

35 Markowski 1910, 33, argued that by making Anytus the addressee of his speech, Libanius reacted to the accusation speech written by the sophist Polycrates; but Russell 1996, 17, has pointed out that in *Epist. Socrat.* 14 not Anytus but Meletus is named as the deliverer of a speech written by Polycrates.

36 See Plat. *Apol.* 18b1–4, 29b9–c7, 30b7–8, 31a5.

Libanius may also emphasize his shifting of the issues of the trial towards a more political—and hence less religious—perspective.

The most remarkable feature of this text, however, is its content; it varies significantly from the much earlier extant texts defending Socrates. Of course this had to be one of the main objectives of Libanius' composition: not merely to produce a stylistically convincing rehash of these earlier texts,³⁷ but to present something quite original and well worth listening to.

How did Libanius achieve this? He concentrated on a part of the accusation where he could still find some new things to say. We are very well informed about the actual contents of the historic bill of indictment: not only do both Plato and Xenophon reproduce its main items in remarkable unison, but its apparently original text is cited by Diogenes Laertius (2.40): "This indictment and affidavit is sworn by Meletus, the son of Meletus, of the deme Pithos, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, of the deme Alopecce: Socrates has committed a crime by refusing to recognize the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing other new divinities. He has also committed a crime by corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death."³⁸ There are, then, two main points of accusation: one religious (claiming that Socrates subverts Athenian *polis* religion by introducing new deities) and one political or pedagogical (claiming that Socrates is a corruptor of Athenian youth). One may argue that the first of these items is the most important: introducing new gods means undermining the fundamental values of the state, and it is by imparting such new-fangled beliefs that Socrates exerts a corrupting influence on Athenian

37 Scholars have often argued that Libanius' declamation is in fact a refutation of the *Accusation of Socrates* written by Polycrates (see Markowski 1910; Mesk 1911; Chroust 1955 and 1957, 69–99; and most recently Patzer 2012, 278–282). This assumption, however, is not without methodological difficulties. Almost all the charges against Socrates that Libanius' declamation tries to rebut can already be found in Plato's and Xenophon's texts, and the remaining ones Libanius might have been able to read in Lysias' defense speech, of which we know next to nothing (for Lysias' speech as a possible source for Libanius see already Hirzel 1887). It seems of course possible that Libanius drew directly upon Polycrates' text, but he never cites Polycrates explicitly. See also the cautious appraisal of Libanius' possible use of Polycrates in Russell 1996, 17–18.

38 Τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Ἀλωπεκῆθεν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος (tr. Hicks, modified). Diogenes Laertius found this text in a work written by Favorinus (second century CE), who claimed to have seen it in an official document in the Metroon on the Athenian agora.

youth. Thus it is no surprise that both Plato and Xenophon devote substantial parts of their texts to either downplaying³⁹ or refuting the religious issue.

Not so Libanius. Throughout his long speech, the new gods allegedly introduced by Socrates play nearly no role at all (nor does the famous *daimonion*). Instead, he devotes almost all his arguments to countering the charge that Socrates presents a grave danger to the Athenian state by exerting his corrupting influence on its youth. The very first chapter of the speech sets the tune by pronouncing the accusers' credo: "our city is doomed if he is not punished,"⁴⁰ and the main body of the text develops the various aspects of this theme which the speaker then tries to prove to be totally without substance. What follows is an overview.

One of the first parts of the speech is a vivid description of the unpretentious simplicity of Socrates' life and the many and great services he has rendered to Athens (14–20). There follows a detailed demonstration that the indictment comes inexplicably late (34–47) and that it moreover targets the wrong man (48–52): it should have been directed at those of Socrates' pupils who may have tried to overthrow Athens' democratic government and not at their teacher who never had such a thing in mind. The speaker then turns to what it claims are concrete charges raised by the accusers.

Anytus' first charge is: "Socrates is a hater of the people, and he persuades his associates to ridicule our democracy" (53).⁴¹ This charge is dealt with in 53–61: the speaker tries to show that Socrates might well have done so rather easily, if he had chosen to do it, there being enough opportunities—but he did not.

The next charge is rather interesting:

Hesiod (he says) and Theognis and Homer and Pindar's lyrics—these poets have always enjoyed honor and glory everywhere, and especially here in Athens—these are the men he attacks, and he tries to show that many of the things they have said are bad.⁴²

LIB. *decl.* 1.62 (tr. RUSSELL, slightly modified)

Libanius' speaker allows himself ample space to refute this charge (63–79). He starts by saying that everyone is free to have his own opinion about poets

39 For the peculiar handling of the religious issue in Plato's *Apology* see Nesselrath 2008, 39.

40 Lib. *decl.* 1.1: ἀνάγκη κακῶς οἰκεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν μὴ τούτου δόντος δίκην (tr. Russell).

41 "μισόδημος," φησὶν, "ἔστι καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πείθει τῆς δημοκρατίας καταγελᾶν."

42 "Ἡσιόδου", φησὶν, "[ἔπη] καὶ Θεόγνιδος καὶ Ὀμήρου καὶ τῶν Πινδάρου μελῶν—τοὺς δὲ ποιητὰς τούτους καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῶν τετυχηκέναι παρὰ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἡμῖν—, τούτων", φησί, "τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπιλαμβάνεται καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐκ ὀλίγα δείκνυσι πονηρῶς ἔχοντα."

and their works (63); even the poets themselves did this, as is well shown by the famous competition between Homer and Hesiod, in which they heartily criticized each other (65–66). People freely criticize the tragic plays that are performed at the Dionysia, and comedy loves to find fault with tragedy (67). More arguments about the unproblematic legitimacy of criticizing poets follow (70–79). One of the most effective and carefully developed of these arguments is that abolishing Socrates' right to talk about and criticize the poets would constitute a very serious attack on the democratic right of free speech (72–77) and thus expose the accusers as antidemocrats—a charge which in fact these accusers wanted to lay at Socrates' door.

After a short interlude where the speaker deals with the charge that Socrates allegedly found fault with the habits of the Athenians (80–84), he returns to Socrates' handling of the poets, stating that Socrates does not uniformly criticize their works but also dispenses praise for them: it all depends on what they say. If what they say makes people better he heartily approves; but if they teach pernicious lessons, he opposes and refutes them (85). The speaker demonstrates this with examples taken from Hesiod (86), Pindar (87), and Theognis (88–91). The speaker then assumes Socrates' pose and delivers in his own words a severe censure of a famous scene in *Iliad* 2. In that scene Odysseus resorted to diverse means when trying to restrain the Greeks from boarding their ships and sailing home: violently flogging people of lower social status, while restraining those higher up with words alone. Odysseus should not have used such unjust and (again) undemocratic treatment; if one points out these shortcomings in Homer's work, one does not harm people but actually improves them—and this is just what Socrates did when thus criticizing the poets (93–97).

This is still not all that Libanius' speaker has to say about Socrates' handling of the poets. Reacting to the accuser's charge that Socrates used the poets' authority to make his own views more persuasive, Libanius' speaker retorts that now the accuser is contradicting himself; he had just said that Socrates spoke ill of the poets (98). Socrates, Libanius' speaker points out, in fact does not even need the poets' authority because he can draw upon a much higher one: the authority of the Delphic Apollo himself, who declared Socrates the wisest of men (99–102). A further passage shows that Socrates really knew which examples to use from Homer to impart useful lessons to his listeners (105–108).

At this point, Libanius more or less leaves the theme of how Socrates dealt with poets, having devoted about the fourth part of the whole speech to this topic (62–108). There follows a number of charges in which Socrates is accused of leading his fellow-citizens into criminal behavior in various ways: by teach-

ing them perjury (109–113); by saying corrupting things to them even more in private than in public (114–116); by targeting young people especially (117–120); and by making people idle (127–132). All these charges are, of course, refuted by Libanius' speaker.

One topic developed in more detail is the blame that according to the accuser must be laid at Socrates' door, blame for having been the teacher of the famous Alcibiades and the infamous Critias (136–149). After refuting that view⁴³ and pointing out in how many ways Socrates actually benefited his *polis*, Libanius' speaker launches himself into an ample epilogue where he warns the jury of the negative consequences Athens will suffer if they condemn Socrates to death.

Now that the outline of this declamation has become clear, one may ask: why bother with a text that rehashes a trial that, as famous as it is, lies in such a distant past? Well, Libanius himself apparently thought it worthwhile to extend this rhetorical exercise to such a scale: it is, in fact, by far the longest of his declamations. It is also most interesting for another aspect: there have been notable attempts to show that its contents actually reflect the times in which Libanius wrote it in some significant ways. To prevent overly wild speculations, however, we would need to establish something like a dating of this text. In most cases where rhetorical school texts are involved this is a very difficult or even impossible business, but in this case we actually have an interesting clue. In a letter written in 362 (and cited above at n. 14) to the Neoplatonic philosopher Maximus, who was at that time one of the most important people within the entourage of the Emperor Julian, Libanius starts with an explicit and detailed reference to Socrates' trial:

What I should have done in regard to Socrates, had I lived in Socrates' time, when those beasts, the three sycophants, attacked him, this, I would have thought, should also be my obligation now towards one, who is a follower of Socrates. (2) And I should have done both this and that [i.e.,

43 This refutation comprises the following points: first, Libanius' speaker sharply distinguishes Alcibiades and Critias (136). He then launches into an impressive encomium-cum-apology of Alcibiades (137–141), which culminates in the sentence "he was victorious over the external foe, but fell victim to malice at home, and he did the city much better service than those who expelled him" (141, tr. Russell). Thirdly, even if Socrates had been the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias (which he never claimed to be, 142), a teacher cannot be held responsible for the bad things his pupils do (142–147), and fourthly, Critias distressed not only the Athenians as a whole, but also Socrates himself as an individual, and Socrates never approved of Critias' deeds (148–149).

coming to the aid of the historical Socrates and to the aid of his present-day follower] ... because I know that a philosopher is a great boon to men ... (3) For these reasons I hate Anytus and his fellows ...

LIB. *Epist.* 694 FOERSTER

The letter shows that Socrates and his infamous accusers are very much on Libanius' mind. Therefore it may not be bold to assume that just around the time of this letter Libanius was already occupied with writing his own defense speech for Socrates.⁴⁴ This was the time when Julian was the sole emperor of the Roman world and had embarked on what he regarded as his mission to restore the former internal and external glory of the Empire: the external one by preparing war against the Persians, and the internal one by giving pagan cults their former place of honor and at the same time significantly reducing the power and influence of Christianity. With this in mind, two features of Libanius' declamation gain additional interest:

First, we have already noted that Libanius says almost nothing about the charge that made Socrates' accusation a serious case of *asebeia*, namely that he did not recognize those gods that the city of Athens venerated, but that he introduced new deities instead. In Libanius' days, this was just what the Christians were doing: no longer recognizing the gods that the pagan elite of the Empire venerated, but introducing new divine powers instead. If Libanius had tried to exculpate Socrates from such a charge, he would very probably have had to develop arguments that the Christians might then have used for themselves;⁴⁵ and though Libanius had nothing against individual Christians (as a number of passages from his letters proves),⁴⁶ he was so averse to Christianity as a religion⁴⁷ that he surely would not have wanted to play into its hands by his rhetoric. This, then, is one area where the character of the times and Libanius' own ideological standpoint apparently had a decisive impact on the contents of this declamation.

Second, the following point may be even more interesting. We have already seen that Libanius devotes surprisingly ample space to defending Socrates' right to criticize the poets for morally questionable sentiments appearing in their works. One of Libanius' most powerful arguments for supporting Socrates'

44 Thus Markowski 1910, 168–169; Russell 1996, 19–20.

45 As Russell 1996, 19 puts it: “to answer charges of this nature on behalf of the great philosophic hero of Hellenism would be a tricky and embarrassing business.”

46 See Nesselrath 2012, 104–109.

47 See Nesselrath 2012, 65–73.

handling of the poets is that it is a basic right of free people within a democracy to freely express their opinions on everything they like, poetry and literature included.

Pisistratus who was a great enthusiast for Homer's poetry, never put a citizen to death for attacking a line of the epic ... yet today, in a democracy, here you are, doing things more cruel than any tyranny ... Theseus did not put the freedom of the people above his own power in order that Anytus and Meletus should forbid people in Athens to debate what they want to, but in order that we should develop our minds with learning ... [74] So the reason why Athens is so fair and delightful a sight, the reason why people come here from every quarter ... is ... that the city is a factory of literature. One man asks, another answers: one can learn, the other teaches. You will find one man praising some old saying, another criticizing it, a third rebutting an unfavorable opinion. [75] These are the activities worthy of the goddess of the Acropolis, ..., of Theseus, of our constitution ... This is why those who honor wisdom stand higher in the world than those who inspire fear by their arms. This is what has made the great difference between us and the barbarians. [76] It follows that the man who destroys freedom of debate subverts the traditions of democracy, gouges out its eyes, as it were, or cuts out its tongue.

LIB. *decl.* 1.73–76 (tr. RUSSELL)

When hearing these ringing words, we may again ask: is this just a conventional invocation of the cherished values of long gone classical Athenian democracy, or is there something more contemporary at stake as well? On 17 June 362, the Emperor Julian issued his highly controversial School Edict, in which he forbade Christian teachers to tackle pagan poets; by this insidious measure he obviously intended to deprive Christians of higher learning in the long run and reduce them to a sect of illiterates. The edict was understandably greeted by indignant Christian protests, but even some prominent pagan supporters were not happy with it. The historian Ammianus Marcellinus, otherwise a great fan of Julian in all respects, condemns it twice in his work (22.10.6; 25.4.20). Libanius' stance in this matter is rather remarkable: he never breathes a word about this edict, but his very silence has been taken as disapproval,⁴⁸ and this may in fact be supported by the degree of passion with which the speaker in his *Defense of Socrates* argues for Socrates' freedom to express himself about poets

48 See Nesselrath 2012, 59, with further literature in n. 6.

and reprimand them for anything he considers debatable. Could Christians not have used the very same arguments to defend their involvement with pagan literature?

Thus, Libanius' *Defense of Socrates* is probably not only another attempt to visualize the interaction between Socrates and his accusers so long ago; it may also have allowed Libanius to meet controversial issues of his own time and even to disagree, through a veil, with his pagan emperor whom in almost every other respect he supported unconditionally.⁴⁹

This survey, then, of Socrates' presence in Libanius' writings yields at least one interesting result. With the notable exception of the *First Declamation*, all references to Socrates in Libanius' work do not really go beyond conventional attitudes, treating Socrates as a paragon of virtue, a model of learning, and a philosopher attracted to bright young people. The *First Declamation*, however, shows us something else. More than 760 years after his death, Socrates could still (under certain circumstances) become an embodiment of intellectual freedom from which Libanius did not even want the unloved Christians to be excluded.

References

- Boys-Stones, G.R. and C. Rowe. *The circle of Socrates: readings in the first-generation Socratics*. Indianapolis 2013.
- Chroust, A.-H. 'Xenophon, Polycrates and the "indictment of Socrates"', *C&M* 16 (1955), 1–77.
- Chroust, A.-H. *Socrates: man and myth: the two Socratic apologies of Xenophon*. London 1957.
- Cribiore, R. *The school of Libanius in late antique Antioch*. Princeton 2007.
- Crosby, M. and W.M. Calder III. 'Libanius, *On the silence of Socrates*: a first translation and an interpretation', *GRBS* 3 (1960), 185–202.
- Davies, J.K. *Athenian Propertied Families*. Oxford 1971.
- Foerster, R. *Libanii Opera*, v: *Declamationes 1–12*. Leipzig 1909.
- Foerster, R. *Libanii Opera*, vi: *Declamationes 13–30*. Leipzig 1911.
- Foerster, R. and K. Münscher. 'Libanios', in: *RE* XII (1925), coll. 2485–2551.

49 We do not know, of course, how many people read this declamation in Libanius' lifetime, nor have we any evidence whether they detected Libanius' implicitly critical stance vis-à-vis Julian's School Edict in this declamation. All we can say is that even admirers of Julian took issue with the edict, as the judgment of Ammianus Marcellinus (22.10.6 and 25.4.20) clearly shows.

- Hirzel, R. 'Polykrates' Anklage und Lysias' Verteidigung des Sokrates', *RhM* 42 (1887), 239–250.
- Markowski, H. *De Libanio Socratis defensore*. Breslau 1910.
- Mesk, J. 'Die Anklagerede des Polykrates gegen Sokrates', *ws* 32 (1911), 56–84.
- Nesselrath, H.-G. "Sokrates tut Unrecht, in dem er nicht an die Götter glaubt, an die die Polis glaubt, sondern andere neue Gottheiten einführt ...": Das Recht der Polis Athen und "neue Götter", in: C. Langenfeld and I. Schneider, *Recht und Religion in Europa: Zeitgenössische Konflikte und historische Perspektiven*. Göttingen 2008, 28–45.
- Nesselrath, H.-G. *Libanios: Zeuge einer schwindenden Welt*. Stuttgart 2012.
- Patzer, A. *Studia Socratica*. Tübingen 2012.
- Russell, D.A. *Libanius: imaginary speeches*. London 1996.
- Zimmermann, B. 'Meletos [4]', *DNP* (1999), 1183.

Political Philosopher or Savior of Souls?

Socrates in Themistius and Julian the Emperor

Maria Carmen De Vita

Università degli Studi di Salerno

Modern literature still lacks a coherent study of the figure of Socrates in the rhetorical tradition of Late Antiquity. Yet between the third and fifth centuries CE the legend of Socrates fared well. Rhetoricians and philosophers frequently evoked the philosopher, albeit often in quite discordant ways.¹ In this chapter, I will deal with examples from Themistius and Julian the Emperor: two intellectuals of the fourth century who are in many ways exact opposites. Julian was an idealist and a philosopher by vocation, remembered mainly for his ambitious plan of pagan restoration despite the Empire's large-scale conversion to Christianity. It is for this reason that his adversaries called him "Apostate."² By contrast Themistius, Julian's erstwhile teacher, was a skilled politician successful as *princeps*' advisor during the reign of several Christian emperors, his open profession of paganism notwithstanding.

In a time of significant political, religious, and cultural change, both men used rhetoric to address intellectuals and new Hellenes. Both employed the figure of Socrates, with his typical attitudes, as an appropriate testimonial for a definite ideological program.³

1 Cf. De Luise and Farinetti 1997.

2 For an exhaustive outline of Julian's biography (331/332–363 CE) see Tantillo 2001. The figure of Themistius (317–c. 390 CE) in his relationships with his society and culture is well illustrated by Maisano 1995, 9–48.

3 Recent studies have emphasized the fuzziness of religious boundaries in Late Antique society. The growing influence of Christianity was interwoven with a wide variety of religious cults and practices (usually referred to by the blanket term "paganism"). Thus there also was a wide category of individuals remaining in a "grey area" between Christianity and paganism; cf. Kahlos 2007, 26–34; Kahlos 2009; Cameron 2011. It is worth remembering that pagans, Christians, and "in-betweens" all shared a common cultural language: that of classical *paideia*. So Socrates and other notables of ancient literature and history often figured in religious and cultural debates by intellectuals of differing faiths, in a symbolic role with which everyone would easily sympathize.

1 Socrates in the Works of Themistius: Political Philosopher and Rhetorician

References to an iconic Socrates are a recurring theme throughout the whole Themistian literary work: from the first panegyrics addressed to Constantius II, the emperor who acknowledged Themistius' merits as Apollo at Delphi once acknowledged the higher wisdom of Socrates (*Or.* 2.27a), to various political writings in which Themistius contrasts his absolute "Socratic" innocence with the unfounded accusations of the sophists (*Orr.* 23, 26), to his latest official panegyrics (*Orr.* 17, 18, 34) where the elderly rhetorician performs a sort of "swan-song" (*Or.* 18.223d) and traces his vocation as a political philosopher back to the influence of Socrates.

Themistius recalls biographic details of the Athenian such as the episode of the Delphic oracle, the pritany, the campaign at Potidaea, and attributes to him the doctrine of love described in the Platonic *Symposium*.⁴ Some of Themistius' information comes from Xenophon's Socratic works and various doxographical sources,⁵ though his key references are to the Platonic dialogues (*Apology of Socrates*, *Charmides*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Hippias Minor*, *Symposium*), which leads us to assume that Themistius, much like the rhetoricians and philosophers his contemporaries, did not differentiate between the historical Socrates and the Socrates who is Plato's spokesman, and that he superimposed the latter on the former.⁶

Themistius highlights certain aspects of his figure of Socrates for a specific purpose. He wants to project himself and his political activity into the philosophical and rhetorical model offered by the famous Athenian. So, by analyzing Socrates as represented in the orations, we may identify the features that characterize Themistius' vision of philosophy and rhetoric.

Let us begin with the passage of *Or.* 26 where Themistius defends himself from the accusation of having reformed philosophy by "introducing new deities," that is to say by leaving schools in order to play an active role in public life as *princeps'* advisor. This is considered a crime by his critics who advise philosophers "to be silent, to keep what they know to themselves" (312d). But Themistius rejects the charge in a long digression on the history of philosophy:

4 Cf. Them. *Or.* 2.27a; *Or.* 23.295b–296b; *Or.* 29.346b; *Or.* 17.215b; *Or.* 34.10; *Or.* 13.298a.

5 For example, see DL 2.3; 2.6 (and Them. *Or.* 20.239c–d; *Or.* 32.356b).

6 This is a characteristic of Julian's portrait of Socrates, too; see the next paragraph.

What about the excellent Socrates? Did he walk on the old and well-worn path? ... For before his time almost every one studied the heavens and the position and shape of the earth and tried to explain the generation of animals and the growth of plants. Socrates did not think that human beings could acquire this kind of knowledge ... He was the first one who considered and posed these questions: What should the basis of moral excellence be? What is virtue in a human being and how may it be achieved? ... If Socrates was forward in posing these questions, he was even more forward in that he did not speak about these issues confidentially and to his pupils alone, but to everyone without reserve, as he says somewhere, in banks, workshops, and wrestling schools.⁷ Modellers of figurines and smiths would surround him whenever he would vex people, which he did by testing them to see what they knew—what a general knew about courage, or what a popular political leader knew about good government, or what a rhetorician understood about the factors by which the human soul is persuaded and led along, or whether a poet understood what kinds of poetry are beneficial. Thus it was that so much hatred was heaped upon him and that he reaped what benefits he did from his love of mankind.

Or. 26.317d–318c (tr. PENELLA 2000, 147–148)

Here we notice three fundamental characteristics of Themistius' portrait of Socrates: a) his indifference to natural philosophy; b) his interest in ethical problems; and c) a teaching method that is clearly unsystematic, carried out publicly, in places common to everyday life (banks, workshops, wrestling schools), and open to people from all walks of life (modellers of figurines, smiths, popular political leaders, rhetoricians, poets).

The first two points lead back to the image of Socrates as moral philosopher, corroborated not only by Plato's *Apology* but also by Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as well as by Cicero in his *Tusculan Disputations*.⁸ Socrates was the first "to call philosophy down from the heavens, set her into their homes, and compel her to ask questions about life and morality and things good and evil."⁹ This interpretation became especially popular among Platonic

7 Cf. Pl. *Euthphr.* 3d6–9; *Ap.* 17c7–9; Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.10.

8 Cf. Pl. *Ap.* 19c4–5; 29d2–30b4; 38a1–8; Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11–16; 4.2.24; 4.7.2–8; Arist. *Metaph.* A.6, 987b1–6; Cic. *Tusc.* 5.4.10. Socrates is also celebrated by Diogenes Laertius as the father of ethics; cf. DL 2.14; 2.18 (= SSR I 6).

9 *Philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus collocavit ... et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere*, Cic. *Tusc.* 5.4.10 (tr. King ⁸1996, 435).

philosophers of the second century CE, who reacted to the Neo-Academic vision of a skeptic Socrates by pointing out the traits typical of a moralist and educator of youth, heir to an ancient Pythagorean tradition.¹⁰

It is precisely this association between Socrates and Pythagoras that appears in Themistius as well, in his description of the philosopher who is never weary of “encouraging and inciting” young pupils:

Now if you lay any claim to the truth or to wisdom and really have something in common with Plato or Socrates or Pythagoras, you should not injure or destroy a person who shares their enthusiasms: rather you should honor and exalt him.

Or. 21.256a (tr. PENELLA 2000, 77)

It seems, then, that the figure of Socrates sketched in Themistius' orations should be traced back to Middle-Platonic circles. This becomes most evident when we consider that in other ways too the author re-interprets in his speeches some standard theories of philosophers and rhetoricians of the second century.¹¹

This is further confirmed by the emphasis Themistius places on the public and egalitarian nature of Socratic teaching (point c, *Or.* 26.318b–c), which had already been amply praised in the orations of Dio Chrysostom:

And there was also Socrates, a poor man at Athens and a man of the people ... He was in general sociable in his nature and a lover of his kind, and in particular he made himself accessible to all who wished to approach and converse with him, not only spending his time for the most part about the market-place, but visiting the palaestras and sitting down near the tables of the money-changers.¹²

DIO CHRYS. *Or.* 54.3 (tr. CROSBY ⁴1986, 374)

Both Themistius and Dio emphasize what they consider to be the philanthropy of Socrates as exemplified by his democratic teaching, open to everyone and

10 This is especially Numenius' thesis (fr. 24 Des Places); cf. Donini 2003, 338–359.

11 For example, Themistius proposes a political interpretation of the Middle Platonic doctrine of assimilation to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ); he stresses the importance of the imperial virtue of *philanthrōpia* (“love of mankind”); cf. Them. *Or.* 2.32d; *Or.* 6.79a; *Or.* 25.188d.

12 See also Dio Chrys. *Or.* 60.10.

rooted in experiences coming from everyday life.¹³ This is a rhetorical stereotype, inspired by the writings of Plato and Xenophon: Socrates, the moralist and the public educator, becomes a symbol of a “philosophizing” that is active participation in the life of the *polis* through shared discussions and inquiries: in other words, a kind of political activity (πολιτεύεσθαι).¹⁴

We have so far observed that many details of the Themistian portrait of Socrates are corroborated by the works of previous philosophers and rhetoricians. To understand their deepest meaning, we must evaluate them from within the polemical context of *Or.* 26. This oration stages a fictitious trial, where Themistius is being sued by unidentified opponents. He is accused of betraying the philosopher’s mission as, by choosing to become a public lecturer who “ventures to speak before all sorts of people” and “canvasses his applauders” (*Or.* 26.313d–314a), he has given up his freedom and independence of thought in favour of what is an essentially political role. In fact, the nature of this charge is not philosophical; what is criticized in Themistius’ behavior is his excessive proximity to the court, his ability to manipulate the flow of rich *curiales* toward Constantinople, and, especially, his extraordinary ease in addressing—despite being pagan—people of different faiths.¹⁵

The author’s self-defensive strategy consists in hurling the accusations back against his opponents. His references to past thinkers and above all to Socrates demonstrate that, in his opinion, to be a philosopher does not mean hiding in a corner and talking with a mere few pupils, but rather facing the masses and thereby increasing the value of speech through social relationships (*Or.* 26.324b–325a). Therefore, the portrait of Socrates’ speaking among people in different places works perfectly for the author’s cultural and political program. Far from innovating, Themistius remains loyal to the most genuine philosophical tradition. It is his opponents, the “artificers of silence,” who betray Socrates (*Or.* 26.313d).

13 In Themistius’ thought philanthropy is the main political and regal virtue, an image of the divine providence that enables the emperor to become closer to his subjects and to God; this kind of “political theology” has Dio Chrysostom as a model (especially the *First Oration On Kingship*); see Them. *Or.* 1.4d, 8a–9b; *Or.* 10.32b–c; *Or.* 11.146c–147b; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.15; 17–18; Downey 1955; Dagron 1968, 85, 137; Vanderspoel 1995, 79–81; Schramm 2014, 134–135.

14 A form of πολιτεύεσθαι also characterizes the philosophy of Socrates in the portrait given by Plutarch, in *An seni* 796d–e; *Quaest. Plat.* 1.999e; *De curios.* 516c (= *SSR* IV A 2); *Adv. Col.* 1117d–e; see Hershbell 1988, 368; Roskam (in this volume).

15 Cf. Brown ²1992, 68–70.

The orations of Themistius offer, then, further proof of the Platonic Socrates being perceived as a practical and political philosopher. For example, we may juxtapose the portrait presented in *Or.* 26 and the opening of *Or.* 28, where the author explicitly chastises contemporary philosophers for their esoteric teaching:

As for the descendants of Socrates, in our day they have vanished and become nonentities—understandably and deservedly so. For they are fearful (I know not why) and wary of public assemblies, where the poet says men become famous and they cannot bear to look away from their couches and secluded corners.¹⁶ They have completely forgotten that their forebears used to speak to crowds of people in workshops, porticoes, baths, and theatres.

Or. 28.341d (tr. PENELLA 2000, 175)

This situation is similar to that described in *Or.* 26, but now Themistius moves from the dock to the prosecutors' tribune: those who refuse to follow the example of Socrates cannot be considered real disciples of the philosopher, because they give up their connection with the colourful life of the *polis* and retreat into a disdainful and aristocratic isolation. "They are more sparing of words than they are of gold" (*Or.* 28.342c). In this passage we can probably recognize a polemical reference to the Neo-Platonic philosophers of post-Iamblichean schools. In Themistius' opinion they pursue an elitist kind of education, considered as a way of spiritual perfecting for a few people hidden "in a corner," in secluded places.¹⁷ To their political and social alienation Themistius opposes the ideal of a public educator, attuned to the practical needs of the state.¹⁸

16 See Pl. *Grg.* 485d6–e1 and, for the image of the corner, also Them. *Or.* 2.30c (= SSR II F 31); *Or.* 22.265b; *Or.* 23.284b; *Or.* 34.12.

17 Themistius, following literary conventions, never mentions his opponents by name; he is probably referring to some of Julian's teachers, Neoplatonic Iamblichean philosophers such as Aedesius, Chrysanthius, Eusebius of Mindus, Maximus of Ephesus, and Priscus of Thesprotia. They did not agree completely among themselves about the mystical aspects of philosophical life, nor were they truly as opposed to public involvement as Themistius' defence makes them out to be; cf. Bowersock 1978, 66–69; Penella 2000, 49–50, 53, 57, 109–117; Delfim Santos 2005; Goulet 2012.

18 Cf. Cracco Ruggini 1972. For a recent reconstruction of the fourth-century debate regarding the true philosophical life and the philosopher's appropriate involvement in political affairs, see Elm 2012, 96–106.

Finally, the figure of Socrates appears in *Or.* 20, the *logos epitaphios* in honour of Themistius' father, Eugenius:

My father used to point to Socrates the Athenian as one who exemplified all these qualities of the true philosopher. Socrates was rebuked at home by Xanthippe and also by Critias and the Thirty Tyrants, who threatened to kill him and drive him out and do horrible things to him if he did not change his mind and be of service to the regime that was in power. Nonetheless, he never succumbed to fear. He was never frightened, nor did he think that there was any danger so terrible and formidable that evil should win out over good or impiety over piety.

Or. 20.239a–c (tr. PENELLA 2000, 58–59)

If, as Penella writes (2000, 195–208), we may recognize in *Or.* 20 a subtle operation of self-advertisement (actually, in the oration dedicated to his father Themistius celebrates his own philosophical and intellectual profile), mentioning Socrates' *paradeigma* is another clear indication of the way the author wanted his speech to be acknowledged by readers. Eugenius and Socrates are projections of Themistius, his predecessors or *alter ego*.

Weighing up the analysis carried out, we may conclude that a practical and political interpretation of the teachings of Socrates emerges from Themistius' orations. But the author presents another image of the Athenian too, that of a clever speaker or rhetorician. This, for instance, is his view in *Or.* 24:

When Prodicus and Gorgias were once living in Athens, there were people who paid serious attention to Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. Yet Prodicus and Gorgias delivered orations and were extravagantly wrought and brimming with delight, and consequently they were able to charge their audience a fee to hear them; whereas Socrates's words were not fancy or clever, but he spoke in a simple, ordinary, casual manner and would gladly have paid someone for wanting to listen to him. Now I hope that you yourselves do not scorn one who is trying to present you with friendly offerings just because they are not extremely delightful or capable of enchanting your ears.¹⁹

Or. 24.300d–301a, transl. PENELLA 2000, 128

19 The efficacy of the rhetorical teaching of Socrates is also emphasized by the Latin rhetorician Fronto in an epistle addressed to Marcus Aurelius; see *ad M. Caes.* 3.15.2. The style of Socrates is proposed as a model of simplicity (ἀφελεία) by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and of *elegantia* by Quintilian; cf. Brancacci 1985, 46–47.

This brief opening lecture, delivered in Nicomedia, pursues the aim of encouraging potential pupils to follow Themistius' lessons. Here the eulogy of the immediacy of the speeches of Socrates becomes part of a shrewd advertising strategy.

Indeed, the contrast between Sophroniscus' son and Prodicus/Gorgias is to be reinterpreted as a contrast between Themistius and the sophists of his own time. Simple (ἁπλός) speech—like that of Socrates—is presented as an effective alternative to the tempting “songs” and “twitterings” of fashionable rhetoricians, who usually aim at astonishing the audience with linguistic and stylistic virtuosity, but are not able to give a healthy moral education.²⁰ Themistius' *paideia*, by contrast, without renouncing formal preciousness, is a form of *philosophical rhetoric* based mainly on morally sound contents.²¹ Rigorous in his definitions, he shuns wordiness and strives to compose “free speeches” (*Or.* 24.301d).

Once more, the Socratic model is not inserted into the oration as a neutral element, as a simple erudite curiosity, but takes on a precise ideological function: that of promoting its author. Themistius identifies with the image of Socrates passed on by tradition and highlights those rhetorical components that allow him to distance himself from the sophists of his own time. He wants to make his teachings more appealing so as to gain new pupils. So, he enjoys wearing the mask of Socrates, once again following the example of his first- and second-century predecessors.²²

2 Socrates in Julian's Works: The Savior of Souls

As we have seen in the previous paragraph, Socrates as portrayed by Themistius represents the practical and political philosopher who speaks with everybody in a simple and direct way and rejects instinctively the conceited attitudes of the sophists. He becomes the symbol of an “active Hellenism,”²³ “a popular form of Greek philosophy which serves as a guide for daily living not only for the educated but for the masses as well.”²⁴ Themistius' portrayal of Socrates

20 Cf. Them. *Or.* 20.237d; *Or.* 22.265b; *Or.* 26.315c; *Or.* 27.332c; *Or.* 28.341b–d. These passages may contain a polemical hint about the exaggerated rhythms of the so-called Asianic style of Himerius: Kennedy 1983, 141–149; Raimondi 2012.

21 Cf. Maisano 1986, 29–47.

22 See for example the Socratic components of Dio Chrysostom's self-portrait; cf. Moles 1978.

23 Cf. Cracco Ruggini 1972, 190; Elm 2012, 99–103.

24 Cf. Downey 1957, 265; Vanderspoel 1995, 11; Penella 2000, 136.

is undoubtedly partial and ideologically oriented, meant to justify an author working alongside the emperor in Constantinople. This is confirmed by the fact that those aspects of the Platonic Socrates irrelevant to Themistius' self-advertisement do not appear in his speeches. There is no trace, for example, of the philosopher who discusses the soul's immortality or who exhorts his pupils to self-knowledge.

Julian's Socrates is a different one. In his plan of a religious restoration of Hellenism, he keeps his distance from Themistius' ideal of a philosophical-rhetorical *paideia*. So, as we will see, his portrait of Socrates reflects a different idea of the philosopher's mission within society.

In Julian's orations, just like in Themistius', there are many references to the biography of Socrates. These are taken mostly from Platonic dialogues (*Apology*, *Charmides*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*), such as the encounter with Zalmoxis' pupil, the demon, the irony, the physical appearance, and, above all, the unfair death.²⁵ Other details are surely inspired by Xenophon's works, such as the anecdote in which Socrates turns his young pupils away from politics (*Memorabilia*) or the one about the poverty of his house (*Oeconomicus*).²⁶ It is from a *Life of Socrates* (perhaps the work of Diogenes Laertius) that Julian may have derived the idea of the extreme popularity of Socrates among the Athenians of the fourth century CE.²⁷

As for the philosophy of Socrates, in some passages the emperor seems to ascribe to Socrates opinions—such as the firm belief that power does not lead to happiness, the impossibility of knowing whether death is evil, the claim that philosophy is an exercise that prepares one for death, and the conviction that a wicked man cannot hurt a respectable person—that are taken from the Platonic dialogues.²⁸ But it is very difficult to determine whether the Apostate could tell which among Plato's works were the so-called Socratic dialogues, these being closer to Socrates as a historical character. More often than not, however, Socrates and Plato are confused or juxtaposed in Julian's speeches (as they are in Themistius'), according to schemes typical of an estab-

25 Cf. Julian. *Ep.* 89b.295b; *Or.* 4.244a (Pl. *Chrm.* 156d4–6); *Or.* 4.249b (Pl. *Ap.* 31c7–d4); *Or.* 7.237b (Pl. *Resp.* 1.377a4); *Or.* 10.314d (Pl. *Symp.* 215a4–b3); *Or.* 3.79a, *Or.* 9.191a, *Or.* 10.314d (Pl. *Ap.* 21a5–7). About the portrait of Socrates in Julian's works, see Criscuolo 1987; Bouffartigue 1992, 53–57.

26 Cf. Julian. *Or.* 6.255c (Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.1); *Or.* 6.259b (Xen. *Oec.* 2.2–4).

27 Cf. DL 2.43.

28 Cf. Julian. *Or.* 3.78d–79b; *Or.* 5.276d; *Or.* 9.181a, 188d, 190c; *Ep.* 30.56, 19–21. All these statements are taken from well-known pieces of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Apology*, or *Crito*; cf. Pl. *Grg.* 470c9–e11; *Phd.* 62b2–8; *Ap.* 30c6–d5; 40b6–c9; *Cri.* 44c2–9.

lished rhetorical tradition.²⁹ The *Panegyric in honour of Eusebia* (*Or.* 2) is a representative example:

For a eulogy, however, one is ambitious to obtain as many hearers as possible, and even a small audience is, I think, not to be despised. Socrates, for instance, spoke in praise of many, as did Plato also and Aristotle.

Or. 2.104a (tr. WRIGHT ³1954, 279)

Perhaps it is the Platonic examples of panegyrics provided by the *Charmides* (157d–158b) or the *Meno* (93c–94b) that Julian has in mind. But the aim of his reference is not to determine whether the eulogies belong to Socrates or Plato. He wants simply to give a conventional list of philosophers who have devoted themselves to the rhetorical genre of the *logos panêgurikos*; in this way he can legitimate the panegyric that he declaims in honor of Eusebia. It is interesting to notice how, in moving on to a new oration (*Or.* 9, *To the Uneducated Cynics*), the philosophers mentioned together with Plato change:

Plato and Pythagoras and Socrates and the Peripatetic philosophers and Zeno ... wished to know themselves, and not to follow vain opinions but to track down truth among all things that are.

Or. 9.188c (tr. WRIGHT ³1949, 25)

Here Julian emphasizes a strict association between Plato and Pythagoras (and not between Socrates and Plato) in the chain of transmission of philosophical truths; indeed, in his opinion both Plato and Pythagoras are exponents of what is essentially a theoretical philosophy that anticipates some traits of the speculation of Iamblichus, Julian's "divine" guide.³⁰

The teaching of Socrates, on the contrary, is represented in a profoundly different way. It is neither a simple transfer of doctrines, nor a private relationship between a pupil and his master. Rather, it manifests itself through a perfect way of life, as clarified in a passage of the *Letter to Themistius*:

As for Pythagoras and Democritus and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, you will perhaps say that they were happy in another sense of the word,

29 Cf. Julian. *Or.* 4.242d–243a; *Or.* 9.189a–b.

30 Julian's interest in Pythagoras (see also *Ep.* 89b.300d) is part of the general rediscovery of Pythagoreanism that characterizes Late Antique philosophy; see O'Meara ²2006. About Julian's passion for Iamblican doctrines, see particularly De Vita 2011, 103–105.

because of their philosophic speculations. But as for Socrates who, having rejected the speculative life and embraced a life of action, had no authority over his own wife or his son, can we say of him that he governed even two or three of his fellow-citizens? ... I maintain that the son of Sophroniscus performed greater tasks than Alexander, for to him I ascribe the wisdom of Plato, the generalship of Xenophon, the fortitude of Antisthenes ... Who, I ask, ever found salvation through the conquests of Alexander? What city was ever more wisely governed because of them, what individual improved? Many indeed you might find whom those conquests enriched, but not one whom they made wiser or more temperate than he was by nature, if indeed they have not made him more insolent and arrogant. Whereas all who now find their salvation in philosophy owe it to Socrates.

Or. 6.264b–d (= SSR I 17; tr. WRIGHT ³1949, 229–231)

This text, fundamental in order to understand the portrait of Socrates drawn by Julian, dates back to a crucial phase of the brief reign of the Apostate just before or immediately after his triumphal entry in Constantinople, probably to 361 at the latest.³¹ The abrupt development of political and military events allowed the young prince to become the sole sovereign of the Empire without having to fight Constantius II.³² Therefore Themistius, one of Julian's former teachers, sent him a (now lost) congratulatory letter in which, as we may deduce from details we find in Julian's reply, the master exhorted the new emperor to compete with Alexander and Marcus Aurelius, and to imitate Heracles and Dionysus in their effort to merge philosophy and politics in order to purify the world from evil (*Or.* 6.255d–259b).³³ It can be assumed that the letter con-

31 The period of composition ranges between 355–356 and 361 CE; the best treatment of the *Letter* and of this problem in particular is Bouffartigue 2006. For a *conspectus* of earlier views see also Swain 2013, 53–91.

32 Cf. *Amm. Marc.* 21.14–15; *Zos.* 3.11.2.

33 Many scholars have postulated a strong intellectual affinity between Julian and Themistius; see Dagron 1968, 230. The prince probably attended courses held by Themistius in Constantinople and subsequently, around 354, wrote rhetorical and philosophical letters addressed to him; cf. Criscuolo 1983. Daly 1980 suggests the interesting hypothesis that Julian, immediately after ascending to the throne, might have offered Themistius the prefectship of Constantinople, in order to gain the favour of contemporary intellectuals. But the rhetorician would not bend to the political trend of the new Hellenic Empire and refused; cf. *Them. Or.* 34.14. About the political and cultural distance between Themistius and Julian (they both diverge in their theory of kingship and in their interpretation of Platonic and Aristotelian texts), see Schramm 2013 and 2014; Chiaradonna 2015.

tained explicit references to Themistius' cultural plan, according to which the philosopher would have to realize through actions and words an effective cooperation with the reigning emperor. The accession to the throne of Julian, who was deeply interested in classical culture and, by his own admission, fond of philosophy, should have appeared to the rhetorician as the perfect chance to fulfil his own dream.³⁴

But Julian responds with extreme caution to Themistius' warm invitation. He is perfectly aware of the difficulties that await him in the management of the Empire, and dampens the enthusiasm of his teacher by referring to the almighty power of *tuchê* that rules human destiny (*Or.* 6.255d–259b). Above all, he expresses a conception of philosophy very different from that of Themistius, despite also finding its symbolic representation in the figure of Socrates. Indeed, according to the Apostate, Socrates is not a model of a political philosopher; “he is rather an exponent of another kind of *bios*, *praktikos* for sure but not *politikos*, who goes beyond spatio-temporal boundaries and similarly involves the destiny of salvation of each man.”³⁵ His teaching does not find its accomplishment in pure contemplation, or in political or military activity (as the opposition between Socrates and Alexander suggests), but in the ability to generate happiness all around him, leading each individual to discover the virtue in which lies the excellence of his own nature. That is why Plato owes to Socrates his “wisdom,” Antisthenes his “courage,” and Xenophon his “strategic talent.”

Thus, for Julian, the philosopher's mission is a divine mission of purification and salvation of souls. In contrast to Themistius' stance, Socrates becomes a sort of “pagan holy man,”³⁶ the best representative of the Hellenic *paideia* conceived not only as a precious cultural heritage but as an inseparable union of classical literature, classical philosophy, and pagan religion, a “supreme category of the spirit.”³⁷ For the Apostate this is the core of his program of cultural and religious restoration.

In this chapter we cannot analyze Julian's thought in all its details. His sophisticated version of Neoplatonism leads back to the Pergamene follow-

34 Cf. Julian. *Or.* 6.254b; 266d; *Or.* 9.185c; Amm. Marc. 16.5.6–7.

35 Cf. Criscuolo 1983, 100. More recently Elm 2012, 86, has argued that Julian's preference for philosophical life, far from indicating a lack of capacity to govern, demonstrates instead that he understood the prerequisites for good governance; he would guide the empire as a true leader and champion of philosophers (*Or.* 6.267a).

36 Cf. Fowden 1982.

37 Cf. Jaeger 1961, 95. Libanius (*Or.* 18.57) ascribes to Julian the melding of rhetoric and religious faith (λόγοι and ἱερὰ θεῶν). About Julian's Hellenism, see also Huart 1978; Criscuolo 1986.

ers of Iamblichus and is clearly characterized by an anti-Christian attitude.³⁸ From the perspective of the Emperor, however, the words of ancient poets and philosophers reveal divine truths which, if correctly interpreted, can enlighten minds imprisoned by the darkness of ignorance and religious misconceptions.³⁹ In this context the effectiveness of the teachings of Socrates, and the salvation of souls he assured, is properly identified as a strong call to the capacity to know oneself:

For Socrates and many others also, as we know, devoted themselves to speculation ... They thought that self-knowledge meant learning precisely what must be assigned to the soul, and what to the body. And to the soul they naturally assigned supremacy, and to the body subjection.

Or. 9.190a (tr. WRIGHT ³1949, 31)

This passage is taken from a polemical writing, the oration *To the Uneducated Cynics*, composed by Julian during Spring–Summer of 362 CE, immediately after the oration *To the Cynic Heracleios* (*Or.* 7). Both discourses strike out at groups of Cynic philosophers living on the fringe of society, condemning all divine and human laws, and often causing disorders together with the loathed Galileans.⁴⁰ The prince rebukes them sharply by appealing to the example of Diogenes, the most noted of Cynics, whose figure is strictly connected with that of Socrates.⁴¹ He wants to prove that in spite of all deviations even Cynicism, when correctly understood, is a serious philosophy. As a matter of fact, he affirms that the Cynics, just like the philosophers of other schools, acknowledge the authority of the Delphic precept to “know yourself.” This maxim can be considered the “starting point” (ἀρχή)⁴² of every authentic philosophy, and is clearly characterized according to Plato’s dialogues:

Let us begin with “Know thyself,” since this precept is divinely inspired. It follows that he who knows himself will know not only about his soul but his body also. And it will not be enough to know that a man is a soul

38 See De Vita 2011, 35–43. Among Julian’s teacher we may recognize some of Themistius’ critics; cf. Elm 2012, 96–106.

39 Cf. Julian. *Or.* 8.162c–d; *Or.* 12.359c; c. *Gal.* fr. 55.12–21 Masaracchia; *Ep.* 61c.422d–423a.

40 For an exhaustive profile of Cynicism in the Imperial age, see Goulet Cazé 1990, 5–77.

41 Cf. Julian. *Or.* 9.181a–b (= SSR V B 94); 188d–189a; 191a; about the succession Socrates–Antisthenes–Diogenes, see Bees (in this volume). The figure of Diogenes assumes in Julian’s writings a deep religious significance; cf. Billerbeck 1996.

42 Julian. *Or.* 7.225c–d.

employing a body, but he will also investigate the essential nature of the soul, and then trace out its faculties.

Or. 9.183a–b (tr. WRIGHT ³1949, 11)

According to some scholars, the importance attributed by the Apostate to the precept “know yourself”—which consists in the awareness of one’s own nature and possibilities—is an indisputable reference to the Platonic *Alcibiades*, where the exhortation “know yourself” is meant as an invitation to know one’s soul.⁴³ In fact, Julian’s work barely hints at that dialogue. The Apostate is taking up theoretical considerations concerning self-cognition used by rhetoricians and philosophers during the first and second centuries.⁴⁴

Apart from the issue about sources, there is no doubt that the Delphic “know yourself” represents the high point of Julian’s so-called “theoretic Socratism.”⁴⁵ But we can identify its practical implications as well. It is possible to find, within Julian’s works, several examples of a deliberate imitation of the attitudes of Socrates and of his way of life; as we can see, the Apostate—just like Themistius—wants to appear as a new Socrates to his contemporaries.

This hypothesis can be tested in some passages of the *Letter to the Athenians* (*Or.* 5), the most explicit document of Julian’s propaganda against Constantius II. It has been demonstrated that this writing is a sort of “autobiography”⁴⁶ in which the emperor thinks back over the tumultuous events that have led him to become at first Caesar and then, unpredictably, Augustus of the Roman Empire.⁴⁷ Here he gains consciousness of his own mission, to be accomplished with the help of the gods:

Gods saved me through philosophy.

Or. 5.272a (tr. WRIGHT ³1949, 251)

43 Cf. Asmus 1917. About the relevance of the Delphic precept in Plato’s dialogues (Pl. *Alc.* 124a7–c10; 128e10–129b3; 130e2–9, 133b7–11), see Moore 2015.

44 Cf. Plut. *De Eap. Delph.* 17.392a; Att. fr. 9.17–23 Des Places; Zambon 2002, 48, 115, 124–125. On the ancient tradition concerning the *Alcibiades* and its importance in later Neoplatonism, see Griffin 2014.

45 Cf. Criscuolo 1987, 100.

46 Cf. Labriola 1975.

47 The central event of Julian’s life was his acclamation as Augustus in Paris early in 360. Whether it was a spontaneous reaction to previous events or engineered is a matter for debate, as is the degree of Julian’s complicity, if indeed it was deliberately brought about; cf. Tougher 2007, 36–41.

This statement appears at the beginning of the *Letter*, where Julian contrasts his good fortune—a young man happily directed towards philosophical *paideia*—with the wretched destiny of his brother Gallus.⁴⁸ It is interesting to notice that the saving aim of philosophy had already been expounded in the *Letter to Themistius* using the example of Socrates.

The most significant passage, however, is to be found further on, where the Apostate remembers one of the critical moments of his life: in 355, just after the death of Gallus, he was suddenly called to Milan from Athens by order of Constantius. There he wrote a letter, a shameful plea to the empress Eusebia, wishing to return to Athens. Only a careful meditation on Socrates' last speech in the *Phaedo* suggested the behavior he should assume:

I forbore to send the letter. But from that night there kept occurring to me an argument which it is perhaps worth your while also to hear. "... Where is your courage, and of what sort is it? A sorry thing it seems. At any rate, you are ready to cringe and flatter from fear of death, and yet it is in your power to lay all that aside and leave it to the gods to work their will, dividing with them the care of yourself, as Socrates, for instance, chose to do: and you might, while doing such things as best you can, commit the whole to their charge; seek to possess nothing, seize nothing, but accept simply what is vouchsafed to you by them."

Or. 5.275d–276d, (tr. WRIGHT ³1949, 261–265)

The deliberate parallelism between Socrates and Julian himself is plain: both are in danger of death, and in both cases reason prevails over irrational fears.⁴⁹ Above all, the vicissitudes of their lives can be compared, because they offer clear examples of the active presence of the gods throughout human history. Indeed, in Julian's view, Socrates is the person who succeeded in assuring spiritual salvation to many people; Julian has become the king of the Roman Empire by averting a terrible war and by striving to detect everywhere and anywhere signs of divine favor.

The Apostate, therefore, wants to bring to the fore the religious aspects of the figure of Socrates, his attitude as a mystic philosopher who takes care of his own soul and becomes an instrument of the will of the gods. As in the case of Themistius, this idea is used mainly as self propaganda directed at a

48 He was made Caesar by Constantius in 351, but only four years later, in 354, he was recalled to the imperial court at Milan, deprived of his rank, and taken to a place near Pola where he was questioned and then executed; see Amm. Marc. 14.11.19–23; Tougher 2007, 16–17.

49 Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 62b2–c8; 77d5–78b7; Julian. *Or.* 5.275b–d.

specific audience, namely the Athenian citizens. The addressees of his writings were subtly led to recognize the existence of a providential plan in what had happened, which conferred to their emperor (as it had to Socrates before) the exceptional status of a sage beloved by the gods.

This self-portrait of a “pagan holy man,” protected by divine favor, will reappear in the later writings of the Apostate’s: for example, in the programmatic passages from *Orr.* 7 and 10, where the author portrays himself as a follower of Zeus and Apollo, prepared to purge the Empire from false religions (*Or.* 7.233a–234c; *Or.* 10.336c), or when he compares his activity as theologian of the new Hellenism to one of a savior or a doctor of the soul (*Or.* 3.89b–c; *Or.* 7.231d).⁵⁰ In texts like these Socrates is not expressly mentioned, but it is clear that the emperor continues to conceive his role as similar to that of Socrates the savior in the *Letter to Themistius*.

Moreover, there are two exceptional testimonies demonstrating that Julian was considered by his contemporaries an authentic successor of the Athenian philosopher: those by Ammianus Marcellinus and by Libanius. They have left in their writings a touching reminiscence about the last days of Julian’s life during the unsuccessful Persian campaign.⁵¹ In the descriptions both of them give of the dying *princeps*, a hint to the death of Socrates as described in Plato’s *Phaedo* is obvious:

His tent was like the prison that had held Socrates, the company like the company there, his wound the poison, and his words those of Socrates. Socrates was the only one not to be in tears: so was he.⁵²

LIB. *Or.* 18.272 (tr. NORMAN ²1987, 463)

Meanwhile, all who were present wept, whereupon even then maintaining his authority, he chided them, saying that it was unworthy to mourn for a prince who was called to union with heaven and the stars. As this made them all silent, he himself engaged with the philosophers Maximus and Priscus in an intricate discussion about the nobility of the soul.

AMM. MARC. 25.3.22–23 (tr. ROLFE ³1958, 207)

Julian dies like Socrates: discussing philosophy, surrounded by his closest friends. With their accounts, Libanius and Ammianus become part of the suc-

⁵⁰ Cf. Lib. *Or.* 18.21.

⁵¹ On the difficulties concerning motivations and objectives of Julian’s Persian expedition (363 CE), see Marcone 1979; Gnoli 2015, 101–146.

⁵² For the comparison between Socrates and the dying Julian see Nesselrath (in this volume).

cessful rhetorical tradition of the *exitus virorum illustrium*.⁵³ Their posthumous eulogies emphasize the image of Julian as an emperor-philosopher, a “Socrates on the throne,” an aspect otherwise subtly concealed by all the writings of the Apostate.

3 Conclusion

At the end of this review of the texts of Themistius and of Julian, let us reaffirm that these authors—each for the purpose of their own self-legitimization—highlight different aspects of the Athenian philosopher and attest to the vitality the icon of Socrates had in Late Antiquity. Themistius focuses on the philosopher’s eloquence and his active life in the *polis*; Julian draws on the invitation to care for one’s soul and the necessity of having faith in the gods. Both achieve, each in his own way, the peculiar wish expressed by the author of the pseudo-libanian Declamation 2, *On the Silence of Socrates*:⁵⁴

I ask you, Socrates ... to speak not only while you are alive, but also ... after you drink the hemlock. And do not stop speaking even when you die. I believe you: the soul is completely immortal, especially your soul. If any of the spirits of the wise visit the souls of their friends, do not be silent, but speak to us in dream, Socrates, as now do the gods.

PS-LIB. *decl.* 2.23 (tr. CROSBY-CALDER 1960, 202)

The author begs Socrates and the whole classical tradition under attack by Christianity to keep on speaking and to resist the cultural and religious revolution taking place. Confronted with this revolution, Themistius and Julian assume differing attitudes: open and collaborative the former, drastically uncompromising the latter. However, they both choose to “wear the mask of Socrates” in order to promote their views about the role of philosophy within society, the nature of rulership and the appropriate education of future rhetors and future emperors. The great prestige of Socrates affords them a certain appeal among their heterogeneous audience, which, we must suppose, was composed in equal parts by pagans, Christians, and other individuals with dif-

53 This tradition is documented in Greek as well as in Latin literature; see, e.g., Cic. *Sen.* 79; Xen. *Cyr.* 8.7.17; Tac. *Ann.* 2.71.

54 This strange piece was probably not written by Libanius and can be considered an imitation of Libanius’ famous Declamation 1; see Nesselrath (in this volume).

fering religious faiths; surely, they were all fascinated by a figure that proved a turning point in the history of ancient culture and ancient philosophy.

References

- Asmus, R. *Der Alkibiades-Kommentar des Iamblichos als Hauptquelle für Kaiser Julian*. Heidelberg 1917.
- Billerbeck, M. 'The ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian', in: R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, *The Cynics: the Cynic movement in Antiquity and its legacy*. London 1996, 205–222.
- Bouffartigue, J. *L'Empereur Julien et la culture de son temps*. Paris 1992.
- Bouffartigue, J. 'La lettre de Julien à Thémistios: histoire d'une fausse manœuvre et d'un désaccord essentiel', in: Á. González Gálvez and P.-L. Malosse, *Mélanges A.F. Norman*. Paris 2006, 113–138.
- Bowersock, G.W. *Julian the Apostate*. Cambridge 1978.
- Brancacci, A. *Rhetorike Philosophousa: Dione Crisostomo nella cultura antica e bizantina*. Napoli 1985.
- Brown, P. *Power and persuasion in Late Antiquity: towards a Christian empire*. Madison 1992.
- Cameron, A. *The last Pagans of Rome*. Oxford 2011.
- Chiaradonna, R. 'La Lettera a Temistio di Giuliano Imperatore e il dibattito filosofico nel IV secolo', in: A. Marcone, *L'imperatore Giuliano: realtà storica e rappresentazione*. Firenze 2015, 149–171.
- Cracco Ruggini, L. 'Simboli di battaglia ideologica nel tardo ellenismo', in: O. Bertolini, *Studi storici in onore di Ottorino Bertolini*, 1. Pisa 1972, 177–300.
- Criscuolo, U. 'Sull'epistola di Giuliano Imperatore al filosofo Temistio', *Koinonia* 7 (1983), 89–111.
- Criscuolo, U. 'Giuliano e l'Ellenismo: conservazione e riforma', *Orpheus* 7 (1986), 272–292.
- Criscuolo, U. 'Giuliano, Socrate e la filosofia', in: S. Calderone, *Hestiasis: Studi di tarda antichità offerti a Salvatore Calderone*, 1. Messina 1987, 85–109.
- Crosby, H.L., *Dio Chrysostom: Discourses*. London 1986.
- Crosby, M. and Calder, W.M. 'Libanius, *On the Silence of Socrates*. A first translation and an interpretation', *GRBS* 3 (1960), 185–202.
- Dagron, G. 'L'empire Romain d'Orient au IV^e siècle et les traditions politiques de l'Hellénisme: le témoignage de Thémistios', *Travaux et Mémoires* 3 (1968), 1–242.
- Daly, L.J. 'In a borderland: Themistius' ambivalence toward Julian', *ByzZ* 73 (1980), 1–11.

- Delfim Santos, F. 'Maxime (D'Éphèse?)', in: R. Goulet, *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, Iva: *De Labeo à Ovidius*. Paris 2005, 313–322.
- Donini, P.L. 'Socrate pitagorico e medioplatonico', *Elenchos* 24 (2003), 333–359.
- Downey, G. 'Philanthropia in religion and statecraft in the fourth century after Christ', *Historia* 4 (1955), 199–208.
- Downey, G. 'Themistius and the defense of Hellenism in the fourth century', *HTHR* 50 (1957), 259–274.
- Elm, S. *Sons of Hellenism, fathers of the Church: Emperor Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus and the vision of Rome*. London 2012.
- Fowden, G. 'The Pagan holy man in Late Antique society', *JHS* 102 (1982), 33–59.
- Gnoli T. *Le guerre di Giuliano imperatore*. Bologna 2015.
- Goulet Cazé, M.-O. 'Le cynisme à l'époque impériale', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 11.36.4 (1990), 5–77.
- Goulet, R. 'Priscus de Thesprotie', in: R. Goulet, *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, Ivb: *De Plotina à Rutilius Rufus*. Paris 2012, 1528–1539.
- Griffin, M. *Olympiodorus: Life of Plato and on Plato, First Alcibiades 1–9*. Bloomsbury 2014.
- Hershbell, J.P. 'Plutarch's portrait of Socrates', *ICS* 13 (1988), 365–382.
- Huart, P. 'Julien et l'Hellénisme', in: R. Braun and J. Richer, *L'Empereur Julien: de l'histoire à la légende (331–1715)*. Paris 1978, 99–123.
- Jaeger, W. *Early Christianity and Greek paideia*. Cambridge 1961.
- Kahlos, M. *Debate and dialogue: Christian and Pagan cultures c. 360–430*. Aldershot 2007.
- Kahlos, M. *Forbearance and compulsion: the rhetoric of religious tolerance and intolerance in Late Antiquity*. London 2009.
- Kennedy, G.A. *Greek rhetoric under Christian Emperors*. Princeton 1983.
- King, J.E. *Cicero: Tusculan Disputations*. London 1996.
- Labriola, I. *Giuliano l'Apostata: Autobiografia. Messaggio agli Ateniesi*. Firenze 1975.
- Luise, F. de and Farinetti, G. *Felicità socratica: immagini di Socrate e modelli antropologici ideali nella filosofia antica*. Hidelshheim 1997.
- Maisano, R. 'La paideia del logos nell'opera oratoria di Temistio', *Koinonia* 10 (1986), 29–47.
- Maisano, R. *Temistio: Discorsi*. Torino 1995.
- Marcone A. 'Il significato della spedizione di Giuliano contro la Persia', *Athenaeum* 57 (1979), 334–356.
- Moles, J.L. 'The career and conversion of Dio Chrysostom', *JHS* 98 (1978), 79–100.
- Moore, C. *Socrates and self-knowledge*. Cambridge 2015.
- Norman, A.F. *Libanius: Selected Works*. London 1987.
- O'Meara, D.J. *Pythagoras revived: mathematics and philosophy in Late Antiquity*. Oxford 2006.

- Penella, R.J. 'The rhetoric of praise in the private orations of Themistius', in: T. Hägg and P. Rousseau, *Greek biography and panegyric in Late Antiquity*. Berkeley 2000, 195–208.
- Raimondi, M. *Imerio e il suo tempo*. Roma 2012.
- Rolfe, J.C. *Ammianus Marcellinus*, II. London 1958.
- Schramm, M. *Freundschaft im Neuplatonismus: politisches Denken und Sozialphilosophie von Plotin bis Kaiser Julian*. Berlin 2013.
- Schramm, M. 'Platonic ethics and politics in Themistius and Julian', in: R.C. Fowler, *Plato in the third Sophistic*. Berlin 2014, 131–144.
- Swain, S. *Themistius: Julian and Greek political theory under Rome*. New York 2013.
- Tantillo, I. *L'imperatore Giuliano*. Roma 2001.
- Tougher, S. *Julian the Apostate*. Edinburgh 2007.
- Vanderspoel, J. *Themistius and the imperial court: oratory, civic duty and Paideia from Constantius to Theodosius*. Ann Arbor 1995.
- Vita, M.C. de. *Giuliano Imperatore filosofo neoplatonico*. Milano 2011.
- Wright, W.C. *The works of the emperor Julian*, I. London 1954.
- Wright, W.C. *The works of the emperor Julian*, II. London 1949.
- Zambon, M. *Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme*. Paris 2002.

Proclus on Socratic Ignorance, Knowledge, and Irony

Danielle A. Layne

Gonzaga University

1 Introduction

Often overlooked in the history of commentary on images of Socrates in antiquity, the late Neoplatonic philosophers discussed and analyzed the contradictions and enigmas associated with the character of Socrates, and in doing so they offer a rich and complex portrait both useful and inspiring for scholars in Socratic studies.¹ Specifically, Neoplatonists like Proclus, despite being concerned only with Plato's Socrates,² advanced complex arguments on various "Socratic" subjects, including Socrates' infamous confessions of ignorance and their seeming contradiction with his avowals of knowledge. In this chapter we shall see how—unlike contemporary scholars, who happily associate Socrates with either skepticism or irony—such associations would have been unnerving to the Neoplatonist. In contrast, Proclus adamantly insisted that Socrates' avowals of ignorance need not be qualified by an appeal to Socratic irony insofar as he argued that Socrates' form (or "grade") of ignorance would not taint the philosopher's corresponding form of knowledge.³ Indeed, long before the work

-
- 1 Neoplatonists are often criticized for neglecting the Socratic character both of philosophy in general and Platonism in particular. For this characteristic view see Zeller 1903, 496; Hathaway 1969, 19–26. For the contrasting view see Beierwaltes 1995, 97–116; Layne and Tarrant 2014; Griffin 2014; Smith 2004, 455–460; Rangos 2004, 464–480; Sedley 2002; Tarrant 2000, 25–26 and 108–111; Taki 2012. See Layne 2015b for a comprehensive bibliography of Socratic references in authors of late antiquity. The following chapter does not address all the criticisms of the Neoplatonic dismissal of the Socratic in Hathaway et al. but focuses instead on the valorization of a kind of ignorance easily associated with the Socratic, and Proclus' corresponding defense of the philosopher's use of irony. In highlighting these leitmotifs in Proclus one should recognize that the value of the "aporetic" is not lost on the authors of late antiquity.
 - 2 For more information on how the Neoplatonists responded to the distinction between the historical Socrates and Plato's Socrates in contradistinction to other Socratic authors see Procl. *in Ti.* 65.22–28, Syrianius *In metaph.* 105.1–5 and Anon. *Proleg.* 3.12. See also Layne and Tarrant 2014, 12–13; Layne 2015b.
 - 3 *In Alc.* 23.15–18. All references and translations of the Proclus' *Commentary on the Alcibiades I* derive from Westerink (ed.)/O'Neill (tr.) 2011.

of Gregory Vlastos (1991, 1994), Proclus “saved” Socrates from charges of deceptive irony and skepticism by appealing to various modes/activities of intellection as well as grades of not-knowing or ignorance, letting Socrates avow both a *kind* of knowledge and a *kind* of ignorance without contradiction. As we shall soon see, when Socrates speaks of his ignorance and his corresponding knowledge, Proclus argues that the philosopher is 1) relying on a hierarchy between different acts of intellection (opining versus discursive reasoning and dialectic) that have distinct cognitive objects (sense versus intellectual) and 2) advancing the idea that there are certain forms of ignorance that do not unsettle one’s claims to knowledge but might rather be constitutive of it.

Ultimately, these differences between activities of intellection and kinds of ignorance allow Proclus to contend that there should be no “doubtful weight attached to Socratic knowledge” (*In Alc.*, 24.10–15). As such, Proclus defends Socrates from the charge of irony when it comes to his disavowals to knowledge. The Neoplatonist further contends that Socrates only uses irony in the appropriate pedagogical context and therein should not be regarded as deceptive. Irony is ultimately seen as a purgative technique wielded by the wise for the sake of transforming the lives of particular individuals in need of salvation. Despite ridiculing and teasing his interlocutors, Socrates speaks ironically for the good of their souls and therefore is motivated primarily by sincere concern. It will be due to this Socratic care, sincerity, and self-knowledge that Proclus will come to see Socrates as a divine lover and true hero, enticing all those he encounters to the examined life.

To see all this we shall first discuss Proclus’ understanding of a kind of excusable or recognized ignorance, and then turn to a detailed account of Proclus’ analysis of forms of knowing that can be held alongside this particular form of ignorance. Once it has been established that Socrates can claim both ignorance and knowledge without an appeal to irony, we shall close by discussing Proclus’ defense of Socrates’ use of pedagogical irony, irony used not for deception but for leading his interlocutors toward the care of themselves.

2 The Value of Recognized Ignorance

No less than today, skeptical interpretations of Socrates were prevalent in the fifth century CE, often employed by all wishing to argue against not only dogmatic readings of Plato but also portraits of Socrates that emphasized his sage-like wisdom. In this vein, Proclus’ *On Providence* attempts at length to dismantle the arguments of Theodore, an inquiring engineer, who doubts the possibility

of human knowledge. Appealing to an image of Socrates laughing “at those who claim to know everything,” Theodore hopes to undermine the Platonic contemplative project by appealing to the philosopher’s repeated claims that he knows nothing.⁴ Proclus responds to this epistemologically pessimistic portrait with several strategies that legitimate philosophical inquiry and the search for knowledge, not least of which is a considerably novel attempt to unpack Socrates’ infamous response to the oracle at Delphi:

To be sure, Socrates is ready to say that he knows nothing, and the oracle of the Pythia proclaimed him for that reason to be “the wisest of all” as he himself explains the oracle. Yet you [sc. Theodore] should consider the depth of what both the god and Socrates said. For he did not say that merely the fact of knowing nothing is a special privilege, but rather when one does not know, to know that one does not know (ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ εἰδότα καὶ τοῦτο εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐκ οἶδε). This ignorance seems to be of great utility (προὔργου) for those who intend to become wise; in reality, however, it tends to be the same as wisdom, and the person who knows himself to be really not knowing and who is not ignorant about what he does not know, is really wise ... When, then, someone has become wise, he will know himself both knowing that he knows and knowing that he does not know. So far then, my friend, is the appropriate interpretation of what Socrates and the oracle say about true wisdom.⁵

PROCL. *De prov.* § 51

4 *De prov.* § 48.1–10. Cf. *Pl. Ap.* 20e–23b and *Phd.* 66d–68a. For information on Theodore, his depiction of Socrates and Plato’s philosophy, and the debates about the possible skeptical aspects of Socrates or Plato, see Steel 2007, 1–4 and 20–22. It might be worth noting that Proclus appears to be framing Theodore in the light of Meno’s eristic paradox: Theodore’s pessimism makes it impossible for him to know that he does not know, particularly about the subject of his concern, whether we are free or determined. Proclus writes against Theodore’s belief that perhaps all of knowledge is merely a dream: “Yet you should have realized that if we cannot know the truth, we also cannot know whether what depends on us exists or not. For ignorance prevents us equally from taking a position for the one or the other alternative. How, then, can we use the fact that we do not know the truth to demonstrate the non-existence of what depends on us, when ignorance has the same power, or rather lack of power, to show both that this faculty exists and that it does not?” *De prov.* § 48.10–16.

5 See Steel 2007, 68. All translations of Proclus’ *On Providence* are from Steel (tr.) 2007 which follows H. Boese’s edition of the *Tria Opuscula* while following the Greek retroversion of William of Moerbeke’s original Latin translation.

First, it should be immediately noted that despite the fact that the *Apology* falls outside the bounds of the Neoplatonic curriculum (*Alcibiades*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Parmenides*), Proclus does not shy away from analyzing and defending the portrait of Socrates painted in this dialogue.⁶ Obviously, this curriculum, first instigated by Iamblichus, omits what many modern scholars would typically hail as representing the so-called Socratic dialogues and as such it is likely this neglect has led scholars to believe that the Neoplatonists were uninterested in the more aporetic depictions of the philosopher. It has been thought that the repeated admissions of ignorance characteristic of the so-called “Socratic” texts would compromise the tradition’s dogmatic epistemological interpretation of Plato and, as such, they were more inclined to dismiss the value of such dialogues.⁷ Certainly the Neoplatonists, who emphasized the importance and possibility of attaining knowledge, could avoid the embarrassing problems associated with Socrates’ repeated confessions of ignorance if they concentrated their attention only on those texts where Plato clearly advances a more dogmatic and didactic version of Socrates. Yet, in his response to Theodore, Proclus comments on an incontestably aporetic depiction of Socrates rather than simply invoking his more maieutic and knowledgeable personae in dialogues such as the *Philebus*, evidencing therein that he does not see a contradiction between the Socrates who avows ignorance in the *Apology* and the more epistemologically optimistic Socrates in the dialogues of the Iamblichean curriculum. In other words, if the Socrates of the *Apology* were contradictory to Proclus’ project, the Neoplatonist could have easily redirected Theodore to another dialogue. Instead he confronts the issue directly, challenging the prejudice that the Neoplatonists ignored or turned a blind eye to Socrates’ avowals of ignorance.

Furthermore, in this short analysis of Socrates’ response to the Delphic oracle, Proclus rejects Theodore’s belief that Socratic ignorance entails Socratic skepticism. For Proclus, Socrates’ recognized ignorance in the face of the Del-

6 For information on the development and order of the Neoplatonic canon instigated by Iamblichus see Jackson, Lycos, Tarrant (trr.) 1998, 14; Tarrant 2000, 90–94 and 2007, 48. Cf. Anon. *Proleg.* 26.12–16.

7 See Hathaway 1969, 19–20: the “decisive character of the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato is its obliviousness to the genuine Socratic element in the dialogues.” For information on Proclus’ understanding of the historical accuracy of Plato’s depiction of Socrates over other *Sôkratikoî logoi* see in *Ti.* 65.22–28 and 62.8–20: Plato’s Socrates has captured the real likeness of the philosopher. See also in *Parm.* 1023.20–23, and in *Alc.* 18.13–19.10. Consider also Tarrant 2007, 156 n. 259 and Tarrant 2000, 56–57.

phic oracle reveals both epistemological optimism—Socrates, in contrast to skeptics like Arcesilaus, thinks that knowledge is possible—and epistemic success—at the very least, a wisdom has been obtained through the recognition of ignorance. In tune, then, with many contemporary commentators who praise the value of recognized ignorance, Proclus presciently suggests that recognized ignorance is both useful for the acquisition of wisdom and is a kind of wisdom itself insofar as it is a knowing of what one knows and what one does not know. Proclus emphasizes that this recognition of ignorance situates Socrates as an intermediary between sense perception and intellect or between that which “does not know the truth at all” and that which knows “immediately the very essence of a being and the truth itself, as it really is.”⁸ While entangled in his understanding of grades of knowledge (which we will discuss in the next section), we can already see that this defense of Socratic ignorance in *On Providence* relies upon the advancement of a basic hierarchy between kinds of individuals who know and who do not know, wherein Proclus clearly asserts that wisdom is not tarnished by an honest recognition of ignorance.

In his *Commentary on the Alcibiades I* Proclus explicitly appeals to this hierarchy and the value of recognized ignorance when he delineates three types of individuals: the wise, the simply ignorant, and the doubly ignorant.

Either we do know or we don't and if we don't know, either we think we do or we don't. If we do know we possess knowledge; if we neither know nor think we do, simple ignorance; but if we don't and think we do, we are doubly ignorant.⁹

PROCL. in *Alc.* 201.5–8

Broadly construed, double ignorance is the heinous condition of the soul manifest in those who hold a pretense or conceit to knowledge. This is the condition of the politicians, poets, and craftsmen in the *Apology* who believe they know the just, the true, or the virtuous but do not. One need only think of Socrates' infamous back-peddlers, including Euthyphro and Meletus, to form a concrete picture of such a condition. Throughout this commentary, Proclus relates this form of ignorance to the refusal to heed the Delphic oracle, viewing it as a kind of epistemic and moral blindness that prevents people from caring

⁸ *De prov.* § 51.

⁹ All inset passages from this work are tr. O'Neill. Cf. in *Alc.* 189.10–190.8; 200.15–201.5; 236.14–19. See also in *Crat.* 13.1; Anon. *Proleg.* 16.17–30.

for their soul (cf. Layne 2015a). Quoting Diotima from the *Symposium*, Proclus laments that the doubly ignorant are “neither honorable nor good nor wise” but think they are and therefore fail to do the work constitutive of virtue and the good life.¹⁰

In contrast to the disreputable state of conceit, individuals in a state of simple ignorance know that they do not know and as such seek after knowledge. The recognition of ignorance is useful, as Proclus wrote in *On Providence*, for it fosters and promotes the activities of inquiry: “inquiry is a seeking after knowledge in matters of which we think ourselves ignorant” (*in Alc.* 236.20–23; cf. 242.25, 188.15–20). While contrasting this state of simple ignorance with both double ignorance and full wisdom, Proclus writes, “To seek wisdom is characteristic neither of the wise nor of the person who suffers from twofold ignorance, but evidently of the man who is in the state of simple ignorance” (189.15–25). According to Proclus, only persons of simple ignorance inquire; unlike the wise, who already possess full knowledge, and the doubly ignorant who fail to see that they lack knowledge, the simply ignorant know themselves and, accordingly, recognize their lack.¹¹ However, this lack does not imply epistemic failure. Rather, for Proclus, the discovery of lack is the beginning of the philosophical life. While discussing the necessity of reversion to the self for self-understanding, Proclus outlines the differences between what persons of knowledge, the doubly ignorant, and the simply ignorant observe:

Of these three one [the doubly ignorant] is totally devoid of reversion to himself: another [the knowledgeable] both reverts and having reverted finds within himself virtues and sciences like radiant images of the gods; and the third [the simply ignorant] does revert, but sees within himself lack of learning and knowledge and so is reduced to the first beginnings of both learning and discovery, either by investigating himself and his own riches, which he possesses but is unaware of, or by approaching instructors and being guided thereby.¹²

in Alc. 190.8–15

10 *In Alc.* 189.2–3. Cf. *Pl. Symp.* 204a, *Sph.* 229c1–10, *Leg.* 863b–d, *Alc.* 118b, *Lysis* 217e–222a, *Plt.* 302b for Platonic references or allusions to the concept of double ignorance; cf. Layne 2009a, 82.

11 See *In Alc.* 176.26–30; 187.10–189.3; 242.10. Cf. *Pl. Symp.* 204a.

12 For the importance of reversion for self-constitution see *ET* § 42–43.

For Proclus the movement to the state of simple ignorance and the life of learning and inquiry is of the utmost importance. He often describes this transition from conceit to the admission of ignorance as a form of purification, cleansing individuals of self-deceit, outward-tending activities, and dependence upon material goods. He further argues that Socrates' practice of exhortation and refutation "delivers [individuals] from twofold ignorance" and brings recipients, like Alcibiades, to a state of contradiction, disagreement, and anxiety for the express purpose of helping them see the folly of conceit.¹³ This process of purification from pretense reveals at least one possible reason why Socrates, in Proclus' estimation, never advanced any positive teachings in dialogues like the *Alcibiades*: Socrates' primary intent in these contexts was not to teach but to "remove the opinions that prevent the soul from grasping the truth" (*in Alc.* 174.1–5; see also 85.10; Layne 2009b).

By distinguishing double ignorance from simple ignorance, Proclus suggests that interpretations of Socratic philosophy are not burdened by the disgracefulness of ignorance *in toto*. Rather, ignorance is the source of error and evil only when one fails to recognize it, therein obstructing the path of learning and inquiry.¹⁴

3 Socratic Knowledge

We have seen that for Proclus there are three different types of individuals: those in a disreputable state of double ignorance, the simply ignorant on the path of learning and inquiry, and, finally, the knowledgeable who, in Proclus' eyes, are perfect not only in their thinking but in all their affairs, who "find within [themselves] virtues and sciences like radiant images of the gods."¹⁵ So, where does Socrates fit into this schema? As our initial passage from *On Providence* seemed to indicate, Socrates appears to be the perfect paradigm of the form of ignorance that constitutes a kind of wisdom insofar as it reflects self-knowledge and leads one to the life of learning and inquiry. Indeed, this char-

13 See *In Alc.* 17.1–5, 115.21–116.1, 174.1–10, and 278.15–279.1.

14 See also *In Alc.* 177.27–178.4, where he writes, "Everyone who has inquired after any subject or consulted teachers about anything can name a time in which he once considered that he did not possess this knowledge; and the reason is that men both hasten to make inquiry when they advert to their own ignorance and frequent the doors of teachers when they are not confident of being sufficient unto themselves for the removal of ignorance" (tr. O'Neill).

15 *In Alc.* 190.10; cf. *in Crat.* 25.3–5.

acterization of Socratic knowledge and ignorance would square nicely with the Platonic dialogues themselves, wherein Socrates insists that he is only a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, and so he does not live the life of wisdom but a life of ceaseless inquiry. Indeed, our primary passage seems to suggest this reading but, notwithstanding this intuitive solution, Proclus wants to make a stronger claim: despite his avowals of ignorance, Socrates is in the third category of individuals. In other words, Socrates is not a man of simple ignorance. Rather, for Proclus, he is a man of wisdom and perfect knowledge.¹⁶ Emphasizing this identification, Proclus describes Socratic knowledge by narrating Alcibiades' first conversation with Socrates, describing the encounter as raising the youth to the "vantage point of Socratic knowledge".¹⁷ In the Neoplatonist's estimation, the beauty of Socrates' wisdom exposes the youth's own deficiency, eventually inspiring Alcibiades to turn (at least in the context of this dialogue) from the life of external goods to the inward care of the soul.

The discussion leads Alcibiades round from the life that tends outward to the investigation of himself, and on the other hand calls him up from the consideration of himself to the love of Socratic knowledge. For to long to learn the reasons for Socrates' behavior is to become a lover of the knowledge pre-existent in him.

in Alc. 21.1–10

In short, Socratic knowledge is what inspires the erotic turn of Alcibiades' soul, awakening the youth to the longing for true beauty residing "pre-existent" in the contents of Socrates' soul. To clarify what Proclus means by pre-existent knowledge in Socrates and how its content would inspire the youth, we should take a moment to unpack the various forms of knowledge that the Neoplatonist ascribes to human souls. This brief exegesis not only will explain what this "pre-existent knowledge" is that inspires Alcibiades but will also prove essential for understanding how Proclus' Socrates can be a divine person of knowledge while still admitting ignorance.

To begin, Proclus distinguishes three orders of soul corresponding to five activities of intellection. The orders of souls are irrational, rational, and intellectual while the corresponding activities of intellection are (1) opinion/*doxa*, (2) knowledge that proceeds from necessary principles/*dianoia*, (3) dialectics,

16 See *in Alc.* 79.20–24; 119.10–120.5; 123.27–30; 126.18; 130.1–2; 132.25; 145.27; 237.28. Cf. *in Crat.* 8.17–20.

17 See *in Alc.* 19.15–30.

(4) intuition, and (5) divine unity.¹⁸ On the lowest rung of this epistemic ladder, (1), Proclus places the activities of (1a) sense-perception, imagination, and emotion, each of which fixates on and belongs exclusively to the realm of matter and the corporeal. These activities are particular to the *irrational soul*, the soul that is inseparable from or dependent upon the body.¹⁹ Such activities without reason's interception lead nowhere, stymie the soul, and cause it to abide in ignorance. Nevertheless, these are not the only activities particular to this lowest level. We might distinguish these aforementioned activities of the soul from the (1b) activity of opining, which is characteristic of the first real cognitive activity of the *rational soul*. This activity of making judgments constitutes the lowest level of intellection, properly considered, for the human being. It is defined as the level of cognition that "only grasps the truth of the fact without its cause" and Proclus associates it with purification, reminding us therein of the state of the simply ignorant insofar as this form of cognition is described as the entry point to the education of the soul helping individuals "shake off the whole scenery of the passion" (*de prov.* § 27). With opinion the rational soul passes judgment on sense perception, correcting "illusions" while also learning to moderate the emotions "drawing [the heart] back from its impulses" (*de prov.* § 17; cf. *Pl. Thet.* 187a5–6). At this level of the rational soul, one's primary cognitive achievement is discovering that "we neither hear nor see anything accurate" in the realm of becoming and thus recognizing that knowledge must rather come from within (*de prov.* § 17; cf. *Phd.* 65b3–4, d). The next act of the rational soul, (2) *dianoia*, begins once one spurns the senses completely and turns inward in the self-reflective act of "discovery" and views what Proclus calls the "essential reasoning principles" (οὐσιώδεις λόγοι) residing in and constituting the soul.²⁰ By turning toward itself and discovering these principles, the rational soul extricates itself from the corporeal and ascends the rungs on the ladder of knowledge as it learns, with perfect clarity, that the sensible physical world of time, movement, and flux cannot be known—the physical world cannot by its nature be an object of knowledge (*de prov.* § 17; see also *in Alc.* 248.5–20; 108.20). For Proclus this act of the rational soul (2) is higher than the rational act of opining (1b), for it contemplates determinate reality, the reasoning principles or images of the Forms abiding in the soul,

18 *De prov.* § 16–20 and § 27–32. See also Steel 2007, 77 n. 68 and 28–30.

19 *De prov.* § 17. See also *in Crat.* 29.3. Cf. *ET* § 197.

20 See also *in Parm.* 982, 28; *ET* § 194–195. For the definitive article on Proclus' conception of the innate reasoning principles see Steel 1997. See further Helmig 2012 and Chulp 2012 for important complexities in Proclus' epistemological program.

rather than indeterminate and unknowable matter. In this form of cognition, such individuals see the beauty residing within.

It is the movement by which the soul reflects upon itself and sees its own essence, the powers in itself, the harmonic proportions of which it consists and the many lives of which it is the plenitude; and it discovers that it is itself a rational world, the image of the beings before it, of which it “leapt out.”

de Prov. § 18 (cf. *Enn.* VI 4 [22] 16, 28–30)

Overall, the science that emerges from such self-reflection is the one beginning “from principles taken as suppositions and which knows causes and draws necessary conclusions in all cases” (*de prov.* § 28). Here it is important to note that like the level of opining in which there is a need to discover a lack of knowing the sensible before ascending to the next act of cognition, this act of reasoning must also become aware of its limits. Discursive reasoning that argues and concludes from necessary premises may be higher than opinion but insofar as it does not know or understand the origins of the principles themselves, such a science, like geometry, “falls short of the most perfect knowledge” (*de prov.* § 28).

The third activity of cognition is (3) dialectic, the “supreme science,” uniting “the many and divided principles with the one principle of all things” (*de prov.* § 29). Dialectic ultimately investigates *the causes* of the reasoning principles in our souls, the Forms themselves (*de prov.* § 28–29; cf. *Pl. Resp.* 510–511d). Proclus describes this as the science that “‘makes the one multiple’ and ‘the multiple one.’” Again, however, this science has a limit insofar as the subject of thinking is still separate from the object of thinking, therein requiring the activities of synthesis, division, and demonstration. This leads to the fourth form of knowledge, (4) the act of supreme intellection, which transcends methods like division or demonstration, contemplating being by “simple intuitions” or “immediate vision” (*de prov.* § 30; see also *in Alc.* 246.25–247.15). This form of knowledge leads the soul to move from the level of rational soul to intellectual soul as its form of thinking imitates the Neoplatonic hypostasis of the Intellect (as much as is possible) in its isomorphic relation to the subject of thinking, the object of thinking, and the act of thinking. A soul at this level of knowing “thinks what they [Forms] are and at the same time thinks that it is thinking, knowing also what it is itself” (*de prov.* § 30). Finally, Proclus advances one more form of knowing, one that surpasses even the hypostasis of the Intellect, revealing therein the limits of intellectual activity itself. Insofar as the principle of all things is not an intellectual object, one must ascend by transcending the

limits of all thinking both rational and intellectual, activating what Proclus calls the “one of the soul,” insofar as it soars toward union with the divine hypostasis of the One/Good. This form of “knowledge” is better described as (5) a kind of touching or unification with the divine (*de prov.* § 31).

To make use of our excursus into the hierarchy of knowledge in Proclus (which, one should note, includes at each level a kind of recognition of ignorance prior to ascent), we can now ask at what level of the soul (irrational, rational, intellectual) Socrates is and which activity of intellection, among (1) through (5), he employs. Furthermore, we can ask how such a classification would help Proclus make sense of Socratic ignorance in light of Socrates’ claims to knowledge. For Proclus, Socratic knowledge, at the very least, corresponds to the first act of the rational soul (1b) that has turned toward itself and has thus come to self-knowledge, recognizing that the locus of knowledge is within and not without. In so doing Socrates has ascended to the level of knowing that he cannot know the world of sense; Socrates *opines* (1b) in such a way as to purify himself from the external world of deceitful sense perception and has come to moderate his emotions. Assuredly we may assume that for Proclus many of Socrates’ interlocutors remain at the level of the irrational soul that opines outwardly (1a) toward the objects of sense while Socrates has already discovered that the world of sense is not the proper object of knowledge. Leaning on this characteristic of Socratic knowledge, Proclus argues that this recognition would explain why Socrates can use conjectural statements like “I think” without tarnishing his wisdom with “indeterminacy, mixture with ignorance, or uncertainty” (*in Alc.* 23.1–4). In his remarks about sensible reality, he is merely making conjectures, since a person at the level of opining *knows* that sensible things cannot be known in themselves. Sensible objects can be *judged* only in relation to what *can* be known, the reasoning principles residing in the soul. As Proclus writes in the *Alcibiades* commentary:

If, then, the knowledge of what is ever the same and of the contingent differs, if their accounts involve very great variation and their appropriate names differ, is there any cause for wonder if Socrates, here speaking of something unstable and liable to change, has employed the phrase “I think” indicating the easily changing nature of the object of knowledge, but not convicting Socrates’ knowledge of indeterminacy, mixture with ignorance or uncertainty. For it is necessary, as we said above, in matters of opinion and conjecture to express one’s notions as conjectural, but in matters intelligible and scientific to employ irrefutable formulae, as knowing the truth.

in Alc. 22.15–23.8 (cf. 22.10)

Later in this same passage Proclus further explicates how Socrates' own tentative remarks are appropriate for the youth's education: they reveal to the eager boy that one should "speak with restraint rather than insistence" in regard to one's notions and corresponding judgments of sense phenomena.²¹

Beyond mere opining (1b) Socratic knowledge is also characterized by the higher activities of the rational soul or *dianoia* (2), the intellectual act that contemplates not merely the reasoning principles in relation to the sensible world but the internal reasoning principles in themselves and in relation to their causes, the Forms.²² For Proclus this explains Socrates' penchant for asking his infamous "What is x?" question. While emphasizing the discovery of the reasoning principles within us alongside contemplating their causes, the principles constitutive of there being knowledge in the soul, Proclus writes:

It is by reason of this that Socrates in his conversation always leads each discussion towards the question "What is x?" since he is anxious to study the reason-principles in the soul in his search for the Form of Beauty, in virtue of which all beautiful phenomena are beautiful, that is, the reason-principle of beautiful things preexisting in the soul, and Knowledge itself, which is truly existent in souls.

in Parm. 987.8–16 (tr. MORROW and DILLON)

For Proclus, Socratic knowledge arises, on one level, from looking to the reasoning-principles in themselves, the essential Beauty in souls, and has thus ascended from conjecture (1b) to *dianoia* (2). At another level, by asking "What is x?" Socrates contemplates the cause of his reasoning principles, Form, and therein begins to practice the rational activity of dialectic (3) where one examines the causes themselves, thereby making "the one multiple" and the "multiple one." Appealing to the *Republic* (6.511b6, 534c1) as well as the *Phaedrus* (265d–266b), Proclus clearly associates this activity with Socrates' valorization of dialectic throughout the dialogues.

Ascending to the cognitive activity of intellectual inspiration (4), Proclus further identifies Socrates as one who surpasses discursive reasoning or mere dialectic, particularly since "on such occasions as he is seeking intelligible Beauty, he proceeds by inspiration rather than by midwifery or testing." Appeal-

21 *In Alc.* 24.10. See another similar example of Proclus' exegesis of Socrates' conjectural statements at *in Alc.* 93.7–8, 95.25–97.3.

22 See *ET* §186. Cf. *in Crat.* 6.1; *in Alc.* 100.29.

ing to Socrates' claims to divine inspiration in the *Phaedrus*, Proclus believes he is not simply contemplating the Form of Beauty as cause of the essential reasoning principle in the soul and therein as a distinct object separate from the subject of thinking. Rather, Socrates' activity is "intellectual" insofar as his discourse thinks Form in itself, wherein the subject of thinking is in an isomorphic relationship with the object of thinking, causing him to be "enthused." Ultimately, this distinction between intellectual activity and rational activity allows Proclus to explain differences in Socratic method that separate dialogues like the *Hippias Major* from the *Phaedrus*. In one text Socrates is a paradigm for the rational soul and in the other for the intellectual soul. As he writes: "For this reason it is not astonishing that whereas both the *Hippias* [Major] and the *Phaedrus* concern the subject of Beauty, the former seeks the essential Beauty in souls, the latter seeks intellectual Beauty, from which all things derive their beauty" (*in Parm.* 987.16–24).

Consequently, Proclus seems to be pushing Socratic knowledge to the highest rungs on his epistemological ladder, often describing Socrates as analogous to and participating in the activities of the intellectual soul. He confirms this identification in his commentary on the *Alcibiades*:

Socrates, as being an inspired lover and elevated to intelligible beauty itself, has established himself as corresponding to the intellect of the soul, for what else is it that is united to the intelligible than intellect and all that possesses intelligent life?

in Alc. 43.7–10

Here, Proclus clearly identifies Socrates not merely with a rational soul but with an intellectual soul and, again, in his commentary on the *Cratylus* Proclus puts Socrates at the level of the intellectual soul when he explicitly claims that in contrast to Hermogenes' irrational use of opinion and Callias' attachment to material imagination Socrates is analogous to the Intellect (*in Crat.* 29.1; cf. Griffin 2014). Further evidence of this identification can be seen in his commentary on the *Parmenides*, when Proclus writes that "Socrates could be compared to the particular intellect, or absolutely to Intellect," since the philosopher is "portrayed as especially confident of the theory of ideas, and what other role is more fitting for the particular intellect than to see the divine Forms and declare them to others?" (*in Parm.* 628; see also *in Tim.* 9.17–24, 58.1–5, 62.10; *in Alc.* 140.22).

In short, Proclus contends that Socrates has reached one of the highest levels of human knowledge despite his claims to ignorance because, in his epistemological worldview, what Socrates is ignorant about differs from what he knows

about. What Socrates knows, he knows by virtue of activating his rational activities as well as his higher intellectual activities; his confessions to ignorance express his recognition of his inability to know what cannot be known, the objects of sense as well as expressions of the limits of each level of knowing. Socratic wisdom is thus perfectly compatible with Socratic ignorance: his ignorance refers to the sensible or the limits of particular cognitive activities that aid (rather than hinder) the ascent toward different forms of knowing. As such the admittance of ignorance does not prevent the philosopher from being a man of knowledge. Keep in mind that Proclus is taking great care not to exaggerate Socratic wisdom or, for that matter, the wisdom any one soul can possess. In the *Parmenides* commentary, Proclus emphasizes that despite his wisdom, Socrates does not have a fully unified vision of the Intellect as Intellect itself, instead grasping this vision only partially or particularly, that is to say, temporally, given that he is soul. As soul (whether rational or intellectual), Socrates will never completely know, or be unified with, the hypostasis Intellect, and so he, to maintain his honesty, must admit ignorance once again. He does not have such divine or complete knowledge. Yet, to be sure, through his love of the Forms, Socrates sits, as Proclus describes it, at the vantage point of the divine (*de prov.* §30; see also *ET* §211; *in Alc.* 146.1–5). In other words, Socrates at the level of the intellectual soul possesses a form of wisdom that surpasses discursive and dialectical thinking but ultimately Socrates remains, as Diotima thought of *erôs*, between the intellectual and the corporeal (see also *in Crat.* 28.20–26). For Proclus, Socrates is not between knowing in a full sense and not knowing at all, and therein only opining. He is not between certainty and complete ignorance. Rather, as Vlastos (1994, 62) may have liked, he is between certain (divine) knowledge, the unified and always existent level of the divine Intellect that thinks itself, and human knowledge, the individual rational/intellectual soul in time using methods of knowledge-acquisition such as the *elenchus* and dialectic. In his intermediary level he partakes of both knowledge and ignorance, wherein he absolutely does know (rather than merely opines) and he absolutely is ignorant as otherwise he would not know, would not ascend to different forms of knowing. Indeed, in contrast to Vlastos, who argues that Plato's Socrates changes from the early to the late dialogues, Proclus' Socrates is, throughout Plato's entire corpus, at the level of the intellectual soul contemplating the Forms, both knowing and not-knowing them. Furthermore, insofar as Proclus thinks that Socrates possesses knowledge of the Forms, he has definitive or intelligible knowledge of the causes of sensible phenomena but, to recall earlier arguments, he is also ignorant of sensible objects in themselves. Thus in a strange way Socratic knowledge sits between various forms of recognized ignorance, ignorance of the world of sense in itself

and ignorance of the Intellect in itself, but he still knows at the highest level possible for the human being, recognizing all the while its limitations.

4 Socratic Irony

Proclus' understanding of ignorance and knowledge obviously helps the Neoplatonist defend the sincerity of Socrates' confessions of ignorance while concomitantly safeguarding his avowals to knowledge. What Socrates knows, he knows as a result of his form of intellection. What Socrates does not know results both from (1) his inability to know particulars or sensible objects in themselves without reference to their causes, (2) his recognition of the limits of each level of knowing, and (3) his understanding that he is not Intellect itself but only a particular intellect at the level of soul. Yet, Proclus also champions the view that Socrates is wholly sincere in *all* that he says and does. This, of course, will seem impossible for the modern-day reader comfortable with associating Socrates with irony. Are there not an overwhelming number of instances in Plato's corpus that either suggest or blatantly demand recognition of Socrates' use of irony? Uneasy with the ascription of irony to Socrates, given that it would or could imply that he uses deceit, Proclus often arranges highly complex arguments or interprets passages allegorically, striving to defend Socrates from the charge of irony. These arguments are sometimes insufficient, as even Proclus admits, and so he concedes that in some instances Socrates is indeed ironic. Nevertheless, for Proclus this irony does not impugn Socrates' sincerity. Socrates' use of irony is for pedagogical, not nefarious, purposes; his form of irony is not deceptive but is oriented toward the good and, as such, Socrates remains wholly sincere in the sense of authentic and concerned.

For example, in his commentary on the *Timaeus*, Proclus advances an allegorical interpretation to dismiss Socrates' disavowal of military expertise and his so-called inability to praise the ideal city adequately. To justify his dismissal of irony in this passage while concomitantly admitting its possible use in other dialogues, Proclus explains that Socrates could use irony of a certain kind if he so wished but only with certain interlocutors. He explains that when Socrates talks to the wise, for example Timaeus, such a device would be inappropriate, but when he converses with the young or with haughty sophists, such expedients as irony are entirely acceptable and possibly necessary (see *in Tim.* 1.62.21–25; Tarrant 2000, 35). As Proclus writes:

Others claim that it is irony that he asserts that he is unable to praise this city adequately—just as he professes not to know various other things too.

However, this irony of Socrates was directed towards sophists and young men, not towards gentlemen of such wisdom and knowledge.

in Tim. 1.62.21–25 (tr. TARRANT)

Here we see that Proclus seems to believe that Socrates possesses a kind of *phronêsis* insofar as he has the ability to discern what methods and behaviors are appropriate in given circumstances. In fact, as we shall see in the next passage, for Proclus it is due to Socrates' form of intellection that the philosopher has the ability to see unity, definition and reason, that is, the Good, in even the most multifarious individuals: thus he can easily discern his interlocutors' needs. Because Socrates can recognize the wise as well as the ignorant, he can tailor his methods to his audience and "distinguish the right moments, characters and subject-matter, and to assign to all the appropriate kinds of discourse" (*in Alc.* 310.08–19). Socrates, as a man of knowledge, is aware of the disposition and tendencies of all those he encounters and as such can accommodate his methods to them. In other words, like the good dialectician of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates knows how to diagnose the ills of his interlocutors and to advance the speeches that are appropriate for them. For some he may use the *elenchus*, for others dialectical inquiry, while still others are compelled to the good life through the narration of myths and analogies intended to stimulate the recollection of divine realities. For Proclus this skill in discerning the right method for the peculiar person arises from Socrates' particular activity of intellection, the "intellectual" activity, which embraces all the forms of wisdom.

For everywhere Socrates pronounces the discourses in a manner suited to the characters in question; and as in the godhead all goods preexist in the form of the One, but different individuals enjoy different goods according to the natural capacity of each, so also Socrates embraces all the forms of knowledge within himself, but uses now one now another, adjusting his own activity to the requirements of the recipients.

in Alc. 28.10–29.5 (cf. 27.20–29.5, 152.1–3; tr. O'NEILL)

Noting that all of Socrates' activities are meant to lead souls from a life tending toward externals to the life of reason and the intellect, Proclus believes that Socrates' highly confrontational methods, including both the *elenchus* and his use of irony, have pedagogical intent. The *elenchus* in particular "induces contradiction, exposes disagreement of opinions and delivers us from twofold ignorance" (*in Alc.* 174.18) and thus Socrates wields it as a cathartic device (*in Parm.* 656.8–14; cf. 654.2–15, 655.1–10, 989.15–18). Socrates may use irony and even ridicule his interlocutor while employing refutation because, ultimately,

he has a praiseworthy aim, turning individuals to the care of their soul. Socrates shows himself as dramatically counter to his adversaries, the sophists, who aim “at deceit and appearances and recoil from the Truth and the One” while Socrates’ irony aims at self-knowledge and self-discovery (*in Alc.* 253.17; *in Crat.* 9.10–15).

Proclus also discusses why most individuals, including Alcibiades, confuse Socratic sincerity with irony. Proclus believes this happens because his interlocutors recognize implicitly that Socrates is wise, that he knows many things despite his admissions of ignorance, but due to their level of intellection they cannot reconcile this with his claims to ignorance, thoughtlessly accusing him of irony, ignoring the possibility that at his level of thinking Socrates can both know and not know. Focusing on Alcibiades’ inability to believe Socrates’ claim that he needs a teacher, Proclus compares Socrates to the divine, which is often misunderstood by those at a lower level of reality.

The closing phrase of the young man, “you are joking Socrates,” indicates the frame of mind of one who is already conscious of Socrates’ power and knowledge. He thinks that Socrates, though requiring nothing and possessed of knowledge, pretends to be in need of a teacher, in order to show up his poverty and want of resource on the question of what is just and unjust. And this accords with reality: as god creates all things without division, but matter receives them into itself in a divided manner, as god acts in eternity, but we participate in time, so also while Socrates says everything beneficently (ἀγαθοειδῶς) and truthfully (ἀληθευτικῶς), the young man takes his words in a different sense and thinks he is joking and casting reproaches because of his being at a loss (ἀπορίας), when Socrates is not really speaking for this reason.

in Alc. 231.3–20 (cf. 313.2–6, 132.20–24; tr. O’NEILL)

In sum, for Proclus, one should always regard Socrates as someone who acts in earnest because it is this dedication to honesty that arouses wonder in Socrates’ companions, a wonder that in turn stimulates the path to inquiry and questioning (*in Alc.* 62.10; see also 127.3). Ultimately, for Proclus, Socrates is a rare and remarkable character akin to the gods by virtue of his wisdom and as such dons the threads of a Platonic hero; for heroes, in Proclus’ eyes, are those who have been “allotted this name because they are able to raise and extend souls toward the gods” (*in Crat.* 75.25–76.3; see also 71.8–13). In short, Proclus views all of Socrates’ activities with esteem and identifies him as a person who has reached the summit of virtue, knowledge, and the good but who also does not fail to return to the cave and assist others. As Proclus writes:

But because Socrates “ventures to declare his own mind,” he descends to an activity inferior to that which abides within him; since for divine lovers, to turn towards the inferior is at any rate venturesome; but nevertheless Socrates does descend, in order that like Hercules he may lead up his beloved from Hades, and persuade him to withdraw from the life of appearance and revert to the life that is intelligent and divine, from which he will come to know both himself and the divine which transcends all beings and is their pre-existent cause.

in Alc. 133.8–13 (tr. O’NEILL)

As this explicit comparison to Hercules suggests, Socrates is not merely an exemplary soul ascending, through his own efforts, the Neoplatonic ladder of knowledge. Rather, he willingly chooses to descend in order to benefit, elevate, and order weaker individuals, purifying them from double ignorance and stimulating their reversion to the contents of their souls (cf. Layne 2017). In this, his irony is far from being a tool of deception but allows his interlocutors to finally care for the divine reasoning principles within.

Overall, in attempting to safeguard Socrates’ complete sincerity and his corresponding mission to care for the souls of all those he encounters, Proclus offers an interesting solution to a complex problem in Socratic studies. He shows that Socrates’ claims to ignorance contradict neither his specific claims to knowledge nor his general association with a kind of sage-like wisdom. Consequently, one need not appeal to irony to make sense of his avowals of ignorance. Furthermore, given Socrates’ knowledge and his sincere care for the souls of his interlocutors, any use of irony is to be taken as directive and illuminating insofar as Socrates’ attempts to lead the “less than perfect soul” (whether they be haughty youths like Alcibiades or eristic and deceptive sophists like Callicles) toward self-care.

References

- Beierwaltes, W. ‘Selbsterkenntnis als sokratischer Impuls im neuplatonischen Denken,’ in: H. Kessler, *Sokrates: Geschichte, Legende, Spiegelungen*. Kusterdingen 1995, 97–116.
- Bröcker, W. *Platonismus ohne Sokrates: ein Vortrag über Plotin*. Frankfurt 1966.
- Chlup, R. *Proclus: an introduction*. Cambridge 2012.
- Griffin, M. ‘Hypostasizing Socrates,’ in: D. Layne and H. Tarrant, 2014.
- Helmig, C. *Forms and concepts: concept formation in the Platonic tradition*, Berlin 2012.
- Duvick, B. *Proclus: on Plato Cratylus*, London 2007.

- Hathaway, R.F. 'The Neoplatonist interpretation of Plato: remarks on its decisive characteristics', *JHPH* 7 (1969), 19–26.
- Jackson, R., K. Lycos and H. Tarrant. *Olympiodorus: commentary on Plato's Gorgias*. Leiden 1998.
- Karasmanēs, V. *Socrates: 2400 years since his death*. Delphi 2004.
- Layne, D. 'Defending the mere presence of ignorance from Plato to Erasmus' in *Proceedings of the 2009 American Catholic Association* (2009), 253–267. (= 2009a)
- Layne, D. 'Refutation and double ignorance in Proclus', *Epoché* 13 (2009), 347–362. (= 2009b)
- Layne, D. 'Involuntary evil and the Socratic problem of double ignorance in Proclus', *International Journal for the Platonic Tradition* 9 (2015), 27–53. (= 2015a)
- Layne, D. 'Socrates Neoplatonicus', in: R. Goulet, *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, Paris 2015, 417–438. (= 2015b)
- Layne, D. 'The Platonic hero', in: D. Layne and D. Butorac, *Proclus and his legacy*. Berlin 2017, 53–68.
- Layne, D. and H. Tarrant. *The Neoplatonic Socrates*. Philadelphia 2014.
- Morrow, G.R. and J.M. Dillon, *Proclus' commentary on Plato's Parmenides*. Princeton 1987.
- Rangos, S. 'Images of Socrates in Neoplatonism', in: Karasmanēs 2004, 464–480.
- Sedley, D. 'Socratic Irony in the Platonist Commentators', in: J. Annas and C. Rowe, *New perspectives on Plato, modern and ancient*. Cambridge 2002, 37–57.
- Smith, A. 'The Neoplatonic Socrates', in: Karasmanēs 2004, 455–460.
- Steel, C. 'Breathing thought: Proclus on the innate knowledge of the soul', in: J. Cleary, *The perennial tradition of Neoplatonism*. Leuven 1997, 293–309.
- Steel, C. *Proclus: On Providence*. London 2007.
- Taki, A. 'Proclus' reading of Plato's *Sokratikoi logoi*: Proclus' observations on dialectic at *Alcibiades* 112d–114e and elsewhere', in: M. Johnson and H. Tarrant, *Alcibiades and the Socratic lover-educator*. London 2012, 180–189.
- Tarrant, H. *Plato's first interpreters*. Ithaca 2000.
- Tarrant, H. *Proclus' commentary on Plato's Timaeus, 1 Book 1: Proclus on the Socratic State*. Cambridge 2007.
- Vlastos, G. *Socrates, ironist and moral philosopher*. Cambridge 1991.
- Vlastos, G. and M. Burnyeat. *Socratic studies*. Cambridge 1994.
- Westerink, L.G. and W. O'Neill. *Proclus' commentary on the first Alcibiades*. Westbury 2011.
- Zeller, E. *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*. Leipzig 1903.

Index of Passages

Aelianus

Varia historia

2.13 [= SSR I A 29]	31, 66n, 72n
2.43 [= SSR I C 87]	643n
4.11 [= SSR I C 54 = V B 256]	644n
8.2	387n
9.12	646n
9.29 [= SSR I C 61 = I C 71 = I C 172]	646n, 649n
10.41	42
11.12 [= SSR I C 508]	784n
13.23	651n
13.32 [= SSR I C 71]	651n
14.33 [= SSR V B 59]	258, 260

Aeschines Orator

Oratio in Timarchum

173 [= SSR I C 110]	501n
---------------------	------

Aeschines Socraticus

SSR VI A

1	202n
5	216n, 218n
6	215n
7	215n
13	118, 118n, 176n, 216n, 250n
14	215n, 250n
16	118n, 212n, 215n, 217n, 285
20	217n
21	118n
22	217n
24	215n, 218n
25	215n, 250n
27	217n
33	217n
38	218n
41	203n

42	204n, 206n
47	205n, 673n
48	118, 205n, 319, 397
48–51	118n
49	207n
50	118n, 206n, 397, 401n, 495, 673n
51	205n, 206n, 674n, 719
53	68n, 207n, 397, 401n, 612, 633n, 648, 651n, 674n, 736n, 775n
54	207n
60	775n
62	118n, 208n
63	208n
64	208n
66	775n
68–72	779n
70	118n, 209n
75	212n
77	118n, 213n
80	286, 320
84	212n
88	118n
89	212n
91	213, 213n
95	118n
ed. Dittmar	
35.48	118n

Aeschylus

Agamemnon

1315–1319	342n
-----------	------

Δικτυουλοί

fr. 46a Radt	343n
--------------	------

Prometheus vincitus

88–100	343n
--------	------

Septem contra Thebas

565	437
-----	-----

Supplices

304	36n
911	342n

Aesopus

n. 150 Perry	471n
--------------	------

Alcidamas*De orationes litteris mandantibus vel**De Sophistis*

2 284

Alexander Aphrodisiensis*De fato*

6 [= SSR I C 49] 287, 784n

In Aristotelis Metaphysicam

462.29–31 56

Alexis

Αὐτοδιδάσκαλος

fr. 25 PCG 106n

Amipsias

Κόννος

fr. 7 PCG 40

fr. 9 PCG [= SSR I A 10] 40, 46

fr. 10 PCG 40

Ammianus Marcellinus*Rerum gestarum libri*

14.11.19–23 830n

16.5.6–7 827n

21.14–15 826n

22.10.6 813

25.3.22–23 831

25.4.20 813

Ammonius*In Aristotelis De interpretatione commentarius*

42.30 685n

44.19 685n

Andocides*De mysteriis*

1.124–127 214n, 537

1.127 538n

Anonymi*Epistulae Socraticae*

6 118n, 216n

12 [= SSR III A 16] 230

14 [= SSR VI A 102] 807n

13 [= SSR IV A 22]

231

15 241n

Anonymus*De mulieribus*

8 [= SSR VI A 63] 208n

Anonymus*Dialexeis*

83 B9 DK 36n

Anonymus*Etymologicum magnum*

18.10 33

Anonymus*In Platonis Theaetetum (PBerol. 9782)*

ed. Bastianini Sedley

col. 3 392

col. 3.50–4.3 162n

Anonymus*Prolegomena in Platonis philosophiam*

3.12 836n

16.17–30 840n

24.13–16 387n

25.6–7 387n

26.12–16 839n

Anonymus*Rhetorica ad Herennium*

3.23 711n

Anonymus*Vita Persii*

8.36 739n

Anthologia Graeca

5.78 252

7.99 252

7.100 252

7.669 252

7.670 252

Antipater Tarsiensis

fr. 3.65 SVF 642n

Antiphanes

Κλεοφάνης

fr. 120 *PCG* 106n

Antisthenes

SSR V A

11 176n
 14 651n
 41 107, 108, 203n
 44 109
 53 141, 151n, 152, 152n, 153,
 153n, 154, 155, 157, 651n
 54 141, 150, 150n, 151, 151n, 152,
 153, 154n, 155, 156n, 157
 63–65 108
 64 108
 85 120
 87 109
 90 651n
 92 736n
 95 165n
 96 109
 104 146
 126 184n, 651n
 127 184n
 134 147n, 155n, 173n
 147 148
 148 148n
 149 148
 150 147, 157
 152 148, 154n, 157, 175n
 153 149n, 154
 154 149n
 155 149n, 175n
 160 144, 144n, 147, 149, 151, 157
 161 634n
 172 107
 173 158, 287, 634n
 174 149, 153, 157
 179 168n
 180 168n
 187 143, 144n, 157n, 736n

ed. Brancacci

3b 108
 4b 108, 109
 4c 108
 5 108
 5b 108

Apsines

Rhetorica

3 42

Apuleius

Apologia

18.7 [= *SSR I C 53*]
 768n

De deo Socratis

16.156 316n
 17.157–158 [= *SSR I C 413*]
 766
 19.164 767n
 20.165–166 [= *SSR I C 413*]
 767

20.166 [= *SSR I C 413*]

316n

23.174 [= *SSR I C 413*]

768

De Platone et eius dogmate

1.6 769n

1.9 769n

Florida

2.1 [= *SSR I C 413* = *IV A 104*]

768n

2.2.5 [= *SSR I C 413* = *IV A 104*]

768

Metamorphoses

1.1.12 762n

1.1.18 762n

1.6 761

1.6.1 761n, 770

1.6.4–7.1 761n

1.7.1 762

1.11–13 761n

1.15–19 761n

6.3 762

10.19.3 763n

10.33 [= *SSR I C 122*]

763n, 773n

10.33.3 [= *SSR I C 122*]

764, 765n

10.33.4 [= *SSR I C 122*]

763n, 764n

10.35.2–3 765n

11.2.4 767n

11.5.4 765n

11.15.3 765n

11.27.9 765n

Metamorphoses (cont.)

11.35.2-3 765n

Aristides Aelius*Orationes*

45.2.19-20 [= SSR VI A 53]

207n

45.2.23-24 [= SSR VI A 53]

207n

46.2.292-294 [= SSR VI A 50]

206n

46.2.293 [= SSR VI A 50]

118n

46.2.294 [= SSR VI A 50]

118n

46.2.369 [= SSR VI A 51]

205n, 206n

46.2.369-370 [= SSR VI A 49]

207n

Aristippus*SSR IV A*

1 182, 646n

3 182

7 182

23 182

36 651n

58 191

96 651n

98 191

124 651n

144 117, 673n

147 182

222 183n

Aristo Chiusfr. 1.353 *SVF* 686fr. 1.384 *SVF* 720nfr. 1.387 *SVF* 720n**Aristocles**

fr. 7 ed. Chiesara [= SSR II O 26]

170n

Aristophanes*Acharnenses*

37 45

109 41n

135 41n

377-382 54

502-503 54n

530-531 57

566-571 342n

855-859 38

Aves

227-266 343n

1001 35

1009 47

1072-1075 58

1280-1296 32n

1282 55, 65

1553 45

1553-1564 55, 65, 761n

1555 65n

1564 [= SSR VI B 15]

245

*Βαβυλώνιοι*fr. 84 *PCG* 45*Δαιτυαλείς*fr. 205 *PCG* 32n, 37, 47fr. 206 *PCG* 37, 37nfr. 225 *PCG* 37*Ecclesiazusae*

248 45

392 276

571-572 283

Equites

90 45

96 53

114 53

185-193 86n

242-277 343n

392-394 87n

423-428 371n

534 40n

580 224n

728-972 86n

1111-1114 379n

1218-1226 86n

1240-1243 371n

1264-1269 38

1329-1330 379n

1333 379n

1400 45

*Nubes I*fr. 392-401 *PCG*

65n

Nubes II

1	75n	367-424	56
1-120	87	385-394	322n
14	224	413-416	38
43-47	39	414	52
71-72	39	439-442	339n
94-99	87	439-443	38
96	35	444-449	41
96-97	49	449	46, 106n
98	644n	453-454	339n
98-99	49	456	52
102	41, 46, 106n	483	36
102-104	75	485	36, 46
104 [= SSR VI B 15]		501-503	32n
	32n	504	39n
112-113	87	521	35n
112-118	792	523	48, 66n
135-139	78n	528-529	49
143	339n	534-536	66n
143-152	52	537-539	48
144-156	32n	538-543	75
144-164	245	540	48
145-146	67	541-542	48
148	87n, 88	543	48, 58
152	88	546-548	48
177-179	42, 46	617-804	39
185-200	73n	628-629	36, 46
202	88	638-651	49
203	88	644	88
219-225	71	657	49
223-790	739n	658-692	49
225	52n, 76	659	88
231-234	78n	659-691	87
245-246	644n	679	88
247-248	56	700-742	77n
254	339n	740-742	49
266	52	830 [= SSR VI B 15]	
296	31		65n, 68
331	50, 106n	830-831	32n
331-334	49-50, 371n	830-832	52
334	50	854-855	36, 46
335	65n	860	88
359-363	73	876	644n
360	371n	889-1104	87
360-361	106n	961-984	370n
360-363	449n	961-1023	370
361	230n	991-995	370n
362-363	54	1006-1007	370
363	128n	1014-1023	370n
		1015-1023	336n, 370n

Nubes II (cont.)

1020-1022	371n
1023	371n
1039	52
1043-1079	370n
1060-1074	370
1070-1082	640
1085	371
1111	106n, 371n
1140	45
1146-1147	644n
1170	75n
1286-1296	322n
1309	106n
1320	75n
1348	639
1405-1446	38
1465-1467	32n
1480	106n
1484-1485	52
1485	106n
1493	75n
1502-1510/1	77
1503	52n
Hypothesis v	40n

Pax

295-345	343n
296-300	343n
296-345	343n
603-606	57
609-611	57

Plutus

253-321	343n
456	45

Ranae

173	39n
176	39n
389-393	32
531	213n
857	45
949-952	125n
959	125n
1314-1315	65
1451	47
1491-1492	106n
1491-1499 [= SSR I A 7]	32n, 371n
1496 [= SSR I A 7]	128n

Ταγηνισται

fr. 506 PCG 106n

Thesmophoriazusae

149-159 339n

Vespae

44-48	32n
425	50n
787-792	38
1043-1045	48
1043-1050	131
1044	35n
1270	453n
1284-1291	54
1301	453n
1408-1413	32n, 245

*Aristoteles**Analytica priora*

2.23.68b8-36	320n
2.24.68b37-69a19	331n

Analytica posteriora

2.13.97b15-25 [= SSR I B 15]	612
------------------------------	-----

De generatione et corruptione

2.8.335b10	604
------------	-----

De partibus animalium

1.1.642a24-31 [= SSR I B 27]	320
1.1.642a28 [= SSR I B 27]	181n

Ethica Eudemia

1.1214b-1215a	721n
1.5.1216b2-10 [= SSR I B 28]	606
3.1.1229a12 [= SSR I B 34]	605
3.1.1229a14-16 [= SSR I B 34]	605
3.1.1230a7-10 [= SSR I B 35]	605
3.5.1232b7-9	452n
7.1.1235a31	689, 690
7.1.1235a35-b2 [= SSR I B 17]	613
7.12.1246b23-24	640n
7.12.1246b32-36 [= SSR I B 29]	608

- 7.14.1247b11–15 22]
604
- Ethica Nicomachea*
- 3.8.1116b3–5 [= SSR I B 36]
604
- 4.7.1127a20–23 41
- 4.7.1127b22–26 [= SSR I B 23]
611
- 6.13.1144b14–21 [= SSR I B 30]
605
- 6.13.1144b28–30 [= SSR I B 30]
605
- 7.2–3.1145b21–27 [= SSR I B 39]
20, 608
- 7.31–34.1147b14–17 [= SSR I B 39]
608
- 7.5–6.1149a–b 651n
- 9.1.1164a3–7 470
- Εὐδημος
fr. 44 Rose 72
- Magna Moralia*
- 1.1.1182a15–23 [= SSR I B 31]
607
- 1.1.1183b8–11 [= SSR I B 32]
607
- 1.9.1187a5–13 [= SSR I B 38]
610
- 1.20.1190b27–29 [= SSR I B 37]
607
- 1.34.1198a10–13 [= SSR I B 33]
607
- 2.6.1200b25–29 [= SSR I B 40]
609
- Metaphysica*
- 1.1.981a19 293
- 1.1.983b13–18 293
- 1.3.984a3–5 35
- 1.4.985a17–21 357n
- 1.6.987a32–b1 [= SSR I B 24]
352
- 1.6.987a28–b18 352n
- 1.6.987b1 686n
- 1.6.987b1–4 351n
- 1.6.987b1–6 610, 818n
- 1.6.982b10–15 580n
- 2.2.996a21–34 181, 181n
- 2.2.997b32–998a4
95
- 5.29.1024b26–34 [= SSR V A 152]
148, 175n
- 5.29.1024b32–34
110n, 254n
- 5.29.1025a6–13 388n
- 7.8.1033b24 685n
- 7.3.1043b4–32 [= SSR V A 150]
147
- 7.3.1043b24 [= SSR V A 150]
148
- 7.3.1043b26 [= SSR V A 150]
147, 148
- 7.3.1046b29–1047b9 [= SSR II A 15]
163n
- 7.3.1047a14–16 [= SSR II B 15]
264
- 13.3.1078a31–33 [= SSR IV A 171]
181
- 13.4.1078b12–17 352n
- 13.4.1078b17–32 [= SSR I B 26]
611
- 13.4.1078b27–29
320
- 13.4.1078b28 611
- 13.4.1079a29 685n
- 13.9.1086a32 611
- 13.9.1086a37–b5 [= SSR I B 25]
611
- Περὶ εὐγενείας
fr. 92 Rose 654n
fr. 93 Rose 649n
- Περὶ φιλοσοφίας
fr. 16 Ross 626n
- Poetica*
- 1.1447b9–10 125, 601
- Politica*
- 1.5.1260a20–24 [= SSR I B 21]
612
- 5.11.1313b11–15 574
- 5.11.1314a27–29 573
- 5.11.1314a33–37 573
- 5.11.1314b35 573
- 5.11.1315a 573
- 5.11–12.1315b 573
- 2.1–3.1260b25–1262a24
604
- [*Problemata physica*]
- 1.953a–955a 644n
- 1.953a26–32 615

Rhetorica

- 1.2.1356a4–12 643n
 1.2.1357b29–30 331n
 1.9.1367b7–9 [= SSR I B 18]
 603
 2.15.1390b28–31 [= SSR I B 14]
 614
 2.15.1390b30 [= SSR I B 14]
 654n
 2.16.1391a8–11 574
 2.20.1393b3–8 [= SSR I B 16]
 602
 2.20.1393b4–8 [= SSR I B 16]
 321
 2.23.1398a24–26 [= SSR I B 14]
 614
 2.23.1398b29–31 [= SSR I B 4 = IV A 16]
 261, 615
 2.23.1398b31–32
 183
 2.23.1399a 132
 2.24.1402a24–28
 87
 3.1.1403b14 58
 3.1.1404a20–1404a40
 782n
 3.5.1407b6–8 88
 3.14.1415b30–32 [= SSR I B 18]
 603
 3.16.1417a18–21 [= SSR I B 3]
 601
 3.18.1419a8–12 [= SSR I B 19]
 604

Sophistici elenchi

- 14.173b17–22 88
 34.183b 633n
 34.183b6–8 [= SSR I B 20]
 611

Topica

- 1.11.101b 420
 1.11.104b19–21 [= SSR V A 153]
 149n
 1.11.104b20–21 [= SSR V A 153]
 254n
 1.11.104b21 [= SSR V A 153]
 110n
 1.18.108b8 424
 1.18.108b17 424
 2.8.113b27–28 417n

- 3.5.119b35 424
 8.3.158a32 424
 8.13.163b33 424

Aristoxenus

ed. Wehrli

- fr. 1 626n
 fr. 10 632n
 fr. 10a–b 624n
 fr. 10b 624n
 fr. 25 624n, 629n
 fr. 30 628n, 630n
 fr. 31 629n
 fr. 47–50 628n
 fr. 50 628n
 fr. 51 [= SSR I B 41]
 626n, 631n, 632, 634, 635,
 635n
 fr. 51–52 [= SSR I B 41–42]
 629n
 fr. 52a [= SSR I D 1]
 626n, 637
 fr. 52b [= SSR I D 2]
 626n, 638
 fr. 53 [= SSR I B 43]
 626n, 646
 fr. 54a [= SSR I B 44]
 128n, 626, 629, 629n, 641,
 649
 fr. 54a–b [= SSR I B 44–45]
 628n
 fr. 54b [= SSR I B 45]
 626n, 641, 650
 fr. 55 [= SSR I B 46]
 631
 fr. 55–60 [= SSR I B 46–51]
 626n
 fr. 56 [= SSR I B 47]
 628n, 640
 fr. 57 [= SSR I B 48]
 653
 fr. 58 [= SSR I B 49]
 632n, 653
 fr. 59 [= SSR I B 50 = I D 1]
 645
 fr. 60 [= SSR I B 51]
 656
 fr. 118–121 627n
 fr. 120a 627n

Arrianus Lucius Flavius*Epicteti Dissertationes*

- 1.9 702
 1.17.10–12 [= SSR V A 160]
 149
 1.29.18 [= SSR I C 518]
 701
 2.2.15 [= SSR I C 520]
 701
 3.1.42 727n
 3.22.19 [= SSR I C 530]
 702
 3.22.76 [= SSR V H 20]
 700n
 3.22.81 702
 3.23.21 701
 3.23.34 667, 668
 3.24.10–11 702
 3.24.60 [= SSR I C 523]
 702
 3.24.64 [= SSR V B 290]
 702
 3.24.66 [= SSR V B 290]
 701n, 702
 4.1.154 [= SSR V B 293]
 701n
 4.1.154–155 [= SSR V B 293]
 702
 4.1.169 [= SSR I C 524]
 701
 4.5.33 654n, 784n
 4.6.20 255n

Epicteti Enchiridium

- 51 701
 52 701

Arsenius*Violetum*

- 253.27–254.2 [= SSR II A 30]
 167n
 502.13–14 [= SSR V A 87]
 109

Asclepius*In Aristotelis Metaphysicam*

- 991b3 p. 90 173n

Athenaeus*Deipnosophistae*

- 2.44c [= SSR III D 2]
 252
 2.220d 255n
 5.218c 40
 5.219a [= SSR I C 18]
 649n
 5.219c–e [= SSR I C 18]
 651n
 5.220a [= SSR VI A 84]
 212n
 5.220d–e [= SSR V A 147]
 148n
 5.220e–f [= SSR I C 17]
 651n
 8.343c–d [= SSR IV A 17]
 183n
 8.343d [= SSR IV A 17]
 262
 11.504e–f 183n
 11.504e–505b 241
 11.506c 387n
 11.507a [= SSR V A 147]
 255n
 11.507a–b [= SSR I C 150 = IV A 26]
 248
 11.507b [= SSR I C 150 = IV A 26]
 183n
 11.507c [= SSR I C 94 = III A 4 = VI A 21]
 118n, 202n, 225n, 249
 11.507c–d 239
 11.507d 248
 11.508d [= SSR II S 7 = IV A 16 = V A 42]
 182n
 11.784d [= SSR V A 64]
 108
 12.534e–f 656n
 12.544a [= SSR IV A 174]
 179n
 12.544d–e [= SSR IV A 31]
 215n
 13.555d [= SSR I B 48]
 655n
 13.555d–556a [= SSR I B 58]
 653
 13.556a–b [= SSR I B 7]
 653
 13.588c–f 198n

Deipnosophistae (cont.)

- 13.599a [= SSR I C 16]
651n
13.610b 56
13.611d–e [= SSR VI A 16]
3n
13.611e–612b [= SSR VI A 16]
285
13.611d–612d [= SSR VI A 16]
212n, 215n
13.611d–612f [= SSR VI A 16]
217n
13.612a [= SSR VI A 16]
118n, 286
14.628f [= SSR I C 143]
3n
14.643–644 784n, 694

Atticus

- fr. 9.17–23 Des Places
829n

Augustinus*De civitate Dei*

- 8.2 638n
8.3 [= SSR I H 13]
107
18.41 [= SSR I H 13]
196n

Boethius*Consolatio philosophiae*

- 1.1 761n
1.3 683n

Callias

- fr. 12 PCG [= SSR I A 2]
128n
fr. 15 PCG 32n

Cassianus*Collationes patrum*

- 13.5.3 287n, 651n

Choniates Michaelis*Carmina*

- 5.1 71n

Chrysippus

- fr. 3.179 SVF 691
fr. 3.288 SVF 693
fr. 3.313 SVF 693

Cicero*Academica*

- 1.4.15–18 [= SSR I C 448]
634n
1.12.43–45 [= SSR I C 447]
634n
1.15 757
1.15–16 783n
1.16 172n
1.43 687
2.3 716
2.42.129 [= SSR II A 31 = III F 17]
170n
2.131 [= SSR IV A 178]
684n

Ad familiares

- 9.1–8 715n
9.24.3 714n

Brutus

- 12.47 452n
85.292 [= SSR I C 438 = VI A 27]
217n

Cato major

- 3 715

De amicitia

- 4 715
26 723
88 717n
88–98 723n
89 717n
89–100 723
90 717n, 723
91 723n
91–92 720
92 723n
97 723n

De die natali

- 3.3 [= SSR II A 11]
165n

De divinatione

- 1.82 694n
1.122 172n
1.123 694

De fato

- 5.10 [= SSR I C 49 = II O 19]
229n, 633n, 651n, 784n

De finibus bonorum et malorum

- 1.42 703
2.1 703
2.2 708n
2.3 714n
2.17 714n
2.18 179n
3.5 684n
3.32 688
3.61 703
3.62 688
3.66 689
4.79 696n
5.74 695n

De inventione rhetorica

- 1.5 715
1.31.51–53 [= SSR I C 434 = VI A 70]
209n
1.53 [= SSR VI A 70]
118n

De legibus

- 2.62 717n
3.1 724n

De natura deorum

- 1.5.11 [= SSR IV H 19]
711n
1.13.32 [= SSR V A 180]
168n
1.33.93 [= SSR III A 15]
225n
1.63 58n
1.93 225n

De officiis

- 1.6 709
1.8 709n
1.19 715
1.46 709n
1.50 709n
1.58 714n
1.83 717n
1.94 709
1.104 172n
1.108 707
1.128 720
1.131 711n
1.132 709

- 1.132–137 707
1.133 710, 712
1.134 707n
1.136 711n
1.148 696, 720
3.11 692n
3.34 692n
3.45 724
3.83 717n

De oratore

- 1.32–33 715
1.35 715n
1.47 708n
1.207 714
2.269–270 714
2.270 707n
3.16–17 [= SSR I H 4]
162n

- 3.41–42 709n
3.60 707
3.60–62 682
3.61–62 685n
3.62 683
3.67 686

De republica

- 1.16 710n

De senectute

- 79 832n

Lucullus

- 139 199n

Philippicae

- 8.15 717n

Tusculanae Disputationes

- 1.10 627n
1.46 213n
3.32.77 [= SSR VI A 47]
205n, 727n
4.4.10 783n
4.37 643n
4.37.80 [= SSR I C 49]
784n
5.3.8–4.10 271
5.4 351n
5.4.10 [= SSR I C 458]
638n, 818n
5.10 643n, 757
5.10–11 181n
5.33 695
5.108 701

Cleanthes1.558 *SVF* 692**Clemens Alexandrinus***Paedagogus*

1.1.1.3–4 667

Stromata

4.8.590 700n

5.14 694

Cratinus

Ἀρχιλόχοι

fr. 2 *PCG* 50

Πανόπτται

fr. 158 *PCG* 36, 46, 49fr. 159 *PCG* 36, 46, 49fr. 161 *PCG* 36fr. 162 *PCG* 36, 46fr. 167b *PCG* 56fr. 28 *PCG* 340nfr. 307 *PCG* 125

Incertae sedis

fr. 317 40n

fr. 380 41, 46

Critias

81 A6 DK 550

Cyrillus*Contra Iulianum*6.185 [= *SSR I B 44*]
629n, 6416.186 [= *SSR I B 44*]
625, 649

6.207 634

6.208 [= *SSR I B 41*]
626n, 630n, 6357.226 [= *SSR I G 56*]
650n**Demetrius Phalereus***Apologia Socratis*fr. 91–93 Wehrli
132[*De elocutione*]

38 261n

291 [= *SSR VI A 89*]
212n296–297 [= *SSR IV A 148* = *VI A 32*]

117–118

296–298 130, 670n

Demosthenes*Contra Neaera*

122 199

Dio Chrysostomus*Orationes*

1.15 820n

1.17–18 820n

13.14–28 [= *SSR V A 208*]

108n

13.20 [= *SSR I C 496* = *V A 208*]

109

13.21 [= *SSR I C 496* = *V A 208*]

109n

13.28 [= *SSR I C 496* = *V A 208*]

109, 667n

54.3 [= *SSR I C 427*]

819

54.3–4 [= *SSR I C 427*]

646n

60.10 [= *SSR I C 428*]

819n

Diodorus Siculus*Bibliotheca historica*

12.39.3.1–5 57

12.40.6 57

14.5 213n

14.17.4–12 222n

17.5.7 552n

Diogenes Laertius*Vitae philosophorum*

1.12 271

1.15 682, 684, 685, 697

2.3 817n

2.6 361, 817n

2.8 360

2.12–14 57, 361n

2.13 50

2.14 [= *SSR I 6*] 818n2.16 [= *SSR I C 12*]
350, 361n, 638n2.18 [= *SSR I 6*] 32n, 636n, 818n

- 2.18–19 [= SSR I D 1]
4, 637n
- 2.19 [= SSR I D 1]
254, 350
- 2.18–26 [= SSR I D 1]
792
- 2.18–47 [= SSR I D 1]
791, 791n
- 2.20 [= SSR VI A 7]
118n, 215n, 246, 645, 792
- 2.20–21 359
- 2.21 700n, 793
- 2.22–23 795
- 2.22–26 793
- 2.23 [= SSR IV A 153]
616, 638n
- 2.25 [= SSR V H 86]
614
- 2.26 [= SSR I B 7]
615, 649, 655n
- 2.27 64
- 2.27–28 40n
- 2.27–30 794
- 2.27–37 792
- 2.29 [= SSR I D 1]
550, 670n
- 2.29–32 252
- 2.30 [= SSR II A 3]
264
- 2.30–37 794
- 2.31 [= SSR III A 2 = V A 3]
222n, 246
- 2.33 752
- 2.34 [= SSR VI A 6]
789
- 2.36 [= SSR IV H 15]
32, 649n, 784n
- 2.37 51n
- 2.38 53
- 2.38–44 792, 795
- 2.39 131, 602n, 795
- 2.40 285, 808
- 2.42 3n
- 2.44 795
- 2.45 229n, 359n, 794, 796
- 2.45–47 792
- 2.46 616, 796
- 2.47 [= SSR I H 5 = IV A 160 = V A 23]
161n, 708, 796
- 2.48–144 792
- 2.56 577
- 2.57 455n
- 2.59 559
- 2.60 [= SSR IV A 15 = VI A 3 = III F 4]
3n, 180n, 217n, 249n, 649n
- 2.60–61 [= SSR VI A 22]
249
- 2.61 [= SSR III C 1 = VI A 13 = V A 43 = V A
141] 250n
- 2.62 [= SSR IV A 23 = VI A 28]
118, 182, 216n, 249
- 2.63 [= SSR VI A 13]
118n, 176n
- 2.64 [= SSR I H 17 = II A 10 = III A 8 = IV A
144 = V A 41]
107, 117, 173n, 708n, 791
- 2.65 [= SSR IV A 1 = IV A 15 = VI A 91]
180n, 183n, 185n, 213n, 261,
646n
- 2.66 [= SSR IV A 17 = IV A 51]
191, 198, 262n
- 2.66–83 288–289
- 2.67 [= SSR IV A 36 = IV A 57 = IV A 86]
263
- 2.68 [= SSR IV A 44 = IV A 68 = IV A 104 = IV
A 105] 182n, 195
- 2.69 [= SSR IV A 87 = IV A 106 = IV A 129]
182n, 192n, 193n, 261
- 2.70 [= SSR IV A 116 = IV A 112 = IV A 125]
182n, 646n
- 2.71 [= SSR A 10 = IV A 49 = IV A 122]
182n
- 2.74 [= SSR IV A 3 = IV A 90]
183, 192n, 198
- 2.75 [= SSR IV A 42 = IV A 69]
192n, 262n
- 2.76 [= SSR IV A 13 = IV A 63 = IV A 70]
180, 192n, 261
- 2.78 [= SSR IV A 123 = V B 312 = IV A 31]
180, 183, 262
- 2.79 [= SSR IV A 37]
182n
- 2.80 [= SSR IV A 4 = IV A 38 = IV A 121]
180, 182n, 183
- 2.81 [= SSR IV A 39 = IV A 88 = IV A 135]
192n, 262
- 2.82–83 [= SSR VI A 24]
218n

Vitae philosophorum (cont.)

- 2.83–85 [= SSR IV A 144]
182n
- 2.84 [= SSR IV A 144.1–11]
117, 181n, 192n
- 2.84–85 199n
- 2.85 [= SSR III A 1 = IV A 144.30–44 = IV A
175] 117, 180, 181, 666n
- 2.86–87 261
- 2.87 199n
- 2.92 [= SSR IV A 166]
181n
- 2.105 [= SSR II O 7 = III A 1 = III A 8 = III B
1 = III F 1 = VI A 23]
222, 246, 251, 793
- 2.106 [= SSR II A 1 = II A 22 = II A 30 = II P
3] 119, 162n, 167n, 170n, 264
- 2.107 [= SSR II A 34]
119, 169n, 232, 264, 321
- 2.108 [= SSR II A 10 = II A 23 = II B 1 = II B
13] 119, 162n, 203n, 264
- 2.112–113 119, 162n
- 2.115–116 [= SSR II O 15]
119
- 2.121 [= SSR VI B 42]
246, 646n
- 2.122 231n, 251
- 2.124 [= SSR VI B 63]
128n, 252, 253
- 2.125 [= SSR II C 18 = III A 1]
252
- 2.126 [= SSR III A 1 = III D 1 = III E 1 = III G
1 = V H 68] 119, 252
- 2.131 [= SSR III F 11]
687, 687n
- 3.5 239n, 337, 352n
- 3.6 [= SSR II A 5]
163n
- 3.19 251
- 3.34 240
- 3.35 [= SSR I C 90 = V A 148]
110n, 148n, 255
- 3.36 [= SSR IV A 15 = VI A 3]
183n, 249, 261
- 3.37 [= SSR VI A 5]
387n
- 3.39 256n
- 3.59 412
- 3.62 249n, 362, 387n
- 4.5 182
- 5.1–35 791
- 6.1 [= SSR V A 1 = V A 3 = V A 8 = V A 11 = V A
145] 108, 109, 176n
- 6.2 [= SSR V A 9 = V A 12 = V A 85 = V A 97]
107, 120, 240, 254
- 6.3 [= SSR V A 28 = V A 56–57 = V A 151 = V
A 122 = V A 171]
193, 255
- 6.4 [= SSR V A 3 = V A 60 = V A 131 = V A 169
= V A 178] 107
- 6.5 [= SSR V A 71 = V A 88 = V A 129 = V A
168 = V A 176–177]
107
- 6.6–9 107
- 6.7 [= SSR V A 27 = V A 87 = V A 90]
255–256
- 6.8 [= SSR V A 15 = V A 72 = V A 89 = V A 114]
107
- 6.11 [= SSR V A 58]
254
- 6.12 [= SSR V A 134]
173n, 700n
- 6.13 107
- 6.15–18 [= SSR V A 41]
203n, 287
- 6.16 108, 240, 255
- 6.18 [= SSR V B 24]
240
- 6.24 [= SSR II A 28 = V B 303 = V B 375 = V B
487] 163n
- 6.25 [= SSR IV A 43]
258, 259
- 6.26 255n, 256n, 259, 260
- 6.35 [= SSR V B 188 = V B 266 = V B 276 = V
B 323] 752
- 6.40 [= SSR V B 59 = V B 63 = V B 173 = V B
183 = V B 274]
257
- 6.41 [= SSR V B 57 = V B 272 = V B 284 = V B
456–457 = V B 501]
260
- 6.53 [= SSR V B 62 = V B 493 = V B 499]
256
- 6.58 [= SSR V B 56 = V B 186 = V B 431]
258
- 6.63 [= SSR V B 36 = V B 208 = V B 269 = V B
343 = V B 355 = V B 360 = V B 496]
701

6.67 [= SSR V B 440]	
259	
6.70–71 [= SSR V B 291]	
191n, 196n	
6.72	198, 257
6.80 [= SSR II H 1 = V B 117 = V B 128 = V D	
4]	257
6.85–93	700
6.89 [= SSR II A 25 = II L 1 = V H 3 = V H 36	
= V H 48]	162n
6.97	700
6.104 [= SSR V A 98 = V B 174 = V B 369 = V	
B 497]	685n
6.105 [= SSR V A 99 = V H 37]	
288, 684, 685	
7.1	684
7.2 [= SSR II O 4]	
684	
7.2–3 [= SSR V H 38]	
684	
7.27	695n
7.30–31	695n
7.31–32	684
7.38	684n
7.39	686
7.40	686
7.52	685
7.63	685
7.91 [= SSR V A 137 = V B 512]	
697	
7.103	698n
7.108	688
7.120	688
7.121 [= SSR V A 136]	
700	
7.135–136	702n
7.142	702n
7.149	694n
7.159	685
7.161 [= SSR II A 32]	
119, 264	
7.177 [= SSR I C 105]	
685	
7.178 [= SSR III F 21]	
693, 694	
8.1 [= SSR I H 2]	
161n	
8.8	271
8.53	212n

9.37	412
9.51	58n
9.53 [= SSR V A 154]	
100, 149n	
10.4	182n
10.118	192n

Diogenes Sinopeus

SSR V B 55	147n
------------	------

Dionysius Halicarnassensis

De Isocrate

18	114n
----	------

Empedocles

31 B3–4 DK	71n
------------	-----

Epicurus

De rerum natura

14	678n
----	------

Epistula ad Menoeceum

122.1–5	675
122.2	674
122.5	677
133.1–135.3	677n

Epiphanius

Adversus haereses

3.6	636n
-----	------

Euclides Megareus

SSR II A

1	161n, 162n
2	163n
6	163n
10	164n, 203n
11	165n, 176n, 648
15	163n
17	165n
23	162n
24	162n
25	162n
26	162n
27	162n
28	163n
29	162n
30	167n, 170n
31	170n
34	169n

Eupolis**Αἰγες**

fr. 1 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 2 <i>PCG</i>	39
fr. 3 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 4 <i>PCG</i>	39, 47
fr. 5 <i>PCG</i>	39
fr. 6 <i>PCG</i>	39
fr. 7 <i>PCG</i>	39
fr. 10 <i>PCG</i>	39
fr. 11 <i>PCG</i>	39, 47
fr. 12 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 13 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 15 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 17 <i>PCG</i>	39, 47
fr. 18 <i>PCG</i>	39, 47
fr. 19 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 21 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 22 <i>PCG</i>	38
fr. 31 <i>PCG</i>	39
fr. 34 <i>PCG</i>	39

Ἀστυράτευοι

fr. 35 <i>PCG</i>	45
-------------------	----

Ἀυτόλυκος

test. ii <i>PCG</i>	45
test. iii <i>PCG</i>	42
fr. 48 <i>PCG</i>	42, 44
fr. 50a <i>PCG</i>	43, 44
fr. 54 <i>PCG</i>	44
fr. 55 <i>PCG</i>	43, 44
fr. 57 <i>PCG</i>	44, 45
fr. 58 <i>PCG</i>	45
fr. 59 <i>PCG</i>	44
fr. 60 <i>PCG</i>	43, 44

Βαπταί

test. ii–vi <i>PCG</i>	32n
------------------------	-----

Δῆμοι

fr. 102 <i>PCG</i>	57
--------------------	----

Κόλακες

fr. 157 <i>PCG</i>	40, 41, 46, 106n, 336n
fr. 158 <i>PCG</i>	40, 336n
fr. 160 <i>PCG</i>	41
fr. 162 <i>PCG</i>	42
fr. 163 <i>PCG</i>	41
fr. 164 <i>PCG</i>	41
fr. 165 <i>PCG</i>	41
fr. 169 <i>PCG</i>	42
fr. 170 <i>PCG</i>	41
fr. 172 <i>PCG</i>	41

fr. 386 <i>PCG</i>	33
--------------------	----

fr. 388 <i>PCG</i>	33
--------------------	----

Incertae sedis

fr. 365 <i>PCG</i>	42, 46
fr. 386 <i>PCG</i>	42, 46, 52
fr. 388 <i>PCG</i>	44, 106n

Euripides**Antiope**

183	374n
184–188	374n
185–186	374n
188	374n
193–194	374n, 375n
196	374n, 375n
200	374n, 375n
202	374n, 375n
206	375n
219	374n
227	374n, 375n
910	374n, 375n

Bacchae

317–318	262
836	262

Heraclidae

356	132, 438
-----	----------

Hercules furens

698–699	342n
---------	------

Hippolytus

88	342n
88–108	128n
776	342

Orestes

1296	342n
------	------

Eusebius**Praeparatio evangelica**

6.9.22 [= SSR I G 49]	287
11.3.2 [= SSR I C 460]	646n
11.3.8 [= SSR I B 43]	646
11.3.9	646
14.6.9	687
14.11.7–12.1 [= SSR I G 48]	647n
14.12	241n
14.16.7	647n

- 14.17.1 [= SSR II O 26]
170n
- 14.18.31 [= SSR I G 45 = IV A 52 = IV A 217]
183n
- 15.14.1 702n
- 15.15.1 702n
- 15.61.12 [= SSR I G 48]
647n
- 15.62.7 [= SSR IV A 166]
181n
- 15.62.10 [= SSR I C 466]
647n
- Fronto**
Epistulae ad Marcum Caesarem
3.15.2 822n
- Galenus**
[*De historia philosophica*]
3 [= SSR I H 8] 638n
7 [= SSR II A 27]
119, 162n
- De usu partium corporis humani*
14.4 690n
- In Hippocratis De natura hominis*
1.4 45
- Gellius Aulus**
Noctes Atticae
1.17.1 699n
1.17.1–3 [= SSR I C 58]
649n
2.18.1–5 [= SSR III A 3]
222n
4.11 624n
7.10.1–4 [= SSR II A 2]
163n
14.3 239
14.3.1–5 240
14.31.4 390n
15.20 655n
- Gnomologium Parisinum*
333 [= SSR V B 222]
752
- Gnomologium Vaticanum*
30 [= SSR IV A 18]
263
437 [= SSR V A 30]
256
- 743.11 [= SSR V A 95]
165n
- 743.277 [= SSR II A 17]
165n
- 743.491 649n
- Gorgias**
Helena
7 151n
13 272
- Testimonia*
76 A23 DK 58
- Gregorius Nazianzenus**
Carmina moralia
1.2.10.307 [= SSR IV A 33]
215n
1.2.10.319–334 [= SSR IV A 33]
215n
- Heraclitus**
12 DK
B35 271, 272n
B125 275
- Herillus**
fr. 1.411 SVF 685
- Hermias**
In Platonis Phaedrum
65.26–69.31 749n
- Hermippus**
fr. 47 PCG 57
- Hermogenes**
De Ideis ed. Rabe
399.18–400.21 449n
399.21–22 450n
- De Ideis* ed. Spengel
419.25–420.7 [= SSR VI A 20]
217n
- Herodotus**
Historiae
1.30 273
1.32 449
1.65 441
2.162 45n

Historiae (cont.)

3.53	569n
3.160	229n
7.152	752
8.83	206n

Hesychius Milesius*De viribus illustribus*

27 [= SSR II A 5 = II A 30 = II A 34]	
	167n

Hierocles*Elementa ethica*

1.50	691
------	-----

Hieronymus*Adversus Iovinianum*

1.48 [= SSR I G 90]	
	784n

De viris illustribus

Praefatio	624n
-----------	------

Hippocrates*[De vetere medicina]*

20	275–276
----	---------

Hippolytus*Refutatio omnium haeresium*

10	638n
----	------

Hippon

26 DK	
A2	35, 56
A9	56
A4	56
A7	35
A10	35

Homerus*Ilias*

1.194–198	767
9.254–258	549n
16.431–458	109
16.644–655	109
21.457	39n
22.167–185	109

Odyssea

1.157	259
3.227	438n

4.70	259
4.392	700n, 793
16.243	438n
22.288	438n
24.6	245

Horatius*Ars poetica*

295–322	708n
---------	------

Epistulae

1.1.10–19 [= SSR IV A 100]	
	194
1.1.13–32 [= SSR IV A 45]	
	195
1.17	198

Hyperides*Pro Euxenippo*

7–8	547n
-----	------

Ioannes Cassianus*Collationes*

13.5.3 [= SSR I C 50 = V B 219]	
	229, 287

Ioannes Chrysostomus*Orationes*

47.23.5	255n
---------	------

Ioannes Tzetzēs*Scholion ad Nubes*

225a	77
------	----

Ion Chius

392.9 Jacoby	638n
26.11 West	549n
27.8 West	549n

Isidorus*Etymologiae*

1.38.1–2	782n
----------	------

Isocrates*Ad Demonium*

6	120n
12	120n
21	120n
40	120n
43	120

45-46	120
<i>Ad Nicoclem</i>	
1-4	112
1-9	112
2	112
11	113
12	111, 120n
32	119n
39	670n
46-47	112
48-49	115
<i>Ad Philippum</i>	
2	116
4	120
11	116
12	116
17	117
17-23	117
23	117
23-24	126
<i>Adversus sophistas</i>	
1 [= SSR V A 170]	105, 106, 107, 217n
2 [= SSR V A 170]	106, 107, 110, 120
3 [= SSR V A 170]	106
3-4 [= SSR V A 170]	106
3-6 [= SSR V A 170]	106
4 [= SSR V A 170]	106
5 [= SSR V A 170]	106
5-6 [= SSR V A 170]	106
7	106
8	106
14-15	105
14-18	111
17	112
19	105
20	105, 106, 112
<i>Aeropagiticus</i>	
26	119
43	120n
56	117
74-75	115

<i>Antidosis</i>	
2-3	114
8	113
13	113
14-323	113
30	115
45	109n
55	117
80-83	115
133-137	120
142-149	120
181	120n
183-188	105n
184-187	111
192	111
193	105
209-210	120n
210	120n
217	120
235	39n
245	120n
250	120n
253	113
253-257	113
258	114
259	114
260	114
262	107
270-282	105n
271	670n
276-278	111
285	120, 667n
292	114
304	120n
<i>Archidamus</i>	
26-27	120
37	120
<i>Busiris</i>	
5 [= SSR I C 152]	131, 406, 727n
6 [= SSR I C 152]	121
15-27	111
17	111
22	120n
<i>De pace</i>	
31	115
57	120

Demonicus

5 106n

Epistula ad Alexandrum

5 115

Epistulae

7.3 667n

8.5 120n

Evagoras

41 120n

42 120n

43 120n

45 120

60 120n

Helena

1 [= SSR I C 152] 110, 111, 390n

2 111

4 108

11 111

57 119n

Nicocles

4 112

5-9 112, 119n

8 120

9 112

30 120

44 120n

47 120

Panathenaicus

1 109n

3 120n

5 114

25 117

26-29 114

30-32 105n

114-118 115

115 115

116 116

117-118 114

118 114

131 115

136 116

198 111

199-265 120

200 117

226 115

232-235 117

233 117

246 116

251 117

260 120n

262 117

268 116

Panegyricus

8 113n

47-49 105n

49 120

53 115

200 391

Plataicus

39 120

*Julianus Imperator**Epistulae*

10.264c-d 683n

16.386d 699

30.56, 19-21 824n

61c.422d-423a 828n

82.445a [= SSR III A 2] 228, 287

89b.295b 824n

89b.300d 825n

Orationes

2.104a 825

3.78d-79b [= SSR I C 546] 824n

3.79a [= SSR I C 546] 824n

3.89b-c 831

4.242d-243a 825n

4.244a 824n

4.249b [= SSR I C 415] 824n

5.272a 829

5.275b-d 830n

5.275d-276d 830

5.276d 824n

6.254b 827n

6.255c 824n

6.255d-259b 826

6.259b 824n

6.264b-d [= SSR I 17] 826

6.266d 827n

6.267a 827n

7.209a [= SSR V A 44] 109

7.215c [= SSR V A 44]	109	1.27	636n
7.216d-217b [= SSR V A 44]	109	1.34-47	809
7.225c-d	828n	1.35	807
7.231d	831	1.39	807
7.233a-234c	831	1.48	807
7.237b	824n	1.48-52	809
8.162c-d	828n	1.53	807, 809
9.181a [= SSR V B 94]	824n	1.53-61	809
9.181a-b [= SSR V B 94]	828n	1.62	809
9.183a-b	829	1.62-108	810
9.185c	827n	1.63	807, 810
9.188c	825	1.63-79	809
9.188d	819n	1.65-66	810
9.188d-189a	828n	1.67	810
9.189a-b	825n	1.70-79	810
9.190a [= SSR I C 547]	828	1.72-77	810
9.190c [= SSR I C 547]	824n	1.73-76	813
9.191a [= SSR I C 429]	828n	1.80-84	810
10.314d	824n	1.85	810
10.336c	831	1.86	810
12.359c	828n	1.87	810
<i>Contra Galilaeos</i>		1.88-91	810
fr. 55.12-21 Masaracchia	828n	1.93-97	810
		1.96	807
		1.98	810
		1.99-102	810
		1.105-108	810
		1.107	807
		1.109-113	811
		1.114	807
		1.114-116	811
		1.127-132	811
		1.129	807
		1.136	811n
		1.136-149	811
		1.137-141	811n
		1.140	807
		1.141	811n
		1.142-147	811n
		1.148-149	811n
		1.150 [= SSR = IV A 164 = VI A 37 = VI A 38]	
		218n	
		1.154	807
		1.155	807
		1.184 [= SSR III A 6]	
		222n, 807	
		2.1	804
		2.3 [= SSR I H 1]	
		804	
Lactantius			
<i>Divinae institutiones</i>			
3.12.9 [= SSR II A 31]	170n		
3.25	700n		
3.28.3	199n		
3.34-37	199n		
Leucippus			
67 DK			
A6	176n		
A7	176n		
Libanius			
<i>Declamationes</i>			
1.1	809n		
1.14-20	809		

Declamationes (cont.)

2.4	805
2.13	805
2.14	804
2.15	804
2.17	804
2.19	804
2.21	805
2.22	804
2.23	805
2.25	805
2.26	805
2.34	784n
2.36	784n
2.36-37	784n
12.21	803
12.22	803
12.28	803
12.38	803
12.41	803
12.46	803
12.47	803
12.49	803
15.13	802
16.45-46	803
23.24	803
26	803n
28	803n
30	803n
32	803n

Epistulae

233.4	799
286.3	801
301.1	799
379.7	800
435.2-3	800
559.1	801
652.1	800, 800n
694.1	800
694.1-3	811-812
872.5	800
1158.1	800
1171.2	800
1487.1	800
1488.3	800
1493.4	800

Orationes

18.21	831n
15.28	801

18.57	827n
18.155	801
18.272	802, 831
27.7	802
64.18	801
Fragmenta	
50 Foerster	32n, 803

Lucianus*Bis accusatus*

33.24-26	33n
----------	-----

De beneficiis

1.8.1-2 [= SSR VI A 6]	
	215n

De parasito

32 [SSR VI A 24]	
	215n

[Macrobii]

21	577n
----	------

Revivescens sive piscator

25	33, 44
----	--------

Somnium sive vita Luciani

12 [= SSR I C 10]	
	637n

Verae historiae

39	577n
----	------

Vitarum auctio

12 [= SSR IV A 59]	
	179n

Lucilius*Saturae*

fr. 518 Marx [= SSR II A 11]	
	165

Lucretius*De rerum natura*

4.1073-1140	192n
4.1141-1150	192n

Lysias*Contra Andocidem*

6.17	58
8.11	286

Pro invalido

24.10	286
-------	-----

Fragmenta

281-286 Carey	656n
---------------	------

Marcellinus*Vita Thucididis*

27 241

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*Meditationes*

1.16.30 [= SSR I C 540]

703

3.6.2 703

6.47.3 703

7.19.2 703

7.66 703

8.3 [= SSR V B 45]

703

11.10.3-4 693

11.39 [= SSR I C 545]

703

Marsilio Ficino*Commentarium in Convivium Platonis De**Amore*

7.16 776n

Maximus Confessor*[Loci communes]* ed. Ihm

13.32/27 789n

Maximus Tyrius*Dissertationes*

1 781

1.9 [= SSR I C 99 = IV A 58 = V A 19 = V B 166] 778n, 781

1.10 [= SSR V B 166]

781, 783

2.4 785n

3 [= SSR I E 3] 23, 772, 773, 774

3.2 773, 774

3.6 774

3.7 774

3.8 774, 780

3.8-9 777

3.18-21 777

4 782, 782n

4.2-3 782

4.4 782

4.6 782

5.3 785n

5.8 [= SSR I C 78]

778n

6 780

6.5-6 778n

6.6 [= SSR VI A 42]

204n, 206n, 780

7 775n

7.5 785n

7.7 [= SSR VI A 42]

204n, 785n

Orationes

8 749n

8-9 23, 772, 774, 775, 775n

8.4 785n

8.5.6 316

8.6 775, 785n

8.8 775

9 749n

10 775n, 783

10.8 778n

11 775n

12 23, 777, 780

12.2 777

12.3-5 777

12.6-8 777

12.7 780

12.8 [= SSR I C 132]

777, 778n, 784n

12.8-10 777

12.10 777, 778n

13.24 [= SSR I C 352]

789n

14.9 778n

15.9-10 [= SSR V B 265]

778n

15.10 778n

16.10 784n

17 781

18-21 23, 748n, 773, 775, 779

18.4 779n, 781, 784n

18.5 [= SSR VI A 31]

776, 778n, 779n, 780

18.6 776

18.7 778n

18.7-9 776

18.9 776n, 778n, 779n, 784n

19 [= SSR I E 7] 776

20 [= SSR I E 8]

776

21 [= SSR I E 9] 776

21.1-7 776

Orationes (cont.)

21.7	781
22.6 [= SSR VI A 31]	778n, 780
22.8	778
25	784
25.7 [= SSR I C 145]	778n, 779, 785
26	782, 782n
26.2	782
26.3	778n, 782, 783
26.4	782
26.5	778n, 780
27.5	778n, 781, 782
27.6	778n
28.4	778n
29.7	778, 778n, 782
32.8 [= SSR I C 31]	778n, 780
32.9 [= SSR V B 298]	778n, 781
34.9	778n
36	781
36.6 [= SSR V B 299]	778n, 781
37.1	778n, 781
38.4 [= SSR VI A 62]	118n, 208n, 778n, 780, 784n
38.7 [= SSR I C 10]	778n
39.5	778n
40.6	778n

Menander*Samia*

325–326	343n
---------	------

Mishnah

<i>Avot</i> 4.3	471n
-----------------	------

Musonius Rufus*Reliquiae* ed. Hense

10.4	700
11.9–10	689
15.11	689
40.7 [= SSR I C 486]	700
42.1–2 [= SSR I C 492]	701

Nemesius*De natura hominis*

38.277	685n
--------	------

Nicephorus*Historia ecclesiastica*

10.36 [= SSR I B 41]	631n
----------------------	------

Numenius

fr. 1.12 SVF	687
fr. 24 Des Places	819n

Olympiodorus*In Platonis Alcibiadem*

21.1–14	749n
---------	------

Origenes*Contra Celsum*

1.64 [= SSR III A 2]	222n
3.66	699
4.68	685n

Panaetius

fr. 126 van Straaten [= SSR I H 17]	173n, 696n
-------------------------------------	------------

Papyri*Codex Vaticanus Graecus* 96

fol. 62v [= SSR VI A 5]	216n
-------------------------	------

<i>PHerc.</i> 155	257
<i>PHerc.</i> 339	257
<i>PHerc.</i> 1021	69n

PHib. 182

fr. A (col. 2)	789
fr. A (col. 2.2)	791
fr. B (col. 3)	793
fr. F (col. 9)	790
fr. H (col. 12.1–10)	790

POxy. 1608

col. i, fr. 1 [= SSR VI A 48]	319
col. i, fr. 4 [= SSR VI A 48]	205n

- col. i, fr. 7 [= *SSR* VI A 48]
205n
- POxy.* 2738 col. ii
39
- POxy.* 2890 verso [= *SSR* VI A 80]
286
- Parmenides**
28 B8 DK 173n
- Pausanias**
Graeciae descriptio
1.18.3 552
1.22.8 [= *SSR* I C 9]
637n
9.32.8 552
9.35.3 637n
- Persius**
Satura 1
44 738
56–62 738n
107–108 738
119–121 738n
Satura 3
52–54 741
66–72 740n
113–114 739
Satura 4
1 732n–733
1–22 728
3 732n
4–8 733
5 732n
8–9 732n
10–13 733
14 732n
16 733
17–18 733–734
19–22 733
20 732n
23 734
23–24 728, 733–734
24 734, 735
25 733
25–32 735
25–41 728
33 733
33–38 734
- 33–41 733
42 733, 734n
42–43 734
42–45 735
42–52 728
51–52 733
Satura 5
14–16 738
21–25 735
30–44 735
36–37 735
52–72 740
73–188 740
189–191 740
- Phaedo Eliensis**
SSR III A
2 228
3 222n
8 203n, 223n
11 229
12 228
16 230, 231
ed. Rossetti
6 633n, 643n, 651n
7 643n
8 287n
11 287n, 651n
21–22 287n
- Philo Alexandrinus**
De providentia
2.21 [= *SSR* I C 57] 644n
- Philo Larisseus**
fr. 2 Mette 667n
- Philodemus**
Ad contubernales (*PHerc* 1005) Angeli
col. 4.9–14 675n
De pietate (*PHerc* 1077, 1428) Gomperz
col. 7a.3–8 p. 72 [= *SSR* V A 179]
168n
De Stoicis (*PHerc* 155, 339) Croenert Gian-
nattasio Andria
col. xii 20 697
col. xiii 3–4 683
col. xviii 26 700n

Historia Academicorum (PHerc 164, 1021)

Dorandi

- col. 1.11–17 670n
- col. 3.38–39 392n
- col. 10.43–44 392n
- col. 22.37–23.6 392n
- col. 32–35 392n

Rhetorica (PHerc 832) Sudhaus

- col. 44.5–20 676n

Stoicorum historia (PHerc. 1018): Dorandi

- col. 61.2 696n

Philostratus*De vita Apollonii Tyanei*

- 1.35.1 [= SSR VI A 14] 215n, 250n
- 4.46 699

Imagines

- 2.5 [= SSR VI A 63] 208n

Vitae sophistarum

- 1.15.2 453n

Photius*Bibliotheca*

- 61 [= SSR VI A 33] 217n

Pindarus*Olympica*

- 6.98 549n
- 9.38 443

Fragmenta ed. Snell

- 157 71

Plato[*Alcibiades I*]

- 103a 651n
- 103a–b 130
- 103a–106a 397
- 103b 733
- 104a–b 732n
- 104e–106a 733
- 105a–b 732n
- 105d5–6 312
- 105e5 312
- 105e7 312
- 106a1 312
- 109b 732n

- 109d 657n
- 110b 439n
- 110c 732n
- 112b–114c 397
- 112d 732n
- 113a–b 417
- 113b 732n
- 113b8–11 732n
- 113b8–114c3 397
- 118b 734, 841n
- 118b7–8 732n
- 119a8 406
- 119a–124b 393
- 119b1–e3 320n
- 119c2–3 732n
- 120a9 406
- 120b2–3 406
- 121a 637n
- 121a–124b 406
- 122b1–2 229n
- 123c 241
- 123c–e 732n
- 123c8 732n
- 123d 486
- 124a7–c10 829n
- 124b9–10 312
- 124c5 312
- 124c8–9 312
- 128e10–129b3 829n
- 130e2–9 329n
- 133b7–11 829n
- 133c18 502
- 135c 732n
- 135e 732n

[*Alcibiades II*]

- 145c9–e5 320n
- 148b–c 147n

[*Amatores*]

- 132a1–4 412–413
- 132a4–b3 413–414
- 132b3–6 414
- 132b8–10 414–415
- 132c 414, 423n
- 132c1 413, 428n
- 132c1–3 415–416
- 132c4–11 416–417
- 132d1 416
- 132d1–3 417
- 132d3–7 418

132d4-5 423
132d7-11 418-419
133a1-7 419
133a-b 423n
133a8-b4 419
133b5-c3 420
133c 648
133c6 421
133c9 421
133c9-11 421
133d 426
133d1-e2 421-422
133e3-134a2 422
134a3-b4 422-423
134a6 428n
134b5-c7 423-424
134c 426
134d1 424
134d1-134e6 424
134d5-12 424
134e 429
134e3 424
134e7-135a7 425
135a7-9 425
135b1-7 425
135c 426
135c1 426
135d1-2 428
135d2-3 426
135d3-8 426
136a3-4 426
136a5-b2 426-427
136a7-8 428
136b10 426
136c 427
136d 427
136e9 427
136e9-137a10 427
136e10 427
137a1 427
137a2 427
137a2-3 417, 427
137a4 427
137a5 427
137a6 427
137a8 427
137a8-9 427
137a8-b2 427
137a10 427

137b1 427
137b1-6 427-428
137b2 428n
137b9-d2 428
137c-139a 428-429
137d2-10 428
137b3-4 428n
137d5-10 428
137d11-16 428
138a5 502
138a8-10 428
138b1-18 428
138b7-18 428
138e1-7 429
139a4 428n
139a4-5 429
139a6-8 429
139a7-8 430
Apologia Socratis
17a-c 144n
17b-18a 633n
17b9-d1 400
17c 646n
17c-d 371n
17c5-6 423
17c7-9 818n
17d 439, 642n, 805
18a-d 205
18b 53, 134n
18b1-4 807n
18b-c 70n
18b-d 371
18b-19d 68n
18c6-d1 51
18d 70
19b3 686n
19b4-c2 89
19c 52, 56, 70, 364n, 415
19c2-5 52
19c-d 351
19c-20d 371n
19c1-5 70
19c4-5 818n
19d 371n, 373n, 644n
19e1-20c3 89
19e3 89
19e4 89
20a3-4 41
20b8 89

Apologia Socratis (cont.)

20b9	89, 106n	29c-30c	381n
20c1-3	612n	29d-30c	780n
20c4-22e6	89	29d-31a	373n
20d	442	29d-31b	691n
20e-21a	439	29d2-30b4	818n
20e6-23c1	748	30a-b	371n, 380n
20e7-21a7	616	30a7	691
20d6	89	30b7-8	807n
20d8	89	30c	777
20e-23b	838n	30c-31a	372n
21a	51n, 245	30c6-d5	824n
21a3	32n	30c9-d6	747n
21a5-7	824n	30e	381, 381n
21b	633n, 648	30e-31a	371n
21c3-8	32	30e-31b	380
21d	633n	30e2-5	32
21d2-7	612n	30e7-31a2	739
22a	642n	31a5	807n
22a-c	377n	31b-c	644n
22d	637n	31c-32a	381, 381n
22d-23a	371n	31c4-32a3	308
22e	633n	31c7-d4	824n
22e-23a	371n	31d	642n, 648
23a1-2	723n	31d-32a	380
23a-c	648	32a	374
23a3-5	425	32d-33a	380n
23b	644n, 648	32d1-3	309
23b2-4	612n	33a	354, 633n
23c-e	340	33a-b	644n
23c8	723n	33b	371n
23d	279, 282, 371	33d-e	246
23d2-9	89	33e [= SSR VI A 5]	218n, 246
23e-24a	371n	33e-34a	246
23e5	807	33e2	249
25d-26a	151n	34a	247, 590n
25e6-26a7	720	34a3	238
26d	360	34c-d	439
26d1-e3	89	34e1-2	309
26d-e	794n	35d6-8	357n
27c10-e3	604n	36b	381, 381n
28a	371n	36b-c	371n
28a-e	372n	36c-d	380n
28d-e3	357n	36d-37a	439
28e	644n	37a	151n
29a1-b6	309	37b5-7	309
29b9-c7	807n	37d	381, 381n
29c-30a	282	37e-38a	32, 381
29c-30b	380	38a1-8	818n

38a5-6	589	166c7-d6	612n
38b	590n, 646n	167c8-168b11	329n
38b7	615n	168b-c	187n
38d-e	372n	172e	642n
38d3-e5	310	173c	41n
39c-d	135	173d	150n
39d5-8	357n	173d-e	391
38e-39b	309	173e-174a	106n
39e1-42d7	309	174a10	502
39e3	310	175b2-4	147n
40a-41d	463n	[<i>Clitopho</i>]	
40a4	310	407a-b	72n
40a6	310	408c	669n
40b1	305, 310	408d-409b	670n
40b6-c9	824n	<i>Cratylus</i>	
40b7	310	384c1	106n
40c1	310	385e4-386e5	85
40c3	305, 310	391b9-c9	85
40d	374	396a-410e	401
41b	443n	400a	648
41c-d	150n, 648	409a-b	361n
42a	648	411b	642n
42d5-6	310	413c	361n
42d6	305	425d5-6	304n
<i>Charmides</i>		429d	151n
153b	245	432d-e	151n
153b2	32n	433d	151n
153d	281	<i>Crito</i>	
154a-155a	550	43b-46a	737n
154a-155e	244	44b	246
154b	651n, 775n	44c2-9	824n
155d	68n, 775n	45b	646n
156a	55	45b-c	252
156a1-b1	517	45d	691n
156d4-6	824n	46b	168
157e-158a	550	46b-48b	328
159b3	113n	46b5-6	361n
159b5	517	47a-48a	325
159b5-160b9	329n	47a12-b3	326
160e4-5	517	47c8-11	328
161b	551	47e-48a	327
161c8-162a7	517	48a5-7	326
162a8-e5	517	49a4-c11	753
164a	581n	50a-54e	401
164b	551	52b	638n
164d3-165b4	502	53b4	361
164d4	612	53d-54a	762
165b4-c2	612n	[<i>Definitiones</i>]	
165d	551	414d	642n

- [*Definitiones*] (*cont.*)
 416a27–28 151n
- [*Epigrammata*] ed. Page
 14 86n
- [*Epistulae*]
 2.312a 249
 7.324b 352
 7.324b–325a 590n
 7.335 133
 7.344b5–6 92n
 7.325a 352
 13.363a6–7 708n
- Euthydemus*
 271c–272b 153n
 271d–272a 486
 272b–e 340n
 272c 40, 339n
 272c2–5 39
 272e1–4 305
 272e3–4 304n
 273d 339n, 581n
 275a 669n, 671n, 691n
 275c 339n, 416
 276b 339
 276d 339n
 276d–e 339n
 277d 339n
 277e 339n
 278c 342
 278e–282d 486, 666n, 669n
 278e3 695n
 279a 670n
 279d6–280a8 604
 282c 672
 282d 667n, 669n, 671n
 282d 669n, 672
 283b 338n
 284d–e 339n
 285c–d 339n
 286b8–c4 85
 288c 254, 338n
 288d 667n
 288d–e 667n, 669n, 671n
 288d–292e 666n, 669n
 288e–289a 671
 289c–290d 668n
 290c–d 668
 291b4–8 341
 291b–c 341
- 291b–292a 341n
 291b–292a 341n
 292b 341
 292d–293a 670
 292d–e 341
 292e–293a 341
 293a 338n, 642n
 294b 338n
 294d 657n
 295d 40, 339n
 295d1–2 97
 297b 342n
 297c–d 341
 298e 339n
 300b 339n
 300e 338n
 303b 339
 303d–e 338n
 304d6 114
 304e 338n
 306e 246
 304d–305e 112
 307b–c 670n
- Euthyphro*
 3b4 302
 3b5–6 301
 3d 644n
 3d6–9 818n
 5a7–c5 612n
 7a6–8a8 329n
 11b–d 637n
 14e–15a 648
 15c1–12 147n
 15c12 612n
 15e5–16a4 612n
 16a 633n
- Gorgias*
 447a 373n, 380
 447a–c 372
 449a 372
 451d 695n
 452a–b 695n
 455a–d 375n
 455e 380
 455e5–6 750
 456a 581n
 456c–457c 112
 456d4–5 112
 457d–e 713

458a	778	483a-484a	372
458a2-4	711n	483c3	112
458a3-4	723n	484b-c	372
459	375n	484c-e	336n
461b	642n	484c-486c	372n
461c6-8	719n	484c-486d	373
462a	778	484c-485e	282
462a1-5	99n	484d	372, 381
462a2	719n	484e	377n
462a3-5	713	484e-485e	374n
462b3-465e1	84n	485c-486c	372n
463-465	115	485c2	721n
463a6-8	112	485d2	721n
464a1-465e1	327	485d	372, 381
464b	718	485d-e	126
464b-c	380	485d6-e1	821n
464b-466a	669n	485e	377n
464c7-d1	722n	485e-486a	336n
465b-d	380	486a-b	372n
465d	361n	486a-d	372
466a-468e	357	487a-d	713
466c	642n	487b	372
467a	778	488b-499b	716
468e-469c	114	490c-491a	112
468e6-8	569	491a1-3	321
469b	778	491c-e	651n
469b3-5	754	491d	187n, 640n
469c1-2	114	491d-e	375n
470c9-e11	824n	491d-492b	372
470d7	695	491e	187n
471d-472c	713-714	491e-492c	716
470d5-e3	614	493a-c	401
471e-472b	380	494d	372, 628n, 643n
473a-476a	778	494e	372
473e	373, 373n, 380	495a5-9	716
474a-b	713	495e	423
474b2-5	610	499b	381n
475a	417n	499b4-c2	716
475d4-6	718n	500a-501c	669n
480b-d	718n	500c	373n, 670n
480c8	721n	500c-d	373n
480c8-d3	720	502b-d	377n
481d	651n	502d-e	375n
481d-482c	713	502d-504a	780n
481d-e	372n	502e-503a	375n
482b	642n	502e-503c	380
482b4-6	713n	503a	381n
482c-486d	716	503a7-9	724n
482e	372	503c	380

Gorgias (cont.)

504c1-3	110
504d1-3	113n
504d-e	375
505a-c	651n
506e-507c	110
505b7	187n
505c-d	381n
505c-e	739n
505d4-7	716
506b	336n, 373n, 375
506b-d	381n
507a	381n
507a-b	375
507c-509c	381n
507d-508a	373n
507e5	716
508a	648
508a2	113n
508a7	112
509a4-6	612n
510a	381n
510a-511b	373n
510b-511a	375n
512d-513e	373n
513a-b	372n
513b-c	375n
513d	187n
515a-b	739n
515b-c	381n
515b-519d	780n
516b-d	381n
516b-e	380
517a-c	375n
517b-c	375n
517b-c	381n
518a-b	372n
518e-519a	372n, 375n
519a	375n, 381n
519c5-7	106n
519d	381n
520a-522e	372n
520a-b	375n
520b	373n
521b	375n
521b-522e	372n, 381n
521d-e	375
521d-522a	375n, 381n
521d-522e	373n

521d7	718
521e	381n
521e-522a	777
522c	381n
522d-e	373
522e	381n
523a-527a	401
524b-526e	372n
524c5	721n
525d-e	381
525e	374
525e-526a	372n
526a-b	381n
526a-b	375n
526b	375n
526c	374
526c-e	372n
526d	375n
527d	375n, 381n
527c-e	381n
527d	375n
527d-e	382

[Hipparchus]

225c	402
225d5-226d1	402
226e4	402
227b	403
227d4	402
228a6-7	402
228a8-10	402
228b-229d	403
229c-d	404
229e1-231a3	402

Hippias Major

282d3-e6	85
286c	420
286c8-e2	612n
287e	642n
298b	642n
300c-d	644n
300e-302b	361n
304d4-e5	612n

Hippias Minor

364a	145n
364c-365c	144
368b	646n
368d-e	36n
369b-371e	144
374c7	387n

Ion

534a 207n

Laches

180c–181c 737n
 181b 54, 55
 184d–185a 325
 184d8–e4 326
 184e8–9 326
 185b–e 326
 186b8–c5 612n
 186c 644n
 186d8–e3 612n
 188a 633n
 188b 226n
 188d3–6 713n
 189a–d 39n
 189e–190e 326
 190c1–2 501
 192b9–193d8 329n
 194d–e 110
 195e–196a 106n
 197e–198b 151n
 199c–e 110
 199e11 147n
 200e2–5 612n
 200e5 147n

Leges

1.630d 556n
 1.631b 695
 1.633 556n
 1.641e4–7 147n
 1.644d–645b 316n
 1.647e 556n
 1.649a 556n
 2.652a–653a 556
 2.653d 557
 2.654a 557
 2.661a–d 695
 2.666b 556n
 2.674b 557
 3.690c5–8 602
 3.691c–d 372n
 3.694c–695c 240
 4.706–707 115
 4.709e–710a 651n
 6.757e3–758a2 602
 6.759b7–c1 602
 6.783a 192n
 7.816d–e 31, 345

7.816d–817d 31
 7.817b 558
 9.856d6–e1 602
 9.863b–d 841n
 10.897c 691n
 11.935d–936b 31
 12.946b2–4 602

Lysis

203a 413n
 203a–b 775n
 204a 413
 204a1 413
 204b5–205a8 32n
 204b8–c2 748n
 206a 68n
 207d–e 130
 210e3–6 719n
 211b8 413
 211c3 718n
 211d–e 651n
 211e 495, 642n
 212a4–7 612n
 214e–215c 467n
 217e–222a 841n
 218e 695n
 223a 422
 223a2–7 32n
 223b4–8 612n
 223b7–8 147n
 235d3–6 603
 280b 39n

Menexenus

235e [= SSR VI A 66]
 40, 775n
 236a–d 779n
 244e 115
 247e6 695
 249d–e 779n

Meno

70a 420
 70a1–2 420
 70a–80b 739n
 71a1–7 612n
 71b3–4 420
 73b3–c5 612
 75c8–d7 99
 78a6–b2 610
 78d–79c 110
 79e–80b 151n

Meno (cont.)

80d1-4	612n
87d2-4	605
87d2-8	605
88c-89a	110
89a3-4	605
89a6-b9	111
89e-95a	53n
90b-95a	657n
91d2-92a2	85
94e-95a	657n
97d-e	637n
98a2-3	113
98d1-5	111

[*Minos*]

319c-e	403
319e1-2	404n
319c5	404n
319d2	408, 409
320a	404
320b3	404n

Parmenides

126a	352n
------	------

Phaedo

58c	183n
59b [= SSR VI A 5 = V A 20]	183n, 184, 226n, 238, 590n
59b-c [= SSR I H 1]	246, 250
59b8 [= SSR VI A 5 = V A 20]	163n, 249
59b10 [= SSR VI A 5 = V A 20]	615n
59c [= SSR II A 4 = IV A 14]	252, 261, 263
59c2-3 [= SSR I H 1]	162n
59d	247
60a-b	246
60a2-6	615
60d	648
60d-61b	3n
61d	252
62a	581n
62b2-8	824n
62b2-c8	830n
63a1	32n
63b	78n
64a-69e	463n

66d-68a	838n
70b	78n
70b-c	67
70c10-12	51
77a8-9	32n
77d5-78b7	830n
80a	648
82c	640n
84e-85b	648
86b-c	627n
88d	627n
89b	223, 224, 224n, 251, 414
89d1-90c7	99
92b-93c	627n
94e	657
95b	439n
95e-102a	13, 349
96a-99c	359, 360, 365
96a-100b	68n
96d1-5	360n
96d6	355
96d8	355
96e-100a	265
96e6-7	355
97b-98b	648
97b3-6	355
97b3-7	359
97b6-7	355
97b8-98c2	754
97b8-99c6	349, 360
97c3-4	357
97c5-6	357
97c6-d1	356
98b7	349, 355
98b7-c1	357
98e1-5	356
98e	642n
99b1	356
99b4-c2	356
99b6-8	360n
99c	348, 364
99c-102a	348, 359
99c2-6	357
99c6	358
99c6-8	364
99c9-d1	350
99d	351
99d-e	78
99d1-6	359

99d4-102a1	350
100d2-9	355
101c	439n
101c9-d1	355
107d-115a	364
107d5	364
115a	336n
116b	649
117d	247
118a	762
118a6-7	414
<i>Phaedrus</i>	
228b	642n
229	762n
229e6	612
230a	181n
230b	775n
234d	775n
235a3-6	32n
237a	762
237b-241d	401
241e	401
242b	252
242b4-d2	306
242b5	302n
242b8	306n
242b8-c3	767n
242b9	304n
242c	642, 762
242c1-3	307
242c3-7	307
244a-257b	401
245c-246a	648
256c	413
257a	651n
259e4-260a4	142n
260d	439n
261a7	65n
264e3	657n
265d-266b	847
267a7-b1	113n
267b10-c7	85
269e-270a	361n
270a	362n
274b-275c	3n
274b6-277a5	99
274c-275b	36n
275e	342n
276b1-8	390n

276d1-8	390n
276e-277a	338n
278c	338n
278e-279a	113
278e-279b	133
279a	113n
279a3-b3	92n
279a4	114
279a5-7	115
279a9	114

Philebus

17b	642n
19c	356
27b	648
29a-30e	648
47b-50b	31
47d5-50e2	86n
48a	339n
48b-50b	337n
48e1-2	32
48e4	32
48e9-10	32
49a1-2	32
65c	41n

Politicus

266e	257
286a5	712
293d	50n
302b	841n
306e-307e	113n
308e-310d	113n

Protagoras

309a-b	651n
309b	130
311d1-2	39
313c4-314b4	90
314c7-d5	32n, 41
314e-316a	337n
314e3-316a5	90
315b8-d1	32n
315c	252
315e	230e
316c5-317c5	92
316d-317a	111n
316d3-e4	46
317b-c	58
317d	404
318e-319a	111n
319a8-320c1	90, 93

Protagoras (cont.)

319b5-d7	321n, 330
319e-320c	380n
320c8-328d2	85
323c-328a	111
327c-d	111
328d8-329b5	90
328e5-329b5	98
329-334	110
329c	168n
329c-e	110
329d1	110
331a6-333b6	90
331b4	110
332a4-333b4	502
333b6	110
333d-e	739n
334a-c	491
334c-338c	144n
334c7-336b3	92
334c7-d5	90
334c9	144n
334d2	145n
334d7-9	144
334d7-335a3	145
335a2	145, 145n
335a4	145
335b2	145n
335b3-c2	90
335d3	145n
335d6-336b3	90
336a6-7	145
336b1-3	95
336c1	145, 712
336d5	145
337b1-b3	145
338a	145
338a6-7	146
338e-339a	404
339e-342a	406
338e6-347a5	90
342a-347a	404
342a-348a	407
342a6-347a5	90
342e	147n
343b5	147n
347b7-348a9	90
347c-e	404
349-361	110

349b1-3	110
349e1-351e3	90
350d5	110
352c1-2	20, 609
354a-c	106n
354e3-356c3	90
356a-357b	106n
356d5	174n
357b5-358a4	90
358a-c	651n
360c2-d5	605
360d-e	110
360e	739n
360e6-8	90
360e6-362a4	90
361a1-3	501
361a3-e6	85
361b1-2	110
361b-c	111
361d7-e5	100

Respublica

1.327a	775n
1.329c	192
1.335b2-336a10	753
1.336b5-6	32n
1.337e4-5	612n
1.338e-339a	31
1.343a2-8	423n
1.348e	581n
1.350e	340n
1.351c8-10	115
1.352d	670n
1.357c	695n
1.377a4	824n
2.357a	241
2.377a-b	70n
2.377e-383c	648
2.379-383a	304n
3.389d-e	187n
3.392b	115
3.394b-395b	337n
3.394d-397d	337n
3.395e-396a	31
3.399e	642n
3.400b-c	39n
3.403a	192
3.409b	39n
3.416b-d	113

- 4.422e-423b 472
 4.430e 187n, 188n
 4.430e-431b 651n
 4.430e12-431a1 187n
 4.439e-440a 609
 5.449b 439n
 5.468b 775n
 5.472a 344n
 5.473b 700
 5.473c-474a 382n
 6.485a-d 382n
 6.487c-d 382n
 6.488a-489a 382n
 6.488a2-489a2 86n
 6.488a7-489a6 321n, 330
 6.488e 67
 6.488e3-489a2 33n
 6.489d-495c 372n
 6.492a-b 373n
 6.492a-c 372n
 6.494c-d 372n
 6.495a-b 372n
 6.495c-d 153n
 6.495c3-4 114
 6.496c-497c 382n
 6.496c3-e2 309n
 6.496c4 305
 6.496c4-5 301
 6.500b4-5 114
 6.505a 341n
 6.510-511d 845
 6.511b-d 341n
 6.511b6 847
 7.514a-521c 672
 7.515c 672n
 7.521d-533d 501
 7.552c 50n
 7.522d1-8 109n
 7.532b 341n
 7.533a 633n
 7.533c 129n
 7.534c1 847
 8.548d 241
 8.549c-e 649n
 8.550c11-12 115
 8.553a2 115
 8.556a 691n
 8.557a5 602
 8.560b-c 188
 8.567d 642n
 9.584e-585a 581n
 9.592a 642n
 10.597b-599b 115
 10.600c3-e2 85
 10.606c 31, 44, 337n
Sophista
 217c1-d3 98
 221d1-236d4 84n
 229b7-230e3 721n
 229c1-10 841n
 229e1-231b8 84
 230d1-2 722n
 232b1-233a7 85
 248a-249c 264
 249c-d 264
 251b 39n
 263e-264a 120
 264c4-268d5 84n
Symposium
 172a1 392
 172c 736n
 172c-173b 247
 173b 248
 173b2 32n
 173d 247
 174a2 442n
 175e 404n
 176c 800n
 177d 68n, 651n
 177d7-8 748n
 180c-d 404n
 185a4 402
 185c-e 760
 185c3-6 32n
 185e-186a 404n
 193e 651n
 194a 404n
 195a 404n
 195a-c 404
 197e7 404n
 198b-212c 775n
 198d 439n, 651n
 199a-b 401
 199c-201c 406
 201d 775n
 201e-204a 404

Symposium (cont.)

203b-e	401
203c-e	775n
204a	841n
209e	633n
210a-212b	401
211d	736n
211d2	210n
211e1	210n
211e3	210n
212b	651n
212b6-7	748n
212c	760
212d	439n
212d-222b	733n
212e-222c	496
215a-b	803
215a-217c	737
215a-222b	775n
215a4-6	73
215a4-b3	824n
215a-216d	69n
215b	337, 636n, 637n
215e	775n
215e-216c	204n
215e2-3	719
216a	734
216b2-3	722
216c-221b	640n
216d	633n, 644
216d-217a	651n
217d3-219d2	750
218a7-b4	54
219a	203
219b-d	196n, 204
219c	651n
219e-220e	54, 55n
220a	196n
220c	79
220c-d	644n
220c8-d5	79
220e	130
220e7-221b6	73
221b	67
221b1-4	52, 54
221c-d	628n, 643n
221e	69
221e4-222a3	321
222a-b	244

222d	344n
<i>Theaetetus</i>	
142a-143c	263
142c3-d3	92n
143c-144d	340
143e	229n, 337n
147d2	606n
150b6-151d6	307
150c7	307
150c7-8	755
150d-e	736n
150d4	307
150d8	307
151a4	304n, 306n
151a5-b1	307
151d7-187a6	85
152d	439n
155d	580
160a9	95
160e6-165e4	96n
161c2-d2	94
161d	649n
161d2-e3	94
161e	78n
162d3-4	94
162d4-163a1	94
162e8-163a1	95n
163b1-164c6	94
164c8-d2	94
164e2-7	94
165d1-e4	94
166a2-168c2	96
166a2-c9	96
166c1-2	97
166c9	96n
166d1	96n
166d4-167d4	96
167d5-168c2	96
167e	691n
170e7	95
172-177	115
172d-175e	336n
172c4-5	115
172c8-9	115
173c6	686n
173d9-10	32n
175c-d	78
175d	78n
177d	495

178e3–6	95n
179b1	95
188a9	95
189e	120
201b–c	153n
201d	495
[<i>Theages</i>]	
123b	495
123e12–15	320n
122d6–127a10	313
125e	657n
127b3–4	313
127e–128a	407
128b1–4	748n
128b	68n, 775n
128d	407
128d–e	642n
128d2	301n
128d3–e5	302n
128d2–7	312
128d4	301n
128d8–129d8	312
128e5	301n
129b–c	642n
129b6	301n, 302n
129c2	302n
129d3–4	312
129a7–c8	313
129e1–3	312
129e3–4	312
129e3–132e	313
129e7	312
130c1–6	314
130d3–e4	313
131a1–7	314
131a5	301n
<i>Timaeus</i>	
24c–25d	115
29a	648
29d	648

Plato comicus

Σοφισταί

fr. 145 <i>PCG</i>	46
fr. 149 <i>PCG</i>	46
fr. 207 <i>PCG</i>	39n, 47, 57

Plinius Gaius Secundus*Naturalis historia*

34.79	552n
36.32	637n, 792n

Plotinus*Enneades*

6.4 [22]	16.28–30
	845

Plutarchus*Adversus Colotem*

1108b [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	747n
1114c	751
1116e–1117c [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	755
1116e [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	748
1117a [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	756
1117d–1118b [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	755
1117d [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	754
1117d–e [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	820n
1117e [= <i>SSR I C 502</i>]	746
1118b–1119c	755
1118c [= <i>SSR I B 11 = I C 502</i>]	612
1118d	748
1124d–e	747n
1126b [= <i>SSR I C 141</i>]	747

Amatorius

762d	747n
------	------

An seni sit gerenda respublica

796d–e	757, 820n
--------	-----------

An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat

499b	747
------	-----

Apophthegmata Alexandri

181–182	255n
---------	------

Coniugalia praecepta

141d	752
------	-----

[Consolatio ad Apollonium]

106b	752
------	-----

De adulatore et amico

72a 754

De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute

328a [= SSR I C 417]

756

328b-c [= SSR I C 28]

747

328d [= SSR I C 126]

747n

329a-b 700

333a 747, 750

De adulatione et amico

67c-e 250n

De amore prolis

494-495 690n

De audiendis poetis

16c 756

21e 751

45f 747

De capienda ex inimicis utilitate

90e 746

De cohibenda ira

455a-b 747n

458c 747n

461d 746, 751

462c 164n

462d [= SSR VI a 24]

218n

De communibus notitiis contra Stoicos

1065b-c 692, 745

1065c 747n

De cupiditate divitiarum

527b 746n

527e 746n

De curiositate

516c [= SSR IV A 2 = VI A 90-91]

180, 213n, 280, 753,

820n

521e 753

De defectu oraculorum

435f 754

De E apud Delphos

392a 829n

De exilio

600f-601a 752

607f 747

De fraterno amore

486e [= SSR I C 171]

752

489d [= SSR II A 15]

163n

De garrulitate

512b [= SSR I C 432]

747n

512f [= SSR I C 161]

747n

513c [= SSR I C 161]

753

De genio Socratis

579b-582e 315

580b-c [= SSR I C 411]

747, 756

580b [= SSR I C 411]

747

580c [= SSR I C 411]

315n

580c-f [= SSR I C 411]

749

580d [= SSR I C 411]

749

580f-581a [= SSR I C 411]

749

581a [= SSR I C 411]

745

581c-d [= SSR I C 411]

746n, 747

581c [= SSR I C 411]

756

581d [= SSR I C 411]

315n

581d-e [= SSR I C 411]

746

581f-582a [= SSR I C 411]

316n

581f-582c [= SSR I C 411]

749

578a 316n

585e 316n

586f 316n

588b-c [= SSR I C 412]

315

588c [= SSR I C 412]

315

588c-589f [= SSR I C 412]

750

588d [= SSR I C 412]

315

588e [= SSR I C 412]	315, 315n	128d-e	549n
588e-589d [= SSR I C 412]		<i>De virtute morali</i>	
	315	440e [= SSR III F 17]	
589f-592f	750		119
592f	749	452c-d	260
593a-594a	750	<i>Laconica apophthegmata</i>	
594e	316n	218a	753
590a-594a	316	<i>Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum</i>	
<i>De Herodoti malignitate</i>		776b-c	747
856c-d	631, 631n, 755	776c-d	753
<i>De invidia et odio</i>		<i>Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum</i>	
537f-538a	747n	1086e-f	756
<i>De Iside et Osiride</i>		1093c	632n
370-371	387n	[<i>Orationes</i>]	
<i>De latenter vivendo</i>		837d-838e	106n
1128f	749, 756	<i>Quaestiones convivales</i>	
[<i>De liberis educandis</i>]		661f	753
7d	667n	711b-c	390n
<i>De profectibus in virtute</i>		717b [= SSR I C 5]	
84b-85b	747n		746
84d	747		751
84f	746n	<i>Quaestiones Platonicae</i>	
<i>De Pythiae oraculis</i>		999c	754
406a	748	999d-f	755
406b-f	782n	999e-f	756
<i>De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando</i>		999e	756, 820n
545b-c	438n	1000a-c	755
<i>De sera numinis vindicta</i>		1000c-d	755
550f-551a	752	1000d-e	756
<i>De sollertia animalium</i>		1000e	756
962b	745	<i>Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata</i>	
<i>De Stoicorum repugnantiis</i>		172d	753
1033a-b	747n	<i>Vita Aemilii Pauli</i>	
1034e	693	275e	756
1035c	692	<i>Vita Agis</i>	
1040d	695	804a	754
1045f-1046a	693, 756	<i>Vita Alcibiadis</i>	
1046a-b	693	191f [= SSR I C 24]	
1051c-d	745		747n
1051c	747n	193a-f	656n
<i>De tranquillitate animi</i>		193a-196e	747
466e [= SSR V B 72 = V H 46]		193b-c	756
	747	193c [= SSR VI A 54]	
470f [= SSR I C 162]			207n, 756
	752	194e-195a [= SSR I C 38]	
475d-e	747n		746
<i>De tuenda sanitate praecepta</i>		202c	756
124d-e	753		

Vita Alexandri Magni

688f 255n
701d 746

Vita Aristidis

319c 646n, 746n
334b–d [= SSR VI A 75]
212n
335b–e 632n, 653
335c–d 745, 746, 756

Vita Dionis

965e [= SSR IV A 27]
261n, 263

Vita Lycurgi

56e–57a 556n
59a 751

Vita Lysandri

441e 552n

Vita Marci Catonis

345a 756
347e–348e 649n
347f 654n, 745
350a–b [= SSR I C 511]
746

Vita Niciae

532b 756
538f [= SSR I C 124]
58n, 747

Vita Periclis

153e–f 57
153e–154a 39n
153f–154a 57
160a [SSR = I C 14]
750
165a–f 651n
165b [= SSR VI A 64]
208n
169d–170a 57
172b 57

Vita Phocionis

758c 754
758d 754
759e 754

Vitae decem oratorum

832b–834b 450n
832c 756
833c 453n

Fragmenta ed. Sandbach

40 754
67 752

140 746
171 746n
189 747n
190 747n

Pollux*Onomasticon*

7.202 45
10.171 40n

Porphyrius*Ad Marcellam*

31 674n

Scholia ad Odysseam

α1 [= SSR V A 187]

143

Vita Plotini

8 393n

Fragmenta ed. Smith

210 [= SSR I B 41]
625n, 631n
211 641
212 626n, 630n, 635
214 635
215 626n, 638, 652n
216 626n, 638
217 626n, 631n, 632, 645

Posidonius

ed. Edelstein Kidd

29 [= SSR V A 137 = V B 512]
697
31 697
142–146 696
150a 697
152 697
159 697

Priscianus*Institutiones grammaticae*

18.189 [= SSR VI A 88]
118n

Proclus*De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad**Theodorum mechanicum*

16–20 844n
17 844
18 845

27	844	140.22	848
27-32	844n	145.27	843n
28	845	146.1-5	849
28-29	845	152.1-3	851
29	845	174.1-5	842n
30	845, 849	174.1-10	842n
31	846	174.18	851
48.1-10	838n	176.26-30	841n
48.10-16	838n	177.27-178.4	842n
51	838, 840n	187.10-189.3	841n
51.3-5 [= SSR I C 452]		188.15-20	841
634n		189.2-3	841n
<i>Elementa theologiae</i>		189.10-190.8	840n
42-43	841n	189.15-25	841
186	847n	190.8-15	841
194-195	844n	190.10	842n
197	844n	200.15-201.5	840n
211	849	201.5-8	840
<i>In Platonis Alcibiadem</i>		231.3-20	852
17.1-5	842n	236.14-19	840n
18.13-19.10	839n	236.20-23	841
19.15-30	843n	237.28	843n
21.1-10	843	242.10	841n
22.10	846	242.25	841
22.15-23.8	846	246.25-247.15	845
23.1-4	846	253.17	852
23.15-18	836n	278.15-279.1	842n
24.10	847n	310.8-19	851
24.10-15	837n	313.2-6	852
27.20-29.5	851	<i>In Platonis Cratylum</i>	
28.10-29.5	851	6.1	847n
43.7-10	848	8.17-20	843n
60.1-92.3	749n	9.10-15	852
62.10	852	13.1	840n
78.7-83.20	749n	25.3-5	842n
79.20-24	843n	28.20-26	849
85.10	842	29.3	844n
93.7-8	847n	37 [= SSR V A 55]	
95.25-97.3	847n		149n, 175n
100.29	847n	71.8-13	852
115.21-116.1	842n	75.25-76.3	852
119.10-120.5	843n	<i>In Platonis Parmenidem</i>	
123.27-30	843n	628	848
126.18	843n	656.8-14	851
127.3	852	654.2-15	851
130.1-2	843n	655.1-10	851
132.20-24	852	982.28	844n
132.25	843n	987.8-16	847
133.8-13	853	987.16-24	848

In Platonis Parmenidem (cont.)

989.15–18	851
1023.20–23	839n

In Platonis Timaeum

9.17–24	848
58.1–5	848
62.8–20	839n
62.10	848
62.21–25	850–851
65.22–28	839n, 846n

Protagoras

80 DK

A1	87
A4	87
A8	85
A9	85
A13	85
A19	85
A21	87
A21a	85
A24	85
A26	85
A27	88
A28	88
B1	85, 88
B4	88, 95
B7	95
B8	85
C1	85
C2	87
C4	87

Quintilianus*Institutio oratoria*

2.16.16	715
3.1.11	452n
3.4.11	114n
5.11.27–29 [= SSR VI A 70]	
	209n
5.14.27–29	714
9.2.46 [= SSR I C 440]	
	634n

Scholia*In Aelium Aristidem*

117.18	53n
--------	-----

In Aristophanis Acharnenses

67	53n, 54n
----	----------

1150	54n
------	-----

In Aristophanis Aves

1279	54n
------	-----

In Aristophanis Nubes

31	53n, 54n
95	35
96 [= SSR I A 22]	
	35
109	45
112b	87
144c	50n
167a	34
223d	71
773	637n

In Aristophanis Ranas

153	54n
404	54n

In Aristophanis Thesmophoriazousas

914	45
-----	----

In Aristophanis Vespas

67	53n
1308	38n

In Homeri Iliadem

13.353	45
--------	----

In Platonis Apologiam

18b [= SSR I B 52]	
	656
28e	45

Seneca Lucius Annaeus*Epistulae morales ad Lucilium*

6.5	697
6.5–6	736n
13.14	698
24.4	698
24.6	698
33.4	697
64.10	698
67.7	698
71.7	698
94.41 [= SSR III A 12]	
	228
104.21	698
104.29	698
121.5	691n

De beneficiis

5.4.1–5.6.7	698
5.6.1 [= SSR V B 41]	
	699

- 5.6.2–7 699
 5.6.3 699
 5.6.4–5 699
 5.6.7 699
 7.24.1–2 [= SSR I C 56] 644n
 7.8.2 698
De constantia sapientis
 18.6 [= SSR I C 68 = V A 2] 784n
De ira
 1.5.13 642n
 2.7.1 [= SSR I C 65] 642n
 3.13.3 [= SSR I C 69] 642n
De providentia
 3.4 698
De tranquillitate animi
 5.1–3 698
 7.3 697
De vita beata
 24.4 698
Naturales quaestiones
 1.12.1 699
 7.1.2 699

Sextus Empiricus*Adversus mathematicos*

- 7.2 181n
 7.151–152 687
 9.56 58n
 11.192 690

Simon

- SSR IV A 224 231, 651n

Simplicius*In Aristotelis Categorias*

- 208.28–32 [= SSR V A 149] 148n, 254n

In Aristotelis Physicam

- 23.22 56
 27.23–24 [= SSR I C 12] 638n

Socrates historicus*Historia ecclesiastica*

- 3.23 [= SSR I B 41] 625

Sophocles*Antigone*

- 940–943 342n

Ἰχνευταί

- fr. 314.45–544 *TGF* 343n

Philoctetes

- 936–940 343n
 986–988 343n

Sophron

- fr. 2A Hordern 126

Speusippus*Epistula ad Philippum regem*

- 2.1 117

Sphaerus

- 1.622–623 *SVF* 694
 1.629–630 *SVF* 694

Stobaeus*Eclogae*

- 1.17.3 702n
 1.184.8 702n
 2.8.26 [= SSR VI A 95] 118n
 2.31.23 [= SSR VI A 77] 118n, 120, 213n
 2.31.98 [= SSR I C 19] 752
 2.55.11 695n
 2.55.22 695n
 2.57.18 695n
 2.69.11 692n
 2.111.18 687

Florilegium

- 3.1172 752
 3.6.63 [= SSR II A 11] 165n
 3.13.45 257
 3.17.16 [= SSR I C 61] 646n

Florilegium (cont.)

- 3.36.21 [= SSR V B 55]
147n
3.36.22 [= SSR V A 30]
256
3.40.8 [= SSR II O 31 = IV A 103]
119
4.27.15 [= SSR II A 15]
164n
4.29.22 746
4.29.25 [= SSR I B 8]
616

Strabo*Geographica*

- 1.2.6 782n
9.1.8 [= SSR II A 29]
162n

Suda

- s.v. Ἀισχίνης [= SSR III A 14 = IV A 25 = VI A 25]
215n
s.v. Ἀντισθένης [= SSR V A 1 = V A 11 = V A 23 = V A 37 = V A 41 = V A 205]
176n
s.v. Ἀριστόξενος
626n
s.v. Εὐκλείδης [= SSR II A 1 = II A 10 = II A 22 = II H 1]
161n, 164n
s.v. Σωκράτης [= SSR I D 1–3 = I H 7 = II A 1 = II I 2 = II S 2 = IV H 2]
625n, 637n, 638, 788
s.v. Τροχιλέας [= SSR I C 59]
649n
s.v. Φαίδων [= SSR III A 8 = III A 8]
222n, 223n

Synesius*Encomium calvitatis*

- 81a [= SSR I B 47]
640

Syriani, Sopatri et Marcellini Scholia ad Hermogenis Status

- 4.159 651n

Syrianus*In Aristotelis Metaphysicam*

- 105.1–5 836n

Tacitus*Annales*

- 2.71 832n

Teleclides

- fr. 39–40 PCG [= SSR I A 1]
32n
fr. 71 PCG 255n

Teles

- fr. 2, 12.8–13.9 Hense [= SSR V B 222]
752

Themistius*Orationes*

- 1.4d 820n
1.8a–9b 820n
2.27a 817
2.27b–c [= SSR II F 31]
3n
2.30c [= SSR II F 31]
821n
2.32d 819n
6.79a 819n
10.32b–c 820n
11.146c–147b 820n
13.298a 817n
17 817
17.215b 817n
18 817
18.223d 817
20.237d 823n
20.239a–c 822
20.239c–d 817n
21.256a 819
21.259b [= SSR I C 451]
634n
22.265b 823n
23 817, 685
23.284b 821n
23.295b–296b 817n
24.300d–301a 822n
24.301d 823
25.188d 819n
26 817
26.312d 817
26.313d 820
26.313d–314a 820
26.315c 823

- 26.317d–318c [= SSR I C 467]
818
26.324b–325a 820
27.332c 823n
28.341b–d 823n
28.341d 821
28.342c 821
29.346b 817n
32.356b 817n
34 817
34.2 [SSR VI A 38]
218n
34.5 [= SSR IV A 166 = VI A 36]
232
34.10 817n
34.12 821n
34.14 826n
Περὶ ἀρετῆς
p. 43 Mach 12–13 [= SSR V A 96]
109

Theodoretus*Graecarum affectionum curatio*

- 1.17 [= SSR I C 118]
651n
1.26–28 [= SSR I C 10]
626n, 631n, 632, 635
1.26–29 [= SSR I C 10]
625
1.28–29 [= SSR I C 10]
633n, 635
1.30–31 [= SSR I C 10]
633n
2.24 [= SSR VI A 15]
241n
4.2 [= SSR I C 51]
626n, 638
12.59 [= SSR I B 44]
632n
12.61 [= SSR I B 45]
632n
12.61–63 [= SSR I B 45]
641
12.63–65 [= SSR I B 45]
625, 650
12.65 [= SSR I B 45]
784n
12.65–67 626n, 638

- 12.68 [= SSR I C 424]
626n, 645

Theon*Progymnasmata*

- 3 [= SSR III A 11]
229
5 [= SSR V B 388]
260

Theophrastus*Characteres*

- 23 41n
27 39n

Opiniones physicae

- 360a.1–8 Diels 626n
360b.1–11 Diels 626n
478–480 Diels 638n

Thucydides*Historiae*

- 1.25.4 76
1.70.8 379n
1.70.8–9 378
1.122.3 379n
1.124.3 379n
2.25 222
2.40.1 274
2.40.1–2 378
2.40.2 379n
2.63.2 379n
2.63.2–3 379n
2.63.2–64.4 378
2.64.4 379n
2.65.7 379n
3.37.2 379n
5.116 223
6.18.2 379
6.18.6 379
6.18.6–7 379, 379n
6.85.1 379n
8.68.1–2 452

Valerius Maximus*Factorum et dictorum memorabilium*

- 3.4 ext. 1 [= SSR I C 468]
636n, 637n
7.2 ext. 2 752

Victorinus Gaius Marius*Commenta in Ciceronis rhetorica*

1.31, 240.20–241.15 [= SSR VI A 70]
209n

Xenocrates

fr. 133–148 Isnardi Parente
167n

Xenophon*Agésilas*

5.1–6 588
5.7 588
8.2 438
8.3 438
9.3 527n
10 525n
11 525n

Anabasis

1.3.13 442n
1.9.18–19 524n
2.1.13 290
2.5.28 241
2.6.21–29 241
3.1.4–7 [= SSR I C 97]
590
3.2.9 525
5.3.4 590
5.3.10 442n
5.6.11 442n
6.3.16 438n
7.7.57 590

Apologia Socratis

1–2 436n
1–4 537
1.2 509
1.2–3 534
1.4 442n
1.7 442n
1.9 442n
2 446
2–3 535
3 371, 526, 531, 534
4 301, 443n, 452
4.62 448
5 301, 371
6–7 306
7 444
9 444

10–26

11

12

12–13

13

13–15

14

16

16–17

17

18

19

19–21

19–23

20

20–21

21

22

23

25

26

28

29–31

31

32

34

Cynegeticus

1.1–18

1.5

1.18

2.1–11.4

12.1–9

12.6

12.10

12.10–22

12.14

13

13.1–9

13.6–9

13.7

13.13

13.17

Cyropaedia

1.1.1

1.1.2

1.1.3

1.1.3–4

806

444, 581n

301, 302

302n, 303n, 305, 306n,
642n

302, 303, 455n

440

245, 245n, 301, 303n, 442,
455

448, 455, 644n

495

646n

525, 536n

527

371, 604n

371

516n

523, 587n

581n

807

443n, 444

444, 651n

371

32n, 247

657n

526

443, 444

371, 449

585

585n

584, 585n

585

585

523n

523n, 526n

586

587n

586

119n

292

586, 592

523n

584

581

303, 581

305

306n

1.1.3-5 581
1.1.4 302, 303, 303n
1.1.4-9 305
1.1.6 581
1.2.1 467, 525n
1.2.7 469
1.2.8 526n
1.2.10 524n, 526n
1.2.60 644n
1.3.10 551n
1.4.2 470
1.4.2-7 648
1.5.6 644n
1.5.7 120
1.5.9 120, 474n
1.5.12 525n
1.6 583
1.6.3-5 644n
1.6.7 524n
1.6.8 527n
1.6.11 474n
1.6.11-13 644n
1.6.21 574
1.6.23 523n
1.6.25 473
1.6.46 303n
2.1.4 187
2.1.11 186, 474
2.1.12-18 186
2.1.13 196
2.1.19 186
2.1.21 185n
2.1.23-25 185n
2.1.31 186
2.9.1-8 246
3.1-18 648
3.1.14 450n
3.1.14-31 583n
3.1.38-40 583n
4.4.2-3 438n
6.1.41 291
6.2.4 527n
7.1.17 438
7.5.76 523n
7.5.86 526n
8.1-2 465
8.1.30-32 525n
8.1.36 524n
8.1.39 524n, 525n, 526n

8.3.49 464
8.4.11 478
8.6.11 524n
8.6.12 525n
8.6.13 526n
8.7.17 832n
8.8 489, 539n
8.8.10 551n
8.8.15-18 119n

De equitum magistro

1.1 525n
1.3-4 488
1.5 488
1.11 593
1.13-16 488
1.21 488
1.22-23 525n
1.23 488
1.24 488
1.25 488
6.4-6 488
8.4 488
8.22 488
9.2 523n

De vectigalibus

1.1-2 581
4.39 585
5.3-4 291
6.2 584
6.2-3 523n

Hellenica

1.7.2 477n
2.3.31 213n
2.3.46 547n
2.4.19 550
3.2.4 547n
3.2.21-25 222n
3.2.29-30 523n
4.4.11 442n
4.5.14 442n
6.1.6 527n
6.3.2 559

Hiero

1.1 564
1.2 570
1.9 569
1.10 570
1.11-13 566
1.14 525n

Hiero (cont.)

1.14-17	566
1.18-25	566
1.26-38	566
1.32-36	566
2.1	566
2.3	566
2.5	568
2.3-5	570
2.5-6	570
3.8	574
4.8-11	524n
7.1-3	526n
7.3-4	525n
7.9	525n
9.3	571
9.7-9	571
11	523n
11.2-4	571
11.13-14	526

Memorabilia

1.1-2	435n, 496, 806
1.1-9	132
1.1.1	444, 445n, 581
1.1.2	601n
1.1.3	301n, 302, 302n, 305, 306n
1.1.4	455n, 590
1.1.6	357n
1.1.6-9	525
1.1.7-10	523
1.1.8-1.2.64	500n
1.1.9	357n
1.1.10	818n
1.1.10-26	806
1.1.11	351
1.1.11-13	181n
1.1.11-16	818n
1.1.13	356n, 362
1.1.15	181n
1.1.16	351, 507, 514, 530n, 531, 586, 794n
1.1.19-20	505
1.1.20	445
1.2	284, 736n
1.2.1	188, 445, 524
1.2.1-2	526
1.2.1-5	651n
1.2.2	495, 532n
1.2.3	526

1.2.4	525, 526
1.2.5-6	448, 556n
1.2.5-7	451n, 790n
1.2.6	85n
1.2.9	321, 445, 490, 526, 603
1.2.12	445
1.2.12-18	371
1.2.12-26	242
1.2.12-28	539n
1.2.12-47	727n
1.2.14	505
1.2.15	505
1.2.16	585n
1.2.17	501, 523
1.2.17-18	526
1.2.17-23	506
1.2.17-29	501
1.2.18	523, 531, 532
1.2.19 [= SSR V A 103]	290, 506
1.2.19-23	493
1.2.19-28	539n
1.2.22	506, 523, 526, 528
1.2.24-26	371
1.2.26	445
1.2.27	538n
1.2.29	244
1.2.29-30	642n
1.2.29-37	279
1.2.29-38	445n
1.2.29-47	371
1.2.31	290, 523, 526, 536
1.2.31-32	279
1.2.35	516n
1.2.37	321
1.2.39	453n
1.2.40-46	445n
1.2.46	416
1.2.48	242, 252, 526, 532
1.2.49	445
1.2.51	445, 688
1.2.51-55	459
1.2.52	689
1.2.53	688
1.2.53-54	613, 690
1.2.55	470, 516n, 689
1.2.56	445
1.2.56-57	472
1.2.57	524

- 1.2.58 445
 1.2.60 [= SSR IV A 3] 454n
 1.2.64 485, 495
 1.3 136, 446, 471n, 496
 1.3.1 481, 526
 1.3.2 525
 1.3.3 525
 1.3-2.1 446
 1.3-7 446
 1.3.1 238n, 442n, 523, 592, 648
 1.3.1-4 446
 1.3.5-15 446
 1.3.6 753
 1.3.7 657n
 1.3.8-13 541n, 590
 1.3.9-11 193
 1.3.11 446n, 523, 526
 1.3.13 446n
 1.4 358, 446, 523, 529, 648
 1.4-2.1 666n
 1.4.1 446, 673, 719n
 1.4.1-6 513
 1.4.1-1.5.6 670n
 1.4.2 359n
 1.4.5-6 358
 1.4.6 794n
 1.4.7 358
 1.4.12 642n
 1.4.13 524, 525
 1.4.13-14 648
 1.4.15 648
 1.4.16 516n
 1.4.18 648
 1.5 446
 1.5.1 525, 526, 532n
 1.5.2 525
 1.5.4 188n, 446, 527
 1.5.4-5 493
 1.5.5 188n, 473
 1.5.6 451n, 526
 1.6 238n, 261, 446, 736n
 1.6.2 278, 290
 1.6.3 447, 523
 1.6.3-5 495
 1.6.4-10 492
 1.6.5 85n, 448
 1.6.6-7 524
 1.6.6-8 651n
 1.6.9 526
 1.6.10 238n, 448
 1.6.13 448
 1.6.14 136, 176n, 448, 468, 495
 1.6.15 452, 489, 523, 526
 1.6.21 476n
 1.7 446
 1.7.1 525
 2 708n
 2.1 183n, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 261, 370n, 446, 447n, 491, 492, 523, 525, 526
 2.1.1 [= SSR IV A 20 = IV A 163] 179n, 185, 189, 379n, 492, 524, 526, 640n
 2.1.1-6 [= SSR IV A 163] 188
 2.1-3.7 491
 2.1.2-3 [= SSR IV A 163] 188
 2.1.3 [= SSR IV A 163] 526
 2.1.6 [= SSR IV A 163] 524
 2.1.7-17 [= SSR IV A 163] 370n
 2.1.8-9 [= SSR IV A 163] 119, 185, 189, 475
 2.1.9 [= SSR IV A 163] 185
 2.1.10 [= SSR IV A 163] 185
 2.1.11 [= SSR IV A 163] 185, 189, 189n, 190, 197
 2.1.12-13 [= SSR IV A 163] 190
 2.1.13 [= SSR IV A 102 = IV A 163] 185
 2.1.13-14 [= SSR IV A 163] 190n
 2.1.15 [= SSR IV A 163] 185
 2.1.16 [= SSR IV A 163] 524
 2.1.17 [= SSR IV A 163] 190n, 197, 527
 2.1.18-20 651n
 2.1.19 525, 526, 536n
 2.1.19-20 525, 526

Memorabilia (cont.)

2.1.20	185, 526	2.6.28	495
2.1.21	449n	2.6.28-29	651n
2.1.21-33	496-497	2.6.36	495, 651n
2.1.21-34	119, 291, 371	2.6.37	471
2.1.22	506n	2.7	524
2.1.28	523, 525, 526	2.7-10	526
2.1.30	192n	2.7.1	523
2.1.31	179, 525	2.7.5	473
2.1.32-33	476	2.7.6-7	473
2.1.33	449, 525, 526	2.7.7	473, 523, 524, 525
2.1.34	449	2.7.7-8	524
2.2	536, 649n, 654n	2.7.8	473
2.2.1-2	699	2.7.9	473
2.2.1-6	463	2.7.10	473
2.2.5	523, 525	2.7.13-14	474
2.2.10	464, 525	2.8.1	474
2.2.12	464	2.9-10	495
2.2.13	465	2.9.4	535
2.3	526, 536	2.9.5	535
2.3-4	525	2.9.8	477
2.3.1	516n	2.10	253
2.3.1-19	245	2.10.3	478
2.3.2	581n	2.10.4	470
2.3.14	465, 525, 536n	3.1	483
2.3.15	466, 643n	3.1-7	481, 491, 587n, 592
2.3.16	466	3.1.1	482, 491, 592
2.3.17	466	3.1.7	524, 525
2.3.18-19	536n	3.1.10	485
2.3.19	529n	3.1.17	524
2.4-6	495	3.2	483, 486, 490
2.4-10	495	3.2.2	485
2.4.1	467	3.2.3	523
2.4.5-7	468, 478	3.3	483, 484, 485, 490
2.5	254, 536	3.3.2-4	488
2.5.5	469	3.3.6	488
2.6	164n, 471n	3.3.7	488
2.6.1	524	3.3.8-9	488
2.6.8	523	3.3.8-10	524
2.6.10-14	471	3.3.9-10	485
2.6.14	471	3.3.9-11	526
2.6.15	471	3.3.11	119n, 485, 488, 526, 535
2.6.16-20	471	3.3.12	143
2.6.21-24	443n	3.3.12-15	488
2.6.22	651n	3.3.13	526
2.6.24-27	469	3.3.13-14	525
2.6.25	525	3.3.14	523, 524, 536n
2.6.25-26	526	3.3.15	673n
2.6.27	477	3.4	470n, 483, 484, 485, 490
		3.4.1-2	523

- 3.4.2-6 486, 524
 3.4.6-12 527
 3.4.7-12 530
 3.4.8 524
 3.4.9 523, 527
 3.4.12 530
 3.5 485, 490
 3.5.2-4 484n
 3.5.5 524
 3.5.5-6 524
 3.5.18 484n, 524
 3.5.18-21 524
 3.5.21 524
 3.6 483, 485, 487, 488, 490,
 589n
 3.6.1 133, 241, 486, 590n, 824n
 3.6.2 523, 526
 3.6.2-3 525
 3.6.4 526
 3.6.4-8 523
 3.6.9 657n
 3.6.15 485
 3.6.16 486, 536n
 3.6.16-18 525
 3.7 244n, 483, 484, 485, 550,
 589n
 3.7.1 525
 3.7.1-3 242n
 3.7.2 523
 3.7.3 536n
 3.7.5-7 490
 3.7.8 581n
 3.7.9 476, 523, 526
 3.8 184, 447n, 482, 491, 739
 3.8.1 [= *SSR IV A 165*]
 491
 3.8.7 [= *SSR IV A 165*]
 491
 3.8.8-9 525
 3.8.10 524, 525
 3.9 134n, 482, 491, 524
 3.9.1-10 514n
 3.9.3 523
 3.9.4 492, 503
 3.9.4-5 608
 3.9.5 188n, 493, 498, 508n, 609
 3.9.6 507n
 3.9.8 443n
 3.9.10-11 490, 524
 3.10 482, 637n
 3.10-14 494
 3.10.1 494
 3.10.6-8 494
 3.10.9-14 494
 3.11 261, 482, 489, 494, 651n
 3.11.3 495
 3.11.10 470
 3.11.16 657n
 3.11.17 [= *SSR V A 14*]
 252, 254, 470n
 3.12 250, 482, 525, 526
 3.12.4 525, 526
 3.12.5 526
 3.12-14 496
 3.12.6 493, 496
 3.13 482, 496
 3.14 482, 496
 4.1.1 500
 4.1.2 495, 523, 524, 532, 594
 4.1.3 584
 4.1.3-4 585n
 4.1.3-5 373n
 4.1.11 238n
 4.2 20, 118n, 151n, 249, 486, 487,
 495, 526, 585n, 666n, 736n,
 739
 4.2-3 130n, 447, 527
 4.2.1 241, 244, 518
 4.2.2 422
 4.2.6 506n, 581n
 4.2.7 523
 4.2.10 50n
 4.2.10-39 514
 4.2.11 485, 527
 4.2.20 523
 4.2.23 280, 290
 4.2.24 612, 818n
 4.2.24-30 502
 4.2.28 525
 4.2.30 589
 4.2.33 443n
 4.2.34-36 525
 4.2.37-39 524
 4.2.39 673
 4.2.40 673
 4.3 358, 503, 523, 529, 648
 4.3.1 143, 502, 511, 525
 4.3.2 503

Memorabilia (cont.)

4.3.3	503
4.3.3-12	503
4.3.3-14	503
4.3.11	524, 648
4.3.12	488, 489, 503
4.3.13	358, 503
4.3.14	503, 648
4.3.14-16	510
4.3.15-16	503
4.3.15-17	525
4.3.16	523, 648
4.3.17	503, 510
4.3.18	503
4.4	508, 525
4.4.1	447, 508, 524
4.4.1-5	510
4.4.2-4	508
4.4.4-5	511
4.4.5	286, 320n, 509
4.4.5-25	447
4.4.6	509
4.4.7	510
4.4.8	511
4.4.9	447, 508, 510
4.4.10-11	447n, 526
4.4.11	510
4.4.12	510
4.4.13	511
4.4.15	694
4.4.17	525
4.4.19	508
4.4.19-22	454n
4.4.19-25	523, 648
4.4.21	508
4.4.21-24	524
4.4.23	654n
4.4.24	464
4.4.24-30	476
4.4.25	320n, 447, 508, 510, 648
4.5	130n, 261, 511, 523
4.5-6	447, 527
4.5.1	188n, 502, 512, 736n
4.5.3-5	512
4.5.6	512
4.5.6-7	507
4.5.7	512, 526, 528
4.5.7-8	502
4.5.8	512

4.5.8-9	651n
4.5.9	492, 512
4.5.10	512, 526, 528, 532
4.5.10-11	493
4.5.11	489, 513
4.5.11-12	525
4.5.12	489, 514
4.6	514, 666n
4.6.1	489, 502, 608
4.6.1-15	671n
4.6.2	648
4.6.3-4	493
4.6.4	508
4.6.4-14	514
4.6.5	493
4.6.5-6	510
4.6.6	493
4.6.11	493
4.6.13	514
4.6.13-15	515n, 527
4.6.14	523
4.6.15	143, 514
4.7	351n
4.7.1	515, 523, 526, 532, 532n, 533
4.7.1-2	515
4.7.2	516
4.7.2-8	818n
4.7.3	181n
4.7.6	356n, 516
4.7.6-7	362
4.7.9	525
4.8	435n
4.8.1	455, 516, 525
4.8.3	516
4.8.4	526, 531
4.8.7	516
4.8.10	516, 525
4.8.11	495, 500, 532n, 673n

Oeconomicus

1-4	522
1.12-15	487
1.16-2.8	523
1.19	524
1.22	523
1.23	188, 473, 525
2.1-8	524
2.2	540
2.2.2-4	824n
2.3	644n

2.4	540	7.14–15	523, 540
2.5	525	7.15	523
2.7	471n, 495, 540	7.15–16	523
2.9	540	7.16	523
2.17–18	580	7.16–32	523
3.3	524	7.19	654n
3.4	485	7.22	523
3.10	523	7.23	524, 528
3.10–15	540	7.26	523, 524
3.14	523, 651n	7.27	523, 540
3.15	523	7.30	524
4.2	524	7.30–31	523
4.2–3	525	7.31	524
4.3	526	7.33	524
4.4–25	489	7.36	524
4.7	524	7.37	524
4.15	524	7.39	524
4.19	524, 530n	7.41	524
4.21	524	7.42	523, 524, 540
4.24	525n	8.1	523
5	760n	8.1–9.10	524
5.1	523, 526	8.2	524
5.4	524, 526, 528, 651n	8.3–8	524
5.5	526	9.1	523
5.12	526, 527	9.2	524
5.15	524, 525, 530n	9.3	525
5.19	524	9.4	525
5.19–20	523, 525	9.11	524, 525
6.4	523	9.12	523, 525
6.5	525	9.14	523
6.7	524	9.14–15	525
6.8	532, 532n	9.15	524
6.9	525, 526, 527	9.16	523
6.12–17	533	9.18	523
6.12–7.1	531	9.19	523, 525
6.12	540	10.1–8	525
6.17–7.3	523	10.5	525
6.17	540	10.10	524
7–10	537	10.11	525
7–21	522, 523n	10.13	523
7.2	540	11.1	536n
7.3	540	11.3	67
7.4	537, 540	11.8	516n, 523, 525
7.4–10.13	523	11.9	526, 540
7.6	523, 540	11.10	526
7.7	523	11.11	525
7.9	523	11.12	523, 526
7.11	523, 537, 540	11.12–13	525, 526
7.13	523, 537, 540	11.13	526

Oeconomicus (cont.)

11.14	526
11.18	525
11.19	526
11.19-20	523, 525, 526
11.21-25	535n
11.22	526, 534, 534, 535
11.22-25	533-534, 537
11.23	523, 526, 535, 536
11.23-25	526
11.25	524, 526, 536
12.2	540
12.4	526
12.6	523, 524
12.9-14	523, 526, 528
12.17-18	526
12.18	523
12.19	524
13.4-5	526
13.5	527, 536n
13.6	524
13.9	524, 525, 526
13.11	526
14.7-9	524
14.10	525, 526
15.1	526
15.4	527
15.5	526
15.10	527
16.8	290
16.9	290
18.10	527
19.15	527, 582
19.15-17	290
20.4	523, 526
20.6	526
20.14	526
20.15	526
20.25	526
21.2	527
21.3-6	526
21.6	525, 526, 527
21.9	525
21.10	524, 525, 526, 527
21.12	506n, 524, 525, 530

Respublica Lacedaemoniorum

1.1-2	581
1.3	551
1.6	654n

2	588
2.13	555
2.18	54n
3.1-2	585n
5.2-7	555
5.5-6	548
5.7	555

Symposium

1.1	31, 523, 532
1.3	775n
1.4	442n, 547
1.5	290, 448
1.7	442n, 547
1.8	506n, 552
1.9	442n, 775n
1.10	552
1.11	44
1.11-16	548n
2.1	44, 548n
2.3-4	525
2.9	523
2.10 [= SSR V A 18]	700n, 649n
2.14	45
2.16-17	39
2.16-18	525
2.21-22	45
2.24	53, 549
2.26 [= SSR V A 67]	555
3.1	546
3.2	473, 549
3.4 [= SSR V A 78]	404n, 526
3.5-6 [= SSR V A 185]	50n
3.7	775n
3.8 [= SSR V A 81]	404n
3.9	244n, 404n
3.10	404n, 495
3.11	44
4.1-3	404n
4.6-8	50n
4.10-18	471n, 557
4.15	119n
4.27-28	651n
4.28	44n
4.34-36	524n

4.34-44 107, 404n
 4.44 254
 4.45 44n, 50n
 4.47-49 648
 4.55 45
 4.56-64 404n, 495
 4.60 39n
 4.62 290, 448
 4.62-63 [= SSR V A 13]
 176n
 4.64 526
 5.5-7 79n
 5.7 337n, 642n
 6.6 52, 67
 6.6-10 454n
 6.8 52
 6.8-9 45
 6.9 45
 8 495, 497
 8.2 413, 651n
 8.4-6 [= SSR V A 14]
 38n, 204n, 254
 8.5 305, 495
 8.8 506n, 552, 651n
 8.25 632n
 8.27 526

8.31 50n
 8.32 525, 536n
 8.33 555
 8.35 559
 8.36 555
 8.37 525
 8.38 526, 553
 8.39 274, 290, 553
 8.41 526, 553
 8.42 495
 8.43 525
 9.1 523
 9.3-4 555
 9.7 555

Zeno Citieus

fr. 1.78 *SVF* 693
 fr. 1.178 *SVF* 693
 fr. 1.205-206 *SVF*
 697
 fr. 1.236 *SVF* 690, 691
 fr. 1.260 *SVF* 693

Zosimus

Historia nova

3.11.2 826n

Index of Ancient Names

- Abradatas 438
 Acantidorus 246
 Achilles 47, 141, 155, 155n, 164, 316n, 549n,
 767, 767n, 769
 Adimantus 127n, 133, 246, 253
 Aeantodorus 11, 247, 253
 Aedesius 821n
 Aelian 19, 31, 42, 66, 72n
 Aelius Aristides 132n, 207, 785
 Aeschines Orator 225n, 226n
 Aeschines Socraticus 3n, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20n,
 24, 68n, 117–118n, 120, 128, 129, 130, 132,
 133n, 136, 136n, 153, 157, 164, 172–173, 176,
 176n, 180n, 184n, 202, 203, 204–205, 206,
 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214–216, 217,
 218, 237, 241, 246, 249–250, 253, 268,
 280, 285, 286, 287, 319, 319n, 320n, 397–
 398, 401n, 403, 495, 612, 633, 633n, 648,
 648n, 649n, 651n, 672, 673, 719, 720,
 720n, 775, 775n, 779–780, 784, 791, 792,
 802n
 Aeschylus 13, 43, 342, 343, 437, 801n
 Aesop 3n, 358, 471
 Agamemnon 549n
 Agathon 210, 244, 248, 775, 779
 Agesilaus 438, 572n, 574, 588
 Agis 694, 754
 Ajax 141, 141n, 150, 151–153, 154, 155–157, 158
 Alcibiades 9, 10, 11, 22, 23, 32n, 38, 38n, 52,
 54, 55, 68, 69n, 72, 73, 79, 127, 130, 131,
 145, 164, 193, 196n, 203–206, 207, 209,
 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 218, 222n, 223, 229–
 230, 241, 242, 243, 244, 251, 311, 312, 319,
 371n, 373n, 377, 378, 379, 379n, 388, 406,
 445, 452, 453n, 486, 489, 496, 500, 501,
 505, 506, 538, 539n, 541n, 590, 591, 614,
 632n, 643, 644, 646, 646n, 656, 656n,
 673, 719, 720n, 727–728, 732, 733–734n,
 735, 737, 737n, 741, 747, 748, 750, 753, 773,
 775, 779, 780, 787, 793, 801n, 803, 804,
 804n, 811, 811n, 842, 843, 852, 853
 Alcidamas 11, 268, 284, 285, 293
 Alexander Polyhistor 792
 Alexander of Aphrodisias 56
 Alexander the Great 255, 406, 685, 703, 826,
 827
 Amipsias 40, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 51n, 55,
 339n, 347n, 794
 Ammianus Marcellinus 813, 814n
 Anacreon 776
 Anatolius 800n
 Anaxagoras 5, 13, 14, 24, 24n, 57, 78, 86, 88,
 89, 348, 349, 350, 352, 354, 355, 356–358,
 359, 360, 360n, 361, 361n, 362–363, 365,
 366, 413–415, 638, 754, 792, 794, 825
 Anaximander 270, 293, 296n
 Anchimolus 252n
 Anchipylus 252
 Anthemion 54, 656, 657
 Antiatticista 392
 Antilocheus 616
 Antiochus of Ascalon 695
 Antiochus of Thessaly 208
 Antipater 21, 642n, 694–696
 Antiphanes 106n
 Antiphon of Cepheise 246
 Antiphon of Rhamnus 15, 16, 253, 278–279,
 436, 444, 446, 447–448, 449–451, 452–
 455, 456, 616
 Antiphon the soothsayer 616
 Antisthenes 4, 7, 8–9, 10, 11, 20, 21, 24, 38n,
 43, 45, 105, 107–109, 110, 110n, 117, 117n,
 120, 128–130, 133, 141, 142–143, 144, 144n,
 146, 147–148, 149–150, 151, 151n, 152n,
 153n, 154n, 155, 156, 157–158, 163, 164–
 165n, 168, 169, 172–173, 174, 175–176n,
 184n, 193, 195n, 198n, 199, 203, 204,
 207n, 226, 228–230, 231, 231n, 237,
 238, 240, 254, 255, 256, 258, 287, 288,
 305, 390, 402n, 404, 404n, 469n, 470,
 546n, 548n, 556n, 624, 634, 651n, 666,
 666n, 672, 673, 673n, 682, 683, 684,
 697, 700n, 708, 736n, 779, 791, 826, 827,
 828n
 Anytus 53–54, 131, 132, 242, 243, 284, 631n,
 656–657, 701, 777, 779, 805, 807, 807n,
 809, 812, 813
 Aphrodite 18, 544, 546, 549, 550, 551
 Apollinarius 799n, 800n
 Apollo 3n, 23, 70n, 239n, 343, 440, 455, 557,
 648, 748, 755, 765, 766, 768, 769, 770,
 800, 810, 817, 831

- Apollodorus 11, 32n, 128n, 184n, 246, 247,
 248, 250, 253, 391, 392, 402, 779, 795
 Apringius 800
 Apsephion 795
 Apuleius 12, 19, 23, 316n, 760, 761n–763,
 764n–768, 769, 769n, 770, 774
 Arcesilaus 392n, 686, 687, 755, 840
 Archedemus 246, 477, 477n, 535
 Archelaus of Athens 4, 5n, 20, 24, 350, 359,
 360n–361n, 365–366, 634, 637, 638, 639,
 639n, 644, 651n, 658, 699, 792
 Archelaus of Macedonia 614, 793
 Archytas 624, 627, 628, 628n, 630
 Areta 656
 Ariadne 545n, 555, 557
 Aristarchus 472, 472n, 473
 Aristodemus 11, 32, 184, 247, 248, 253, 359,
 391, 446, 780
 Aristo of Chius 173, 686, 720
 Aristo of Ceos 173, 181n
 Ariston (father of Plato) 258
 Aristophon 802, 802n
 Aristides 212, 616, 787
 Aristippus 4, 9, 10, 11, 14, 117, 118, 118n, 128,
 129n, 133, 179–186, 187, 188, 189–194, 195–
 197, 198–200, 213, 214, 215n, 216, 217, 226,
 230, 231, 237, 238, 249, 250, 252, 253, 259,
 261, 262, 263, 268, 275, 280, 288, 289,
 369, 445n, 446, 446n, 447n, 449, 460,
 460n, 461n, 471, 472, 475, 477, 491, 492,
 492n, 500n, 615, 640n, 646, 646n, 651n,
 656, 666, 666n, 672, 673, 696, 739, 753,
 792
 Aristocles 170, 171, 172, 646n–647n, 648n
 Aristodemus 11, 32n, 184n, 247, 248, 253,
 359n, 391, 446, 780
 Aristomenes 761, 762, 762n
 Aristophanes 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 31, 32–
 33n, 34, 35–36, 37, 38, 39, 40–41, 42,
 43, 44, 45, 47–50, 51–52, 53–55, 56–
 57, 58, 59, 64, 65–67, 68, 68n, 70–73,
 74–75, 76, 77, 78–79, 80, 84, 86–87n,
 89, 92, 93, 100, 125, 129, 131, 134, 212n,
 242, 245, 268, 276, 277, 277n, 283,
 322n, 338–340n, 343, 350–351, 359,
 360, 365, 369, 370, 371, 371n, 373, 382,
 415, 420n, 453, 545, 639, 644n, 649n,
 739n, 744, 776, 779, 792, 794, 796,
 797
 Aristotle of Stagira 2, 3, 12, 19, 20, 24, 35, 41,
 72, 87, 88, 95, 110, 110n, 114, 114n, 120, 125,
 126, 129n, 132, 147, 148, 149, 162, 163, 175,
 181, 181n, 229n, 254, 261, 264, 268n, 269,
 270, 292, 294, 319, 320, 330, 331n, 333,
 352, 357n, 387n, 388, 388n, 417, 417n,
 420, 452n, 467n, 468, 469, 519, 547, 573,
 589n, 601–603, 604–605, 606–607, 608,
 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617,
 618, 619, 619n, 620, 623, 626, 626n, 627,
 627n, 633, 633n, 640, 648, 649n, 651n,
 653, 654n, 658, 669, 676n, 685n, 686n,
 689, 690, 693, 696, 698, 721, 736, 744,
 745, 787, 790, 791, 793, 796, 797, 825
 Aristotle the Myth 202n
 Aristoxenus 3, 19, 20, 23, 128, 132, 212, 225n,
 614n, 623–634, 635, 639–640, 641, 642,
 643–645, 646, 647, 647n, 649–650, 651–
 652, 653, 654n, 656–657, 658
 Artemis 795
 Asclepiades 251
 Aspasia 9, 24, 57, 58, 153, 199, 199n, 207, 208,
 209–210, 211, 401, 651n, 779–780, 803,
 803n
 Aster 252
 Athena 39, 152, 316n, 767, 769
 Athenaëus 19, 40, 56, 108, 202n, 215, 239n,
 241, 248, 249, 255n, 286, 293n, 628n, 654,
 694, 695n
 Athenian Stranger 556
 Augustine 19n
 Aulus Gellius 19n, 163, 166, 223, 239, 240
 Autolycus 42, 43, 44, 506, 545, 552, 553, 775,
 779
 Bacchae 207, 211
 Bacchylides 46
 Bias 752
 Callias 32n, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 92, 128n,
 145, 208, 208n, 212, 212n, 214, 274, 290,
 404n, 442, 442n, 506n, 537, 545n, 548,
 548n, 553, 555, 556n, 559, 779, 779n, 792,
 848
 Callicles 14, 112, 112n, 126, 187n, 242, 245, 282,
 336, 369, 370, 371–373, 374, 375–376, 377,
 379, 381, 382, 712, 713n, 716, 718, 779n,
 780, 853
 Callisthenes 649n

- Callisto 651n
 Callistratus 37
 Calycius 800n
 Cambyses 583, 583n
 Carneades 392n
 Cato 698, 724, 745
 Cebes 11, 32n, 133, 222n, 224, 242, 250, 252,
 349, 354, 355, 360n, 532, 779, 792
 Censorinus 165, 166
 Cephalus 253, 802, 802n
 Chaerecrates 245n, 465, 466–467, 532, 536,
 536n
 Chaerephon 11, 32n, 39n, 65, 77, 127, 133,
 184n, 216n, 242, 245–246, 247, 253, 387,
 439, 440, 441, 455, 465–467, 532, 536,
 616, 780, 794, 801
 Charicles 279, 536
 Charmadas 708n
 Charmides 11, 55, 241, 242–243, 244, 245, 253,
 281, 312, 404, 413, 483, 484, 485, 486, 490,
 517, 536, 536n, 548–549, 550, 552, 553,
 556n, 557, 589n, 591, 640, 779, 780
 Chiron 47, 585, 585n
 Chrysanthius 821n
 Chrysilla 214, 538, 539n
 Chrysippus 21, 682, 690–691, 692, 693, 693n,
 695, 697, 698, 703
 Cicero 19, 22, 121, 125, 162, 170, 171–172, 173,
 209, 209n, 213n, 217, 228n, 271, 351, 627,
 682, 685n, 686, 687, 687n, 689, 692, 694,
 695, 696, 701, 703, 707, 708–712, 713–
 715, 716, 717n, 718, 720–721, 722, 723, 724,
 724n, 757, 783n, 818
 Cimon 614
 Cleanthes 21, 257, 682, 687, 692, 698, 703
 Clearchus 291, 627n
 Clement 20, 56, 271, 667, 694, 695
 Cleombrotus 250, 253, 261
 Cleomenes 694
 Cleon 53n, 54, 65
 Cleonymus 66
 Clinias 230, 246, 246n, 250, 339, 340, 341,
 344, 416, 668, 670, 671
 Colotes 665, 754, 755
 Connus 40, 339, 340, 780
 Conon 131, 795
 Constantius II 817, 826, 829, 830, 830n
 Cornutus Lucius Annaeus 735, 736, 737, 738,
 739, 740
 Crates 21, 254, 682, 684, 685, 699, 700, 700n
 Cratinus 6, 33, 35–36, 37, 40n, 41, 46, 48, 49,
 50, 50n, 56, 58, 65, 125, 340n
 Cratylus 352
 Critias 11, 15, 18, 127, 213, 242–243, 244, 245,
 278, 279, 329n, 371, 371n, 445, 445n,
 452, 453n, 456, 489, 500, 501, 501n,
 505, 506, 517, 538, 539, 546–548, 549,
 550, 551–553, 555, 556n, 558, 559, 642,
 727n, 773, 774n, 779, 793, 803, 811, 811n,
 822
 Crito 11, 128, 222n, 242, 246–247, 249, 250,
 251, 253, 326, 340, 341, 401, 471n, 476,
 477, 477n, 532, 535, 646, 646n, 669, 779,
 792, 793, 805
 Critobulus 11, 79n, 164n, 193, 246–247, 250,
 253, 446, 461n, 462n, 471–472, 477n, 522,
 533, 540, 541n, 548n, 556n, 557, 580,
 642n, 643, 779
 Ctesippus 250, 253, 338, 339, 344
 Cyril 625, 626, 626n, 629n, 636n, 647n, 652,
 652n, 654n
 Cyrus 109, 291, 240, 438, 462, 463, 466, 469,
 470, 473n–474n, 484n, 489, 525n, 539,
 572, 572n, 574, 578, 581, 583, 587, 590,
 593, 594, 595, 650n
 Daedalus 637, 637n
 Damon 39, 39n, 47, 57, 58, 792
 Danae 343
 Danaids 342
 Dandamis 746
 Dante 77
 Darius 752
 Datianus 800n
 Demetrius of Byzantium 793
 Demetrius of Magnesia 796
 Demetrius of Phalerum 19n, 23, 132, 625n,
 646n, 649n, 653, 745, 795
 Democritus 133, 387, 412, 610, 825
 Demodocus 246, 253
 Demosthenes 121, 126, 199, 225n, 552, 801n,
 803
 Dercyllides 386n
 Diagoras 6, 58, 88, 88n, 360
 Dicaearchus 627n, 670, 696
 Dinomache 730, 731, 732n
 Dio Chrysostom 19n, 108n, 156, 819, 820,
 823n

- Diodorus Cronus 163n, 172n
 Diodorus of Athens 11, 253, 478, 478n
 Diodorus Siculus 57, 213n, 222n, 223n
 Diogenes Laertius 3n, 19, 21, 24, 32, 50, 53, 55, 86, 100, 128n, 163, 164, 167, 170–172, 173, 180, 181, 183, 192n, 199, 202n, 212, 213, 217, 222, 223, 223n, 228, 231, 237, 238, 238n, 240, 246, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 255n, 257, 259, 261, 262, 264, 271, 275, 285, 288, 289, 293n, 337, 350, 352, 359, 366, 386n, 412, 455, 460n, 594, 602n, 614, 626n, 670n, 682, 683, 684–685, 686, 700, 707, 708, 787, 788, 789, 791, 792, 794, 795, 796, 797, 808, 808n, 818n, 824
 Diogenes of Apollonia 5, 86
 Diogenes of Sinope 11, 163, 238, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260
 Dion 252, 574
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus 822n
 Dionysius I of Syracuse 182, 194, 198, 213, 215n, 230, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 289, 614
 Dionysius II of Syracuse 182, 629n
 Dionysius the grammar teacher 412
 Dionysodorus 254, 338
 Dionysus 545, 555
 Diotima 68, 199n, 210, 211, 401, 406, 633, 633n, 779–780, 841, 849
 Domninus 800n
 Duris 792

 Echecrates 183n, 627n
 Eleatic Stranger 84, 98, 264, 521, 720
 Empedocles 5n, 275, 276, 277, 615
 Ephialtes 42
 Epicharmus 125
 Epicrates 231
 Epictetus 21, 149, 151, 255, 667, 668, 682, 701, 702–703, 772
 Epicurus 665, 666, 667, 669, 674–675, 676–678n, 703
 Epigenes 246, 250, 253, 496
 Eubulus 559
 Euclides 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 117n, 118n–119n, 128, 130, 133, 161–166, 167, 168, 169, 170–171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 184n, 203, 203n, 226, 227n, 237, 238, 250, 263, 264, 321n, 391, 648, 648n, 792, 794
 Eugenius 822
 Eugnomonius 801n
 Eupolis 3, 6, 32–33n, 38, 40, 41, 42–43, 44, 45–46, 47, 49, 51–52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 336, 545n
 Euripides 5, 14, 24n, 31, 32n, 43, 65, 125, 125n, 129, 131, 213, 272, 286, 319, 320, 336, 342, 369, 373, 374, 376, 377, 377n, 382, 437, 792, 801n
 Eurylochus 793
 Euryptolemus 241
 Eurystheus 437
 Eusebia 825
 Eusebius of Caesarea 170, 626n, 646n–648n
 Eusebius of Mindus 821n
 Eutherus 474, 475, 476
 Euthydemus 13, 20, 97, 130n, 151n, 153n, 231, 241, 241n, 244, 249, 253, 280, 301, 338, 340, 344, 345, 416, 418, 422, 481, 486, 495, 500n, 502, 503, 506n, 509, 510, 512, 514, 518, 527n, 585n, 589, 673, 739, 751
 Euthyphro 301, 401, 749, 840
 Evenus 89, 780

 Favorinus 131, 792, 793, 795, 808n
 Fronto 822n

 Gaius 713
 Galatia 800
 Galaxidorus 17n, 316n, 749
 Gallus 830
 Gemellus 799n, 800n
 Glaucón 11, 127n, 128n, 133, 231, 241, 241n, 246, 253, 391, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 490, 589n, 591, 792
 Gorgias 58, 75, 89, 108, 112, 141n, 151n, 157, 176, 254, 268, 271, 272, 273, 273n, 277, 278, 282, 380, 708n, 712, 779, 822, 823
 Graces 86n, 469, 637, 792
 Gryllus 211

 Hagnon 129, 213
 Hegesander 202n, 225n, 248, 252n, 262
 Heraclitus 175, 271, 272n, 275, 277, 293, 464, 703, 751
 Hercules 156n, 192n, 291, 341, 370, 371, 372, 437, 446, 448, 460, 826, 853
 Herillus 685
 Hermaeum 217

- Hermes Propylaion 637
 Hermias 748n, 749n
 Hermippus 57, 225n
 Hermodorus 163, 163n
 Hermogenes (associate of Socrates) 128,
 132, 212, 242, 250, 253, 301, 303n, 436,
 443, 444, 478, 500n, 532, 534, 556n, 806,
 806n, 848
 Hermogenes (Second Sophistic) 217, 449n,
 450n
 Herodas 126n
 Herodotus 11, 229n, 268, 271, 272, 273, 274,
 293, 449, 581n
 Hesiod 50, 277, 776, 783, 809, 810
 Hesychius 788
 Hiero 18, 564, 565, 566, 567–568, 569, 570,
 572–573, 574, 575, 582
 Hieronymus of Rhodes 225n, 251n, 649n,
 653, 655, 793
 Hieronymus of Stridon (Saint Jerome) 23,
 251, 624n, 655, 655n, 745
 Hilarinus 800
 Himerius 823n
 Hippias 43, 89, 145–146, 176n, 211, 268, 277,
 278, 286, 447, 447n, 449, 454, 508, 509–
 510, 511, 514
 Hipparchus 15, 403
 Hippocrates (associate of Socrates) 90
 Hippocrates (doctor) 268, 271
 Hippon 35, 36, 37, 56, 58
 Hipponicus 208, 212, 212n, 250, 773
 Hippothales 32n, 413n, 719n
 Homer 24, 24n, 46, 50, 88, 109, 143, 164, 277,
 278, 293, 316n, 425, 549, 550, 556n, 650n,
 750, 767, 767n, 776, 778, 781, 782–783,
 784, 809, 810, 813
 Horace 194, 195, 196n, 708n, 727n
 Hygieia 550
 Hyperides 547n

 Iamblichus 825, 828, 839, 839n
 Icarus 802
 Idomeneus 3n, 217, 249, 792
 Iolaus 341, 342, 437
 Ion of Chios 137, 277, 365n, 634, 638, 638n,
 639n, 793
 Iovianus 800n
 Ischomachus 17, 180, 213, 214, 280, 290, 461,
 461n, 462n, 472n, 521–525, 526, 527, 528,
 529, 529n, 530, 531, 531n, 532, 533, 534,
 535–537, 538, 539, 540–541n, 572n, 574,
 582, 780
 Isis 761, 761n, 763, 764–765
 Isocrates 4, 7, 12, 39, 105–106, 107, 108, 109–
 110, 111, 112, 113, 114–115, 116, 117, 118–121,
 126, 131, 133, 134, 157, 217n, 268, 269n,
 282–283, 293, 293n, 390n, 391, 406,
 435n, 547, 571, 669, 670

 John Tzetzes 77
 Julian the Emperor 25, 26, 109, 227, 228n,
 287, 683n, 800n, 801, 811, 812, 813, 814n,
 816, 824, 825, 826–830, 831–832

 Kleiton 494

 Lais 192, 192n, 198, 199, 199n
 Lamprocles 463, 463n, 464, 465, 536, 615,
 649–650, 652, 654n, 655, 794
 Lar 766, 766n
 Leon (Academic) 387n
 Leon of Salamis 793
 Leonidas 774
 Libanius 19, 25, 132, 284, 799, 800–801, 802,
 803–805, 806–809, 810, 811–812, 813, 814,
 815
 Lucian 19n, 33, 33n, 125, 126n, 387n, 577
 Lucius 760, 761, 762, 763–766, 767, 770
 Lucretius 192n
 Lycon 242, 548, 548n, 552, 773, 779, 805, 807
 Lycurgus 440, 441, 552, 554, 555, 693, 694,
 751, 800
 Lysander 243, 612
 Lysanias 246, 253
 Lysias 11, 32n, 118n, 131–132n, 134, 214, 215, 217,
 252, 268, 285, 286, 293, 401, 655, 656n,
 657, 806, 808n
 Lysicles 208, 208n, 211
 Lysimachus (father of Aristides) 654n
 Lysimachus (son of Aristides) 649, 650
 Lysippus 69, 79, 795
 Lysistratus 37, 38

 Macedonius 800
 Marcus Aurelius 21, 682n, 693, 703, 822n, 826
 Marsyas 68
 Maximus of Ephesus 800n, 801, 801n, 811,
 821n, 831

- Maximus of Tyre 12, 19, 23, 24, 206, 316n,
 748n, 749n, 772–774, 775, 776, 777, 778,
 779n, 780, 781, 782–783, 784–785
 Meidias 406
 Melanto 289
 Melesias 326
 Meletus (accuser of Socrates) 54, 89, 135,
 242, 301, 360, 400, 400n, 603, 604n,
 631n, 656, 692, 701, 773, 777, 779, 805,
 807–808, 813, 840
 Meletus (father of Meletus) 808
 Melissa 170, 277
 Menedemus of Eretria 3, 119, 217, 251, 252,
 649n, 792
 Menedemus of Pyrrha 635, 636
 Menexenus 32n, 250, 253, 413, 615, 649, 650,
 652, 654n, 794
 Meno 241, 420, 605
 Meroe 761
 Michael Choniates 71n
 Miltiades 213, 214, 286, 320
 Minos 403, 404
 Moschus 252, 252n
 Musaeus 277, 782n
 Muses 557
 Musonius Rufus 21, 689, 699, 700–701, 702
 Myrto 463n, 615–616, 648, 649–650n, 652–
 653, 654–655, 745, 746, 787, 794

 Nicephorus Callistus 631n
 Niceratus 50n, 556n
 Nicias (character in Aelius Aristides) 313
 Nicias (general) 38, 152n, 226n, 325, 379, 559
 Nicocles 112, 113, 800n
 Nicostratus 246, 253
 Numenius 819n
 Nymphs 643n

 Odysseus 141, 141n, 143, 144, 144n, 150–153,
 154, 155–157n, 316n, 549n, 810
 Oedipus 150
 Oenipides 14, 415n
 Olympiodorus 393, 406
 Olympus 71
 Orpheus 277, 782n
 Osiris 763, 764n

 Paeanius 800
 Palamedes 47

 Palladius 801n
 Pamphila 793
 Panaetius 21, 22, 23, 117, 117n, 128, 164, 173,
 174, 174n, 181, 182, 653, 654, 692, 696, 707,
 708, 709, 709n, 724, 745, 791
 Papposilenus 72n
 Paralius 246, 253
 Paris Alexander 152, 763
 Parmenides 5n, 170, 172, 173, 173n, 176n, 272,
 275, 276, 277, 296n, 361, 751, 780
 Parrhasius 494
 Parthenopaeus 437
 Pausanias 402
 Peisander 45
 Pelasgus 342
 Penelope 289
 Penia 401
 Pericles 39, 47, 57, 199n, 207, 208, 210, 211,
 213, 274, 275, 294, 377, 378, 379n, 380,
 416, 445n, 484, 484n, 490, 547, 553, 614,
 727, 731, 732, 750, 773, 801n
 Periktione 550
 Perseus 343
 Persius Aulus P. Flaccus 19, 22, 727–728, 729,
 729n, 731, 732–733, 734, 735, 736, 737–
 740, 741
 Phaedo 4, 10, 11, 20, 22, 117n, 118n, 128, 130,
 133, 164, 173, 184n, 203, 203n, 221–230,
 231, 232, 237, 250, 251, 252, 253, 268, 287,
 414, 624, 633, 634, 643, 775, 779, 792, 793,
 805
 Phaedondas 242, 250, 252, 532
 Phaedruss 11, 19n, 128n, 133, 231, 252, 253, 775,
 779, 780
 Phalinius 290, 291n
 Pheidippides 36, 38, 56, 87, 212n, 639
 Phaenarete 636n, 792
 Philemon 695n
 Philip II of Macedonia 116, 225n, 803
 Philip of Opus 387, 392n
 Philip the jester 44, 45, 404
 Philo of Larissa 20, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671,
 672, 675, 676
 Philocrates 225n
 Philodemus 21, 182, 257, 392n, 676, 683, 684,
 696, 697, 716, 720, 720n, 788
 Philolaus 252
 Philonides 37
 Phocion 754

- Phoenix 164, 391
 Phrynichus 40n, 217
 Pindar 6, 71, 71n, 372n, 443, 810
 Pisistratus 813
 Pistias 494
 Pittacus 404
 Plato 2, 2n, 3n, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 31–32n, 34, 35, 38n, 39, 40–41n, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50–51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 64, 67, 68–70, 71, 72, 72n, 74–75, 76, 78, 79, 84–87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92–94, 95–97, 98–99, 100, 105, 106–107, 109n, 110, 111–112, 113, 114–115, 116, 117, 117n, 119–120, 125, 126–127, 128, 129–130, 131, 132, 133–135, 136, 137, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147–148, 149, 150–151n, 152n, 153n, 156–157, 158, 162, 163, 164, 164n, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170–171, 172n, 173, 174–175, 176, 180, 180n, 182, 183–184n, 187–188n, 193, 196n, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 210–211, 212, 217, 218n, 221, 223–224, 225–227, 229n, 231, 237, 238–240, 241, 242, 243, 244–246, 247, 248, 249–250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 268–269, 270, 271, 276, 279, 280, 281, 282–283, 285, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293–295, 296, 297, 299n–302, 303n–305, 306–307, 308, 309, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316–317, 319, 321, 330, 336, 337, 338–339, 340, 341, 342, 344, 345, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352–353, 356, 357n, 358, 359, 360–361, 362–364, 365–366n, 369, 371, 372, 373–374n, 377, 377n, 380–381, 382, 382n, 386–389, 390–393n, 394n, 395, 396n–398n, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404–405, 406, 407, 408, 412–414, 415–416, 417, 418, 420, 421, 422, 423, 423n, 425, 427, 428n, 430n, 435, 439, 440, 441–442, 443n, 444, 445n, 446n, 451, 460n, 463n, 467n, 471, 477n, 481, 483, 484, 486, 487, 488, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 501, 502, 508n, 514, 515, 517–519, 521, 527, 544–545, 546, 547, 550–551, 552, 554, 556, 557, 558–559, 564, 565, 567, 567n, 569n, 573, 574, 577, 578, 579, 580, 580n, 581n–584n, 586–587, 588–589n, 590n, 592, 592n, 602–603, 604, 605–607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615–617, 618, 619–620, 623, 624, 627, 627n, 628n, 632–633, 634–635, 636–637n, 640, 640n, 642–643n, 644n, 646–648n, 649n, 651n, 654n, 657, 657n, 658n, 665, 666, 666n, 668, 669, 670, 671–672, 675, 676n, 677, 677n, 685, 686, 686n, 691n, 693, 694, 695–696, 697, 698, 700, 701, 704, 707, 708, 708n, 710, 712–713, 714, 715, 716, 718, 719–720n, 721n, 722, 723, 727n, 728–729n, 732–733, 734, 736n, 737n, 739, 744, 745, 745n, 747–748, 750, 751, 753, 754–755, 756, 760–762n, 764n, 765, 766, 767n, 768, 769–770n, 773, 774, 775, 775n, 776n, 777, 778, 779–780, 781, 782, 783, 784–785, 787, 789, 790, 791, 794, 795, 796, 797, 799, 801, 801n, 803n, 805, 806, 807, 808–809n, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 824, 825, 826–827, 828, 829, 829n, 831, 836–837, 838–839n, 841n, 843, 849, 850, 852
 Plato Comicus 6, 39n, 45, 46–47, 50, 57, 453, 453n
 Plistanus 251, 252
 Plotinus 393n
 Plutarch 12, 19, 22, 23, 39, 47, 57, 106n, 125, 180, 208, 213, 228n, 250, 255, 260, 280, 293, 314, 315–316n, 438n, 443, 631, 632, 632n, 654, 654n, 692, 693, 695, 708n, 719, 720n, 744, 745–749, 750, 751, 752, 753–755, 756, 757, 764n, 772, 774, 820n
 Polemon 693
 Polus 379, 380, 569n, 712, 717, 718n, 779, 780
 Polyarchus 628n
 Polycrates 4, 84, 131, 134, 216, 216n, 268, 284, 406, 445, 602, 602n, 727n, 806, 807n, 808n
 Polydora 289
 Polykleitos 494
 Pompeius 703
 Poros 401
 Porphyry 143, 393n, 625, 625n, 629, 630, 631n, 632n, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 641, 645, 647, 649, 652n, 654n, 674, 784, 788
 Praxagora 283, 290
 Priscianus 800n
 Priscus 821n, 831
 Proclus 3, 19, 26, 212, 748n, 836–837, 838–840, 841, 842, 843, 844–845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853

- Prodamus 39, 47, 57
 Prodicus 32n, 37, 39, 43, 73, 73n, 89, 99, 106n,
 119, 145, 151, 165n, 176n, 185n, 186, 192n,
 193, 230, 290, 291, 296, 371, 446, 448, 449,
 460, 496, 506n, 779, 822, 823
 Prometheus 91, 108
 Protagoras 6, 7, 32n, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 58,
 58n, 75, 85–86, 87–89, 90–94, 95–98, 99,
 100, 100n, 105, 110–111n, 144, 145, 146, 149,
 296, 404, 405, 491, 492, 779
 Proxenus 590
 Pseudo-Demetrius 117, 129, 130, 212
 Pyrrho 181n
 Pythagoras 212, 271, 606, 624, 627, 628, 629,
 699, 703, 746, 751, 775, 801, 819, 825,
 825n
 Pythia 245n, 439, 838

 Quintilian 209n, 822n

 Regulus 698
 Rhadamanthys 376
 Rhodogyne 208, 210, 211
 Rufinus 800n

 Sacesphorus 231
 Sappho 776, 776n
 Sathon 129n
 Satyrus 649n, 653, 655, 655n, 656n, 793
 Scopas 793
 Seneca Lucius Annaeus 19n, 21, 215, 227,
 228n, 697, 698, 699, 728
 Seth 764n
 Sextus Empiricus 690
 Silenus 6, 13, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79, 337, 342,
 344, 345, 636n, 803
 Simmias 11, 133, 224, 242, 250, 252, 315, 532,
 627n, 749, 750, 779, 792
 Simon 10, 11, 230, 231–232, 250, 251, 792
 Simonides 18, 90, 404, 405, 406, 564, 565,
 566, 567–568, 569–570, 571, 572, 574,
 575, 582, 582n, 714
 Simplicius 254n, 701
 Solon 273, 274, 290, 421, 553, 752
 Sophocles 72n, 343, 801n
 Sophron 125, 126, 126n, 601
 Sophroniscus (Socrates' father) 634, 635,
 636, 636n, 638, 649, 650n, 792, 808, 822,
 823, 826
 Sophroniscus (Socrates' son) 615, 650, 652,
 654n, 794
 Sosicrates 181n
 Sotion 117, 181, 182, 262n
 Speusippus 116, 117, 182
 Sphaerus 693, 694
 Spintharus 20, 128, 629–630n, 634, 641, 645,
 657, 788, 793
 Stesichorus 42
 Stilpo 119, 170, 792
 Stobaeus 166, 287, 288, 668, 695n
 Strabo 223
 Straton 693
 Strepsiades 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 52, 57, 71, 77,
 77n, 87, 88, 212n, 276, 277
 Synesius 228n

 Tatianus 800n
 Taurus 163
 Telauges 212, 213
 Telecles 392n
 Telecleides 32n
 Telestes 624
 Terpsion 23, 162, 250, 253, 263, 745
 Thales 35, 36, 47, 270, 277, 278, 293, 294
 Thargelia 208, 210, 211
 Theanor 750
 Theaetetus 93, 94, 96, 98, 263, 340, 391,
 606n, 780
 Theages 127, 246, 253, 313, 314, 314n
 Themistius 19, 25, 26, 232, 685, 799, 816–817,
 818, 819–822, 823, 824, 826–827, 828n,
 829, 830, 832
 Themistocles 205, 206, 207, 209, 211, 274, 319,
 553
 Theocritus 125, 315n, 749
 Theodectes 601
 Theodore 837, 838–839
 Theodoret 625, 626, 626n, 629n, 632n, 633n,
 636n, 647n, 652, 652n, 654n
 Theodorus 94, 95, 95n, 263, 391, 780
 Theodote 470, 482, 489, 494, 495, 496, 651n
 Theodotus 246
 Theognis 546, 546n, 809, 810
 Theon of Antiochia 694
 Theon of Smyrna 228n, 229
 Theophrastus 132, 269, 269n, 626n, 638,
 696
 Theopompus 182, 290, 291

- Theramenes 129, 213, 213n, 242, 243, 554, 558, 558n
 Theron 574
 Theseus 343, 813
 Thrasyllus 386–388, 412
 Thrasymachus 32n, 38, 47, 47n, 296, 423, 780
 Thucydides 11, 76, 126, 268, 271, 272, 274, 275, 369, 377, 379n, 382, 451, 452–453, 454, 455, 780, 801n
 Timaeus of Locri 521, 648, 780, 850
 Timaeus of Tauromenium 635, 636
 Timarchus of Athens 225n, 226n
 Timarchus of Thebes 313, 749
 Timon (character in Libanius) 803
 Timon of Phlius 232, 264, 792
 Tissaphernes 206, 290
 Trophonius 749
 Trygaeos 343, 343n
 Typhon 764n

 Valerius Maximus 19n
 Venus 763
 Victorinus 209n, 800

 Xanthippe 3n, 217, 246, 463n, 615, 615n, 616n, 648, 649–650n, 652–653, 654–655, 694, 699n, 746, 751, 778, 778n, 781, 784, 787, 789, 791, 794, 822
 Xenarchus 125, 601
 Xenocrates 167n, 202, 202n, 249, 696
 Xenophanes 5n, 170
 Xenophilus 629n
 Xenophon 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 31, 44, 46, 47, 52–53, 54n, 67, 79n, 117n, 118, 119–120, 125, 126, 127–128, 129, 130, 130n, 132–133, 134, 134n, 136, 137, 141, 142, 143, 144, 151, 156, 157, 164n, 166, 169, 173, 174, 176n, 184–185n, 187, 188, 188n, 190, 191, 200, 203, 204, 209, 210, 211, 214, 214n, 217, 222n, 231, 237–238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 245n, 247, 249, 252, 253, 254, 268, 269n, 273n, 274, 278–279, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 292, 293, 293n, 295, 295n, 300, 301–302, 303–304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 314, 316, 317, 319, 320n–321n, 330, 333, 348, 351n, 352, 358, 359, 359n, 362, 365, 370, 371, 387n, 390n, 391, 397n, 398n, 425, 435–436, 437, 438, 439, 441–442, 443, 444, 445–446n, 448, 449, 450–451, 452, 453, 454–456, 459, 460–463, 465, 466, 467–469, 470–472n, 473n, 476, 479, 481, 482, 483–485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 495, 496, 497, 498, 498n, 500–502, 503, 504, 505–506, 507, 509–510, 511, 513, 514–516, 518, 518n, 519n, 521, 522, 523n, 524n, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531–532, 533, 535, 536, 537, 539, 540–541n, 544, 545, 546–549, 550, 551–552, 553, 554, 557, 558n, 559, 564, 567, 569–572, 573, 574, 575, 577, 578–580, 581–584, 585–588, 589–591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 602, 603, 603n, 604n, 608, 612, 613, 614, 616n, 623, 624, 642, 642n, 643n, 644n, 648n, 651n, 656, 657n, 670n, 672, 673, 676n, 688, 689, 691n, 697, 704, 707, 708, 708n, 719n, 727n, 744, 750, 753, 774, 775, 779–780, 789, 791, 792, 794, 795, 796, 797, 801, 806, 808, 809, 820, 826, 827
 Xerxes 774

 Zalmoxis 824
 Zeno of Elea 170, 361
 Zeno of Citium 21, 254, 682, 683, 684–685, 686, 687, 687n, 689, 690–691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 695n, 696, 697, 698, 702, 703–704, 709n, 775, 825
 Zeno of Sidon 694
 Zethus 336, 374–375, 376, 377
 Zeus 49, 129, 135, 342, 403, 437, 692, 702, 773, 831
 Zopyrus 10, 69n, 228, 229, 229n, 287, 643, 651n, 784

Index of Modern Names

- Aalders, G.J.D. 570n, 574n
Adam, J. 153n
Adkins, A.W.H. 190, 369n, 374n, 379n
Ahbel-Rappe, S. 1n, 2n
Alesse, F. 173n, 682n, 685n, 694n, 696, 696n,
708n, 720n, 727n
Alexiou, E. 114n, 120n
Allison, J.W. 369n, 374n, 379n
Alt, K. 749n
Altman, W.H.F. 388
Altwegg, W. 141n
Alvino, M.C. 17, 31n
Ambler, W.H. 522n, 533n, 535n, 538
Ambuel, D. 96n
Anderson, D. 204n
Anderson, M. 644n
Angeli, A. 675n
Angier, T. 321n
Annas, J. 179n, 181n, 194, 412n, 502n
Apelt, O. 369n, 373n
Arieti, J.A. 31n, 40n
Aronadio, F. 164n, 390
Asmus, R. 829n
Ast, G.A.F. 252, 544n
Atkins, E.M. 707n, 709n, 710n, 715, 717, 717n,
723
Atkinson, J.E. 54n, 707n, 709n, 710n, 715,
717n
Austin, C. ix, 255n, 545n
Austin, E.A. 337n
Austin, J.L. 192
Avery, H.C. 453n
Azoulay, V. 443n, 465n, 524n, 539n, 579n

Babut, D. 360, 749n
Baer, R. 642n, 676
Bailey, C. 676
Bailly, J.A. 312n, 313n
Bakola, E. 50n
Balansard, A. 95n, 96n
Baltes, M. 760n
Bandini, M. 84n, 435n, 444n, 445n, 446n,
447n, 452n, 455n
Barabas, M. 643n
Baragwanath, E. 581n
Barceló, P. 379n

Barker, A. 623n
Barnes, J. 601n, 617
Barney, R. 112n
Barr, W. 729n, 732n
Barrus, R.M. 40n
Bartsch, S. 727n, 729n, 734n, 735n
Baumeister, T. 747n
Baynham, E.J. 406
Bearzot, C. 558n
Beatus Rhenanus 777n
Beaujeu, J. 760n
Beck, M. 753n
Bees, R. 21, 683, 683n, 685n, 687n, 688n,
690n, 691n, 692n, 694n, 695n, 697n,
698n, 700, 700n, 701n, 709n, 727n, 828n
Beierwaltes, W. 836n
Bélis, A. 626n
Bellandi, F. 727n
Benitez, E.E. 401, 402, 728n
Benjamin, A.S. 603n
Benson, H.H. 388n, 671n
Bergk, T. 36, 36n
Bernard, W. 760n
Bers, V. 440n
Berry, E.G. 118n
Bertagna, M.I. 91n
Berti, E. 100n, 114n, 626n
Bertrand, J.-M. 450n, 454n
Besnier, B. 707n
Betegh, G. 358n, 363, 364n
Bevilacqua, F. 297n, 445n, 446n, 461n, 464n,
472n, 474n
Bicknell, P.J. 649n, 655n
Bidez, J. 647n
Bielfeld, R. 343n
Biles, Z.P. 35n, 65n
Billerbeck, M. 828n
Blank, D.L. 85n, 114n, 645n
Blass, F. 142, 142n
Blondell, R. 98n, 336n
Bluck, R.S. 359, 364
Blyth, D. 389n
Böck, A. 544n
Bonazzi, M. 95n, 754
Bostock, D. 148
Bouchet, C. 112n

- Bouffartigue, J. 824n, 826n
 Bouvier, D. 51n, 66n, 70n
 Bowersock, G.W. 821n
 Bowie, E.L. 32n, 66n, 74n
 Boyancé, P. 166n
 Boys-Stones, G.R. 199n, 221n, 222n, 227,
 643n, 651n, 727n, 737n, 803n, 804n
 Bradley, P.J. 583n, 591n
 Brancacci, A. 8, 9, 91n, 93n, 107n–108n, 110n,
 112n, 113n, 119n, 141n, 144n, 149n, 164n,
 165n, 166n, 168n, 172n, 175n, 204n, 227n,
 231n, 557, 649n, 736n, 822n
 Brandis, C.A. 173n
 Brandwood, L. 394n
 Braund, S. 729n
 Bréhier, E. 647n
 Breitenbach, H.R. 435n, 441n, 521n
 Bremer, D. 296n
 Brenk, F. 774n
 Brickhouse, T.C. 216n, 300n, 494, 578n, 602n,
 638n, 671n
 Brisson, L. 11, 69n, 183n, 245n, 246n, 247n,
 248n, 250n, 251n, 253n, 265n, 301n,
 305n, 319n, 321n, 386n, 387n, 550n, 615n
 Brittain, C. 669n
 Brock, R. 31n, 338n, 339n
 Bromberg, J. 5, 6, 86n, 106n, 338n
 Brown, E. 693, 694n
 Brown, P. 820n
 Brownson, C.L. 438n
 Bruell, C. 415n, 500n
 Brunschwig, J.-L. 417n
 Budin, S. 475n
 Buermann, H. 655n
 Buffière, F. 782n
 Bultrighini, U. 547n, 551n
 Burnet, J. 223, 223n, 350n, 352n, 461, 623n,
 637n, 708n
 Burnyeat, M.F. 145n, 341n
 Bury, R.G. 544n
 Bussanich, J. 1n, 2n

 Caizzi, F. [see Decleva Caizzi]
 Calder III, W.M. 774n, 804–805, 832
 Cambiano, G. 96n
 Cameron, A. 816n
 Campbell, L. 97n, 338n
 Campos Daroca, J. 772n
 Canfora, L. 65n, 546n

 Cantarella, E. 226n
 Canto-Sperber, M. 99n, 667n, 668n, 672n
 Cappelletti, A.S. 638n
 Capra, A. 6, 40n, 51n, 52n, 53n, 68n, 69n,
 72n, 74n, 86n, 90n, 99n, 100n, 106n
 Carey, C. 35n, 40n, 46, 46n, 49, 49n, 106n,
 656n
 Carlini, A. 412n
 Carter, I.B. 369n, 374n, 375n, 377n, 378n, 381n
 Casaubon, I. 732n
 Casertano, G. 92n, 99n
 Cassio, A.C. 37n
 Caster, M. 521n
 Cave Wright, W. 228
 Centrone, B. 84n, 98n, 224n, 226n, 271n,
 624n
 Cerri, G. 277n, 351n
 Chambry, P. 436n
 Chance, T.H. 338n, 666n, 668n, 670n
 Chantraine, P. 436n, 521n
 Chappell, T.D.J. 96n
 Charalabopoulos, N.G. 31n, 40n, 69n, 72n,
 336n, 339n, 340n, 344n, 390n, 391n
 Chenet, F. 647n
 Chiaradonna, R. 826n
 Chiesara, M.L. 647n, 648n
 Chroust, A.-H. 164n, 212, 212n, 601n, 638n,
 808n
 Clark, P.M. 388
 Classen, C.J. 97n
 Clay, D. 31n, 117n, 183n, 212n
 Cobb, W.S. 313n
 Cobet, C.G. 445n
 Cohen, E. 475, 475n
 Colish, M.L. 727n
 Collins, J.H. 105n, 108n, 112n, 114n, 391n,
 666n, 668n
 Conger, G.P. 647n
 Connor, W.R. 369n, 373n
 Cooper, J.M. 244n, 403n, 417, 578n, 605n,
 617n, 708n
 Cooper, L. 31n
 Corey, D.D. 85n, 100n
 Corlu, A. 749n
 Cornarius, I. 544n
 Corradi, M. 6, 87n, 88n, 89n, 90n, 92n, 95n,
 96n, 100n
 Couat, A. 55n
 Courcelle, P.P. 502n

- Cracco Ruggini, L. 821n, 823n
 Cribiore, R. 799, 799n, 805n
 Crichton, A. 340n
 Criscuolo, U. 824n, 826n, 827n, 829n
 Croiset, A. 450n, 453n, 454n, 521n
 Cromey, R.D. 655n, 659n
 Crönert, W. 645n
 Crosby, H.L. 832
 Crosby, M. 804n, 819
 Cucchiarelli, A. 727n
 Curd, P. 296
- D'Alessandro Behr, F. 734n
 D'Annunzio, G. 224n
 da Vinci, L. 270
 Dagron, G. 820n, 826n
 Dahmen, J. 141n
 Dalfen, J. 336n, 371n, 372n, 374n, 375n, 379n
 Daly, L.J. 826n
 Danzig, G. 1n, 16, 132n, 214n, 240, 240n, 372n, 382n, 435n, 437n, 445n, 461n, 466n, 473n, 479n, 498n, 509n, 518n, 522n, 531n, 533n, 535n, 537, 538n, 539n, 541, 541n, 544n, 548n, 557n, 580n, 589n, 592n, 593, 595n
 Davidson, J. 495
 Davies, J.K. 538, 655n, 806n
 De Brasi, D. 22, 728n, 733n
 de Luise, F. 1n, 747n, 816n
 de Romilly, J. 87
 de Strycker, E. 305n, 371n
 De Vita, M.C. 25, 825n, 828n
 de Vries, G.J. 31, 31n, 113n, 338n, 505n
 Decleva Caizzi, F. 141n, 154n, 189n, 196n, 256n
 Del Corno, D. 87n
 Del Grande, C. 225
 Delatte, A. 487, 524n
 Delattre, D. 720n
 Delebecque, E. 521n, 524n, 574n
 Delfim Santos, F. 821n
 Demont, P. 96n, 438n
 Denniston, J.D. 442n
 Denyer, N. 90n, 91n, 96n, 389n, 398n
 Dessen, C.S. 727n, 732n–733n
 Destrée, P. 69n
 Devereux, D. 494
 Di Lanzo, D. 10
 Díaz de Cerio Díez, M. 91n
- Dickie, M.W. 379n
 Diels, H. ix, 35, 296
 Dienelt, K. 369n, 374n
 Dihle, A. 623n, 787
 Dillon, J.M. 748n, 774n, 847
 Dirlmeier, F. 689n
 Dittmar, H. 118n, 164n, 210n, 623n, 719, 779n
 Dixsaut, M. 222, 226n
 Dodds, E.R. 112n, 372n, 374n, 375n, 379n, 382n
 Donini, P.L. 819n
 Donlan, W. 369n, 373n
 Dorandi, T. ix, 24, 25, 174n, 253n, 645n, 670n, 683n, 696n, 788, 791n, 792n, 796n
 Döring, A. 601n
 Döring, K. 118n, 148n, 169n, 175n, 176n, 209n, 237n, 238n, 249n, 250n, 254n, 256n, 261n, 312n, 351n, 548n, 623n, 644n, 654n, 673n, 682n, 684n, 686n, 693n, 697n–699, 701, 701n, 702n, 727n, 728n, 736n, 747n, 749n
 Dorion, L.-A. 1n, 17, 84n, 86n, 119n, 187n, 214n, 237n, 239n–240n, 241n, 242n, 253n, 279, 295, 295n, 299n, 300n, 303, 305n, 348n, 425, 428n, 435n, 437, 437n, 444n, 445n, 446n, 447n, 452n, 455n, 460n–461n, 462n, 463n, 464, 464n, 465n, 470n, 471n, 472n, 473n, 475n, 477n, 478n, 481n, 484n, 487, 493, 493n, 500n, 502n, 504–505, 509n, 521n, 523n, 526n, 527n, 528n, 533n, 537, 539n, 541n, 544n, 548n, 553n, 567n, 572n, 578n, 579n, 586n, 588n, 592n, 601n, 602n, 648n, 657n, 721n
 Dornseiff, F. 544n
 Dorter, K. 353n, 354n
 Dover, K.J. 32n, 34n, 37n, 40n, 41, 41n, 48n, 50, 50n, 53n, 54, 55n, 56, 57n, 71n, 74, 74n, 131, 204n, 226n, 544n, 637n, 656n
 Downey, G. 820n, 823n
 Drachmann, A.B. 574n
 Dragonetti, C. 647n
 Drews, F. 23, 761n, 763n, 764n, 766n, 767n, 769n
 Dubel, S. 109n
 Duff, T. 748n
 Duke, E.A. 392n
 Dupréel, E. 6, 72n, 643n
 Durant, W. 195n

- Dümmler, F. 151n, 231n
 Dušanić, S. 221n, 222n, 550
 Dyck, A.R. 707n
- Ebert, T. 363n
 Edmunds, L. 31n, 33n, 40n, 50n, 52n, 55n,
 66n, 106n, 270, 371n, 415n, 551n
 Ehlers, B. 164n, 208, 208n, 779n
 Ehrenberg, V. 369n, 374n, 378n, 379n
 Eide, T. 643n
 Elm, S. 821n, 823n, 827n, 828n
 Englert, W.G. 644n, 761n, 762n, 764n
 Erbse, H. 444n, 445n
 Erler, M. 13, 31n, 69n, 99n, 337n, 338n, 341n,
 633n, 665n, 670n, 671n, 672n, 688–689n,
 690n, 691n, 719, 720n, 737n
 Esposito, A. 205n
 Estienne, H. (Stephanus) 85, 400n, 577,
 577n, 595
 Eucken, C. 107n, 112n, 115, 115n, 116n
 Everitt, B. 394n
- Fairweather, J.A. 222n
 Farinetti, G. 747n, 816n
 Ferrari, F. 94, 94n, 99n
 Festugière, A.J. 151n, 159n, 647n
 Field, G.C. 319n, 521n
 Filliozat, J. 647n
 Filonik, J. 56n
 Fine, G. 388n
 Fine, K. 332n
 Fischer, J.L. 547, 645n
 Fitton, J.W. 623n, 649n, 652n, 654n, 655n
 Flacelière, R. 544n
 Flamand, J.-M. 250n
 Flashar, H. 296n, 665n
 Fletcher, R. 638n
 Foerster, R. 229n, 803–804n, 805n, 806n
 Follet, S. 252n
 Ford, A. 602n
 Forschner, M. 691n
 Fortenbaugh, W.W. 623n, 627n, 628n
 Foucault, M. 187, 550, 633n
 Fowden, G. 827n
 Fowler, H.N. 442, 800n
 Fraenkel, E. 337n, 343n
 Franek, J. 316n
 Frangoulidis, S. 761n–762n
 Frede, D. 337n, 352n
- Frede, M. 283, 357n, 417n
 Freudenburg, K. 728n
 Friedländer, P. 99n, 305n, 313n
 Fronterotta, F. 84n, 271
 Fuller, B.A.G. 180n
 Furley, D. 362n
- Gagarin, M. 92, 100, 152n, 450n–451n
 Gaile-Irbe, A. 574n, 589n
 Gaiser, K. 69, 666, 666n, 671n
 Gallo, I. 789n–791
 Gallo, L. 555n
 Gauss, H. 371n
 Gavray, M.-A. 88, 88n, 96n, 98n
 Geffcken, J. 623n
 Geiger, R. 713n
 Geissler, P. 35n, 42n
 Gemoll, W. 544n
 Gentili, B. 545n
 Gera, D.L. 470n, 489, 521n, 582n, 583n, 594n
 Gergel, T. 449n
 Gerhard, G.A. 164n
 Gerson, L.P. 357n
 Giangiulio, M. 39n
 Giangrande, L. 545n, 546n, 551n
 Giannantoni, G. ix, 85n, 90n, 98n, 118n, 119n,
 141n, 144, 144n, 146n, 149n, 151n, 152n,
 154n, 164n, 168n, 170n, 174–175n, 221n,
 225n, 226, 227, 229n, 231n, 232, 240n,
 546n, 626n, 634, 634n, 673n, 719, 727n,
 791–792, 793, 794–797
 Giannopoulou, Z. 95n, 97n, 98n
 Gibert, J. 374n
 Gigandet, A. 707n
 Gigante, M. 674, 674n, 720n
 Gigon, O. 165n, 173n, 225, 299n, 348n, 374n,
 445n, 446n, 466, 470, 475n, 689, 689n,
 795
 Gill, C. 582n, 671n, 672n
 Giorgetti, G.P. 428n
 Giovannelli, M. 80n
 Giuliano, F.M. 90n
 Gnoli, T. 831n
 Gomperz, T. 141n, 168n, 223, 601n, 638n
 Gonzalez, F.J. 210n, 670n, 671n, 672n
 Gooch, P.W. 31n
 Görgemanns, H. 666n
 Görler, W. 686n
 Gosling, J.C.B. 491

- Goulet, R. 251n, 254n, 821n
 Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 240n, 249n, 256n, 257n, 258n, 828n
 Gourinat, J.-B. 98n, 582n, 701n
 Gotteland, S. 121n
 Gower, O.S.L. 353n, 354n, 355n
 Graham, D.W. 350n, 357n, 639n
 Gray, V.J. 119n, 371n, 436n, 437n, 445n, 447n, 449n, 460, 460n, 461n, 462, 470n, 477n, 478n, 481n, 482n, 489, 490, 500n, 507n, 518n, 544n, 545n, 558n, 566, 567n, 582n, 586n, 670n, 673n
 Greene, W.C. 31n, 32n, 338n
 Grewe, N. 770n
 Grey, W.R. 35n–36n, 55, 55n
 Gribble, D. 216n
 Griffin, M. 829n, 836n, 848
 Griffin, M.T. 707n, 709n, 710n, 715, 717, 717n, 723
 Grote, D. 375n
 Grote, G. 173n, 180n, 182, 184n, 185n, 193n, 195n, 198, 223, 223n, 225, 412
 Guidorizzi, G. 87n
 Gummere, R.M. 228, 736n
 Guthrie, W.K.C. 229n
- Haake, M. 655n
 Hackforth, R. 350n, 355n
 Hägg, T. 787
 Halbfass, W. 647n
 Halliwell, S. 32n, 35n, 54n, 70n, 337n, 428n, 545, 602n
 Halperin, D. 413n
 Hankins, J. 578n
 Hansen, G.C. 636n
 Hansen, M.H. 547n
 Hardy, J. 692, 692n
 Harrison, A.R.W. 655n
 Harrison, S.J. 760n, 761n
 Hartlich, P. 666, 666n, 667n
 Harvey, D. 35n
 Hathaway, R.F. 836n, 839n
 Hatzfeld, J. 574n
 Hawtrey, R.S.W. 339n, 341n, 668n
 Hayhoe, J. 707n
 Heath, M. 32n, 35n, 49n, 54n, 782n
 Heiberg, J.L. 623n, 629n, 644n, 646n
 Heidel, W.A. 423n
 Heitsch, E. 381n, 728n
- Helm, J.J. 51n
 Helmig, C. 844n
 Henderson, J. 371n, 739n
 Henkelman, W.F.M. 643n
 Henrichsen, A.J.F. 544n
 Henry, M. 779n
 Hermann, K.F. 544n
 Hershbell, J.P. 693n, 746n, 755, 820n
 Hesk, J. 419n, 423n
 Heßler, J.E. 20, 667n, 674n, 675n, 676n, 677n, 678n
 Hicks, R.D. 697, 792n, 808n
 Higgins, W.F. 127n, 591n
 Hijmans, B.L. 760n
 Hill, J. 110n
 Hindley, C. 544n
 Hirzel, R. 567n
 Hobden, F. 18n, 579n, 586n, 593n
 Hobein, H. 231n
 Hock, R.F. 231n
 Hogenmüller, B. 437n, 704n
 Hoinski, D. 354n
 Höistad, R. 141n, 142n
 Hönigswald, R. ■ please add page refs
 Hooley, D.M. 176n
 Hordern, J.H. 126, 126n
 Horn, C. 350n, 363n
 Hornblower, S. 372n, 379n, 452, 452n, 551
 Hourcade, A. 450n
 Huart, P. 827n
 Huffman, C.A. 623n, 626n, 627n, 628n, 629n, 630n, 633n, 635n, 645n, 650n, 655n, 784n, 793
 Hug, A. 544n
 Humbert, J. 118n, 221, 225, 226n, 227, 232
 Humble, N. 19, 438n, 445n, 505n, 554n, 581n, 583n, 588n, 589n, 591n
 Hume, D. 125
 Hunter, R.L. 86n
 Huss, B. 119n, 545, 545n, 546n, 548n, 551n, 700n
 Hornblower, S. 372n, 379n, 452, 452n, 551
 Husson, S. 257n
 Hutchinson, D.S. 114n, 403, 403n
 Huby, P.M. 388
- Iannucci, A. 547n
 Ihm, S. 789n
 Ildefonse, F. 90n, 91n

- Imperio, O. 66n, 86n
 Inverso, H. 202n
 Inwood, B. 682n, 714n
 Ioppolo, A.M. 68n, 685n
 Iozzia, D. 161n
 Irwin, T.H. 375n, 382n, 601n, 619n
 Isnardi Parente, M. 163n, 167n

 Jackson, R. 839n
 Jacoby, F. 638n
 Jaeger, W. 185n, 187n, 375n, 552n, 647n, 827n
 Janko, R. 58n, 216n, 360n
 Jansen, J. 585, 585n, 593n
 Jansen, L. 334n
 Jedrkiewicz, S. 12, 301n, 305, 306n, 312n
 Joël, K. 141n, 152n, 601n, 623n
 Johnson, D.M. 1n, 16, 370n, 461n, 468n, 479n, 491, 502n, 509n, 553n, 579n, 582n, 583n, 587n, 592n, 594n, 595n
 Johnson, M. 114n, 401
 Johnson, R. 117n
 Johnson, S. 136
 Johnston, S. 473n, 474
 Johnstone, C.L. 450n
 Jordan, M.D. 669n
 Jordović, I. 13, 14, 322n, 371n
 Jowett, B. 69, 70n, 78n, 338n, 345
 Joyal, M.A. 299n, 302n, 312n, 314, 316n
 Judeich, W. 548n
 Just, R. 655n

 Kahlos, M. 816n
 Kahn, C.H. 127n, 129, 133, 151n, 179n, 181n, 208, 208n, 210n, 211n, 212n, 221n, 229n, 232, 351n, 373n, 381n, 382n, 579n, 601n, 602n, 668n, 671n, 672n
 Kaibel, G. 42, 42n
 Kamtekar, R. 1n, 2n
 Kanayama, Y. 363n
 Karasmanēs, V. 1n
 Karavites, P. 31n, 74
 Karttunen, K. 647n
 Kassel, R. ix
 Keaney, J. 782n
 Kechagia, E. 665n, 754, 755n
 Kecskeméti, J. 578n
 Kennedy, G.A. 823n
 Kerferd, G.B. 40n, 84n, 442, 442n, 665n, 691n
 Keulen, W.H. 761, 762n, 763n

 King, J.E. 711n, 818n
 Kinzig, W. 635n, 650n
 Kirchner, J. 559
 Kirwan, C. 149n
 Kißel, W. 728n, 729n, 730n, 732n, 733n, 734n, 739n, 740n
 Klosko, G. 382n
 Koch, T. 88, 88n
 Kofsky, A. 647n
 Kohan, W.O. 93n
 Konstan, D. 31n, 66n, 74, 75, 86n, 277n, 720n, 782n
 Kopff, E.C. 34n, 48n, 65n
 Kopperschmidt, J. 342n
 Körte, A. 544n
 Krafft, P. 760n
 Kranz, W. ix
 Kraut, R. 756n
 Kronenberg, I. 214n
 Krumeich, R. 343n
 Kuhn, H. 336n
 Kukula, R.C. 728n
 Kurihara, Y. 388n, 728n

 Labarbe, J. 649n, 652n, 655n
 Labriola, I. 829n
 Lacey, W.K. 655n
 Lachance, G. 518n
 Lacrosse, J. 647n
 Lakmann, M.L. 760n
 Laks, A. 5n, 74n, 296, 351n
 Lamagna, M. 559n
 Lamb, W.R.M. 428n
 Lamberton, R. 782n
 Lämmle, R. 343n
 Lampe, K. 312n
 Lännström, A. 299n, 300n
 Lape, S. 655n
 Lateiner, D. 369n
 Layne, D. 26
 Lee, E.N. 95n
 Lee, G. 729n, 732n
 Lee, M.-K. 93n
 Leeman, A.D. 715n
 Lefèvre, E. 695n, 709n
 Lehnert, G. 141n
 Lennox, J.G. 330n, 357, 357n, 363n
 Leo, F. 623n, 628n
 Lesses, G. 550n

- Levet, J.-P. 105n
 Levine Gera, D. 208n
 Lévy, C. 707, 707n, 711, 711n, 714n, 715, 716, 724
 Lévystone, D. 141n, 150n, 154n
 Liddell, H.G. ix
 Link, S. 556n
 Littlewood, C. 728n, 729n
 Littman, R.J. 727n
 Livingstone, N. 111n
 Lombardo, M. 546n
 Lombardo, S. 719n
 Long, A.A. 187n, 189n, 296, 304n, 316n, 349n, 671n, 672n, 674n, 682, 682n, 683, 683n, 687, 687n, 692n, 693, 693n, 695n, 701n, 702, 702n, 703n, 727n, 744, 744n, 749
 Long, A.G. 92n, 94n, 95n, 99n
 López Cruces, J.L. 772n
 Luccioni, J. 521n, 524n
 Ludwig, P.W. 371n
 Lupo, C. 651n
 Luz, M. 109n
 Lycos, K. 839n

 MacDonald, J. 31n
 MacDowell, D.M. 37, 506n, 655n
 Macgregor Morris, I. 773n
 Machiavelli, N. 571n
 Macleod, M.D. 440, 442, 443, 445, 445n, 448, 578n
 MacNaghten, R.E. 299n
 Mader, M. 31, 31n
 Magalhães-Vilhena, V. 521n
 Maffi, A. 162n
 Maier, H. 444n, 601n, 623n, 651n
 Maisano, R. 816n, 823n
 Malherbe, A. 216n
 Mallet, A. 648n
 Mann, W. 194n, 180n, 181n, 194n
 Männlein-Robert, I. 412n
 Mansfeld, J. 412, 412n, 623n
 Manuwald, B. 90n, 92n, 336n
 Marchant, E.C. 449, 468n, 476n, 500n, 507n, 508n
 Marccone, A. 831n
 Marcovich, M. 271
 Markowski, H. 804, 804n, 807n, 808n, 812n
 Marmodoro, A. 110n
 Marmorale, E.V. 738n

 Marshal, E. 380n
 Mársico, C. 153n, 204n, 216n, 319n
 Marx, F. 165, 165n
 Marzluf, P. 111n
 Masaracchia, A. 114n, 828n
 Mathieu, G. 131
 Mazzara, G. 151n
 Mazzarino, S. 558n
 McAdon, B. 113n
 McCabe, M.M. 98n
 McCoy, M. 293n
 McLean, D. 643n, 784n
 McPartland, K. 93n
 McPherran, M.L. 300n, 317n, 322, 328, 329, 330, 610n, 648n
 McQueen, E.I. 222n, 223n
 Medda, E. 286n
 Meier, C. 380n
 Menchelli, M. 119n
 Menn, S. 349n, 360n
 Merlan, P. 184n
 Mesk, J. 808n
 Mhire, J.J. 56n
 Michelini, A.N. 39n, 53n, 108n, 112n, 336n, 340n, 666n, 670n, 672n, 673n
 Miller, M. 337n
 Miller, P.A. 51n, 734n
 Miller, W. 709n, 710n
 Millet, P. 215n
 Milnes, W. 541n
 Minar, E.L. 623n
 Moles, J.L. 109n, 823n
 Momigliano, A. 559, 623n, 626n, 627n, 628n
 Montiglio, S. 115n
 Montuori, M. 221n, 223, 223n, 224n, 225, 226n
 Moore, C. 17, 32n, 39n, 53n, 65n, 145n, 158n, 188n, 200n, 237n, 245n, 297n, 445n, 447n, 459n, 466n, 502, 502n, 511, 517, 517n, 544n, 587n, 613, 623n, 678n, 797n, 829n
 Morgan, K.A. 155, 155n
 Morrison, D.R. 1n, 2n, 351n, 493n, 497, 500n, 502n, 509n, 521n, 567n, 579n, 584n, 585n, 589n, 657n, 658n, 671n
 Morrison, J.S. 453n
 Mosconi, G. 547
 Most, G. 296
 Mullach, F.W.A. 141n, 154n, 170n

- Müller, C.W. 387n, 390
 Müller, J. 13, 363n
 Müller, K. 626n, 629n
 Muller, R. 169n, 263n, 448n
 Münscher, K. 803n, 804n, 806n
 Münstermann, H. 761n
 Mura, G. 755n
 Muramoto, O. 644n
 Murgatroyd, P. 760n
 Murphy, D.J. 7, 109n, 119n, 121n, 297n, 642n
 Murray, O. 546n
 Musti, D. 546n, 547, 551n

 Nafissi, M. 546n
 Nails, D. 11n, 85n, 221n, 241n, 246n, 413n,
 460n, 463n, 465n, 470n, 471n, 472n,
 477n, 478n, 616n, 649n, 655n
 Napolitano, M. 87n
 Narcy, M. 69n, 95n, 97n, 107n, 339n, 447n,
 450n, 451n, 454n, 455n, 461n, 496, 579n,
 645n, 791n, 794, 795n
 Nardi, T. 653n
 Natali, C. 515n
 Natorp, P. 163n, 209n
 Navia, L.E. 149n, 151n
 Nee, L.D. 522n, 538n, 539n
 Nehamas, A. 601n, 618n, 619n
 Nesselrath, H.-G. 2n, 805n, 806n, 809n, 812n
 Nestle, W. 111n, 369n, 374n
 Neuhausen, H. 147n
 Newell, W.R. 572n
 Nicolai, R. 113n
 Nietzsche, F. 171, 643n
 Nightingale, A.W. 32n, 40n, 55n, 69n, 114n,
 293n, 336n, 425
 Nikitinski, H. 734n
 Noack, L. 687n
 North, H. 187n, 370n, 372n, 505n, 640n
 Notomi, N. 40n, 84n, 106n

 O'Brien, D. 517n
 O'Brien, M.C. 760n, 762
 O'Connor, D.K. 185n, 196, 370n
 O'Meara, D.J. 825n
 O'Neill, W. 836n
 O'Reagan, D. 32n, 49n
 O'Sullivan, L. 646n, 655n
 Ober, J. 114n, 371n, 372n, 373n, 379n, 380n,
 381n, 382n

 Oehler, K. 176n
 Ogden, D. 655n
 Oldfather, W. 774n
 Ollier, F. 436n, 544n, 552n
 Olson, S.D. 32n, 76n
 Opsomer, J. 754, 755-756

 Pageau St. Hilaire, A. 412n
 Pangle, T.L. 522, 522n, 531n, 533n, 545n
 Palpacelli, L. 112n, 338n, 339n
 Palumbo, L. 100n, 632n, 719n
 Papageorgiou, N. 37, 37n, 106n
 Parker, H. 776n
 Parker, L.P.E. 32n, 35n
 Parmentier, L. 221n, 224n, 226
 Partridge, J. 299n, 302n, 304n
 Patzer, A. 33n, 42, 42n, 44, 44n, 55n, 64n,
 107n, 141n, 142n, 144n, 154n, 277n, 361n,
 365n, 578n, 623n, 625n, 628n, 636n,
 638n, 639n, 642n, 644n, 808n
 Pearson, L. 626n
 Pecorella Longo, C. 546, 547, 547n
 Pelling, C. 746n, 748n, 750, 751, 754n
 Pembroke, S.G. 691, 691n
 Pendrick, G.J. 449n, 450n, 453n
 Penella, R.J. 818, 819, 821-822, 823n
 Penner, T. 601n
 Peterson, S. 14, 273n, 278n, 281, 281n, 282n,
 289n, 291n, 293n, 297n, 320n, 387n,
 415n, 425, 602n
 Petrie, R. 31n
 Philip, J.A. 626n
 Phillips, J. 502n
 Piccirilli, L. 555
 Pieters, J.T.M. 35n
 Pinto, M. 105n
 Pirrotta, S. 46n, 453n
 Platter, C. 51n, 66n
 Pinkster, H. 715n
 Pohlenz, M. 638n, 682, 682n, 696n
 Polanyi, K. 462, 462n
 Polleichtner, W. 338n
 Pomeroy, S.B. 521n
 Pontier, P. 15, 119n, 440n, 548n, 556n, 579n,
 592n
 Popper, K.R. 558n
 Post, L.A. 338n
 Poulakos, T. 105n, 111n
 Pownall, F. 210n

- Preller, L. 222, 225
 Press, G.A. 110n
 Prince, S.H. 8n, 107n, 141n, 571n
 Prior, W.J. 84n, 671n
 Pucci, P. 301n–303, 304n, 437n
- Raaflaub, K.A. 378n, 379n, 380n
 Rabbås, Ø. 332n, 333, 334n
 Radermacher, L. 141n
 Rademaker, A. 87n, 370n, 372n, 373n, 375n
 Radke, G. 769n
 Raimondi, M. 823n
 Rangos, S. 836n
 Rankin, H.D. 179n, 180n, 182n, 141n, 149n, 155n
 Rapaport, A. 544n
 Raubitschek, A.E. 39n
 Reale, G. 179n, 221n
 Rechenauer, G. 296n
 Reckford, K.J. 49, 50n, 728n, 737n, 740n
 Redfield, J.M. 7, 98n
 Remer, G. 707n, 714n
 Renaud, F. 22, 202n, 389n, 712n, 715n, 719n, 720n, 722n, 723n, 728n
 Revermann, M. 70n, 76
 Rhodes, P.J. 547n
 Ribbing, S. 299n
 Riddell, J. 51n
 Ries, K. 114n
 Riginos, A. 86n, 107n, 238n, 251n, 430n
 Robin, L. 221, 222n, 224, 224n, 226n, 228n, 601n
 Robinson, R. 322, 323, 323n, 328, 330, 332n
 Robinson, T.M. 100n, 550n
 Röck, H. 149n
 Roeper, G. 252n
 Roochnik, D. 111n, 321n
 Rose, G.P. 51n
 Rose, H.J. 773n
 Rosen, R.M. 35n, 54n
 Rosenmeyer, T.G. 59n
 Roskam, G. 23, 316n, 697n, 720n, 745n, 747n, 748n, 749n, 750, 756, 820n
 Ross, W.D. 351n, 352n, 601n, 618
 Rossetti, L. 1n, 11, 12, 68n, 86n, 90n, 127, 127n, 132n, 137, 164n, 205n, 210n, 211, 211n, 221n, 224n, 225, 226n, 227, 227n, 228n, 229n, 230, 268n, 269n, 270n, 273n, 277n, 285n, 287n, 295n, 296n, 297n, 320n, 322n, 378n, 415n, 502n, 546n, 547, 579n, 582n, 623n, 624n, 636n, 643n, 645n, 656n, 672n, 673n, 739n
- Roth, P. 114n, 116n
 Roubinet, C. 715
 Rowe, C.J. 222n, 223n, 353n, 355n, 380n, 582n, 584n, 651n, 721n, 727n, 737n, 803n, 804n
 Ruch, M. 715
 Ruffel, I. 35n
 Russell, D.A. 782n, 805, 805n, 807n, 808n, 809n, 811n, 812n
 Rusten, J. 32n, 35n, 37, 37n, 40n, 54n
 Rutherford, R.B. 371n
- Saetta Cottone, R. 5n, 351n
 Sandbach, F.H. 521n
 Sandridge, N.B. 467, 482n, 586n
 Sandstad, P. 12, 330n, 332n
 Sandy, G. 760n
 Sandys, J. 119n
 Santas, G.X. 322, 322n, 325, 326, 327, 328
 Sarri, F. 221n
 Sartori, F. 547
 Sassi, M.M. 80n
 Saxonhouse, A. 31n
 Sayre, F. 254n, 256n, 684n
 Sayre, K. 210n
 Schein, S. 204n
 Scheurer, S. 343n
 Schiappa, E. 88, 88n, 105n
 Schlam, C.C. 760n
 Schmekel, A. 694
 Schmid, W. 623n, 671n
 Schmitz, M. 769n
 Schneider, J.G. 544n
 Schneider, J.-P. 251n
 Schneider, M. 678n
 Schofield, M. 381n, 382n, 589n, 702, 702n, 713n
 Scholz, P. 369n, 373n
 Scholz, U.W. 728n
 Schöpsdau, K. 345
 Schorn, S. 570n, 579n, 584n, 623n, 625n, 627n, 629n, 631n, 632n, 634n, 636n, 644n, 645n, 655n, 793
 Schramm, M. 820n, 826n
 Schrieff, A. 85n
 Schuller, W. 379n

- Schulze, W. 343, 343n
 Schweingruber, F. 701n
 Scobie, A. 761n
 Scott, D. 99n
 Scott, G.A. 93n, 204n
 Scott, R.A. ix, 77n, 412n, 428, 436, 437n,
 549n, 652n, 721n
 Sealey, R. 655n
 Sedlar, J.W. 647n
 Sedley, D. 386n
 Seel, G. 580n
 Segoloni, L.M. 31n, 37n, 64n, 545n
 Sellars, J. 231, 231n
 Senn, S. 316n
 Serrano Cantarín, R. 91n
 Setaioli, A. 749n
 Shaw, J.C. 375n
 Shero, L.R. 437n
 Shorey, P. 111n, 112n
 Sidwell, K. 32n, 35n
 Slings, S. 305n, 666n, 667n, 669n, 671n, 673n
 Smith, A. 625n, 626n, 630n, 631n, 632, 635,
 638, 641, 645, 652n, 836n
 Smith, C.F. 378n
 Smith, N.D. 1n, 2n, 20, 216n, 300n, 494, 578n,
 602n, 671
 Smith, W.S. 765n
 Smyth, H.W. 412n, 413n
 Sohlberg, D. 459n
 Solana, J. 84n
 Sommerstein, A.H. 40n, 54n, 65n, 77n
 Sonnabend, H. 623n
 Souilhé, J. 412
 Sprague, R.K. 341, 713n
 Stalley, R. 550n
 Stavru, A. 1, 20, 64n, 86n, 157n, 228n, 297n,
 348n, 365n, 459n, 479n, 509n, 515n,
 519n, 611n, 643n, 651n, 654n, 678n, 704n
 Ste. Croix, G.E.M. 56, 56n
 Steel, C. 364, 838n, 844n
 Steffen, W. 342n, 343n
 Steinmetz, P. 686n, 696n
 Stenzel, J. 176n, 619
 Steven, K. 783n
 Stevens, J.A. 214n, 522, 522n, 531n, 538n,
 539n, 540n, 541n
 Stokes, M. 435n
 Storey, I.C. 32n–33n, 34n, 35n, 38–39n, 40n,
 42, 42n–45n, 46n, 47n, 48n
 Strauss, L. 17, 214n, 465n, 467n, 479n, 509n,
 521, 522, 529n, 530, 531, 531n, 532, 533n,
 535n, 537, 538, 540, 540n, 541n, 564, 565,
 567, 568, 568n, 569, 570
 Stuart, D.R. 623n
 Stuart Jones, H. ix
 Sudhaus, S. 112n
 Suvák, V. 8, 110n
 Swain, S. 826n
 Swift Riginos, A. 86n, 107n, 238n, 251n
 Swoboda, H. 548n
 Szlezák, T.A. 111n, 338n, 342n, 668n, 671n
 Taki, A. 836n
 Talamo, C. 546, 546n, 547
 Talbot, E. 436n
 Tamiolaki, M. 461n, 482n, 579n
 Taormina, D.P. 99n
 Taplin, O. 342n, 343n
 Tarán, L. 387n
 Tarrant, H. 15, 32n, 39n, 53n, 116n, 198, 198n,
 199, 313n, 320n, 386n, 389n, 393, 393n,
 401, 404n, 406, 407, 708n, 720n, 728n,
 756n, 836n, 839n, 850
 Taylor, A.E. 350n, 601n, 618n, 619n
 Taylor, C.C.W. 84n, 491
 Tell, H. 33n, 50n, 85n, 105n
 Testard, M. 709n
 Thesleff, H. 111n, 115n, 116n, 389n, 544n
 Thierry, P. 77
 Thompson, D.B. 232n
 Thompson, H. 232n
 Thomsen, O. 544n
 Thornton, B. 199n
 Tilman, V. 638n
 Timmerman, D. 105n
 Tola, F. 647n
 Too, Y.L. 522n
 Tougher, S. 829n, 830n
 Trabattoni, F. 90n, 98n, 313n
 Trampedach, K. 379n, 380n, 381n, 382n
 Trapp, M. 1n, 2n, 24, 772n, 776n, 777n, 782n,
 784n, 785n
 Trivigno, F.V. 39n, 53n
 Tsouna, V. 182, 182n, 185n, 190n, 196n, 675n
 Tulli, M. 69n, 86n, 92n, 113n, 550n
 Tuozzo, T.M. 502, 518n, 550n
 Tuplin, C. 18n, 579n, 583n, 586n, 593n
 Turner, E.G. 790, 791

- Ueberweg, F. 687n
 Urstad, K. 9, 199n, 219n
 Usener, S. 113n, 667n
 Usher, M.D. 31n

 Valgimigli, M. 224n, 226n
 van Berkel, T.A. 88n, 470n, 474n
 van der Paardt, R. Th. 762, 765n
 van Mal-Maeder, D. 760n
 Vander Waerdt, P. 51n, 68, 68n, 351n, 435n, 437n
 Vanderspoel, J. 820n, 823n
 Vasiliou, I. 31n
 Vegetti, M. 126n, 127n
 Vela Tejada, J. 544n
 Verde, F. 161n
 Verdegem, S. 748n, 756
 Vickers, M. 32n
 Vidal Naquet, P. 555, 556n
 Visconti, A. 626n
 Vlastos, G. 2n, 31n, 56n, 202n, 299n, 312n, 322, 323, 324, 324n, 328, 330, 350n, 443n, 601n, 618, 619, 633n, 671n, 721n, 837, 849
 Vogel, F. 637n
 von Albrecht, M. 697n
 von Arnim, H. ix, 141n, 173n, 439n, 445n
 von Fritz, K. 170, 171–172, 174–176n, 221n, 223, 228
 von Jan, K. 624n, 629n
 von Loewenclau, I. 210n
 von Mess, A. 623n, 628n, 629n, 642n, 645n, 654n, 655n
 von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, U. 544n, 557n

 Wallace, R.W. 440n
 Ward, J. Jr. 394n
 Wareh, T. 105n
 Warne, C. 322n, 325n
 Warren, J. 755, 755n
 Wassermann, F.M. 374n
 Waterfield, R. 580n, 601n
 Watson, J. 179n

 Wehrli, F. 128n, 132, 623n, 624n, 626n, 627n, 628n–629n, 630n–632n, 634, 635, 637, 638, 640, 641, 645–646, 649, 650, 653, 656, 669n, 788, 793
 Weiske, B.G. 544n
 Wessels, A. 343n
 Westerink, L.G. 749n, 836n
 Westman, R. 755n
 White, N.P. 722n
 White, S. 627n
 Wiesner, J. 450n
 Wiggins, D. 363n
 Wilcox, S. 109n, 114n
 Wilkins, E.G. 502n
 Wilkins, J. 35n
 Winckelmann, A.G. 338n
 Winiarczyk, M. 88n
 Wink-Yagmur, J. 678n
 Witte, B. 113n
 Wolf, E. 164n
 Wolff, A. 655n
 Wolfsdorf, D. 31n
 Wood, E.M. 63n
 Wood, N. 63n
 Woodbury, L. 57n, 616n, 623n, 629n, 638n, 650n, 652n, 655n
 Woodruff, P. 100n, 152n, 300n

 Yunis, H. 113n

 Zambon, M. 829n
 Zanker, P. 31n, 69, 69n
 Zeller, E. 128, 149n, 163n, 166n, 180n, 623n, 638n, 655n, 836n
 Zeppi, S. 339n
 Zhmud, L. 627n
 Zilioli, U. 1n, 118n
 Zimmermann, B. 339n, 343n, 572n, 623n, 624n, 807n
 Zoll, G. 715n
 Zuckert, C.H. 55n, 314n
 Zuolo, F. 18, 552n, 574n